History

Book Two

CHINESE LIAISON DETAIL

A Record of Tolerance

CHINESE LIAISON DETAIL

Walter S. Jones, M.D.

Summer, 1943, in India and Burma was a military nightmare--the sortin which the dreamer strains with agonizing futility toward a goal whichhe views with fascinated loathing. After the humiliating collapse of anoffensive in the Arakan, British morale sank to the bottom. Brigadier OrdeWingate led a hit-and-run brigade into Japanese territory, and he was eagerto go in again in 1944. For his troops, however, the experience had beenhorrifying. One-third of them never returned.

Relations between China and the United States seesawed between grudgingpartnership and outright hostility. At one point, Generalissimo Chiangdemanded the dismissal of General Stilwell, his Chief of Staff for Alliedoperations. True, Allied negotiations early in the year produced attractiveplans for logistical aid to China--an accelerated air supply program, theLedo Road through North Burma, petroleum pipelines, and enlargement ofGeneral Claire Chennault's Fourteenth Air Force in China. But althoughthese promises kept China in the game, the Generalissimo repeatedly lookedat his cards, threw down, and waited for a new deal.

In high places and low, Americans stared in disbelief at the disparitybetween the jobs to do and the tools with which to do them. Item: senda steady flow of supplies to the Chinese Government and armies throughthe archaic port of Calcutta, up the obsolete narrow gauge railroad andferryboat line in the Brahmaputra Valley, into depots to be built on airfieldsyet to be finished, over the Himalayas by air, and out, finally, throughmedieval channels of distribution to Chinese troops. Item: improve theChinese Army by concentrating 300,000 ill-organized and demoralized cooliesin uniform, feeding, clothing, housing, and healing them according to standardssomewhat resembling those of modern times, training or retraining them,creating a will to fight, and leading them into contact with the enemy.To tackle such tasks would be quixotic, under the best of conditions.

But time was short. No one could safely assume that Japan would remaincontent with her easy conquests of Burma and East China. Supplies, equipment,and weapons were scarce. Without them, the manpower of China and Indiawas almost an embarrassment. China and the United States were sworn partners,yet hardly an officer or soldier in the Chinese and American Armies couldexchange a half-dozen intelligible words. As for the environment--geographyhad always forbidden humans to inhabit much of the region except on themost primitive and pathetic terms. Not a step forward could be

taken that was not in the direction of jungle, mountain, mud, heat, rain, and disease.

Nevertheless, there were brave plans. The efforts of 1943 were to presage the reconquest of Burma in 1944. By extraordinary persistence, Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten and General Stilwell conjured the Generalissimo into an agreement to commit a significant number of his troops to a North Burma campaign. General Wingate was to lead a second expedition into Central Burma. And British forces were to launch amphibious assaults on the Andaman Islands and lower Burma. Then, at Tehran, in December, Marshal Stalin promised to take Russia into the war against Japan as soon as Germany surrendered. In a few hours Churchill and Roosevelt cut back the Burma plan. Why waste effort in the Far East, delay victory in Europe, and postpone the thrust of Russia's might against Japan? They did not entirely abandon India and China. They retained their earlier intention to reconquer Burma and improve China's political and military condition. But they once again confined Far Eastern measures within limits that might make them indecisive, at best, and unnecessary, at worst.

The men in Burma in 1943 thus fell between the millstones of obduratecircumstances and dubious prospects. Their immediate task was to get downinto North Burma. Approximately 275 miles of road were required to connectLedo, India, with existing routes to China. New construction would be neededfor about half the distance, and major improvements of existing trailsand cart-tracks tbereafter. Waiting for them was the 18th Divisionof the 15th Japanese Army. Three other divisions were availableif the 18th had any trouble blocking off North Burma while the mainJapanese forces assembled to attack India.

All summer American, Chinese, and Indian troops and laborers toiledon the Road. The 38th and 22d Chinese Divisions trained at Ramgarh, India,and then occupied final staging positions north of the Hukawng Valley inBurma. What was the consequence of these efforts of 1943? By the end ofthe year, a barely passable road trace reached to Shingbwiyang. But Shingbwiyangwas only one-third along the required distance to be traversed by the surveyors,cat operators, and 'dozers. What of the Chinese infantry, out in frontof the engineers? After their first contact with enemy outposts below Shingbwiyang,the Chinese lay in foxholes, wasting away the winter in false alarms, patrols,and vacillation. One battalion managed to think itself surrounded by athin line of enemy patrols, and it sorrowfully subsisted for 2 months onairdropped supplies.

Sergeant Fromant and his men at North Tirap Aid Station representone facet of the struggle against futility in Burma. For them and for thousandsduring the war, the problem was to accommodate to relatively static circumstances.Whatever deprivation, isolation, or desolation; whatever tedium of dailyroutine, fatigue, exasperation

with the sheer brutishness of weather and things, theirs was not the final responsibility nor the final failure or success. To achieve balance, serenity, patience, and to retain enough resiliency to accept change when change came--this was their merit. Clerks, mechanics, and warehouse laborers, radio repairmen and truck drivers, laboratory technicians and hospital ward orderlies, weather observers, crane operators, railroad brakemen, cooks, and all the corporals and sergeants who supervised them--by the thousands throughout India and the rear areas of the Burma combat zone, the Fromants and Lotzes watched and worked and waited.

But what of those who passed through and were off to the East, where planes were loaded and took flight for China, where engineer regiments and quartermaster battalions and signal wire crews disappeared in the Naga Hills and leech-infested jungle? What was their story? Those dysentery cases, those fever-shaken Chinese, those limping GI's--where had they been that a mud-floored, thatched-roof bamboo hospital ward was a haven, and a regular diet of Spam a reward?

Maj. Walter S. Jones, a gynecologist from Providence, was one ofthose who headed down the Ledo Road in the summer of 1943. The 48th EvacuationHospital with which he came to India was a semi-mobile unit, designed toback up such forward medical installations as the battalions and fieldhospitals. As the Ledo Road progressed and Chinese troops went into battle,the 48th and 73d Evacuation Hospitals (and the 14th which arrived soonafterward) were to provide relatively complete hospital facilities forlarge numbers of patients. But in the early months of 1943, neither roadconstruction nor combat forces required such support. It soon appearedto Jones that temporary and miscellaneous duties would be assigned to thestaff of the 48th. After casting a skeptical eye at several such possibilities,and by taking account of his boyhood experiences as the son of a missionaryin China, he quickly secured an assignment which promised action and interest.In a matter of days, he was out on the Road, attached to the l0th ChineseEngineer Regiment as its medical adviser.

Chinese Liaison Detail is the account Jones wrote almost 2 yearslater of his adventures. For adventures they were--to an adventurer. Theferocious conditions of weather and terrain, the scarcity of provisionsand accommodations, the hazards to health seemed to be challenges to him.For months he kept moving up and down the trails and road trace, searchingout suitable sites for jungle hospitals, sizing up the quality of the servicesbeing provided by American and Chinese medical units, and serving as the"eyes" of the Base Headquarters Surgeon. Where his duties didnot take him his curiosity did. He not only mingled with the troops onthe road but he often took a storyteller's interest in their personalities,biographies, and achievements. And to these acquisitions of experienceand lore, his sharp eyes and scholarly habits added information about geography,history, and cul-

ture of North Burma. The result is a hitherto unequaled narrative about the Ledo Road during the most arduous and speculative phase of its development.

Not unnoticed in his reminiscences are the medical features of the North Burma scene. Both in his text and in the appendixes he added, he outlined the essential problem: to institute and maintain sanitation and other disease prevention procedures among the troops on the road. Many of the required measures were elemental. The difficulty was to provide them among ignorant or indifferent troops, with few of the technical facilities which modern public health agencies take for granted, and under circumstances where only a reduction of health hazards--not their elimination--could be predicted.

Obviously, such matters were hardly central in Jones's training ingynecology, although they were, naturally, within the province of any medicalofficer. Yet his periodic reports to the commander of the 10th ChineseEngineers showed patient and persistent attention even to the least glamorousrequirements of camp sanitation and hygiene. Of the fact that he himselfsuffered from dysentery and malaria, the major diseases of the area, hecomplained not at all. But he recognized the special significance of hisencounter with scrub typhus. When so many facts about the disease werestill in doubt, any information which a scientific observer could providemight be of critical importance. Hence the value of his remarkable andunique account of the disease from the victim's vantage point. It deservesa place among the classics of medical literature.

Nor is the scrub typhus episode the only part of Chinese LiaisonDetail which possesses literary value. The zest which led Jones outamong the roadbuilders, and more than a little literary talent, producecolorful narrative, evocative exposition, and dramatic structure. It isfrom the latter, which is doubtless the least self-conscious feature ofthe narrative, that its ultimate strength derives. Schematically, ChineseLiaison Detail is governed by a single organizing principle. This principlecan be designated (in Jones's own term) as that of reconnaissance. Frombeginning to end, he tells the story of an exploratory journey. From Americato Bombay, Bombay to Ledo, Ledo to the 10th Engineer Headquarters, andfrom point to point along the Road, he progresses in a rhythmic sequenceof alternating rest and motion. Each new episode of his journey is anothereffort at discovery, reconnaissance.

One consequence of this structural design in the narrative is thehigh tone of responsiveness which animates it. The author's many conversationalor expository asides, though in excess of his minimum narrative needs,are entirely relevant in a story of travel and exploration. They establishthe perception of connectedness between incidents which occur in accidentalsequence, and they enlarge the realm of time and space through which thetraveler marches. The pilgrim Jones recalls bits of gossip about thosewhom he meets on the road, and he

often pauses to hear them tell their stories. In camp, he ruminates upon the nature of the land which he is exploring and the company he keeps. Long afterward, with a future audience in view, he entertains as he explains and informs. He reenacts the journey.

Dramatic momentum is another effect arising from the sequence of search and recognition. The initial exploratory scenes arouse curiosity, invite an expedition. The middle passages are violent and tense, as Jones and the roadbuilders struggle in the wilderness. Later, when success is imminent, certain omens of disaster appear. After driving east from Ledo and then turning south, in the true direction they must go, the roadbuilders break out of the jungle at their summer's goal, the village of Shingbwiyang. But they have cut the final miles of their road-trace along a pathway of death, the Refugee trail. The generals can congratulate themselves when the Chinese Army in India invades the Hukawng Valley and the Second Burma Campaign is underway at last. But among the casualties Jones sees in Seagrave's hospital at Shingbwiyang, about Thanksgiving time, are a few, say the Chinese doctors, with "the Felix-Weel Disease, you know, Teefus." Thus does the quest, the chase, the journey near its end, and thus do fact and literary design create an ironic climax to Chinese Liaison Detail.

One final word needs to be said. That word is tolerance. It naturallyapplies to Jones's voluntary acceptance of foul living conditions, onerousobligations, and pain. Unlike most of the men on the road, Jones, becauseof his medical training, knew full well all the invisible enemies whichsurrounded him. His tolerance, therefore, went well beyond the minimumof grudging passivity. In the form of fortitude, it was a virtue, not merelya stoical vice. But even more admirable was the tolerance which characterizedhis work as a medical liaison officer with the Chinese.

Medical aid to China during World War II took many forms--the distributionof medical supplies and equipment in large quantities; the training ofmedical officers and troops; and the deployment of American medical unitswith the Chinese Army in battle. To help coordinate the Chinese-Americanmedical system, the liaison officer system of the combat arms was extendedto the medical service. Often, the success of the entire effort dependedon the liaison system. And the key to effective liaison was tolerance.

One could say as much, in fact, for the entire American war effortin the Far East. It was a gigantic Chinese Liaison Detail. Gen. JosephW. Stilwell, although Chinese Army in India Commander, was but Chief ofStaff under Generalissimo Chiang, and Deputy Commander of Southeast AsiaCommand under Lord Louis Mountbatten. Still other complications in hisofficial relations to the Air Forces and to other high-ranking Chineseand British commanders frequently limited his powers to those of representation,advisement, and persuasion. His policy position generally fell betweentwo strongly argued extremes. One, that of Gen. Claire Chennault, calledfor a major American air

offensive in China. Stilwell--usually backed by the War Department--believedChennault's program would need too much of what was hardest to supply--aircraftand gasoline via "the Hump"--and would make too little use ofthe more plentiful ground forces in India and China. Doubtful of the possibilitiesfor short-term success, he furthermore saw little likelihood that Chennault'splan would lead to any long-term or postwar improvement in China's ownmilitary strength.

