CHAPTER VI
Division and Brigade Medical Support
Two impressive aspects of medical operations in support of combat units inVietnam were the versatility of the classic system and the far-reachingmodifications of the system that evolved from the Vietnamese experience.
Doctrine prescribed the structure and type of medical support for combatunits sent to Vietnam. A medical battalion of four companies, each with threeplatoons, supported each division. A single medical company supported eachseparate brigade. The medical platoon of three sections supported units ofinfantry and tank battalions or armored cavalry squadrons. Under the fluidconditions of warfare in Vietnam, the employment and deployment of combat unitsdetermined the utilization of their supporting medical units, and no two medicalbattalions were used alike. The action accounts that follow are representativeof these varied usages.
Usages of Divisional Medical Assets
1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile)
In September 1965, the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile), supported by the15th Medical Battalion (Airmobile), arrived at the Central Highlands bases ofQui Nhon and An Khe lying southeast of Pleiku. In October the North VietnameseArmy began a major operation in the Central Highlands, opening its campaign withan attack on the Plei Me Special Forces camp 25 miles southwest of Pleiku. The1st Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile), was moved into the area southand west of Pleiku to block any further enemy advance and to stand in readinessas a reaction force. On 27 October, the lst Cavalry Division (Airmobile) wasdirected to seek out and destroy the enemy force in western Pleiku province.Thus began the month-long campaign known as the Battle of the Ia Drang Valley.The great effectiveness of the airmobile division was demonstrated in its firstcombat trial.
The Ia Drang campaign also proved the worth of the airmobile medical supportbattalion. An innovation, the airmobile medical battalion differed structurallyin several ways from the conventional medical battalion. The most importantdifference was that it included an air ambulance platoon of 12 helicopters andan aircraft maintenance section.
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Doctrinally, the division of responsibility between air ambulances organic toa division and Army-level, or Dust-off helicopters, was clear cut. Divisionalair ambulances evacuated patients in the division's area of operations from thesite of wounding to one of the division's four clearing stations. Dust-offhelicopters evacuated patients from the divisional clearing station to an Armyhospital. In practice, the line of demarcation was often blurred. During lullsin combat, divisional aircraft flew patients from the clearing station to ahospital, while during peak periods of combat, Army-level helicopterssupplemented divisional aircraft and evacuated casualties from the frontline tothe divisional clearing station. Occasionally, assault helicopters were usedwhen the medical air evacuation platoon was overtaxed, but Dust-off waspreferred because the medical aidman aboard could give emergency treatment andbecause the patient could be regulated to the hospital best suited to his needs.
In contrast to the usual practice in Vietnam of evacuating a casualtydirectly from the site of wounding to a hospital by air ambulance, 95 percentof the casualties in the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) were first evacuatedto one of the division's clearing stations, because of the size of thedivision's area of operations. The remaining 5 percent, severely wounded orcritically ill patients who could not have survived a stop en route, wereevacuated directly to the 45th Surgical Hospital in Tay Ninh or the 2d SurgicalHospital in Lai Khe.
Since there was no difference in flying time from the combat area to thehelipad of the clearing station of the 15th Medical Battalion (Airmobile) andthat of the 45th Surgical Hospital at Tay Ninh, patients were evacuated to theclearing station. The two units complemented each other. Personnel at theclearing station became adept in the triage of combat casualties and in thetechniques-such as administering blood and reducing shock-of stabilizing aseriously wounded patient. Surgeons at the 45th Surgical Hospital, in turn, were freed to devote their full effort to resuscitative surgery without fearthat the condition of patients awaiting surgery would deteriorate. The clearingstation handled a surprisingly large number of casualties in a short period oftime. It also weeded out the slightly wounded and the "sick, lame, andlazy" who would have become the responsibility of the 45th SurgicalHospital had they been evacuated there originally.
25th Infantry Division
In contrast to the relationship between the 15th Medical Battalion.(Airmobile) and the 45th Surgical Hospital, casualties from the 25th InfantryDivision, which also operated in the Tay Ninh area, were
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evacuated directly to the 45th Surgical Hospital by Dust-off helicopterswhich operated from the hospital's helipad. Use of the 25-bed facility adjacentto the 45th Surgical Hospital operated by Company D, 25th Medical Battalion,which supported the 25th Infantry Division, was limited to the care of thepatient with a minor illness or a slight wound.
