Field Operations, Table of Contents
SECTION III
THE ST. MIHIEL OPERATION
CHAPTER XIV
THE FIRST ARMYa
While General Pershing’s original instructions contemplated the formation of a separate American army, the German offensives of the spring of 1918 had postponed this from day to day. The German March attack first interfered; then, although an agreement was reached, on May 19, looking to an early American concentration in the Woevre, the offensive of May 27 prevented this. On July 14,another conference was held, but without definite result. The German attack, then expected, opened on the 15th, the counterattack on the 18th, and the conference was renewed on the 21st, after the favorable opening of these operations. The final success of these operations was then uncertain, but it was now arranged that two American armies should be formed, the First Army for temporary service between the Marne and the Aisne, the Second in the proper American region about Toul.
On July 24, the Bombon conference of commanders was held, which decided that all the allied forces should take the offensive. Certain definite operations were agreed upon. These were: (a) Continuation of operations on the Marne, with a view of securing, as a minimum result, the release of the Paris—Chalons railway; (b) the reduction of the Amiens salient by the British, securing the release of the Paris—Amiens railway; (c) release of the mining regions in the north, and elimination of the menace to Dunkirk and Calais; (d) reduction of the St. Mihiel salient by the Americans.
At a conference on September 2, at which there were present Marshal Foch, General Potain, and General Pershing, it was decided that the Americans should undertake two major operations. The first was the reduction of the St. Mihiel salient, to be carried out by the middle of that month; the second, now known as the Meuse-Argonne operation, was to be launched between the 20th and 25th of the month in conjunction with the French Fourth Army, both armies under the direction of General Potain.
The St. Mihiel salient was very strong, both naturally and artificially. Its western face lay on the Cotes de Meuse; on its southern face were Loupmont Ridge and Montsec, offshoots of the main heights, and the wooded and hilly ground east to the Moselle near Pont-a-Mousson. Still, it was a salient, with the inherent weaknesses of salients.
aAbstracted from Major Operations of the American Expeditionary Forces in France, 1917-1918. Prepared in the Historical Section, the Army War College.
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Its offensive value to the Germans lay in the fact that it interrupted communication on the main Paris—Nancy railway, threatening at the same time the entire region from Nancy to Bar-le-Duc, and from Bar-le-Duc to Verdun. For defensive value, it directly covered Metz and the Briey iron country; furthermore, it would have to be reduced before an offensive could be started between the Meuse and the Argonne against the German lateral communications.
The reduction of the salient itself, then, had become necessary; how success should be exploited, whether directly toward Briey or by a separate operation toward Mezieres, was not for American, but for the allied headquarters to say. But the first step, the local operation itself, would mean not only a moral but a material gain, in restoring communications and territory, and in substituting a threat against the German communications for the existing one against the French.
At the beginning of the operation, the enemy line, which had held with few changes for four years, ran along the woods and hills just north of the Pont-a-Mousson—St. Mihiel highway, touching the Meuse at St. Mihiel, then turned north, crossed the Cotes de Meuse, and dropped off into the Woevre plain at Combres, just under Les Eparges; from here it followed the foot of the heights north past Verdun. Behind this line was the fighting area called the Wilhelm zone, following, in a general way, theshape of the salient. The Schroeter zone filled the interior of the salient, behind an organized line from Harville, east of Fresnes, around by Buxieres, northeast of St. Mihiel, to Rembercourt, northeast of Thiaucourt. On the line Harville—Rembercourt began the withdrawal position, which here consisted of two zones, called Michel I and Michel II. The Michel I zone contained an organized position which was connected with the front-line defenses by a switch line at the Braquis salient, north of Fresnes, and on the other flank ran into the outer defenses of Metz. The Michel II zone, behind this, showed little preparation. Wire was a prominent feature of the defenses everywhere; the chief of staff of the American Fourth Corps, after a reconnaissance, characterized the whole salient as a "sea of wire." It was believed, however, that much of the wire was rusted and in poor repair, which proved to be the case.
The general plan for the reduction of the salient called for two simultaneous attacks, one from the south through the wooded country east of Montsec, and one from the west, across the Cotes de Meuse south of Les Eparges. Between the two were to be follow-up and exploitation attacks, amounting to a holding attack against the tip of the salient. Finally, certain exploitation was planned, to be undertaken only on orders from the army commander. The southern and western attacks were divided into three phases. Divisions were to advance as rapidly as possible to the first phase line, regardless of units on their flanks, bringing forward artillery into the captured ground to support further advance. Each corps was then to advance, regardless of the other corps, to the first day line. The second day line was the army objective, and the advance to it was to be made only on army orders.