The other position, that of the Generalissimo, was mainly defensive.China's chronic poverty, deepened by the long years of war; her intricateand uncertain political structure; and the Nationalist fears of what thefuture might bring from the Communist enclave in the north--all these arguedstrongly against the strain of aggressive policies. Stilwell believed,however, that Chinese troops who were properly trained and led, liberallysupplied from American sources, and backed by a stable and reform-mindedgovernment not only could take a significant part in the war but beginto establish firm foundations for post-war growth and security.

What Stilwell came to over and over was the liaison officer's position:to help others help themselves. Military policies such as Chennault proposedwere, according to Stilwell, substitutes for self-help. Their effect, sooneror later, would be to weaken or corrupt an inactive China. Conversely,he feared that unless China accepted technical advice, at least, she wouldnot be able to use effectively whatever material aids to self-help shereceived. Like the liaison officers within his command, therefore, he attemptedto occupy a middle position, one wherein he could demand less often thanhe could counsel, but wherein a failure by China to help herself underhis guidance and with the supplies he controlled might force her once moreto go it alone. It was the liaison officer's delicate mission to standbetween those Americans who would impatiently groan, "For God's sake,let us do it right!" and those who would cry, "Well, then, haveit your own way and be damned to you!"

In this incredibly difficult situation, tolerance was vital. Theimportance of its presence or absence is suggested by three available documents--theStilwell diaries and other papers, the reminiscences of Dr. Gordon Seagrave,and Chinese Liaison Detail. In the first of these, the spirit oftolerance hardly exists, and many of Stilwell's subordinates absorbed thesuspicion, sense of injured pride, and the rancor which he barely concealedon official occasions and which were otherwise plainly visible. Just shortof positive intolerance, these attitudes poisoned the atmosphere, and theyconstantly gave a bad name to all that was valid in Stilwell's policiesand to the very great deal that he actually accomplished. His distrustof the British and his disrespect for Chinese leadership were assumed toexist even in specific instances when he or his subordinates evinced confidencein their Allied partners. Consequently, when he asked for efforts whichwere especially costly or hazardous, the British and Chinese suspecteda hint that they were slackers, and when

he commended the troops, that he was slyly condemning their leaders.It may be difficult to argue that Stilwell could have accomplished morethan he did between 1942 and late 1944, considering the severe limits placedupon Far East activity. Yet it is very probable that even less would havebeen more valuable, had it been accomplished in an atmosphere of greatertolerance.

Conversely, Dr. Seagrave displayed the maximum effectiveness of theliaison system. Entirely absorbed in the tasks of aiding an alien people,and itself compounded of men and women from many nationalities, creeds,and customs, the Seagrave hospital was a model of tolerance. Although thebest known, it was not the only instance of this virtue. More than a fewAmerican medical units gave close-in support to the Chinese in an atmosphereof confidence and respect. The large hospitals in the rear were full ofChinese patients during 1944 and early 1945. Their records convey not theleast hint of the ill-winds of irritation which blew in the summit headquartersat Chungking or New Delhi. As late as 1946, a visit to the 14th EvacuationHospital at Mile 19 on the Ledo Road would demonstrate that, although thelong-term care of Chinese casualties had become tedious, there was no visibleintercultural antagonism, no active suspicion that China had somehow saddledthe hospital with patients she was perfectly able to care for, or thatChinese sick and wounded were malingering in order to postpone the daywhen they must help themselves. Here, as in the Seagrave hospital, tolerancewas a way of life.

Between the two extremes existed the kind of tolerance which Jonesand dozens of other liaison officers displayed. Never carried to the extentof complete intercultural blending, and perhaps never entirely free ofsome Stilwell-like reservations, it nonetheless produced a high and practicallevel of international interaction. Based on self-respect, as well as thewillingness to adjust to another man's cultural and personal habits, thetolerance of such men as Jones produced a common effort to attain commongoals. Such tolerance did not mean that either party gave up his own heritageor values. Nor did either become so "soft on" the other thatstandards of judgment disappeared. The relationship might even deterioratewhen the partners encountered extreme adversity or adopted violently contrastingpoints of view. But even if it fell short of perfection, liaison of thiskind also proved durable in unfavorable circumstances.

In fact, a working tolerance such as that which Jones and the Chinesedisplayed, required that each accept certain limits in the liaison system,just as each had the right to expect certain commitments to the principlesof interaction. While Jones worked hard to make some inroads upon Chinesehabits which he knew led to increased sick rates, he accepted the probabilityof partial failure, even to the point of sharing many of the personal riskswhich those habits produced. Similarly,

his Chinese colleagues retained their authority and prestige, butthey recognized that when they deferred somewhat to Jones's advice regardingsupplies and equipment, the positioning of hospital stations, and the evacuationpolicy, they gained the opportunity to improve the regimental medical service.

In a world at war, liaison between cultures could not then--and cannotnow--survive the intolerance which too typically impeded American, British,and Chinese efforts to work together. Nor could it await the appearanceof such generous and benevolent figures as Dr. Seagrave, rare then, now,and always. But that ordinary men in predictably difficult circumstancescould develop cultural liaison of a steadfast, practical, and positivekind--this is the challenging record of tolerance in Chinese LiaisonDetail.

I. "ACROSS THE FARHILLS"

For some months now¹ the Ledo Road has been a going concern.The convoys are raising columns of dust as they roll on their way to China.People live in houses with tin roofs and cement floors. The Post Exchangesstock girdles and cosmetics, curios and ice cream, even Coca-Cola on occasion.

There are very few people left in this Theater who remember the dayswhen it was an adventure to drive a jeep four-wheel-double-low to Mile30.² It is a pity that so few of the old guard put their experienceson paper before they departed. The Road was pushed across the hills bya band of gallant and hardy giants. Some quiet pluggers did their stintwith much perspiration but little comment. Others were colorful charactersindeed, who rollicked their way through the jungles in the best traditionsof James Fenimore Cooper, Bret Harte, and Kenneth Roberts. The literatureof this war would be enriched if some of those officers and men could beinduced to recount their experiences.

The following material is not an account of the unusual. Many men ofthe advance parties could tell a better story: Men of the 823rd EngineerAviation Battalion, the 45th Engineer Regiment, the 330th Engineer Regiment,the 21st Quartermaster Regiment, the 151st Medical Battalion and

¹As of the summer of 1945, when Jones wrotehis reminiscences. (His typed copies were sent to the India-Burma TheaterSurgeon, and later to the Historical Unit, Office of The Surgeon General.The numerous short chapters, with their original headings, have been groupedinto larger units, as above, and titles have been supplied by the editor.Occasionally, trivial verbal slips have been corrected without comment.)The Ledo Road was officially declared open on 22 January 1945. The principalaccounts of its construction are Leslie Anders, The Ledo Road (1965),and relevant parts of Karl C. Dod, The Corps of Engineers: The War AgainstJapan (United States Army in World War II: The Technical Services)(Washington D.C., Government Printing Office, 1966).
²From Ledo. The engineers reached the Burma border at Mile 43on 28 February 1943. When the monsoon interrupted road work in May, theroadhead was only 4 miles across the border. See Romanus and Sunderland,II, pp. 12-14.

the 48th Evacuation Hospital.³ The object of this narrativeis to present a worm's eye observation of a stupendous operation as accuratelyas possible.

4201 Shipment

The 48th Evacuation Hospital⁴ arrived at Camp Anza, Californiafrom Fort Devens, Massachusetts, on the night of 10-11 January 1943. Herewere assembling the units of the 4201 Shipment. These included the 20thGeneral Hospital, 73rd Evacuation Hospital, 478th Quartermaster Regiment,151st Medical Battalion, 330th Engineer Regiment, 21st Quartermaster Regiment(colored), 7th Ordnance Battalion, and several small separate depot companies.These 6000 odd souls, male and female, white and colored, embarked on 19January; and the transport left Wilmington, Cal., harbor at 0800 hours,20 January. The U.S.S. Monticello was the 28,000 ton Italian luxury linerConte Grande, seized in a Brazilian port and hastily refitted. There wasperturbation among certain of the passengers as the ship plowed unconvoyedacross the Pacific. This was somewhat assuaged by the rumor that the presentPope had once conducted divine worship on the ornate staircase of the grandsalon (now serving as troop compartment C-1). The 42 day trip in a crowdedtroop ship is another story which has no place here. Bombay was reachedon 3 March. From there the units were shuffled across India, via Poona,Deolali, or Ranchi.

Margherita

The bulk of the officer and enlisted personnel of the 48th EvacuationHospital were introduced to the scene of their future labors at 0700 hoursthe morning of 19 March 1943. The ramshackle train stopped in the middleof nowhere; but presumably near a village. On the left was a badly ruttedroad, with a few shacks and tents in the jungle beyond it. On the rightwas jungle. Ahead the meter gauge track ran toward the smokestack of asmall lumber mill. The column was formed and marched a few hundred yardsdown a muddy lane. We broke ranks at the present Transient Camp area, onthe spot where the 18th General Hospital⁵ nurses inclosure recentlystood. It was announced that somewhere in the brush were 28 tents, oneof which contained rations. None of the men had had a decent meal or sufficientwater for the best part of three days. By 1100 hours a fire was going andthe chow line formed. As Detachment Commander, my hours were filled withhouse-

³The 823d and the 45th were sent to Ledo inDecember 1942, and took over the assignment of roadbuilding. The 330thEngineer General Service Regiment, elements of the 21st Quartermaster Group,and the two medical units arrived in March 1943. See Romanus and Sunderland,I, pp. 306, 348. Regarding the 21st Quartermaster Group, see North TirapLog, p. 11, n. 34.
⁴Originally an affiliated unit of Rhode Island Hospital, Providence.It was a 750-bed, semimobile organization. See North Tirap Log,pp. 10, 37, for notes on the 20th General Hospital and the 73d EvacuationHospital.
⁵The 18th General Hospital reached India in October 1944, afterservice in the Fiji Islands , and operated a hospital at Ledo from lateOctober 1944, to mid-April 1945. Thereafter, until October 1945, it servedat Myitkyina, Burma, and returned to the United States in November.

keeping duties. Some time before dark, I chopped 15 stumps (by count)out of the dirt floor of my tent; settled my cot precariously around anoutcrop of rock; and washed my face.

It rained fourteen of the next sixteen days. Destined for the tropics,the entire shipment had naturally been instructed to drop all rubber footboots; and foraging parties were scouring fifty miles back to Tinsukia.The local shoe merchants enjoyed a bonanza. The drudgery of getting settled,however, was relieved by a number of pleasant interludes. Some enterprisingcitizen discovered the Margherita Club. This Cozy Nook for Tea Plantershad a peace time membership of eighteen. When the Americans lined up sixdeep at the bar, the nightly dole of four bottles of liquor did not gofar. The English inhabitants were horrified at the arrival of so many nurses.No self-respecting planter would consider having his wife spend her firstIndian summer in Assam during the monsoons. It was sadly predicted thatmany of the girls would fail to survive the season.

Orientation

On 22 March an Officers Call was held at Base Headquarters, Ledo. General[Raymond A.] Wheeler and Colonel [John C.] Arrowsmith⁶ briefedthe gathering on this project, complete with maps. One gained the impressionthat we were in on the ground floor of a major operation. But the obviousobstacles of terrain, transport, material, and man power gave pause forthought. Base Section #3 was so designated on the premise that Rangoonwas a port of entry.⁷ The fact that Rangoon was nearly a thousandmiles away, and that we actually occupied about ten percent of the areaindicated on the map, lent an ironic touch to the bold panorama. It wasa proposition that probably only Americans would have tackled. They wentto it with a laugh and a curse, as they took off their shirts.