To elaborate further on the contrast between these two methods, the 15thMedical Battalion (Airmobile) operated a clearing station and used the 45thSurgical Hospital in the classic role of a surgical hospital. Company D, 25thMedical Battalion, provided a holding area for patients who could be returned toduty in a few days. Under this arrangement, the 45th Surgical Hospital alsoserved as a clearing station.
The same relationship existed between the remaining companies of the 25thMedical Battalion and the 12th Evacuation Hospital at Chu Lai. The threecompanies together operated a single 25-bed facility as a holding area. The 12thEvacuation Hospital served as a clearing station as well as an evacuationhospital.
In 1968, the 25th Medical Battalion operated facilities at three locationsand treated 75,184 patients. Dust-off helicopters flew 8,159 missions andevacuated more than 20,000 patients. In 1969, the 25th Medical Battalion treatedmore than 58,000 patients. That same year, Dust-off aircraft flew approximately7,000 missions and evacuated about 14,000 patients.
326th Medical Battalion
During its service in Vietnam, the 326th Medical Battalion was converted froman airborne to an airmobile unit. It lost some men and ground vehicles andacquired an air ambulance platoon which became known as "EagleDust-off." This conversion paralleled the conversion of the 101st AirborneDivision to the 101st Air Cavalry Division to the 101st Airborne Division(Airmobile). Even so, the battalion still did not match the table oforganization for an airmobile medical battalion. Instead, it operated under amodified table of organization.
To insure adequate medical support for the 101st Airborne Division(Airmobile) which operated primarily in the vicinity of Hue and Phu Bai, exceptfor its 3d Brigade which was retained in the critical Saigon area, all elementsof the 326th Medical Battalion were monitored and evaluated continually. As aresult of this surveillance, changes were made from time to time to improve theunit's performance. For example, four litter bearers, one from each medicalcompany, were deleted in exchange for four preventive medicine specialists whowere added to the staff of the division surgeon.
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Mobile Riverine Force
The Mobile Riverine Force, created in 1967, was composed of the 2d Brigade,9th Infantry Division, and two Navy river assault squadrons of 50 boats each.The force, designed to deny the extensive river and canal complex of the MekongDelta to the enemy, was wholly independent of fixed support bases and operatedentirely afloat. Company D, 9th Medical Battalion, supported the Mobile RiverineForce in a highly unorthodox manner. Shortly after Company D arrived at the DongTam base in early 1968, it established a medical facility in a convertedarmored troop carrier to provide more effective medical support for riverineoperations. Later this facility, the only Army medical facility in Vietnam basedin a Navy ship, was moved to a barracks ship, the U.S.S. Colleton. Afterthe arrival of Company A, 9th Medical Battalion, at Dong Tam in August 1968,Company D established a 37-bed facility for medical cases aboard the U.S.S. Nueces,thus freeing the unit on the Colleton for care of surgical patients. Whenthe U.S.S.Mercer replaced the Colleton a few months later, themedical and surgical units were united aboard the Nueces. The rearsection of the aid station of Company D was maintained in these ships at thebase anchorage.
On tactical operations, Navy armored troop carriers, preceded by minesweepingcraft and escorted by armored boats, transported the soldiers along the vastnetwork of waterways in the Delta. The units debarked upon reaching the area ofoperations or upon contact with the enemy.
Small, specially designed craft with an aid station aboard, called aid boats,accompanied the troop boats into combat. A physician, attached to Company Dduring these riverine operations, went forward on an aid boat with the combatunits. The aid boats functioned at night when most combat in the Delta tookplace. Casualties were evacuated to the ship-based rear aid station at the baseanchorage by aid boats or by helicopters permanently assigned to the MobileRiverine Force, at first by the Army and later by the Navy.
The primary medical problem in riverine operations was "immersionfoot," which was minimized by alternating units in combat every 2 or 3days. While the fresh troops sustained the attack, those units relieved wereallowed to "dry out" and refit.
Riverine operations brought extensive modifications in the use of personneland equipment as well as in the structure of Company D. Ground ambulances andtents were eliminated. The aid station, as noted, was split into two sections.One section remained aboard the vessel at the rear anchorage; the otheraccompanied the combat units.
