7TH INFANTRY DIVISION
7TH MEDICAL BATTALION
X CORPS
NORTHEAST KOREA
THE LOSS MAJOR OREN C. ATCHLEY, MEDICAL SERVICE CORPS
COMMANDING OFFICER, 7TH MEDICAL BATTALION, 7TH INFANTRY DIVISION
24 NOVEMBER 1950
The following Command Report, 7th Medical Battalion, for December 1950 provides a unique view into the events surrounding the loss of Maj. Oren C. Atchley, MSC, Commanding Officer, 7th Medical Battalion, 7th Infantry Division, in late November 1950. It is unusual to have such detailed information on the loss of not only Maj. Atchley but also of Sgt. Leonard Jefferson Smith, Jr., and then Pvt. Richard L. Stuck, all of the 7th Medical Battalion, and Cpl. Albert Williams, medic, assigned to the 560th Ambulance Company but then attached to the 7th Medical Battalion. The wounding of Pvt. Harry J. Mayfield, ambulance driver, 560th Ambulance Company, is also described in detail as are the actions of Sgt. Robert L. Kemble, Ambulance Company, 7th Medical Battalion, who also accompanied Maj. Atchley’s patrol. Both Sgt. Kemble and Pvt. Mayfield were reported missing in action (MIA) and were later returned to U.S. military control, Kemble on 29 November and Mayfield on the 30th. Captain Robert S. O’Hern, MSC, battalion adjutant, provides detailed information in the following reports on the missing battalion commander and his detailed debriefing of Sgt. Robert L. Kemble. For his actions during this patrol, Maj. Atchley (promoted to Lt. Col. on 10 December 1950) was awarded a posthumous Distinguished Service Cross (DSC) (see Incl II to Command Report below).
John T. Greenwood, Ph.D.
Senior Contract Historian
Gray & Associates LC
Office of Medical History
Office of The Surgeon General, U.S. Army
Falls Church, Virginia
HEADQUARTERS 7TH MEDICAL BATTALION
APO # 7, c/o Postmaster
San Francisco, California
7
January 1951
SUBJECT: Command Report for the Month of December1950
TO : Commanding General
7thInfantry Division
APO 7
Attn: G-3 Historian
1.MISSION: Division Medical Service including:
a. Evacuation of Unit MedicalInstallations.
b.Operation of the Division ClearingStation.
c. Dental Service for an InfantryDivision.
2.EVACUATION AND OPERATION OF UNIT MEDICAL INSTALLATIONS:
Duringthe early days of December the evacuation of Unit Medical Installationswasdifficult, due to the long haul by ambulance. The foremost ClearingStation waslocated at Kapsan in support of the 17th Regimental Combat Team, someelementsof which were located at Hyesanjin. The Route of Evacuation was overthe MSRfrom Hyesanjin to Kapsan, a distance of approximately 40 miles. FromKapsan theEvacuation continued to Pungsan a distance of approximately 42 roadmiles,where a second Clearing Platoon was located in support of some elementsof the31st and 32nd Infantry Regiments. From there the Evacuation continuedovermountainous and rough terrain to Pukchong an approximate distance of 68miles.The Clearing Platoon located at Pukehong was further evacuated by RailandAmbulance to the 121st Evacuation Hospital located in the Hamhung andHungnamarea, a distance of approximately 80 miles.
Duringone phase of this Evacuation one ambulance carrying seven patients wasreportedlost but later reported safely into the 121st Evacuation Hospital,however,during the interim period a search was conducted which resulted in theloss ofthe Battalion Commander and four Enlisted men. (See inclosures I and II)
2
CommandReport, 7th Med Bn, for the month of Dec 1950, cont’d.
3.FURTHER EVACUATION: For further Evacuation, Operation of ClearingStation,Dental Service, Supply and Operations see inclosures III through IX.
FORTHE COMMANDING OFFICER:
[signed]
JOHNP. RILEY JR.
Major,MSC
S-39 Incls: See Index
1stInd
SUBJECT:Command Report
HEADQUARTERS7th Medical Battalion, APO 7, 9 January 1951
TO:Commanding General, 7th Infantry Division, APO 7, Attn: G-3
1.The undersigned feels that a closer relationship should be establishedbetweenthe special divisional staff heads and the Medical Battalion CO,especiallyadvance knowledge on movement operations so as to give advance thoughtand considerationsin planning proper medical support and evacuation of war casualties.Advancenotice of troop movements and terrain study is most essential inanticipatingnatural drift lines.
2.Operation of one of the Clearing Platoons has been crippled somewhatbecause ofthe lack of major items of equipment such as, autoclave, generator,organictransportation, kitchen, etc.