All hands turned to learning about the country, the natives, and ourChinese Allies--who were much in evidence around the Base. Orientationgroups listened to planters and British officers.⁸ Languageclasses struggled with the west China version of Mandarin. This was toofrequently expounded by an east China interpreter who spoke some Englishbut had a poor Mandarin accent; and relayed through a stolid line officer,with the

⁶Major General Wheeler commanded the Servicesof Supply in CBI; Colonel Arrowsmith comanded Base Section 3, with headquartersat Ledo. Given names are inserted in brackets and unit identificationsgiven in footnotes the first time the individual is mentioned. At the endof Book Two is a list of all who are named in the text. The comments whichJones frequently puts in footnotes are given with his initials. His routineidentification of officers and units, and supplementary notes added bythe editor are given without initials, except when the effect might beconfusing.
⁷WSJ: When it was a base section it was the fightingfront of the Theater; now that it is Advance Section, it is a base forChina.
⁸WSJ: One of these lecturers was a joy to behold. Themouths of the spectators hung open as they listened to his story of theretreat from Burma. The raconteur was an officer out of a Gurkha regiment.He was magnificently costumed. Commencing with hobnailed boots, the eyestraveled up a pair of hairy legs to faded shorts. At the waist was an arsenalof knives and revolvers. Thence to a dilapidated gray wool shirt sans sleeves.The spectators observed with awe the flies crawling over a granite face,which twitched never a flicker. All this was topped by a cylindrical hatof lacquered straw, claimed to be a gift of a Naga chieftain.

Mandarin dialect but no English. Sweating people crowded into steamingmess shacks to hear American officers describe the Chinese Training Centerat Ramgarh. Eager beavers gnawed at the bamboo shoots. It was a periodof earnest expectancy, somewhat reminiscent of a carnival.

Excursions and Alarums

The first six weeks provided a sustained tempo of excitement. Nobodyknew what would happen next, and it usually did. People were going outon mysterious expeditions.

Major [Eric P.] Stone and Lieutenant [Thomas, Jr.] Perry of the 48thEvacuation Hospital, led a column of porters somewhere the other side ofbeyond, to establish an aid station along the Pun Yang-Pebu trace.⁹It is said that the spark-plug of this jaunt was Sgt. [Walter J.] Marazzi.He taught the porters one stock phrase, which became a shot of adrenalin.His was the tail back position. When these human beasts of burden flagged,he would shout, "Who is the King of the Naga Hills?" The answer"Marazzi!!" ran along the line, and the file would close up.Another unique character was Pfc. [Frank J.] Dabal.¹⁰ This barrelof a man was elaborately festooned with tattooing; and he was a never-endingmarvel to the hillsmen when he flexed his muscles.

Another intriguing episode was the "Jap Invasion of Ledo."¹¹This must have been the first week in April 1943, although my notes arenot quite clear on the point. General Wheeler was on a reconnaissance toNathkaw, the farthest southern outpost of the defenses overlooking theOld Refugee Trail. A Jap patrol raided this position, and a tremendousamount of ammunition was expended in the process. In Ledo the repercussionswere deafening. My tentmate, the unit Security Officer, was aroused fromhis slumbers in the cold gray dawn. Patrols were thrown along the DehingRiver, and the nurses area swarmed with men ready to do or die. All mannerof excitable characters cruised the byways, armed to the teeth with knives,pistols and tommy guns. Apparently nobody considered a minor detail: Nathkawwas a hard seven days march over the easiest trail, and considerably more[?] as the crow flies. In those days the Jap enjoyed a reputation as ajungle infiltrator which subsequent events have somewhat dimmed.

One hot morning officers call was being held in the 48th Evacuationmess hall. The Base Commander [Arrowsmith] sauntered into unit headquarters,followed by a hard-bitten figure chewing on a long cigarette holder andwearing a battered campaign hat. There were a number of enlisted men inthe office. They had been in India just about long enough to have reached

⁹See North Tirap Log, p. 20. This robbedAid Station 2 of three men, Craig, Price, and Seith.
¹⁰WSJ: Popularly known as "The Mad Russian."Being a very intense Pole, he resented being called a Russian; and I hadto break him twice for getting into fights over it.
¹¹Small columns of the Japanese 18th Division moved towardFort Hertz, a British post, and American-Chinese positions at the edgeof the Hukawng Valley. The Chinese garrison at Nathkaw held firm. The Japanesepatrols soon withdrew. See also North Tirap Log, p. 50. The dateJones gives is correct.

the stage where nothing impressed them very much. The first man to registeron the visitors was the runner. This lad was hardly the brightest man inthe outfit, else he would not have been the runner. A glitter of insigniastimulated him into action. He arrived at the mess shack in a lather. "Acouple of Majors are up front," he gasped. It may be mentioned thatthe then Commander of the 48th [Col. Charles L. Leedham, MC] was one ofthe ranking regular officers on the Base. It was sometimes his pleasureto allow the common or garden variety of officers to cool their heels.He arose from his seat, visited the latrine, adjusted himself before themirror. On his arrival at his headquarters Colonel Arrowsmith is said tohave remarked: "Colonel, is this the way you receive the LieutenantGeneral of the United States Army commanding this Theater?" Smallsounds were heard from the Colonel as he gazed at "Vinegar Joe"Stilwell.¹²

The 48th Evac Is Dispersed

It was immediately apparent that one general and two evacuation hospitalswere too much support for eight or nine thousand Americans and a divisionof Chinese. The medical plan that unfolded was logical. The 20th GeneralHospital took over the small plant in the Margherita polo field, hithertooperated by the 98th Station Hospital.¹³ The 73rd EvacuationHospital prepared to move into the new all-bamboo installation under constructionon a plateau a mile or so down the road. The 151st Medical Battalion wasdeployed to make its seasoned personnel most effective. The ambulance companyserviced Ledo and the thirty-odd miles of road. One company establisheda small station hospital at Namgoi (Mile 32 in those days), to serve thetroops at road-head. Part of one company went with the Rice Mission.¹⁴The rest of the Battalion went out to establish aid stations at one-dayintervals along the trails through the hills.

The 48th Evacuation Hospital was overage. Within a week we were requisitionedfor men to go on air dropping, to run gas stations, and to work on therail transport system. By the end of a month, so many enlisted men wereout on detached service that it was difficult to run the housekeeping.On 18 April Colonel Leedham flew to Delhi to discuss a new assignment.On 5 May rumors began to ooze around that part of the organization wouldgo to operate a station hospital for the Chinese Training Center at Ramgarh.¹⁵Twenty officers, forty nurses, and approximately half the enlisted

¹²In the spring of 1943, Stilwell inspectedhis India bases, and, among other tasks, he quieted the excitement overthe Japanese foray. After a trip to Washington in May, he returned to Indiato carry out a severe shakeup of several major enterprises, the road projectincluded. See Romanus and Sunderland, I, pp. 309, 347-348; and StilwellPapers, pp. 201-202, 216-218.
¹³A 100-bed hospital which had served at Ramgarh in 1942 andhad been at Ledo since January 1943. From Ledo it went to Chakulia, nearCalcutta, where it stayed until mid-summer 1945. After a few final monthsin Shingbwiyang, Burma, it was sent home.
¹⁴Lt. Col. Earle M. Rice, MC, who had been with a Military Observersparty in India in 1942, became Assistant Theater Surgeon in March 1943and Theater Malariologist in October 1943.
¹⁵To replace the Seagrave unit, by then establishing medicalstations for Chinese infantry moving into Burma. The 48th took over theRamgarh hospital on 15 May 1943.

men were destined to leave in the near future. My instructions wereto break down the detachment with a view to sending off personnel for astation hospital, and retaining enough technicians to run a small fieldhospital here at a later date.

Six officers interested in nutrition and tropical medicine were earmarkedfor the Rice Mission. This mysterious expedition, it later developed, wasa combination of malaria survey and a study of nutritional problems amongChinese troops. It spent some four months in the lower Assam Valley; andits members returned with a prodigious number of tall stories.¹⁶

The balance of the unit was bait for odd job details. Ledo Sector CombatCommand¹⁷ wanted liaison officers for Chinese duty. Medicalofficers were needed at remote forward outposts. Nurses were used at BaseHeadquarters as stenographers. It was this residual remnant that probablyaccumulated the most interesting assignments, and had the most varied experiencesof the scattered 48th.

Chinese Detail

I was supposed to remain with the detachment at Margherita as executiveofficer. All kinds of curious jobs were going begging, however; and itbehooved me to look after myself, unless I wanted to moulder in the mudat the Staging Area. It appeared that the most fun lay across the far hills.What could be better than getting out with the Chinese? I was born in China,and had lived there fourteen years. Although twenty-five years in the Stateshad pretty well washed away any command of the language, even that limitedbackground was a premium. Very few people in the area wanted to have anythingmore to do with our unfamiliar Allies than was necessary.

On 10 May I contacted Dr. [Franz] Kriegel¹⁸ then Combat Surgeon.I spent the next day up the Road with him visiting the 6th Motor Transport,38th Division Headquarters, 112th Infantry, and the 10th Engineers.¹⁹After dinner with General [Haydon L.] Boatner, a deal was in the making.

¹⁶1st Lt. Milton Korb, MC, and Captains IrvingA. Beck, John S. Dziob, Israel E. Garber. William L. Leet, and FrederickA. Webster, MC. At Chabua, the "Mary" project studied the antimalarialeffects of several drugs: Diary entries for 26-27 April 1943, of Col. RobertP. Williams, MC, the Theater Surgeon, a copy of which was sent to the presenteditor by Colonel Williams; also, U.S. Army Medical Service, Malaria,p. 35.
¹⁷Headquarters Company 5303d (Provisional) Combat Troops directedsupport operations for the Chinese Army in India. The staffs for the 5303dand CAI headquarters were the same. The 5303d was redesignated on 1 February1944, as Northern Combat Area Command. See Romanus and Sunderland, II,pp. 28-32, 138-139.
¹⁸WSJ: Dr. Franz Kriegel was an interesting character,and my dealings with him were always of the pleasantest. A Polish Jew,educated in Czechoslovakia, he left central Europe one jump ahead of theNazis. He served with the Spanish Republicans; and when Franco won out,moved on to China with the Red Cross. He had been almost 4 years fightingthe Japanese. He spoke Chinese about as well as he did English. * * * Kriegeland the other Czech and Polish contract surgeons serving with the Chinesewere the most typical Men Without a Country I have ever known. Middle agedand war weary, they had no prospect of going home; and they doubted ifthey would have homes to go to if they could. [See North Tirap Log,p. 19.]
¹⁹Chinese units moving from Ramgarh into Burma to complete theirtraining, screen the advancing Ledo Road, and ultimately inaugurate theSecond Burma Campaign. The 112th Infantry, 38th Division, was the leadregiment in the movement. See Romanus and Sunderland, II, pp. 28-48.

The 48th was told to make ten officers available for liaison duty. So13 May, Kriegel and I took four other men the rounds of the Chinese camps.One incident of that trip will never be forgotten. Kriegel was a stocky,brisk, fast-talking little fellow with a manner of mixed domineering andcondescension which the Chinese always resented. We passed the guard atthe Field Artillery Bn with a curt word, and walked over to the dispensaryon the far side of the area. In a few moments, the Officer of the Guardappeared and engaged in earnest conversation with the Chinese medical officer,who was obviously embarrassed. The officer requested that we return tothe gate, report to him, and then return to the dispensary. Otherwise hewould lose face. It was raining slightly and it would be a long walk. Ifwe complied, Kriegel would also lose face. He refused in his most vehementChinese, on the basis that as Combat Command Surgeon he could enter anyarea. The Officer of the Guard repaired to the quarters of the CO. Therewas loud talk and sounds of someone being beaten with a stick. The poorofficer emerged in a hurry and urged us to depart. Kriegel was in a badspot; but he elected to play his hand out, and started over for the CO.A few orders were shouted, a whistle blew, and we were surrounded by anarmed guard. There was no need or desire for further argument. We weremarched off the area between two files of grim Chinese fingering tommyguns. We went at once to 38th Division Hq to demand an apology. Here wewere very politely but firmly informed that the General [Sun Li-jen] washaving his afternoon nap, and would probably not wake up for two or threehours. The whole episode was a sound lesson in how not to deal with theChinese, a characteristic example of how they react to an officious approach.If you want to be aggressive with Chinese troops, you need plenty of rank,and it has to be in the Chinese army, not the American or any other.²⁰Needless to say, none of the officers with us could thereafter beinduced to volunteer for liaison duty.