The two sections of the aid station were often separated for days. Thesection accompanying the combat units was split even further when
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two or three missions were, conducted simultaneously in different areas.Since the physician attached to the company was almost always forward with thecombat elements, the medical operations assistant, a Medical Service Corpsofficer, usually supervised the rear section at the base anchorage. This officerand the senior enlisted medical aidmen he supervised had considerably greaterresponsibility for the treatment and evacuation of patients than was customary.Casualties requiring more extensive care than could be provided in the rearsection were evacuated by helicopter to a hospital. Helicopters as well asshuttle craft were used to supply the aid boats from the ship-based rearsection. The rear section itself was supplied from shore.
4th Infantry Division
The 4th Infantry Division was deployed to Vietnam in July 1966. Each brigademoved by sea with all its supporting elements. Thus, the attached medicalcompany was able to maintain a continuous record of the health of the command.
Although one brigade of the 4th Infantry Division was initially positioned inthe coastal area of Phu Yen Province in III CTZ, the entire division wasdeployed to the Central Highlands by the end of 1966 to counter the steadybuildup of North Vietnamese units in that region. During 1967, the division,and its predecessors in the Central Highlands, the 101st Airborne and the 25thInfantry Divisions, remained on the defensive. The brigades of these divisionswere moved from one location to another in a series of spoiling operations asthe need dictated, making it expedient at times to attach, detach, or exchangecomponents of one division with those of another.
An example of this practice was the exchange between the 3d Brigade, 4thInfantry Division, and the 3d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division. The 3d Brigade,25th Infantry Division, was operating in the Pleiku area when the 4th InfantryDivision arrived in II CTZ. Thus it was assigned to the 4th Infantry Divisionalong with its attached medical company. The 3d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division,and its attached medical company operated as a separate task force in the areaof operations of the 25th Infantry Division. It was therefore inactivated andreactivated as the 3d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division. The exchange permitteddirect operational control over these units. The medical companies exchangedbecame components of the medical battalions organic to their new divisions, the4th and 25th Medical Battalions of the 4th and 25th Infantry Divisions,respectively.
Army-level medical support for the 1st Brigade, 4th Infantry Division,operating in the Tuy Hoa area, was provided by the 8th Field Hospital at NhaTrang. The 18th Surgical Hospital, supplemented by
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the 71st Evacuation Hospital in late 1967, serviced the main base camp atPleiku.
United States forces in the Central Highlands went on the offensive in 1968and 1969. Predicated on the mobility of the helicopter, landing zones and firesupport bases were set up temporarily and operational sweeps were conducted fromthese sites. Since combat units were widely dispersed, it was necessary tosubdivide the medical assets supporting them to insure the best coverage. The"light" clearing station was evolved for this purpose.
Under this concept, teams, each consisting of a physician and from seven to10 medical enlisted men, deployed to the landing zones or fire support baseswith the units they supported. These operations usually lasted from several daysto several weeks. The forward area "light"' clearing station worked inunison with the main components of the parent medical company at thesemipermanent base camp in the rear where treatment facilities were housed inprotected bunkers. The purpose of the "light" clearing station was toprepare the casualty for helicopter evacuation to the main section at the basecamp. At this field station, casualties were quickly sorted out as to seriousnessand type of wound to allow the worst cases to be evacuated first. An innovationin field medical service, the "light" clearing station allowed medicalsupport to be provided concurrently at the base camp and in the field.
As combat activities diminished in 1970, the operations of the 4th InfantryDivision were curtailed. In April 1970, the 3d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division,with its attached support elements, including Company D, 4th Medical Battalion,departed Vietnam for the continental United States. The other three components,of the, 4th Medical Battalion remained in Vietnam to support the division basecamp at Pleiku and the combat activities of the 1st and 2d Brigades of thedivision in the Central Highlands.
To support the mission of the 4th Infantry Division in the Cambodianincursion during May and June 1970, the 4th Medical Battalion positioned aclearing station at a fire support base close to the Cambodian border. Use ofthe six Dust-off helicopters assigned to support the clearing station wasdictated by the nature of the operation. Two maintained an orbit over thelanding zone, two remained on standby at the clearing station, and two wereretained on call at the base camp. The majority of casualties from the Cambodianincursion received initial medical treatment at the 4th Medical Battalion'sclearing station on the border.