3.Concur with the reports of the various company commanders and sectionheads ofthis battalion and feel the organizations are functioning with maxiralefficiency and in keeping with high standards both tactically andprofessionally as expected of them.
ROBERTS. BUDGE
Major MC
Commanding
9Incls:
n/c
3
Indexto Inclosnres of Command Report of 7th Medical Battalion for the monthofDecember 1950
InclI: MIA Report on Battalion Commander, 7th Medical Battalion
InclII: Report of Personnel Missing in Action.
InclIII: Organizational Chart.
InclIV: Report, Clearing Company, 7th Medical Battalion.
InclV: Report, Ambulance Company, 7th Medical Battalion.
InclVI: Report, Headquarters & headquarters Company, 7th MedicalBattalion. [Ed.— following enclosures withdrawn]
Incl VII: Report, Battalion Supply Office, 7th Medical Battalion.
Incl VIII: Report, Medical Supply Office, 7th Medical Battalion.
Incl IX: Report, Dental Service, 7th Medical Battalion.
Incl I
DISPOSITION FORM
SUBJECT MIA Report on Bn CO, 7th Med Bn
TO Surgeon, 7th Inf Div
FROM CO, 7th Med Bn, APO 7
DATE: 28 Nov 50
1. The following is a chronological account of the facts and circumstances surrounding the MIA Casualty Report submitted on Major Oren C. Atchley, Oxxxxx, MSC; 3 EM 7th Medical Battalion and 2 EM 560th Amb Co (atched this orgn), as requested for Lt Col Rowan, Deputy Chief of Staff, 7th Infantry Division, by Major Keen, AG. All map references are Korea 1: 250,000.
2. On 23 November 1950, at approximately 1900 hours, Cpl Simmons, an ambulance driver from the 560th Ambulance Co, (atched this Hq) reported to me that he left the 1st Platoon Clearing Station, this battalion, located at Kapsan, DA4148, at approximately 1430 hours and he knew that ambulance #A-24, same organization, had departed from the same station approximately one hour earlier but as yet had not arrive at its destination: 2d Platoon Clearing Station, located at Pukchong, DV 4255. I directed him to report this fact to Lt Arthur Warren, his platoon commander and that if he had any difficulty in doing so to report back to me.
3. Lt Warren in receiving this information conferred with Captain Lindquist, Ambulance Company Commander, this battalion and it was determined that the Ambulance leaving Kapsan had stopped at the 3d Platoon Clearing Station located at Pungsan DA2817 for medical care for the patient load it was carrying. This was a routine practice. The two officers decided to wait for a few hours to see if the ambulance would show up.
4. At approximately 2200 hours that date, I received a call from the battalion Commander, Major Oren C. Atchley, Oxxxxx, MSC, at advance 7th Med Bn CP at Pungsan and I asked him if he knew the whereabouts of the missing ambulance. He did not, but sent a Sgt from his CP over to the Clearing Station to inquire if they knew. I called back within the half hour and Major Atchley informed me the ambulance had departed that station at approximately 1400 hours and should have arrived at Pukchong by 1800 or 1900 hours. He directed me to dispatch an ambulance with extra litters, blankets, and aid man to proceed towards Pungsan and cover the mountainous route in search of the missing ambulance. He stated he was sending a similar party from Pungsan to cover the route from that direction and also the road leading off into the 31st RCT area which the lost ambulance could possibly have taken. The two searching parties were to meet at the MP Station on top of the mountain and report their results. At 0430 24 November 1950 I received a call from the MP officer at the mountain top, stating the two searching parties were there and had not been able locate the missing ambulance. I directed him to send both to the forward CP at Pungsan and I would inform Major Atchley they were coming. The MP officer also informed me that a search had been made as far as the 121st Evacuation Hospital at Hamhung, CV7518, without favorable results
[2]
5.At approximately 0830 24 November 1950, Major Atchley called me andsaid he wastaking a party consisting of an ambulance, his jeep, and five (5) otherpersons, extra food, arms and ammunition, blankets, splints and medicalequipment in search of the missing ambulance. He stated he would leavePungsanproceeding on the MSR to South in the direction of Hwangsuwon-ni(Kosuiin-ri)DA2505 and take the right fork in the road south of this town to thewest bysouthwest direction to Untaek (Untan) DV1398 and in the generalvicinity of the31st RCT area.6. The division surgeon informed our forward CP at 1500 hours 24 November 50, to the effect that the lost ambulance had reported into the 121st Evacuation Hospital at Hamhung, discharged its patient load and was on the way back to Pukchong. All concerned were notified.