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The intermediate attack was to neutralize the garrison at the point of the salient; follow-up the enemy’s attempts to withdraw; prevent his assembling in the Foret de la Montagne, and otherwise protect the flanks of the main attacks; and finally, in conjunction with the flank guards of those attacks, to clear out the whole salient when cut off.
The southern attack was to be made by the American First and Fourth Corps, in order from right to left. The American Fifth Corps was charged with the western attack, and the French Second Colonial Corps with the intermediate, which was to commence after the southern attack had started.
In conjunction with the western attack, the French Second Army was to attack on the left of the American First Army and protect the flank.
The front from Port-sur-Seille to a point opposite Verdun was turned over to General Pershing’s command on August 30, and the assembly commenced. It involved not only the moving of 600,000 troops, with great quantities of artillery, but putting together for the first time all the elements of the First Army, and providing for its maintenance directly by our own Service of Supply.
For supply, each of the two attacks was treated as an independent group, with its own system of hospitals, depots, and railheads. The areas involved were new to us, and all army installations had to be planned and placed during the concentration and prior to the actual passing of the command in the front line. This required many arrangements which would have been finished already had the area been occupied by our troops before.
Hitherto, supply had been handled through our regulating station at Is-sur-Tille. But this was 180 km. (111.7 miles) from the south face of the salient, and so was not suitable for forwarding supplies by truck. Besides, that station was much congested at this time, and it was apparent that one such station could not handle the supplies for the army for this operation and at the same time take care of the troops in the advance section of the Service of Supply, and the French Seventh and Eighth Armies south of Nancy. Arrangements were made, therefore, to place an American regulating station at St. Dizier. The capacity of the regulating station here was 1,000,000 men, and it could supply both the American First Army and the French Second Army of 400,000 men.
The right of the American line was held by the First Corps, General Liggett. It extended from Port-sur-Seille east of the Moselle to Limey, crossing the river just north of Pont-a-Mousson. The 82d Division, east of the river, was merely to follow up the attack on the west, which was made by the 90th, 5th, and 2d Divisions, with the 78th Division in reserve. From Limey to Richecourt was the Fourth Corps, General Dickman, with the 89th, 42d, and 1st Divisions in line and the 3d Division in reserve. The French Second Colonial Corps occupied a very broad front, from Richecourt all the way around to Mouilly, with only three divisions, the French 39th, 26th, and 2dLight Infantry Divisions, in line and none in reserve, since their attack was only a follow-up. From Mouilly to Watronville was our Fifth Corps, General Cameron, with the American 26th, French 15th Colonial, and part
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of the American 4th Divisions in line, and the rest of the 4th in reserve; the attack was to be made by the 26th and French 15th Colonial, the4th serving to connect with the French Second Army on the left.
The artillery preparation began at 1 a. m. on September12, 1918. Though the Germans had commenced their withdrawal from the salient, nevertheless the attack came as a tactical surprise, and they were thrown into the utmost confusion by long-range artillery fire upon the roads. Fire directed against the defenses proper was very effective in tearing up trenches and wire, and driving the enemy under cover. The American superiority was overpowering, especially as the enemy already was in process of withdrawing his guns, so the reaction was very light.
The southern attack started at 5 a. m., September 12,preceded by a rolling barrage, and assisted by French tanks, manned partly by French and partly by Americans. Also engineer detachments went ahead to cut wire. To the infantry the wire did not prove as great an obstacle as had been anticipated. In many places it was old and in bad condition; some gaps had been cut by the artillery, others were made by the tanks and engineers; and the enemy, demoralized by the volume of fire and by the suddenness of the attack, was unable to make a stubborn defense. All initial objectives were taken on schedule time.
The western attack started at 8 a. m. and was equally successful. The French corps in the center moved up as intended, connecting the two attacks and cleaning out the point of the salient.
The entire attack was so evidently successful that the schedule was advanced, and the salient was cut off by a junction of the Fourth and Fifth Corps at Vigneulles early in the morning of the 13th. The advance was halted on the army objective. Artillery was brought up, defense of the line was organized, patrols were pushed ahead, and the lines became stabilized along the front of the Michel I zone, above described. Many units were transferred to the theater of the next operation, the Meuse-Argonne.