23d (Americal) Infantry Division
Task Force OREGON, which later became the 23d (Americal) Infantry Division,was formed in April 1967. Operating from bases at Duc
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Pho and Chu Lai, it moved into Quang Ngai and Quang Tin Provinces south of DaNang along the coast. Its mission was to free Marine units operating in I CTZSouth to reinforce the area southwest of Da Nang and near the Demilitarized Zonein I CTZ North where the enemy threat continued to grow in size and intensitythroughout 1967.
The task force was composed of the 196th Light Infantry Brigade, the 3dBrigade, 25th Infantry Division (later the 3d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division),and the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division. Formed as separate brigades, eachhad an attached medical company. Thus, the task force did not have a medicalbattalion. Medical planning and supply functions were provided by addingspecialized administrative personnel to the staff of the task force surgeon,thus giving him the equivalent of a divisional medical battalion staff.
Task Force OREGON having accomplished its mission, the 23d (Americal)Infantry Division was formed in September 1967 for sustained combat operationsin I CTZ. At that time, the 3d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division, and the 1stBrigade, 101st Airborne Division, were replaced by the 198th and 11th LightInfantry Brigades which had just arrived in Vietnam. These joined the 196thLight Infantry Brigade as organic components of the Americal Division. The 3dBrigade, 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile), supported by Company A, 15th MedicalBattalion (Airmobile), and the 3d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division, supported byCompany D, 4th Medical Battalion, remained as attached units of the division.Initially, the 23d Medical Battalion, which was formed in December 1967 tosupport the Americal Division, operated with only a Headquarters and Company Asince the other medical companies were organic to their brigades. When theAmerical Division was reorganized under the ROAD (Reorganization Objective ArmyDivisions) concept in February 1969, three companies were added to the battalionand it was authorized a strength of 38 officers and 333 enlisted men.
Medical service in the Americal Division was a mixture of the old and thenew. Casualties were evacuated from the forward area mainly by helicopter, butground ambulances were used extensively for routine resupply, nonemergencypatient evacuation, and to support MEDCAP (Medical Civic Action Program). Groundambulances were also used extensively in the Chu Lai base area, which was morethan 9 miles long, and by medical units stationed at brigade and battalion baseareas along Route 1 in the Duc Pho and Chu Lai regions.
Since the size of the Americal Division's area of operations entailed fairlylong air ambulance flights, medical companies were stationed at remote inlandbases, such as Duc Pho. These companies retained sick and lightly woundedsoldiers for early return to duty, and also provided emergency resuscitation ofthe severely wounded in preparation for the long helicopter flight to ahospital.
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Battalion aid stations at the firebases were near the areas of extensivecombat and could provide emergency medical treatment. Inclement weather oftenmade it impossible to evacuate patients immediately, and the battalion surgeonwas on hand to care for the seriously wounded. He was also available to advisethe battalion commander on medical matters and, when necessary, could use thetactical communications net to assist his aidmen in the field.
Since there was no evacuation hospital in the Americal Division's area ofoperations-the nearest evacuation hospitals were located at Qui Nhon, more than125 miles from Chu Lai-patients with predictable recovery rates were retainedlonger than normal at the medical clearing companies. Seriously wounded orcritically ill patients were evacuated to the 2d Surgical Hospital or the 1stMarine Hospital Company at Chu Lai.
The companies of the 23d Medical Battalion were housed in semi-permanentinstallations. Throughout 1968 and 1969, patients were held for a period of 7days at these clearing stations. At times, they were held longer, but this wasthe exception. Admissions to the clearing stations of the 23d Medical Battalioninvolving nonbattle injuries exceeded those resulting from hostile action; feverof undetermined origin was a primary cause for hospitalization.
The 23d Medical Battalion was also responsible for treating sick and woundedVietnamese civilians. During the period from 1 January to 31 December 1969, thecombined companies of the battalion treated 21,891 Vietnamese patients. Whilemuch of this treatment was outpatient care for the often neglected peasant inthe villages and hamlets, a large percentage of more definitive medical,surgical, and rehabilitative treatment was done on the wards of the 23d MedicalBattalion. Company B, 23d Medical Battalion, for example, maintained a civilianwar casualty ward which accommodated 30 Vietnamese patients. The ward wasconstantly full and averaged about 110 patients a month. While constantlyengaged in care of the sick and injured, the 23d Medical Battalion alsoconducted a vigorous program to train Vietnamese health workers so they couldassume greater medical responsibilities in their own villages and hamlets.
