Book Five
THE MARAUDERS AND THE MICROBES
A Record of Righteous Indignation
THE MARAUDERS AND THE MICROBES
James E. T. Hopkins, M.D., Henry G. Stelling, M.D., andTracy S. Voorhees
"VICTORY AGAIN. Radio from George Marshall on U.S. units for Stepchild.Only 3,000, but the entering wedge. Can we use them! And how!"--StilwellDiary, 2 Sept. 1943.
"* * * 12 men left in 2 [Battalion] G[alahad]. Beach and Mageesick. Shudmak discouraged. [Galahad] is just shot."--Stilwell Diary,30 May 1944.1
Stilwell's terse terms of jubilance and despair sum up the historyof the first and principal action of American infantry in the Burma campaignsof World War II. At Quebec, in August 1943, Stilwell's sponsors securedthe promise of an American force as a token match for the British 14thArmy and the Chinese Army in India. The Quebec planners supposed that theAmerican regiment would serve with General Wingate's long range penetrationgroup. This notion did not suit Stilwell, however. He did not like Wingate'splan for isolated action; his national pride was offended. Rather, he wantedthe regiment to fight in close conjunction with the main Chinese advance,acting as a spearhead or as a flanking weapon. Wingate resisted Stilwell'sclaims, and the Americans had already started toward Burma before Stilwell'sauthority over them was assured.2
To raise the regiment, the War Department issued a call for volunteersand rapidly assembled the officers and men who responded from the UnitedStates, Trinidad, Puerto Rico, and the South and Southwest Pacific Theaters.On 29 October, the troops arrived at Bombay,
1Stilwell Papers, Hoover Institution on War,Revolution, and Peace, Stanford University. The quoted passages are alsofound in the published version of the diaries, pp. 219 and (in part) 301.Stepchild was the cover name for Burma campaign plans. Galahadwas the code title of the regiment of American infantry which journalistsdubbed "Merrill's Marauders" and the Army officially knew asthe 5307th Composite Unit (Provisional); Stilwell always preferred theoriginal code name. Lieutenant Colonels George A. McGee, Jr., and CharlesE. Beach commanded the 2d and 3d Battalions of the regiment. Maj. MelvinA. Schudmak, M.C., was the Regimental Surgeon. The appropriate militarysymbol for battalion appears in the quoted passage.
2Stilwell Diary, 1 Sept. 1944 (Black and White Book), 3 Jan.1944 (Notebook). Also: NCAC History, pp. 39-46; Merrill's Marauders,pp. 8-16; Eldridge, Wrath in Burma, pp. 179-180; Romanus and Sunderland,II, pp. 34-36; Ogburn, Marauders, pp. 49, 60-62. Stilwell wroteon 1 September: "What's the matter with our people? After a long struggle,we get a handful of U.S. troops, & by God, they tell us they are tooperate under WINGATE! We don't know enough to handle them, but that exhibitionistdoes! And what has he done? Made an abortive jaunt to Katha, got caughtE. of the Irrawaddy & came out, with a loss of 40%--Net result, cutthe RR that our people had already cut [by air attacks]. Now he's an expert.This is enough to discourage Christ."
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stopped briefly at a staging camp in nearby Deolali, and then movedto Deogarh, Bengal Province, for their training. The unsettled commandsituation left them under improvised administrative and supply arrangementsfor much of this time. The troops were restive under the general supervisionof Wingate's headquarters. Their self-respect as volunteers leaked awayin the weeks when they did not even bear an official military designation.Their enthusiasm was scarcely increased by the vague and awkward nomenclaturefinally adopted--5307th Composite Unit (Provisional).3
The 5307th was organized into three battalions of infantry, withoutartillery support but with 700 pack animals. Each battalion was dividedinto two combat teams. Of special importance was an air supply section,for it was conceived at the outset that the 5307th, like Wingate's SpecialForce, would depend on aircraft for supplies and for casualty evacuation.Twelve officers and 84 men composed the medical establishment, enough toprovide detachments for each combat team.
The volunteers presumably were ready for a "hazardous mission,"and were in a "high state of physical ruggedness and stamina."Some were battle-tested. Accepting Wingate's doctrines, the planners assumedthat the regiment would be able to stand 3 months of jungle fighting. Atthe end of that time, its condition would be so bad that there would beno use trying to salvage it by sending in replacements. Its survivors wouldneed prolonged rest at the rear before they could again be sent into combat.4
3Romanus and Sunderland, ibid.; Ogburn,pp. 29-34, 46-62, 282-283; Merrill's Marauders and NCAC History,ibid. The medical establishment in the Theater was evidently notamong those branches privy to the plan for 5307th. Tamraz records in hisdiary his unawareness until the end of October, when he was suddenly askedby the British what he proposed to do for 5307 hospitalization: see p.171. Williams, the Theater Surgeon, wrote the editor in 1947 that "thewhole project was so hush-hush that I did not hear of it until the daybefore they were committed to action in Upper Burma." In this regardit is notable that from September onward, Tamraz was in almost daily touchwith officers who were joining South East Asia Command headquarters, thenforming. The 5307th was, of course, part of the SEAC. Williams, accordingto entries in his diary, met very highly placed medical officers from theOffice of The Surgeon General, who were visiting from the United Statesin the latter part of September. He also conferred at Ledo in Septemberwith General Boatner, and with the two principal medical officers in thecombat command, Vernon W. Petersen and L. N. Simmons. In December he metwith the Rear Echelon and SOS Surgeons and he was at Ledo, looking intothe outbreak of scrub typhus. It is difficult to imagine that none of thesepeople mentioned 5307th to Tamraz or Williams. But it is probable, in viewof their comments or recollections, that they were not officially drawninto the planning discussions or asked to make special arrangements for5307th while it was conceived as a branch of Wingate's Special Force underthe authority of SEAC.
4Merrill's Marauders, pp. 8-14; Ogburn, pp. 9, 29; Romanusand Sunderland, II, p. 34; "Organization into Combat Teams for Combat,"an appendix to "Galahad--5307th Composite Unit (Prov)--Merrill's Marauders--1September 1943--1 June 1944": Stilwell Papers, Folder I, Section 2."Galahad" was the draft of the published Merrill's Marauders.The figure given for the medical establishment comes from the diary ofCol. Robert P. Williams, 23 Feb. 1944, when he visited the 5307th in Burma.The size of combat team detachments, according to "Organization intoCombat Teams," just cited, is given as two officers and 15 men. Comparativelythere were nine officers and 126 men in a standard regimental medical detachment.
Most of the officers were among the original volunteers. Two were addedto the 5307th after it finished training. They came from the 14th and 73dEvacuation Hospitals. At the same time, 15 enlisted men were transferredto 5307th from the 99th Station Hospital: Tamraz Diary, 14 January (thepassage is not quoted in part III of the diary because it is an entry ofhis headquarters staff, made while he was away on an inspection trip).
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For several months, Col. Charles N. Hunter, the senior officer, ledthe 5307th. When Stilwell placed Brig. Gen. Frank D. Merrill in commandon 6 January 1944, the period for the development of corps d'esprit hadnearly ended. However, the loyalty already attached to Hunter quickly expandedto include Merrill. Ordered to the combat zone immediately upon assumingcommand, Merrill led the 5307th into position south of Shingbwiyang. Asthe men completed their 100-mile march from Ledo on 21 February, Stilwellwatched them come in and noted approvingly: "Tough looking lot ofbabies. Told M. what his job would be * * * we can go now."5
Tough the Marauders certainly proved to be. They looked the partsuggested by the gaudy name which newsmen gave them at Shingbwiyang. Theystayed in the jungle until the first week in June, marching and fightingfor the full 4 months they were there. They withstood the silent terrorof ambushed jungle trails. They survived while their clothes, boots, andsometimes their flesh rotted in the heat and damp. They carried their sickand wounded with them to jungle clearings or river sandbars from whichlight planes flew the casualties to safety. They fought pitched battlesat their road- and trail-blocks. They crossed a 7,000-foot-high range ofmountains in the rain on half-cleared trails and attacked at the end ofthe march without a rest. When they could fight no longer, they had enoughmeanness left in them to rebel, to a degree in deed and in spirit utterly,against what they felt were unlawful, ignorant, and harsh demands stillbeing made upon them.
When Stilwell appraised the Marauders as they started their firstattack mission, he doubtless thought of what had been heard of them duringtheir training period. They had been hard to handle. They despised theaccommodations and rations which the British produced. Cliques from differentoutfits resisted assimilation; to break them up, the troops were finallyreshuffled among the several battalions. Soon after they reached India,some of the men went "over the hill" for women and drink.
But they had "shaped up" by the time they reached Burmaafter a last, wild Christmas spree. Stilwell probably put their unrulinesson the credit side of the book, if he thought of it at all seriously. TheMarauders fitted the traditional image of volunteer, expeditionary troopsin their slouchiness, touchiness, and air of rascality. The fact that manynursed grievances did not show. But the time had been and would come againwhen their recollection of real or imagined promises of special amenitiesand perquisites would surface and fester.
5Stilwell Diary, 21 Feb. 1944 (Notebook); Merrill'sMarauders, pp. 14-16; Romanus and Sunderland, II, p. 146; Ogburn, pp.47-88. Ogburn recalled: "We did not feel tough--our complaints wouldhave kept a corps of chaplains occupied--but it was gratifying to be thoughtso" (p. 81). In 1947, Colonel Williams (the Theater Surgeon) wroteto the editor: "These volunteers were a tough lot, capable in theirown estimation of licking the entire Jap Army." The picture that remainedin his mind was of a unit which "had gotten so out of hand that theBritish had asked CBI to 'please for God's sake take them off our hands.'" In part, evidently, the toughness was revealed (as he saw them)in lack of discipline and organizational structure.
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Two incidents might have received special attention in Stilwell'ssummary view of his troops. Not long after the 5307th reached India, Theaterauthorities began to hear rumors that they were in everything except a"high state of physical ruggedness." By November, the incidenceof malaria was so high that the Acting Theater Malariologist, Maj. F. A.Mantz, MC, hastened to Deogarh for an inspection. His report was startling.It was "incumbent upon any medical officer," he wrote, "surveyinga unit with a current malaria rate of 4080/1000 annum; with 7.4% of themen non-effective each week because of malaria; and 57.3% of the remainderinfected during the past year, to consider that unit as unfit for operationsbefore adequate rest treatment and replacement is provided."6If it was impossible to replace the infected men, he proposed the removalof all soldiers who had had three or more malaria relapses and whose lastrelapse had occurred since 1 September 1943. The remainder of the malariavictims should be put on a regimen of complete rest while being treated.He estimated that the three-relapse policy would eliminate 12.8 percentof the troops in the 3d Battalion, where the infected men were most numerous.No heed was taken of the more radical of his two proposals. No men werereleased, but training was suspended in the 3d Battalion for those menundergoing a full course of treatment for malaria. Suppressive Atabrinetherapy then was resumed.7
The episode revealed more than the deep inroads malaria had madein the regiment. Just as significant was the fact that it had broken throughthe routine of Atabrine suppressive discipline. The combination of enforcedand self-regulated measures of hygiene obviously had collapsed, as oneespecially virulent manifestation of the loose morale of the troops enroute to and during their first weeks in India. The
6As reported in n. 90, p. 24, the malaria ratefor CBI troops exceeded that anywhere else in the Army. In 1943 it ranfrom 264/1000/annum in June to 322/1000/annum in August. In November therate fell below 200/1000/annum. Thus Mantz's recommendations must be consideredconservative, observing due respect to the priority which commanders gaveto training.
7Letter, RE Headquarters CBI, "Report of Malaria Survey,"29 Nov. 1943, Deputy Theater Surgeon to Chief of Staff, inclosing "MalariaStatus of 5307th Provisional Regiment," 26 Nov. 1943, from Mantz tothe Commanding Officer, 5307th Regiment; "War Diary of 5307th CompositeUnit (Provisional)," by Maj. John M. Jones, Inf., appendix 16 of NCACHistory; Letter No. 6398/A/D.M.S. 4., GHQ (I), Medical Directorate, "MedicalArrangements--5307 Prov. Regt. U.S. Army," 31 Dec. 1943, Brig. J.S. Fulton to Col. John Tamraz. Jones's "War Diary" seems to havebeen excepted from the general security declassification of the StilwellPapers in the Hoover Institution. However, the present editor used andcited it in his own work (Medical Service in Combat), and Ogburnused it in Marauders. The continuation of security reservationsappears unnecessary.
After leaving CBI, Captain Hopkins, whose reports on 5307th are publishedherein, composed some "Notes" for an article he did not complete.In most respects, the material is less circumstantial than his other statements,but some details are included which are not so precisely presented elsewhere.Malaria rates, he said in the Notes, had run as high as 8,190/1,000/annumin one unit which contributed troops to 3d Battalion; in another, the ratewas 4,000/1,000/annum; in a third, 2,000/1,000/annum; and in a fourth,1,000/1,000/annum. In November, when Mantz surveyed the troops, 213 casesof malaria had appeared in 3 weeks. By then, over 10 percent of the troopshad had over four attacks of malaria; over 50 percent had had one or moreattacks. They had not taken Atabrine during the preceding month. In December,all 3d Battalion men were treated for malaria. Thereafter they were expectedto take Atabrine every day. "The malaria rate promptly dropped":Hopkins Notes, pp. 1-2.
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need to restore Atabrine discipline was as pressing as the need totreat the relapses.
One final incident relating to the health of the command occurredbefore the 5307th went into battle. Stilwell noted the number of men whofell from the ranks on the march down from Ledo to Ningbyen, Burma. Whenhe met the officers to give them their final instructions, he told themthat most of the march casualties had been found fit for duty by the hospitalsto which they had gone. Many of them, indeed, had not been sick enoughto have been evacuated at all. They were being immediately returned tothe regiment. "He directed the regimental surgeon [Maj. Melvin A.Schudmak, MC] to straighten out some of the younger inexperienced Medicson how to handle minor sickness without resorting to sending every manwith a case of diarrhea or a headache to the hospital."8
Whether or not Stilwell was quoted exactly, the touch of sarcasmis authentic; so is the hint that fortitude is the sovereign remedy fortropical diseases. The tone is that of the hardy commander instructinghis tender-minded medical staff in its obligations to a tough-minded legion.But at least some of the medical officers of the 5307th were not so inexperiencedor soft-hearted as to evacuate typical cases of "Delhi belly"or trifling F.U.O.--Fever of Undetermined Origin. Henry G. Stelling, inthe 2d Battalion, had already served at a tropical military station beforehe volunteered to join the 5307th. So had James E. T. Hopkins, who hadcome to the 3d Battalion from combat service in the South and SouthwestPacific, where he began his studies of the manner and cause of battle casualtiesin jungle warfare. With the information he had painstakingly collectedon the battlefield, he could account for the exact nature and circumstancesof death, wounds, and injury of several hundred troops. These vital datahe was prepared to correlate with the tactical and disciplinary aspectsof training and combat which had affected the soldiers' vulnerability.9
Soon after the Marauders left the battlefield in June, these officerswrote extended reports on the campaign.10 Quite frankly,both were
8"War Diary of 5307th," p. 29.
9U.S. Army Medical Service, Wound Ballistics, chapterIV and appendixes A, B, and C. The editors of the work pay special honorto Hopkins in their preface, p. xiv.
10Various circumstantial details regarding the Hopkins and Stellingreports will become evident in the presentation which follows. Hopkins,Stelling, and Capt. Abraham Lewis Kolodny, MC, of the 2d Battalion, sentstatements in July "through channels"--headquarters of the 475thInfantry, 5332d Brigade, Northern Combat Area Command, and CBI Theater--toThe Surgeon General, Washington, D.C. It was October before the reportsreached Theater Headquarters, where they were held for an unknown lengthof time, although eventually they found their way to the addressee. Meanwhile,Hopkins was sent home and left a copy of his report with the HistoricalUnit, Office of The Surgeon General, in the early autumn. Copies of allthree reports are now among Army records deposited in Kansas City, Mo.Copies of the Hopkins and Stelling reports also are among the StilwellPapers in the Hoover Institution. Kolodny's report, dated 19 July 1944,is quite brief. Its tone is formal and the information it reports is muchmore fully presented by Hopkins. He joins Hopkins and Stelling in believingthat the amount of chronic disease in the troops is excessive, and thatfacilities for convalescent and resting troops are inadequate. Ogburn (Marauders,p. ix) states that Kolodny once started to gather materials for a book,but turned them over to Ogburn instead.
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briefs in the case of the 5307th against the Army. They presentedthe medical history of the regiment to support their authors' contentionthat by June 1944 the Marauders were honorably "used up"and had not, as rumor had it, simply lost their nerve. Hopkins and Stellingalso wished to protect their men from further combat until they had beenthoroughly rested and the sick and wounded had completely recovered theirhealth. To add urgency to their case, they had learned that convalescingtroops were to be sent back into the lines, and that under the War Department'scurrent policies, the Marauders were no more eligible for return to theUnited States than a rear echelon clerk with similar months of overseasduty to his credit.11
The reports are unusually valuable, despite their special pleading.In the first place, the medical records of the 5307th were scanty and unreliable.It never composed the statutory "annual medical report," an omissionwhich is understandable in the light of its troubled history and its breakupin August 1944. But the fact that most of the Marauders left combat asmedical evacuees means that the regiment's medical history mustbe reconstructed if its combat record is to be explained. In the secondplace, both reports came from the battalion level, without having beenfiltered by administrative screens erected by regimental or higher headquarters.Thus they are less remote, less generalized, and less conventionalizedthan most of the documents available to the military historian. Becauseof their origin, the reports omit some lines of perspective which the observerneeds to obtain a clear picture of the 5307th. But at the same time, thepicture they outline is undisguised by shadings of tact or bureaucraticself-consideration. Unlike the ordinary history of a medical unit, theydo not try to present a success story. They explain a failure.
The reports have been divided into three comparable parts. The firstgives the authors' versions of the origin, organization, and precombatexperience of the Marauders. The second and third portions treat the campaignin March and April and in May 1944, periods which constituted distinctchapters in the Marauders' history.
11By August, however, many became eligibleand did return to the United States. At about the same time, Hopkins, Stelling,and Kolodny were shifted out of the combat regiment.
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The Hopkins Report
5307th Composite Unit (Prov)
Third Battalion Medical Detachment
A.P.O. #487
c/o PM, N.Y.C., NY
22 June 1944
Subject: Preliminary Report of Physical and Mental Condition of Menand Officers of the 3rd Battalion with Recommendations
To: The Surgeon General etc.12
Introduction.--a. The physical and mental condition ofthe 3rd Bn. has now reached a point where when the men are returned fromBurma and are discharged from the hospital to gather as a unit, its functionwill (in my opinion) be poor even as a garrison unit backed by the bestefforts of the medical and other officers. This is a preliminary historyof the 3rd Bn., many of the figures are not accurate to the last man. Ithas to be remembered that the personnel came from many organizations. Nomedical records came with them. We have constantly been on the move andhave just returned from four months in Burma.
b. This report is made with hope that adequate steps will betaken immediately by proper military authorities in this area. It is desiredthat if they are unable to remedy the situation adequate steps will betaken by the War Department.
Brief history of formation and work of the 3rd Battalion as wellas its relation to the 2nd and 1st Battalions of this unit--a.In September 1943 volunteers were gathered from four divisions which hadseen action in the Southwest Pacific. Approximately 600 men and officerscongregated in New Caledonia to form a special Infantry Battalion. Divisionsfurnished men approximately as follows: 37th 150; 43rd 150; 25th 100; Americal200.
b. The 37th Division has been overseas since May 1942. The 147thInfantry sailed in March 1942, served on Tonga and Samoa and fought onGuadalcanal from November 1942 through May 1943. Infantry Regiments 148and 145 served in New Zealand, Fiji, Guadalcanal, and the Russell Islands.They fought on New Georgia as well as surrounding islands with high casualties.
12There are several copies of the Hopkins reports.One is in the files of the Historical Unit, Army Medical Service, D/A.Another, with the original letter of transmittal, is in the Stilwell Papers,Hoover Library, Folder 88, No. 1. In his transmittal letter, which he addressedto Col. Charles N. Hunter, Hopkins stated that he was being evacuated froma hospital, perhaps destined for the United States. He suspected that theauthorities considered him persona non gratis, but he hoped he couldat least present his case to the officials in New Delhi. To Hunter, personally,he wrote: "We are backing you to the limit out here and feel thatyou are a shining light in a dark basket."
In the text of the report here presented, trivial typographical errorshave been corrected. Bracketed insertions are supplied by the editor.
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c. The 43rd Division made up of the 172nd Infantry, 169th Infantry,and 103rd Infantry departed overseas October lst 1942. They spent timein New Zealand, New Caledonia, New Hebrides, and Guadalcanal. This Divisionoccupied the Russell Islands in February 1943 and made the initial landingsin the New Georgia Group. They took extremely heavy battle casualties.
d. The 25th Division with the 27th Infantry and 161st Infantryarrived on Guadalcanal during the first week in January 1943. The majorityof these men had been overseas before Pearl Harbor. They had seen actionthere and at Midway (in some cases). These men played a major role in theGuadalcanal Campaign and later participated with very reduced strengthin the New Georgia Campaign where they had a very high casualty rate.
e. Two regiments of the Americal Division departed overseas inJanuary 1942 and the 164th Infantry in March 1942. After many months onNew Caledonia this division carried the greater part of the GuadalcanalCampaign suffering heavy casualties. They had a short rest in Fiji beforethe volunteers joined this unit [the 5307th].
f. During the early part of October the newly organized battalionboarded the Army Transport Lurline to travel by way of several AustralianPorts to India. On the boat we found two other Infantry Battalions, the1st Battalion from Panama and the Continental United States and the 2ndBattalion made up of men and officers from the Caribbean Theatre.
g. At Brisbane seven officers from the 41st Division, and 150enlisted men from the 32nd Division and 125 enlisted men from the 98thPack Artillery joined the 3rd Battalion. The majority of the men had beenoverseas over 18 months.
h. The Regiment landed November 1st at Bombay and traveled bytrain to a British Transit Camp at Deolali, India. In three weeks afterrigorous training here, we gathered at an isolated spot, Deogarh in CentralProvince, India. A new tent camp was soon formed. The 3d Battalion transferred160 men and 6 officers to the lst and 2nd Battalions and took an equalnumber of men and officers from them. We organized and trained accordingto Wingate tactics. In December General Merrill joined us and we knew thatwe would work under General Stilwell. Training with numerous field exercisescontinued until late January when we were to leave for Burma.
i. During the latter part of January 100 men from the 31st and33rd Q.M. Pack organizations with numerous animals were attached to the3rd Battalion. We were also given a few men and officers who came to usby way of North Africa.
j. During our training period in India the 3rd Battalion sent115 men to Regiment for duty. These men were considered by the MedicalOfficers to be unfit for combat. (See miscellaneous Disease). 79 men weresent to the 181st General Hospital at Karachi and 36 to the 97th StationHospital at Agra. A few of these men got back to duty before we left forBurma.13
13Hopkins Notes: "Each battalion transferredmen with chronic disease and psychiatric complaints as well as poor generalphysical and mental fitness to regimental headquarters where they wereto pack parachutes and drop them out of planes to the unit in Burma. Thefirst and second battalions each sent about 20 men, the third battalionsent 115 as well as 70 to the 181st General Hospital. The majority of thehospital cases did not return in time for combat. The 185 men were replacedby quartermaster pack and casual troops who had not been in combat."
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k. After boat and train travel the entire regiment arrived atLedo during the first week of February 1944. After one day's rest we startedthe march from Ledo into Burma. The Campaign was not to end for the majorityof my men until the last week in May 1944. Over 100 men from the 3rd Battalionare still fighting at Myitkyina. About 50% of these are men who had beenleft in hospitals when we went into Burma. Others are men who have recentlybeen sent back to duty most of them without medical examination beforethe trip to Myitkyina.
1. The Battalion like the rest of the 5307 lived and fought fromthe early part of February well into the last week of May 1944 or 4 months.We played the major part in two engagements and a minor part in two. Wealso fought four minor battles and twelve skirmishes. We marched between700 and 800 miles over mountainous jungle terrain in Northern Burma.
Hospital facilities.--a. I have spent many months in theSolomons and have visited New Zealand, New Caledonia, and Fiji. Medicalcare, from the eyes of the Battalion Surgeon, was very good in these places.My opinion is that none of the troops in the Solomons from August 1942until September 1943 could expect adequate medical care. The hospitalsdid not have the facilities to study chronic or acute disease properly.Transportation facilities, crowded hospitals and understrength units madeshort periods of hospitalization necessary. Many sick men especially [those]with malaria were treated in quarters or on duty. Many attacks of malariain the Pacific were given very little more nursing care or rest than theaverage common cold at home; very little interest could be aroused in studyingthe diagnostic problems and chronic cases. This must, in part, explainwhy so many chronic cases came with the 3rd Battalion. Many of these menvolunteered with the hope that they would get hospital care. This is afact.
b. Hospital care on the Lurline from New Caledonia to India wasexcellent. The British hospitals did a good job at Deolali and Deogarh.We were always disappointed in the care given the few venereal cases inIndia. Our station was several hundred miles from the 181st General Hospitalat Karachi. We could use it for little except cases which we thought requiredmedical boards14 and complicated diagnostic procedure. Duringour stay in India we sent 79 men to this hospital. Few were given medicalboards and some were treated three months before joining our unit.
c. We also made use of the 97th Station Hospital at Agra. The30 or so cases sent here were diagnostic problems and complicated venerealsand mostly eventually returned to duty. 30 to 40 men were left in hospitalsat Ledo along the road. The majority were chronic cases.
d. From Burma our men were evacuated by liaison planes whichlanded on run-[ways] we prepared in clearings which are found at strategicpoints in
14Procedures of special boards of officersconvened to determine and, if necessary, change the duty classificationof troops.
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Northern Burma. At times sick and wounded men had to be littered manymiles.
Living conditions.--a. The men of the third battalionhave had field living conditions for practically their entire stay overseas.Even in Fiji and New Caledonia floorless tents without screens and lightswere universal for the infantry. In combat of course the much publicizedfoxhole gave a resting place. Some outfits in the islands lived in holeafter hole for as long as 70 days in succession. In India when not on maneuverswe lived in British tents which are quite warm during the day and coldduring the night. On our maneuvers which usually lasted five days we spentuncomfortable periods because of the very cold nights. A man hiking 10-15miles per day with five days' rations on his back is not willing to carryover two blankets in most cases and this certainly was not adequate inthe field.
b. Our four months in Burma found us sometimes on top of theground and sometimes in holes. The first month was cold, the next two monthswere ideal, and the last month was very hot and wet. Because of this manymiserable nights were spent and joint pains were universal.
c. On the islands the days were full of maneuvers, salvage andstevedore work when not in actual combat. Sleeping accommodations consistedof a bunk, the blanket they carried overseas and a net.
d. Food was never ideal. In all Pacific areas it came from cans.Canned milk, fruit and fruit juices were never easy to obtain or sufficientwhen obtainable. Synthetic lemon juice was the rule. Baking powder andyeast were seldom issued in sufficient quantities. Fresh meat was practicallynonexistent. Some units went as long as two months on C-Rations. In theinfantry outfit which I joined15 outbreaks of simple diarrheaand gastritis were weekly occurrences. We could never blame anything butthe canned food. Food supplied to my unit on Guadalcanal ran 10% spoilage.On the Russells it ran 10-20%. After the New Georgia campaign, where wehad lived on cold C rations when we could get them, spoilage ran for differenttypes of brand from 10 to 50%.
e. At our assembly area in New Caledonia and on the Lurline thefood was exceptional. During our training period in India, it was neveradequate in variety.16
f. In Burma, we marched and fought for four months on K-Rationswith an occasional 10-1 drop whereupon many men usually developed gastritisand diarrhea. The food was inadequate since the average loss of weightappears to be about twenty pounds.17
15First Battalion, 148th Infantry, 37th Division.
16Ogburn recalled the diet in much the same terms: adequatebut likely to leave appetites unappeased: Marauders, pp. 55-56.
17Supply service sources indicated that K-rations constituted80 percent of the Marauders' food supply in the campaign. The remaindercame in the form of B, C, and 10-in-1 rations. (K, C, and 10-in-1 rationswere balanced standardized units, K and C providing a day's supply fora single individual, and 10-in-1 providing one day's meals for a group.The B rations consisted of various bulk items to be used as needed or desired.)An untitled, unsigned typescript which is the war diary of the 2d Battalion(judging from clear internal evidence) reports receipt of airdropped suppliesfrom time to time. The usual ration drop provided 2 days of K-rations perman; sometimes a 3-day supply came down. Receipt of 10-in-1 rations isoccasionally acknowledged, as are "extras"--B-ration items suchas chicken, milk, bread, jam, rice, candy, and, on 29 March, "turnovers":"2nd Battalion Diary," pp. 5710, 5716, 5722, and passim,Stilwell Papers, Folder 132.
Some reports placed the average weight-loss of men who completed the campaignas high as 35 pounds. Subacute vitamin deficiency signs were observed,particularly of a scorbutic nature. Dental officers in the 14th EvacuationHospital, which received Marauders at the end of the campaign, learnedthat many men disliked and discarded the antiscorbutic lemon extract powderin the rations. Ogburn reports the same fact. See Merrill's Marauders,p. 26; Van Auken, "History of Preventive Medicine," chapter IV(contributed by Capt. Carl J. Koehn, SnC); "Annual Report, 14th EvacuationHospital, SOS, USAF, IBT, 1944"; Ogburn, pp. 153-156, and passim.
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Recreational facilities.--a. Recreational facilities forthese men during the eighteen months in the Pacific were of necessity poor.When in rear areas poor setups existed. In forward areas certainly littlecould be expected. When movies did function bombing raids or the weatheroften discouraged any but the most persistent. Even soldiers became unwillingto undergo much discomfort while attempting to see poor or antiquated moviesand newsreels.
b. No other facilities existed for the men in most cases. Ourstay in the Pacific was a little early for recreational kits and free useof radios.
c. Both the movie and reading material situation improved inIndia but was far from ideal. The Post Exchange situation was poor.
d. Post Exchange supplies for infantry troops in the Solomonsfor the first year were practically non-existent. For six months in myarea we were unable to obtain a tooth brush. Beer and Coca-Cola were ofcourse not available with few exceptions.
Medical history with a discussion of malaria in the unit.--a.The four medical officers who gathered in New Caledonia with the 3rd Battalionknew that their job would be a difficult one. I, as one of them, can saywe did not realize how serious the physical condition of these men hadbecome. We expected picked troops. Instead we found many chronically illmen. Many brave men came but also numerous psychiatric problems as wellas men with chronic disturbances who believed that they might get treatmentif they could get away from their outfits.18 We were also tofind that a majority of the men and officers had [had] one or more attacksof malaria.
b. Under the direction of Major Norton our battalion surgeon,we weeded out about 20 men. The step was obviously inadequate. We weresoon to find the men had not been given adequate physical examinationsand histories by us or by their organizations. As I will later show, wehad then and still have many chronically ill men in our battalion.
c. From our arrival in New Caledonia until we finally set upat Deogarh, during the last week in November, we did not have free accessto our medical supplies. Because of this we were largely dependent on othersfor medical help during our trip to India. In New Caledonia the 6th ReplacementDepot Dispensary held sick call for the battalion. I worked regularly there.In the first week before we started one suppressive atabrine daily we treatedabout 50 cases of malaria. On the Lurline all medical attention was givenat their request by the Naval Medical Staff. After about three weeks theyconvinced Major Camp that the atabrine should be stopped and the malariacases allowed to break down. Their large sick bay was soon filled and
18So says Ogburn also, p. 41.
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remained filled for the entire trip. Some of the men, as had been thepractice in the 'canal, treated themselves, as I later found out. Duringmy association with this unit I have found many men who had taken atabrineconstantly since their first attack in order that the severity of theirattacks would be decreased. The Naval Medical personnel were very muchupset over the condition of our men. We in the Pacific have always knownthat the condition of naval personnel is much better than Army personnel.To us such a statement would be an obvious conclusion. The sick bay treatedmany cases of recurrent malaria, amebiasis, hookworm, as well as the usualchronic bronchitis, sinusitis, arthritis and other chronic disturbanceswhich caused so much suffering among our men. They thought the situationso grave that a letter was written and sent through Major Schudmak, ourregimental surgeon, to our Commanding Officer, giving their opinion thatthe 3rd Battalion was not in physical condition for combat. At Bombay,our debarkation port, they sent Major Camp, our battalion surgeon and anotherofficer, both with chronic malarial fever, to an Army Hospital. These twomen were given a medical board. Twenty enlisted men also went to the hospitalwith chronic amebiasis etc.
d. At Deolali the 3rd battalion kept between 50 and 100 men inthe British Hospital. During one week we had over 100 cases of recurrentmalaria.
e. A conservative estimate of recurrent attacks of malaria atDeogarh for the first five weeks would run between two and three hundred.We usually carried between 75 and 150 cases in the 80th British GeneralHospital, a small field hospital. Of course they were not all malaria.Our 10 bed battalion hospital usually carried 15 to 20 patients.
f. A malarial survey of the 3rd battalion, conducted by the DelhiMalariologist, led to a blanket treatment in the early part of December.This was the third blanket treatment for some of the men in the AmericalDivision. This was followed by a daily suppressive dose of atabrine. Hisreport recommended that men who had malaria over four times not be sentinto combat.19 This amounted to a considerable number of menand was apparently considered a poor policy as it was never carried out.
g. We continued the suppressive treatment until the men wereevacuated to hospitals from Myitkyina during the last week of May. Whatsuppressive treatment our men who are in Burma as casuals are getting mustdepend on what they wish to take. A few are evacuated daily with malaria.Without atabrine, our men would have been of little use in Burma. Our mentook atabrine in Burma on the honor system.
h. A high percentage took it regularly as is proven by theircolor and the low incidence of severe attacks. During the first three months,I evacuated two cases both of whom had been taking one tablet of atabrineregularly. They had severe malaria complicated by other diseases. Bothhad had it several times.
i. The doctors, Capt. [Milton H.] Ivens and Capt. [Philip J.]Cecala, who were with the other column of my battalion have been transferredfrom
19Varies from the official recommendation,but the sense is the same; see p. 296.
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this unit and I have no records as yet available, but my impressionis that they evacuated about 10 cases in three months. Many low grade feverswith mild symptoms responded to therapeutic atabrine treatment. The menbegan to break through in increasing numbers during the last two weeksof the campaign. Some [malaria cases] were complicated by scrub typhusor amebiasis or both.
j. Preliminary study of all available data indicated that [of]the men from the 43rd, the 37th, the 25th and the Americal Divisions, 80%have had one or more attacks, 30% have had over four attacks. An approximateoverall count would give three attacks for every man.
k. The entire 3rd battalion or rather what was left of it, wasevacuated from Myitkyina by plane during the last week of May on EMTs.20
Approximately 90% of the men are still distributed among three hospitals,the 20th General, the 14th Evac[uation Hospital], and the 111th Station[Hospital]. The atabrine suppressive policy is irregular in the hospitals.Some of the men are still taking it. Some have already had one or moreattacks of malaria. None of our men have died of malaria. I have seen onlytwo cases of cerebral malaria, neither of whom had a rough course or complication.
1. From personal experience I am unwilling to take men with chronicmalaria into combat.
The Stelling Report
5307th Composite Unit (Prov)
2nd Battalion Medical Detachment
APO 487
C/O Postmaster, New York, New York
30 June 1944
Subject: Report of Physical and Mental Condition of Men and Officersof 2nd Battalion with Recommendations
To: The Surgeon General
Outline of principal considerations.--A. This report21is written in order to present certain vital facts concerning the physicaland mental condition of the men and officers of the 2nd Battalion. Allof these facts support the conclusion that the unit as a whole and themen as individuals
20Emergency Medical Tags--the brief printedforms on which lower echelon aid stations wrote the initial diagnosis andtreatment of patients they evacuated.
21Stelling, like Hopkins, first sent his letter to Colonel Hunter,who indorsed it forward on 21 August 1944, from the 475th Infantry Headquartersto The Surgeon General, through the Commanding General, 5332d Brigade (the"Mars" Force which succeeded the Marauders). The 5332d sent iton to the Commanding General, Northern Combat Area Command. From thereit went in October to Theater Headquarters and finally to the ultimateaddressee in Washington, D.C.
The text published here is from the carbon copy in the Stilwell Papers,Folder 88, section 1. The typescript was written almost entirely in capitalletters. To improve readability, normal form has been followed in the textabove. Minor typographical and verbal errors have been corrected; paragraphinghas occasionally been provided. Editorial insertions are in brackets.
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are no longer fit to function in combat or even in garrison withoutadequate medical treatment and a prolonged convalescent and rest periodof many months. Most of these men and officers have served in foreign dutyover two years, and many have served in foreign duty from six years toeighteen months without having leave or furlough to go home. Some of thesehad already been given orders to return home when the Pearl Harbor attackoccurred and their leaves and furloughs were cancelled. A large numberof men and officers of the battalion who have survived the past two yearsof constant strenuous maneuvers in tropical lands, climaxed by four monthsof combat in Burma, during which they marched from seven hundred to a thousandmiles over mountains and through jungles, will never be fit for combatagain.