7. Repeated check with the forward CP was made during the night and the following day 25 November 1950 but no word was heard of Major Atchley’s search party. Presuming he was following the route of the lost ambulance it was momentarily expected that we would have word from him either at Hamhung or he would arrive at Pukchong.
8. The evening of 25 November 1950 I called the Operations Section, Surgeon’s Office, X Corps, and informed Colonel Gorby, Corps Surgeon, that we had received no word from Major Atchley and would he please had check with the medical units in the vicinity of Hamhung. He called back with the half hour and said none of the units there had seen him. He said he would inform the Provost Marshal X Corps and I should immediately inform the 7th Div Surgeon and Provost Marshal which I did through the forward CP. Col Gorby also suggested they be requested to contact elements of the 7th RCT, 3d Infantry Division, into whose area it was thought the search party may have entered.
9. On the evening of 26 November 1950, Major John P. Riley, S-3, this battalion, informed the Chief of Staff and other members of the General Staff concerning Major Atchley’s absence. Reports were requested from units having patrols in that area and General Barr informed Major Riley that he would cause patrols to be sent into the area in the search. The Division Surgeon requested X Corps Surgeon to have all concerned alered for possible news of Major Atchley and party. Air search was requested.
10. G-1, 7th Div notified this headquarters to submit casualty reports as of 1200 hours 27 November 1950. This has been accomplished.
11. The forward battalion CP informed me on 28 November 1950, that division headquarters was sending out an infantry team with jeeps to search the area.
12. All efforts to date have proved futile.
ROBERT S. O’HERN, Capt, MSC Adjutant
Incl II
HEADQUARTERS 7TH MEDICAL BATTALION
APO 7
11 December 1950
SUBJECT: Report of Personnel MIA (Sgt Kemble)
TO : AG Casualty Section, 7th Inf Div, APO 7.
The following is a statement made by Sgt Robert L. Kemble, RAXXXXXXXX, Ambulance Company, 7th Medical Battalion, APO 7, who was recovered after missing in action. The Sergeant was a member of a search party formed by Major Oren C. Atchley,1 OXXXXX, MSC, this organization, in an attempt to find a lost ambulance.
At0830, 24 November 1950, we departed Pungsan, Korea, south in thedirection ofUntaek, Korea. The search party consisted of Major Atchley, myself,Cpl.Leonard J. Smith,2 RAXXXXXXXX, Hq & Hq Co, thisBattalion, PfcRichard L. Stuck,3 RAXXXXXXXX, Clr Co, this Battalion, andPvts[Albert] Williams4 and [Harry J.] Mayfield, 559th [560th]AmbulanceCompany, 163rd Medical Battalion (sep). On the way, we stopped at the31t RCTMedical Company CP for approximately one (1) Hour, leaving there at1100 hours.We continued south on the road and stopped at a fork in the road southand eastof Susang-ni, DV 0487. At this time the Major and Smith, who wereleading inthe jeep, directed me to wait while they went on south to investigatethe road.About 30 minutes later he returned with information to the effect thathe didnot think the ambulance had taken that road. It was about 1415 hoursand westayed long enough to eat. On departing we turned right on the roadleading tothe west. The Major stated that down this road about 25 miles we shouldcontacta patrol of troops from the 3d Div. During this time we passed one townbutthere was no evidence of the ambulance or action of any kind. I believethistown was Sangdong, CV 8988. Either before or after passing this town wewent bya mine shaft. I checked the speedometer later and noticed we had gone20 miles,about this time we came to a place where the road divided and the Majordecidedto take the road to the left. This road led us into a town that Ibelieve is calledTari-ri, CV9786. In the center of the town this road came to a "Y"shape. The town had been bombed and appeared deserted. We took theright forkand crossed a bridge. As we crossed the bridge the Major hollered backit mightbe the right road as there was a sign on the bridge stating it had beenerectedby the 13th Engineers (C) Bn. On the other side we came to the deadend. TheMajor said for us to wait and he would reconnoiter the area. I pulledoff to aSchool House about 50 yards away so I would be out in the open, andaway fromthe buildings in the town. The Major came back shortly and said hecouldn'tfind a road out but for us to wait and he would try a differentdirection. Hewas gone about five (5) minutes when I began to notice we were beingsurroundedon all sides by men approaching with long-barreled rifles, they werenotwearing any particular type of uniform. I told the ambulance driver tomake abreak for it! We headed around the school house and at the far end Inoticedthe Major coming in our direction. We stopped long enough to tell himwe werebeing surrounded. The Major took off in the lead on a trail leadingfrom theschool and out of town to the right into an open field. We were firedon asleaving and it looked like more enemy was trying to cut us off fromforward.They were all afoot. Approximately one (1) mile out we stopped in anopen fieldand the Major told us to get out and disperse. We were on a hill andcould seethe river below us. The Major and I went down a draw to the river tosee if wecould cross. At the river we found a railroad embankment crossing thedrawparalleled to the river. At the same time we noticed the enemy comingup theother side of the river. I asked the Major if we should open fire onthem.