Medical Support of Separate Infantry Brigades
Several brigade-sized units with organic or attached medical companiesoperated in Vietnam. These included the 11th, 196th, and 198th Light InfantryBrigades that later became the 23d (Americal) Infantry Division, with theirorganic medical companies still intact. Others were the 3d Brigade, 82d AirborneDivision, the 3d Brigade, 5th Mechanized Division, the 199th Light InfantryBrigade, the 173d Airborne Brigade,
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and the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment. The medical companies of these unitsoperated independently of any higher headquarters in contrast to theirdivisional counterparts which were under the command of the division's medicalbattalion.
The medical companies of the 199th Light Infantry Brigade and the 173dAirborne Brigade were organic to their support battalions, the 6th and 173dSupport Battalions, respectively. On the other hand, the 3d Brigade, 82dAirborne Division, and the 3d Brigade, 5th Mechanized Division, belonged to thedivision structures even though they operated as separate brigades. Therefore,their medical companies were attached and not organic. The 37th Medical Company,which supported the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, differed from the others inthat it was neither an element of a support battalion nor a medical battalion.It had been specifically tailored for an armored cavalry regiment.
37th Medical Company
At the beginning of 1969, the function of the 37th Medical Company was tosupport the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment operating in the Blackhorse area.Since all combat casualties from January through April 1969 were treated at the7th Surgical Hospital, which was adjacent to the 37th Medical Company's clearingstation, the company limited its activities to routine sick call and vigoroussupport of MEDCAP.
In May 1969, the 7th Surgical Hospital was inactivated. The 37th MedicalCompany inherited its superior facilities and reorganized its treatmentcapability considerably. The emergency room and ward were expanded, the dentalclinic was enlarged, and an X-ray unit was installed. At the same time, asection was deployed to Quan Loi to support combat operations in the forwardarea.
When the 37th Medical Company was assigned the task of supporting the 3dBrigade, 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile), which was also operating in theBlackhorse area, in May 1969, a mutual support program was established withCompany C, 15th Medical Battalion (Airmobile), 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile),with which the 37th Medical Company shared its facilities. During the summermonths, the 37th Medical Company received an average of 2.7 casualties a day,who were evacuated to the rear clearing station by a medical evacuationhelicopter from the 15th Medical Battalion (Airmobile). The superior facilitiesat this rear station, especially the X-ray unit that had been installed,permitted many less serious battle injuries to be treated entirely at theclearing station level. When the 199th Light Infantry Brigade replaced the 1stCavalry Division (Airmobile), the 37th Medical Company, in co-operation withCompany C, 7th Support Battalion, 199th Light Infantry Brigade, continued toprovide routine sick call and casualty support in
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the area. Early in December 1969, the main body of the 37th Medical Companywas deployed in Quan Loi to support the elements of the 11th Armored CavalryRegiment. A small element was based at Bien Hoa to take advantage of access tothe supply depot at Long Binh.
Task Force Shoemaker
Task Force SHOEMAKER, which participated in the Cambodian incursion, wascomposed of the 1st Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) ; the 11th ArmoredCavalry Regiment plus the 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry Regiment; the 2d Battalion,47th Mechanized Infantry Regiment; the 2d Battalion, 34th Armored Regiment; the5th Battalion, 12th Infantry Regiment; and the 5th Battalion, 60th InfantryRegiment. The medical support of this operation illustrated the flexibility ofthe medical service in offensive sweeps by brigade-type units.
The task force received its medical support from elements of the 15th MedicalBattalion (Airmobile) and the 37th Medical Company at the base camp at Quan Loi,near the center of the intended zone of operations. In addition two clearingstations in protected bunkers existed at this site. A forward command post ofthe 15th Medical Battalion (Airmobile) was added to Company C, 15th MedicalBattalion, and the 37th Medical Company, the units operating the two clearingstations.
A special emergency medical team composed of a physician, two clinicaltechnicians, three aidmen, and a radio operator was formed out of theHeadquarters and Company A, 15th Medical Battalion (Airmobile). Available forduty anywhere in the task force's area of operations, it established a forwardemergency treatment station at Katum where an aid station existed. Flown in withits equipment by helicopter, the team was functioning within an hour. A medicalhelicopter remained on station with the team.