B. Each fact presented in this report has come from the experience ofthe men and officers of the battalion and those of the writer who is amedical officer of the battalion and who has marched through the entireBurma campaign up to the last engagement and has been present at everycombat engagement of the battalion except the beginning of the last oneat Myitkyina. Each fact has behind it the sworn testimonials of from oneto several hundred men and officers.22 Practically every factwas observed personally by the writer. Several opinions are also presentedbased on the professional knowledge of the writer. It is earnestly hopedthat the facts, conclusions and recommendations here presented will beacted upon by the proper military authorities in time to remedy the situation.
C. The writer was forced to leave Myitkyina several days after the majorityof the 2nd Battalion were evacuated by EMTs on planes to India. He wasill with fever which soon developed into epidemic hepatitis23and resulted in hospitalization. This illness delayed the preparation andpresentation of this report by almost thirty days.
D. The facts here presented focus upon two main considerations of primeimportance which cannot be ignored. First, that every man and officer inthe 2nd Battalion, as well as those of the lst and 3rd Battalions of 5307,who survived the Burma campaign as "Merrill's Marauders," hasfor several months, in addition to many other diseases and illnesses, sufferedunder an ever increasing complex of symptoms and ailments summarized bestand recognized by medical authorities as exhaustion syndrome. Second, thatevery man and most officers of "Merrill's Marauders" has experienceda series of mental frustrations in the form of so many promises that werenever
22Perhaps Stelling refers to information whichthe Theater Inspector-General, Brig. Gen. Francis H. Griswold, obtainedconfidentially. Stilwell put Griswold on the case on 22 June: StilwellDiary, 22 June 1944. Romanus and Sunderland, the historians of CBI, citeGriswold's report with apparent confidence: II, p. 239 et seq.
23As noted in n. 113, p. 259, and on pp. 263, and 268 infectioushepatitis caused concern to the British 14th Army and to the Chindits,but it was not a significant disease in the 5307th. No special notice ofit is given by the 14th Evacuation Hospital in its account of the clinicalsituation in 5307th patients, nor is the 5307th identified among unitsin CBI wherein the disease became temporarily important: 14th EvacuationHospital Annual Report, 1944; Blumgart, Herrman L., and George M. Pike,"History of Internal Medicine in India-Burma Theater," pp. 124-127.
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kept, and so many disillusionments as to the general and many of thespecific situations, that morale and esprit de corps which at first wereexcellent have now faded to the vanishing point.
E. It cannot be overemphasized that this is the first time in the historyof modern war that so many men so heavily laden, have been called uponto march so rapidly and so long, over such high mountains and through suchthick jungles, on inadequate diet, in pursuit of such a tenacious enemy.And there is no one who can personally comprehend adequately the draininghardships on bodies and minds caused by marching from seven hundred toa thousand miles over such terrain except a medical officer who has carriedas much weight on his own back as that carried by the average man in theoutfit. The men and other officers felt the hardships and suffered theexhaustion but they did not and cannot comprehend [the total effects ofthe campaign] in terms of actual energy loss and damage done to their ownbodies unless they possess the scientific knowledge of such matters asthat possessed by medical officers. And no man can march along carryingone-tenth or one-half or even three-fourths as much weight per pound ofhis own body weight as [was] the weight carried by the average man in theoutfit and claim with justification that he comprehends the hardships ofthe outfit, and therefore, because he feels comparatively fresh that thewhole outfit is in good shape and ready for another hundred miles or so.It follows that no officers of such caliber can be qualified in terms ofscientific medical truth to state whether or not such an outfit as "Merrill'sMarauders" is in condition for combat or not. And certainly no officerwho did not take active part in the campaign is qualified to do so. Onlya medical officer in possession of the facts who has carried his own packof equipment equivalent in weight to the average in the outfit and throughoutthe entire campaign is qualified to give a true and comprehensive statementof the physical and mental condition of the men in the outfit.
To overlook these fundamental basic truths is to ignore the main difficultiesunder which the whole outfit suffered and still suffers. No medical officerwho has not experienced these difficulties and hardships throughout sucha campaign is qualified to examine a man who has gone through the BurmaCampaign by means of the usual gross diagnostic procedures and state inevery case whether that man is in condition for combat. Of course it goeswithout saying that certain well known diseases can be diagnosed by theusual procedures in the hands of any medical officer and the terminationand probable prognosis and time of convalescence estimated. But the veryserious diseases made much worse by the underlying exhaustion syndromeand the mental picture involved here are not subject to adequate diagnosisby such gross procedures and rushed techniques as the average evacuationhospital or theatre general hospital are forced to adopt.
F. It is my personal opinion that never before has severe exhaustionsyndrome been so manifest on such a large scale as it is manifest mostastound-
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ingly throughout the men and officers of 5307th.24 Beforethe third month of combat, evidence of marked adrenal insufficiency beganto be noticed in the men. Blacking out and dizziness were common in spiteof adequate salt and vitamin intake and an almost passable but still inadequatediet. Lack of muscle tone accentuated diarrheas already present in over90% of the men. Anorexia and gastritis accompanied by nausea and vomitingwere quite common. Mental and physical lassitude increased. Weight lossaveraged twenty pounds per man and in many cases reached as much as fiftypounds. This in spite of the fact that the men were trained down to thepoint of no excess fat early in the campaign. Failure to regain the usualphysical rebound in strength and endurance after a day or two rest everyten to thirty days was universal. The comparatively delicious ten-in-oneration which was dropped to us occasionally during these short day or tworest periods failed to give us the rebound of energy expected. The mencontinued to decrease in strength and endurance and their physical andmental lassitude and exhaustion continued to increase until the very last.
G. It is a fact that the morale and spirit de corps which reached theirheight following the first two major combat engagements in which the menfought magnificently and withstood assault, and in the second engagementaccounted for over 200 of the enemy for every American killed or wounded,--thatthis wonderful fighting spirit as a unit gradually dwindled due to exhaustion,false promises and increasing distrust of theatre commanders and of otherhigh ranking officers, General Merrill excluded. The spirit and will togo on became purely a matter of getting out of Burma as soon as possiblerather than that of a fighting unit proud of its record and desirous ofincreasing accomplishments to add to its laurels. Toward the last it becamea matter of getting over one more hill and still another mountain overand over again with the certain knowledge that by no other means couldwe ever hope to terminate the torture. It was during these times that themost crushing disappointment came. The outfit was dead on its feet. Noone seemed to know or willing to tell if they did know how long we wereexpected to march and where to and what for. Once every two weeks or sosome announcement was relayed that we would not go beyond such and sucha place or south of this village or that, and no sooner did we arrive thanaway we would be ordered again.
During the first half of the Burma campaign during which we accomplishedwith great success our original missions there were almost daily meetingsat which the officers were given information concerning the situation whichwas handed down to the men so that every one would know what to do andwhat to expect. This information became less and less and finally dwindledto practically nothing at all even though excellent radio commu-
24The unawareness of British and American junglewarriors about their common lot now seems peculiar. Each had been trainedto take pride in its uniqueness--and pride was meant to take the edge frompangs of hunger. Yet in May, when both were on the verge of collapse, theyfelt neglected and isolated. It might have been heartening for them torecognize their brotherhood in peril and fortitude. But there are no signsthat Stilwell made certain that each knew he expected no more from onethan from the other. Instead, invidious comparisons were allowed, if notencouraged, to the point where the sense of injustice surmounted the senseof heroic identity.
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nications existed between battalion and regimental headquarters.25Not even good child psychology was being used on us. Never was thepromised stick of candy given to us even though promise after promise wasmade. And this was no little march of a week or a month or of a few hundredyards of fighting for ten days or so without packs. This was a long gruellingcampaign of over seven hundred miles of marching with extra full and oftenoverloaded packs, for four whole months on an inadequate diet, over oneof the highest ranges of mountains in the world through some of the mosttreacherous enemy-invaded jungles in the world.26
H. Be it noted that the medical officers of the entire outfit of threebattalions consistently adhered to the principle of keeping the men goingagainst all odds in as good a condition of health and morale as we couldhelp maintain. And that only after the men began failing fast did a fewof us begin to insist that something be done [to] remedy the situation.This condition and difference in combat experience and actual work done,and knowledge of our men and willingness to help them, divided the medicalofficers into two schools of thought and action. One school which was inthe majority and held the weight of rank, and apparently desired and desiresto increase this weight of rank, consistently "yessed" the commandingofficers in nearly every recommendation concerning the fitness of the mento continue in combat. These same medical officers allowed themselves tobe dictated to by these line officers.27 When matters becameso extreme that seriously ill officers and men were ordered to take onemarch after another even when not in contact with the enemy, and finallythe column and battalion commanders recommended medical evacuation beforethe battalion surgeon dared perform this most sacred duty for the men,it was quite evident that such a medical officer was only a mouthpieceof the battalion commander.
Out of the entire high ranking personnel excluding medical officersonly two officers consistently made efforts to fight for the integrityof the outfit as a whole and to back up their talk with action to do allin their power to give the men and officers of 5307th a fair and squaredeal and a fighting chance. These two officers are General Merrill himselfand Colonel Hunter. All others in direct day by day contact with the organizationwere either powerless to help or didn't seem to care whether the men weretreated justly or not. The outfit seemed doomed after General Merrill'stransfer to another post, and this condition of being a pawn in the handsof General [Haydon L.] Boatner and other generals of this theatre, regardlessof the physical and
25The campaign is discussed more specificallyin other parts of the report. One point may here be noted, however. Atthe outset, Stilwell gave Merrill a good deal of freedom in determiningtactical movements. Later, after its second major engagement, unforeseenJapanese flanking movements required improvisation. The assault on Myitkyinaeventuated in several weeks of tactical developments which were often pragmaticallyinstituted. Stelling, however, is making two points, the first that theywere told too little and the second that they were told too much.
26It is no disparagement of the Marauders' march to Myitkyinato observe that the Kumon Range, which they crossed at 6,000 feet, hardlyqualifies as "one of the highest ranges of mountains in the world."It is true, however, that the Burma jungle was as difficult as that encounteredin the Pacific areas, and that no Japanese force fought better than the18th Division which defended North Burma.
27Part of this sentence is garbled and obliterated by faultytyping. The construction here, however, seems clearly what Stelling intended.
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mental unfitness of the men, persists. Unless the War Department willintercede on behalf of several thousand still sick and exhausted men inthe outfit there is little hope of averting one of the greatest mass tragediesof gross injustice in the annals of the United States Army.28
History of 2nd Battalion; the relation to other battalions in 5307thComposite Unit (Prov) up until arrival in India.--A. The 2nd Battalionwas derived from and organized out of the 33rd Infantry in Trinidad B.W.I.in September 1943. The 33rd Infantry at that time was composed of two battalionsmade up of men from Panama, from which the whole regiment had originallycome, and several hundred replacements from the United States proper aswell as from Jamaica and Puerto Rico. These replacements came at intervalsas one cadre after another was sent to the states [from the 33d Infantry].
B. The replacements from the states were subjects of amazement on thepart of both medical and line officers all the way up to the Regimentalcommanding officer. It seemed evident that Trinidad and the 33rd Infantryin particular was being used for a dumping ground for all of the misfitsin the Army. Many of the men had extremely low I.Q.s and many were physicalwrecks. There were literally dozens of marked pes planus cases andmany with bony deformities ranging from ankylosis of elbow and shoulderjoints to herniated intervertebral discs, and incapacitating limitationsof motion of the body due to residual deformities from automobile and otheraccidents. Several were found to be totally blind in one eye and of lowvisual acuity in the other. Some had perforated ear drums and others werepartially or totally deaf due to neural pathology. At least a dozen drainingpilonidal cysts were found and many severe hemorrhoid cases. Several menwere veterans of the last war and one had been paid disability compensationsince 1918.29
28The final two sentences pertain principally,if not entirely, to the situation in June. Then, as will be shown, theoriginal Marauder campaign had ended and a rather different kind of battlehad developed at Myitkyina. General Merrill had been transferred becauseof ill health. After January, Brig. Gen. Haydon L. Boatner served as CommandingGeneral, Northern Combat Area Command, and Chief of Staff, Chinese Armyin India. On 30 May, Stilwell put him in command of the Myitkyina TaskForce: Romanus and Sunderland, II, pp. 138, 237. Stelling's distributionof praise and blame typifies opinions which the Marauders generally expressed.The reference to "several thousand" men is vague. Presumablyit means the original 5307th plus replacements and some additional Americantroops added to the Myitkyina Task Force in June.
29The only likely way to account for the absurd assignment ofmedical misfits to the 33d is (a) the War Department policies of 1942 and1943 which attempted to find military use for men with various mild orchronic disorders; (b) the classification of the Trinidad station as noncombatant;or (c) as Stelling says, the deliberate "dumping" of misfitsby other units. For many men, a "limited service" status resultedin assignment to camps where conditions were not greatly different fromthose of civilian life. But unwise, careless, or inappropriate placementof such men occurred often enough to produce many tales such as that Stellingrecounts. The editor recalls an interchange of men between the camp headquarterswhere he was stationed and the 91st Division, which had been sent a goodmany limited servicemen and which had others whose health had deterioratedin training. Before the bargain was sealed, camp officers narrowly scrutinizedthe service records of all whom the 91st proposed to transfer, and refusedto accept a good many who were obvious troublemakers. It was also stipulatedthat no men should be transferred whose medical condition warranted discharge.The camp was to receive only bona fide limited servicemen fit for appropriatenoncombatant duties. But Dante would have been inspired by the sight ofthe several hundred men the 91st unloaded in the company street one afternoon-grayhaired, haggard, twisted by arthritis or doubled over with the coughingspasms of chronic bronchitis--"halt, lame, and blind," poor devils!
And there was the night the first sergeant explained why the camp headquarterscompany had had so many men in the guardhouse in its early days. He hadbeen stationed, he said, at Fort Ord. One day his company was ordered tomake up a cadre of a hundred men or so to open up a new camp. He and hisCO went promptly to work, and when the day was done they had neatly eliminatedall their problems from the ranks. Off went the cadre, and good riddance.Five days later he (as first sergeant) and his CO were ordered to takeover the cadre at the new station! When they arrived, they found a dozenmen wandering around, another 30 or so asleep in the barracks, the restdrunk in town or "over the hill."
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C. When the 2nd Battalion was formed it was difficult to find the requirednumber of even partially normal soldiers from among the many volunteers.The announcement of the special military mission for which volunteers weredesired was followed so quickly by the rapid organization and actual departureof the men that little time was available to select the men carefully ona physical as well as mental basis.
D. The CO of the 33rd Infantry was quite new in September 1943 becausehe had been in Trinidad only a month or so. He was so anxious to have a100% volunteer outfit for the special mission that he practically orderedall of the officers to volunteer and in other ways brought pressure tobear. The men were quickly gathered together in platoons and companiesand asked by their officers after a very brief explanation of an importanthazardous and mysterious mission to which they would be flown by specialtransport planes: "Is there any man here who does not volunteer?"or "If there is any man here who does not volunteer step out in frontof the company and tell us why." My name was placed on a list severalhours before I had heard of the great event because I was out making asanitary inspection of an outpost. But little did the CO realize that themen would do almost anything to get out of Trinidad--myself included. However,the summary manner in which the "100% volunteer" unit was rushedtogether put a bad taste in everyone's mouth. Many of the men and officers--myselfincluded--had volunteered into the Army shortly after Pearl Harbor andsome before and we couldn't figure out why the CO or others higher or lowerthan himself just didn't order us to active combat in the first place.But failing to do this why not let us really volunteer again instead ofmaking a halfway gesture under pressure.
E. Many of us had already been in Trinidad a year or more. Some whocame from Panama hadn't been home in from four to six years. Nothing everhappened in Trinidad except marching, maneuvers and jungle warfare trainingover and over again. When Africa began to be safe for the Allies, Trinidadwas no longer a very dangerous or exciting post. Most of us had been runthrough at least one and some two or three jungle warfare training coursesin which we hiked hundreds of miles but did little else except listen tolectures, watch demonstrations and wait for something to happen.
F. The V.D. rate on the island was astonishingly high, at times 90%among the Negro soldiers (Americans of 99th Coast Artillery), and it becameas high as 75% among the white soldiers. However, much good V.D. controlwork was done in the 33rd Infantry a few months before the 2nd Battalionof 5307 was formed and new V.D. cases were practically nil before
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we left Trinidad. Malaria was quite common and many men had had fromtwo to eight reoccurrences. Trichophytosis and other chronic fungus infectionswere almost universal.
G. In May 1943 a great flourish of excitement and much preparation includingtraining in amphibious landings with the Navy was participated in by the33rd when the Regiment was to be included in the attack on Martinique.When this fell through there was a great letdown as most of the men werespoiling for a fight. Even though many lives were saved by the diplomatictriumph of the peaceful submission of Martinique by American and Frenchcollaboration, the cancelling of our combat mission after so much preparationand expectation seemed to be the loss of our last hope to break the uselessand deadening monotony of Trinidad. We had become a bunch of grass andtree planters where grass and trees were plentiful.
H. Morale was suddenly restored upon the formation of the 2nd Battalionof 5307 and the men we left behind in Trinidad were for the most part adisappointed and despondent lot. Before the news came through that therewas to be a special battalion organized from the 33rd for the secret missionin September 1943 there was a number of suicides and the N.P. wards atthe hospital and the guard house and the wood pile were always overrunningwith candidates.
I. The morale of the 2nd Battalion was especially high just before leavingTrinidad because we had gathered information that we were going to thestates first. For most of us this was to be the first feel to be had ofour native land in nearly a year, and for some the first homecoming inseveral years of continuous foreign duty. Other volunteers were added toour group from Puerto Rico. Among these were some who had been promisedverbatim leaves and furloughs in the states before going into combat.
J. The first great shock of our experience after leaving Trinidad camein Miami, Florida, where we were treated more like prisoners and ordinaryconvicts than volunteers on a special mission. No one was allowed to contactany of his friends or relatives. No messages of any kind were allowed tobe sent or received. Everyone was checked on carefully and kept withincertain areas of hotels especially blacked out and selected for the purpose.None of us except maybe two or three of the highest ranking officers hadthe slightest notion of what our mission would be, or whether we were headedto the East or the West or to the northern borders of the United States.All hopes for leaves and furloughs were lost. Home for the first time inover a year, and for some, years, we were to be sealed in special trainsand ridden through our own home towns nonstop to some distant P.O.E. [Portof Embarkation]. Most of us understood that this procedure is S.O.P. [StandingOperating Procedure] for troops in transit and we were finally reconciledby the realization that ours must be such a special mission that we hadto pay a special price. For many of us this was truly the last fleetingfeel of our native land because many of our battalion are already buriedin India and Burma. Not until we were held over twenty days in Deolali,India, doing absolutely nothing but marching and shooting once on a range,and unpacking and repacking our equipment, and listening to the same lectureswe had heard
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a dozen times before, did we begin to question the wisdom of not beingallowed leaves and furloughs in the states. This especially since the mainbenefits of security had been lost because several of our men had goneAWOL in the states all the way from Miami to California. Almost every dayone or more men would escape from the trains and go AWOL.30
K. At Camp Stoneman in California we were allowed to write letters andsend telegrams and make telephone calls during the two days we were noton alert. This helped our morale greatly and we became resigned to anotherlong absence from home. Those among the men who had been definitely promisedfurloughs by their colonel in Puerto Rico tried to contact the InspectorGeneral at Stoneman but were told by our CO [Lt. Col. George A. McGee,Jr.] that he didn't think that they deserved furloughs in spite of thefact that some of them had not been home in several years and that he hadjust shortly returned from over a month's leave in the states before heleft Trinidad. This started the first bad feelings between the men andthe CO of the battalion.
L. Food and medical facilities and ordinary sanitary and other comfortswere practically ideal in Trinidad, and of course especially on all Pullmantrains from Miami to California, and in Camp Stoneman itself. Excellentfood and medical facilities and entertainment and other comforts continuedaboard the Lurline all the way to India. Training and closer organizationand special study periods and lectures on jungle fighting and various subjectsto be in demand later were carried on during most of the voyage of 37 daysfrom San Francisco to Bombay. Much speculation on the nature of our missionwas indulged in but very few facts were known by any except the very highestofficers. All we knew was that we would probably be called upon to fightJaps in some jungle in India or Burma or China.
M. It must be borne in mind that by no possible twist of the imaginationcould the 2nd Battalion be regarded from the medical-physical standpointas being made up of first class fighting men. Morale was high and braveryand will to fight unquestioned and later proved magnificently true. Butphysical handicaps of most serious degree were and still are common amongmen. Many possessed the body deformities already enumerated. Chronic recurrentmalaria continued to break through from time to time. A few had organicheart disease and were sent to hospitals in India later. Several were nearlydeaf or nearly blind and old V.D.s began to break through. The most seriousof these cases were also sent to American hospitals in India later afterbeing further diagnosed and treated by the Navy Medical officers on theLurline. But to weed out even all the seriously handicapped men at thislate stage would have reduced the battalion's strength so much that
30The grievance of the men, while understandable,is hardly supportable. If the need for strict security is admitted, thento send the troops on leave after they had been accepted for a secret missionwould have been foolish. That leaks did occur anyhow, due to the indiscretionof men who went absent without leave, does not argue against security measureswhich were as comprehensive as possible. Since the 5307th was to be thefirst American infantry unit to fight in Burma, and since its task wouldbe long range penetration, security precautions were especially justified.But, as it was, Tokyo Rose went on the air when the troops debarked inBombay to send them greetings and threats!
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the matter was dropped for the time being with the hope that some replacementscould be found before the actual combat mission began. It is a drasticmistake ever to suppose that the longer men are left in tropical countriesthe better their condition to fight in these countries becomes. The theoryof acclimatization in the tropic backfires after the first year. The menbecome more and more drained of their physical and mental stamina.31
N. Great interest was shown in the coming aboard of the 3rd Battalionat New Caledonia and at Brisbane. Our men and officers eagerly searchedout these men to get first hand accounts of combat experiences. Medicalofficers held daily seminars on subjects of special interest dealing mainlywith diseases to be expected in India and Burma and China. Medical officerslectured to the men on subjects of first aid and sanitation and stressedthe use of atabrine and halazone32 and use of repellent andnets to prevent malaria and other mosquito borne diseases. The men werevery attentive and cooperative and general morale was very high.
O. The main depressing influence on the men's spirits during the voyageon the Lurline was cancellation of all shore leaves. We were not allowedto set foot on any port of call except a few officers at Noumea, New Caledonia,and officers of field grade at Brisbane and at Fremantle near Perth, Australia.However, at Fremantle we were marched ashore to a park near the edge oftown and then marched aboard again. Several men went AWOL at every portof call but most of these were rounded up and brought aboard again. Oneman jumped overboard when far out at sea and was never seen again.
After arrival in India.--A. The first disappointment in Indiawas refusal to allow passes to see Bombay. But most of the men and officersstill realized that our mission must of necessity be of great importanceand they were eager to get going and have it over with. This especiallybecause we were told in Trinidad that in volunteering for the mission,which was to be a short and hazardous one, we earned the privilege of beingsent home as soon as the mission was over.33 But the majorityof the men and officers could not forget that no leaves or furloughs orpasses of
31This viewpoint might be considered carefully,since it challenges the normal practice of using veteran troops accordingto their training and experience. As noted on p. 5, the 151st Medical Battalion,which became one of the main ground evacuation units in Northern CombatArea Command, had desert training. The 13th Medical Battalion had mountaintraining with pack animals and thus was presumably an appropriate unitto serve in North Burma, despite the contrast between cold weather trainingand tropical service: Kuite, George B., "Report of Medical DepartmentActivities" (13th Mountain Medical Battalion, 1944. Kuite, the executiveofficer of the 13th MMB, was interviewed in 1945 in the Office of The SurgeonGeneral, and the report records his statements).
32The chlorinating tablet used for individual water purification.
33The very early origin of this mistaken idea should be noted.Who made such statements and on what authority is impossible to determinefrom available sources. But it is certain they were made in some fashionand were universally believed. It will be recalled that the War Departmenthad notified Stilwell that it thought the 5307th would be consumed by a3-month jungle campaign. No attempt would be made to send individual replacementsto it. The Theater Inspector-General and, subsequently, the historiansof CBI believed that views such as Stelling reports were a distorted renderingof the War Department statement. How it became known so quickly and sowidely is a question. But once known in its distorted version it was somuch what everyone wished that it could never be revised or explained convincinglyto the 5307th. The question of good faith does not really arise for mostof the victims of false hope, for they received the distorted statementin all confidence from superiors or peers.
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any kind had been issued in many months and in most cases in years.Nevertheless, we had become resigned to our fate and realized thoroughlythat we were on no vacation.
B. The first astounding shock in India came at Deolali where officersand men were dumped in barn-like structures with inches of dust under footto sleep on wooden and rope beds. The shock was not the barns or the bedsbut rather the evident fact that the camp which was to be our trainingpoint was not yet available and that we were thrown there at Deolali towaste precious time that could have been spent at home or at least in activetraining for our mission. The food and sanitation at Deolali for men andofficers were deplorable. The food in most instances for the men was actuallynauseating in its preparation and appearance. Hair as well as maggots wasin the meat and the vegetables were rotten. The native Indians who preparedthe food were filthy in their persons and habits. Finally after a weekor so the medical officers insisted that the preparation and serving ofthe food be supervised by our own cooks and KPs. But the raw food itselfwas no good. The men went to nearby English and Chinese restaurants andlunch rooms and soon became out of funds buying food to eat. They alsopurchased large amounts of tea and cookies and fruit from native peddlers.34
C. Sanitation in other ways besides that connected with the preparationand serving of food was unbelievable. Latrines were wide open with openbuckets to catch the fecal deposits. These were collected periodicallyby the native Indian servants and stored away somewhere to be used as fertilizer.Every single principle of sanitation which we had stressed to the men formonths and months previous to this was violated before their eyes and ourown. Numerous cases of gastritis and diarrhea developed within the firsttwo weeks. Also several dozen cases of malaria began to break through inspite of atabrine suppressive treatment. Most of us were afraid to eat.I personally rented a bicycle and rode for miles around buying up all theAmerican and Australian canned fruit and vegetables and milk and cheesethat I could find as well as crackers in boxes. I lived mostly on theseduring the twenty days spent in Deolali as did many of my fellow officersand men themselves. Only once a day
34There is no reason to suspect exaggerationin Stelling's account. The conditions he describes were met with everywherein CBI. There were the problems of native food-sources and food-handlers;of antiquated waste disposal procedures supported by the caste system;of environmental sources of filth, discomfort, and disease; of strainedcivilian and military resources in the host nation. Remedial actions requireda combination of administrative ingenuity and persistence, on the one hand,and technical and material changes, on the other. See Van Auken, "PreventiveMedicine," op. cit. To add complications in this instance,the 5307th had been organized and sent to India on very short notice, andits status was "between stools"--an American unit authorizedby the Combined Chiefs of Staff to serve in the new inter-Allied SouthEast Asia Command with the British long range penetration group which Wingateled. Fumbling the question of logistical responsibility and arrangementsunquestionably occurred. The War Department queried Mountbatten on theDeolali episode, observing that Stilwell had offered to take responsibilityfor housing and training 5307th, but that SEAC had refused the offer. TheWar Department pointed out that while the troops waited at Deolali forDeogarh to be put in readiness, 2 weeks of training were lost. In viewof its great effort to assemble and ship the troops speedily, the War Department,speaking of Gen. George C. Marshall's personal interest, was greatly disturbed:Romanus and Sunderland, II, pp. 34-35; Ogburn, pp. 47-52; and see n. 3,p. 294.
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did I venture into the officers' mess and then mainly for social ratherthan for gustatory purposes.
The conditions of feeding and sanitation at Deolali were inexcusablebut we were told to keep quiet about them in order to avoid internationalfriction. Socially and in every other form of hospitality our British hostswere most cordial. Hospital facilities and the quality of the British medicalofficers and sisters were excellent in every respect. All of our men sentinto the British Military hospital at Deolali were given excellent treatment.We could not comprehend the reasons for the discrepancy between the excellenceof the British hospital personnel and the facilities and the deplorablesanitary conditions in and near our living and eating quarters.35
D. Our next big shock mainly from the medical standpoint, as are mostof the shocks and disappointments and frustrations related to the physicaland mental condition of the men, came at Deogarh, India. Here was our maintraining camp which we were to use for about nine weeks. Our shelters werevery neat double walled and roofed Indian type tents. The nights were extremelycold and days extremely hot. These natural phenomena could not be helpedand our shelters and cots were as comfortable as could be expected. Besides,we had all been trained in very rugged outdoor living in jungles, sleepingand marching in pouring rains, and we now knew at last that we would beexpected to go into Burma and live under plenty of hardships. Soon we werenot only prepared for many hardships but we expected them. And we feltconfident that we could stand up under any hardship of physical endurancethat could present itself.
But we were not prepared for the failure of those who had selected andoutfitted our training camp to arrange for necessary sanitary facilitiesand to provide an adequate food supply. No latrines were provided and noone seemed to worry about this at first except the medical officers. Thefood was grossly deficient for weeks and only improved after insistentappeals to higher authority.36 Nothing could be gained by trainingto go without food and thus face our rigorous Burma campaign poorly nourished.The quality and variety of food served in camp at Deogarh can best be judgedby those who have lived on C and K and Ten in One rations by stating thatwe actually looked forward to overnight and several day maneuvers in orderto enjoy these rations which are all many times more palatable and balancedin every way compared to food served in camp during the first half. Latersome milk and fruit and vegetables and better meat and some sweets wereprovided. In fact, during the last two or three weeks of the nine weeksof our training the food was quite adequate and very palatable.
35In a few weeks, as Stelling soon reports,he saw a similar discrepancy develop in his own regiment. He explainedit then as the failure of his commanders to heed good advice from the medicalofficers. A little reflection might have suggested to him that some suchreason might equally explain the difference between a British staging areaand a British hospital.
36Being then under British control, the 5307th was on Britishrations. Stelling's complaint is like that of brigade commanders and troopsin Wingate's Special Force during the same months, while it was also intraining; see pp. 216-217 and 239-243. For conditions and activities atDeogarh, also see Ogburn, pp. 52-58.
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E. The sanitary problem was not solved until the last part of our trainingperiod.37 Only slit trenches were available for the first halfof the training period and these had to be dug in shale and among rocksand were never more than a foot or two deep until much later when demolitiondetails were appointed to blow craters into the ground. The fecal depositswere never properly covered until finally during the second half of ourstay in camp regular box type latrines were constructed and their freedomfrom flies closely supervised. But this was only accomplished after repeatedoral and written reports were made by medical officers through the chainof command. The training schedule was so crowded that it was claimed thatno time was available for the construction of proper latrines.
F. In like manner the preparation and serving of food and the disposalof garbage was never properly done from the standpoint of sanitation untilnear the end of the training period. Meat and vegetables and bread wereleft exposed as well as other articles of food to millions of flies fromnearby slit trenches and these flies were allowed to swarm over food andkitchen utensils. Only after several weeks of adverse reports by the medicalofficers were these conditions improved. Finally, during the second halfof our training period in this camp steps were taken and time allowed forthe construction of fly proof kitchens and food storage and serving facilities.
G. But these tardy efforts at improving the deplorable sanitary conditionscame too late and only after serious damage had been done to the men. Manyof the diarrheas acquired at Deolali were not yet cured when we arrivedat the camp in Deogarh. Within a month 90% of the men were incapacitatedby diarrhea, most of which proved to be bacillary dysentery and a few casesof Amebiasis. There were also many cases of Fever of undetermined originand the ever present recurrent malaria. The 80th British General Hospitalin the vicinity of our camp, placed there especially to serve us, was filledto overflowing with our men. And our own ten-bed hospital was always full.So many men were ill at one time that in addition to those overrunningall available hospitals in the vicinity the men had to be kept in theirown tents and treated there. The men received excellent care in the Britishand American hospitals including the 181st General Hospital at Karachi,and the 97th Station Hospital at Agra to which most of our most seriouscases were sent.
H. During the training period at Deogarh there seemed to be a plan putinto operation for the 2nd battalion only, by the CO and other high rankingofficers, to divide the men from the boys on a basis of physical enduranceas quickly as possible. We were always sent on the longest marching maneuvers.Most of these took place before our pack animals arrived. On one maneuver
37Diarrhea and dysentery were the principalacute diseases in 5307th from November 1943 to January 1944. In December,an outbreak of bacillary dysentery occurred in the 1st and 2d Battalions;there were about 200 cases: Hopkins Notes. The very close parallel betweenthese conditions and those in Wingate's troops should be noted, along withthe inability of medical officers to "get through" to their commanders,or, if they did, to persuade them it was profitable manpower economy touse small work crews to build and maintain sanitary facilities in orderto protect much larger numbers of men from sickness. The severity of Stelling'scriticism is matched by that of senior British medical officers reportingon Wingate's training centers and campgrounds: see pp. 256-258.
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lasting ten days,38 all during which the [men of the] HeavyWeapons outfit in our battalion were forced to hand carry their weapons,we covered over 200 miles carrying in addition full field packs and rationsfor from three to five days at a time. On some days we marched 20 to 40miles. The heavy weapons men hand-carrying mortars and heavy machine gunsas well as some ammunition were almost completely broken down on the march.Upon returning to camp a large percentage of them had to be hospitalizedimmediately because of exhaustion and seriously swollen and infected feetas well as high fevers, some of which were malaria and others of undeterminedorigin. All during these maneuvers diarrheas were common. The peak of theepidemic of dysentery followed shortly after the longest maneuver of 200miles. When they returned their resistance to infection had greatly decreased.
I. Then, in spite of large numbers of sick and exhausted men, trainingin river crossings was carried out. Training always continued regardlessof the condition of the men. There seemed to be a childish desire on thepart of the battalion commanders of the 2nd and 3rd Battalions to bragabout what their men could do or had done and then to make them do it allover. Less than 50% of the entire outfit could swim. These men were broughtto the river's edge, and without previous instruction as to the use offlotation bladders provided them, were ordered to go across some 300 yardsof cold deep water. A suggestion made by a medical officer to have a rubberraft or boat handy in case of an accident during this first river crossingwas ignored by the battalion commander. Finally, after two men had to bepulled out to prevent drowning, the column commander of the combat teamto which I was attached realized the danger of this first river crossingunder such conditions and moved to a narrower part of the river. He hada rope stretched across to add to the confidence of the non-swimmers untilthey could realize that the flotation bladders properly used would holdthem up safely. In spite of these precautions six other men had to be draggedout by the few life savers present. In the wider portion of the river withouta rope or a boat these would have resulted in fatalities. Two men had alreadybeen lost from drowning by other battalions.39
J. Shortly after we arrived at Deogarh we were addressed by GeneralWingate and the implication was made that we would fight side by side withthe British soldiers on a long range penetration into Burma under GeneralWingate's command. A British medical officer who had been with GeneralWingate on his first campaign talked to the medical officers of 5307thand gave us some very good pointers on what to be prepared for. Britishintelligence officers were assigned to us and a group of Gurkha soldierswere attached to us.
K. Soon after the first long maneuver during which the combat team towhich I was attached captured the Brigadier and a British column by meansof an ambush, there were statements made to the effect that we would not
38Probably the exercises conducted jointlywith Wingate.
39Ogburn's notice of the marches and river crossings of 1stand 3d Battalions suggests that there was no special design against 2dBattalion: Ogburn, pp. 50, 53-58. Given Wingate's presiding genius in thetraining period, the importance of training in river-crossings and of endurancewould not be underestimated.
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be under General Wingate's command but under General Stilwell instead.Shortly after this we were addressed by Lord Louis Mountbatten who madea very fine impression on most of us and gave us the first true pictureof the general set-up in this theatre. Nevertheless, each week or so thegeneral picture seemed to change and no one seemed to know just what wewere going to do. Of course we didn't expect detailed information dealingwith the strategy and tactics of the impending campaign. But we did expectto know before we entered the campaign under whose command we would beand the general nature of our mission. However, we were first told thatwe would go on a long penetration into Burma. Then we were told that wewould go on a short range penetration spearheading the Chinese. We weretold we had been promised to Prime Minister Churchill by President Rooseveltto fight under Wingate. Then we were told that we were entirely under GeneralStilwell's command. Naturally, we had all supposed that such details ofour special mission had been worked out far in advance. Of course we werepowerless to do anything about the situation except to do as we were told,but much confidence in our leaders was lost and we had the feeling of beinga political football.40
L. In January our regiment was activated and Colonel F. G. Brink, aspecial G-3 representative from the War Department,41 who hadsupervised our training at Deogarh, presented Colonel Hunter as our RegimentalCommander. But soon General Merrill came to take over the command of theregiment. By this time most of us arrived at the very obvious conclusionthat everything wasn't running too smoothly among the generals of the theatrecommand. The British intelligence officers and Gurkha soldiers were takenfrom us. Insulting remarks against the British were made by high officersin our Command. We began to feel that something was going wrong in thegeneral setup of our command and in the specific plans for our unit. Wecouldn't see the fire in the stove but we could feel that the stove wasgetting hot. But our chief concern was to accomplish our mission and getout as soon as possible.42
M. During the last two or three weeks at Deogarh several hundred mulesand horses were given to the regiment with which to train. Days were spenttrying to get men who in the vast majority of cases had never ridden ahorse or a mule and could not swim themselves to lead the animals acrossthe river. These operations in the case of the 2nd Battalion were placedin charge of a veterinary officer who had had no experience whatsoeverin this
40One suspects that Stelling's tone would havebeen a good deal more bitter had the 5307th remained under British control,for national alienation would have been added to all other foes of highmorale. The British Special Force, certainly, believed that it would nothave suffered so in May and June had it not then been under American operationalcontrol: see With Wingate's Chindits, part IV.