The purpose of the operation had been fully accomplished. The salient had been eliminated; and, though the Germans could claim that they had retired "according to plan," nevertheless, they had the distinct impression of "a serious defeat." But more than this, the American Army was now an accomplished fact. For the first time, wire entanglements ceased to be regarded as an impossible obstacle; open warfare training became the preeminent consideration in all forces. The complete success with such small loss gave such a spirit to our troops that they became immediately available for employment in the heavy fighting of the next operation.
The strength of the First Army in the St. Mihiel operation was approximately 660,000 men, of whom about 110,000 were French.1
MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ACTIVITIES
During the period from the reduction of the Marne salient, with gradually lessening American participation there, to the time of our preparations.
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for the St. Mihiel operation, shipments of materiel from the United States had relieved somewhat, although far from satisfactory, our critical shortages. In other words, Medical Department personnel and materiel were constantly arriving, but not in proportion to meet initial shortages and at the same time keep pace with the increased needs resulting from augmentation in strength by the arrival of combattroops.2
The medical department, through its G-4 representatives, immediately took steps to cooperate with the chief surgeon of the First Army in providing, so far as possible, adequate hospitalization for the large number of casualties that were anticipated in the forthcoming St. Mihiel operation. As the number of casualties apprehended happily was not realized, we found ourselves for the first time facing a comforting situation of over hospitalization. Had the number of casualties that we had every reason to expect actually developed, the Medical Department would again have found itself short in resources and embarrassed in meeting its obligations. At this time our critical shortages were in personnel, hospital equipment, ambulances, and hospital trains. The shortage in personnel was particularly acute, as we had already withdrawn from base hospitals all the personnel that could be spared without seriously jeopardizing their efficiency. To help out in this emergency, it was necessary to secure authority for the assignment of 1,200 men of the line from the orthopedic training battalion to our mobile sanitary formations. These men suffered from flat-foot, or other joint infirmities, but their acquisition at this critical time tided us over another difficulty.2
The medical service of the American Expeditionary Force sat this time was short thousands of personnel, hundreds of ambulances, and many evacuation hospitals. These conditions necessitated the adoption of dangerous expedients, such as the use of nonmedical personnel, employment of field hospitals as evacuation hospitals, borrowing of ambulances from the French, Italians, and from base hospitals, and the depletion of divisions in training, base hospitals, and other organizations of all the personnel that could be spared. Nearly all such reserves of the Medical Department were placed at the disposal of our First Army, but all it was possible to secure were inadequate for the needs expected.3
Our borrowing resources were exercised to the utmost possibilities. Ambulances and hospital trains were borrowed from the French, who loaned freely. The situation seemed so acute that 15 United States Army ambulance sections sent to Italy direct from the United States for the Italian Government were, through its prompt cooperation, detailed to our service and brought up for use in the engagement.2
The order of battle having been issued, it became evident that separate hospitalization and evacuation facilities would have to be provided for the Toul and Verdun fronts of the salient, respectively. Provision had to be made also for evacuations from the French Second Colonial Corps (now a part of the American First Army).
The tripartite nature of the hospitalization and evacuation required that while the army chief surgeon remain at Neufchateau, both in order to co-
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ordinate the Medical Department service of the entire army and to utilize trunk-line telephone service to front and rear, he be represented on each front by officers assigned for that and related purposes. Four medical officers were therefore assigned to the Toul front, one as representative of the army chief surgeon, one as assistant to that officer, while a third was in charge of evacuation from all points west of Toul, and a fourth was director of ambulances. Similar services were performed by two medical officers on the Verdun front.4