_______1 Maj.Oren C.Atchley, Medical Service Corps (3 November 1912-24 November 1950). Maj. Atchley (Hunt, Texas) assumed command ofthe 7th Medical Battalion in Japan on 13 July 1950. He was also actingDivisionSurgeon from 11 July to 16 August 1950. He was reported missing inaction andpresumed dead on 24 November 1950. Atchley was promoted to Lt. Col. asof 10December 1950. He was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross, BronzeStar,Combat Medical Badge, and Purple Heart in addition to other campaignand servicemedals for Korea.
DSC Citation: The Distinguished Service Cross is awarded to Lieutenant Colonel Oren C. Atchley, Medical Service Corps, United States Army, for extraordinary heroism in action while serving as commanding officer of the 7th Medical Battalion, Seventh Infantry Division, in the vicinity of Pungsan, Korea, on November 24, 1950. While at a forward command post, he organized a search party to attempt to locate an ambulance with wounded men that was missing in enemy territory. The search party was attacked while he was on reconnaissance, and he was separated from the other men. On his return, without hesitation and fully award of the odds against him, he fired on the enemy, distracting them, giving his men time to escape. When last seen he was fearlessly maintaining his stand and urging the others to withdraw.
2 Sgt. Leonard J. Smith, Jr. (1929-3 February 1951). Sgt. Smith (Tampa, Florida) was captured in North Korea on 24 November, marched to a POW camp, and died there on 3 February 1951. He was awarded a Bronze Star and Combat Medical Badge in addition to other campaign and service medals for Korea.
3 Sgt. Richard L. Stuck (1930-24 November 1950). Sgt. Stuck (Beaver, Pennsylvania) died from wounds received on 24 November 1950. He received the Purple Heart, Combat Medical Badge, and campaign and service medals for Korea.
4 Cpl. Albert Williams (1930-27 November 1950). Cpl. Williams (Hinds, Mississippi) was a medic with the 560th Ambulance Company and was taken prisoner on 27 November and presumed to have died that day. He was awarded the Purple Heart, Combat Medical Badge, and campaign and service medals for Korea.
[2]
Hq7th Med Bn, APO 7, Subject: Report of Personnel MIA (Sgt Kemble) 11 Dec50
Hesaid not to because maybe if we didn't they wouldn't. He said we'dbetterabandon our vehicles and take off on foot. We went back and gatheredthe restof the men at the vehicles and prepared to abandon them. We each took acan of"C" rations and all the ammunition we could carry. We headed over thehill parallel to the river and railroad. Looking down off the right, wecouldsee them both. After a short ways we headed down to the railroad,turned leftin the opposite direction of the town we'd left, with Major in thelead. Wekept about 30 yards from one another. About 3/4 of a mile down therailroad wesaw a North Korean with a long-barrelled rifle coming head on towardsus. Whenhe saw the Major he stopped, whirled around and started running. TheMajorfired and the North Korean dived off the bank down towards the river.The Majorsaw him crossing the river but he was too far off out of range to getaneffective shot. This took place about dusk. We headed on about 3/4 of amilefurther and turned right off the railroad tracks and crossed the river.Weheaded straight up the side of a mountain following a trail. At the topweturned left and proceeded cautiously. Ahead the trail went around themountainand down grade. Dogs were heard barking below us and the shapes ofhouses couldbe made out. The trail led down through the houses. The first house waspassedOK. The Major and Smith got by the second house where the dogs werebarking. AsI approached, someone came out of the house. They kept repeatingsomething inKorean. Then it sounded as though they said in English "are youthere"? I turned and whispered to the 3 men behind me, "hit thedirt". Mayfield hollered "he's got a gun!” The North Korean startedtowards us and I shot him. He fell to our left, and as he did he openedup onus with a burp gun he had. Other persons came out of the house andopened fireon us. One was firing a burp gun. Williams had 2 hand grenades that hegave tome. I threw one towards the house and it must have been effectivebecause Iheard screaming as if they had been hit. Just before this I saw theMajor orSmith, it looked more like the Major, standing up ahead in the middleof theroad with a carbine on automatic firing into the same house I hadthrown thegrenade. The second grenade I threw hit the side of the house. Rightafter thatthe firing quieted down to sporadic shots. I looked down to the rightandthought I saw three tanks in the distance. I was trying to see theMajor and atthe same time the men behind me were trying to get me back. I told themto goahead and I would take the rear. They told me to go ahead and I wouldfollow,as I took off and had them cover me and then follow in turn. I ranabout 50yards and fell in the ditch to cover for them while they were catchingup. Whenthey came up I saw Williams supporting Stuck. He had been hit and wasinsistingwe take off and get away. He kept saying he couldn't make it and thathe wasdone for. On examining him I saw that he was shot right through thecenter ofthe chest. We carried him back about 400 yards further, near a stream,andexamined him closer. He was in shock and semi-delirious. I covered himwith myparka and told him we were going back for the Major and try to help. Idon'tthink he understood. We three held a conference whether to try to takeStuck ornot. In the meantime we heard more firing in the direction the Majorhad gone.We decided the best to do was to leave Stuck and try to get help forhim. Wehad no means of giving Medical treatment to him of any kind. When weleft wetried to get over to the other side of the mountain but ran into heavygun fireover there. We backtracked along the slope and tried to get over to theMajorby the other side but ran into more fire over there. We backtrackedagain towhere we started and I told the other two men I didn't think there wasbut oneother thing to do but to travel south and east until we contactedAmericantroops, if possible.