Liaison Officer

This is as good a point as any to pause and consider the function ofthe Liaison Officer. Theoretically he is the tie that binds, the personaltouch in Allied operations, the lubricant which permits two commands tomesh without clashing of gears. After eight months experience in this uncomfortableposition, I think of him as a thumb-like appendage which springs from thepalm. When the hands are clasped across the sea, in the classic gestureof two totally different races fighting any war for a common purpose, heis caught in the middle. Through him channel the conflicting aims, hopes,fears, suspicions, and squeeze plays of two commands who live on oppositesides of the fence. He is the first echelon ambassador. If he is a soundofficer

²⁰Within days after reaching Burma in 1942,even Stilwell had made this discovery and never felt entirely certain wherehe stood in respect to Chinese Army lines of command, even when they presumablyled to or through his headquarters. Jones's description of the liaisonofficer's position might well be compared to the official accounts of Stilwell'scommand and to Stilwell's own letters and diary. See Romanus and Sunderland,I and II; and Stilwell Papers.

he will early appreciate one fact: On his approach, friendliness, tact,hard work, and good judgment, the service whose uniform he wears standsor falls in the eyes of the unit to which he is attached. To a dozen, orto a few thousand men, his performance is of more significance in internationalamity than any potentate whose photograph smiles out of the pages of theSunday Supplement. It is necessary on state occasions to get all horsedup in suntans and tie; but one may better operate on the theory that theappropriate uniform is a set of fatigues, a pair of boots, a pistol, anda cheerful grin.

It is not easy for any man to detach himself from the environment inwhich he was raised, or which he has built for himself. In a physical sense,soldiers have done this with reasonable success since the days of the TrojanWars. In an emotional sense, it is not so simple. The subtle differences,and the fundamental differences, present barriers which require the mobilizationof all resources before attempting to hurdle them. The fundamental difficultyfor the liaison officer (aside from language) is the cumulative wear andtear of living in close contact with people who are so alien in habitsand mannerisms. No matter how he may try to see their point of view, orhow he appreciates their better qualities, the thousands of little thingswhittle away at his good humor. An irritable liaison officer is a liability.He loses the friendship and confidence of the command to which he is attached.This in turn creates frictions for the command he represents. It is mypersonal opinion that the effective term of service for the average liaisonofficer is six to ten months of continuous field duty. The shorter periodapplies when a man has been the only American with a unit, particularlyif he has lived largely on the Chinese ration. After that he should haveat least a month in which to rehabilitate himself.

II. "MY NEW HAPPYHOME"

Chinese Camp

On May 15, 1943, I moved in.²¹ This arrival was greeted witha large dose of curiosity, close scrutiny, and courteous attention. Allafternoon droves of polite and friendly officers dropped in, by twos andthrees, to see what kind of a specimen Uncle Sam had tossed into theirmidst. As the word spread that the American had actually asked for theassignment, more people found reasons to consult with the Regimental Surgeon.Pretty soon, I noticed that the orderly required the assistance of an excessivenumber of enlisted men to carry small items around the tent.²²

²¹With the 10th Engineer Regiment.
²²WSJ: The curiosity which greeted my appearance in campwas no great surprise. As a small boy I had spent my vacations going therounds of my father's parishes in Chekiang Province. It was an old storyto stop at a village for a bite to eat, and to be the cynosure of all eyes.Before one had thanked the host, practically every man, woman, child, dog,and chicken in the community would be hanging through the windows, jostlingin the doorways, and prowling about the room. I grew up having my luggageexamined, the texture of my clothing fingered, and listening to remarksabout the whiteness of my skin and the blondness of the hair I once had.I am used to it, but I still do not enjoy it.

Naturally my first request was to be accorded the consummate honor ofreporting to the Colonel of this glorious Regiment, to which I was attachedto do such duties as my limited capabilities and profound ignorance permitted.I was informed that he was at the moment engaged in matters of high import;but that he would presently greet me in the manner befitting the arrivalof a representative of the noble and mighty ally of China. In about halfan hour, there was a first-rate stir as "Colonel ----" enteredand was introduced. The air that accompanies the arrival of a Chinese officeris a fair index of his relative importance. I quickly looked him over.He was a youngish sort of chap, and gave the impression of lacking whatit takes to be the commander of an "independent" regiment. SoI threw him a first-class highball [salute] but just a shade under thebest. He proved to be the Lieutenant Colonel serving as Executive Officer.My initial disappointment in him was short lived. He was not of unit commandercaliber; but he was a sound, level-headed cooperative officer of fine type.He became one of the best Chinese friends I had in the 10th Engineers.I went through the same business with two other Lt. Colonels, both of whocan play ball on my team any day.

In due course, I was informed that the Regimental Commander awaitedmy pleasure.²³ I walked across under escort and met Colonel(now Major General) [L. C.] Lee. He was a small, shrewd, quiet articlewell worth careful consideration. He had spent his entire adult life inthe army: building canals, harassing bandits, and fighting the Japanese.He had worked up the military ladder the hard way, until he became Superintendentof the Chinese Military Engineering Academy, following which he sank allhis assets (and the Lee family fortune) in organizing a regiment. The 10thEngineers were his personal property, and most of the officers were hishand picked former students.²⁴ I had a long and close associationwith Colonel Lee. He was a reasonable gentleman to work with, and a gamelittle bantam when it came to climbing a steep trail. He was as good, orbetter, a unit commander of field grade as I have personally served under--Chineseor American.

My new happy home was quite a proposition. In the first place it wasright next door to the regimental guard house. A Chinese officer of highrank usually keeps the panoply of power visible in the foreground. Thisincludes heavy and well armed personal guard details. It also includeshaving the dungeon in a place where all visitors can see what happens tohim who displeases the strong man. Thus it follows quite naturally thatthe hoosegow, the security guard, the office tents, and the regimentalQM depot should all be crowded together in close proximity to the officersquarters. More than one night my sleep was disturbed by the groans, cries,or drunken conversation of the inmates of the regimental jug. Many of thesemen were sick with malaria and/or dysentery. Being prisoners, they werein disgrace;

²³WSJ: Chinese officers are not properlyaddressed by grade of rank, but by command title: "Battalion Commander,""Commander of the Transport Company," "Commander of theRegimental Medical Company," "Commander of Troops Cleaning Latrines."
²⁴WSJ: In much the same manner, "Light Horse Harry"of the same surname formed a troop of cavalry in the Revolution; and WadeHampton of South Carolina became a general officer of the Confederate Statesof America.

and they received scant sympathy. The Regimental Surgeon was perfectlycapable of disregarding, with a clear conscience, the lamentations of theseunfortunates. They would have had the privilege of attending his sick callif they had only been good boys.

The Surgeon and I shared a British tent which had seen better days.It managed to spring at least three leaks, preferably over a bed, withevery rain. The plain dirt floor was a little lumpy, but usually not muddy.We each inhabited one side lengthwise, separated by a shelf of bamboo slatswhich served us as a library. He had a comfortable folding beach chairconstructed of scrap lumber and burlap sacking. I acquired an Indian canechair. Our bamboo desks also served as washstands, or if necessary as dinnertables. Our cots maintained an even keel on the floor with the assistanceof a few stones. Our trunks were set off the ground on ration boxes, toprevent too much rusting. The ditch encircling our domicile gradually assumeda chalky hue from the tooth powder expectorated into it. Directly in front,about eight feet away and at a slightly higher level, was the main streetof this tent city. It was built of unmatched hardwood saplings, insecurelypinned down by stringers at the sides. On rainy nights the logs rattledand creaked, and the mud under and between them squelched. One grew accustomedto the racket of passing strangers who sounded as if they were about tofall in on top of you.

The two principal animal needs of man were provided for at convenientdistances. About 35 yards up the back hill were the latrines. Ours wasa bamboo slat shanty with a leaf roof. The pit was covered by a log platformhaving four squat-hole openings. As an added concession to the officers,each hole was provided with a board cover having an upright stick for ahandle. An even slab on each side of the hole furnished a secure footingfor assuming the necessary angle.²⁵

The mess tent was a few yards away. Directly in front of the main entrancewas the Colonel's table. The three by three foot split bamboo top restedon legs of untrimmed saplings driven into the dirt floor. The benches weretwo bamboo trunks placed side by side, to a total width of about six inches,on bamboo uprights. Seven officers ate around this over-sized checker board.My name, in Chinese characters on a slip of paper, was posted on the tableleg at the place to the Colonel's right.²⁶ This placed me withmy neighbor close on the right. In juggling a bowl of rice and chopsticks,it required the exercise of great care to keep my elbow out of his leftear. Four similar tables were spotted around the tent. At each side entrance,an issue tin pail stood on a ration box. In this was the piece de resistanceof every meal of every

²⁵WSJ: The Chinese have a high regardfor the physiological advantages of this angle. It is, however, a littlehard on the knees, especially if dysentery compels frequent visits. OurAllies consider sitting on a toilet seat to be an unsanitary foreign habit.By preference they habitually stand on the seat and squat. Their aim isnot always too good. The GI's running the small camps in the hills tookpride in creating comfortable seats of woven bamboo. The aforementionedpractice was therefore the cause of much bitterness toward Chinese visitors.
²⁶WSJ: This is the seat of honor at informal meals. Onformal occasions, the seat is directly across the table. This enables thehost to gaze on the pleasant countenance of the guest.

day of the month--rice. Netting of any kind was a critical item on thebase. What the Chinese troops wanted they had to buy themselves. They werenot particularly concerned about the presence of flies, which after allare perfectly normal insects. Consequently, there was no screening whatsoever.

The customers sauntered in casually after the bugle blew. They werealways hungry, but etiquette demanded that they appear to be in no rushto eat. Only the head table used the front entrance. The rest sloshed aroundthrough the mud to the side doors. They filled their bowls, took theirseats, and then the noise began. The Colonel frequently came in late. Everybodystood to attention; he made a short bow from the waist; they bowed; thenall sat down. Nobody resumed eating until the Colonel took his first bite.Colonel Lee seldom took advantage of his prerogative of the dramatic entry.He was usually late because he was busy. His men so respected him, however,that they invariably accorded him all the meticulous niceties of courtesy.

The problem of how to feed me immediately reared its ugly head. Initially,it was suggested that I be served American food in my own tent. To haveeaten alone would have implied that I was segregating myself from the mostsociable moments of the day--chow time. This would not help to establishthe bond of camaraderie and mutual confidence essential to a liaison operation.Aside from the diplomatic aspect, there were practical considerations.It would not be feasible to draw a one-man American ration and have itproperly prepared. Chinese food is so cooked that it is generally servedsteaming hot, and is sanitary if eaten from clean dishes. Certain Americanitems are subject to contamination in Chinese kitchens; and it would requiretime to train a cook. On the other hand, the regiment could not draw aChinese ration for me, nor could I draw one through their channels. Theupshot of the whole business was that periodically I purchased a fourteenday dry ration from QM with emphasis on sugar, flour, canned fruit, sausageand jam. This was turned over to the mess officer for use as a luxury supplement.In exchange I ate their rice.

The regiment ate twice a day, at 1000 and 1600 hours. The diet was anunvarying monotony of rice, corn beef, and what squash or bamboo sproutscould be procured locally. The rice was below Chinese peasant standard.Purchased through Indian sources, it contained considerable husk, dirt,and gravel to pad the weight. (In the next few months I broke two fillingsbiting down on stones.) Sausage and sweets were welcome additions to thisration, and my friends were most pleased. Every two weeks, the mess officerwould make a speech to the effect that the delicacies on the table werethe contribution of their distinguished guest and comrade in arms.

I had no reason to regret this solution to the ration problem, but mystomach did. Rice and corn beef were not just what the doctor's stomachordered. I made it a point to hold sick call at some American camp alongthe line daily, whenever possible at mealtime. By this means one did notget fat, but could manage.