41Assigned by Theater Headquarters on 13 November to supervisetraining: Romanus and Sunderland, II, p. 35.
42Stelling's reading of the confusion is instructive. Whereasthose at the top saw the changes as steadily clarifying and improving theorganizational status of 5307th, some in or just above the enlisted ranksfelt "pushed around." That many could not approve the shift toAmerican control without disparagement of the British is pitiful, but suchbitter competitiveness was all too common and, unfortunately, had its rootseven in Stilwell's mind and example: see Chinese Liaison Detail andWith Wingate's Chindits. Ogburn, however, remembered the changesin a favorable light and emphasized the confidence placed in Merrill becauseof his apparent high place in CBI affairs: Marauders, pp. 64-65.
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activity. The horsemen of the battalion, including the specially trainedpersonnel of a QM Pack outfit which had brought the animals in, were practicallyignored, and the veterinary officer continued in charge of most activitiesdealing with the animals and many others not dealing with the animals.He became universally hated by all the men and most of the officers ofthe battalion, because of his overweening sense of importance and his arrogantmanner of giving orders to those over whom he had no official authority.The fact that he was maintained in his decisions and became the welcome"shadow" of the battalion commander caused still more loss ofconfidence in the CO. The captain in charge of the pack train and his trainedpersonnel were continually ignored by or forced to take orders in non-medicalmatters to do with the animals from the veterinary officer.
N. Before leaving for Burma our morale as a regiment was greatly strengthenedby knowing that General Merrill was with us. Every officer and man hadand still has a high regard for the General. He struck the right note whenhe told us in a speech to the regiment that his main objective was to leadus into Burma and to help us to accomplish our mission as soon as possibleand then get us out. Through his efforts many of the men and officers receivedthe first passes to visit places of interest in India just before the BurmaCampaign of Merrill's Marauders began.
O. Shortly before we left for Burma a number of our best men and severalof our best officers were still in hospitals due to the exhaustion of ourstrenuous maneuvers and the epidemic of dysentery and other diseases. Wetook some of these with us as convalescent patients on the train as wehad done before when we left Deolali. Each time we were forced to leavesome in the hospital until they were well enough to join us later. Alsoour battalion medical officers formed a board and decided upon the mostserious cases to be sent to the 181st General Hospital at Karachi and tothe 97th Station Hospital at Agra. These amounted to some 25 patients.About 50 other partially incapacitated men who were absolutely unfit toeven start a rigorous campaign but who were not acutely ill were assignedby the medical board of our battalion to Regimental Headquarters to servein the rear echelon. Other men were also sent to the rear echelon by otherthan medical officers in the battalion for non-medical reasons.
P. In addition to these, early in our training period at Deogarh, wehad exchanged about 80 men and one or two officers with the 3rd Battalionso as to have the benefit of men who had combat experience in the junglesagainst the Japs.
The Burma Campaign.--A. Early in February the regiment arrivedat Margherita near Ledo. After a day's [effort of] unpacking and packingthe packs for the animals and for our own backs we started down the LedoRoad. The first day's march of over twenty miles resulted in many sorebacks for animals and men and many blistered feet and other ailments forthe men. Some of the "bunches" on the backs of the animals startedthis first day persisted until the animals were killed in the Burma Campaign.About twenty of the men had to be ridden on trucks because of their conditionfollowing this first day's march. Several, including a medical officer,were sent
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to the 20th General Hospital for treatment on the second day of themarch. Those among us who had had experience in the cavalry could not imaginewhy anyone in command ordered such a long first-day march with full packson animals not yet hardened to marching. But we continued from ten to twentymiles per day down the Ledo Road until we had covered practically its fulllength to about 150 mile marker in ten days. Of course all the men carriedfull packs as did the animals from Margherita to the end of the Burma Campaignunless they became incapacitated in some way and had to be evacuated orwere killed in combat.
B. Later on the road one of the trucks carrying men and rations ranaway down a steep hill and off the road into some trees. In this accidentone man was killed and ten men were injured seriously enough to be sentto a nearby evacuation hospital. There were several compound fracturesof the arms and legs and a few head injuries in this group. Also, in additionto this group other men fell out each day and we left the serious fevercases at evacuation hospitals at intervals along the road.43Toward the end we were riding from thirty to forty men each day on theration trucks and we had lost almost as many scattered along the road.But most of these were returned to us by truck transport before we startedinto the jungles proper.
C. Food along the road was adequate and well prepared most of the time.Our own ration trucks carried our cooks and some K.P.s and most of thefood we ate. Sanitation was quite bad because all our bivouac areas werepredesignated and most were at former camp sites either still being usedby construction engineers, or close to Chinese camps, or just recentlyused by them or by the battalions ahead of us. Human as well as animalfeces were almost always scattered around in these camp sites. And of courseflies were plentiful. Some of our bivouac areas had adequate latrines butthe latrines were not used by many of the men who had gone before us.
Stilwell attacked the Japanese 18th Division in a series ofenveloping maneuvers. None succeeded, but each engagement forced Lt. Gen.Shinichi Tanaka to give ground on the road leading southward to Kamaing.The Chinese 22d and 38th Divisions were Stilwell's chief weapons. To putan edge on them he had a group of tanks and the Marauders. By the middleof February 1944, the Chinese had dislodged the enemy from its originalpositions in the northern part of the Hukawng Valley. Stilwell thoughtthat vigorous efforts on the flanks as well as in the center of his advancemight catch the 18th in the vicinity of Maingkwan, the valley'smost significant village.
Accordingly, he sent the Marauders around a battalion of the 56thRegiment, which Tanaka had posted well out on his right flank. The Chinese113th Regiment, 38th Division, followed the Marauders. It
43Detachments from the 48th Evacuation Hospitaland 151st Medical Battalion manned the roadside hospitals.
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was to consolidate positions which the 5307th would take up behindthe enemy's main line of resistance. The 22d Division and the tanks wereto advance in the center and to try to get around the enemy left flankon the southwest.
From 24 February to 3 March the Marauders marched along jungle trailsuntil they were safely past the 18th Division line. Then they swungback toward Walawbum, a village on Tanaka's line of communications nearhis headquarters. The 1st Battalion guarded the trails at the Marauders'back while the 2d and 3d Battalions attacked. Unexpectedly, Tanaka decidedto concentrate on the Marauders, estimating astutely that the Chinese wouldadvance too slowly and cautiously to be immediately dangerous. His boldplan nearly succeeded. But when the Marauders held fast against artilleryfire and infantry assaults, and the Chinese finally closed in upon him,he ordered a withdrawal on 7 March. The Marauders, in turn, dropped backto avoid encountering the full strength of the 18th as it passedby the roadblock. They turned their sector over to the 113th Regiment,which by then had caught up with them. They had been under fire at Walawbumfor 4 days before they returned to the jungle to evacuate their casualties,replenish their supplies and ammunition, and await orders for their nextmission.44
During their 3-day rest, the Marauders could accept with justifiablepride the congratulations Stilwell sent them. After their brisk 100-milemarch, they inflicted several hundred casualties on the enemy, and theypassed their first battle-test with aplomb and determination. They hadlost only eight men killed and 37 wounded. Yet it might have sobered themto reflect that their strength was nearly 10 percent less than it had beenwhen they started for Walawbum. Thirty-three of 250 men they evacuatedhad suffered nonbattle injuries. The rest of the evacuees (battle casualtiesexcepted) were sick. Many of their disorders were either preventable orwere conditions of long-standing with which the Marauders should not havebeen burdened. Nineteen men, who should have been protected by Atabrinesuppressive control, went to the hospital with malaria. Eight were sickwith other serious fevers; dengue was the most common. Ten displayed neuropsychiatricsymptoms. The remaining 109 invalids--almost the equivalent of a company--wereevacuated with a miscellany of illnesses and disabilities. It is safe toconjecture that less seriously afflicted men stayed with their comrades,and that many of those who were evacuated and those who remained had diarrhea,dysentery, and various chronic disorders. A few of the evacuees had
44Romanus and Sunderland, II, pp. 148-159;Merrill's Marauders, pp. 31-45; Ogburn, pp. 91-134. The only accountwithout the cold curse of summarization is that of Ogburn. Although Stilwellregretted the withdrawal of the 5307th, he had told Merrill to hold downhis losses and to use discretion in his tactical movements. Very poor communicationsprevented Stilwell from coordinating the Marauders' concluding actionsat Walawbum with those of the oncoming Chinese. As it turned out, however,the intended envelopment sprang its most serious leak on Stilwell's right,where the 22d Division came in too late to close off Tanaka's escape route.
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scrub typhus, which they probably had picked up while crossing thenorthern edge of the Hukawng Valley.45
The medical support of the Marauders was like that which NorthernCombat Area Command had devised for the Chinese Army in India (and whichWingate's Special Force would adopt).46 Battalion medicaldetachments marched in the columns, established aid stations during battle,collected and gave emergency treatment to casualties, and cared for thesick. The sick and wounded walked, rode, or, if necessary, were carriedwith the columns until they recovered or an air-evacuation point becameaccessible. One of the most essential tasks which 3d Battalion performedin the Walawbum engagement, therefore, was to secure an airstrip at LalangGa. Communications with the rear regarding medical matters--supply andevacuation, mainly--were the responsibility of the regimental surgeon.Through him, the battalion surgeons arranged to get their casualties tothe airstrip and aboard the light planes sent down to serve as combat areaambulances.
The L-1 and L-5 planes carried casualties to the nearest landingfield that could accommodate two-motored aircraft. For the Walawbum engagement,such a field opened on 29 February at Taipha Ga; planes also continuedto fly to the older and more distant airfield at Shingbwiyang. At thesepoints the patients were transferred to the C-47 ambulance planes of the803d Medical Air Evacuation Squadron. In this way 135 Americans were broughtto the 20th General and 73d Evacuation Hospitals at Ledo after the battleof Walawbum.47
Air clearing stations were essential links in the chain of evacuation.Those in the most forward zone were improvised by local troops until detachmentsof the l3th Mountain Medical Battalion moved in. At the larger fields inthe rear, the 151st Medical Battalion, a Service of Supply unit, providedclearing stations. A typical ACS, such as that which the 151st put at TaiphaGa in March for Chinese and 5307th evacuees, consisted of a medical officerand from 10 to 25 men--nursing orderlies, drivers, loaders, laborers. Ithad a ward tent and facilities for an average patient census of 30; firstaid supplies on the scale of a divisional emergency unit; a few trucksor ambulances; and housekeeping equipment for the ACS personnel. The ACScould be opened or closed on short notice, or it could become the nucleusof a major evacuation center.48
45NCAC History, p. 65; Merrill's Marauders,p. 45. Ogburn, p. 134, depends on previously published sources. Conjectureis required with regard to the 109 miscellaneous cases, since no recordof the diagnoses ever has been located.
46See pp. 225-232.
47"War Diary of 5307th," p. 46; G-4 Periodic ReportsNos. 19-22, CBI, 1944; George B. Kuite, "Report of Medical DepartmentActivities" (13th Mountain Medical Battalion, 1944).
48The most comprehensive account of the evacuation system isthat written by Floyd T. Romberger, Jr., the Evacuation Officer in theS.O.S. Surgeon's office at Ledo (see North Tirap Log, supra).His unpublished "Organization and Operation of Air and Ground Evacuationon the Ledo Road Project" is supplemented by the annual reports ofthe 151st Medical Battalion, the 803d Medical Air Evacuation Squadron,and the 5th and 71st Liaison Squadrons, as well as by the reports and correspondenceof SOS, NCAC, and Theater Headquarters. See also Stone, "Evacuationof Sick and Wounded."
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The great advantage of this evacuation plan was that it avoided longlitter or ambulance hauls and followed the Marauders by air into areaswhere land communications were difficult. The disadvantage was that somepatients who went back to the large hospitals might have been as well treatedand restored to duty sooner by more forward medical stations. Some, also,had to wait out the entire evacuation sequence before they received anythingbut emergency care, when intermediate therapeutic procedures would haveforestalled death, radical treatment, or a long convalescence.
The usual way to solve such a problem was to use mobile evacuationhospitals between the divisional medical battalion and the major fixedor semi-mobile hospitals. Combat Command had none assigned to it, however.Instead it had to do the best it could with such units as Seagrave's andthe 25th Field Hospita1.49 Such units, being relativelylarge and well-equipped, functioned best on an effective line of groundcommunication, whereas many of the troops in Burma required medical servicewhich was fully mobile and of a relatively advanced technical quality.This need was especially great during the several envelopment maneuvers,when flank regiments were out for weeks on jungle trails.
The answer to the need lay in mobile surgical units such as the PortableSurgical Hospitals (four officers, 33 enlisted men), which the Army hadrecently established as standardized medical units. Combat Command hadthree of these, the 42d, 43d, and 46th. More were needed. To fill the gapcomparable surgical teams were improvised with medical troops detachedfrom hospitals and other units in the combat area. The place of the surgicalhospital was near the regimental line, ahead of (but, with luck, near to)an airstrip. They were expected to work under fire, if need be, in orderto stay inside a defensive perimeter or to avoid long litter carries inthe jungle. Their role was to provide prompt and significant surgery forcasualties which the battalion aid stations could not handle decisivelyand who would profit from
49Justice to Seagrave's hospital cannot bedone in a short note. It was a small, multi-purpose unit, capable of servingas a surgical hospital or field hospital, as need be. It began its workwith the Chinese Fifth Army in the First Burma Campaign, served in Indiaat the training center of the New First Army, and went through the SecondBurma Campaign until the Chinese left Burma in 1945. The 400-bed 25th FieldHospital, although designed for communications zone stations, did yeomanservice on the combat road. In the first stage of the campaign, its hospitalsections were used separately to provide both advanced and intermediatefacilities. The 1st Hospital Section took over a Seagrave station at TaiphaGa just before the Walawbum engagement. Between 4 and 12 March, it treated460 battle casualties. Some of them were Marauders taken to the 25th fromthe airfield instead of being sent on back to Ledo. See Seagrave, BurmaSurgeon Returns, and the annual reports for 1944 of the 896th ClearingCompany and the 25th Field Hospital; also G-4 Periodic Reports, Nos. 19and 20, CBI, 1944.
John H. Grindlay, one of Seagrave's most valuable assistants, reviewedthe medical problem for The Surgeon General in April 1944. He thought thatevery combat battalion in the jungle needed a mobile surgical unit. Therewere enough restless surgeons in the evacuation hospitals and other unitsin or near Burma to provide such teams, if Portable Surgical Hospitalswere too scarce: John H. Grindlay, "Report of Medical Department Activitiesin China Burma India," 29 Apr. 1944 (report of interview). About thesame time, the Theater Surgeon wrote to Maj. Gen. George F. Lull, DeputySurgeon General, that "Seagrave's Nondescripts are doing a wonderfuljob." Williams said he was using the 25th Field Hospital "likethree portables for the first stage"; later he would consolidate itas a hospital: Letter, Williams to Lull, 2 Apr. 1944 (copy furnished theeditor by Williams).
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advanced procedures before reaching a large hospital. Such treatmentmight in itself be sufficient to prevent further evacuation, the patientbeing briefly held and then returned to duty or to the battalion medicalstation. Otherwise, such patients were started on their way to recoverysoon after being wounded and at the same time that they were on their wayto the Ledo hospitals.
A small surgical team from the 13th Medical Battalion was attachedto 1st Battalion, 5307th, for the Walawbum engagement. A veterinary officerfrom the medical battalion also went with the Marauders. The 113th Regimenthad surgical support from a team composed of officers and men from Seagrave'swell-seasoned hospital and from the 13th Medical Battalion. When the 113thand 5307th made contact at the end of the Walawbum battle, and both usedthe Lalang Ga airstrip, the 13th Medical Battalion teams combined to treatMarauder casualties.50
50The problem of triage produced by the long-rangeair evacuation system came under review in the annual reports for 1944of the 20th General and 73d Evacuation Hospitals, although it was, of course,taken up long before the reports went out at the end of the year. Featuresof the Portable Surgical Hospitals were revealed in their annual reports.Units sending personnel out for improvised surgical detachments usuallynoted the fact in their annual reports and sometimes included accountsof the service their men had performed, for example, the 1944 annual reportof the 73d Evacuation Hospital, the 896th Clearing Company, the 13th MountainMedical Battalion. Information regarding the detachments with the 113thRegiment and 1st Battalion, 5307th, is found in Seagrave, Burma SurgeonReturns, pp. 110, 115; Kuite, "Report"; G-4 Periodic ReportsNos. 21 and 22, CBI, 1944; and Hopkins, in Wound Ballistics, op. cit.,pp. 249-251. The whole subject is treated briefly in the editor's article,"Surgeons in Battle: The Mobile Surgical Hospital in Burma, 1943 to1945."
The following passages from Kuite's report suggest the role of the improvisedsurgical team, as well as the way in which the 13th Medical Battalion clearingstations worked:
"These teams functioned as portable surgical units which marched andlived with the Chinese infantry. They set up emergency operating roomsunder tarpaulins or parachutes, operated on casualties, performed debridements,amputations, abdominal surgery, and applied casts. They were supplied solelyby parachute drop, frequently worked under artillery fire, had to improviseand substitute, as supplies frequently were not delivered in accordancewith plan, and often found at the end of a day's march twenty-five to fortycasualties waiting to be treated * * *.
"It was not unusual for Colonel [Vernon W.] Petersen, the NorthernCombat Area Command Surgeon, to drop in at a clearing company installationand say, 'Major Kuite, I need five officers and twenty-two men to accompanya battalion on a mission down the left flank. They will be leaving tomorrowmorning. Horses or mules may or may not be available; I don't know. Youwill have to make arrangements for animals and rations immediately. Ifanimals are available, they will carry only the necessary surgical equipment.If they are not available, your men will have to carry their own personalequipment, rations, and whatever surgical equipment they can carry. Medicalsupplies will be air dropped at designated locations and times. Code wordfor medical supplies will be ----. See Colonel ---- (chief American liaisonofficer of the battalion) for details.' "
In describing clearing station functions, he wrote: "If a serviceableroad was located near, ambulances with Chinese drivers brought casualtiesto our forward installation. Here the casualties were sorted, given morphine,plasma, shock treatment, and such operative treatment as debridement, removalof foreign bodies, amputations, and application of plaster casts. Earlyin the campaign these casualties were then evacuated to one of our clearinghospital units, usually located ten to twenty miles to the rear, near anair-evacuation station. From this station patients were either flown byplane or driven by ambulance to the 25th Field Hospital at Shingbwiyangor to the 20th General Hospital at Ledo. Later, when portable surgicalteams arrived, our forward installation sorted the casualties, treatedshock cases, and then sent the more serious cases and those requiring greatersurgical skill to the nearest portable surgical unit, which was locatednearby (usually within two miles of us)."
The larger units which provided surgical teams had been under instructionssince November 1943 to prepare for such service. A suggested Table of Organizationfor a "Special Hospital Unit (Surgical)" of 50 beds called forfour medical officers (three surgeons and one internist-anesthetist), and20 enlisted men. The unit was to be trained to go on foot with Chineseinfantry and to be relatively self-sufficient, depending for supplies onwhat it could carry and what could be dropped in from the air: Letter,8 Nov. 1943, Hq Base Section 3 to 20th General, 73d and 14th EvacuationHospitals, "Fifty Bed Field Hospital."
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As far as can be determined, sick and wounded Marauders receivedgood care.51 Early in April a committee of surgical chiefsof service met to study the treatment of battle casualties. On the whole,it concluded, the medical officers in forward units had performed commendablyand there had been a steady gain in the speed of evacuation. In the Chineseadvance of December 1943-January 1944, slovenly practices and difficultground communications delayed evacuees as long as 2 weeks. In March, casualtiescame to the Ledo hospitals from 24 hours to 4 days after being wounded.The longer period, unfortunately, pertained most regularly to the Marauders.At Walawbum, they had been tightly confined to their roadblock positionsand perimeters from 3 to 8 March. Later in the month, casualties incurredduring their march to the next roadblock position could be evacuated onlyat irregular intervals from jungle clearings.
As a result of such delays and of the unavailability of advancedsurgical detachments, more men from the 5307th than from Chinese unitshad wound infections when they were hospitalized. Along with such seriouscases, however, were Marauders with relatively minor disabilities. Thecommittee realized, of course, that unless intermediate medical facilitieswere accessible, the 5307th had no alternative but to evacuate those who(even temporarily) could not fight or keep up the march.
The committee was bound to take notice of various technical flawsin field medical service: inadequate wound debridement, premature or poorly-accomplishedwound-closure, circulatory constriction due to dressings or casts thatwere too tight, for example. Even when qualified by general statementsof encouragement and approval, the report of the hospital surgeons causedsome resentment in the field, where officers
51Hopkins, in Wound Ballistics, p. 251:"Aside from the variable, and sometimes inadequate, facilities fortheir evacuation, the men of the 5307th Composite Unit (Provisional) receivedexcellent surgical care." Ogburn takes a favorable view of the medicalservices, throughout. The India-Burma Theater Surgical Consultant, thoughhe gained his impressions many months after the campaign, was also commendatoryin the editor's conversations with him.
Relating to the whole subject were Hopkins' studies of wound ballisticsin the New Georgia and Burma campaigns, op. cit. His statisticalsummaries and his discussion in chapter IV relate to combined data from1st Battalion, 148th Infantry (New Georgia), and 1st and 3d Battalions,5307th. It appears from the case studies presented in the appendixes thatat Walawbum (as throughout both jungle campaigns) machine guns and riflesdid more damage than any other enemy weapons, both in terms of numbersof casualties and in terms of wounds that removed men permanently fromtheir units. However, 1st Battalion lost eight men from artillery fire,and five men in 3d Battalion were wounded when they exploded an Americanboobytrap on a trail leading away from Walawbum. Six men, he discovered,had been wounded while outside of or in shallow foxholes. Four of thesemen, also, were without their helmets. In such observations, Hopkins wasin no way trying to minimize the hazards of combat or disparage the qualityof the troops. Rather, he was asking whether casualties could be reducedin number or severity, and whether unit fighting strength could be conservedby more effective practice of standard protective and tactical doctrine.
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felt that critics in the rear failed to appreciate the difficultiesof battle and jungle surgery.52
The Walawbum engagement was child's play compared to what the Maraudersfaced during the next month of the campaign. Even before the last and worstweek of that 30 days, a reliable report53 warned 5307thheadquarters that "should the men be told they will stay here on completionof the campaign, they will be practically impossible to control. The menfeel they have earned a furlough home, and say it has been promised themtoo." Since the campaign plan was open-ended, the combination of anticipationwith a grievance was ominous.
After Tanaka eluded him in the Hukawng Valley, Stilwell planned anotherdouble envelopment about midway on the Mogaung Plain. Again, Chinese troopsadvanced on Tanaka's left flank and in the center. The Marauders, dividedinto two flanking forces, circled around his right. The 1st Battalion headedfor Shaduzup on trails close to the Kamaing Road. Almost at once it encounteredenemy ambushes and trailblocks. Some of these it fought through. In otherinstances it left the trail and literally hacked a new pathway throughclose-set jungle. The battalion's progress was not only slow but arduousand dangerous to the last degree of endurance.
When it finally reached Tanaka's communication line near Shaduzup,it fell upon an unsuspecting Japanese supply camp. Then it blocked theKamaing Road for 2 days (27 and 28 March). When the Chinese 113th Regimentcame up behind it, 1st Battalion pulled back into the jungle again. Aftera 2-day rest, it started eastward to rejoin the rest of the 5307th. Communicationswith Stilwell were unreliable, and it was unaware that its battle at Shaduzuphad been too late to coincide with roadblocks set up by 2d and 3d Battalionsfurther south. Worse, it was not aware that the other combat teams werein mortal danger. The 1st Battalion took up a moderate pace until Osborne,its commander, became uneasy enough to go directly to Stilwell's headquartersat Shaduzup. There he was told to get on as fast as he could
52Essential Medical Technical Data [EMTD] Reports,CBI to SGO, January-April 1944; 73d Evacuation Hospital and 20th GeneralHospital annual reports for 1944; Clarence J. Berne, MC, Chief of SurgicalService, 73d Evacuation Hospital, "Observations in regard to liaisonbetween surgeons in portable surgical hospitals and evacuation hospitalsin Northern Burma Campaign," a letter report.
To some extent inexperience did, in fact, hamper effective forward surgery.Maj. George B. Kuite of the 13th Medical Battalion reported that only fourmedical officers in his unit had advanced beyond recent graduation frommedical school. Of the four, two had nearly completed a surgical interneship;the other two were not even that close to surgical specialization. Butthe pressures of the campaign plunged all of them into "surgery byforce of necessity," dentists and veterinarians, too. "It wasnothing unusual to see an officer operating with an open textbook alongsidethe patient." Many men rated as enlisted technicians lacked training,but in time, it became "necessary to allow enlisted men to do simpledebridements, when casualties came faster than we could take care of them":Kuite, "Report," op. cit. The 25th Field Hospital andsome of the Portable Surgical Hospitals evidently had fair to excellentpreparation for the particular forms of battle service encountered in Burma;but one reported that its men saw their first surgery when the first woundedman arrived: Stone, "Surgeons in Battle," op. cit.
British hospital officers noted many of the same weaknesses in thefield treatment of Chindit casualties: see pp. 258-261.
53Letter report, Maj. B. P. Harrison, Jr., to Rear Echelon,Galahad, 29 Mar. 1944, in Stilwell Papers, Folder 88, section 2.
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to the village of Hsamshingyang. By forced marches day and nightit reached 3d Battalion headquarters on 7 April. Colonel Hunter welcomedit by giving it a place in an attack he was preparing. The battalion combedits ranks for men still able to negotiate the trails. It found only 250to send up the line with the 3d Battalion.54
How had the 2d and 3d Battalions fared during these weeks in March?After leaving Walawbum they marched eastward into the rough hills on therim of the Mogaung Valley. The trails were unguarded, but the necessityof crossing and recrossing the many streams in the hills made the marchwearisome. However, with one combat team guarding their rear, they attackedTanaka's communications line at Inkangahtawng 23-24 March. Then they learnedthat there was a strong enemy force coming up toward them from Kamaing.Merrill pulled his troops back to avoid this threat. No sooner were histroops disengaged than he was told that another enemy column, a reinforcedbattalion, had started north and soon would be behind him. Unless he interceptedit, he and the Chinese would be outflanked. Stilwell therefore orderedthe 5307th to return eastward and throw itself across the enemy's pathway.
Back they went, 3d Battalion followed by 2d. They sent their I &R platoons ahead to protect their line of march. A series of brave andstubborn rearguard stands by the scouts allowed the combat teams to geton to the main trail north. The 3d Battalion reached Hsamshingyang, whereit found a clearing it could use as an airstrip. Five miles behind, underartillery as well as small arms fire, 2d Battalion dug in on a hilltopat Nphum Ga. There it stayed under fire for 2 weeks.
For the first 2 days of the ordeal the two battalions were in touchwith one another. Then the Japanese took the waterhole at Nphum Ga55and closed the trail to Hsamshingyang. No longer could 2d Battalion obtainsupplies or evacuate its wounded. General Merrill collapsed with a heartdisorder; Colonel Hunter assumed command. In conditions of mounting desperationand morbid horror, 2d Battalion held its perimeter. Day after day, 3d Battalionattacked up the trail or tried to find a jungle bypass to the hilltop.On 6 April, it still had a mile to go to reach Nphum Ga. Next day Hunteradded the 250 men of 1st Battalion to the relief force. He committed allhis troops on the 8th and advanced a half-mile before night fell. The troopsdug in on the trail so that they could resume the attack immediately nextday. But on Easter Sunday morning, the 9th, Hunter's patrols discoveredthey could simply walk on in to the 2d Battalion perimeter. The Japanesehad vanished during the night. Although they had suffered many casualties,they were still relatively strong and they slipped off to join the garrison
54Romanus and Sunderland, II, pp. 175-191;Merrill's Marauders, pp. 47-91; Ogburn, pp. 137-218.
55"2nd Battalion Diary," 1 April: "We were drinkingmuddy, and I mean muddy, water. Nothing else to be had. Even seen fellastaking water from pool where dead mules lie." On 6 April, after waterwas dropped in plastic containers from aircraft, the diarist wrote: "Can'tunderstand how we held out with the water the boys had to drink."
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at Myitkyina. The 5307th moved a few miles northward to lick itswounds.56
The march to Shaduzup and the battle near it cost 1st Battalion almostas many casualties as the entire regiment lost at Walawbum--8 killed, 35wounded.57 At Inkangahtawng, casualties in 2d and 3d Battalionswere much lighter. They lost 2 killed and 12 wounded. The great damageto the regiment occurred in the siege of Nphum Ga. There the Marauderslost 57 killed and 302 wounded. Although many sick and wounded men werekept in the columns when the siege lifted, 379 were evacuated from Hsamshingyangin the second week of April.58
As before, casualties were carried to battalion aid stations or surgicalteams on litters or mules, if they could not walk. Airstrips for lightplanes evacuated patients from the Shaduzup and Inkangahtawng areas. AtNphum Ga, 2d Battalion casualties were taken to the 3d Battalion perimeterat Hsamshingyang during the first 2 days of the battle. Thereafter, theenemy controlled the trail; no further evacuation occurred until afterthe battle ended.59
In the Shaduzup-Inkangahtawng engagements, most, if not all, theregiment's casualties were seen by surgeons from the 13th Medical Battalionand Seagrave's hospital. They had been formed into a mobile surgical teamin February, and already had marched to and served at Walawbum with theChinese 113th Regiment and the 5307th. On occasions, Charlton Ogburn, inthe 1st Battalion, recalls seeing them digging foxholes for their patientsduring artillery bombardments. He saw his own battalion surgeons, JohnMcLaughlin and Winnie Steinfield, operating at night by flashlight behindponcho shields.60
The medical detachments with 2d and 3d Battalions were put to theseverest tests of nerve and energy. As 2d Battalion scrambled in the rainup to Nphum Ga, enemy artillery fired repeatedly into the column. Somehowthe company aidmen pulled the wounded men along, improvised litters, orput them on mules. As soon as the perimeter was established, Maj. BernardRogoff, the battalion surgeon, began operating in a deserted basha. Oneknows, despite the absence of records, that Captains Stelling and LewisA. Kolodny, Rogoff's as-
56Romanus and Sunderland, Merrill's Marauders,Ogburn, ibid. During this period, Stilwell's diary entries suggestthat his attention was given to the Chinese advance until the 5307th wascaught at Nphum Ga. On 4 April, he noted a "disturbing msg. from Hunterlast night." He worried on the 5th ("No report from Galahad")until he heard late in the day that "G is ok. Closing in on japs atNphum Ga." How hard the fighting was he may not have realized. Hisentries on the 6th, 11th and 13th are cheerful in their references to the5307th.
57Merrill's Marauders, p. 57; Ogburn, p. 185. There wasa heavy outbreak of amebic dysentery immediately after the battalion reachedNphum Ga: Hopkins Notes, p. 3.
58Merrill's Marauders, p. 91; Romanus and Sunderland,II, p. 191. In contrast: "No more than 15-20 men were evacuated [beforethe battle of Nphum Ga, from 3d Battalion] because of disease": HopkinsNotes, p. 2.
592d Battalion Diary, 17, 25, 26 and 29 March; NCAC History,pp. 93-101; "War Diary of 5307th," pp. 55, 70; Merrill's Marauders,p. 68.
60Seagrave, Burma Surgeon Returns, p. 120; Ogburn, pp.180, 186; 13th Medical Battalion "Unit History," 1944; Kuite,"Report"; Merrill's Marauders, p. 57.
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sistants, were at once at work receiving casualties, moving theminto sheltered positions at the edge of the deserted village, and supervisingtheir evacuation on litters. The wounded were carried to Captain Hopkins'3d Battalion aid station at Hsamshingyang, who in turn put them aboardthe liaison planes which landed at the airstrip on 29 March. Evacuationstopped after that, when the Japanese cut the line between the two battalions.
A few men came to Rogoff fearful or apathetic from battle fatigue.He set them to work digging trenches and foxholes for the casualties. Allbut two of his eight neuropsychiatric cases responded to this practicaltherapy and returned to the firing line. About sanitation he could do little.The carcasses of horses and mules soon littered the perimeter. The menwere too closely confined to their foxholes to do much about their ownwastes. The flies and the stench became almost unbearable. An airdrop of500 pounds of lime helped a little, but not much.
The waterhole of the village lay near the edge of the perimeter.On the 31st the Japanese captured it. Until 3 April, 2d Battalion had nowater except what it could collect in pits and shellholes on the few occasionswhen rain fell. Then water was airdropped into the perimeter in plasticcontainers. It had to be used sparingly. The doctors were unable to providethe extra fluids which the wounded men required, and they were handicappedin preparing plaster casts. Supplies became scarce. On the 8th, they werepartly replenished by an airdrop of glucose-saline solution, vitamins forintravenous administration, gas gangrene-tetanus serum, and, for the dysenterypatients, sulphaguanadine and paregoric.
On 4 April, Rogoff reported a casualty list of 17 killed, 97 wounded.Fifteen men had previously been evacuated to 3d Battalion. By the 6th,he had 100 patients in his aid station. Four of his medical men had beenwounded. Some of the casualties were refusing to stay at the station andwere returning to their foxholes to fight. Three of the wounded men weresubsequently killed. When the siege ended on Easter Sunday, Rogoff leda litter train of 103 wounded men to Hsamshingyang.
Meanwhile, Hopkins and his assistant, 1st Lt. Paul E. Armstrong,had not only maintained the 3d Battalion aid station but had been out onthe combat trail. Sometimes their aid post was as near as 30 yards to thefiring line. Wrote the official diarist of the 5307th:
[Hopkins] goes anywhere to take care of the wounded * * * He has a pleasantpersonality that assures each wounded soldier he is in the hands of a manwho cares for him and who knows how to take care of him. He has seen everyman before he died * * * Every wounded man is moved and treated withintwo minutes of being shot. Medics move with the assault troops. An 81 mmand one knee mortar shell
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landed in the aid station and wounded two men. Doc Hopkins got a pieceof shrapnel in the aid pouch at his side.61
As soon as the 5307th established its bivouac north of Nphum Ga,when the siege ended, it put together a small hospital with parachutesand bamboo lean-tos. To reinforce the battalion detachments, Combat Commandflew in a group of medical officers from the l4th, 48th, and 73d EvacuationHospitals near Ledo. The team was shocked to learn of the conditions underwhich medical service had been rendered "on the hill," but impressedby the quality of the work which the battalion surgeons had done. Woundedmen who had survived were in good condition, even though their injurieswere 2 weeks old. During the 10 days the special team stayed with the Marauders,they kept an average of 70 patients in the hospital. Hasty studies of thetroops were carried out with the intention of evacuating those appearingunfit for further jungle fighting.62
Terribly exhausted; suffering extensively and persistently from malaria,diarrhea, and both bacillary and amebic dysentery; beset by festering skinlesions, infected scratches and bites; depleted by 500 miles of marchingon packaged rations, the Marauders were sorely stricken. They had lost700 men killed, wounded, disabled by nonbattle injuries, and, most of all,sick. Over half of this number had been evacuated from 2d Battalion alone.Many remaining in the regiment were more or less ill, and their physicalcondition was too poor to respond quickly to medication and rest.63
61"War Diary of 5307th," pp. 126-127.Kolodny, of 2d Battalion, had a similarly narrow escape at Walawbum: Ogburn,p. 117. Preceding details of the medical service at Nphum Ga and Hsamshingyangare from the "War Diary," pp. 93-135, the "2nd BattalionDiary," 29 March-9 April, and Ogburn, ibid. Hopkins and Rogoffwere decorated with the Bronze Star medal; so were medical techniciansEugene F. Arnold and Joseph N. Gomez: Stilwell Papers, Folder 88, section3; Merrill's Marauders, p. 116.
6273d Evacuation Hospital Annual Report, 1944, appendix 3, "BriefResume of Detached Service with the 5307th Prov. Comp. Unit."