[3]
Weput the North star to our back and traveled south all night, bypassingvillagesand houses keeping to the mountains honing to hit a road.
Atdawn the next day, 25 November 1950, we were up on a mountain anddecided torest during the day in the shelter of the rocks. It was so cold though,wecouldn't stay there we kept walking south and east following the sun.We walkeduntil 2200 that night. Being quite exhausted we stopped and built afire andmade a bed out of pine branches to lay over the snow. We took turnspullingguard, I dried my sacks and insides of my shoe pacs and kept tellingtheambulance drivers to keep wriggling their toes and care for their feet.Mayfield had on combat boots and Williams had at Snow Pacs. For food wesplitone can of Apricots. Mayfield was sick and kept vomiting all night.
Thenext day, 26 November 1950, we started out again in the same directionwe hadthe day before, that after noon we heard a fire fight in the distance.Therewere both American and enemy weapons and from the sounds of it anInfantrycompany was engaged and air power was used. At 2200 hours that night westoppedand ate a can of pears, the last we had. We took the same care of ourfeet. Inoticed both the Ambulance drivers feet were in bad shape, and Mayfieldwasstill vomiting, they were both depressed and discouraged.
Thefollowing morning, 27 November 1950, we started out again. The twodrivers weredoubting we were ever going to be rescued and needed encouragement tokeepgoing. That afternoon we saw a lone House and decided to take ourchance on itbeing friendly as we couldn't go much further without help. We wentdown to thehouse and they took us in and fed us. The two drivers were holleringandscreaming because of the pain in their feet and I didn't think theywould makeit much further. We stayed there all night and I tried to keep guardbutbecause of the warmth and my state of exhaustion I fell asleep. Theoccupantsgave us no trouble.
Thefollowing morning 28 November 1950, the two drivers were in very badshape.Williams feet were so bad he couldn't get his shoes on. His feet wereswollenand the toe nails were dropping off. Mayfield with a lot of strugglegot hisshoes on. We knew we couldn’t take Williams and told him we were goingto haveto go for help. He wanted us to go on for help and gave me his parka.About amile down the mountain we noticed 4 or 5 houses below us. They werestanding200 yards or so apart. We decided to pass each house at a time and oneof uswould cover the other. As I approached the 3rd or 4th house a youngNorthKorean came out and was trying to tell me something I motioned toMayfield tocome ahead. Some women came out of the house with "C" ration cans andmade gestures for us to come in the house. When we got in she showed ussomemeat she was cooking and pointed towards an oxen in the road toindicated itwas beef. I had her eat some and then we all ate. While we were eatingthefarmer in whose house we had stayed the night before came in and he andthe youngman did a lot of talking and motioning in our direction. They came overand gotus by the arm and led us out of the house and up a trail. They took usabout 15miles over a mountain, carrying Mayfield most of the way. He wanted togive upand I had to keep insisting and encouraging him to go on. About dark wecame toa house on the other side of the mountain and they fed us there. TheNorthKoreans and I wanted to go on further but Mayfield couldn't. The 2NorthKoreans left then and came back with about 10 more natives. They burstin fromall doors and surrounded us. I noticed right away they were not armedand theydid not try to take ours. The men all pulled South Korean arm bandsfrom theirpockets and put them on their arms.
