Preface
General Westmoreland's request that I prepare a monograph setting forthactivities of the Medical Department in support of the U.S. Army in Vietnam, forthe years 1965-1970, was most welcome since I had but recently returned from asecond tour in Vietnam during which time I had held the positions of Surgeon,U.S. Army, Vietnam (USARV) and Surgeon, U.S. Military Assistance Command,Vietnam (USMACV).
The purpose of this monograph is to provide a meaningful overview ofsignificant medical problems encountered and decisions made, of achievements andmistakes, and of lessons learned in Vietnam. The hope is that this study willprovide a source of information for future planning, pending the writing of thedefinitive history of the Army Medical Department in Vietnam.
Emphasis is placed on perspective rather than detail. In addition todescribing the events that occurred, I have sought to explain why decisions weremade and specific actions taken. Purely technical medical considerations are notwithin the scope of this monograph. An evaluation of the health of the commandand the care provided to battle casualties is made within an operationalcontext. The absence of more detail on the magnificent support provided bymedical elements of the U.S. Air Force and U.S. Navy to U.S. Army medical operations is the result of the needfor brevity rather than lack of appreciation.
In planning the outline of this monograph, I gave consideration to theduties, experiences, and actions which make up the total of Medical Departmentsupport of the Army. I decided to concentrate on the major subdivisions of themedical service rather than deal with all aspects superficially.
This study tells the story of the Army Medical Department in Vietnam.Hopefully, this experience will provide a basis for those who must evaluate ourcurrent doctrine and organization for those who will be responsible for planningthe medical support of future operations.
It is with no little pride that one can say that the facts give concreteevidence of the magnificent job done by the men and women who comprise the ArmyMedical Department in Vietnam.
In conclusion, I wish to acknowledge the efforts of the many contributors whomade this monograph possible. This study was, as can well be imagined, noone-man job. I am grateful to the members of the various directorates andoffices of the Office of The Surgeon General who provided me with material, andespecially appreciative of the efforts of the
members of the Historical Unit, U.S. Army Medical Department, for theirtechnical assistance in the preparation and editing of the manuscript.
Washington,D.C. SURGEON NEEL, M.D.
15 August1972 Major General, U.S. Army
Deputy Surgeon General