Because of difficulties, which would have resulted in communication and liaison between the American and French contingents, and because the surgeon of the French Second Colonial Corps was thoroughly acquainted with his sector, no American represented the army chief surgeon on that front. Instead, the surgeon of the French Second Colonial Corps was charged with all duties incident to its evacuation service. Evacuations from the French Second Colonial Corps were to be made to the following points, where French hospitals already were in operation: Pierrefitte, Menil-la-Horgne, Loxeville, Revigny, Void, Vaucouleurs, Commercy, and Lignieres. Also sections of our Evacuation Hospital No. 14 and of our Toul-Justice hospital group were reserved for casualties among French artillery in the Toul area.4
Estimates of the number of casualties that would be incurred in this operation varied on the part of the different officers concerned from 30,000 to 75,000. That of the chief surgeon of the First Army was 33,000. For these were provided 6,000 beds in rear of the French Second Colonial Corps, 15,000 in the Toul area, and 4,500 in the Verdun region.5
The French Department of Armies in the East was requested to signify what fixed sanitary formations could be turned over to the American First Army by the French Eighth and Second Armies for the Toul and Verdun fronts, respectively. In addition to certain buildings previously assigned—i. e., those occupied by Evacuation Hospital No. 1 at Sebastopol—the French now turned over the following for American use: On the Toul front the entire Justice group of barracks, the Perrin-Brichambault and Luxembourg barracks and French Evacuation Hospital No. 10, all of these at Toul; the French evacuation hospitals at Pagny-sur-Meuse, Trondes, Chaligny, and La Malgrange. On the Verdun front were turned over the evacuation hospitals at Souilly, Petit Maujouy (locations only), Vaubecourt, Benoite Vaux Couvent, Rambluzin, La Morlette ,and Recourt.6 The base hospitals at Neufchateau, Bazoilles-sur-Meuse, Vittel, and Contrexeville were to be reserved for preoperative and serious postoperative cases from the area east of St. Mihiel, and the base hospitals at Chaumont, Rimaucourt, and Langres were reserved for the same class of casualties from the area west of that point. The base hospital at Dijon was to be reserved as a preoperative hospital in the event of the other hospitals becoming overcrowded.7
Before troops were mobilized for this offensive, a few army medical units had been installed, as follows, to serve American needs: Evacuation Hospital No. 1, Sebastopol Barracks, 3 km. (1.8 miles) north of Toul; Mobile Hospital No.39, Aulnois-sous-Vertuzey; Convalescent Unit No. 1, Toul.
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Medical formations mobilized for this offensive, including the foregoing, were located at the points now to be mentioned:8
Toul Front, Southern Front.:
Sebastopol Barracks.-Evacuation Hospital No. 1,Mobile Hospital No. 3, Evacuation Ambulance Company No. 8.
Aulnois-sous-Vertuzey.-Mobile Hospital No. 39.
Toul, Justice group.-Base Hospital No. 45,arrived August 20; Base Hospital No. 51, arrived August 27. These units were established under the jurisdiction of the Service of Supplies and technically were not under Army control. They functioned, however, as evacuation hospitals. Evacuation Hospital No. 14, at Perrin-Brichambault Barracks, arrived August 16. Evacuation Hospital No. 3, same location, arrived August 22. Gas Hospital conducted by personnel from Base Hospital No. 45.Battalion of reclassified soldiers, arrived August 24.
La Marche barracks annex.-Neurologic unit No. 2(from Base Hospital No. 117) in Favier Barracks, arrived August 25. Army Red Cross Hospital No. 114, in Luxembourg Barracks, arrived September 4. Contagious disease hospital, operated by Contagious Unit 1, already on duty in this area. Ambulance Companies132 and 319, arrived September 3. Evacuation Ambulance Company No. 7, arrived September 1;Company 10, arrived August 31; Companies 11 and 12, arrived September 9; United States Army Ambulance Section 599, arrived September 1.
Chaligny.-Evacuation Hospital No. 13, arrived August 23; Field Hospital 162, 1st Corps, established August 2.
La Malgrange (near Nancy).-Field Hospital No.163, established August 22. United States Army Ambulance Section 601, arrived September 6.
Trondes.-Field Hospital No. 161, 1st Corps, established August 27. Mobile Hospital No. 4, arrived August 24. Ambulance Company No.310, arrived September 3.
Pagny-sur-Meuse.-Evacuation Hospital No. 12,arrived August 29. Field Hospital No. 117, established August 28. Evacuation Ambulance Company No. 4, arrived August 28.
Sorcy.-Evacuation Hospital No. 11, arrived September 11. Field Hospital No. 41 and Ambulance Company 41, established August 28.
Western Front:
Vaubecourt.-Evacuation Hospital No. 9, arrived August 29.
Souilly.-Evacuation Hospital No. 6, arrived August 25, and Evacuation Hospital No. 7, arrived August 24. Evacuation Ambulance Company No. 2, arrived September 13. United States Army Ambulance Service Section No. 521, arrived August 29, United States Army Ambulance Service Section No. 530, arrived September 6.
Petit Maujouy.-Evacuation Hospital No. 8,arrived August 26. Evacuation Ambulance Companies Nos. 1 and 6, arrived August 28.
La Morlette.-Mobile Hospital No. 1, arrived September 5.
Recourt.-Mobile Hospital No. 2, arrived August28.