63Merrill's Marauders, pp. 91, 94; 73d Evacuation Hospital,ibid. A tabular "Casualty Report," 5 July 1944, showedthe following losses up to the end of April (Stilwell Papers, Folder 204):
| February | March | April | Total, |
Killed in action | 1 | 19 | 30 | 50 |
Died from wounds | 0 | 6 | 15 | 21 |
Died from injuries during action | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 |
Wounded in action | 0 | 84 | 147 | 231 |
Missing | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
Sick and injured evacuated | 127 | 73 | 304 | 504 |
Died, nonbattle causes | 3 | 0 | 1 | 4 |
Total | 131 | 183 | 498 | 812 |
Hopkins noted that there were approximately 200 casesof sickness in the 2d Battalion when it left Nphum Ga; most of the patientshad amebic dysentery, he believed. He also reported that there had been26 cases of scrub typhus in 1st Battalion, with two deaths; five casesin 2d Battalion (no deaths); and four cases in 3d Battalion (one death).Some of these may have occurred during the period of rest and patrol actionafter the siege was ended, but before the 5307th started for Myitkyina:Hopkins Notes, p. 3.
Hopkins had continued his studies of wound ballistics. Several men in the1st Battalion were hurt by American weapons--one when a twig caught thetrigger of his submachine gun while he was on horseback; two by the fireof poorly-sited mortars; three while cleaning their rifles; one by discharginghis rifle accidentally in his foxhole at night; and one who left his foxholeduring the night and was shot by someone who supposed he was a Japanese.The last six of these men received their wounds in the brief trail actionat Nphum Ga; the other three casualties occurred in the Shaduzup engagement.
Two men shot in the head on the way to Shaduzup were not wearing helmetswhen they were wounded. Two others, one at Shaduzup and one near NphumGa, were shot when they needlessly left their foxholes. Still another bledto death when he hysterically fought off treatment after he had been woundedin the leg. After the action at Shaduzup, two men were wounded as theytried to recover two other wounded men. And two were killed in action onpatrol outside Nphum Ga.
His records of his own battalion covered 78 casualties. Of these, 36 occurredbetween 1 and 6 April, and 29 between 7 and 9 April. Thirteen were killedin action or died of wounds. Ten of the casualties were victims of surprise.Six of them were preparing breakfast and looking curiously at the bodiesof Japanese killed the day before; the other four were with the scoutson a flanking operation near Nphum Ga. In this case Hopkins thought thatthere had been insufficient care in reconnaissance. One of the men diedof wounds incurred while attempting to reach another casualty. Americanweapons were involved in several cases resulting in death--one killed bya case of ammunition dropped from a cargo plane at Hsamshingyang, anotherby a companion carelessly cleaning his rifle, a third who wore an unusualsuit of coveralls and was mistaken for a Japanese when he emerged fromthe jungle after a patrol. Another soldier was wounded when a defectiveshell exploded while he was loading his mortar. Two men were hit by Americanplanes strafing Japanese positions; three men in a shallow foxhole werewounded by a tree-burst of an American mortar shell; four others were hitby the second ranging shot of poorly-sited 60 mm. mortars; and once againa man was shot when he rose suddenly from his foxhole and was mistakenfor an enemy soldier.
In several cases, Hopkins thought that tactical errors contributed to casualties.Two men were wounded who continued to fire at the enemy after having beenwarned to take cover; one of them was killed while he was being pulledto shelter. Eight men bunched on a trail leading to Nphum Ga were simultaneouslywounded by a Japanese mortar shell. Several were wounded when they failedto seek cover or moved incautiously from cover. In such instances the victimswere entering or were already in known fire lanes.
The number of casualties which Hopkins evidently thought might have beenavoided seems to be proportionately greater for the Nphum Ga engagementthan for the battles at Walawbum and at Shaduzup-Inkangahtawng. He himselfdid not make this comparison. But his case studies suggest that a fairquestion might be asked: "Did the lapses which led to casualties derivein part from the mounting fatigue and illness of the troops at Nphum Ga?Were they, if so, thus partly a consequence of deterioration in health?"
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General Wingate was accused of ruthless folly, if not madness, whenhe lost one-third of his brigade in the jungles and plains of Burma in1943. By mid-April, the 5307th had suffered almost as many casualties asthe Chindits and, like them, had many men sick and dazed in the ranks.But the campaign of 1944 was still under way. The Mogaung-Myitkyina linestill had to be captured.
The Hopkins Report, Continued
General discussion of disease.--a. In the Pacific thesick rate was high for the following diseases: Bronchitis, arthritis, asthmaticattacks, sinusitis, myositis, external otitis, diarrhea, dysentery, thecommon cold, and gastritis.
b. Among the men of the 3rd battalion who were studied in India,approximately 250 were seen and studied with 400-500 chronic cases of disease.For example I have records on 13 chronic backaches; 30 chronic gastritiscases; 10 severe psychoneurotics; 8 psychosis cases; 30 chronic bronchitiscases; 10 hernias; 30 chronic malaria with splenomegaly, anemia, and weightloss; 9 men with chronic recurrent attacks of pleurisy; 5 with per-
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forated drums, some with chronic otitis; 11 severe chronic tonsillitiscases; and 5 pilonidals. This discussion could take up many groups of chronicdisease. Our sick call usually ran 25 to 75 men and we were very liberalabout seeing them throughout the day.
c. I have previously stated that we put 115 men not fit for combatin the rear echelon and sent 69 to the Karachi [181st] General Hospital.The rest and many of those we sent to the hospital went with us into Burma.
d. We have all been impressed by chronic attacks of dizzynesson change of position which the men complain of, as well as the high incidenceof anorexia and gastritis. The symptoms continue even after days of hospitalization.
Typhus.--a. The 3rd Battalion left for Burma with itstyphus inoculation complete. We continually kept typhus before the mindsof the men. They were cautioned against lice and ticks. We were never impressedwith the danger of the so-called Burma or CBI fever which is apparentlytsutsugamushi fever [scrub typhus]. My battalion had one typhus case inIndia. In Burma, during the first three months, three cases were evacuated;one died. During our last three weeks in Burma, many men were evacuatedwith typhus. Figures are not yet available but the 3rd Battalion recordswill probably show between 125 and 150 cases. Twenty-one men from thisbattalion have already died and several are still seriously ill.
b. Our men were apparently inoculated at Ritpong61where the Japanese had had two recent deaths, according to statements ofa prisoner, from an undiagnosed disease. The majority of the dead and sickslept in bashas on the outskirts of the village.
c. The hospitals here state that these typhus cases should begiven medical boards and evacuated to the states for further convalescence.However no one with the possible exception of the 111th Station Hospital65seems willing to take this step.
d. In the majority of cases it seems apparent that these menare not getting the type of study and convalescent care that their diseasewarrants. Lipman, Byron and Casey in the January 1944 issue of the [ArmyMedical Department] Bulletin give the following opinion.
e. "It is well to stress a few points. Scrub typhus fevermay run an entirely mild course with relatively low-grade temperature rangingfrom 99 degrees to 102 degrees. However, regardless of the severity ofthe infection all cases in their convalescence should have a period ofprolonged bed rest following a regimen akin to that used in rheumatic feverand postdiphtheritic heart disease. Every case should have electrocardiogramstudies in order accurately to assess cardiac damage of which perhaps thereis more than is immediately apparent. In justice to the patient, extremelycareful study should be made before returning the patient to full or limitedduty."
Amebiasis.--a. My opinion is that the Amebiasis rate inthe Pacific was low, but diagnostic facilities available to me were poorand I may be mis-
64On the trail to Myitkyina in May.
65At Chabua; later redesignated the 142d General Hospital. Itreceived some of the evacuees from 5307th in June, when hospitals at Ledoreached the point of overflow.
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taken. We were troubled more by bacillary dysentery. On the Lurline15 to 20 cases [occurred; the men] were transferred to the Army StationHospital in Bombay. In India a few cases were treated at Deolali and Deogarh.No followups have been done on any of these men.
b. Diarrhea and dysentery were ever present with the 3rd Battalionin Burma. The men used Halazone religiously and we were always settingup water points away from villages where it might be contaminated withCysts.66 We saw many attacks of bloody dysentery especiallyduring the latter two months of the campaign. Stools are not being doneroutinely at the 20th GH or the 14th Evac Hospitals. The 111th StationHospital has been able to make adequate studies. Their work points to avery high percentage of amebiasis. I personally think 90% of the men havethe disease.
c. No steps have been taken for mass diagnostic procedure, oradequate followup of the treated cases. Some men have gone back to Myitkyinawithout adequate stool study.
Casualties.--a. The men of the 43rd, the 25th, the Americal,and 37th Divisions came in the majority of cases from battalions wheremilitary and medical casualties had been high. I know very little aboutthe 32nd Division. My battalion, the 1st battalion of the 148th Infantry,had over 200 casualties. This amounts to 25 to 30% casualties. My impressionis that the other divisions took higher casualties.
b. In Burma up to the present, the battalion has had 45 killedor died of wounds, 22 dead from disease and 115 wounded. At this time itis not possible to figure the exact percentage but it would seem about10% killed or dead and 15% wounded.67
Morale.--a. The spirit and enthusiasm among the 22 officersand 650 men who formed the unit in New Caledonia were exceptional and impressive.It was a great unit. Unfortunately some outfits had promised the men promotionsif they volunteered. This was the case in my regiment. I was actually toldthat I would be given a majority. It soon began to dawn on the men thatthey were not to be a commando unit as they had been told and that theywere not to be automatically promoted. After considerable controversy allprivates were made private first class.
b. The enthusiastic spirit of officers and men was dampened atBrisbane where five officers who outranked all ours in their grades andwho had not seen combat joined us from the 41st Division. They broughtno men.
c. None of the men or officers with few exceptions, since beingoverseas, had been given leave. Many had not returned home for severalmonths before sailing overseas. They were very disappointed to find thatit was not the policy to give passes ashore in any ports. In India no leaveswere given until about one half of the third battalion went AWOL duringthe latter part of December. When this started a few short leaves weregiven. In two
66Encysted forms of E. histolytica,the amoeba causing dysentery. In this form, the organism was especiallyresistant to chlorination.
67These figures represent the total after participation in thebattle of Myitkyina. Hence, they exceed those given above for the periodof February-April (Walawbum, Inkangahtawng, and Nphum Ga engagements).
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years or more overseas the majority of the men and officers have neverhad leave.
d. It is not within the scope of this report to discuss the numerouscliques and problems which have arisen so often to lower the men's morale.The attitude of the average enlisted man is that many promises have beenmade and few have been kept. They openly state that their days of volunteeringare over. They feel that their country has let them down. They have beenin the Army long enough to know that psychologically and medically theyhave gotten what they call a raw deal. The majority of them still havegreat respect for the Regimental Staff and General Merrill.
e. Seventy five percent of these men should have been evacuatedfrom Burma before the start of the Myitkyina campaign. They put up witha lot and led the Chinese to Myitkyina, doing a large part of the fightingon the way. They all knew of and believed in the vague promise that theywould be evacuated as soon as the airport was taken. This was accomplishedjust about two weeks before the battalion was finally evacuated on EMTtags.
f. The 3rd battalion was the most superb fighting outfit I haveever seen. Considering the fighting they did their casualties were amazinglylow. These low casualties go hand in hand with their accomplishment andboth are due to the leadership of company commanders and platoon leadersas well as their magnificent courage and past experience. Many died becausethey were willing to fight Japs as well as disease on the trip to Myitkyina.
g. Many of these men were mentally and physically ill after 2and 3 campaigns and 2 years of field duty in the tropics and subtropics.Their morale is low and they have lost all confidence in the CBI TheatreLeaders. It is not helped by seeing raw and previously unorganized infantryand poorly trained and prepared engineer troops sent to Myitkyina to carryon a large share of the battle.
h. It is not helped by seeing their buddies sent out as casualsquickly sent back to the same area, after a magnificent showing for fourmonths of sickness, death, wounds, and misery. Many were still affectedwith the disease with which they were evacuated.
i. Here I want to insert a paragraph from the January issue ofthe Bulletin of the U.S. Army Medical Dept. I quote: "Moraleis an intangible necessity which no army can get along without and stillbe successful. Soldiers with inferior weapons and equipment but with highmorale can overcome an enemy with the best equipment but low morale. TheArmy is well aware of this, and through its Special Service Division hasaccomplished much by encouraging athletic recreation and entertainmentas diversions. A Special Service Officer is assigned to each post and unit.Frequent physical inspections are conducted, since poor health can seriouslyinterfere with morale. The selection, preparation, and serving of foodare closely supervised, as it is well known that plenty of good food isone of the prime supports of good morale in any group of men. Morale, however,is far more than entertainment and diversion. As a matter of fact it isan integral factor in mental hygiene." Unquote.
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The Stelling Report, Continued
D. After starting into the jungles we failed to make our objective thefirst day so our battalion commander decided to continue in the dark alonga very narrow jungle trail without lights of any kind. The trail went acrossseveral muddy stream beds and two or three flimsy bamboo foot bridges.In the pitch black dark only those who have attempted to do so can possiblyappreciate the utter impossibility of keeping a column of loaded pack animalsand men moving along such a trail with thick vines and bamboo and underbrushgrowing up to the very edge of a narrow winding trail and with fallen logsand roots every few feet. With just a little light or in bright moonlightit can be done, but with no lights at all and men falling and stumblingand animal packs getting caught in vines and stuck between and under limbsof trees, it is an impossibility to move over a few feet a minute. It takeshours to move even a half mile. It is easily understandable that occasionscould arise in enemy territory where a half mile or even a few hundredyards or feet could mean the difference between victory and defeat. Butwithout such special reasons we have on several occasions wasted wholenights that should have been spent sleeping just moving two or three miles.Never has any possible advantage been achieved by us in night marches throughthe jungles except once or twice on moonlight nights. The disgust generatedby our battalion commander on the first night march by stubbornly orderingthe battalion on for three or four hours after dark during which we movednearly one-half of a mile, of course without any light whatsoever, causedhim to reach a new low in the estimation of all the men and most of theofficers. It's no doubt laughable now but let anyone try to walk in absolutedarkness in deep jungles such as I have described, stumbling and fallingand barking shins and spraining ankles and falling on their faces in themud, and stopping to repack animals--all this to absolutely no avail. Spenda whole night doing this and find that you have covered nearly a mile ormaybe two by morning, which you could have covered in less than one hourin daylight and see how much adrenalin you use up, and how fresh you feelto march all day the next day in enemy infested jungles. The morale factorinvolved in such physical and mental frustrations is quite large. Any officerwho stubbornly persists in ordering such utterly inexcusable and dangerouslydepleting activities of which this is only one example destroys one's faithin his mentality to say nothing of his leadership.
E. During three days [of] rest at the end of the ten day Ledo Road marchand after part of a day and a night and another part-day march to our firststopping place in the jungle, we received our first air drop and packedrations and ammunition in addition to regular packs for our start intodeeper jungles to our first engagement with the enemy; every few days wereceived air drops of food and ammunition and other supplies when needed.This was to be routine during the four months of the Burma campaign. TheAir Corps working in conjunction with the men of the rear echelon coordinatedby regimental and combat headquarters did an excellent job without whichthe campaign would have been impossible.
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F. Rations were K rations enough for from three to five days at eachdrop. No rations were carried on animals except for their own grain. Krations for mountain and jungle marching were found to be inadequate tomaintain body weight and energy even when supplemented with C and D andTen in One rations occasionally. This proved to be true in spite of adequatesalt and vitamins added to the diet.
G. The 2nd Battalion fought through four major engagements and threeminor ones and several skirmishes during the four months of the Burma campaign.55 men were killed in combat or died of wounds and 175 of the wounded arestill living. Two died accidental deaths out of combat. None have to myknowledge died of disease up to the time of this writing.68These figures are not absolutely accurate to the last man because about25 men of the 2nd Battalion are still in the vicinity of Myitkyina andthe detailed medical records of the battalion are not available to me atthe present time. Neither have hospital records been completed.
H. It should be borne in mind that only once were we taken totally bysurprise by the enemy. Excellent scouting and patrolling and general reconnaissanceby our own men and accurate and timely information by the Kachins assignedto us and the excellent work of the OSS mostly done by Kachins kept uswell posted. Of course this information came to us mostly through regimentalheadquarters. Only one out and out catastrophe occurred due to failureto guard a trail. But none of the enemy ever forced their way through ourperimeter.69
I. The worst combat ordeal for the battalion and the one catastrophereferred to which caused the highest number of casualties came when wewere completely surrounded by what later proved to be a reinforced battalionof Japs as we were holding rear guard for the regiment at Nphum Ga. Wewere surrounded here on this hill for fifteen days. The conditions werehorrible in the extreme. It is here that the greatest drain on the lifeand strength of the battalion occurred. We were living on a bull's eye.Day and [night] almost with every Jap shell we lost more men in killedand wounded. Here alone we lost 45 killed and 150 wounded. There was nowater to be had except from a mud hole in which drainage from dead animalsaccumulated, until later during the siege water was dropped to [us] alongwith food and ammunition and medical supplies. Out of some 200 horses andmules which went to Nphum Ga all but about 53 were killed or wounded byenemy fire and the wounded animals had to be killed by us.
J. On Nphum Ga the medical and sanitary problems were acute in the extreme.Nothing could be done to relieve the situation until the combined effortsof the Air Corps and the 3rd Battalion helped us to break the siege. Mencould not venture out of their fox holes except when absolutely necessary.They began to look like skeletons, haggard and worn and very thin
68Totals for the campaign, including the Myitkyinaengagement.
69Kachin rangers led by OSS officers screened the advance of2d and 3d Battalions to Inkangahtawng and marched with 2d Battalion toMyitkyina.
The characterization of the Nphum Ga episode as a "surprise"is misleading. The northward thrust of the enemy was a typical maneuveron the flank. Stilwell parried it, as Tanaka had parried Stilwell's attemptsat envelopment. But perhaps 2d Battalion pride would have been strengthenedhad it known more clearly the part it played at Nphum Ga.
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from severe battle exhaustion due to prolonged and almost constant enemyfire and bombardment which made it next to impossible to ever eat or sleepor even to relax for a moment. The water problem at first became accentuatedby the capture of our only real water hole by the enemy. For several daysuntil water could be dropped to us the whole battalion tried to get waterout of the only mud hole below the picket line. From this and due to otherextreme sanitary problems because of being trapped and of not being ableto bury the men and animals deep enough as fast as they were killed, andnot being able to move from the spot for half a month, acute gastritiscomplicated by pernicious nausea and vomiting and bloody diarrhea werealmost universal by the tenth day of the siege. After many promises ofrelief had failed, most of the men and officers began to have the hopelesslook of despair and had developed such severe battle exhaustion that theycould not continue to function. These and the high number of wounded anddying averaging together as high as twenty per day made it impossible forthe medical personnel to dig fox holes fast enough for the men who couldnot dig for themselves. Some of the men including those from the pack animalpersonnel helped enlarge the aid station facilities which however wereadequate.
K. With no water during the first part of the siege with which to boilinstruments and barely enough to give oral medication and practically noneto drink, some of the men became delirious from thirst and all sufferedmarked dehydration. It became difficult to recognize one's closest associatesby looks and because of personality changes due to the physical and mentalstrain of the siege.
L. The surgical problem was acute. Men already weakened pitifully hadlittle resistance and succumbed more rapidly to infection and from bloodloss. Plasma saved many lives but many more could have been saved if evacuationto hospitals could have been achieved earlier. Only operations of absolutenecessity to attempt to save life and limb were performed. These had tobe done while almost standing on one's head on the edges of fox holes inwhich the patients lay. Deep fox holes could not be dug fast enough toaccommodate even the most serious surgical cases. Great heroism was shownby some of the medical enlisted men in going out at all times and underall conditions to bring in casualties. The majority of the medical personnelbore up bravely and efficiently under this most trying of all ordeals.
M. The great majority of the enlisted men of the line and their officersfought on day and night with magnificent bravery and courage. Our perimeterwas never successfully invaded by the enemy in spite of repeated chargesfrom many directions and enemy reinforcements that were brought up.
N. After the siege was broken and the enemy thrown back mainly throughthe efforts of the 3rd Battalion and the Air Corps from the outside reinforcingour efforts from the inside, we were finally relieved. Even before thissiege of half a month, after the 2nd Battalion and a column from the 3rdBattalion had destroyed several hundred Japs near the road at Inkangahtawngabout the middle of March, we had been promised evacuation on grounds thatour mission had been accomplished.
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We were told at that time that we would start out of Burma in aboutten days. Also about the tenth of March we were told that the animals wouldneed to hold up for only ten days longer. We had accomplished the desiredeffects of causing the Japs to withdraw south on the Road allowing theaccumulating Chinese forces to break a stalemate and advance rapidly downthe road toward Kamaing. In doing this the 2nd Battalion had formed oneroad block behind the Jap lines and had tapped enemy wires leading to divisionheadquarters and gained much vital information contributing to allied successes.70And in attempting to cut the road again at Inkangahtawng [we] had practicallyannihilated a Japanese battalion. The 3rd Battalion fought magnificentlynear Walawbum, destroying many hundreds of the enemy. The 1st Battalionhad engaged the enemy several times north of these points and had causedhim to become disorganized and to lose many men.
O. Thus, before the siege of the 2nd Battalion at Nphum Ga we were ledto believe that we were on the way out of Burma.71 In fact,we had been congratulated upon our good work and told that we had killedour quota of Japs. It must be constantly borne in mind in order to havea true picture of the campaign of "Merrill's Marauders" thatwe were not resting between combat engagements, but were always on themove enduring unbelievable physical and mental hardships which defy description.During the successful first half of our campaign our extraordinary mobilityaccounted for much of our success. We moved much faster than any of theenemy forces we engaged and surprised them time and again. Roughly speakingwe moved from two to four times faster than any of the Chinese outfitswith which we were associated. So, before the Nphum Ga siege,
70Specifically, at Walawbum. At Inkangahtawng,a radio message from Merrill, warning Colonel Hunter of an approachingJapanese force, reached 2d Battalion but not Hunter himself. The responseof 2d Battalion helped alert the rest of the 5307th on 24 March: Romanusand Sunderland, II, pp. 153-181.
71Without gainsaying Stelling's report of "promises,"since subsequent inquiries revealed that there had been much loose talkabout the future, it may be helpful to restate the sequence of events.The Inkangahtawng roadblock plan developed from proposals by Hunter andMerrill, responding to Stilwell's instructions to set up another flankingmaneuver after the battle of Walawbum. They first recommended a wide approachmarch and an attack at Shaduzup. The result of discussion was a plan toattack both at Shaduzup and at Inkangahtawng. As Hunter approached thetarget, he thought that it would be possible to attack even more boldlyif the three battalions rapidly assembled and fell on the major Japanesecenter at Kamaing. He and Merrill agreed, however, that unless they couldcount on speedy action by the Chinese to follow up the Marauder attack,the 5307th might become locked in a static battle: Romanus and Sunderland,II, pp. 175-182. The discussion suggests that Hunter and Merrill did notforesee an end to Marauder efforts after the roadblock engagement at Inkangahtawng.Thenceforth, as Stelling goes on to say, the 5307th was in continuous action.No rest period followed the battle at Inkangahtawng, as had been the caseat Walawbum. It is not likely that any major occasion occurred in whichpromises or predictions were officially laid before the troops.
It is true, however, that during March the question of how far Stilwellshould advance was being asked at the highest levels of South East AsiaCommand and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Early in March, Stilwell doubtedwhether it would be safe to go below Kamaing unless Chinese and Britishforces were fully committed to the North Burma Campaign. Throughout Marchand April, Mountbatten persisted in opposing an advance to Mogaung andMyitkyina, believing that other plans for Allied cooperation would be morefruitful (though more delayed and costly of resources). Not until earlyMay was Stilwell clearly shown the "green light" to attempt theMogaung-Myitkyina operations; Romanus and Sunderland, II, pp. 160-164,171-172, 176-178, 200-203. If Kamaing had been the final goal of the springcampaign, the 5307th's task might have ended soon after the battle of Inkangahtawng.
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in spite of great fatigue, our morale was high. Our losses in killedand wounded up to this time before Nphum Ga were very small, less thanone American killed or wounded for every 200 Japs killed.
When we came down off Nphum Ga after the most killing and wearing ordealthat had ever been sustained by any similar unit in the Army, and afterthe Chinese had moved up to hold the ground we had gained,72the whole regiment of "Merrill's Marauders" naturally expectedto be sent out of Burma for a much deserved rest. The most optimistic amongstus thought of the implications made in Trinidad when the 100% volunteermission was said to be a hazardous one but with hope of being sent homeat the end of it. And all of us recalled the several promises made duringthe fighting and marching thus far in Burma by no less than General Merrilland Colonel Hunter themselves, as to our being through with our missionin ten days following the initial successes. So after Nphum Ga, we wereall consternated [sic] and in the weakened exhausted state of the 2nd Battalionwe couldn't at first believe our ears when we heard that still anothercombat march lay ahead of us.
What Mogaung was to the Chindits, Myitkyina was to the Marauders--acity of despair. The fate of the two forces was curiously similar. In May,both had reached the end of the period supposedly allotted to them forjungle penetration warfare. Both, then, were called on by Stilwell forone more assault. By that time a major part of each had been severely mauledin a static situation, the 111th Brigade of the Chindits at Blackpool andthe 2d Battalion, 5307th, at Nphum Ga. Each believed that it was performingtasks for which other national forces were properly responsible. Theirsuffering, they thought, resulted from shirking or failure not their own.The monsoon rains pelted each force alike; the trails and dugouts turnedto slime beneath their feet. Their men--the half or so left for the lastattempt--were all gaunt and weary. Some of their officers were disgruntled,many of the doctors were resentful, most of the troops were either jocularlyor sullenly bitter.
The 5307th had 2 weeks in April to rest after the battle of NphumGa. New clothing, extra rations, treatment of the sick, and some routinetraining exercises were thought to be preparation for withdrawal to Indiaas soon as Chinese troops took over the trail patrols. By the 21st, however,Stilwell's orders to attack Myitkyina reached the regiment. A week laterit had been bracketed with Chinese and Kachin troops. The 1st and 3d Battalionswere joined to the Chinese 150th Regiment, 50th Division, and the Chinese88th Regiment, 30th Division. They formed H and K Forces, respectively.The
72A battalion of the 112th Regiment, 38th Division.
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Chinese troops had recently been flown to the combat area from China.A pack artillery battery, surgical teams, and the 42d Portable SurgicalHospital were added to the columns. The 2d Battalion, cut in half at NphumGa, was reorganized internally into more compact subdivisions. Three hundredKachin scouts accompanied it. It was called M Force.
When the reorganization was completed, General Merrill, just outof a hospital, spoke in Stilwell's name.
In giving Merrill his orders for the march, Stilwell stated that heknew he was calling on Galahad for more effort than could fairly be expected,but that he had no other option. In the light of that, and the exhaustionof the unit, he authorized Merrill to begin evacuating Galahad 'withoutfurther order if everything worked out as expected.' After discussing theplan with his battalion commanders, Merrill said a few words about whatwould be done for Galahad on completion of the mission. Such a prospectwas a tremendous incentive to the weary men of Galahad, and Merrill believedmany made the march as a last desperate effort for a great prize.73
The rewards, according to the way the men understood Merrill, wereto be immediate return to India when the Marauders took their objective,"a party to cause taxpayers a shudder," recuperation in restcamps (which were located in such attractive places as Kashmir), and furloughs.74
The advance to Myitkyina was desperately difficult. The trails overthe Kumon Mountains were wet and overgrown, steep and narrow. Many milesof the pathway had to be rebuilt or cut out anew. K Force led the way on28 April. Just across the mountains it attacked enemy strongholds at Ritpongand Tingkrukawng. H Force, which started for Myitkyina on 30 April, wentpast the Japanese while K Force engaged them. M Force (2d Battalion) firstspread out in the Naubum-Nphum Ga area to seal the trails. Its task wasnot dangerous but it was tiring. On 5 May, it closed up its patrols andleft for Myitkyina over the worst of the trails selected for the advance.Animals and men began to fail at once as the column hastened after therest of the force.
H Force reached Myitkyina airfield on 17 May. "The attack wentlike a service school demonstration, for although the Japanese knew Myitkyinawas in danger, the actual assault was a complete surprise."75The Marauders took positions to protect the airfield from possible counterattacks,and the Air Force promptly began flying in supplies
73Romanus and Sunderland, II, p. 225; the generaldescription of reorganization, ibid., pp. 224-225, and Merrill'sMarauders, pp. 96-97. Ogburn, pp. 222-227 and 278, describes the situationand attitudes in 5307th after the battle of Nphum Ga. Hunter astonishedthe men by ordering them to march and drill when they began to show signsof recovery.
74As given by Ogburn, p. 227. It will be recalled that the troopshad complete confidence in Merrill and Hunter.
75Romanus and Sunderland, II, p. 226.
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and additional Chinese troops. Urged on by Hunter, Merrill hopedto attack the city at once. But time and luck ran out. The Chinese regimentswere inexperienced, easily daunted and confused, and sometimes badly led.The Marauders were exhausted. Both broke down repeatedly short of theirobjectives. Japanese reinforcements soon found holes in the Chinese andAmerican lines. In a few days a determined, well-organized, and fortifiedgarrison of over 4,000 troops defied the Myitkyina Task Force.
Stilwell had no more Chinese he could add to the attack. The BritishChindits were a long distance away, although--against their protests--hewas maneuvering them up to the Mogaung-Myitkyina line. But in the lastweek of May, he found additional American troops. The men were replacementsfor the 5307th, who had been secured in the United States by a call forvolunteers. The War Department intended that they would compose a fullyorganized and trained unit to replace 5307th as a whole. Stilwell,however, had no time to carry out the War Department plan for a new regiment.Instead, he ordered the men to Myitkyina on 30 May (5 days after they reachedIndia) to fill up the ranks of the Marauders. At the same time he pulledtwo battalions of engineers, the 209th and 236th, off the Ledo Road andsent them to the battlefield. They were split into companies and sandwichedbetween Marauder units.76
Nothing availed. During the last week of May, a very strict policyon evacuation had been enforced, with the hope of preventing rapid decimationof the ranks. Additionally, word went through medical installations onthe battlefield and back at Ledo to stretch every point in order to returnmen to duty. But such measures actually hastened the collapse of the 5307th.To injury they added insult.
In each previous mission, the Marauders had been required to undertakea jungle march, seize a designated enemy position, hold it for a few days,and turn it over to the Chinese. This they had done at Myitkyina. Neverbefore had it been expected that they would settle down to a battle ofconventional, yard-by-yard advance, let alone besiege a city. Yet thischange of purpose and style now was demanded. The stringent evacuationpolicy, the reappearance of some Marauders previously evacuated to Ledo,and the addition of replacements all
76Ibid., pp. 229-243; 2d Battalion Diary,15 April-17 May; Russell F. Hill, Operations Sergeant, "S-3 Journal3rd Bn 5307th Comp. Unit (Prov)," Stilwell Papers, Folder 88, section2; Stilwell Diary, 23 April-30 May 1944. Stilwell's entries show his worrywhile the 5307th made the approach march to Myitkyina. After a few daysof exuberance when Myitkyina airfield was taken so easily, gloom set in.He put Col. John E. McCammon, Merrill's assistant, in command of MyitkyinaTask Force. McCammon was sick, and after 2 weeks Stilwell replaced himwith his own Chief of Staff, General Boatner. Boatner commanded the taskforce from 30 May to 26 June. Stilwell felt he did not act with sufficientenergy, and when Boatner showed signs of malaria, Stilwell replaced himwith another officer from his staff, Brig. Gen. Theodore F. Wessels (whohad been at SEAC Headquarters for several months).
On more than one occasion Stilwell noted an atmosphere of discouragementat Myitkyina along with reports of faulty operations and low morale amongChinese and American troops. Expecting the Japanese to counterattack, hebegan looking for reinforcements. On 22 May, he alerted the engineers forpossible transfer to Myitkyina. Orders regarding the replacement troopsare referred to on 28 and 29 May.
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showed that they were being committed to the Myitkyina battle tothe bitter end. What little capacity to fight they had left after NphumGa had been preserved by hope and will. In the face of what seemed likebetrayal, hope and will vanished and the Marauders were finished. All buta few score were flown back to Ledo as medical evacuees in the first 3days of June.77
The medical support for the Myitkyina expedition was more elaboratethan the Marauders customarily received. In addition to their own battalionmedical detachments, surgical teams accompanied the H and K Force columns.With H Force, 1st Lt. Milton A. Dushkin led a Seagrave hospital team ofthree officers, 16 enlisted men, an English civilian technician, and threeChinese orderlies. His teammates were Lieutenants Carl J. Antonellis andTheodore Gurney. All had been serving for months with the Chinese New FirstArmy and, like the Marauders, they were seasoned jungle troops. K Forcehad with it Capt. F. B. Zombro and three men of the 73d Evacuation Hospital.They had been part of the medical troops flown in to help the 5307th afterthe battle of Nphum Ga. The principal surgical unit in the column, however,was the 42d Portable Surgical Hospital. It supported the Chinese 88th Infantryin K Force. Zombro's team backed up Hopkins's 3d Battalion medical detachment.78
When K Force started for Myitkyina, the 73d Evacuation Hospital teamand 3d Battalion medical detachment marched near the head of the column.The 42d PSH went at the rear with the animal train of the 88th Infantry.Its men were on foot. Twenty-five horses carried its equipment which, inthe absence of packing cases, had been bundled up into bags of parachutecloth--"bulky, awkward, difficult to pack as well as to load."Since the bags were not waterproof, supplies and equipment were repeatedlysoaked. When the trail became too steep for the animals, the Chinese shoulderedthe loads. At first the men of the PSH put their own baggage on the animals.But when they discovered that the pack train came in 3 hours after a bivouachad been established, they picked up packs discarded by other troops andthenceforth carried their own rations, blankets, jungle hammocks, and personalbelongings.
On the afternoon of 7 May, K Force began fighting at the villageof Ritpong. Casualties collected in a clearing, and the 42d was calledup from the rear of the column. The trail was so narrow that men and animalscould pass each other only in a few places. It was dawn of the 8th beforethe PSH equipment had been hand-carried forward to the casualty collectionpoint. Meanwhile the men of the 42d had given emergency treatment to some50 wounded soldiers. As soon as the equipment arrived, serious surgerybegan under a bamboo lean-to. By
77Romanus and Sunderland, II, pp. 238-242;Merrill's Marauders, pp. 110-113; "War Diary of 5307th,"pp. 75-78; 2d Battalion Diary, 30 May-5 June; "S-3 Journal of 3rdBn," 29 May.
78Seagrave, Burma Surgeon Returns, pp. 129-130; "WarDiary of 5307th," pp. 139-142; G-4 Periodic Reports Nos. 25-29, CBI,1944; 73d Evacuation Hospital, "Brief Resume"; 42d Portable SurgicalHospital "Annual Historical Report--1944."
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the end of the 4-day engagement at Ritpong, there were 60 litterpatients in the portable surgical hospital. When K Force resumed the advance,the question of evacuation became acute.
The nearest evacuation point was a hard two days' march. The secondbattalion of the 88th Chinese Regiment was assigned the task. Litters wereconstructed of bamboo poles and ground sheets and each was carried by twoChinese. Fellow soldiers carried the extra rifles, fourteen per man, andextra packs, eight per man! The walking wounded straggled behind. One officerfrom this organization [the 42d] accompanied and supervised this evacuation.Upon arrival at a small liaison plane landing field at Arang, in the mountains,air evacuation was begun. One hundred and ten patients were evacuated byliaison plane in one day from that field. Two planes crashed because ofthe hazardous take-off. However, no patients were lost in the completeevacuation.79
The 42d learned a valuable lesson at Ritpong. Afterward, it pareddown its equipment to essentials, which it packed on four animals. Theseanimals, with four of the unit's men, were put with 3d Battalion headquartersnear the front of the column. The rest of the PSH troops moved up to thehead of the Chinese infantry, which followed 3d Battalion. Only secondaryand reserve hospital baggage remained in the animal train at the rear.The plan of operation was for the four men at the head of the column togo into action as soon as a battle began. By the time the rest of the PSHhad come up, the hospital would be unpacked and medical service could bestarted at once. The plan was tested a few days later when K Force attackeda well-protected Japanese battalion at Tingkrukawng. The 88th Infantrytook fairly heavy casualties. The Marauder 3d Battalion lost 8 killed and21 wounded.
Hopkins placed his aid station immediately behind the 81 mm. mortarsand near an ammunition dump--the only available spot for him in the crampedposition which the battalion occupied on rough and thickly overgrown terrain.The 42d PSH stationed itself 200 yards behind the aid post. Hardly hadit laid out its hospital than enemy troops filtered through the Chineseline. They opened fire on the trail and the nearby hospital. Several Chineseand two American animal-handlers were killed. It was late afternoon beforethe enemy was driven off and casualty evacuation to the PSH began.
The 42d worked "all night with flashlights in spite of the proximityof the enemy, until ten o'clock the next morning, at which time the columnreceived orders to move. The Hospital was torn down and at ten-thirty movedwith the column thirteen grueling miles over mountain trail."80Its patients again were carried on litters over the long
7942d Portable Surgical Hospital Report, p.7.
80Ibid., p. 6.