The 10th Engineers

Being an "independent" regiment, the 10th Engineers had certainprerogatives peculiar to such privately raised and financed organizations.The structure was roughly that of a miniature division, minus artilleryand cavalry. (There would have been cavalry if horses were available.)Nine engineer line companies, in three battalions, with basic infantrytraining formed the bulk of the regiment. In addition were one each Signal,Motor Transport and Special Service (MP) companies, together with a woefullyunderstrength Medical Detachment. The commander of such a unit could bea Major General (there are no Brigadiers in the Chinese Army). The strengthfluctuated between 2400 and 2600.

Chinese channels of higher command are loose. There are many pretextsfor failure to comply with orders. The same applies to by-passing one ormore echelons to get to the commander who will issue the orders one caresto obey. The situation was complicated by another factor. All other Chinesetroops were attached or assigned to the 38th Chinese Division. The 10thEngineers were attached to American SOS for duty. What is more they werethe largest organized group of any nationality working on the Road at thetime. Their channels were therefore Chinese or American as desired. Thisopened up opportunities for duplication of requisitions, side-slippingof responsibility, and squeeze plays for additional equipment. It was thekind of chess game dear to the Chinese mind.²⁷

Evidently the row to be hoed would be long and devious. I was an unknownand presumably weak reed to lean upon. But I was the only American medicalofficer present who knew anything about the Chinese. If this sucker waswilling to bite, the command was willing to gamble. Thus I became the firstAmerican medical liaison officer to be attached to troops in the Ledo area.Until relieved by reason of sickness, I served the longest continuous periodwith the same unit.

I had been placed with the 10th Engineers primarily for three reasons:(1) Because of the excessive non-effective rate in the regiment. (2) Becausea disproportionatey small number of sick men were admitted to Americanhospitals. (3) To watch the requisitioning and expenditure of medical supplies.The Chinese were quite aware of this, in spite of their meticulous courtesyand superficial appearance of welcome. For many weeks it was a matter offencing delicately around, in search of the chinks in a wall of politeoriental obstinacy.

The first major problem was the Regimental Hospital. The 38th Divisionhad a field hospital; the 10th Engineers must have one as a matter of prestige.That the entire medical detachment would make a second-rate showing asa battalion dispensary was no consideration. Requisitions had includedequipment ranging from vaginal speculae to major orthopedic

²⁷WSJ: In fairness to Colonel Lee, itmust be said that he took a minimum advantage of the situation. Duringmy service with the regiment, in every instance in which he incurred theire of the Americans by appearing to hang back on an assignment, subsequentevents proved his judgment to have been sound.

tools. The Chinese respect certain aspects of western technical progress;but often the modern trappings seem more important than the knowledge ofhow to use them. In general, medical officers lack even enough professionalbackground to recognize their own limitations. Patients are abundant andstoical. If the Americans dish out the equipment, the sky is the limit.

The 50-bed installation was in a deplorable state. Patients were crowded8 to 10 per tent. There were no decent messing or latrine facilities. Therewas no attempt to segregate cases by type; nor any system for screeningcases admitted. There was no administrative system at all. The only pieceof paper relating to any patient was a scrap of toilet tissue showing medicationgiven. Medical officers were not even certain how long patients had beenin hospital. The Headquarters Dispensary, at which sick call was held for1600 men, kept no records of any kind.

There were adequate facilities for evacuation to American hospitalsin Ledo. During the first week the active tuberculars, acute dysenteries,and all except minor surgical cases were cleaned out. The physical plantwas gradually improved and necessary equipment secured. A record systemwas set up. The officers were taught to write at least a reasonable facsimileof a diagnosis in English, on the slip of each patient transferred to theAmerican hospital. Ward rounds were conducted daily, with the emphasison simple teaching. (For an obstetrician, I ran a pretty fancy course intropical medicine.) By rotating battalion surgeons into the hospital, thenew ideas were fairly well disseminated through the medical detachment.

The aim was to gradually whittle the patient population down to malariaand short term cases. Acute and long term cases were evacuated to Americanhospitals more promptly. In the course of time, the hospital was physicallymuch more attractive, and the service obviously improved. The command beganto give up its grandiose ideas of a general hospital doing major surgery.As a long range policy all this paid dividends. After the regiment movedfarther forward and became strung out along and ahead of the Road, I wasfrequently absent from headquarters. At these times reasonably good judgmentcontinued to be exercised in triage of cases;²⁸and the battalionsurgeons ran much better dispensaries in isolated locations.

Sanitation is a thorn in the flesh of any medical officer with Chinese.This is not entirely because they are personally dirty or slovenly. Itis based on their reluctance to accept modern ideas of the transmissionof disease. There is in fact no great incentive for them to wish to controldisease. In a land teeming with undernourished millions, disease is considereda blessing bestowed by nature to keep the population down within the limitsof the food supply. Of course, it is undesirable to have one's own familysick; but there is no urgent reason to worry about the other fellow. Thisunderlying concept is fundamentally the reason for the low status of theChinese medical service. Manpower is the most expendable commodity theChinese Army has. A man keeps up, or the dogs eat his carcass in the ditch.Why tie up personnel and equipment

²⁸Sorting of casualties at the time of admission,with respect to retention or further evacuation, as required by the natureof the case and the capacity of the unit to handle it; or, sorting withrespect to the type of sickness or injury.

looking after a man who can not perform duty? Furthermore, why exertenergy in preventing the diseases sent by heaven? All except the most intelligentofficers think our doctrines of transmission of infection are crazy foreignideas. Even the better officers are hard to convince that a trained manis an asset, and that to keep him well is sound economy. The only approachis to repeatedly compare sanitary conditions in companies against theirsick rates; and to dramatize the man-days lost. Colonel Lee was anxiousto keep his effective strength up, in order to make a good showing. Hewas receptive and cooperative; but he had little support from his battalionand company officers. It was difficult to get even the medical officersinterested in sanitation. On returning to headquarters after prolongedtrips, it was always apparent that latrine policing and other public healthmeasures had deteriorated. It was never possible to get the Officers Messto institute a proper system of scalding utensils.

Medical supply was a perpetual headache. Requisitions for both equipmentand supplies were sometimes fantastic. Three times to my knowledge, vaginalspeculae were requisitioned simply because they looked pretty in a catalog.There was no rhyme or reason to either the quantity or assortment of drugsordered. Review of back requisitions on file had raised the question ofblack market operation. I never found any evidence to substantiate this.The trouble seemed to be one of all around poor arithmetic. The Chineseare noted for their business acumen. It seems incredible that all the medicalofficers, including the Supply Officer, could be so totally lacking inany sense of planning for requirements and expenditures. To add to theconfusion, drugs were doled out with very sketchy relationship to the diseasepresented, or to the expected period of therapy. All this was graduallyimproved (but never wholly corrected) by a series of round table discussions.When supplies were due, all officers would bring in their requisitions.Each was edited by making the officer justify each item, on the basis ofanticipated sick rates and on accepted treatment schedules. The greatestobstacle to this scheme was their extremely limited knowledge of elementarydiagnostic and prognostic medicine.

In spite of it all, most of these young officers were keen, conscientious,and eager to learn. They developed into good doctors by Chinese Army standards.Curiously enough, the best of the lot was the Veterinarian. He was a competent,middle aged man who could transpose his understanding of animals to handlingmen. Since there were no horses with the regiment, he was utilized as abattalion surgeon. He did so well that I saw to it that he was assignedto the company which was currently most isolated from support.

What Makes the Chinese Tick?

To the Chinese, their customs, mannerisms, and the way of life in generalare very logical. To get along effectively with them as a liaison officer,one must try to view them from the angle at which they look at themselves.The sum total effect of their disregard for privacy, their table manners,and the smell of their latrines at times becomes almost unbearable. Alongwith

this, one may have prickly heat, be hungry, and be running a temperature.It is a temptation to swear that not even the family shirts will go toa Chinese laundry after the war. This, however, is to lose the sense ofhuman values.

Chinese are extremely friendly, gregarious, and given to endless socialsmall talk. They are accustomed to being densely packed together in familyand clan groups, in school dormitories, and in military quarters. Theyactually feel restless and lonesome unless there is a crowd around. Hencethey neither understand or care for personal privacy, nor recognize theneed for it on the part of others. Their personal possessions are subjectto scrutiny, comment, and use by the community. Their curiosity is insatiable.They open each other's mail with a perfectly innocent and friendly air.

When I moved in, my possessions included a small locked tin trunk. Thisproved useful for purposes other than to prevent theft. In nearly eightmonths, small articles, possibly to the sum of $2.50 were stolen. In spiteof the Chinese reputation for being light fingered, they have a delicatesense of from whom not to steal. This parallels the G.I. courtesyin purloining objects only from somebody else's company area. The liaisonofficer, although he never really "belongs," has a recognizedplace in the regiment with which he sleeps, eats, and works. As such heis a second class guest. To steal from him is a reflection on the honorof the organization.²⁹ My locked trunk was principally a defenseagainst curiosity. After keeping my pistol hanging near my cot for sometime, I put it away. Somebody working the unfamiliar mechanism might shoothimself. Eventually my trunk contained less clothing, and more personalletters and official papers. When a regular American ration of cigarettesbegan to come into the base, I had to hoard my limited supply. My friendsdeveloped a habit of "borrowing" my American brands, and payingme back in equivalent numbers of "Navy Cut." This was done ona meticulously accurate basis, but was hardly an even swap to my taste.

Last Christmas [1944] I had an experience which throws another lighton the Chinese mentality. Driving from Myitkyina to Namti [Burma], I metone of my friends, a 10th Engineer battalion commander, tearing down theroad rolling up a cloud of dust. He slammed on his brakes and walked backa hundred yards to shake hands and talk about old times. I noticed he talkedabout those days in very passable English. That is one point to rememberabout the Chinese. They adjust to their environment even to learning thelanguage. They believe in education whenever or wherever it can be obtained.³⁰

²⁹WSJ: I am aware that this attitudehas deteriorated of late. Long campaigning accustoms any army to minorlooting. As the old outfits are seeded with replacements, some of the finerpoints of view very understandably break down. Furthermore the American,with his wealth of money, food, and fine equipment, is a constant temptation.The perpetually hungry, poverty-stricken Chinese soldier was a coolie notmany months ago.
³⁰WSJ: If you get up early enough in the morning as youpass the Ledo station, you will observe every small Chinese youngster inthe bazaar area trooping across the tracks to school. You can't sell anypeople short who turn their kids out to school at the crack of dawn, eventhough they may not be well able to afford it. The Chinese have not beenan independent nation for thousands of years by coincidence!

It must be remembered that any troops are a cross section of their country.The Chinese units in this area are not even a fair cross section. The morecivilized and cultured eastern coastal areas are in Japanese hands. TheChungking government has therefore to conscript the peasantry of the undevelopedwest. Not many years ago the provinces of West China enjoyed an unenviablereputation. They were as remote and inaccessible as the Rocky Mountainsin Civil War times. It is as fair to rate China on the basis of the ChineseArmy in India, as it is to assume that a crowd of colored service troopson their way to a movie give a complete picture of America. Nevertheless,these country boys have proved themselves to be hardy marchers and patientsufferers. To disparage their fighting quality is to lose sight of thefact that they have little tradition or experience in offensive warfare,and that they are called upon to cope with modern equipment for which theyhave no technical background of knowledge. A jeep is a strange and wonderfultoy in the hands of a kid whose father may own a single cow.

One of the most serious defects of the Chinese military machine is thegeneral low standard of education, which is reflected in the quality ofNCO and junior officer personnel. This not only makes for dubious leadership,but is an impediment in such simple matters as routine correspondence,and in the transmission of messages and orders. As a result, there appearsa system which has always existed in illiterate armies. This is a compositeof rigid channels of command, refusal to permit initiative in NCOs andjunior officers, and centralization of responsibility at field grade orhigher levels. A machine built out of this material is bound to be slow,uneven, and awkward in action. Chinese soldiers have been accused of beingbalky, when the obvious thing to do is readily apparent. The reason forthis is simple. Chinese conscripts have been so steeped in the conceptof fixed command channels, that they hesitate to take orders from strangers.They may even refuse to obey officers of adjacent Chinese units. They waituntil the Old Man talks; and sometimes they are still waiting after heis dead.