[4]
Hq 7th Med Bn, APO 7, Subject; Report of personnel MIA(Sgt Kemble) 11 Dec 50 cont'd page 4.
Theword "peace" was written on them with south Korean Flag and Koreanwriting on them. They went out of their way to be nice to us and gaveus agallon can of GI apple sauce. They drew a picture of a cross on a pieceofpaper and wrote K2 on it and made action like they wanted to take careof ourfeet. Mayfield wouldn't let them take off his shoes and I told themmine wereOK. Then they opened the door and showed me a sled with hay on it andat thesame time one of them drew a picture of an ambulance. Mayfield stilldidn'twant to go but I told him I thought we should take a chance on it. Theyhad toforce Mayfield on. They tried to pull and force me out but I jerkedloose andstood back with my M-1 and had them go out first. They did and Ifollowed. Anox pulled the sled and we followed, we went across country about 3 or 4milesuntil we came to a road. This was the first road we'd seen since wewere lost.It appeared to have been well travelled by vehicles. We went on aboutmileuntil we hit town. At the first house we were stopped by a Korean wholet us goby after the Koreans with us gave a password. From the time we left thehouse Ihad them covered with my M-1. The next place we stopped was a housethat lookedlike a prison. They took Mayfield in and I followed, Mayfield keptwanting toknow if we were PWs. During the night about 20 or 30 more natives camein. Theywere very secretive and suspicious acting and sat around in a circle.
Thenext morning, 29 November 1950, Mayfield wanted to make a break for itbut Itold him there wasn’t any use and if we were PWs just to make the bestof it.For about two hours they kept taking papers out of secret places and itwasevident they were filling them out on me. They used a lot of officiallookingstamps and seals on them, they wanted me to write on them but Iwouldn't.
Atapproximately 1000 hours they grabbed me and pulled me out the door.When Ilooked down the street I saw an American Patrol and hollered at them.They tookus to the 31st RCT Aid Station for Medical Care.
Itis my opinion that the Major and Smith got away from the village wherewe hadour first fire fight because of the firing we heard on the far side ofthemountain later on. I believe that was from he and Smith trying to fighttheirway out. Because of the apparent critical condition Stuck was in Idon't thinkthere was much chance for him.
Williamsfeet were very black and swollen and the toe nails had come off. Ithink hewould be taken care of as best possible by the North Koreans we lefthim with.The patrol that rescued us could not go on further towards him becauseof heavyenemy fire.
Sgt.Kemble was evacuated through Medical channels to the 121st EvacuationHospital.
ROBERTS. O'HERN
Captain MSC
Adjutant
Incl III
Organizational Chart
Incl IV
CLEARING COMPANY Seventh MedicalBattalion
APO 7
2 Jan 1950
Subject: Command Report
To: S-3, Hq. 7th Medical Battalion
On 1 Dec. 1950 the Clearing Company was widely dispersed and operating three platoons, each with a different type of mission. The 1st Platoon was at Yong-po airfield, near Hamhung, assisting in air evacuation of 7th Division and Marine wounded. The 2nd Plt. was at Pukchong, serving as a large holding installation, in conjunction with the 1st MASH. The 3rd. Plt. was at Pungsan, in direct support of the 17th RCT. On 2 Dec. the 3rd Pit. closed down operations and it and the Clearing Company Headquarters went to Hamhung. On 3 Dec. the Clearing Company minus the 2nd Platoon set up a Clearing Station at Unhung-ni, between Hamhung and Hungnam,while the 2nd Plt. was staying in Pukchong to give medical support to the troops which were vacating Northeastern Korea. On 5 Dec. the 2nd Plt. left Pukchong and joined the rest of the company at Unhung-ni. A Clearing Station was in operation at this location until 15 Dec.
During the evacuation the Hamhung from the northeastern part of Korea, the company was forced to abandon two 2 ½ -ton trucks with trailers and one separate trailer in the mountain passes.
On 14 Dec. the Clearing Co., minus a detachment of picked personnel, left Hungnam on the USNS General Freeman and debarked at Pusan on 18 Dec. They proceeded by train to Toksong-dong, where a Clearing Station was put into operation on 20 December.
On 15 Dec. the medical battalion of the 3rd Division assumed the medical support of the remainder of the 7th Division in the Hungnam area, and on 19 Dec. the detachment which had remained behind from the Clearing Company at Hungnam left for Pusan on the USNS General Mitchell. They joined the rest of the company at Toksong-dong. A combined Clearing Station was in operation at that location ant it 31 Dec., when the 1st Plt, was attached to the 17th RCT and moved north to support the regiment in its new location. The remainder of the company remained at Toksong-dong to operate the installation at that location.