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route to the airstrip at Arang. In the Ritpong and Tingkrukawng engagementsthe PSH treated 133 Chinese and American surgical cases.81
Although K Force held the enemy at bay, H and M Forces still hadthe rain and the precipitous trails to contend with. Sick men accumulatedso rapidly that when H Force passed by Arang, it dropped off the Seagravemedical team to care for its invalids and supervise air evacuation. Casualtiesfrom K and sick men from M Force soon swelled the number needing help atArang. Over 100 men were brought out from the village by liaison plane.Beyond Arang, a 2-day, 20-mile march produced over 30 more sick men in1st Battalion. Five of them had scrub typhus. They were left at the villageof Seingyang, expecting evacuation by air. A week went by. Finally an officerand one of the sergeants, both seriously ill, walked on in to Myitkyinaairfield. Four liaison plane trips later, a part of the group at Seingyanghad been rescued. Then a plane crashed and the flights were halted. After4 more days of waiting, the remaining sick received a message to come onin to Myitkyina or go back to the airstrip at Arang. They chose the latterand finally were evacuated.82
When the Marauders attacked Myitkyina, the battalion aid stationswere established in the perimeters. For the first few days, before enemycounteraction became serious, the principal medical problem was the still-increasingnumber of sick men. In the latter 10 days of the month, however, battlecasualties, too, required attention. Hopkins' aidmen and the 73d EvacuationHospital team were at Charpate, in 3d Battalion territory, on the 24th.Early in the morning "a large Japanese patrol infiltrated the perimeterand was not discovered until it was practically inside the command post.During the ensuing action six Americans including two officers, were killedand seven [enlisted men were] severely wounded. The aid station was withinfifty feet of the point of attack but fortunately none of the personnelwas injured." After 2 days in this position, 3d Battalion withdrewto a less active point north of the airstrip, where it remained until themen were evacuated at the end of the month. At the same time, the 73d EvacuationHospital team returned to its parent unit.83
The other medical unit with K Force, the 42d Portable Surgical Hospital,put its station in the perimeter of the Chinese 88th Infantry. The tacticalsituation was too changeable for the hospital to be safe. On 21 May, rifle,machine gun, and mortar fire spattered the area. PSH men scrambled to gettheir patients under cover, but some were hurt anew and some were killed.One of the medical men, too, was seriously wounded. He was later decoratedwith the Bronze Star medal.
81Ibid.; 73d Evacuation Hospital, "BriefResume."
82Ogburn, p. 253; "War Diary of 5307th," pp. 63-63a.The latter source gives Kawyang as the second evacuation point. It seemsless likely as the location, since it is on a side-trail. It is furtherfrom Myitkyina than Seingyang, but closer to Arang. Otherwise the two accountsconfirm one another. Ogburn, pp. 238-240, gives a glimpse of the evacuationpoint at Arang, from which he was himself evacuated.
8373d Evacuation Hospital, "Brief Resume."
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During the following week, Japanese patrols broke into the defenseson numerous occasions. Once an enemy machine gun was emplaced a mere 75feet from the hospital. At times, intense fire interrupted surgery. Heavyrain and deep mud prevailed constantly. Hospital troops and patients livedin foxholes under tarpaulin shelters. By the end of May, the 42d PSH, likethe 5307th, was exhausted. Two of its officers--one, Capt. Douglas A. Sunderland,with a Bronze Star for heroism during attacks on the hospital--were evacuatedsick; so were five of the men. The rest were relieved from duty with the88th Infantry, and the 42d moved to the airfield near Seagrave's hospital.84
Before H Force attacked the Myitkyina airfield on 17 May, GordonSeagrave and his hospital were with the 50th Chinese Division in the MogaungValley. Lately arrived, the Chinese were inactive. Seagrave fumed at thelack of business. Acting on a hunch, he cleared out all his patients onthe 18th and packed his equipment. He alerted his staff--another medicalofficer, two Burmese contract surgeons, three Burmese technicians, threeAmerican medical men (including a Chinese-American corporal who had joinedthe unit that day and became the registration clerk), 18 Burmese nurses,and five Chinese orderlies. Almost as if on a schedule, Petersen, the CombatCommand Surgeon, telephoned and told Seagrave to get over to Maingkwanairfield. Planes were coming to carry his hospital to Myitkyina. By theend of the afternoon, the hospital was on the battlefield near the 5307thcommand post. It sheltered its equipment beside a revetment at the airfield.Next morning, the staff laid litters across packing boxes and began tooperate on casualties. At noon in came Dushkin and the H Force surgicalteam, "the thinnest, dirtiest, weariest bunch of men [Seagrave] hadseen for a long time." No matter. They went to work immediately underscorching sun and squalls of rain. The nurses held umbrellas over the patientson the operating table during the worst of the downpour.
A Chinese litter bearer company scoured the battlefield, collectingcasualties wherever they found them, without regard for their unit origin.By nightfall Seagrave's surgeons had operated on 128 men. Many of themwere promptly evacuated in the troop transport and cargo planes which wereflying to and fro between Myitkyina and Ledo. Patients who remained wereput on ground sheets under parachute cloth and tarpaulins. Casualties continuedto come in. An electric generator was located to provide light. It was2:30 in the morning before the last patient had been treated and the hospitalpersonnel sought relief from the rain under the same improvised tents whichsheltered the wounded.
Next day they draped parachutes over bamboo poles to form three operatingpavilions. A slight decline in casualties gave them time to put up sheltersfor the medical troops, as well.
8442d PSH Report, p. 7; "History of 42ndP.S.H. in Myitkyina Campaign"; NCAC History, appendix 2: "Myitkyina,"p. 29; Citation list, Stilwell Papers, Folder 88, section 3.
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Rain was almost continuous and the condition of shock in many patientswas greatly aggravated by the cold and wet, blood and mud. Evacuation byplane became more difficult and patients were lying everywhere underfootunder every kind of cover or lack of cover. Because of torrential rainduring the night the "covers" hastily thrown up for half theunit personnel collapsed and little real rest was possible.
It took two more moves in as many days for the hospital to find apermanent position. They soon improved their shelters, and after 10 inchesof water covered the ground one night, Seagrave's demand for drainage ditchesbrought action. By early June, the hospital was securely established.85
One other medical unit served with 5307th while it was at Myitkyina,a surgical team of one officer and four men from the 25th Field Hospital.They reached the airfield on 24 May, where troops of the 5307th headquartersand the 209th Engineers were located during the rest of the month. Mainly,the team treated emergency cases and sick men, evacuating its patientsto the nearby 42d PSH or to Seagrave's hospital.86
85Seagrave, Burma Surgeon Returns, pp.132-139. The first quotation is on page 137. Seagrave's chronology is incorrect;the flight occurred on the 18th, as stated above. For the second quotationand other details, 896th Clearing Company Annual Report, 1944, pp. 3-5;NCAC History, "Myitkyina," pp. 17-21.
8625th Field Hospital Annual Report, 1944, p. 7; NCAC History,"Myitkyina," pp. 24, 89. Medical operations continued to expandduring June. The 42d PSH moved to the airfield on 29 May. It pooled itsstaff with that of Seagrave until 7 June. Next it went on a 5-day supportmission with an outlying American unit. When it returned, it put up a permanenthospital on the west side of the airfield. It built five wards--one of35 beds for surgical cases, two of 27 and 40 beds, respectively, for medicalpatients, a 10-bed officer ward, and a 30-bed ward inclosed in barbed wirefor sick and wounded Japanese prisoners. Throughout June and July, admissionsaveraged 40 per day in number. About one-fourth of these received primarysurgical treatment at the 42d. The remainder came from other hospitalsfor further evacuation. It did its surgery at night, since casualties usuallydid not arrive until late afternoon. (The 58th Portable Surgical Hospital,which often evacuated patients to the 42d, operated in the morning andearly afternoon because it was too close to the enemy to show lights afterdark.)
The 42d became a jack of all trades. It was the chief supply center formedical units at Myitkyina. It cleaned and sterilized linen, sponges, andinstruments for the 58th PSH. It collected the patients' packs and armsand sent them to task force headquarters. It scrounged up clothing forJapanese prisoners. And it formed a first aid team to stand by for crashlandings at the airfield: 42d PSH Annual Report, 1944; Seagrave, BurmaSurgeon Returns, p. 153 (Seagrave speaks with high praise of 42d PSHofficers); NCAC History, "Myitkyina," pp. 29, 41, 50.
The 58th Portable Surgical Hospital flew to Myitkyina on 10 June. It relievedthe 42d PSH in the combat perimeter of the 88th Infantry. Its first bamboosurgery building caved in under an airdropped package. It then moved closerto the combat line and put up canvas-and-bamboo huts for an operating room,a receiving room, and an evacuation ward. It dug large pits to protectpatients waiting for treatment or evacuation. The hospital frequently washit by small arms and mortar fire. When under fire during surgery, theoperating teams put the litters they used for tables on the ground, andthe surgeons finished their work on their knees.
The 58th evacuated its patients to the airstrip in jeeps when the roadswere not too muddy. Otherwise, they used oxcarts. If these bogged down,Chinese and Burmese litter bearers did the job. The trip was long and slowand it was under enemy observation. Evacuation trains frequently were firedupon. One patient was killed. The usual destination of the evacuees wasthe 42d PSH, which either arranged for air evacuation or provided surgicalcare, if the casualty were one of an "overflow" group: 58th PortableSurgical Hospital "Annual Report," 1944; NCAC History, "Myitkyina,"pp. 42-43; G-4 Periodic Reports, Nos. 28-33, CBI, 1944.
In July a new unit, the 44th Field Hospital, came in. An advance partybuilt a hospital and patients were first admitted on 29 July. By mid-August,after Myitkyina fell, it had treated 628 patients, two-thirds of whom wereAmerican. Its dental clinic had handled 149 cases, the E.E.N.T. clinic,250; the surgeons had performed 44 major operations: 44th Field Hospital"Historical Data," 1944; NCAC History, "Myitkyina,"p. 88.
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Seagrave has left a vivid sketch of the medical scene at Myitkyina.He depicts his own hospital, specifically.87 But thesudden influxes of casualties, the strenuous exertions of evacuation, themenace of enemy fire, the dreadful climate, and the remarkable successof close-in medical support provided by indefatigable doctors, nurses,and enlisted technicians--these were the hallmarks of the medical servicein Burma, whether it was provided by a battalion detachment, a mobile surgicalteam, or a field hospital:
* * * On July 14th, 190 operations were performed in 24 hours on Chinesepatients. This number was made not only possible but easy by two factors:the nearness to the front lines--always less than 2½ miles--andthe extreme efficiency and endurance of the Chinese regimental litter bearers.It should be called to the [reader's] attention that the first aid workdone by forward Chinese units was uniformly of a very high grade in sharpcontrast to the first aid work done in the first "Battle of Burma."There is no question that this is the direct result of training given theChinese units by Liaison American Medical Officers at Ramgarh, Ledo, andactually on the field of battle at Myitkyina. The task of such medicalliaison officers is a thankless one and they attain little fame. But tothose who have been responsible for this change in Chinese first-aid methodssome recognition is due.88
Because of this improvement in first-aid and the speed with which casualtieswere borne by Chinese litter bearers to hospital, a very great many menwith wounds of unbelievable severity were able to reach the hospital whowould never have done so in any previous war, or in the first Burma Campaignwhere effort was made to set up surgical teams out of range of enemy shellfire. In all those previous battles such cases
87896th Clearing Company Report, 1944, pp.6-7; a similar but more circumstantial description is in Seagrave, BurmaSurgeon Returns, chapter 7.
88Chinese medical units trained chiefly at the New First ArmyCenter in Ramgarh. American medical officers and a Chinese medical trainingunit from Anshun, China, opened the first Medical Service Course in January1943. The standard program was a 4-week course in field medical service.More specialized programs were occasionally provided, one of which wasa 6-months' course for junior medical officers. Dental and veterinary trainingprograms were also instituted. The Ramgarh center for medical trainingremained open until April 1945; similar centers were established in Chinaat Kunming, Tali, and Kweilin.
One of the most important parts of the medical education program was theseries of courses for regimental line officers. Although only 1 week long,the courses covered basic features of sanitation and field medical operations.Over 1,200 officers took classes in 1943 and 1944. No one--even Seagrave--couldhave been very optimistic when the training program began. Every aspectof the Chinese Army seemed unfavorable to medical education: a grave scarcityof medically-trained personnel, line officers and men entirely unacquaintedwith modern medicine and sanitation, language barriers between instructorsand students, absence of equipment and books except what could be improvisedor locally produced. Yet despite many inevitable disappointments and failures,the total result was little short of miraculous: Stone, Medical Servicein Combat, I, chapter IV, pp. 145-177.
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would have died before reaching hospitals. Luckily, in this battle,it was impossible to place hospital units out of range of shell fire andso patients reached the hospital much more rapidly, in some cases withina half-hour of the time the wound was received. This, plus the large amountsof blood plasma and sulfa drugs furnished the forward units, made it possibleto save lives of very many soldiers who otherwise would have died. Of some4,000 Chinese casualties operated on by this unit alone during the Myitkyinabattle (an average of 50 per day) only 168 died (3.8%).
Although so close to the front, no casualties were experienced by unitpersonnel except on one occasion when one of the Chinese orderlies waswandering around where he should not have been during a shelling and receiveda microscopic shell fragment in the leg. Shelling never interfered withimportant operative work which went on, with an occasional ducking of heads,when the whistling sounded too close, in spite of shelling. On one occasionthe Japs pulled up a 150 mm gun to the north and with its "shorts"dropping to the north of us and its regular shells dropping so close tothe south that their shrapnel fell within the revetment, and with the Myitkyina75s shelling the field west of us and mortars blasting at installationsjust to the east, the unit was so completely surrounded by fire that personnelhardly knew which way to duck * * *.
Sun, rain, mud and dust alternated continuously during the battle ofMyitkyina, but the blood of almost 4,500 casualties (Chinese, American,British, Indians, Kachins) was with us continually, flowing down ditches,rotting, breeding flies, maggots and stench--price of the conquest of oneof the really important air bases of the future.
Air evacuation procedures continued to play a vital part in the medicalservice, whereas ground evacuation remained very difficult. During theapproach to Myitkyina, casualties suffered seriously from delay and troublein reaching airstrips at Arang, Seingyang, and Myitkyina. At Myitkyina,the battalion aid stations and surgical hospitals lacked sufficient litterbearers to carry patients to the evacuation points on the airstrip. Therain and mud soon made it very difficult even to use jeeps as ambulances.Natives and their oxcarts were brought into action. "This involvedthe complicated process of getting the cart, oxen, owner, and driver togetherat the same place, at the designated time. The trip was excruciatinglyslow, so much so that one cart could make only one trip daily.89
At the airfield the absence of an air clearing station caused furtherdifficulties in ground evacuation. Task Force headquarters supposed thatstray men always were at hand to help receive and load patients, so itturned down an SOS offer to put in a clearing station of the sort so successfullyoperating in the Hukawng and Mogaung Valleys. Instead, two men from the5307th were assigned the duty of super-
89W. W. Hiehle, "Medical Service in MyitkyinaCampaign."
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vising a small evacuation shelter at the field. They were entirelyoverwhelmed by the tasks of receiving and dispatching patients, keepingadequate records, reserving and assigning air space, watching the conditionof the patients, and directing the work crews of soldiers or native laborerssent to help them. An unnecessary burden fell upon the nearby 42d PortableSurgical Hospital. After working throughout the night in surgery, "itwas necessary on many occasions for them to litter patients from the hospitalto the air strip * * * at the expense of operating efficiency of the hospital* * * delay in loading planes and consequent blocking of the air strip."90
The first ambulance plane of the 803d Medical Air Evacuation Squadronlanded at Myitkyina on 18 May. It was shot up before it could take off.During the attack, the crew removed the patients they had just put aboard.In the process, the flight surgeon, flight nurse, and two technicians werewounded. But thereafter the air evacuation system worked smoothly and continuously.Since the campaign depended entirely upon air support, there were alwayscargo planes returning from Myitkyina which could transport patients ifthe 803d MAES ambulance aircraft were full. Myitkyina patients accountedfor 75 percent of all who were air evacuated from North Burma between 17May and 3 August. Almost 4,000 Chinese and American patients were flownout in the first month of the battle alone.91
Before the battle of Myitkyina, patients usually reached base hospitalsin from 1 to 4 days. The first group of Marauders to be flown back hadbeen held up 5 or more days because of their inaccessibility during theapproach march to Myitkyina. But from Myitkyina, Marauder casualties reachedLedo within 24-48 hours. About one-fourth of those admitted to Ledo hospitalson 17 May, the day of the attack on Myitkyina airfield, had been woundedearlier that day. By the end of 18 May, 83 percent of the Americans and75 percent of the Chinese who were wounded on 17 May were safely in hospital.This efficiency continued throughout the Myitkyina engagement. Those sentby the portable surgical hospitals and Seagrave usually
90Ibid.; later in June a proper ACSof the 151st Medical Battalion went into operation, however: Romberger,"Air and Ground Evacuation," pp. 36-38.
91Romberger, "Air and Ground Evacuation," pp. 36-38,and appendix V, pp. 27-28; 803d MAES Annual Report, 1944. The "ReportSummarizing the Activities of U.S. Army Medical Department Units Assignedto Northern Combat Area Command During the Northern and Central Burma Campaigns,Evacuation," showed the following figures for American air evacueesin North Burma (only a part of which came from the 5307th):
February (1944) | 44 |
March | 200 |
April | 502 |
May | 1,879 |
June | 1,342 |
July | 969 |
August | 1,145 |
In the same months, the total air evacuation figures,swelled by Chinese and British casualties, were, respectively, 469, 1,031,1,211, 4,351, 3,311, 2,302, and 3,171.
The use of cargo planes and the lack of an air clearing station occasionedspecial disadvantages. Medical attendants were available to accompany patientsonly in the ambulance planes of the 803d. Blankets, clothing, and littersaccumulated at Ledo because there was no system to collect or exchangethem during the period of improvised air clearing services.
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had remained overnight. Some, however, still had the odor of etheron their breath when they arrived. About half the casualties came directlyfrom battalion aid stations within 24 hours of being wounded.
Medical officers in the fixed hospitals again observed two consequencesof the rapid air evacuation system. First, opportunities were increasedfor definitive and successful treatment. Second, the large hospitals receivedpatients who might have been just as effectively treated nearer the front,if enough field facilities had been present.92
[Death] in flight was rare indeed * * * Patients with intra-cranialinjuries tolerated air evacuation beautifully. Intrathoracic injuries,without sucking wounds of the chest, could be transported safely with benefitof oxygen if cyanosis or dyspnoea were present. Intra-abdominal injuries,with preexisting abdominal distention, occasionally did badly in flight.Soldiers subject to abdominal laparotomies in the forward area, fared betterin flight and subsequently if the trip were postponed 5 to 7 days followingoperations. Gastric suction aboard the plane was not employed. By virtueof the tactical situation, such delay in evacuation was frequently impossible.Injuries of the cervical cord with respiratory embarrassment required,as might be expected, special attention. Fracture of the long bones withtemporary immobilization tolerated such travel exceedingly well.
If general statements can be justly made, it may be concluded that,
(1) Battle casualties tolerate air evacuation exceedingly well.
(2) Rapid evacuation permits early major definitive surgery--especiallyapplicable in intra-cranial injuries.
(3) Many patients reached fixed hospitals in the Base alive, who otherwisewould have perished en route.
(4) Those wounded, denied surgery in forward units, in the light ofinterdicting tactical situations, might benefit from surgery in rear hospitalsbefore infection occurred.
For the Marauders the most crucial aspect of the medical evacuationprogram became the policy which governed it. No question arose about howbattle casualties should be handled. If they could not be restored to dutyalmost immediately, they were evacuated. Whether they went directly toan airstrip or to a portable surgical hospital made little difference.In either case, they were soon in a fixed hospital and they were lost fromthe unit for an indefinite period of time. Many of the sick, however, werethought to be curable without evacuation. Most of the respiratory and entericdisorders, skin infections, and malarial or other fevers constituted groundsfor evacuation only if the man were acutely ill, utterly unresponsive totreatment, or unable to keep up with
92"Report of the 20th General Hospital,3 April 1943 to 1 August 1945," pp. 45-56; 20th General Hospital "AnnualReport," 1944, pp. 75-76. The quotation is from the report first cited.Some of the casualties with soft-tissue wounds need not have been carriedall the way to the fixed hospitals, for example. But the holding facilitiesof the aid stations, portable surgical hospitals, and Seagrave hospitalwere too limited to preclude evacuation of most casualties and many sick.
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the columns. The policy was well illustrated after the battle ofNphum Ga. A large number of men were evacuated, but many more were treatedin the area to control, if not cure, their illnesses, and to produce somepartial semblance of fitness for duty.
The differentiation between sick and wounded derived from the facilitiesand medical staffs needed to care for them. The wounded who required surgeryand, in many instances, immobilization, could not be treated in marchingcolumns or by aid stations. The sick, however, might be given suitablemedication and simple nursing help at the battalion level. Convalescenceand military duty were simultaneous. Although the policy was not ideal,it was in accord with established military practice and it had been tolerableup to the time the Marauders attacked Myitkyina.
When the Marauders emerged from the jungle in mid-May they were "apitiful but still a splendid sight," according to Merrill.93The splendor was in their very presence, after the torture of the approachmarch. Their misery immediately became evident at the battalion aid stations."In wholesale numbers they reported to the doctors, seeking evacuation.A large number, if not practically all, were legitimately ill men * * *many had been so for a long time. Particularly malaria cases."94
The Regimental Surgeon, Maj. Melvin A. Schudmak, began recommendingthat the entire unit be withdrawn because of its wretched physical condition.The battalion surgeons seconded him.95 But the Japanesecounterattack was expected. Although it did not come, the failure of theadvance on Myitkyina town left the expeditionary force in a precariousposition after 22 May. Mass evacuation would apparently endanger the entireoperation. The hope was that the 5307th could hang on until replacementsarrived. Then, with the fresh strength thus provided, it could finish theMyitkyina campaign.
The problem of the sick remained, nevertheless. The rule-of-thumbin 5307th, for which Hunter, then the senior officer, took responsibility,was that men should be evacuated if they ran temperatures of 102° for3 consecutive days and if a committee of medical officers authorized evacuation.The policy meant that men with malaria and a variety of other diseaseswould be held for at least 72 hours in hope that treatment would beat downtheir symptoms. In practice, the battalion surgeons doubtless tried tohasten the evacuation of men who obviously could not respond to medicationin the prescribed time. To hold men with scrub typhus, for example, positivelyreduced their chances of survival.
Yet the policy was inhibitory in spirit as well as in application.After "instructions were issued by Gen. Boatner stressing the gravityof the
93Romanus and Sunderland, II, p. 230.
94"Galahad" (op. cit., the corrected draftof Merrill's Marauders), p. 78. The published version, however,omits the quoted passage.
95NCAC History, "Myitkyina," p. 4. Schudmak receivedthe Legion of Merit award after the campaign.
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outlook and cautioning the Medicos against indiscriminate evacuation,"the atmosphere became lurid with suspicion and hostility. There were chargesthat some doctors disobeyed orders and evacuated men who were well althoughtired and despondent. Conversely, there were charges that line officerspersonally invaded aid stations and evacuation points, removed EmergencyMedical Tags from sick men, and sent them back to their combat teams.96
96"Galahad," p. 77. Approximatelythe same passage occurs in Merrill's Marauders, p. 111, and NCACHistory, "Myitkyina," pp. 4, 28. Williams, the Theater Surgeon,wrote to Stilwell on 23 August 1944, in part as follows:
"I have been informed that three derelictions occurred in connectionwith the medical service of General Merrill's men:
"(1) that men who had no wounds or disease, but were simply exhausted,were evacuated to hospital;
"* * * (3) that sick men, tagged for evacuation by medical officers,had had their medical tags removed by non-medical officers and had beenordered back to duty before they had received treatment.
"The first offense, evacuation of well men, is clearly an usurpationof command function by the unit medical officer. It can only be excusedas a misdirected effort to cooperate in conservation of manpower. As soonas the Theater Surgeon learned of this practice, the attention of the Surgeon,Northern Combat Area Command, was called to it and he was advised to issueinstructions putting a stop to it, that a medical officer's sole functionin such cases was the making of proper recommendations to his commandingofficer. It may be noted also that commanders concerned might have stoppedthis practice when they first learned of it by giving proper orders tothe medical officers serving under their command. * * *
"The last incident, that of interfering with the evacuation of sickmen is a very serious charge. At least one authentic incidence occurred.The man was evacuated the next day. Fortunately there were no untowardeffects * * * Medical officers did not send sick soldiers intocombat."
Williams' diary shows he conferred on 23 May with Stilwell, Boatner, Petersen,and others at Stilwell's headquarters at Shaduzup, but that on the 26thBoatner rejected his request to visit Myitkyina. In the letter just quoted,he objected to this restriction on his efforts to go where he felt needed.Probably he did not know that on 24 May, Stilwell had ordered his headquartersto cut down the number of visitors to the combat area: "No one shouldbe allowed up front who cannot in some way help the situation." Hadhe known, however, he might well have asked why the Theater Surgeon shouldnot be a necessary observer of the scene at Myitkyina, in the midst ofa medical crisis: Radio message CHC 1100, 24 May 1944, Stilwell to ForwardEchelon.
At the end of May, Williams stopped briefly in New Delhi and then he wassent to Washington, D.C., to confer with The Surgeon General regardingfuture medical requirements in the Theater. The letter just quoted he wroteabout 2 weeks after returning to India.
"Careful scrutiny of all cases" and "drastic measures"to restrict evacuations "became necessary," according to thecorrected draft of Merrill's Marauders, p. 78. As for General Boatner,it should be said that he was acting as Stilwell's chief of staff until30 May, when he became commander of the Myitkyina Task Force. Prior tothat date, then, the command responsibility for the evacuation policy didnot lie with him. The Marauders were on their way to Ledo 2 days afterhe was put in charge of the Myitkyina operations. Afterwards, he struggledwith the evacuation problem of "New Galahad" and the engineers.These he treated with conventional severity to break up the link betweenmedical (or pseudomedical) evacuation and low morale. Thus on 15 June hereported to Stilwell: (a) continued instances of fear and confusion amongthe raw American troops; (b) "definitely limiting * * * American evacuations.Much to the wails of the U.S."; and (c) hope of receiving troops fromthe old 5307th who, he understood, were now ready for duty after hospitalizationat Ledo: holograph report, Boatner to Stilwell, 15 June 1945, StilwellPapers, Folder 207 (although dated "July" the report is withina June series, has several references to events in June, and requires aJune date to fall in the period of Boatner's command at Myitkyina, whichended 26 June). So much confusion arose in June regarding Galahad thatincidents in "New Galahad"--the replacements plus engineers--weresometimes mistakenly identified with "Old Galahad"--the original5307th.
On 4 October 1944, Boatner wrote to Stilwell about "many rumors aboutmyself concerning evacuation and forcing Galahad to fight. Naturally Iam taking no outward notice of same because although untrue, it would probablydo more harm than good to recognize them. As you no doubt have assumed,I never once took part personally in any way in the decision as to whomshould be evacuated, etc., or put personal pressure on medical evacuationpersonnel. This can be substantiated."
His letter continued by discussing his relations with Colonel Hunter. Hunter,on 25 May, had written critically to McCammon, commander of Myitkyina TaskForce, to the effect that the 5307th was being unfairly required to performtasks which the Chinese should be undertaking. When Boatner succeeded McCammon,he attempted to avoid irritating Hunter; the way he chose was to stay outof Hunter's sight. "And, the precise and premeditated reason I neveronce visited Hunter's C.P. in the field, was knowing of his previous complaintsand suspicions of senior headquarters and our having decided to retainhim in command in spite of that. I did not want to let him infer by mypresence that I was there to put pressure on him, to interfere or givehim reason to be suspicious in any way,": Stilwell Papers, Folder204.
While this peculiar situation arose after the 5307th had been evacuated,it is illustrative of the tenseness in command relationships. The veryjuxtaposition of evacuation and command in Boatner's mind suggests theclose interaction between them on the battlefield. The matter is brieflydiscussed in Romanus and Sunderland, II, pp. 237, 239.
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Outright official verification of the charges on either side neverbecame public. It is very probable that the medical staff legitimatelyevacuated some men who did not meet the exact and literal evacuation prescriptionbut who were really suffering from combinations of malaria, dysentery,and extreme exhaustion. And the testimony of medical officers cannot berefuted with regard to the intervention by line officers in the evacuationprocess. It would be mistaken to think that many such cases occurred; improbableto suppose that officers in 5307th itself were involved, after all theyhad shared with their men; and irrational not to allow for the extremeanxiety of Task Force Headquarters about the tactical emergency.
By the end of May, in any case, the terms "sick" and "well"were meaningless. In 2d Battalion, which had started to Myitkyina with27 officers and 537 men, there were only 12 men left in action on 30 May.Even counting the engineer company bracketed with it, there were only 24officers and 455 men. The engineers were absolutely unprepared for combat.McGee, 2d Battalion Commander, and some of his men collapsed several timesduring an attack. No one could claim any longer that 2d Battalion existedas a fighting force. Matters were much the same in 3d Battalion. It hadfought several times on the way to Myitkyina, and after the 24th it wasseverely attacked repeatedly at Charpate, near the airfield. The commanderof K Force, with which 3d Battalion had marched, was dying of scrub typhus.The 3d Battalion commander had malaria and was evacuated after the unitwithdrew from Charpate; soon he was on his way to the United States. Obviously,the battalion could not survive any further battles. Only in 1st Battaliondid some strength remain--about 200 men and some of its officers were stillable to carry on.97
Approximately 2,000 Marauders started for Myitkyina in the fourthmonth of their campaign. Thirteen hundred reached the airfield and werein action for about 12 days. Probably about 200 were evacuated from Myitkyinabefore the end of the month. The rest, excepting the
97Stilwell Diary, 30 May; 2d Battalion Diary,28 April, 26 May-4 June: "Sick men first, others after" (3 June)."Evacuation continued; whole Bn cleared by tonight. McGee, Rogoff,Healy [a Combat Team commander), last of our unit to come out" (4June); Merrill's Marauders, pp. 112-113; Romanus and Sunderland,II, pp. 237-242. Capt. Lewis Kolodny, one of the 2d Battalion Surgeons,photographed McGee as he lost consciousness, telephone in hand, in a foxhole;Ogburn published the photograph in The Marauders; "Galahad,"p. 75.
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1st Battalion survivors, were evacuated by air between 30 May and4 June. The official casualty record, at that point, was as follows:98
Battle casualties: |
|
Battle deaths | 93 |
Nonbattle deaths | 30 |
Wounded in action1 | 293 |
Missing in action | 8 |
Total | 424 |
Disease casualties: |
|
Amoebic dysentery | 503 |
Scrub typhus | 149 |
Malaria2 | 296 |
Psychoneurosis | 72 |
Miscellaneous fevers | 950 |
Total | 1,970 |
Grand total | 2,394 |
1Not including lightly wounded men treated in the columnand not reported.
2Diagnosis on evacuation: not, therefore, representativeof the almost universal incidence of malaria in 5307th.
Before the battle of Myitkyina, the 20th General Hospital had beenthe destination of sick and wounded Marauders. This remarkable organization,its staff from the University of Pennsylvania, had built a 1,000-bed facilityout of bamboo in 1943, in spite of the most disheartening conditions ofclimate and scarcity. By 1944 it was working at full capacity. Most ofits patients were Chinese, but it also received the most seriously sickor injured Americans on the Ledo Road, and all of the evacuees from the5307th during February,
98Merrill's Marauders, p. 114. The footnotesare part of the original table. It is repeated in Romanus and Sunderland,II, p. 240. The "Casualty Report," 5 July 1944, Stilwell Papers,Folder 204, gives the following figures for May and June (see p. 331, n.63, for February-April figures):
| May | June |
Killed in action | 14 | 3 |
Died of wounds in action | 6 | 1 |
Died of injuries in action | 0 | 0 |
Wounded in action | 68 | 25 |
Missing in action | 7 | 0 |
Sick and injured evacuated | 1,568 | 638 |
Nonbattle deaths | 17 | 11 |
Total | 1,680 | 678 |
The June figures distinguish between "Old" and"New" Galahad. Those for "Old Galahad"--the 5307th--areshown above. While June battle casualties almost all came from the 1stBattalion men who remained at Myitkyina throughout the rest of the campaign,many of the sick who were evacuated were probably among the troops withdrawnen masse from 30 May to 4 June. Certainly the figure shown for sick andinjured evacuees is far too large to come from the few "Old Galahad"troops active in June, even if it included some Marauders who returnedfrom the hospitals and were sent back almost immediately.
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March, and April. Thereafter, even by extraordinary efforts it couldnot keep up with the demand for hospital beds.99
A crisis in hospitalization arose just when the Marauders began theirlast march. Its roots went back a year to May 1943, when plans to provideadequate medical support in the Second Burma Campaign were cut back tofit into the total resources of the U.S. Army. Since that time, CombatCommand had acquired a few small field medical units--the portable surgicalhospitals, the 13th Medical Battalion, and the 25th Field Hospital. Nonew intermediate or large hospitals had been assigned to it, however. Whenthe 5307th went into action it relied on the SOS hospitals then in theLedo area to absorb the new burden of combat casualties.100
Their ability to do so seemed doubtful. Warnings from the SOS Surgeonat Ledo and from the Combat Command Surgeon brought little response.101For one thing, the War Department had reduced the formula scale forauthorizing hospital beds to the Theater. For another, there had been diversionsand delays of medical troops scheduled for service in CBI. The priorityof other theaters of war produced some of these disappointments. In part,however, the Theater itself was to blame for the apparent inattention toits pressing needs. Until June 1944, it did not send the War Departmentdetailed information regarding the amount of hospitalization given to Chinesetroops. Although there were thousands of such patients, it looked to TheSurgeon General as if the Theater had beds to spare. The error in reportingcame to light too late to prevent the midsummer crisis in which the Maraudersunwittingly became involved.102 On 1 June
99The official annual reports of the Theaterand SOS Surgeons provide general surveys of the hospitalization problem.The annual reports of the 20th General Hospital itself are especially relevant,of course; that for 1944 is both extensive and well-written.
100Citations on planning accompany chapters III and XIV of Stone,Medical Service in Combat, and ibid., "The Hospitalizationand Evacuation of Sick and Wounded in the Communications Zone, China-Burma-Indiaand India-Burma Theaters, 1942-1946," an unpublished report to TheSurgeon General. In May 1943, the medical plans were discussed in Washington,D.C. They outlined a series of medical units extending from the combatzone to the rear, and including mobile surgical units, field hospitals,and evacuation hospitals. To stay within the limits imposed by the scarcityof troops and equipment, however, the Theater had to content itself withrequisitions for a few portable surgical and field hospitals. Delay inreceiving both types of units was expected.
1013 and 5 January, and 22 February 1944, from Base Section3, and 17 February 1944, with subsequent indorsements and statements inMarch and April, from CAI Headquarters: cited in Stone, Medical Servicein Combat, II, p. 73, notes 12-15. Williams visited Ledo in Februaryand again late in May, according to his diary.
102See Tamraz Diary, pp. 174-175 and n. 105, p. 186.The War Department's immediate reaction was to arrange rapid transportationfor the 69th General Hospital, which had already been earmarked for CBI.Its staff began to arrive in midsummer.
The formula scale for hospitalization is discussed in Stone, MedicalService in Combat, chapter III, pp. 134-147; see also Tamraz Diary,part three. In February 1944, the scale was revised upward again on thebasis of Theater protests. Williams, the Theater Surgeon, wrote to hisdeputy, Col. George E. Armstrong, on 15 June 1944: "After all thesemonths the War Department finally let us know why they've been putting* * * off [our hospital shipments]." Curiously, he still felt thatthe statistical reports need not show Chinese patients since the reportform did not literally require detailed information about services givenforeign troops. In any case, the form was not adapted to present a realisticpicture of Chinese hospitalization prior to June 1944. Williams later commentedon the inadequacy of his staff to undertake administrative responsibility,and on Tamraz' concentration upon American medical needs: Letter, Williamsto the editor, 13 Mar. 1947.
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1944, the Ledo group of SOS hospitals possessed an authorized bedcapacity of 3,250. They were actually caring for 7,088 Chinese and Americanpatients, and they were prepared, if necessary, to make room for another2,000.103
The hospitals making this prodigious effort were the 14th, 48th,and 73d Evacuation Hospitals, rated at 750 beds each, and the 20th GeneralHospital.104 Several of them had sent officers and mento surgical teams out with combat forces. But also there were a few officers,nurses, or technicians who were temporarily assigned to Ledo hospitalswhile waiting to go to their permanent posts in Burma and China. The 685thClearing Company, formerly one of the companies of the 151st Medical Battalion,took some pressure off the larger units by hurriedly building and operatinga 500-bed station hospital at Ledo. The SOS Surgeon also had arranged tosend patients back to the 111th Station Hospital at the large air transportbase of Chabua, some 75 miles away.105
In this group of hospitals, the 20th alone took care of the sickand wounded Marauders flown to Ledo from Walawbum, Shaduzup, Inkangahtawng,and Nphum Ga. By the end of April, however, the rate of its improvisedexpansion fell behind the accelerating overload of patients. In that monthit admitted over 2,000 men, most of them Chinese. Its daily patient censusexceeded 1,800. May was worse. Over 2,500 patients were admitted and over2,000 were in the wards each day. Before the end of the month, the 20thhad to evacuate patients in order to make room for new arrivals. In thisway some of the sick from 5307th found themselves in the 111th StationHospital at Chabua. Even so, in June the 20th admitted just a few lessthan 3,000 new patients and cared continuously for nearly 2,500. Undersuch circumstances it had to be satisfied to be "not unduly embarrassedby reports * * * that we had missed a number of cases of amebiasis andone diabetic." But except in one respect, it maintained the qualityof its professional services magnificently. Indeed, by opening new or rebuilt
103Essential Technical Medical Data Report,CBI, July 1944, including the ETMD Report of Base Section 3, CBI.