Benoite Vaux Couvent.-Neurological Unit No. 1(from Base Hospital 117), arrived September 2.
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Rambluzin.-Gas hospital operated by personnel of Ambulance Company No. 108, arrived August 28.
Froidos.-United States Army Ambulance Service Section No. 602, arrived September 6.8
The medical supply dump for the Western Front was located at Souilly, and for the Southern Front at Toul. The French general hospital at Bar-le-Duc provided 2,200 beds for an overflow of American casualties.5
The ambulance companies which were attached to all evacuation hospitals were reinforced by busses, both ordinary and sight-seeing.9
Ten army ambulance sections were promised by the French, but only three reported. Of these, one was held in reserve and the other two were used for French casualties.9
United States Army Ambulance Service Sections No. 520and No. 570 served the First Army Corps sanitary train; Nos. 542 and 604 served the Fifth Army Corps sanitary train.8
Though it was appreciated that the wounded should be moved from the front to hospitals as rapidly as possible, it was evident that their condition upon arrival would be gravely impaired if their transport was hurried or if they did not receive treatment to prepare them for the ambulance journey. This was particularly true of the severely shocked and of those intoxicated by phosgene. Orders were therefore given directing that facilities be provided for preliminary treatment of shocked and gassed cases near the front, and forbidding the speeding of ambulances.10
The following order, prepared by the army surgeon, gives such directions as were transmitted to the First, Fourth, and Fifth Corps.
HEADQUARTERS FIRSTARMY,
AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCES,
September 6, 1918
Annex No. 6 (Field Order No. 9).
Subject: Plan of evacuation of sick and wounded and supply.
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I. EVACUATION OF SICK AND WOUNDED | ||
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(a) 1st Corps, 4th Corps, and Army Troops | ||
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Severely wounded: | ||
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Mobile Hospital No. 39 at Aulnois-sous-Vertuzey, km. south of Aulnois on Aulnois—Vertuzey Road. | |
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Evacuation Hospital No. 1 at Sebastopol, 5 km. north of Toul on Toul—Menil La Tour Road. | |
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Evacuation Hospital No. 13 at Chaligny, 10 km. southwest of Nancy. | |
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Slightly wounded: | ||
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Provisional hospital, Sorcy R. R. station, about 1 km. north of Sorcy. Reached by one-way road leaving Aulnois—Sorcy Road just north of bridge over R. R. and crossing over canal. | |
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Provisional evacuation hospital at Pagny-sur-Meuse railroad station. Provisional evacuation hospital, 1 km. north of Trondes, on Trondes—Menil—La Tour road. | |
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Evacuation Hospital No. 14 in the Perrin-Brichambault section of the Justice group of baracks just south of Toul. | |
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Provisional evacuation hospital at La Malgrange, 1 km. south of Nancy on Nancy—Richard—Menil road. | |
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Gas hospital, La Marche section of Justice group of barracks just south of Toul. | |
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Hospital for contagious diseases in Justice group of barracks just south of Toul. | |
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Base Hospital No. 45, La Marche section, and Base Hospital No. 51, Favier section of Justice group of barracks just south of Toul. | |
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Evacuation ambulance companies will be stationed; one at Dieulouard, one at Domevre-en-Haye, and one at Cornieville, subject to call of regimental or battalion commanders of army artillery units for transportation of wounded from first aid stations to evacuation hospitals as designated above. | |
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(b) 5th Corps | ||
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Evacuation Hospital No. 8, at Petit-Maujouy, 1 km. east of Senoncourt on Senoncourt—Ancemont road. Mobile Hospital No. 2, at Recourt. A careful sorting must be effected at divisional sorting stations to preclude the danger of these hospitals being overwhelmed with slight or gassed cases necessitating a secondary evacuation to Souilly, where they should have been sent originally. | |
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Slightly wounded and sick: All troops |
Evacuation Hospitals Nos. 6 and 7 at Souilly. Evacuation Hospital No. 9 at Vaubecourt. | |
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Gassed: All troops |
Gas hospital, Rambluzin, 3 km. east of Heippes, on Heippes—Recourt road. | |
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Nervous and shell concussion: All troops |
Benoite-Vaux, 7 km. southeast of Souilly on Recourt-Neuville road (selected cases). | |
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(c) 2d Colonial Corps (French) | ||
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II. EVACUATION OF ANIMALS | ||
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1st and 4th Corps |
To army evacuation stations at Jeanne d’Arc Caserne, 3 miles east of Toul, on Toul—Nancy road. | |
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5th Corps |
To army animal evacuation station at Souilly. | |
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2d Colonial Corps (French) |
As directed by corps commander. | |
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III. RAIL HEADS | ||
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1st Corps: | ||
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Belleville. | |
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Belleville. | |
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Gare-de la-Ferme-Boyer. | |
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Gare-de la-Ferme-Boyer. | |
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Toul. | |
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Belleville. | |
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4th Corps: | ||
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Manoncourt. | |
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Manoncourt. | |
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Sorcy. | |
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Toul. | |
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Manoncourt. | |
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5th Corps: | ||
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Rattentout. | |
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Rattentout. | |
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Rattentout. | |
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2d Colonial Corps (French) |
As directed by corps commander. | |
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Army reserve: | ||
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Champigneulles. | |
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Sorcy. | |
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As separately assigned. | |
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NOTE.-The hospitals at Trondes, operated by Field Hospital 161, Ambulance Company 161, and Mobile Hospital No. 4 were omitted from the battle order and were but little used in comparison with others. However, had any severe resistance been encountered by the center divisions they would have been our foremost evacuation center. From this point, in contradistinction to others, any required number of hospital trains could have been dispatched.