A superior officer is superior in any man's language, whether he developedhimself by sweat and hard work, or had the benefit of education and a culturalbackground. One of the battalion commanders of the 10th Engineers was twenty-nineyears old. He had been fifteen years in the Army. Starting as a farmerboy in the ranks, he picked up an education as he went along to be a Lt.Colonel. He was an avid reader, shrewd judge of men, and a fine leader.A striking example of the cultured type was Colonel Lee, who obviouslycame of good family.³¹ Any American officer could be proud tohave his urbane good manners, both on formal occasions and in the performanceof his daily business. My observation is that Chinese units have theirshare of good officers, but in considerably lesser proportions than Americanunits; and the quality tends to fall off sharply in the lower grades.

³¹WSJ: Colonel Lee was raised in Shantung.That is the province where Confucius was born and lived. The Old Sage spenthis days serving his government as a minor official, and his nights writingphilosophy. Colonel Lee was a good representative of that tradition.

The race had walled cities and a mature culture when our ancestors roamedNorth Europe in wolfskins. In the twentieth century, China lacks the technicaland mechanical background whereby both the western powers and the Japanesehave out-stripped her. This does not mean that China is a backward nationin potential. The history of civilization disproves that. Gunpowder andprinting, craftsmanship and art, and an ancient slant on life which isstill sound, are not the marks of a poor race. The principal differencebetween the Chinese and us is really no great difference at all. They simplylike their own way of looking at the world, and they don't give a damnabout anybody else's. An American can understand that viewpoint. A generalizationis a dangerous thing, because it destroys flexibility of thought. It ispossible, however, to make one safe generalization. The Chinese are intelligent,aggressive, shrewd, patient, and hard working. China has remained a cohesiveand self-sustaining nation for six thousand years, because of many of thesame qualities which enabled America to build an empire in a hundred andfifty. We will do well to hold together as long as she has. Much of thefriction which has become evident in this campaign stems from a singlefactor: For once the American soldier is dealing with an alien army whichis as independent, cocky, and self-centered as he is. It is easy to wise-crackabout the Boo-Hows,³² but often it does not make much sense.

The Chinese is seldom the mystical and inscrutable Oriental portrayedby Hollywood. Probably his most striking characteristic is his inborn abilityand willingness to laugh, rain or shine. My friends used to ask me howI could voluntarily live so cheerfully with the Chinese, and appear totake their part in case of argument. I could do it because they were goodguys, and because they were in the right in at least fifty percent of thearguments.

There were diverse characters in our little club. The good old phrase:"You can't tell one Chinaman from another," is not at all sound.The troops were largely West China farmers; but the officers were a compositeof the nation. They varied in complexion; they differed in speech; andthey were poles apart in personality. The Adjutant, for one, was a short,squat, unimaginative man who closely resembled portraits of Genghis Khan.Like many officers in the American army, he was over age in grade and painfullyconscious of it. He seldom spoke unless necessary, and then with irritation.Certainly he was nobody's bosom pal; but he had a rare touch of somethingthat was a continual surprise. Somehow on the nights that I dragged myweary carcass most painfully into camp, his orderly would appear to inviteme to share a snack with him. He had such a charming manner of lookingat an American cigarette that I did not resent the occasional disappearanceof a pack. He never failed to replace twenty with a British tin of fifty.The night of 7 June 1943 is still a vivid recollection. I was aroused fromslumber

³²American pigeon-Chinese for "bad.""Hao bu hao" (how goes it?), "Bu hao," (bad), and "Dinghao," (good) were the common counters of cultural interchange betweenthe two armies.

with the request that I partake of a few delicacies in his tent. Saiddelicacies proved to be a bottle of Calcutta gut-rot somebody had smuggledin. He had already drunk his assistant under the table, and had reacheda stage of pugnacity which had his personal staff intimidated. Nevertheless,we had a swell evening, although I coasted along under wraps. Many thingswere discussed: the birds and the bees, the Chinese lack of a rotationpolicy³³ (which was the same as ours in those days), the cherryblossoms on the bough, and personal opinions of the military system asseen through civilian eyes. When his limited English and my scanty Chinesefailed, we understood each other perfectly, as happens on such occasions.After I poured him into bed, I nearly broke my neck in a slit trench onthe way home.

Another officer was the younger brother of a prominent Nose and Throatspecialist in a famous Yangtze River town; and the nephew of the Chineseambassador to Colombia. He was an intelligent and charming person, anda thoroughly competent officer. He had figured some angle to get an Americaneducation. At his insistence, I wrote a letter on his behalf to the Presidentof Harvard University.³⁴

Another boy, about nineteen years old, was a Lieutenant in the MedicalDetachment. He was a dreamer if there ever was one. As Medical Supply Officer,he soon demonstrated a complete lack of command of simple arithmetic; butthere was something about him that appealed. One week he went to town topick up a requisition, and was AWOL³⁵ for five days. It tookme a day and a half to find him; and I never quite determined whether hehad been to church or had been shacked up with a girl. In the end, however,it was so arranged that he was not courtmartialed.

There were many prize characters in the 10th Engineers; and probablythe prize of them all was the Colonel's interpreter. This lad told severalstories of his antecedents. The best one was that he was the son of anex-Chinese Ambassador to Germany, and had been born in Berlin. As far asI know, this was never disproved. He always used the first name of Frederickin introducing himself, with a good German pronunciation. One night heconfided to me that he was going to America. A few days later he disappeared.Eventually he was pulled off a transport at an Indian port as a stowaway.Instead of being shot, he was reassigned to another unit; and I have seenhim several times since. Numerous people, at one time or other, have questionedthe good judgment of Colonel Lee in using this boy as his regular interpreter.No doubt the astute Colonel utilized him as a stooge, for exactly the samereason that I never exhibited my entire Chinese vocabulary in the presenceof the Chinese.

The world cannot be a dull place, as long as one enjoys the people thatlive in it, of whatever color.

³³A policy of returning troops to the UnitedStates after long overseas service.
³⁴WSJ: I was a little dubious as to how much influencethis might have. The Registrar could probably determine that I once hadbeen an undistinguished student at the medical school.
³⁵Absent without leave.

III. ON THE LEDO ROAD

Namchik Valley

From May to September 1943, I lived at Regimental Headquarters at Mile23 and roamed the Namchik Valley. I was the only American medical officeron fifteen miles of road. In addition to my duties with the Chinese, Ibecame the village doctor for the scattered small American units in myterritory. These included the lst Veterinary Company (Mile 20), a smallPOL³⁶ station operated by men of the 48th Evac Hosp (Mile 23.3),a detachment of the 115 Ordnance Company (Mile 24), and a Signal Detachment(Mile 24.5). Capt. [Douglas F.] Watson built a bamboo dispensary at thelst Vets, where sick call for all these units was held. This aid stationwas manned by two reliable technicians from the 48th Evac Hosp.³⁷At Mile 20, there were some fifty Indians engaged in building theveterinary stables,³⁸ so my responsibilities became cosmopolitan.

My relation with the Americans along the Road is not properly a partof this narrative; but their proximity was a godsend to me. Sick call at1100 hours meant one square meal a day; and every few miles there was someonewho could talk English. There were many experiences to remember. Such asthe night I sent [1st Lt. Paul H.] Breidenbach³⁹ to the hospital,with a temperature of 105°. He had refused to leave his men for thepast two days, because he was the only officer present. By using weeklysanitary reports as a weapon, I was able to help [2d Lt. William J.] Smithsecure proper mess equipment for his orphans.⁴⁰ Visiting theChinese companies at Namgoi and Hellgate,⁴¹ I frequently stoppedat the hospital "D"

³⁶Petrol, oil, and lubricants.
³⁷WSJ: T4c. Adam Bagaskas, and T5c. Joseph Ravin. Thesemen used uniformly good judgment. While I was absent or sick in hospital,they selected, treated, and evacuated cases to the complete satisfactionof all concerned.
³⁸WSJ: As the malaria rates among Americans rose to cripplinglevels I combed over these natives. The first lot inspected, 14 June 1943,showed 40.4% with enlarged spleens or active symptoms of malaria. * * *Skat [an insect repellent], netting, and other antimalarial supplies wereextremely limited. It was difficult to protect the men against adjacentnatives, except by clothing regulations. Almost all of the units I servicedhad construction labor in or near their camps. The noneffective rate wasstaggering. The weekly man-days lost from malaria alone by the 1stVet Co. rose: 9 June--0.8%; 16 June--2.2%; 23 June--6.3%; 30 June--15.2%.* * * For the 4 weeks ending 28 August--15.6%. For the 5 weeks ending 31July, the 115 Ord. Co. Det. lost 15.8% man-days. * * * For the 6 weeksending 28 August, the Base Signal Det. lost 15.6%. All of these figureswere elevated by other diseases and injuries. It took the Medical Departmentmany months to convince higher authority that the policy of quarteringnative labor in American camps was disastrous.
Ed.--Col. John M. Tamraz, Services of Supply Surgeon, had guessed in February1943 that the American sick rate would run as high as 20%. The Britishthought that the rate for malaria would be 25%, basing their estimateson prewar experience. See North Tirap Log, p. 24, n. 90, and referencescited; Romanus and Sunderland, I, p. 308.
³⁹115th Ordnance Company.
⁴⁰Troops of the Base Signal Detachment, which Smith directed.Jones adds in a footnote: "This hot potato got action. But the BaseSignal Officer would have killed me on sight for a month thereafter, asit bounced through channels." Smith, wrote Jones, was a "smartyoung Texan" who was "one of the wheelhorses of the telephoneservice all the way down to Myitkyina and beyond."
⁴¹East of Ledo.

Company, 151st Medical Battalion was operating at the Namgoi crossing.⁴²Here I used to see [Capt. Floyd T., Jr.] Romberger;⁴³ and forseveral months [1st Lt. Hubert] Holdsworth⁴⁴ was running thesub-depot dispensary at Hellgate.

On 19 June, a radio came in from Delhi ordering another officer andmyself to China, attached to the 14th Air Force. I happened to come toLedo on Sunday, 20 June, and heard about it. It sounded like a good show;but General Boatner requested the orders be rescinded, on the basis thatI was already serving with Chinese troops. [1st Lt. Rolden F.] Canfield⁴⁵however, went over on a veterinary mission about that time.

Every week or two I would drive to Ledo in the weapons carrier the 1stVets let me have on M/R⁴⁶ in exchange for holding their sickcall. There I used to see [Capt. George F.] Conde,⁴⁷ and Webster,who came up on the Rice Mission business once in awhile.

Chinese-American relations were good, and many amusing incidents occurred.Probably the most gala occasion was the opening of the Namchik Bridges.The original road came off a steep bluff, and crossed the stream undera log structure which threatened to give way whenever the water rose. Theroad was straightened by bridging a tributary, building a fill over a neckof land, and erecting a steel span across the main river. The smaller bridgewas built by the 10th Engineers and was known as the "Chinese Bridge."The "American Bridge" was steel-rigged by the 45th Engineers(colored). There was a friendly rivalry on the job, and a big celebrationwas planned for the simultaneous opening on 2 July. A platform was erectedmidway on the gravel fill. After a preliminary dinner given by ColonelLee, the party repaired to the Namchik. Laudatory speeches were made bythe Chinese and Americans, and interpreted in the reverse direction. The45th Engineer band played the "Star Spangled Banner" and somethingintended to be the Chinese National Anthem. Two Chinese nurses⁴⁸and several

⁴²WSJ: One of the choice items of theMedical Department lore is the Namgoi Bridge, long forgotten by most. TheNamgoi is a little stream with a large watershed. (The history of the "LifeLine to China" has been a struggle with little streams draining largewatersheds.) The fundamental error in the planning of the Namgoi Hospitalwas that the detachment area was across this placid little rill from thewards. Nobody considered this point at the time, but our Operations Sectionwould know better now. A few yards upstream was a temporary log bridge;while next to it the Chinese worked round the clock pouring concrete andrigging steel for a new span. About 5 July the new structure would carrytraffic. The temporary and permanent bridges were a bit inconvenient forthe 151st Med. Bn., so they threw across a small suspension to connectthe two sections of the hospital. During the big flood of 3 July, boththe log and the steel bridges washed out. For days thereafter, all therations and fuel for the troops east of Namgoi were carried on the backof natives over a swinging, creaking, three-foot link of wire and bamboo.Meanwhile the 45th Engrs. frantically rebuilt the vehicular structure.When the boys with Castles on their collars make tart remarks about theCaduceus Club, a most effective rebuttal is the bridge the medical engineersbuilt across the Namgoi.
⁴³151st Medical Battalion; original editor of North TirapLog.
⁴⁴48th Evacuation Hospital.
⁴⁵1st Veterinary Company.
⁴⁶Memorandum receipt.
⁴⁷48th Evacuation Hospital, also serving as a liaison officer.
⁴⁸WSJ: There were several civilian Chinese nurses attachedto the 20th General Hospital during the summer and fall of 1943. They hadbeen trained in American mission hospitals, and were of great assistancewith the influx of Chinese patients. They generated a heated competitionamong the young Chinese officers in Ledo.