104See pp. 10, 37, and 77, for notes on all but the 14th EvacuationHospital. It was an affiliate of the University of Southern California,Los Angeles. When it reached India in August 1943, SOS sent it toMile 19 on the Ledo Road. It took several months to construct a hospitalof tents and bashas, but in time it became a major facility for Chinesepatients. Its special role was to provide care for long-term, chronic,or permanently disabled patients, for whom repatriation was impossibleuntil the war ended. The editor recalls his visit to the hospital longafter the campaigns had ended and little else but routine work was leftto do. To counter ennui and look constructively toward the future, manyof the medical officers were engaged in a program of self-instruction.With stray dogs for "patients," training in surgery was partof the curriculum.
105Stone, Medical Service in Combat, chapters XIV-XV,citing the correspondence and reports of the headquarters involved andthe annual reports of the units themselves.
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wards of improved design during the months of crisis it even increasedthe excellence of its performance.106
The exception was in its lack of facilities for convalescent patients.The 20th had authority to send to the United States anyone needing morethan 6 months of care. But a good many patients remained who required afew weeks for recuperation before returning to duty after clinical treatment.This need Tamraz, the SOS Surgeon, had foreseen long before. In March 1943,he recommended that a convalescent hospital or camp be established in theLedo area. No one opposed the idea, but other needs appeared more urgent.Early in 1944, however, the practice was started of sending long-term Chinesepatients to the 14th Evacuation Hospital at Mile 19 on the Ledo Road. Soonthe l4th became a major center for convalescent, rehabilitation, and repatriationservices in the Chinese Army in India. For a time, also, some thought wasgiven to the possibility of sending American convalescents back to the99th Station Hospital at Gaya in central India.
The impracticality of such a procedure led the 20th General to opena small convalescent annex in the spring of 1944. To it men were to gowhen they were ambulatory and out of danger. Medical attendance would beprovided on a minimal scale, but normal command relationships were to beintroduced so that the men would become psychologically, as well as physically,prepared to resume normal military activity. The SOS Surgeon, too, beganto take hold of the problem. A convalescent camp site was selected, somebashas were constructed, and in April the 14th Evacuation Hospital sentup one-third of its staff to open the new facility. But hardly had itsmen reached Ledo than Marauder casualties began pouring in after the disastrousmarch to Myitkyina. In a few days, all that was left of the 5307th arrivedat the 14th Evacuation Hospital branch.107
First things were put first. The new 5307th casualties preemptedthe space intended for Marauder convalescents. It was almost impossibleto retain them as full-fledged patients, shaky and weak though they were.Many, therefore, were prematurely released from medical surveillance. Therewas no place for them to go except to a staging camp, where unattachedtroops or men in transit were housed. "It is true that in order todischarge them from the hospital," the Theater Surgeon later explained,"these cases were marked 'Duty.' But in each case
10620th General Hospital Annual Report, 1944,pp. 1-3, 66-67, 84, 96-98, 109-111; as a basis for evaluation, the unanimousopinion of all observers who left records of their visits to the 20th.For its full program of professional services, its emphasis upon studyas well as treatment--its staff produced 38 scientific and clinical papersin 1944, as well as the annual critical reviews of services performed--,and its sense of responsibility for setting medical standards, as the leadinghospital in the area, its commander, Brig. Gen. Isidor S. Ravdin, and hisstaff amply deserved the prise bestowed on it.
107See Tamraz Diary, pp. 148-149; and Stone, op. cit.,II, pp. 89-93. The correspondence, radio messages, reports, and plans onthis important matter were voluminous and are noted in the work cited.CBI formally requested three convalescent hospital units in March 1944.The War Department was sympathetic, but it could do no more at the timethan authorize the establishment of such facilities with personnel alreadyin the Theater. Not until fall did the Theater receive the troops for aconvalescent camp.
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the camp commander was informed that the man should not be returnedto his organization for a specified number of days."108
It was the last week in May, no time for Marauders to be showingnotes to line officers, as if they were schoolboys whose parents askedfor them to be excused from physical education until they "felt better."The attack on Myitkyina dragged. Supplies were dwindling and casualtieswere rising. It looked possible for the Japanese to break out of the Myitkyinatrap, perhaps even to destroy the expeditionary force. Stilwell's commanders,apparently with his knowledge, initiated Draconian measures. The battalionswere ordered to hold down evacuations, especially when malaria was thechief cause of sickness. The Ledo hospitals were "asked"--indeclaratory tones--to turn out Marauders as soon as they were able "topull a trigger." Rear echelon headquarters was told to send up allwho had been released from hospitals.109
Reputable medical authorities such as Ravdin and his staff rebuffedattempts to influence their professional judgment. Moreover, Ravdin andMerrill went directly to Stilwell on 8 June. Almost certainly they askedhim to clarify, if not justify, his intentions. In his diary he noted thelethal effects of scrub typhus, which suggests that Ravdin discussed theimportance of convalescent care for men who had survived serious diseasesin spite of their general debility after the campaign. Stilwell afterwardwas reported to have said he did not intend to mobilize sick men in orderto strengthen Myitkyina Task Force. Later he quite certainly exempted thesick and wounded from his demands for continued combat from the BritishChindits, when they, like the Marauders, were seeking relief.110
However, if bedridden evacuees still were safe, there were otherswho had been discharged from the 20th General and 14th Evacuation Hospitalssimply to make room for more acutely ill or wounded men. Rear echelon authoritiesraided the staging camp and selected some 200 men to return to Myitkyina.It is said that medical officers rescued some of them on the way to theairport.111 Among those who reached
108Ibid.; 14th Evacuation Hospital AnnualReport, 1944; 20th General Hospital Annual Report, 1944; Romanus and Sunderland,II, pp. 237-241. The quotation is from the letter Williams wrote to Stilwellon 23 August 1944, which has already been cited in connection with theevacuation scandal. Although Williams' diary shows that he visited themajor hospitals on 24 May, he was about a week ahead of the crisis overconvalescents. When it occurred he was in New Delhi and soon afterwardhe was in Washington, D.C.
109Romanus and Sunderland, II, pp. 237-239; Merrill's Marauders,pp. 111-112; "Galahad," pp. 75-78; Memorandum, CBI Headquarters,Armstrong to CG CBI ("Re the attached [Hopkins] report"); Letter,CBI Headquarters, Armstrong to Petersen, 15 July 1944; Letter, Williamsto Stilwell, 3 Aug. 1944, previously cited. Williams stated, in the passageomitted from the quotation on p. 353, that one of the "derelictions"was: "that men were returned to duty before they were ready for duty."His comment thereon is quoted in the text. Hunter wrote his letter of proteston 25 May. It seems likely that the premature efforts to recover evacueeshelped him to his decision to demand relief of the unit. In addition toRomanus and Sunderland, ibid., see NCAC History, "Myitkyina,"p. 4. and Ogburn, pp. 256-258, 260-261.
110Stilwell Diary, 8 June 1944; Tracy S. Voorhees, whose reportis part of the text, met Ravdin and discussed the matter with him. Theattempts at intervention in the medical process became widely discussedamong officers and troops. No denials have been recorded. The explanationattributed to Stilwell testifies to the fact while commenting on the intention.Also, see With Wingate's Chindits, part four.
111Ogburn, pp. 260-261.
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the battlefield, a number (variously reported as from 10 to 50) wereimmediately tagged for medical reevacuation. The remainder were as depressedand bitter as they had been sick, injured, or exhausted a few days before.112
Soon the rest of the 5307th, except 200 from 1st Battalion, returnedto Ledo. The matter of the convalescents did not end therewith, however.Two weeks later, Boatner was told that the staging camp had filled up withMarauders lively enough to shoot up the barracks, carouse, and go absentwithout leave. Some, it was said, were anxious to get back to the fight.He welcomed the rumor that many of them were being rounded up to go intoNew Galahad. The information he received was authentic, but the new attemptat recovering Marauders had little success. Its main effect was to keepopen the graves in which Marauder hopes and pride had been buried.113
Special efforts to revive Marauder corps d'esprit were ironic, ifnot futile. With most of the 5307th back at the Ledo camp, Stilwell (onBoatner's prompting) visited Myitkyina on 18 June and pinned medals onsome Marauder chests. "The men look good," he wrote in his diary.It was their officers who were unduly "gloomy with their talk of lowmorale and poor health in New and Old Galahad." But by the 22d, theseries of incidents regarding evacuation and the return of evacuees reachedthe level of scandal. He was forced to launch an official investigationof the 5307th and Myitkyina Task Force.114
112Romanus and Sunderland, II, p. 240; Merrill'sMarauders, p. 112; "Galahad," p. 76. In a letter to the editor,12 Feb. 1947, Lt. Col. Kirk T. Mosley, MC, the Theater Epidemiologist whowas in Burma in June 1944, commented: "The pay-off was when some [Marauders]were sent back to Myitkyina before they felt they were completely well.I shall never forget the medical officer who was ordered back to Myitkyina.He had recently been discharged from the hospital with scrub typhus andwas still weak. His reaction and that of his fellow medical officers wasmost bitter."
113Holograph report, Boatner to Stilwell, 15 June 1944, StilwellPapers, Folder 204: "From Galahad's rear in Dinjan I hear that 250of old Galahad men are being equipped and will be flown back today. Theywill be of tremendous help. Rumor has it that they were roving around thecountryside and many AWOL's. Col. Osborne just saw me and spoke most earnestlyabout how he felt these men are malingering and wants to go back to geta few more officers and many men back here. If Hunter OK's I will sendhim back. On the face of it, it might appear we have plenty here on thefield for protection. Such is not actually the case--we in fact have onlya prayer."
However, when Ogburn voluntarily returned to Myitkyina on 22 June, Osbornetold him that the emergency had passed and the problem was to get 5307thout rather than in; Hunter is said to have told another voluntary returneethe same thing: Ogburn, p. 267. Ogburn vividly describes the chaos at thestaging camp, pp. 273-278. The camp itself was a far cry from the plushcenter which the Marauders had imagined they would occupy. The storiesabout interference with evacuation and return to duty were widely knownand easily exaggerated. Grievances ripened into near-rebellion. Villainsand heroes in the high command were chosen. "Most of the men swallowedtheir bitterness and anger * * * and because of the minority the rest camp,as it filled up, was little better than a shambles," Ogburn recalled,p. 274.
Actually, once before Marauder evacuees had been returned to combat. Earlierin May, about 200 men released from hospital were combined with the 149thChinese Regiment, 50th Division. The team went far out on the right flankto attempt a penetration and roadblock operation against Kamaing. "PurpleForce," as it was called, lost its way and encountered such difficultterrain that it abandoned its baggage before returning to the central lineof advance. With this column marched a surgical team of the 13th MedicalBattalion. The difference between this episode, which caused no complaint,and the terminal situation was that when the 5307th attacked Myitkyina,it carried out what it had been told was its last mission. Returnof evacuees in June, therefore, violated a promise. Romanus and Sunderland,II, pp. 210-211, briefly note the futile mission of "Purple Force."The medical team is described in the 13th Medical Battalion Annual Report,1944.
114Stilwell Diary, 22 June 1944; Romanus and Sunderland, II,p. 240.
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Thenceforth little more was heard about or from the Marauders. Theinvestigation produced no official action, although the 5307th thoughtthat the sudden relief and repatriation of Hunter, late in June lackedsubtlety. The inquiry added one dimension to the disagreeable picture,however. Boatner, explaining Stilwell's position, spoke of the inter-Alliedaspects of the campaign. Both the Chinese at Myitkyina and the BritishChindits below Mogaung were part of the same operation to which the Marauderswere assigned. Stilwell could not afford any accusations that he sparedAmerican combat troops at the expense of their Allies.115The 5307th, that is, was a political as well as a military force.
The point can be sharpened, in fact. In the last week of May, whilethe Marauders were being manipulated, the 111th Brigade of the Chinditsevacuated its roadblock, Blackpool, much against Stilwells wishes. Beforeand after, Stilwell flung the incident in the faces of British commanders,questioning their claim that the 111th, specifically, and the Chinditsgenerally, were no longer fit for combat. Stilwell went to great lengthsto hold the 111th in the Kamaing area after it left Blackpool, even thoughit had hundreds of sick and wounded men to evacuate. He repeatedly expresseddoubt that the 77th Brigade did all it could to help capture Mogaung. Likewise,Boatner, when commanding Myitkyina Task Force, took a stern tone with theMorris Force wing of the 111th across the Irrawaddy from Myitkyina, andhe was belated and grudging in acknowledging its exhaustion.
Stilwell's relationships with the Chinese were just as uneasy. Throughoutthe campaign he alternately coaxed and bullied local commanders into aggressiveaction. He knew that Generalissimo Chiang secretly restrained the ChineseArmy in India when he thought its risks were excessive compared to thoseof the British and Americans. Just within the month, in fact, the battlefor Kamaing and Mogaung had not progressed satisfactorily until Chianglifted his hand from the 22d and 38th Divisions. Under such circumstances,Stilwell was certain to feel that the Chinese, like the British, wouldquickly take flight if he seemed overly protective of his American infantry.116
No favoritism appeared. He required the 5307th and the Chindits todemonstrate conclusively that they were literally and completely used upbefore he spared them further combat. He settled any questions about whetherthey had done their duty by requiring them to go beyond it. While the Americanswere in the battle, the expenditure of Chinese troops at Myitkyina couldnot be challenged. And while he continued to fight at Myitkyina, the needfor the British below Mogaung could be demonstrated. He won his victory.But from the standpoint of the Marauders it was a Pyrrhic triumph.
115Romanus and Sunderland, II, pp. 239-240.
116Relative to British and Chinese forces, see With Wingate'sChindits; Romanus and Sunderland, II, pp. 196-199, 204-213, 215-216,220-223.
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The Hopkins Report, Concluded
Present status of 5307.--a. By the 31st of May all but13 men and one officer of the 3rd battalion had left Myitkyina on EMT tags.These men were held up several days because of General Boatner's verbalorder to Major Schudmak that none but very seriously ill would be evacuated.
b. Approximately 100 men from the 3rd Bn are now117at Myitkyina. These can be divided into four classes:
(1) Men who had been assigned to the rear echelon before combat becausethey had been designated unfit for combat duty by the battalion medicalofficers.
(2) Men who had been left in hospitals when the 3rd Battalion went intoBurma.
(3) Men who came out of Burma during the campaign because of woundsor illness.
(4) Men who came out during the last week of May.
c. It is true that these men have been treated in hospitals.My opinion however is from knowing the histories of many, that a largemajority are in very poor mental and physical condition. A typical exampleof that is one who just came in the ward with a snake bite. He receiveda bullet wound through his inguinal region and hip area in April. He wassent back during the latter part of May with considerable temporary limitationof motion.
d. The remainder of the 3rd battalion can now be found in oneof four places.
(1) 20th General Hospital.
(2) 14th Evacuation Hospital.
(3) 111th Station Hospital.
(4) The Staging Area at Ledo.
e. Since the airfield at Myitkyina was occupied, several verystrong efforts have been made by higher headquarters in that area to sendall available men back. This as I have said has resulted in the returnof many sick men and soldiers who had not had adequate convalescence.
f. Since there is no rehabilitation or convalescent setup inthis area many men have been discharged to duty in a shorter period thantheir situation warrants.
g. We have found it necessary to readmit many men to these hospitalsin order to prevent them from going back to combat, as casuals, beforethey are in reasonable condition. Many men are readmitted because theyhave not been adequately studied or treated. This is especially true foramebiasis cases.
h. Since the men are all still alerted for Myitkyina no leavescan be granted.
11722 June 1944, the date of the report.
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Discussion.--a. I have outlined the history of the 3rdbattalion of 5307. I have discussed the medical history and written aboutmiscellaneous diseases seen, as well as typhus, malaria, and amebiasis.I have discussed casualties, food, and living conditions, not to mentionhospital care and morale.
b. The discussion I believe has shown several important pointswhich apply to the greater majority of the men in the 3rd battalion aswell as to many others in 5307.
(1) The men have lived in the tropics and subtropics from 18 to 36 months.
(2) Recreational facilities, food, and general living conditions haveconsistently been substandard even when not in combat.
(3) The majority of these men have been through two severe campaignsand some through three.
(4) Casualty figures for these Campaigns have been high, probably anaverage of 25% for the men who were doing the fighting.118
(5) Hospital facilities have been poor during these two years. Theyare now good.119
(6) The men have been subjected to almost constant physical and mentalstrain.
(7) Chronic disease rate in this outfit is very high.
(8) 80% of the men from the Southwest Pacific have had malaria; 30%over four times; over 3 attacks for every man.120
118No fully reliable medical statistics existfor 5307th. Some medical records were destroyed when the mule carryingthem was blown up by an artillery shell. In some tactical situations recordswere not kept or, if kept, were not consolidated. The regiment refusedto send the normal weekly medical statistical reports to the Theater Headquarters;presumably to do so might endanger secrecy. Minor wounds and illnesseswere sometimes not reported. Men with several possible causes for evacuationwere often listed only in one statistical category: Radio NR 192, 1 Mar.1944, 5307th Hq to CBI Rear Echelon Hq; "Medical Service in MyitkyinaCampaign," 15 Aug. 1944; "Galahad," p. 105.
The figures published in Merrill's Marauders (424 battle casualties)gave the rate as 14 percent. The "Casualty Report," 15 July 1944,Stilwell Papers, Folder 204, showed almost exactly the same figure andrate. However, a note in Merrill's Marauders, p. 114, states thatthe number of wounded at Nphum Ga alone exceeded the official figure for"Wounded in Action" in the entire Regiment for the whole campaign.
Hopkins may also be right in his estimate of casualties among troops "doingthe fighting." Except at Myitkyina, one battalion or a part of itusually occupied a position which did not encounter enemy fire. Therefore,the troops actually engaged would have suffered casualties at a rate higherthan that shown for the entire force.
119The contrast is drawn, apparently, between Pacific area hospitalsand the Ledo group of hospitals.
120The most usable indexes of disease in 5307th come from the14th Evacuation Hospital branch. It received the Marauders evacuated inMay and June. Although some of the patients came from "New Galahad,"the majority were out of the original 5307th. The hospital reported thefollowing figures for disease in 5307th when it was evacuated:
Gastrointestinal diseases | 616 |
Malaria | 516 |
Upper respiratory infections | 301 |
Exhaustion syndrome | 135 |
Scrub typhus | 93 |
Undiagnosed fevers | 109 |
Neuropsychiatric conditions | 42 |
Dermatological infections and diseases, as primary cause of admission | 31 |
Miscellaneous | 65 |
Total | 1,905 |
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(9) The battalion has had 125 to 150 cases of typhus with 21 deaths.
(10) The amebiasis rate is very high and will require followup studies.Diagnostic procedures have not been adequate.
(11) Morale of this unit is very low. As a doctor who has seen two infantrybattalions intimately and lived with them for months in and out of combatI feel qualified to judge the situation. The 3rd battalion was at one timea great outfit with esprit de corps. The morale now found combined withthe health of the men makes this outfit of little value as an offensivefighting unit.
The most serious disease was scrub typhus. The 14th EHrendered initial treatment in 93 cases and received 35 convalescent casesfrom the 20th General Hospital. Mild cases may have escaped notice or wereincluded in the category of undiagnosed fevers. Fifteen men died from thedisease in the 14th EH. (The 20th General Hospital treated 432 Americanand 41 Chinese cases during 1944. There were 22 American and 3 Chinesedeaths. It built a special air conditioned ward and instituted enrichednursing procedures for scrub typhus patients.) Hopkins stated in his "Notes"that in May, 1st Battalion evacuated 23 scrub typhus patients, five ofwhom died. The 3d Battalion had 68 cases, with 21 deaths. He reported nocases from 2d Battalion in May: Hopkins Notes, pp. 3-4.
Dysentery was the most frequent cause of hospitalization. The 14th EH hadno facilities for the culture of pathogenic organisms but it made microscopicstudies of a large number of cases. Amebiasis was widespread. (The 20thGeneral Hospital treated 257 cases of bacillary and 316 cases of amebicdysentery in 1944. It also diagnosed 49 cases of amebic hepatitis. It saw"quite a number of diarrheas of considerable duration, etiology undetermined,treatment ineffective. Some follow amoebic, some follow bacillary dysentery.")
In a group of 875 cases of disease studied in the 14th EH, malaria wasthe primary diagnosis in 205 cases; the secondary diagnosis in 22 more;and the clinical diagnosis (without supporting laboratory findings) inan additional 63 cases. Of this group of patients from 5307th, 115 disclaimedprevious attacks of the disease. The remainder reported they had had fromtwo to fifteen recurrences. The hospital staff found that there had beena sharp rise in malaria cases in the last few days of the campaign. Overtmalaria was more common in "New Galahad" later in June and inJuly than it had been earlier in the original 5307th. (The 20th GeneralHospital treated 2,633 cases of malaria in 1944. There were 26 cases ofcerebral malaria in American troops; four died. Although all troops inthe forward area were supposed to be taking Atabrine, "only 20 of67 patients [surveyed] gave a history of taking adequate amounts * * *Thirty-five stated that they had had none. In a second survey, 25 of 27stated that they took no Atabrine at all. Figures of this sort depend agreat deal upon the experience and skill of the ward officer in elicitingan accurate history.")
The mental health of 5307th cannot be described with any certainty. Hopkinsreported the evacuation of 31 traumatic neurosis cases, 29 of which returnedto duty. "Eighteen chronic anxiety states were activated by combat.Only one was sent to the United States, as were five psychoses; eight psychopathswere recommended for discharge under section VIII [of Army Regulationscovering medical department matters]. Very few mental cases were encounteredin the third battalion as potential cases had been given non-combat jobsbefore the campaign."--Hopkins Notes, p. 5.
Most of the breakdowns in the regiment appeared after the siege of NphumGa or at Myitkyina. The official figure for psychoneurosis (Merrill'sMarauders, p. 114) is 72. It appeared that the relative number of psychiatriccases in 5307th was exceeded by that in "New Galahad" and theengineer battalions at Myitkyina. Observers believed this difference resultedfrom the fact that the latter had gone into battle without adequate trainingor combat experience. Thus they had not eliminated men of unstable personalitiesbeforehand, nor had they been adequately prepared for battle.
At the end of May, the tensions in 5307th arising from prolonged combat,the restricted evacuation policy, and the threat of renewed duty at Myitkyinaprecipitated some battle fatigue and neurosis. The diagnosis of "anxietystate" accurately described most of these conditions. The men wereevacuated and treated promptly, and 62 percent returned to duty--many toMyitkyina Task Force and, later, the 475th Infantry. In contrast, psychiatriccasualties from "New Galahad" were often held at Myitkyina untilthe end of the battle in August. In these cases, conversion hysteria wastypical, usually accompanied by and persisting longer than anxiety states.These evacuees were much more resistant to treatment than men of the 5307th,and their hospitalization, if successfully terminated, was of longer duration.From "New Galahad" only 13.8 percent of such casualties returnedto duty; from the two engineer battalions, only 33 percent: Lt. Col. JohnR. S. Mays, "History of Neuropsychiatry in India Burma Theater inWorld War II" (unpublished report to The Surgeon General). The findingson disease given herein are from the 14th Evacuation Hospital Annual Report,1944, and 20th General Hospital Annual Report, 1944.
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(12) The medical situation is now so bad in the 3rd battalion that itcan only be kept on even a moderately efficient garrison status with thegreatest effort of the surgeons and other officers. Incidentally, of sevenmedical officers we have had I am the only one still on duty with the unit.I have never seen so many physically unfit men gathered in one unit.
(13) 5307 is still alerted for Burma. As soon as men are sent back toduty they go into Burma as casuals. The greater majority are not fit forcombat at present or even in the near future.
(14) It must be remembered that the men have just finished a hazardousand remarkable infantry campaign during which they marched and fought over700 miles of rugged Northern Burma terrain. During this time they weresubjected not only to severe physical and mental strain but also K rationsfor four months.
(15) It should be pointed out that two-thirds of the men in the 3rdBn have been overseas two years. No rotation plan has as yet applied tothem.
Recommendations.--a. The alert for the 3rd battalion onthe Burma front should be immediately removed.
b. A systematic effort should be made to study the Army recordsand health of the men.
(1) A large percentage of the men with chronic malaria should be givenmedical boards or reassigned. Many of these men need long periods of hospitalization.
(2) All men should have adequate stool studies for amebiasis and otherintestinal diseases.
(3) Chronic diseases of other types should be adequately studied andproper disposition made.
c. Assuming that all men have been properly studied and treatedby hospitals the ones discharged should be sent to a camp assigned to 5307.The hospitals should make an honest effort to board all men who requirethis step. Boards should be more lenient than with service troops. Othermen not fit for infantry work should be designated as reassigned. The menreturning to camp would be in good physical condition or their physicalstatus would be known. They would fall into several classes.
(1) Men and officers from the 25th, the 43rd, the 37th, the 41st, the32nd, and Americal Divisions; men and officers from the 97th and 98th PackArtillery Outfits. This group would now number approximately 550.
(2) Men from the above units who were transferred to the 1st and 2ndbattalions. They now number approximately 150 men and officers.
(3) Men and officers who were in the 1st and 2nd battalions who arenow in the 3rd battalion. About 150.
(4) Men and officers from the 31st and 33rd Quartermaster Pack Outfitswhich joined the 3rd battalion in January 1944: about 80.
(5) Various casuals, probably 50 men and officers.
(6) Men and officers who were sent to 5307 Regiment Headquarters beforethe Burma Campaign because they were not fit for combat duty. Approximately100.
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d. All men overseas two years should be immediately sent to theContinental United States.121
e. Men who have been overseas 18 months and have been throughone or more campaigns should be sent to the Continental United States.
f. Men who have been overseas less than 18 months and have beenthrough two or more campaigns should be sent to the Continental UnitedStates.
g. The remainder of these men should be either reorganized orsent to units where their various talents could be best utilized.
h. The ideal set-up would be to take the qualified men home asa unit.
JAMES E. T. HOPKINS,
Captain, M.C.,
Battalion Surgeon
JETH/jet
27 June 1944122
Additional notes on the status of 5307.--a. The statusof this battalion as well as the first and second battalions, is essentiallythe same as it was in the report dated June 22nd 1944.
b. At this point, it should be explained that the regimentalsurgeon has been hospitalized at APO 465 [Calcutta] since leaving Myitkyina.He has not been available to this unit for two weeks. Within the past fewdays I have talked with all but one of the remaining medical officers inthe regiment. I am of the opinion that they agree with me and will backany statement made in either of these reports.
c. It is my opinion that the medical situation of the regimentis now beyond the China Burma India Theatre control and requires the attentionof the War Department. Many will agree that it holds more dynamite thanthe Patton Incident.123
Discussion of steps taken to remedy the situation.--a.All possible steps have, in my opinion, been taken by the regimental staffto carry out the recommendations of the medical officers of this unit.
b. I have talked with the commanding officers of the 20thGeneral Hospital, the 111th Station Hospital and the 14th Evacuation Hospital.Their co-
121Such men became eligible for return in August;most men in 2d and 3d Battalions left the Theater soon after. A revisedrotation policy--the "point system"--prevailed in 1945 whereinmonths of service overseas and combat received weighted credit toward repatriation.
122Hopkins' continuing concern led him to resume his reportson 27 June, 13-14 July, and 17 July. Each one he addressed to The SurgeonGeneral from 3d Medical Detachment, 5307th. The "Subject" ineach was: "Additional notes on the present status of 5307 with a [or,the] discussion of steps [or, the steps] to remedy the situation."The supplementary reports are given in order, but the repetitive letterhead,addressee, "Subject" headings, and signatures are omitted.
123In Sicily in 1943, Gen. George S. Patton, visiting a hospital,became violently angry upon encountering patients he believed were malingering.One he scolded hysterically, another he struck. During his inspection,"he continued to talk in a loud voice about the cowardice of peoplewho claimed they were suffering from psychoneuroses and exclaimed thatthey should not be allowed in the same hospital with the brave woundedmen." Dwight D. Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe (1948), pp. 179-180.
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operation is excellent but they are unable to relieve the most importantfactors which are playing a part in the situation.
c. I have written three personal letters, copies of which areattached to this report.124 Col. Perrin Long, MC, taught mepreventive medicine and information on the sulfa drugs at Johns HopkinsHospital and Medical School. Col. Benjamin Baker is a former teacher anda personal friend. He is particularly interested in the men of this battalionbecause of his work in USAFSPA Headquarters in the Pacific. General Merrillis, of course, the former commanding officer of this unit.
17 July 1944125
Additional notes on status of 5307.--a. The status ofthis battalion as well as the lst and 2nd Battalions is essentially thesame as it was in the report dated June 22, 1944.
b. At this point it should be explained that the Regimental Surgeonwhile on leave at APO 465 was hospitalized and thus has not been wherehe could study his troops. Recently, he was able to spend several daysin this area before going back to Myitkyina.
c. Theatre Headquarters was given, during the early part of July,permission to send all two year men by air travel to the Continental UnitedStates. A few days later, the following telegram was received by 5307 CompositeUnit (Prov): "Decision of Boss [Stilwell] relative Galahad rotationis that no men will be rotated who are physically fit for further combatuntil situation here is cleared. Green light will be given as soon as possible.Present qualifications for rotation are two years overseas and certificategiven by commanding officer of S.O.S. Hospitals stating that soldier becauseof physical condition should be sent to States. (This does not mean thatthe soldier is necessarily a convalescent.) However, the surgeon will carefullyconsider all cases. In order to expedite and coordinate carefully it isrequested you delegate authority to issue orders to Comdg. Gen. NCAC. Fromyour headquarters quotas and dates are to be radioed to Breister who willthen select names and issue orders." This put a different light onthe picture. The hospitals in this area are reluctant to send these twoyear men home unless they can demonstrate definite disease. Up until thisdate orders have been received by only 6 officers and 35 enlisted men.Apparently men not received by the SOS Hospitals will not be rotated untilMyitkyina falls. It is the opinion of the writer that at least half ofthese men are not at present ready for combat even under emergency conditions.126
124None were retained with the carbon copiesof Hopkins' report in Army files.
125Hopkins' final reports on 13, 14, and 17 July are virtuallyidentical, those on the 13th and 14th differing only in typographical form.The report of the 17th is almost the same as those of the 13th and 14th,but it enlarges upon the subject of rotation of 5307th troops, supplyingdetails which support the position he had previously taken on the matter.The report of the 17th is printed herein, as inclusive of those of the13th and 14th.
126On 13-14 July, Hopkins wrote more briefly on this subject,stating that he had learned on 3 July that the rotation of 2-year men hadbeen authorized by the War Department, but that Stilwell had attached theadditional condition of substantial unfitness for duty because of illnessand hospitalization. There were 700 men eligible for evacuation, accordingto Hopkins, of whom only half would be returned under Stilwell's terms.Apparently, Hopkins continued to investigate the matter and by 17 July,he was prepared to quote explicitly the order which restricted the rotationof 2-year men. The quotation provides for the chief expansion of his remarkson this subject in the earlier 13-14 June report. The name "Breister"in the quotation probably should be [Waldermar F.] Breidster. The pointis not, however, in the name but in the firm retention of discriminatorycontrol over rotation by Northern Combat Area Command headquarters.
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d. It is the general impression of many that the men who areout of the hospitals by the end of July will be sent to Myitkyina organizedinto platoon groups rather than as a unit.
e. The present living conditions of the 1,000 or so men now outof the hospitals, are deplorable. They have been placed in the TransientCamp at Ledo. This is a poorly drained area. Practically all of the bashasleak. There are not enough of these, so we are now housing the men in tents.None of these living quarters are screened. Insects come through wallsas well as doors and windows. There is no evidence of mosquito controlin this area. Food is ample. No post exchange supplies have been availablefor two weeks. No shower facilities are available in the area. The latrinesare unkept and inadequate. Rarely have the soldiers been subjected to suchinadequate and sub-standard living conditions.127
f. Approximately 100 men out of the Battalion have been givenleave. It now appears that very few more men or officers will be givenleave until after Myitkyina falls.
Discussion of steps taken to remedy the situation.--a.All possible steps, in my opinion have been taken by the Regimental Staffto carry out the recommendations of the Medical officers of this unit.
b. I have given testimony about the mental and physical conditionof these men to both the Combat Hdqtrs, Inspector General and the TheatreInspector at their request.
c. I have talked with the commanding officers of the 20th GeneralHospital, 14th Evacuation Hospital and the 111th Station Hospital. Conversationshave also been held with the Base Section Three, the Combat Hdqtrs., andthe Theatre Surgeon.128 Their cooperation is excellent, butapparently they are unable to relieve the most important factors playinga part in the situation. We do, however, seem to be assured that the Typhuscases will have a prolonged convalescence. A few will be given medicalboards.
d. Steps are being taken by this organization to apply mosquitocontrol in this area and to improve the housing and general living conditions.It must be remembered that this area is a staging area which should beready at all times to provide [adequate] living conditions for transienttroops.
127On 13 and 14 July, Hopkins stated in subparagraphe that a list had been requested which was to show the names ofmen unfit for combat but available to serve as instructors at Myitkyina.Presumably they were to work with the engineers and replacements. Sincethis point is not included in the 17 July report, Hopkins must have concludedthat the action contemplated would not be taken. Subparagraph identitiesvary in the 14 and 17 July reports, because of the omission noted herein.The description of the transient camp (subparagraph f. in the 14July report) is a little longer in the 17 July report.
128Williams, the Theater Surgeon, was in Washington, D.C., from21 June to 1 August. Hopkins must have talked to the Acting Theater Surgeon,Col. George E. Armstrong. Armstrong reported on 15 July 1944, incidentally,that steps had been taken to relieve Hopkins from duty with Galahad: Letter,15 July 1944, Acting Theater Surgeon to NCAC Surgeon.
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Observations on the inadequate preparations made to receive thesetroops as they came from a combat area.--a. No convalescentor rest camp was established.
b. No effort appears to have been made to study the troops' peculiarproblems and meet them.
c. Preparations were not made by the hospitals of this area tostudy and rehabilitate these troops. It must have been obvious that theycould not have remained in combat indefinitely.129
d. The area selected for their recovery after hospital care showsno signs of the application of even the simplest sanitary principles.130
e. Adequate plans were not drawn up to treat the acute typhuscases or to care for them after the severe period of their illness. Themortality rate in one hospital was 30% of 50 cases.131
f. The command here apparently did not appreciate the seriousnessof our malaria and amebiasis as well as morale problem.132
Justification for the submission of these reports.133--a.The writer considers these reports of interest to the Surgeon General forseveral basic reasons.
(1) This is the first campaign waged by American infantry in this theatre.
(2) I do not believe that the Surgeon General has records availablewhich give a true picture of the medical history of this group of 5307,which came from the Pacific area.
(3) This was a special type of Infantry outfit with a special Medicaltable of organization and equipment.
(4) It is my impression that other American troops will fight undercontrol of this theatre.134 This makes it seem imperative thatthe Surgeon
129As indicated above, plans for replacing5307th were very vague, although they did exist. If Myitkyina had fallenquickly, the steps already underway to develop convalescent facilitiesmight have been satisfactory. At least, the pressure to interrupt the periodof recuperation would have been less. Also, if Myitkyina had been takenpromptly, Stilwell would have had time to organize and train the replacementsproperly.
130Inattention to transient and staging areas was common. In1943, conditions at Chabua became so bad that Stilwell personally tookstern measures to have them improved. Responsibility for such camps oftenfell on officers who were all-too-easily spared from more urgent dutiesand who saw little value in their labor. Transient troops and an inadequatepermanent party contributed little to the maintenance, even less to theimprovement, of such areas.
131See n. 120, p. 363, for figures on scrub typhus. The 20thGeneral Hospital had been very concerned and had taken special steps tocare for scrub typhus patients. The inadequacies of which Hopkins was awarewere in the 14th Evacuation Hospital Branch, and they arose from the unreadinessof the entire hospitalization program. The staff of the 14th did the bestit could on short notice.
132As hereafter indicated, it did and it didn't. In the caseof malaria, adequate suppressive measures were firmly enjoined; it wasalso generally known that the troops were infected. No clarity about amebiasisexisted, nor about the problems of water purification procedures. Thesegaps in understanding were not limited to commanders, but existed in themedical establishment as well, due to the inadequacy of records, limitationson laboratory facilities, and the changing state of opinion regarding theeffect of chlorination on amebic cysts. No one could doubt that diarrheaand dysentery sorely troubled the troops, but the accumulation of adequateclinical information required fixed hospital services.
133This section of the 17 July report is not found in the reportsof 13 and 14 July.