In anticipation of many casualties, the bulk of the whole blood supply inVietnam was moved forward for use by the 37th Medical Company and Company C,15th Medical Battalion (Airmobile). The estimate of 500 to 800 casualties withinthe first 3 days of the operation failed to materialize, and the usable portionof the whole blood supply was returned to the 9th Medical Laboratory forredistribution.
The Air Ambulance Platoon, 15th Medical Battalion (Airmobile), moved up toQuan Loi for the operation. The platoon leader and his operations assistant werejoined by the battalion commander, S-3, and an assistant of the 15th MedicalBattalion (Airmobile) to co-ordinate the use of medical assets. Two helicopterswere assigned to the 37th Medical Company in direct support of the 11th ArmoredCavalry Regiment while three others operated out of Quan Loi with Company C,l5th Medical Battalion (Airmobile). Other medical evacuation helicopters weresta-
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tioned at landing zones and fire support bases. A Dust-off helicopterremained on standby at Quan Loi to evacuate casualties from the clearing stationto a hospital.
After 4 days, the task force was dissolved and the 1st Cavalry Division(Airmobile) took over the operational control of all the former components ofthe task force. Operations shifted eastward inside of Cambodia north of Bu Dop.A second emergency medical team from Headquarters and Company A, 15th MedicalBattalion (Airmobile), was emplaced at Bu Dop.
To summarize the operation, the 15th Medical Battalion (Airmobile) moved a"jump" command post forward to Quan Loi, which consisted of thebattalion commander, S-3, an assistant, and the air ambulance platoon leader andhis operations officer. Two emergency medical teams were established, one atKatum and one at Bu Dop. Each team treated about 30 emergency cases. The airambulances of the 15th Medical Battalion (Airmobile) were positioned at avariety of places within the area of operations to insure adequate evacuationcapability. The 45th Medical Company (Air Ambulance) provided one helicopter onstandby at Quan Loi for the backhaul missions in addition to a liaison officerin the forward area with the medical battalion. This arrangement proved to beone of the key factors in providing the best possible medical care to the combattroops involved in the Cambodian operation.
Trial Reorganization
By mid-summer of 1967, it was apparent that the impact of the helicopter onthe doctrine and organization of field medical service was not transitory. Thealmost exclusive reliance upon the helicopter ambulance had virtually eliminatedthe battalion aid station, and often the division clearing station, from thechain of evacuation when a surgical, evacuation, or field hospital was within thesame flying time or distance.
Many medical officers with combat experience in Vietnam agreed that thereliance upon the helicopter was not a condition that was limited to thepeculiarities of the Vietnam conflict. Enough experience in a variety ofoperations over the previous 2 years had been accumulated to support the beliefthat the time had come to conduct the appropriate tests so that modificationscould be instituted. A hundred physicians were interviewed in the field, oftenunder combat conditions, as to their recommendations. Their reports wereanalyzed along with the critiques that had been solicited over the previous 2years.
It was apparent that realignment of personnel and organization was needed toallow for a more efficient application of medical assets. The consensus wasthat there were too many physicians in the division and brigade medicalorganization to make full use of their talents. Plans for
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a new alignment were developed and tested by the 1st Infantry Division fromOctober 1967 into March of the following year. It was estimated, on the basis ofthe test, that the number of physicians in the division could be reduced from 34to approximately 12 without impairing the quality of medical care available tothe troops.
During the test period, the brigade surgeon, artillery battalion surgeon, andengineer battalion surgeon positions were eliminated. The artillery and engineerbattalions retained their medical sections as did the aviation battalion andcavalry squadron. The medical battalion was moved from the support command todivision control and the infantry battalion medical platoons were placed underits direct command. Thus the medical battalion commander controlled all medicalresources.
As a result of the test, all the brigade, artillery, and engineer surgeonpositions were eliminated from the division medical organization. One-half ofthe wheeled ambulances and their crews were eliminated from the medicalbattalion while the medical platoons of the infantry battalions were reassignedto it. Operational control of the entire division medical service was delegatedto the division surgeon.
Exact utilization of medical officers varied with each division and brigade,but by the end of 1970, all were operating under the general concept thatphysicians should not be assigned to combat and combat support units.