The activities of certain army units of the Medical Department will be discussed below, after the histories of the several divisions engaged have been given.
An agreement was made with the French for placing 45 of their hospital trains at the disposal of our regulating officer at St. Dizier. These, with the 20 American trains already available, it was thought would be sufficient.4
American hospital trains were to be employed for the long hauls to base hospitals in the intermediate and base sections which required travel from 8 to 24 hours, and the French trains were to be used for evacuations to the base hospitals in the advance section.7
The plan of train evacuations was essentially that adopted and issued as an order by General Headquarters on the 29th of August, 1918. The regulating station at Is-sur-Tille was to receive reports concerning bed space direct from the base hospitals in the advance section and from the chief surgeon, S. O. S., for the base hospitals in the intermediate and base sections. This regulating station then allotted beds in all base hospitals to the regulating station at St. Dizier, which handled the train evacuations from the First Army area.7
Secondary evacuations—that is, from one base hospital to another—were regulated by the Is-sur-Tille station.7
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As the battle developed, the vast majority of the casualties drained into the evacuation and base hospitals in and about Toul. Train evacuations were immediately begun as the casualties arrived, but as the operation succeeded even beyond the highest hopes, the number of these happily was so small that the system of train evacuations adopted for this engagement was never actually given a thorough trial.7
As mentioned elsewhere, there were only 17 hospital trains dispatched from the Toul front, which evacuated 6,539 cases, including a large number of sick to make room for battle casualties, and only 5 trains from the Verdunfront, evacuating 725.7
REFERENCES
(1) Final Report of Gen. John J. Pershing, September 1,1919.
(2) Report on activities of G-4-B, medical group, fourth section, general staff, G. H. Q., A. E. F., by Col. S. H. Wadhams, M. C., chief of section, December 31, 1918, 56. On file, Historical Division, S. G. O.
(3) Medical activities of the American Expeditionary Forces in the Zone of the Armies, by Col. A. N. Stark, M. C., chief surgeon, First Army, undated, 11. On file, Historical Division, S. G. O.
(4) Final report of chief surgeon, First Army, upon the St. Mihiel and Meuse-Argonne offensives, undated, 4, 5. On file, Historical Division, S.G. O.
(5) Medical activities of the American Expeditionary Forces in the Zone of the Armies, by Col. A. N. Stark, M. C., chief surgeon, First Army, undated, 9. On file, Historical Division, S. G. O.
(6) Final Report of chief surgeon, First Army, upon the St. Mihiel and Meuse-Argonne offensives, undated, 2. On file, Historical Division, S. G.O.
(7) Evacuation system of a field army, by Col. C. R. Reynolds, M. C., chief surgeon, Second Army, undated, 27. On file, Historical Division, S.G. O.
(8) Letter from chief surgeon, First Army, to assistant chief of staff, G-3, February 6, 1919. Subject: Report of Medical Department units, First Army. On file, Historical Division, S. G. O.
(9) Final report of chief surgeon, First Army, upon St. Mihiel and Meuse-Argonne offensives, undated, 5. On file, Historical Division, S. G. O.
(10) Evacuation system in the Zone of the Armies, by Col. A. N. Stark, M. C., chief surgeon, First Army, undated, 1. On file, Historical Division, S. G. O.