134From the survivors of Old and New Galahad, the Theater formedthe 475th Infantry Regiment in August 1944. The 475th and the 124th CavalryRegiment, which was sent to the Theater, formed the 5332d Brigade--the"Mars Task Force"--which helped the Chinese clear the Burma Roadfrom Bhamo to the China border in 1944-45. On 6 October, Stilwell visitedthe 475th at Myitkyina and talked with the men from Galahad, first withscattered individuals, then with the regiment, and finally with delegationsfrom each battalion. The subject was the grievances of the earlier campaignand fears that the causes of them would be repeated: Romanus and Sunderland,II, p. 467.
In fact, both the health of the command and the arrangements for medicalservice in 5332d Brigade were better than those of 5307th, although oldsanitary and disciplinary defects did not entirely disappear. Preventivemedicine programs were instituted with newly arrived malaria control unitsand enlarged supplies of insect repellents. New portable surgical hospitalsand field hospitals enriched the medical establishment. Commanders weremore diligent in their support of medical officers. Overall administrationand control were more reliable.
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General get intimate information about troops in this area insofar astheir health and morale are concerned.
(5) The writer does not try to set himself up as a military authority,but has only attempted to set down in writing a few simple truths. It ishoped that this effort will tend to increase the desire of all concernedto see the mental and physical health and military efficiency of troops,who have fought and will fight in this area, continually improve.
The Stelling Report, Concluded
P. It was at this point that confidence in Theatre commanders becamezero. We could not believe that General Merrill had forsaken his men andwe did not believe this. We knew he had already had one heart attack andwas at the moment in a general hospital. So we were forced to concludethat his promises to us had been overruled by higher authority. Our consternationreached a new high when it was discovered and witnessed many times thatour own battalion commander and our own column commanders and our regimentaland battalion surgeons all collaborated in the fanciful idea that the majorityof the outfit was in condition to continue in a few days on the most difficultmountain marching and combat mission of the entire campaign.
The men had almost fallen off of Nphum Ga after the siege and they walkedabout as in a trance and with lack lustre eyes and hopeless staring attitude.The idea was expressed by the battalion commander and the column commander,whether they believed it or not, that a few days of rest and ten in onerats [rations] would put the men in good shape again. And they themselvesabout this time personally expressed to me that they felt better than everbefore in their whole lives. The column commander of the column to whichI was attached is the most incurable chronic optimist I have ever knownand a very capable leader in every respect. However, shortly after startingon the most fool-hardy and crushing second half of the campaign, he aswell as dozens of others blacked out and fainted several times during strenuousclimbs. Coming off of Nphum Ga he weighed little more than 120 of his 180pounds with which he started the training period back at Deogarh.
Q. It is a disgrace upon the Medical Department of the Army that theranking medical officers of the regiment did not insist upon the total
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evacuation of the 2nd and 3rd Battalions of 5307 after Nphum Ga andafter the Chinese took over and held the gains which had been made. Therewas no immediate danger of enemy contact. Almost a month passed beforewe finally marched far enough to make contact with the enemy again andthen we were on the offensive. The medical officers who began to insistthat this action take place were sent out with combat teams on specialholding missions which were for the most part unnecessary, and were notincluded in any of the regimental meetings of medical officers, meetingswhere decisions were made as to recommendations concerning the physicaland mental condition of the troops. These were the officers who had alwaysbeen out in front in every engagement and had performed nearly all of thesurgical procedures to help save the men's lives and to prevent deformities.The regimental surgeon in his administrative capacity did not undergo thehardships of the entire campaign. He rarely carried a pack and was flownby air from place to place. Yet he dared to pose as an authority upon thecondition of the men and made only token protests against the treatmentthey were receiving. He was most always overflowing with cheerfulness andcordiality to those of higher rank but usually ignored the suggestionsof those with lower rank and discouraged their ideas. He ordered me tostop carrying my pack saying that it was too heavy and would reduce myefficiency, yet he failed to realize or admit the degree to which the healthand efficiency of the men had been lowered by the hardships they endured,until near the end of the campaign.
R. The battalion surgeon carried a light pack and for days carried nopack at all and was often seen hanging to the tails of exhausted overloadedanimals as they climbed mountains. Yet he refused to evacuate seriouslyill men on several occasions. Except just after Nphum Ga he never evacuatedbut a small percentage of the seriously ill until the last month of thecampaign. He took the attitude that the men were exaggerating their illnessesuntil proven otherwise. He preferred to be overly cheerful and on occasionto shout in a lusty voice: "Carry on men! Carry on!" He nearlyalways held out promises of long rests to the men which never came, andhis usual statement to sick men regardless of whether facilities for evacuationwere available was: "Come back and see me tomorrow. I can do nothingmore for you now." and "Tomorrow" would usually find usfurther away from evacuation facilities than ever. The men throughout thebattalion began to detest and loathe him and many have threatened to killhim if given a chance. I know of three line officers who were seriouslyill for from one to two weeks before he finally agreed to evacuate them,as well as many enlisted with similar complaints. Two of the officers hadepidemic hepatitis and one had severe bloody diarrhea. Neither of themcould function efficiently during these weeks. They only suffered and draggedalong with the column. They volunteered the statement before they were
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finally evacuated that the battalion surgeon allowed his medical judgmentto be dictated by the battalion commander.135
S. During the last half of the campaign following Nphum Ga the men wereso thoroughly exhausted that they could climb the five to six thousandfoot range of mountains they were forced to cross only by very slow laboredmarching with rest stops every five or ten minutes. The mules and horseswere so exhausted and undernourished that they began falling down withoutbeing able to get up even without packs and saddles. We were losing towardthe last of these rugged mountain marches as many as ten animals in a singleday. Near the last, loads had to be left and the few remaining animalsshuttled back and forth until the absolutely essential loads were broughtthrough. Many animals and pack saddles and much ammunition and equipmenthad to be left behind with no hope of recovery. The battalion at timeswas scattered from ten to twenty-five miles along these mountain trails.If any sizable enemy force had been met or had ambushed or cut off segmentsof our columns we would have been exterminated without a chance of holdingour own.136 Our battalion commander was so set on reaching Arangand being ready to push on to Myitkyina and so blind
135Passages such as these invite the readerto retire with a jury. Before doing so, the terms of the law should bestated. First, the 5307th was created to be totally expended in the NorthBurma campaign. The campaign had been planned to culminate in the captureof Myitkyina. Second, the 5307th had been designed to carry out protractedjungle marches capped by diversionary operations in favor of the main bodyof forces at Stilwell's disposal. Its value was in what it could do forthe Chinese, not what it could do itself. Third, its tactical doctrines,based upon the Wingate formulae, required abnormally restricted communications,supplies, and evacuation. Unlike normal forces, it had no rear, only afront: it was not shaped to fall back, only go forward. Finally, its mostprecious quality, its raison d'etre, was its continuous mobility, not itsfirepower. The latter needed to be sufficient only to harass the enemy.But more important still was the absolute necessity that the 5307th keepmoving to threaten the enemy constantly from the flanks and from the rear.
These terms were rigorous, even fatal. They allowed little latitude forinterpretation. Stelling and those of like compassion mistakenly supposedthat they alone recognized the perilous plight of the 5307th. On the contrary,Stilwell, who ordered the march to Myitkyina, and all who seerned to countenancethe order, gave many signs of grave apprehension. On both sides of legitimatedoubt there were hardy, brave, and sensitive men who had already demonstratedtheir good faith at Walawbum, Shaduzup, Inkangahtawng, and Nphum Ga. Doubtsnotwithstanding, they would soon be facing the enemy again at Ritpong,Charpate, and Myitkyina. The battalion commander who convinced himselfthat the 5307th could take Myitkyina was the same commander who led histroops until he lay unconscious in a foxhole. The battalion surgeon whohid his feelings under the frivolous mask of a games-master was the samesurgeon whose aid station had been under fire inside the perimeter at NphumGa and whose name would be among the three recorded by the 2d Battaliondiarist as the last to leave Myitkyina. Stilwell and his commanders werenearly wrong in hoping that the 5307th could fight at Myitkyina. Stellingand his comrades were nearly right in fearing that the 5307th had beendestroyed at Nphum Ga.
Here was the classic situation once more. Pierre gazes in wonder at theartillerymen whose gayety increases as enemy cannon balls fall ever morethickly. The young recruit flees in outrage from war-demons so wanton asto award the red badge of courage only to the naive or the foolhardy: Pauldies on a quiet afternoon on the Western Front. Above the Scamandrian plainthe gods amuse themselves while mortals quarrel. When, instead, they facetheir common and hopeless fate, when Priam kneels and Achilleus weeps,the gods withdraw in pity. Stilwell and Stelling, Bezuhov and Henry Fleming,Rogoff and Hopkins--only the names change.
136Perhaps Stelling did not know that K and H Forces were ahead,and that K Force, especially, had taken action to safeguard the rest ofthe force. The Kachin scouts with 2d Battalion, too, offered insuranceagainst surprise attack on this occasion, as they had when the 2d and 3dBattalions marched to Inkangahtawng. Having been left to guard the rear,2d Battalion had the unfortunate task of attempting to close up to therest of the force when it neared Myitkyina and Hunter foresaw the opportunityto take the town as well as the airfield.
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in his stubborn determination that he walked off with his usual verylight pack and left most of his staff far behind and started pushing theleading platoon at full speed. Some units of the outfit were two days behindincluding about thirty quite ill patients who were trailing near the endtrying to keep up.
When the battalion finally reached Arang some fifty men were completelyincapable of marching because of exhaustion plus specific diseases includingadvanced malaria, epidemic hepatitis, cholecystitis, chronic bloody diarrheasof weeks' duration, and fevers of undetermined origin. Several typhus casesdeveloped out of this group. I made an insistent appeal to the battalionsurgeon to put up a stand to evacuate the battalion at Arang where an airstripwas available, as none of the men would be able to fight when they finishedthe march to Myitkyina or its vicinity. No man in the battalion was incondition for combat at Arang and certainly the almost fifty miles whichstill lay ahead would not improve the condition of any of the men. Thebattalion surgeon refused to make a stand which in my opinion it was hisduty to do. Instead he ordered me to remain at Arang with the acutely illpatients and to take charge of their evacuation by plane. He told me thatI would rejoin the battalion in about two days.
T. The battalion's stand near Myitkyina was deplorable. The men wereso completely exhausted by then that they were literally on their lastlegs. All alertness and all will to fight or even move had left them. Whenordered to dig in, many fell from exhaustion and went to sleep by theirpartially dug fox-holes. Others fell without attempting to dig. Those onguard fell asleep from sheer exhaustion. One man was killed and seven woundedby enemy fire, and the wounded who could still move looked dazed and madelittle attempt to take cover. The medical men were too exhausted to carefor the wounded and considerable time passed before the wounded could befinally evacuated.
U. This was the pitiful end of a magnificent fighting unit which hadgradually been depleted of strength and will to fight by constant and manyunnecessary drains on their energy and morale. These depletions began inTrinidad and developed as serious illnesses for the group back at Deolali,and continued getting more and more serious through Deogarh and throughoutthe entire Burma campaign. The men fought courageously and accounted forhundreds of the enemy. They accomplished the original mission with greatsuccess, but they were ordered on and on past the breaking point and promiseafter promise to them failed to materialize. Due to lack of vision andlack of knowledge of the limitations of physical endurance, or failureto act upon this vision and knowledge, in the face of what was known tobe a very difficult situation, the theatre commanders forced the regimentalcommand to drive the men until they dropped and to an ignominious failurefrom which many will never recover to the point of having the strengthand the will and unhampered courage to fight again. The medical departmentfailed in its duty to the men to insure that every American soldier bemaintained in as good health as possible throughout
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every campaign, and that all sick as well as wounded be evacuated assoon as possible. No situation can change the fact that seriously ill andutterly exhausted men cannot fight.
V. Finally, upon the suggestion of the commanding officer the battalionsurgeon authorized evacuation of what was left of the men by emergencymedical tags from Myitkyina on planes to hospitals in India.
Later, at the airstrip near Myitkyina I found to my astonishment thatmany 5307 men who had been evacuated during the last part of the campaignsince Nphum Ga, and some of the rear echelon who have never been fit forcombat, had been sent to duty at the airstrip. Among these I found eightwith fevers ranging from 100 to 104 and several men who had been woundedand whose wounds were still draining, and one man who had had an abdominaloperation less than three weeks before and with the skin incision stillquite raw, and another man who is a veteran of the last war and over 48years old with pitting edema of the hands and evident cardiac pathology.I was told that orders had been issued by General Boatner that none butthe most acutely ill patients were to be evacuated. This despite the factthat there were several thousand Chinese troops near the airstrip and inthe vicinity of Myitkyina, as well as several hundred fresh American troopswho had not seen combat before. Entirely new medical officers who knewlittle of the condition of the men in "Merrill's Marauders" andcouldn't possibly comprehend their fitness for combat or any other dutywere in ranking position at the Myitkyina airstrip and given authorityabove that of the medical officers of "Merrill's Marauders" withthe stipulation that no patients could be evacuated without the specificsanction of the new medical officers.137 I made an effort toevacuate all of the 5307 men of "Merrill's Marauders" whom Iknew to be unfit for combat or duty of any kind and was successful in evacuatingseveral dozen of the most serious cases in spite of opposition. It wasat this time that I succumbed to illness after having run a high feverfor over a week and I was sent to a hospital in India.
Present status of the 2nd Battalion and the men of "Merrill'sMarauders" as a whole.--A. Since arriving back in India I havelearned from unimpeachable sources and witnessed personally many astoundingdevelopments. The great majority of "Merrill's Marauders" sentback to Myitkyina for duty were collected suddenly from rear echelon andconvalescent areas and rest camps and put in trucks from which they wereplaced on planes and
137This reference to new medical officers doesnot occur in other source materials. From Stelling's account it appearsthat he speaks of events some time between 4 and 20 June, after the replacementshad reached the scene and the 2d Battalion had left it. The new medicalmen might have been individual replacements sent to "New Galahad"from other units in CBI; they might have been officers with the engineers;or they might have been in the staffs of the 42d and 58th Portable SurgicalHospitals and the Seagrave hospital. Stelling's protests complement Boatner'sreport of 15 June that evacuations were being restricted. Stelling understandablybelieved that the evacuation policy worked more hardship on ex-Maraudersin "New Galahad" than upon the fresher replacements. In thisregard, it should be noted that on 15 July, Col. George E. Armstrong, actingas Theater Surgeon while Williams was in Washington, D.C., reported thathe instructed the medical officers at Myitkyina not to sanction medicalevacuation for "tired" men: Letter, 15 July 1944, Acting TheaterSurgeon to NCAC Surgeon.
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flown to Myitkyina. Many of these were definitely weak and ill patientsconvalescing in and near the staging area because the hospitals were andstill are overflowing and cannot accommodate the men. The medical officersof the 20th General Hospital and 111th and 14th Evacuation Hospitals uponlearning of this wholesale gathering of convalescents to be sent to Myitkyinawithout medical sanction, immediately took steps to rehospitalize as manyas possible and to issue convalescent certificates for the protection ofthe patients.
B. The majority of the men and officers of the 2nd Battalion as wellas of the other battalions of "Merrill's Marauders" are stillin the 20th General Hospital or in the 14th and 111th Evacuation Hospitalseither as wounded or as acutely ill patients or convalescing from definitediseases. The hospital care has been as good as could be expected underthe crowded conditions and by the overworked medical personnel. Howeverit has proven impossible under these conditions to accurately diagnoseand adequately treat many cases. Even the most obvious diseases have inmost cases been of necessity treated inadequately. Among the malarias firsttreated very briefly with 30 grains of quinine given once followed by afew tablets of atabrine there are already beginning to be reoccurrencesreporting almost daily to sick call and being rehospitalized. Some of thesehave already had malaria from six to ten and even more times. And in spiteof the fact, as proven by the cases and observations of many medical officersin the tropics, that malaria cannot be cured by means of atabrine aloneor even with moderate amounts of quinine in addition, the same mistakesare being repeated over and over. Medical officers with combat experiencein tropical and subtropical terrain know that it never pays to take chronicrecurrent malaria cases into combat. The most conscientious of these medicalofficers will refuse to do so. Such malaria cases will invariably breakdown often just when the men are needed most. No man with high fever isin fit condition for combat. Fortunately atabrine suppressive treatmentwill hold the fevers down but men with chronic recurrent malarias respondless and less to atabrine and will never recover unless returned to temperatezones and given further study and extensive therapy.
C. In like manner cases of amebiasis have been inadequately treated.A few shots of emetine or a few doses of other medication will not cureamebiasis. Of the cases thus treated there will be many chronic reoccurrencesand the probability of liver abscesses greatly increased. It is my opinion,as it is the opinion of other medical officers in 5307, that the percentageof amebic dysenteries among our men is far greater than the cases so fardiagnosed seem to indicate. I have already contacted several men and officerswho are supposedly cured of the specific illness with which they enteredthe hospitals but are now quite definitely still suffering symptoms typicalof amebiasis as well as those of other serious ailments they experiencedin the Burma campaign.138
138The 20th General Hospital reported: "Theresponse to emetine is dramatic. A few recurrences and amoebic liver abscesseshave occurred." It also reported observing numerous cases of diarrheawhich resisted treatment and which followed amoebic or bacillary dysentery:Annual Report, 1944, pp. 86, 88-89.
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D. New cases of epidemic hepatitis are increasing each week. In the2nd Battalion we have had more evidence of this disease and more seriouscases than the other battalions. The rather long prodromal and incubationperiods of this disease will continue to keep many developing cases coveredup. But the disease as we have had it is completely incapacitating andcan be of even more serious consequence.139
E. Many upper respiratory as well as possible lung pathologies havebeen insufficiently investigated and it is quite probable that if chestplates were done at this time several cases of tuberculosis would be found.The 2nd Battalion passed through one native village in which it was foundthat a native had just died and another was in the last stages of tuberculosis.I was called in to examine this man and he had every sign and symptom ofterminal tuberculosis, and several groups of natives were coughing andexpectorating bloody sputum around the basha. This condition may have existedin other villages as several mysterious deaths had been reported and aninterpreter described to me how many of the natives were coming down withdisease. The men of the battalion always in spite of warnings to the contraryslept in or near the bashas of native villages whenever possible. Manyof them have chronic coughs and have not regained weight or appetite sincebeing in the hospitals here.140
F. Typhus did not strike the men of the 2nd Battalion as it did thoseof the 1st and 3rd Battalions. We had only about six to ten cases whereasthe other two battalions combined had near to two hundred cases and ofthese nearly forty have died. A large percentage of these deaths can beattributed to the exhausted condition of the men and failure to evacuatefevers of undetermined origin quickly enough. The 2nd battalion marchedto Myitkyina over a different route than that used by the other battalionsand thus missed the principal infected foci of the disease. But typhushas been increasing lately among the men of the Chinese and American forcesin the vicinity of Myitkyina.
G. Since the evacuation of the majority of "Merrill's Marauders"from Burma several other very disappointing and inexcusable occurrenceshave served to decrease our morale still further and our confidence inthose of high authority who are still refusing to treat us fairly. Whenwe left for Burma we were told to pack all our personal belongings in oneor two barracks bags
139The 14th Evacuation Hospital Branch didnot give special attention to infectious hepatitis in its review of diseasein the 5307th, nor was it identified as a major cause of illness amongAmerican troops in CBI, generally speaking. The 20th General Hospital reported:"This disease has increased during the past few months. There havebeen 87 cases during the year [among American troops]. One severe casedied [the entry on this reads: Cause unknown, was on suppressive atabrine].Several cases have been accompanied by more pain, tenderness and feverthan is usually seen." Its monthly account of the disease showed fourto six cases had been hospitalized in each month from April through July.During the period August-November, from 10 to 17 cases per month enteredthe 20th General: Annual Report, 1944, pp. 85b, 85d, 89.
140As shown in n. 120, p. 363, upper respiratory infectionswere the third highest cause of hospitalization in the 14th EvacuationHospital Branch. During 1944, the 20th General Hospital treated 41 Americanpatients for tuberculosis. It noted that upper respiratory infections causedhospitalization more frequently in April, May, and June, than in the coldmonths: Annual Report, 1944, p. 89. Conceivably, this unexpected phenomenonmight have been due to the evacuation policies and tactical isolation ofthe 5307th, which tended to hold back the sick until their condition becamegrave.
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and some of the men and officers had suit cases and trunks. We weretold that this personal property, including our best clothes and shoesand all of our official papers and letters and photographs and other thingsof equally cherished and irreplaceable value, would be kept in a safe placefor us under guard until our return. However, when we returned we foundthat 90% of everyone's bags and cases and trunks had been either totallylost or hopelessly wrecked and the contents strewn in tangled, damp androtting masses. Containers had been ripped open with knives and locks brokenand suitcases and trunks crushed in or torn open. In this manner at least90% of the personal luggage of every combat team of every battalion hasbeen totally or partially wrecked. The only compensation so far presentedhas been a free issue to all men and officers of at least one completeuniform including shoes and hat. This issue may be entirely unrelated tothe loss of our personal belongings. What is left of the wrecked and scatteredbelongings can be seen now in a few long bamboo huts still unguarded andno attempt has yet been made to classify the articles or to salvage them.
H. New American outfits coming to India for the first time as we did,but not having the previous combat experience that some of us had, andthe training and prolonged working together as combat teams which all of"Merrill's Marauders" experienced, have been rushed into theMyitkyina area almost totally unprepared for combat. These outfits havehad unbelievably heavy casualties and some of them were never given a fightingchance. A few companies have lost more killed in one or two engagementsthan our entire regiment lost in four months of many engagements.141Company commanders and platoon leaders of infantry outfits just flown inand of engineer outfits who had only eight months basic training over ayear ago and have since been working on the Ledo Road and laying pipe,were sent into action hastily organized and poorly equipped. Whole companiesdidn't even have entrenching tools and their fire power was greatly reducedbecause of '03 rifles and practically no automatic weapons.
These outfits were rushed to the Myitkyina area in spite of thousandsof Chinese troops already present. In some cases they were promised atleast a brief training period and had not a chance to get organized properlysince leaving the boat. Some were sent out without Kachin or Chinese scoutsor liaison men or proper reconnaissance and they lost hundreds of men trying
141The "Casualty Report," 5 July1944, Stilwell Papers, Folder 204, shows that in June 1944, "New Galahad"had 309 battle casualties of all types, compared to the official figureof 424 for the 5307th in the entire campaign. In "New Galahad,"in that month, 45 were killed in action and 12 more died of wounds; 248more survived wounds in action. The number of battle deaths in "NewGalahad" in its first month was well over half the number in 5307thduring the whole campaign. Romanus and Sunderland, II, pp. 241-243, describethe hurried organization of "New Galahad," the unprepared conditionof the men, and their ultimate development into reliable and effectivefighters. The final casualty report for the battle of Myitkyina listed272 killed and 955 wounded American troops; most of them were from "NewGalahad." There were 980 American sick. It can be assumed that thenumber recorded as sick did not include those with minor conditions. However,since "New Galahad" was directly on an effective evacuation line,the figure is probably more revealing than figures for 5307th prior toMay (when only the seriously sick were evacuated). The casualties in the209th and 236th Engineer Battalions were "as heavy * * * as [thoseof] any American units in the theater (the former, 41 per cent)."This estimate and the total figures for the Myitkyina battle are givenin Romanus and Sunderland, II, pp. 252-253.
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to take well dug-in and fortified Japanese positions which have beenin preparation over a year. Others were caught in the open by veteran Japtroops and shot down by machine guns without having a chance to fight back.This information came first hand from officers and men who managed to survive,some of whom I knew personally in Trinidad, and who could have no otherpossible motive than to tell the truth and hope that other men would notbe sacrificed as many of their fellows were. Quite a few who volunteeredthis information are still patients in hospitals along with other woundedand sick from "Merrill's Marauders." These accounts of actualexperiences do not help the morale or add to the confidence of the menso far as the responsible leaders in this theatre are concerned. In factthey reinforce all the doubts and misgivings as well as the experiencesthat exist concerning these responsible leaders.
I. The latest and most crushing fact of all has put the final touchto the gross injustice that has been dealt out to "Merrill's Marauders"of 5307. Lists were finally prepared and orders in process to send alltwo year men of the regiment to the continental United States. In factabout 800 were to be started on their way in July. A very encouraging speechwas made to the available men of the regiment by a representative of theInspector General implying possibilities that all men of the outfit wouldbe sent home to the United States in the near future. But suddenly allof these homegoing orders and plans were canceled or suspended. Now themen are faced with the possibility of being sent into combat again in thenear future in spite of their illness and exhaustion.
It is true that the hospitalization and rest most of them have receivedfor the past few weeks have improved their physical condition to some degree.But now the medical officers of the outfit who are the only ones who canknow from actual experience the condition of the men have been pushed asideand hospital medical officers given the full and only authority to saywhether a man is fit for combat or not. This further injustice to the entireoutfit is the more deplorable because it takes away one of the best hopesthe men have of getting fair treatment at this late date. No foolish implicationis made that a medical officer or any doctor must have a disease beforehe can diagnose or treat it properly and no inference should be drawn thatthe medical officers of this outfit regard themselves as superior or asthe only judges of the hardships to be found in jungle warfare. But itis undoubtedly true that no medical man can perform a rushed examinationon a man, using the usual diagnostic procedures as are available at thepresent time, and just because the man shows no evidence of a specificdisease and can walk to and from meals and to a picture show once in awhile and says he feels pretty good, to class this man as fit for dutywith the impending possibility of early combat attached, and this so shortlyafter the man has undergone such hardships as this paper presents. Onlythe medical officers who have endured with the men the self-same hardshipscan properly evaluate the men's present condition and point with justificationto the fact that the men are not fit for duty or combat.
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J. The medical officers of the 20th General and the 14th and 111th EvacuationHospitals and their entire medical personnel have been most kind and efficientin their efforts to help the men and officers of "Merrill's Marauders."But they cannot appreciate the full damage done from the physical or mentalstandpoints to the men of the outfit. They admittedly cannot carry outall of the diagnostic procedures indicated in many cases, and in the mostserious groups of illnesses such as typhus, malaria, amebiasis and epidemichepatitis they have denied authority to take necessary steps to guaranteethat these men shall not be returned to combat.142 The mostdefinite statement yet made as to this problem came from the Chief of theMedical Service of the 20th General Hospital. He stated to a battalionsurgeon of the regiment, "This is war and we know what should be donebut our hands are tied and we cannot do any more for you than we are doing."Yet he admits that there is a very high probability that there are casesof developing liver abscesses and tuberculosis as well as other seriouscomplications among the men.
K. In this there is a serious challenge to the sacred duty which themedical department owes to the men of the army and to the sense of intellectual
142The passage is ambiguous. Should it read:"have been denied authority," or "have denied having authority"?Stelling touches unwittingly upon another complicated administrative problem.In the Ledo area, the 20th General Hospital had the authority to convenea Disposition Board, which could recommend the return of patients to theUnited States or to duty in the Theater. Those returned were deemed tohave permanent disabilities, to require more than 6 months of treatment,to need therapeutic care unavailable in the Theater, or to be fit onlyfor limited or Zone of Interior military duty. Informally, at least, the20th sometimes recommended limited duty in the Theater, but the officialpolicy envisaged evacuation to the United States of such soldiers.
Overall Theater policies with regard to disposition went through severalphases of informal development until 24 August 1944. Then the Theater issuedits first general directive on the subject. Theater policy, according tothe directive, forbade evacuation to the United States of patients "merelybecause they have suffered any specified number of attacks of malaria orof any other disease, such as scrub typhus." Instead, their dispositionwas to be judged only in accordance with the physical qualifications neededfor further service in the Theater. However, evacuation was countenancedfor all cases of blackwater fever, chronic malaria with residual defects,bronchial asthma, peptic ulcer, rheumatic and arthritic conditions (notincluding "the vague pain in the back for which no cause other thana weak spirit can be found"); and active pulmonary tuberculosis.
The directive advised disposition boards that uncomplicated malaria oramebic dysentery cases were not to be evacuated. The boards were to concernthemselves only with medical matters, eliminating from consideration thepatient's length of overseas service, anxiety to return home, or dissatisfactionwith his assignment. Such circumstances, unless they were constituent aspectsof genuine psychic illness, were to be dealt with by administrative orcommand agencies. So also were cases of chronic alcoholism, pregnancy,general maladjustment and ineptness, constitutional psychopathic behavior,"the nostalgic, and those who are so unmindful of their obligationsand duty that they will seize any opportunity to escape the tedium of serviceand return to the comforts of home." The directive commented thatinappropriate medical disposition of such cases constituted a matter ofgrowing concern to the Theater command.
Later in the year the Theater Surgeon's office informally encouraged Theaterreassignment as one means of dealing with medical disabilities. Reassignmentsfrom one area to another in the Theater, or from one type of unit to another,it was suggested, could conserve manpower without medical injury to theindividual. This policy was officially confirmed in July 1945.
The subject is discussed in Stone, "The Hospitalization and Evacuationof Sick and Wounded in the Communications Zone, China-Burma-India and India-BurmaTheaters, 1942-1946," chapter X. The quoted passages are from Memorandum,SOS Headquarters, Office of the Surgeon, "The Disposition Board,"24 August 1944. It will be noted that the "guarantees" Stellingsought could not be provided, and that service in 5307th was not groundsper se for evacuation. On the other hand, any condition of a seriousnature could lead to study by a Disposition Board and, on evidence showingsufficient incapacity, any individual could be evacuated. It is obviousthat the policy statement reflects the Theater's current experience withtropical combat conditions. In some passages, the tone is reminiscent ofthe controversies regarding the Marauders.
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honesty and adherence to scientific truth which is the essence of themedical profession. If pressure from high ranking field officers can beapplied to Army General and Evacuation Hospitals as well as to medicalofficers in general to such an extent [regarding their] prerogative ofprotecting the health of the fighting men and guaranteeing that men unfitfor combat are kept out of combat, then those hospitals as well as allmedical officers are robbed of sacred duties and rights to which theirprofessional knowledge and service entitles them.
Summary and conclusions.--A. Many facts have been stated as wellas several opinions advanced based on my observation and knowledge of thephysical and mental condition of the men and officers of the 2nd Battalionas well as its relation to the lst and 3rd Battalions of "Merrill'sMarauders" of 5307 Composite Unit (Prov). Much evidence has been presentedto prove that these men have undergone such grueling physical and mentalhardships, that they still suffer such exhaustion superimposed on so manydiagnosed and undiagnosed diseases, that they are not in condition forcombat at the present time and cannot be made in condition for months tocome, especially in this theatre.
B. The tactical situations which have been alluded to, and the personalreferences to certain individuals which have been made, are all presentedin a purely scientific spirit as necessary evidence in the long chain ofphysical ordeals and mental disappointments and frustrations which havebeen the chief factors in reducing the men of the outfit to their presentstate of unfitness. Few names have been mentioned but it is quite evidentthat the names of other persons referred to can be easily determined. Thepersonal animosity which I can't help holding towards certain individualsmentioned, because of their callous disregard for the feelings and conditionof the men and their failure to make a firm stand in behalf of the outfitas a whole, has little place in the purpose of this paper. It is not mydesire to bring into any more bold relief the personalities of these individuals.I have only quoted and interpreted some particular facts which bear directlyupon the condition of the outfit as a whole. But if anyone should desireto investigate more completely the truth of these matters I am preparedto advance still more evidence to support the statements which have beenmade. But it is not the purpose of this paper to disparage anyone. I onlyseek justice for the men and the outfit as a whole.
C. General Merrill and Colonel Hunter are mentioned quite specificallyas being two men associated intimately with the regiment who have donethe most to give the men a fair deal. It is emphasized again here thatthese two leaders in direct command of "Merrill's Marauders",and their regimental staffs, are not implied to be responsible for thecontinuance of the Burma Campaign after Nphum Ga and our first missionswere successfully completed, except as they were directed by higher authority,and of course this holds for the campaign as a whole, to some degree. GeneralMerrill had and still has the admiration and respect of the entire regiment.And the officers and men realize perfectly, when after General Merrill'shospitalization he was not available for duty, that Colonel Hunter wasdirected by still
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higher authority to continue the campaign in spite of evident disadvantagesand disappointments amounting in the end to the medical evacuation of mostof the regiment.
D. It is not presumed that the writer implies that he understood ornow understands the tactics and strategy of the Burma Campaign, and hedoes not make claim in any way shape or form to be a military expert, northat the extreme urgency of the situation could not justify the TheatreCommander and his staff to sacrifice the entire regiment if they saw fit.The only claim made by the writer and the only basis for the facts andopinions presented in this paper is that he is a medical officer of the2nd Battalion who went through the campaign itself, and he is thus qualifiedas an expert to judge and give an accurate estimate of the physical andmental condition of the men and officers with whom he was and is on suchintimate terms. The morale factor being of such vital importance as a partof the mental picture it is necessary to relate the numerous instancesof mental frustration presented, and these required reference to tacticalsituations and the personality traits of leaders. The writer deems it hisduty to the 2nd Battalion and to the regiment as a whole, and to his professionand to the loved ones to whom his life is dedicated, and to the idealsand principles of the United States of America which are to him far dearerthan life itself, to relate the true facts and opinions here presented.This is done in the hope that the proper military authorities will takesteps to prevent further injustice to the regiment.
Again he would like to emphasize the evident possibility that the TheatreCommander did not have time to evaluate the details concerning the welfareof one regiment when many more important and pressing matters concerningthe success of the war in this theatre occupied and still occupy his attention.Information concerning the fitness of the regiment may have been inaccuratelypresented to him. This statement is made because in the evaluation of thepsychological as well as physical disintegration of the men of the regiment,implications could be drawn from the many uncomplimentary remarks concerningthe theatre generals, that some intent other than that of presenting theactual influences upon the men has been insinuated. No such other intentis implied. It is entirely in keeping with the true intent of this appealto higher authority that the proper military authority to remedy the situationmay and should in all justice be within the Theatre Command itself.
E. It is realized by all concerned that the many stupendous problemsof training, transporting, equipping and feeding the regiment, and of maintaininga supply of ammunition and food and medical and other supplies under junglewarfare conditions were solved for the most part with the great efficiencycommon to all American forces at home and abroad. These fighting forcesare known the world over for their excellence in training and stamina incombat, and for the abundance of the latest and best arms and ammunitionand plentiful food and medical and other supplies. American forces arealso known for the excellent treatment their sick and wounded receive andfor the generous recognition and treatment of men who have been
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through long and arduous campaigns. We of "Merrill's Marauders"of 5307 being a composite and a provisional outfit assigned as we wereto a specially long and most hazardous mission, have been forced to arriveat the unanimous conclusion that the treatment we have received duringthe second half of the Burma campaign and since most of us have been backin India is far below best American standards. Being rated as a 100% volunteeroutfit and having a record of several successful missions behind us climaxingan average of two years of continuous foreign duty, we believe that wedeserve thorough and highly specialized medical care and enough rest infavorable surroundings to enable us to become fit for combat again. Thelatest steps taken to groom us for almost immediate combat in the nextmonth or two are quite the opposite from the treatment we have a rightto expect and most certainly deserve.
F. The writer does not lay claim to a full knowledge of the causes ofall the various instances bearing upon the physical and mental conditionof the men as presented in this paper. The individuals responsible no doubtfelt that they were justified under the circumstances to act as they haveacted. However, the writer does claim that whatever the causes were andno matter how justified they may have been or still may be, the end resultis that of rendering the men physically and mentally unfit for combat orduty of any kind for many months to come.
Recommendations.--That the entire personnel of the 2nd Battalionas well as that of the 1st and 3rd Battalions of 5307 Composite Unit (Provisional)who took part in the Burma Campaign as "Merrill's Marauders"be returned to the continental United States for thorough medical studyand treatment and a prolonged rest of from two to three months before reassignmentand return to active duty.
HENRY G. STELLING
Captain, M.C.
Three responses to the reports of Hopkins and Stelling were writtenin 1944. General Boatner wrote to Stilwell that Combat Command Headquartershad sent Theater Headquarters three reports from Galahad medical officers."Two," he continued, "were more or less constructive inspirit but one was most destructive." He then called Stilwell's attentionto the remarks of Colonel Hunter regarding the "officer authors ofthe worse reports." They had "been made available for reassignment."143
143Letter, Boatner to Stilwell, 4 Oct. 1944,Stilwell Papers, Folder 204. Boatner does not name the authors on whomhis judgment is rendered, but there can be little doubt that the two whodisturbed him least were Hopkins and Kolodny.
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Colonel Hunter, to whom Hopkins and Stelling had sent their reports,wrote as follows:144
"1. These reports are transmitted as a matter of interest.
"2. I concur in those parts of the report where the reportingofficer drew conclusions as a medical officer.
"3. Captain Stelling is an unquestionably fine surgeon and devotedto his work and to his men. This officer has been reported by this headquartersas available for reassignment. It has been my observation that conscientiousmedical officers especially the young ones are deeply affected by the destructionof human life caused by modern war. This report will illustrate the effectand should be read with the understanding that the report itself is thebest evidence of the mental state of the reporting officer."