American girls from the 20th General Hospital and 73d Evacuation werepresent. The final act was to drape one each Chinese and American nurseon the fenders of a jeep. The crowd cheered as they snipped the ribbonacross the roadway in unison. Then everybody took off to the cocktail partyat the 45th Engineers Headquarters near Hellgate.

Malaria and Dysentery

Life along the Namchik, however, was not all skittles and beer. It rainedtorrents the night of 30 June, and continued to pour about all of 1 July.It cleared long enough to hold the bridge ceremonies on 2 July, but startedagain that night.

I had been feeling miserable all day, and did not go to the party atHellgate. Back at camp a group of us finished up the remains of the Colonel'sluncheon. Soon after I got to bed I had a stiff chill. Around 0200 hours,the Officer of the Guard asked me to see a sick man. He had malaria allright, but didn't look as sick as his physician felt. Another chill beforebreakfast finished off the night. We had no atabrine⁴⁹ in camp,so I dosed myself with quinine before I went down to the Vets for sickcall. The river was rising rapidly. Immediately after lunch all hands turnedout to evacuate the kitchen and tents from the lower level. By the timethe last of the equipment was carried up to the bluff, the lower area was4 feet under water. About then someone came by with the news that the Namgoiand Namchik bridges had gone out, and that Tate's Dam (actually a causewayand bridge) had washed away.

Things did not look too good. I was the only American medic in a twentymile stretch, isolated from the hospitals on either side by broken bridges.Ting⁵⁰ was at the 20th General with dysentery. Chang⁵¹was sick. We had better than 2000 Chinese in the area, plus some 200 Americans,with no prospects of evacuation for at least a week. Besides, three Americanboys had showed up to sick call with obvious malaria that morning. Thebest thing would be to dose myself as best I could, and stick around.

Back at camp, bed looked awfully good. I woke with a chill about 1400hours; went back to sleep; and woke again in an hour or so vomiting upthe quinine. My orderly, Yang Hun Hsin, had slept in the tent the nightbefore to watch me. Now he was hovering around like a mother hen. The nexttime I woke, my musette bag was packed and he was trying to get my shoeson. Obviously I was getting goofy. A doc with probable cerebral malaria,vomiting quinine and with no atabrine, would be of little use to anybody.It did not require much of a struggle to persuade me to take off.

⁴⁹A synthetic drug, Atabrine, was the principalchemical weapon against malaria during World War II, when quinine-producingareas were in enemy hands. In 1943, CBI authorities still were cautiousabout prescribing it as a suppressive, fearing the results of "concealing"infections in order to keep men on duty, and anxious that troops not neglectantimalarial discipline by relying on Atabrine suppressive measures. SeeRomanus and Sunderland, II, p. 286; U.S. Army Medical Service, Malaria,chapter VII; Infectious Diseases, chapter XV; and The Maraudersand the Microbes, p. 395, n. 152.
⁵⁰Regimental Surgeon, 10th Engineer Regiment.
⁵¹Assistant Regimental Surgeon, 10th Engineer Regiment.

Watson gave me a driver; we picked up the three sick Americans; leftword for the 151st Medical Bn to send someone down from Namgoi if necessary;and headed for town. Fortunately the phone was still working. The lst Vetration truck called out to say they were stranded outside of Ledo, andthey were told to come as far as possible to meet us.

At Tate's Dam the bridge was out, but there was a three-foot tree fallenacross the gully. Abandoning the vehicle, we worked across that astraddle.I was at the rear, and had a job to keep the lad ahead of me from fallingoff. On the other side a six-by-six had been sitting all day with a loadof meat. The driver offered to take us back to the next road block. Themeat stunk so high that two of the boys started vomiting over the tailboard.So we threw the stuff out. Near Mile 7 the road was too far under waterfor the truck to pass, but we managed to walk about a mile along an embankment.Here a jeep picked us up. At the Tirap River bridge two of us had anotherchill together. Of course we were soaking wet, and that one might not havebeen from the malaria. The road was blocked at Mile 4.5; but when the officeron guard took a look, he piled us into a truck. The driver slammed throughuntil his motor stalled. They winched us out from the other end. The 1stVets welcomed us with open arms, and we flopped into the ration truck.

3 July was my thirty-ninth birthday. May there never be another onelike it.

I remember lying on a bench in the receiving room at the 20th General.Sometime later [Lt. Col. Thomas] Fitzhugh⁵² came in and saidthat the blood smear was loaded with falciparum. Oral medication was abandonedfor intravenous quinine (which thrombosed the veins in my right arm); andI recall [Major Dickinson S.] "Red" Pepper getting out of bedto readjust a needle dislodged by thrashing around. It was noon of 5 Julybefore I really came to enough to take stock of the situation. Thereafterrecovery was without complications and discharge was in two weeks.

I was sent to quarters with the 48th Evac Hosp Detachment at Lekhapaniunder the watchful eye of [lst Lt. William F.] Stankard.⁵³ Aftertwo weeks I returned to duty on 30 July. The new hospital constructionwas well under way, and most of the patients had been moved from tentsto the new bashas. Sanitation had slipped badly. No latrine oil had beenrequisitioned during the month of my absence. The place was crawling withflies and the kitchens were filthy again. On 9 August I was in the hospitalagain with bacillary dysentery for twelve days.⁵⁴

⁵²Chief of Medical Service, 20th General Hospital.
⁵³In an extended note, Jones describes the large hospital forIndian laborers which Stankard and a few others from the 48th EvacuationHospital operated at Lekhapani. By scrounging odds and ends of suppliesand equipment, Stankard managed to care for as many as 750 patients, didmajor surgery, and ran "one of the best good-will shows in the area."
⁵⁴WSJ: These were the days before suppressive Atabrine,and when all materials for ordinary sanitary facilities were at a premium.If one lived with Chinese troops, malaria and dysentery were perfectlynormal occupational hazards. They required the same philosophical disregardas Housemaid's Knee.
Ed.--In the incidence rate of diarrhea and dysentery, as in malaria, theCBI Theater led all overseas commands. The average rate of incidence forthe war years was 131 per annum per 1,000 troops. In the peak year of 1944the rate was 181 per annum per 1,000. Putting the point in another way,CBI had 1.8% of Army troop strength but 10.9% of all cases of dysenteryand diarrhea. Of the 56,951 reported cases of diarrhea and dysentery, thecommon forms of diarrhea were the most prevalent. Bacillary and unclassifieddysentery accounted for about 21% of the reported cases. With a peak ratein 1943 of 15.45 per annum per 1,000, bacillary dysentery had a 1942-45average incidence rate of 8.9. However, the number of actual cases, asopposed to reported cases, probably ran up to a rate of 20 per annum per1,000.
The widespread infection of Indian and Chinese troops and of civilian laborers,and their inadequate sanitary practices produced a very difficult situation.But it was not unbeatable, as Jones showed. On a theaterwide scale littleimprovement occurred until 1945, after the visit of a special commissionfrom the Army Epidemiological Board. Its surveys and recommendations, whenapplied by comprehensive sanitary regulations, produced a marked declinein enteric disorders. Sulfadiazine was used to treat patients with bacillaryforms of dysentery, and the disease was rarely fatal. See Romanus and Sunderland,II, pp. 286-287; U.S. Army Medical Service, Communicable Disease * ** Respiratory and Alimentary Tracts, pp. 376-389.

Prepare To Move

During July and early August the situation at road-head was in a stateof flux. Rain and mud were impeding operations. Several plans were discussedto increase forward progress once the monsoons stopped. It was once proposedto have the 10th Engineers maintain the road, and send the 823rd Engr AvnBn to the front of the line. This would entail transferring heavy equipmentto the Chinese and training operators. It was finally decided to pull themoff bridge and culvert building, and to deploy them to fell timber alongthe right of way and along the trace ahead of the point.

On 29 July and 3 August conferences were held at the Surgeon's Officeto discuss medical support for both the "Chinese Jeep Road"⁵⁵and the Refugee Trail between Namlip and Tagap. A plan was formulated whichwas carried out except for the location of the installations proposed atLoglai and Tagung.⁵⁶

Hitherto Chinese units had been equipped more or less helter skelter.About this time there was an effort to bring order out of chaos by developinga provisional T/O & E⁵⁷ for all Chinese units. Because the10th Engineers were not properly a part of Combat Command, the establishmentof their equipment list was palmed off on SOS. I am in no position to judgethe efficacy of the items from other depots, but the experience with medicalequipment was sad. It appeared that this had been allocated without consultationwith the Surgeon. The authorized items were naturally CDS British stock.⁵⁸They must have been picked sight unseen from the catalog,

⁵⁵WSJ: This was never a Jeep Road inany sense of the word. The stretch between Nawng Yang and Namlip becameknown as the Tincha Trace. The section usually known as the Chinese JeepRoad extended from Chinese Midway to Tagap. It was constructed by handby the 12th Chinese Engineers during the period when the 10th was clearingthe trace.
⁵⁶Jones included a photocopy of the plan in his narrative. Itshows the intention of Services of Supply to provide three new aid stationsalong the road. Seagrave already had a hospital at Tagap, and 151st MedicalBattalion stations were to assist in evacuation to the rear.
⁵⁷Table of Organization and Equipment. To develop them not onlystabilized the Chinese Army in India and regularized its supply system,but helped modernize the Chinese Army in general. Eventually, standardtables were worked out for all types of units, from coolie transportationcompanies to infantry divisions. They were applied to the Chinese troopsselected for modernization under American auspices.
⁵⁸CDS: Chinese Defense Supplies. Some of the supplies whichthe United States provided the Chinese Government on credit were actuallyprocured from British sources in India. By this means the refugee Chinesedivisions were rapidly reequipped at the Ramgarh Training Center and aportion of Britain's Lend-Lease debt was cancelled by "reverse Lend-Lease."Jones's dissatisfaction with British materials and levels of supply typifiedthe American reaction, generally.

with selection of items nearly approximating American nomenclature.The result was unrealistic to say the least. In addition, some of the itemswere not available on the base. Nevertheless, there it was in black andwhite on official paper.⁵⁹ I spent the next six weeks walkingthrough warehouses, taking inventory, justifying, stalling, and tryingto get my hands on substitute items. It did not take the Chinese long tocatch on that SOS had no sound idea of what the T/E authorized comprised,and that most of what had been promised would not be available in the predictablefuture. The only thing that saved American "face" was the factthat the 22nd and 38th Chinese Divisions were being alerted for the HukawngValley push. Once in awhile it was possible to fall back on the statementthat they had priority on medical supplies for the purpose of saving thelives of the brave Chinese fighting men.⁶⁰

Reconnaissance

Colonel Lee delayed starting the movement until he was assured of aworkable supply system for the isolated companies. After protracted negotiationshe decided to go see for himself.

The party⁶¹ left Mile 23 early the morning of 3 September.We proceeded by jeep to roadhead. This was at Garo Brook⁶² onthe south slope of Pangsau Pass at a point then Mile 44. There we pickedup twenty-five porters and were joined by Colonel [Robert E.] York, RoadEngineer, who walked with us through calf-deep mud to Nawng Yang. Herewe had a late lunch with Major [Edmund H., Jr.] Daves and Captain [EmbreeW., Jr.] Morgan.⁶³

The 2nd Battalion Headquarters, 330th Engineers, was perched on a steephalf-cleared hillside. The officers quarters and orderly room were on alevel with the mess shack roof, whose floor in turn was on a level withthe dispensary roof, etc. Housing was in pyramidal tents, with a few bamboo-frametarpaulined shacks. About a hundred slab steps led down to what would someday be a road.