During the month of December, 1950, the Clearing Company admitted 750 patients, of which only two were battle casualties. There were 111 non-battle casualty injuries and 637 cases of disease. Although the 7th Division suffered many more battle casualties than these figures reflect, the great majority of them were evacuated through Marine or X Corps installations, due to the tactical situation.
During this period there were 109 cases of cold injury, 104 cases of upper respiratory infections, and 10 cases of neuropsychictric ailments.The remainder of the the diseases were in the normal incidences.
The period was one which was, characterized manly by movement and varied types of operations. It was the Clearing Company's first experience in withdrawal tactics, and, support of this type of operation.
[signed]
RICHARD L. MINER
Capt.,MC
Commanding
InclV
AMBULANCE COMPANY 7TH MEDICAL BATTALION
APO 7
2 January 1951
SUBJECT: Unit History
TO: Commanding Officer
7th Medical Battalion
APO 7
The Unit was alerted the first day of the month at Pukchong, Korea. On 2 December 1950 the company departed that location in a motor convoy with Hamhung, Korea as its destination. At this time 14 vehicles were not with the Unit due to their supporting the 31st Infantry Regiment near the Chosin reservoir in North Korea.
The convoy encountered no difficulty the 75 miles to Hamhung arriving there 0330 hours on the 3rd. We stopped for the remainder of the night with the 3rd Platoon Clearing Company who then were host to the 7th Medical Battalion for rations and quarters.
Onthat same day at 1500 hours we traveled 5½ miles to Hungnam,Korea and set upin a school building. This location was used as an assembly area forthe 7thMedical Battalion while the company was carrying on normal operationsorambulance service to various units evacuating to the 121st EvacuationHospital.
Themorale of the company was boosted on the 12th day of December. On thisdate SFCOnis Whitehouse, with other EM of the company, joined the Unit from theChosinreservoir area. This was the first time they had been with the companysince 26November 1950.
Reportsfrom SFC Whitehouse varified the fact that 7 vehicles had been lost inenemyaction near the reservoir. This brought a total loss or 12 vehicles intheKorean war.
On14 December the Unit, less a Provisional Platoon of 16 vehicles thatstayed atHungnam for evacuating the sick and wounded, motored to Hungnam harbor,gotaboard a LCVP then to the USNS General H. B. Freeman. The Unit'sdestination wasPusan, Korea arriving there on the 17th. The company debarked on the18th,marched to the Pusan RTO for a troop movement by rail to Toksung-dong,Korea arrivingat 2330 hours of the same day.
TheUnit was quartered and began to set up in a building formerly used as aschool.Two tents were also set up for troop quarters and another for theOrderly andSupply rooms. Company
2
SUBJECT:Unit History, Amb Co, 7th Med. Bn
headquarterspersonnel stayed in one room of the main building. Normal operationswere beingcarried on in garrison fashion.
On22 December the vehicles and men that were left at Hungnam as aprovisionalplatoon had joined the company at Toksong-dong. While earoute aboardthe USNS GeneralBilly Mitchell, Pfc Craft was admitted to sick bay. When all the troopsdebarkedfrom the ship, Pfc Craft was transferred to the Swedish EvacuationHospital atPusan.
The26th of December 1950 1st Lt Morton T Cutler assumed command of thecompany dueto Captain Lindquist being transferred to Headquarters and HeadquartersCompanyof this Battalion. Cpl. Mitchell, driver for the Captain, wastransferred to Hq& Hq Co at the same time.
Inspectionswere quite frequent the past week from higher headquarters. Vehicles,supplyand orderly rooms and general area have been improved greatly.Cleanliness andfirst echelon work of the vehicles have been stressed mainly and arecentinspection by Division Ordnance has shown our vehicles are aboveaverage withinthe Division.
Tenpromotions to corporal, four to private first class, one to sergeantand two tosergeant first class were effected the past month.
Payday for the unit was Sunday, 31 December 1950.
[signed]
MORTONT CUTLER
1stLt., MSC
Commanding
InclVI
HEADQUARTERS & HEADQUARTERS COMPANY
7th Medical Battalion
APO 7, care of Postmaster
San Francisco California
8 January 1951.
SUBJECT: Command Report for the month of December 1950
TO: S-3 Officer
7th Medical Battalion
APO 7
1. Mission-Command, and organizational maintenance for Medical Battalion: division medical supply and dental service.
2.The following report is the main events or the unit which took placeduring themonth of December 1950.