The most extensive evaluation of Hopkins' report was that of Col.Tracy S. Voorhees, of the Judge Advocate General's office. He was sentto the Theater in the late spring to investigate the medical supply system.In his final report, he observed that other matters of interest to theMedical Department inevitably had come to his attention. One of them wasthe medical history of the 5307th, in general, and the reports of Hopkins,in particular. His statement to The Surgeon General was dated 16 August1944, early enough to be derived from fresh observation and interviews,but late enough to describe the terminal procedures carried out in andfor the 5307th.
The Voorhees Report: "The ControversyAffecting Merrill's Marauders, 5307th Composite
Provisional Unit"
1. The serious morale situation affecting this organization and themedical controversy which raged about it came to my attention first fromthe surgeon of one of the three battalions of the Raiders; second, fromColonel Armstrong, who investigated the complaints made by the above officer;third, from Colonel Ravdin, Commanding Officer of the 20th General Hospital;and fourth, from conversation with various enlisted men who were in theRaiders.
2. The release by the War Department of the story carried in the pressof 6 August has brought this matter to light. Later information indicatesthat a Senate Committee may investigate it. Especially on this accountyou may desire to have all available facts. The following information is,of course, partial only.
3. Captain Hopkins, a battalion surgeon of the 5307th, to whom I wasintroduced when just about to board a plane at Agra on 5 July, handed me
1441st Indorsement, Hq 475th Infantry to CG5332d Brigade, Stilwell Papers, Folder 88, section 1. The typescript hasbeen altered to read: "This report is * * *," suggesting thatStelling's report was being temporarily held back or passed on withoutcomment. The next indorsements from 5332d Headquarters list the Stellingand Kolodny reports along with the Hopkins report.
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a paper which he requested that I bring personally to The Surgeon General.Later examination showed that the paper was a very serious criticism, withdetailed factual information supporting it. Captain Hopkins' battalionwas, as I recollect it, "C" Battalion. According to this statement,many of these men then on duty in the Pacific, volunteered for this unitunder representations that it was to be a Commando outfit. It indicatedthat many were not in good physical condition at that time, had undergonelong campaigns, had malaria, etc. The report reviewed the training in Indiaand the campaign, the very extensive illness, the alleged failure in Commandto protect the men adequately or to relieve them when ill. (From this orother sources I learned that out of an original strength of 4,700, Merrill'sMarauders, although losing only 32 killed in battle, wound up with a strengthof less than 100 able to fight.) The report went through various promisesmade or understood to have been made to the men, the breaking of such promises,and the deterioration of morale. It was addressed directly to The SurgeonGeneral, not through channels.
4. I spoke to Colonel Armstrong as to this report, and learned thatanother copy had come into his possession; that he had made a thoroughinvestigation of it, and had, as the Acting Theater Surgeon, sought a personalmeeting with General Stilwell to discuss it, but that General Stilwellhad declined to see him. Colonel Armstrong felt that he had taken adequateaction in regard to the Hopkins report. Such action included the following:
a. He had informed Hopkins of the proper military channels for forwardingsuch a report.
b. He had directed Hopkins to withdraw all copies of the report, allbut one being in his possession at that time (that one was presumably theone which I had).
c. Colonel Armstrong had shown the report to the Theater G-1, who promisedan investigation of the morale problems involved.
d. Theater Headquarters had assured that the two-year rotation programwould be applied to Merrill's Marauders, and that between 700 and 800 wouldbe rotated shortly, probably by air.
e. All hospitals are recommending return to U.S. for hospitalizationof all cases of chronic malaria and amoebiasis. They feel that repeatedcases warrant return. All chronic malaria cases having (1) chronic splenomegaly,(2) chronic anemia, (3) residual cerebral symptoms of psychoneurosis asa result of worry from repeated attacks are being returned to U.S. Returningmen to combat service, without any of the above findings, even though theyhave had malaria ten times, does not, in the opinion of Colonel [FrancisC.] Wood, Chief of the Medical Service, 20th General Hospital, jeopardizethe future health of the individual.
f. A convalescent and reconditioning camp, under command and technicalsupervision of the 14th Evacuation Hospital at Ledo Area, has been established.Men here will be carried as "Hospital", reconditioning will besupervised by medical officers, but discipline and actual reconditioningby line officers of Northern Combat Area Command (NCAC). No patient willbe marked "Duty" until fit for combat.
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g. General Boatner of NCAC gave assurance that all of the 5307th willbe pulled out of Myitkyina as soon as replacements are available, and [kept]no longer than one [more] month.
h. The Surgeon of NCAC was directed to instruct all his MCs to ceaseevacuating non-medical cases (fatigue cases) from combat areas but to makesuch recommendations to their commanding officers as they deem appropriate.This is upon the basis that evacuation of "tired" is the functionof command but that recommendations by MCs are appropriate.
5. Colonel Armstrong, in discussing the Hopkins report with me, alsoindicated that Medical Department officers in Merrill's Marauders had beenat fault in diagnosing cases as unfit for duty which the facts did notjustify, and that this had been done because of sympathy for the men.
6. Colonel Ravdin, Commanding Officer of the 20th General, had beenone of the medical officers put under pressure to return troops to dutyeven if considered by him medically unfit. One officer responsible forsuch pressure was a Colonel Bradsher. Colonel Ravdin refused to take suchaction and was told that he would answer for this directly to General Stilwell.He wrote to General Stilwell explaining his position. Later he was orderedto Myitkyina where General Stilwell apologized to him for the other orders,saying that he had not known of them, and that Colonel Ravdin's actionhad been correct.
7. With knowledge of all of the above factors, I did not feel that itwas right to bring the Hopkins report out of the Theater unless consentwere given by the proper authorities there to do so. I had at the earliestopportunity informed Colonel Armstrong that I had a copy of the report.It was clear that he did not feel that the report should be brought outof the Theater. In this I felt he was justified since it was not made throughchannels and there was, therefore, no opportunity for the other side ofthe case to be stated. Further, it was no part of my business to becomeinvolved in the controversy over the report. Since I could not return thereport to Captain Hopkins, I burned it and sent a message to Captain Hopkinsthat after studying the report, I felt it improper to bring it out of theTheater; that I had no way to return it to him and was therefore destroyingit.
8. I took this course with some reluctance as the document was a mostremarkable one and contained a most informative statement with persuasiveinternal evidence of being an accurate and fair review of the circumstances.
9. Captain Hopkins was relieved of his post as Combat Surgeon, and was,I believe, assigned or about to be assigned to a hospital, but it was laterdetermined to return him to the United States. On his return an interviewwith him by a representative of The Surgeon General's Office might giveconsiderable enlightening information.
10. I also met at various places men of the 5307th Unit. The attitudeof all was the same. They swore by Merrill as being the finest CommandingOfficer in the world, and were against everybody else. They felt that theyhad been very badly treated and repeatedly let down by their country. Itappeared that they had been first promised that they would be taken outof the line on 15 May. Then they were told that they must capture the Myitkyina
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air strip and would then be relieved. They did this and were then toldthat they must capture the town of Myitkyina and they would then be relieved.They did this,145 and then the Chinese took over and they lostthe town again. Those of the Raiders still able to fight were apparentlyleft in the line. I was told from independent sources that General Merrillstated that he had made the definite promise to the men that they wouldbe relieved by 15 May. General Merrill was taken ill in the Spring andwas in the hospital (the 20th General). I believe that this was in April.It was at first thought that he had a coronary attack. The final diagnosisI do not know, but he was in the hospital again later and was found physicallyunfit for any field duty.
TRACY S. VOORHEES
Colonel, J.A.G.D.
Director, Control Division.
Post mortem dissections of 5307th usually concentrate upon the heart.The Marauders decry the heartlessness of senior officers, and attributethe demise of the 5307th to harsh and fraudulent autocracy. But observersoutside the force blame the Marauders themselves for the misery at Myitkyina.The breakdown of morale, according to this viewpoint, determined the Marauders'fate. The diagnosis: heart failure.
Can it not be argued, however, that such explanations only tell uswhen the 5307th revealed that it could no longer fight? They donot tell us why they collapsed. What reached Myitkyina in H, K,and M Forces was not the 5307th but a rapidly decomposing corpse. The painfulcontroversies that arose late in May were quarrels about what should bedone with the body and whether someone should be tried for murder. The5307th which marched through Ledo past the 20th General Hospital in Februarywas spare, uncouth, tough. The Marauders unloaded at the hospital gatesin June were "gaunt, famished, grimy, tattered, and worn out physicallyand psychologically."146 Eye-witness descriptionsof their arrival at Myitkyina are similar; what happened beforeMyitkyina had been decisive.
The 5307th of February, March, and April had evacuated relativelyfew of its sick and not even all of its wounded. As soon as the Maraudersreached Myitkyina, they sought hospitalization "wholesale." Theirdeterioration proved to be as irreversible as decay in human flesh. The5307th that fought at Walawbum, Shaduzup, and Inkangahtawng had moved inand out of combat positions aggressively and speedily. The Marauders whoreached Myitkyina--about half those who started the march--could barelyfall into defensive perimeter positions or drag away to safety when orderedto withdraw. After a few days even the
145Chinese elements of H Force reached theoutskirts and railroad station of Myitkyina on 17 and 18 May, but theywere so disorganized that they abandoned the positions. The 5307th troopsthen at Myitkyina included only the 3d Battalion. Thus, the version ofthe battle given to Voorhees appears misleading. Otherwise, the accuracyof Voorhees' report testifies to what must have been an extraordinary capacityto get at the truth of the problems he examined, and do so very quickly.
14620th General Hospital Annual Report, 1944, p. 2.
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desperately worried Task Force commanders were willing to exchangethe inefficiency of green replacements and engineers for the deathbed struggleof the Marauders. The 5307th did die of heart failure at Myitkyina, asall human organisms die utterly when the heart stops surging. But the mostimportant question remains: what destroyed the Marauder heart?
The chief causes of the disaster were environmental, tactical, andmedical in nature. The environment was crowded with impediments to tacticaloperations and hazards to health. The tactical deployment of the 5307thas a long-range penetration force and, especially, as a static defensiveforce at Nphum Ga, demanded unusual discipline and physical prowess. Themedical imperfections and sanitary defects of the Marauders, in the menacingenvironment and under such tactical strains, produced the physical collapsewhich occurred before the battle of Myitkyina. Injudicious promises andfalse expectations, the severity of enemy action late in the campaign,the disappointing performance of Chinese troops at Myitkyina--all theselowered the Marauders' morale and operational effectiveness. But the 5307thmight have withstood them creditably had it not been fatally injured byenvironmental deprivation, tactical misfortune, and medical demolition.
The social and physical environment of North Burma was inhospitablein peace and hostile in war. Except for the Kamaing Road, jungle trails,many barely passable for native villagers, served as lines of communication.Troops marching on them found their way hindered by numerous watercoursesand thickets. Much of the terrain was hilly, with sharp ascents, complicatedridge lines, and steep declivities. Isolated forces, such as the BritishChindits, the 5307th, and various other flanking parties, required superbstamina merely to reach their destinations with energy to spare for combat.
Environmental threats to health were numerous. The climate was disagreeable:excessively warm and humid much of the time, often rainy in the spring.In it thrived all the insect pests and carriers of disease organisms: flies,mosquitoes, gnats, mites, and ticks. The inhabitants, few though they were,provided hosts to spare for the parasites that produced malaria and otherfevers, and all forms of dysentery. The ground was infested, the waterpolluted, the air debilitating, the terrain exhausting.
Many men in 5307th were well acclimated to tropical and subtropicalconditions. Third Battalion troops had served in the Pacific area, andthe 2d Battalion was composed mainly of men from Caribbean stations. Allwere in India for nearly 4 months before they began their combat missions.They trained in a region which possessed some of the physical featuresof the combat zone and most of its sanitary defects. As a result the 5307thencountered only two unpredicted environmental hazards. One was the unexpectedseverity of the Kumon Mountain trails that led to Myitkyina. Their rain-soakedcondition and steep grades made them much worse than any which
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the Marauders had encountered before. The endurance of the men wouldhave been risked even if they had made the march when they were fresh.The other unpleasant surprise was the mite-infested ground where lurkedthe carriers of scrub typhus organisms. By February 1944, it was knownthat North Burma harbored the disease. Certain types of terrain were suspected,but no advance information could be secured regarding sites of possibledanger.
When in comparable situations, enemy and Allied forces reacted inthe same ways to the environment. The Chindits of 1943 lasted about 3 monthsbehind enemy lines. The Japanese, having plunged into jungle and hillycountry west of the Chindwin early in 1944, deteriorated rapidly as theyretreated after 3 months of strenuous maneuver and combat. The 14th and16th Brigades of Wingate's Special Force became ineffective in a littleshorter time, while the 77th and 111th Brigades survived over 4 monthsbefore approaching the point of futility. The environmental toll in eachcase was usurious: antipathy to the point of nausea and despondency, disgustand lethargy, tension and fatigue.
Other troops than penetration forces, however, submitted to the sameenvironment for longer periods of time. The second factor, tactical disposition,must therefore be taken into account in explaining the 5307th collapse.From the time they left Ledo in January until 10 April, after the battleof Nphum Ga, the 5307th was in motion or in combat continuously. The numberof days of "rest" did not amount to as much as a week, and theywere used to assemble the troops after a battle, gather supplies, evacuatecasualties, and overhaul equipment and weapons.
A longer interval for rest followed the siege of Nphum Ga. For many,however, the period was one of recovery from acute exhaustion and illness.For all, anxiety regarding the future prevented relaxation. After 10 days,patrol activity commenced and the troops formed up for the march to Myitkyina.Thereafter there were no respites. For 4 months, then, with negligibleintervals, the 5307th was constantly engaged. It could not have been otherwise,if the force was to serve the purposes for which it had been created, penetrationand flanking operations designed to divert enemy strength from the defensesopposing the Chinese Army in the Hukawng and Mogaung Valleys.
Weight loss and fatigue were direct consequences of penetration marches.The isolation of 5307th required it to subsist for 4 months on airdroppedrations. Although the K-ration proved to be the best combat food pack yetdevised, monotony, personal preferences, and occasionally, scarcity ledto dietary insufficiency. As long as it had to maneuver out of reach ofground supply lines, the 5307th could do nothing to improve the quantityand quality of its food supply. That the regiment withstood the rigorouscampaign as well as it did was a credit to the combat ration. But it couldnot stave off or reverse a steady loss of weight and energy in the troops.
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The need for mobility and stealth in tactical maneuvers added tothe discomforts and dangers in the environment. Strict limits on the baggagetrain prevented the troops from equipping themselves with extra boots andclothes, antimosquito gear, or improved jungle bedding. Such aids to health,comfort, and endurance were sacrificed to speed. Similarly, their tacticaldisposition forced them to depend upon the least certain of water sanitationprocedures. Boiling water usually was impractical; there was too littletime or too much chance of enemy observation. Bulky water purificationequipment could not be transported. The standard Lyster bag used in bivouacwas not always accessible to all the troops. They depended mainly on individualuse of chlorinating tablets for water safety.
The effects of environmental and tactical strain accumulated noticeablyin March. But the most striking consequences of tactical operations appearedwhen the 5307th, by necessity and not by choice, was forced to stand still.Facing an emergency and with no other troops to turn to, Stilwell orderedthe Marauders to defend the trail up which the enemy had sent a flankingcolumn. At Nphum Ga, the troops trained and inured to the derring-do ofpenetration tactics, submitted to "a static defensive role [which]was a radical change in the concept of [their] employment."147One battalion under siege, a second trying to rescue it, and a third scramblingto reinforce, the 5307th adjusted to the new role successfully, but ata fatal cost.
The force was too lightly armed, too isolated, and too oriented tohit-and-run tactics to undertake a prolonged defensive engagement. Similarly,the British 77th Brigade in the later days at White City and outside Mogaung,and the 111th Brigade at Blackpool fought well in a static situation, butthey too emerged from such battles more severely damaged than from anysequence of rigorous marching and daring attack. Even troops outside thedefensive perimeter were afflicted. The 77th "flyer column" circlingWhite City; 3d Battalion, 5307th, attacking day after day up the trailfrom Hsamshingyang; and 1st Battalion making forced marches to reach NphumGa--each suffered exceptionally from its effort to support the troops whowere pinned down defensively.
Disease as well as enemy fire fell more heavily than ever beforeon the Marauders at Nphum Ga. For the 5307th to pass through contaminatedterrain on the march was dangerous enough. To occupy such areas for dayson end was lethal. First, it became impossible to escape thorough exposureto possible sources of disease. Second, the troops contaminated themselves.Thus the deserted villages of Hsamshingyang and Nphum Ga, sites alreadysufficiently risky, became saturated with insect pests and disease organismsproduced in decaying animals and men, foul water, and fecal wastes. Mentalhealth, too, was imperiled, for the troops on the hill were hemmed in withouta line of supply,
147Romanus and Sunderland, II, p. 182. In 1947,the editor emphasized the unfortunate consequences of the defensive battle:Stone, "The Marauders and the Microbes."
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evacuation, or retreat. Their casualties accumulated on the spot,visible and pitiable testaments to the waste of battle and the fate thatmight befall the entire force. Scrub typhus appeared. Malaria recurrencesflared up ominously. The diarrheas and dysenteries became rampant. Chronicdisabilities took acute forms. When the siege lifted, the men nearly collapsedwith exhaustion and sickness. Special medical facilities were introduced.Evacuations exploded into the hundreds.148
Thus, fostered by environmental conditions and tactical malfunctions,the Marauders' worst enemy, disease, attacked with frightening speed. Hadit not been for sickness, a very respectable force of at least 2,300 wouldhave remained after the battle of Nphum Ga. Enemy action had produced nowherenear the predicted losses.149 Even without the killed,wounded, and missing, the force would have had as much strength as it hadever needed for its successful roadblock attacks. Reinforced by Chinesetroops for the march to Myitkyina, the 5307th would have been strongerthan before, if enemy action alone had been the chief cause of its depletion.
At this juncture, the Marauders received a heavy blow to morale.They learned they were called on for one last effort, one they felt exceededthe terms of campaigning set for them originally and justified by commonsense. Not only was the demand unfair, but, they added, many of them weretoo exhausted or too sick to go on. Their grievances and illnesses reinforcedone another. Total breakdown of the force seemed imminent. But some tensionbecame dissipated when the troops attached their animosity to Stilwelland other invisible authorities; their confidence in Merrill and Hunterrevived; and their morale lifted enough for most of them to start for Myitkyina,reluctantly but in good faith. Their health, too, temporarily improved.Vigorous medication and a partial respite from tactical maneuvers broughtunder control the most acute manifestations of disease. But with its residualmalnutrition and enfeeblement, infection and infestation, the 5307th inMay was very different from the force that had started the long junglecampaign in February.
One misleading feature of the crisis in health was the apparent suddennesswith which it arose. Commanders--especially those at a distance--mightwell suppose it was the specific result of a single severe engagement.If so, rapid recovery could be predicted. So late in an arduous campaign,complete rehabilitation would be impossible, but
148Romanus and Sunderland, II, pp. 189-191,point out that exhaustion and the deterioration of morale were the worstresults of the battle. The editor adds emphasis to the outbreak of disease,in the light of the testimony of Hopkins and Stelling, miscellaneous evidenceon the medical history of 5307th, and, by comparison, the experience ofthe Chindits (see With Wingate's Chindits).
149According to the official report, Merrill's Marauders,p. 114, the Theater had predicted 35 percent losses to enemy action and50 percent losses to disease. Up to the march on Myitkyina, enemy actionhad produced 11.2 percent loss, and the evacuation of nonbattle casualtieshad reduced the force by 18.6 percent. To this point, then, the campaignwas running nearly true to expectations. The ominous sign was in the nonbattlecasualties requiring evacuation in April--304 compared to the 200 evacuatedin the preceding 2 months together. These calculations are made from figuresin "Casualty Report," 5 July 1944, Stilwell Papers, Folder 204.
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it seemed likely that the force could regain strength enough fora final all-out effort. The troops might think otherwise. But as to that,Stilwell had already openly expressed suspicion that the men and theirofficers were "soft" about health. Although the regiment hadshown enough durability to quiet such doubts, they were too habitual andtraditional among commanders to be completely allayed. But such assessmentsof the situation, although they stiffened resolves to send the Maraudersto Myitkyina, failed to recognize the medical background and history of5307th. The outbreak of disease at Nphum Ga was not merely a special emergency.It was produced by physical liabilities of long standing; preventable faultsin medical discipline; and the accumulating disabilities of the hostileenvironment, the tactical experience of long-range jungle penetration,and the defense at Nphum Ga.
From the first day it reached India, 5307th showed its lack of thesuperior physical capacities specified for it. After assembling the volunteersand again after debarking, command authorities failed to disengage menphysically unfit for the strain of jungle combat. Some men with chronicsickness or permanent disability were cleared from the force during theperiod of staging and training, but some returned and some were taken outof their rear echelon posts to serve as replacements at Myitkyina. To burdenthe 5307th with such troops was foolish and unnecessary. Even those ableto participate in the beginning phase of the campaign were potential casualtiesliable to break down at a crucial moment.
An equally unsatisfactory feature of the troops who composed 5307thwas their high sick rate. On shipboard, malaria, dysentery, and respiratoryinfections were excessive and evidently likely to become long-term risks.The first two of these diseases flared up periodically during the preparatoryperiod in India. Malaria became so common that the regiment interruptedtraining to treat it. Outbreaks of bacillary dysentery occurred, the continuedincidence of amebic dysentery produced alarm, and the diarrheas never disappeared.In addition to inhibiting troop activity, such conditions testified topoor health in the past and to inadequate sanitary discipline in the present.
The treatment of enteric disorders posed no peculiar problems. Theessential task was to prevent their recurrence and to relieve the men fromlong-continued drains on their energy. To do so required careful attentionto sanitation. Unfortunately, in both the camps which 5307th occupied inIndia, sanitary facilities were wretched, and food supplies from localsources were medically unacceptable. Command concern, aroused by medicalofficers, came late. Thus, remediable faults in sanitation led to new intestinaldisorders in the regiment. Many men lost training opportunities and didnot store up strength for the campaign to come. Worse, the 5307th carriedinto the jungle its own sources of recontamination, as well as the naggingburden of diarrhea and dysentery. The climax came at Nphum Ga, where 2dBattalion could not provide itself with adequate field sanitation, and3d Battalion, fighting
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every day to reach Nphum Ga, had no time to spare for sanitary protection.The outbreak of dysentery was virtually inevitable.
There are no signs that the 5307th improved on the average poor standardsof British and American troops in respect to field sanitation. The mannerof their deployment made difficult the enforcement of disciplinary regulationsor the provision of self-regulating equipment. Some hints from the scenesuggest, indeed, that the troops adopted primitivism as a sign of a formidablecharacter. In some degrees, thus, did they cooperate with environmentaland tactical impediments to cleanliness, proper waste disposal, the eliminationof flies, and the safety of food and water. With regard to food they wereprobably better off than many troops in fixed camps, where native marketsand food-handlers were a constant source of enteric disease. The problemof water purification was another story, however. The troops necessarilydepended on open water sources, all of which were rightly assumed to becontaminated with intestinal disease organisms. Among these were the encystedform of E. histolytica, the cause of amebic dysentery.
To guard their water, the men were required to add chlorinating tabletsto their canteens and Lyster bags. Failures to achieve satisfactory resultswere certain to occur. The unpleasant taste of overchlorinated water encouragedthe use of dosages under, rather than on, the safe side. The delay neededto allow chlorinating tablets to work effectively was an annoyance. Theappeal of a sparkling stream, the temporary unavailability of halazonetablets, or simple carelessness--all together admitted many chances thatthe men would consume contaminated water. That they did so, in fact, wasshown by the wide and persistent spread of diarrhea and the intermittentupsurge of bacillary dysentery.
With amebic dysentery the case was somewhat different--and all themore menacing. The orthodox view was that chlorination could not kill amebiccysts. Only special filtration devices or boiling, followed by normal chlorinationpractices, sufficed. It is true that research reports had appeared in 1943and in January 1944, suggesting that superchlorination destroyed cysts.Few medical officers knew of these reports. From one standpoint, it madelittle difference, because the 9th Medical Laboratory in CBI later showedthat the research had been faulty.150 Boiling water wasimpractical and the use of special filters was impossible, so the 5307thwas inevitably threatened by waterborne amebic dysentery.
From another standpoint, however, even a false promise that chlorinationcould check amebiasis would have been valuable. Of all the dysenteriesthis form was most feared. It was the commonest of be-
150Van Auken, "History of Preventive Medicine,"pp. 136-141. Hopkins, composing his "Notes" before the researchon chlorination had been challenged, believed that "better halazonediscipline" would have helped greatly to prevent amebic dysentery.Halazone, he stated, "was used regularly but 30 minutes discipline[that is, delay between chlorination and consumption, as recommended bythe new research reports] was not universal": Hopkins Notes, p. 5.
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liefs that no one could escape diarrhea in the tropics: why try?Bacillary dysentery displayed such acute features that troops usually ascribedit to some particular and accidental source--"food poisoning."To deal with it by continuous and unglamorous measures of field and messsanitation awakened little permanent enthusiasm. But for reasons difficultto surmise, the troops were more easily aroused to the danger of amebicdysentery. One wonders whether the nationally-publicized outbreak fromcontaminated water in a Chicago hotel, not long before the war, helpedcall attention to the disease. In any case, superchlorination might havebeen undertaken for the sake of curbing amebiasis. While this goal couldnot have been attained, protection against other enteric disorders wouldhave been much increased.
Like amebic dysentery, respiratory and skin infections were difficultto prevent. The most desirable safeguards, shelter, prompt relief fromduty while under treatment, cleanliness, and better clothes and boots,were unattainable. Exposure, drenching, excessive fatigue were unavoidable.The strict evacuation policy, without which the 5307th could not have carriedout its tactical responsibilities, and the unrelenting harshness of theenvironment often permitted respiratory and skin ailments to become serious,chronic, or recurrent. Their effects, therefore, were bound to accumulate,and when they became widespread and deep-seated, the 5307th rapidly losteffectiveness.
Still less preventable was scrub typhus. For this serious diseasethe medical establishment had no specific remedy. Careful nursing and vigilanttreatment of symptoms gave the victim his best chance for recovery. Ifhe were in poor condition, beset by concomitant diseases, or not promptlyhospitalized, he probably would die. There were two protective measures.The first was to avoid sites infested by the mite which transmitted thedisease organism. But this the troops could hardly do because of ignoranceabout danger zones and because of tactical circumstances. The second wasto repel the mites chemically. The preferred insect repellent, dimethylphthallate, could be relied on for this purpose, but merely to apply theointment to hands and face was insufficient. To provide a fair measureof protection, the troops needed clothing that was frequently washed andimpregnated with the repellent. The supply system was too undeveloped toproduce such preventive measures for the 5307th, and recognition that theywere required awaited the Marauders' experience. Once understood, needled to deed. In the 5332d Brigade, successors to the 5307th, better selectionof campsites, repellent and clothing discipline, and the issue of treatedfield uniforms were introduced with some success.151
151Van Auken, op. cit., chapter XV.Local medical officers vigorously investigated the disease in 1943 andearly 1944. Late in that year a party from the U.S. Typhus Commission beganan extensive field study. When the disease appeared in the 5307th, CombatCommand advised medical officers to be alert to its symptoms and to evacuateits victims as soon as possible. They were sent a summary of availableinformation about the disease in North Burma, and troops were warned touse dimethyl phthallate liberally. In June, Myitkyina Task Force was orderedto spray the troops' clothing once a week with the repellent. In the samemonth, the new Theater Epidemiologist, Lt. Col. Kirk T. Mosley, launchedexperiments in the 102d Chemical Processing Company at Ledo to find outhow to impregnate clothing mechanically and in large quantities. Difficultiesin supplying clothing persisted. Efforts to have the troops do their laundryin soap-and-repellent solutions were not famously successful. Repellentand clothing discipline ebbed and rose according to the energies expendedby commanders to maintain it: Stone, Medical Service in Combat,III, pp. 215-219, with attendant citations of field memorandums, correspondence,and directives.
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With regard to malaria, the foremost cause of incapacity in 5307th,the story concerns control, rather than prevention or treatment of disease.The disease already was well established in 3d Battalion before the troopshad even landed in India. To what extent new infections occurred betweenFebruary and May is unknown. There is evidence that a significant numberof men came down with the disease for the first time in May and early June.The remainder--probably three-quarters of the unit--succumbed to recurrencesof old infections.
Attempts to prevent infection were unimpressive. Little had yet beendone in the Theater to establish environmental controls over mosquito carriers.There were millions of native hosts in India, and the 5307th itself providedboth victims and hosts as the force maneuvered in Burma. Repellents andmosquito bars were unpopular. To require troops to use them diligentlyrequired more command supervision and discipline than could be expected.Infection and reinfection, therefore, were the likely results of operationsin the jungle. Herein the experience of American, British, and Japanesetroops in Burma was identical.
In most cases malaria was readily treated by standardized coursesof medication with quinine or Atabrine. The real problem was to do so withoutevacuating the patient to a hospital, and yet have a fair prospect of clearingthe pathogenic plasmodia from his bloodstream. The 5307th, like the Chindits,tried to treat malaria patients on the trail and to reserve evacuationfor any who developed cerebral malaria or who failed to respond to extendedAtabrine therapy. In principle, no distinctions were made between men withnew infections and those who had had numerous recurrences. Practically,it is probable that the latter received some benefit of doubt from theirmedical officers.
The main effort at controlling malaria was devoted to Atabrine suppressivediscipline. Many had been introduced to the system of self-administrationof a tablet a day, which had been developed in the Pacific theaters. Atabrinediscipline was neglected, however, until the disease brought training toa standstill. Thereafter, suppressive practices apparently held up welluntil the battle of Nphum Ga. By then some cases were "breaking through"on the march, and they became very numerous during and immediately afterthe siege. Evacuations and medication produced some relief. But as thetroops struggled over the trail to Myitkyina and lost momentum in the fightfor the town, malaria overwhelmed the force.
The most probable cause of the outbreak was a serious breach in
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Atabrine suppressive discipline. In the midst of a crisis in morale,such an explanation became especially convincing. Research evidence andpractical experience had shown repeatedly that a sustained suppressiveprogram was all but invulnerable to malaria "breakthrough." Ifthere might be a few cases of atypical response to Atabrine, it could safelybe predicted that suppressive discipline was more than adequate to protectthe bulk of the troops from chills and fever. The outbreak at Nphum Ga,however, revived old doubts. The unusual exhaustion of the men, the frequencywith which malaria was accompanied by another disease, and the number oflong-standing and recurrent infections led many to think it plausible thatmalaria had conquered the suppressive system.152
It is doubtful whether the command and the medical establishmentever regained control of the situation. Some semblance of Atabrine disciplinehad been reinstated before the march to Myitkyina began. But "breakthroughs"and new cases immediately appeared again. Those who did not fall by thewayside with malaria were thoroughly ill when they staggered into the aidstations at Myitkyina. Sent off after the usual onsite treatment, theysoon returned as sick as ever. Outraged by restrictions on evacuation andthe pressure to continue the campaign, genuinely dazed with fatigue andsuffering from other diseases, more and more men repudiated Atabrine therapy.The sicker they became, the lower fell their morale. The lower their morale,the less hope there was of restoring Atabrine discipline and curbing malaria.
Thus were the Marauders destroyed, not by misleadership, althoughit played a part in the closing phase of the disaster; nor by the enemy,although he put the 5307th to severe tests. Although it was from Myitkyinathat they were evacuated, their destruction occurred on the
152The research and controversies on Atabrinesuppression are discussed in connection with the Chindits, pp. 270-275;see also p. 24, for malaria in the American Army. Malaria control in CBIis treated in Van Auken, op. cit., chapter XII. The section on Atabrinein this chapter, by Col. Karl Lundeberg, the Theater Preventive MedicineConsultant, describes the vacillation in the Theater (echoing that in theWar Department as late in 1943), the preference for environmental controland for full therapy, and the cautious institution of suppressive discipline.He quotes "a very shrewd analysis" by Maj. Maurice Seltzer, theSOS Malariologist at Ledo, who wrote in June 1944:
"[I] undertook an informal survey by personal questioning of officersand men of the state of malaria discipline existing in the 5307th ProvisionalCombat Unit [sic] while under combat conditions. Briefly, it might be statedthat discipline was good during the first two months, especially as regardsatabrine administration. About the only lag was in the use of repellents.Shortly after the interval stated above, concomitant with increasing fatigue,[and] acquirement of other diseases, such as the dysenteries, morale beganto deteriorate and malaria discipline suffered greatly. No attention waspaid either to clothing, repellent, or the use of atabrine. As this processwent on, the impression of the medical officers was that a large numberof men deliberately exposed themselves or at least welcomed the incurrenceof malaria infection.
"It is conceivable that in situations such as the above, no matterhow elaborate and how perfect anti-malaria measures are, in the face ofa command that no longer has the desire to stay well, little can be done."
The Theater Surgeon, Lundeberg reported, was "hard pressed" toinsist upon Atabrine suppressive measures in the combat zone, in the faceof honest doubts and reports of toxic side-effects. Not until December1944, when the Surgeon toured the combat zone with officers who had first-handknowledge of the success of the policy in the Pacific, did real progressbegin. The ensuing publication of new directives and educational materials,and "a remarkable degree of command acceptance of responsibility"led in 1945 to success "beyond all expectations": Van Auken,pp. 241-245.
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hilltop at Nphum Ga, and on the ridges and jungle trails leadingto Myitkyina airfield. Of the three chief causes of the regiment's collapse,the environment was the underlying cause; the tactical disposition wasthe sustaining and, in the static engagement of Nphum Ga, the precipitatingcause; and the invasion of the troops by disease was the final and decisivecause. To an unknown extent, the Marauders helped their enemies by theirloose sanitary practices, by command ineptness in supporting the medicalestablishment, and by defiance of Atabrine suppressive discipline. Theywere no more guilty of these defects than most troops.153But had they been better trained and better disciplined they might haveheld on long enough at Myitkyina to end their campaign in the sunshineof victory rather than in the twilight of recrimination.
The military record of the 5307th was a variable function of itsmedical history. It bore up under environmental strains. It put its tacticalopportunities to good use. The injuries it inflicted on the enemy outnumberedten to one the injuries it received. But in the end, amoebae and plasmodia,bacteria and rickettsia, rather than Japanese soldiers, vanquished Merrill'sMarauders.
153Hopkins concluded in his "Notes,"p. 5: "Strict suppressive atabrine use, better halazone discipline,dimethylphthallate impregnated clothes and replacements flown in by planeswhich evacuated patients would have prevented much disease, as well asmental and physical fatigue." He took pride in the thought that hisbattalion had held up as well or better than the others, despite the factthat it was heavily infected with malaria. "It is certainly a victoryfor atabrine * * * This is another case showing that malaria even withodds provided by chronic malaria, can be suppressed with great successby atabrine even under the severest conditions" (p. 4).
The experience of 5307th was reproduced elsewhere. As noted above, thecampaign against malaria lacked acceptable results until 1945, which isto say that indifferent practice of control discipline characterized thetroops of 5332d Brigade, among them former Marauders and "New Galahad"men in the 475th Infantry. The British Chindits were only a month behindthe 5307th in collapsing from malaria and other diseases. As for the enemy,intelligence reports indicated that sanitary policies were reasonably welldefined, but supplies and equipment became scarce in 1944. Prisoners reportedthat the Japanese in North Burma became increasingly plagued by malaria;many men had numerous recurrences. Quinine and Atabrine were in use assuppressants, but the dosages which were reported seemed inadequate.
Other prevalent diseases were beri-beri, diarrhea and dysentery, and skinailments. Prisoners complained about the medical service in North Burma.Some claimed patients died from want of medical assistance; others, thatonly patients too ill to march received care; another, that walking woundedwere kept with their sections in combat. "The Sgt. captured at Myitkyinaon 7 August stated that troops in that area were much dissatisfied withthe care given to the wounded and sick; wounded able to stand were forcedto go to the front. In the last stages of the Myitkyina battle, woundedwere killed to keep them from falling into enemy hands."
Inspections of medical installations revealed that inferior and improvisedfacilities were the rule. Supplies were scarce. Makeshift equipment wascommon. "Most of the med. units inspected after the evacuation containedJapanese dead lying on their beds, some with food at their sides, othersfully clothed who apparently had been trying to walk away. In a few unitsan occasional living patient was found. In others the dead had been shotthrough their heads. No evidences of medical personnel ever having beenleft behind to give care to the wounded were found."
The Japanese losses were heavy. In April, in the 55th Regiment, which the5307th met on the Kamaing Road and which later helped defend Myitkyina,one man in three had been a casualty. There had been 507 casualties duringthe month, 217 killed and wounded, and 290 sick. Among the sick, 156 hadmalaria; 75 had beri-beri. It may be noted that the number of battle casualtiesapproached the number of sick, as was true in 5307th before the march toMyitkyina. Thereafter the balance shifted radically in 5307th, as it had,late in the campaign, for all Chindit brigades except the 77th (see n.104, p. 252 and n. 105, p. 253). The source of the above information onJapanese medical history is from extracts of British Intelligence reportswhich the Historical Unit, Army Medical Service, kindly sent to the editor.