1 December 1950, Foward C.P. moved backfrom Pungsaa Korea to rejoin the main group of the battalion atPukchong Korea.
2 December 1950, Unit was ordered tomove from Pukchong Korea at 1539 hours, by VOCO of the battalioncommander. At1630 hours all the vehicle of the unit was loaded and ready to move. Atl900hours convoy departed area with instruction to destroy any vehiclesthat had tobe abandoned during convey movement. No vehicles or this unit had to bedestroyedduring convey movement.
3December 1950, Unit arrived at HamhungKorea at 0230 hours. Unit stayed over night with a Clearing CompanyPlatoonwhich was located in the town of Hamhung Korea. At 1400 hours unitmoved toHungnam Korea to set up operations in school building.
4 December 1950, The unit conducted a checkingof TO&E equipment that was lost during the convoy movement fromPukchong toHungnam Korea. The equipment that was lost consisted of one (1) C.P.tent,one(1)squad tent and two (2) small wall tents.
14December 1950, Unit departed HungnamKorea at 1300 hours. Traveled by motor to Hungnam Harbor a distance ofapproximately 7 miles. From 1330 to 1430 hours unit embarked LCVP. At1435hours unit embarked the USNS General H.B. Freeman.
15December 1950, At 0900 hours the USNSGeneral H.B. Freeman arrived at the Port of Pusan Korea.
17December 1950, Unit aboard General H.B. Freeman awaiting orders to debark.
18December 1950, At 1715 hours unitdebarked USNS
2
General H. B. Freeman and marched to Pusan Korea RTO, for troop movement by rail, destination Toksung-dong Korea, arrived at 2330 hours. Unit then marched from RTO to a grain warehouse to spend the night.
19 December 1950, At 1400 hours unit marched to school building a distance of one (1) mile. Unit then set up operations in the school building.
22 December 1950, Word was received this date, that at 0030 hours, 28 November 1950, Capt James Baido, Cpl Elwyn D. Nordyke, Cpl James L. Scott (while on DS with Med Co 31st Inf) was in a convey with the Med Co 31st Inf moving towards the Chosin Reservoir, North Korea when the convey was ambushed by the enemy. Sgt Walter C. Boncal, Med Co 31st Inf was the last person to see them, since they were report M.I.A.
3. The following is Foot Notes of the events of this unit.
6 December 1950, lst Lt W.P. Stender (MSC) promoted to Captain, par 17 SO #73 Hq X Corps.
7 December 1950, Major John E Pleasants(DC) assumes Command of the battalion per. G.O. 30 Hq 7th Med Bn.
9December 1950, Major Oren C Atchley(MSC) promoted to LT Col par 21 SO 72 Hq X Corps (while missing inaction)Catpain A.M. Lawson (DC) promoted to Major par 3 SO 76 Hq X Corp (whileon DS).
10 December 1950, Major Robert S Budge(MC) assigned and joined to this unit.
11 December 1950, Major Robert S Budge(MC) assumes Command of the Battalion vice Major John C Pleasents (DC)relieved.
13 December 1950, Pfc William D Inmanevacuated and reasgd to 2nd ESB Hospital.
26 December 19505 Lt Col Oren C Atchley(MSC) and Corporal Leonard J Smith dropped from morning report asM.I.A.Corporal Charles L Mitchell assigned to unit from Ambulance Company.CaptainMarshall C Lindquist (MSC) assigned to unit as Company Commander viceCaptainWilbur P Stender (MSC) relieved. Captain Wilbur P Stender (MSC) and CWOClarence H Miller from duty to absent sick to 4th Field Hospital. LstLtWilliam N Llewellyn (MSC) assigned to the unit as S-4 Officer fromClearingfrom Clearing Company.
27 December 1950, Major Ansel M Lawson(DC) was relieved from DS and reasgd to 9956 TSU Fitzsimons GeneralHospitalDenver, Colo.
28 December 19501 Sgt Kenwerd P Hebert,Kenneth L Gates and Vernon I Rathburn promted to Sgt 1cl par 1 SO 141Hq 7thMed Bn. Pfc Hubert L Harden and Joseph A Donioan promoted to Corporalpar 1 SO141 Hq 7th Med Bn.
3
30 December 1950, M/Sgt Joseph JBakulla, is First Sergeant of Headquarters Company, vice M/Sgt CharlesR Wrightrelieved.
[signed]
MARSHALLC. LINDQUIST
Capt.MSC
Commanding
3Incls
1.. Bn Supply Report
2. Div Med Supply Report
3. Div Dental Section Report
[Ed.— all enclosures withdrawn]
SOURCE: National Archives and Records Administration,Record Group 407, Records of the US Army Adjutant General, UnitHistoricalRecords, 7th Medical Battalion, 7th Infantry Division, Command Report,December1950, Box 3185.