We proceeded along the muddy dozer track to Thursday River, a famousand once busy spot. The old Refugee Trail ran almost due south from

⁵⁹In a note and an appendix Jones reportedthat the small first aid kits authorized for medical noncommissioned officerswere available, but the even simpler kits for aidmen were not. No officer'smedical chests--seven were allotted--could be located. In the standard,prepacked cases of medical supplies, most of the surgical instruments weremissing, and one of the four cases which constituted the regimental supplyunit never was found.
⁶⁰WSJ: Now the gentle reader understands whatis meant by the liaison officer being in the middle.
⁶¹WSJ: The party selected to go consisted of: ColonelLee; Major Chow, Acting Vice Commander; Major Wang, 3rd Bn Commander; aWarrant Officer; the Colonel's orderly and another soldier; Mr. [Fay H.]Lawler, the interpreter; and myself.
⁶²WSJ: So called because here was a large camp of portersfrom the Garo hills. They were sturdier and better carriers than the Nagas,and were hired in considerable numbers on a 6 month basis. Many of theseGaros were Christians. One told a friend of mine, I am American--AmericanBaptist." The ranking civilian leader and spiritual adviser of thesenatives was Dr. Telford, an American missionary. The evening singing ofthe old evangelistic hymns at Garo Brook was a local attraction; even betterthan the sundown services of Seagrave's Burmese nurses.
⁶³WSJ: Major Daves had been Provost Marshal on the Monticello,with Morgan as his assistant. I became acquainted with them on the ship;and during my tour along the Road they became two of my best friends. Theircamps at Nawng Yang and at the Ngalang crossing are spots of fond memory.The genial hospitality and good chow were unfailing; and I spent many nightsthere in the course of my wanderings.

100

Nawng Yang over three high ranges to Namlip. The survey for the newroad avoided this land mass by skirting around it to the east, along theNawng Yang and Loglai River Valleys. There was an overgrown preexistingtrail part way around this bend, but for all practical purposes the tracepartly chopped through a virgin jungle wilderness. Thursday River was thefirst of the camps [Capt. Russell] Rupert⁶⁴ established alongthis line in April 1943, and it was used as a supply base for a long time.The site was on an acre or so of flat land where a little stream tumblesdown a steep hill to join the Nawng Yang. The trace climbed out of thevalley onto a high ledge behind. The entire party spent the night here,except Major Daves who went ahead to where "D" Company was pushingthe point. Here for the first time I met renowned [Capt. George M.] Burgett.⁶⁵

The morning of 4 September we made slow time to Midway. A bulldozertrack in rainy weather is hard walking. The treads gouge a pair of deepruts; the blade throws up a parapet of soft dirt on each side, and thecenter strip is scraped flat by the chassis. Rain collects in the rutsand soaks both sides of the channel. It is frequently almost impossibleto find firm footing. At such places the porters swing either up or downthe hillside and beat a new path. This has the disadvantage that it involvestiresome scrambling up and down hill off the road. We found Major Daveswaking up for lunch after spending the night with the lead dozer.⁶⁶

At Midway our party reorganized. Major Wang and one soldier returnedto bring the 3rd Battalion into Thursday River. Colonel Lee, Chow, Lawler,the Warrant Officer, one soldier and I went on. With us was Sgt. [MonroeH.] Cherry,⁶⁷ whom Daves loaned us as a guide. As we left Midwaythe lead dozer was just cutting past camp, at a point now about Mile 49.From

⁶⁴WSJ: He commanded the trace-cuttingparties of the 330th Engr Regt which developed the road trace from NawngYang to Tagap. He was in the jungle from April to October 1943. Duringthe last month he was completely exhausted and in poor health. He walkedout 4 days to roadhead with me 26-30 October, and was sent to the 20thGeneral Hospital for several weeks. He was never fit for field duty afterthat; and became Mess Officer of the Headquarters Officers Mess, Ledo,until his return to the United States in the winter of 1945.
⁶⁵WSJ: This officer was famous along the Road, all theway from Pangsau in the summer of 1943 to Bhamo in the winter of 1945.He was original in his ideas and somewhat of a nonconformist. His opinions,voiced with a stammer which became more pronounced the hotter he got, werenot infrequently at variance with higher authority. He preferred to liveas far at the head of the line as he could get from Road Headquarters.With the possible exception of Daves, he was the subject of more hilariousanecdotes than any of the men who built the Ledo Road. If he ever writeshis story the way he talks, I will surely buy the book.
⁶⁶WSJ: This was common practice when the going was rough.He was a compact, grizzled little man in his middle fifties. His vocabularywas garnished with the gems acquired during the years spent with the railroads.In a campaign hat curled up like a sombrero, an antique six-shooter onhis hip, he was a familiar figure along the Road. He was usually to befound prowling around at the point where the fallen timber was thickestand the mud deepest. He treated his men like a father, and they respondedin kind. No battalion commander in the area got as much output from hismen by sheer leadership. He was sometimes called the "Iron Major,"and he certainly deserved the title as much as the original owner did [the"Iron Duke," Wellington].
⁶⁷WSJ: 330th Engineer Regiment. His name derived fromhis being part Cherokee Indian. This quiet, tobacco-chewing Texan was agreat friend of the Nagas and the Kachins, but could not abide the Chinese.He was famous as the semiofficial scout and guide along the trails. Hesaved his cigarettes for trading, and always carried a handful of silverrupees and a small box of crude opium. He was the middle man in numeroustransactions involving rings and jewelry the natives had secured in therefugee days. This was supplemented by his talents as a dice and pokerplayer. He will have a tidier nest egg after the war than most officers.

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here the trace was a thin slash through the jungle, patted down to aslippery path by the bare feet of the porters hauling rations out to thesurvey teams.

We spent the night at Loglai two miles beyond (now Mile 51). Two habitableshanties on a little bluff overlooking the river, remained of the old campbuilt by Rupert. Some annoying things came to light as we settled down.Only Cherry and I were properly equipped. Lawler⁶⁸ had a mosquitonet, but no cot or mess kit. The colonel had cot, net, a cup and a spoon.The rest had blankets, cups, and chopsticks. For the rest of the trip theseven of us shared the two mess kits and utensils. This kind of carelessnessis costly and uncomfortable.

Loglai in those days was a beautiful spot. We sat on the rocks at theedge of the bluff, around a little fire. It was a clear night, and thedome of sky over the little valley was ablaze with stars. Somehow the starsseem brighter in Burma than any place I have been. The Americans and theChinese alternated in singing, while the porters squatted listening inthe dark.

The next morning (5 September) we walked the four miles across the TagungRiver to Tincha. I was the first one in, and received a hearty greetingfrom [1st Lt. Wilbur B.] Manter,⁶⁹ attempting to build a fieldhospital there in anticipation of the extension of the Road. He was livingon short rations with two colored cooks. Most of his native labor was sickwith what was probably the first unrecognized outbreak of scrub typhuswe had encountered.

On 6 September we headed over [Capt. Samuel D.] Clark's⁷⁰trail for Gared Ra pass. It was eight miles to the top and another fiveto Namlip. We were told that rations were cached in an old tent for usat Gared Ra.

⁶⁸WSJ: Another well known figure. Hewas sometimes called the "Boy Scout" from the high laced bootsand stiff brimmed campaign hat he habitually wore. He had lived for manyyears in China, and was fluent in some seven regional dialects. At theoutbreak of the war he was in Indo-China managing one of the Chinese concernsimporting war material over the railroad into Yunnan. His mother and sisterwere caught by the Japanese in Shanghai, and were interned there until1944, when they were repatriated. He came to India with the Chinese Army,in the capacity of civilian interpreter. A quick, irritable, active littleman. Forgetting his equipment was quite in character with some of his otheroddities. After a series of contract details with the 10th Engineers, hespent considerable time with Colonel [James G.] Truitt's advance locationparties. He developed a large hernia during his service in the jungle,which he was about to have repaired when I last saw him in the spring of1945.
⁶⁹WSJ: 48th Evacuation Hospital. An All-Maine footballplayer while at Bowdoin. This splendid officer was a hound for punishment,and nearly killed himself carrying out his assignments. One of his exploitsoccurred while he was building the hospital at Tincha. Suitable bamboowas very scarce on the west bank of the Loglai. He swam across the riverand found a good stand on the other side. The streams were still floodedand few of his natives could swim. So he built a boom down which he plannedto log his timber. At the last minute the boom broke, and Manter was verynearly drowned. [Jones also quotes the official commendation which Manterreceived for participating in a strenuous reconnaissance mission to locatesites for hospitals along the projected road, and for building the hospitalat Tincha.]
⁷⁰WSJ: 48th Evacuation Hospital. He went with Manteron Rupert's original advance party. He made friends with the Nagas, andused to go to their villages to treat and visit them. While one group cutsouthwest from Tincha, another went down to Namlip via the Refugee Trailand worked northwest. They were to meet at Gared Ra, on the divide betweenthe Loglai and Namlip watersheds. There were no native villages in thisarea. It was blind cutting in rough, densely wooded country. The storywhich I had never heard before goes that things were getting nowhere fast,until Clark and a group of his Naga pals took out one fine day and choppedthe connection across the pass. The route itself tended to confirm thistale. It climbed the shoulders at steep grades and crossed the divide atits highest point, in typical Naga fashion. After the bulldozers had developedit, only a limited amount of truck traffic was able to negotiate the route.The present Road had to be relocated across a lower saddle to the north.The enlisted men used to call Clark one of the best engineers on the trace.He had itchy feet, and liked to see the country. He returned to Ledo inlate August 1943. He then wandered all over eastern India on his leave.After a couple of months of clinical work at the 20th General Hospital,he joined the 48th Evac Hosp element at Tincha. Not satisfied to sit still,he volunteered to operate the aid station at Namyang. He later moved toTaga Sakan. When the entire 48th Evac was pulled back to Ledo, so muchcivilization got on his nerves. He asked for another field assignment,and was loaned to one of the NCAC Portable Surgical Hospitals on the leftflank of the push south from Kamaing to Mogaung. [This was the 43d PortableSurgical Hospital supporting the Chinese 38th Division.--Ed.] He was withthe Chinese and the British 36th Division in the Railroad Corridor [leadingsouth from Mogaung; possibly he now was attached to the 60th Portable SurgicalHospital.--Ed.]. The high spot of this venture was a reconnaissance onthe Indawgyi Lake with some British officers. The last thing he did wasto ride one of the first convoys to China. A footloose troubadour if thereever was one. One wonders how he will be able to settle down again to themonotony of practice in a small New England town.

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The porters protested at a haul of eight miles, but were assured ofa night at the pass. Fortunately we got off to an early start. The Garosmade good time and I stayed with them, while the rest of the party dalliedto eat at the Ngalang crossing. There was a gain of over 1000 feet in thethree miles from Kichu Creek to the top. I arrived dead beat at 1330 hoursin a driving rain. Instead of a tent and rations, there were two dilapidatedbamboo shacks. Even the thatch and side walls were soggy and there wasinsufficient dry fuel to start a fire. The bustees were crawling with vermin.I have an aversion for the combination of natives and fleas. When the restof the party came up at 1500 hours, it was decided to push on to Namlip,after a half hour rest. It was a five mile race against darkness down awet and unfamiliar trail. I pulled in with the lead porters at 1900 hours.Chris Hill's⁷¹ camp certainly looked good. That was one of thethree worst days I ever had on the trails. It took almost twelve hourswalking time to make thirteen miles.

After dark we became concerned for the rest of the party. I went backa mile or so and met Lawler and Colonel Lee. Half an hour behind, in cameCherry shepherding Chow and the Chinese Warrant Officer.

The next morning was devoted to rest and care of blisters. In the afternoonI talked with [lst Lt. Robert C.] Barker⁷² about medical supportof the battalion which would be based at Namlip. Then Colonel Lee, Lawler,and I climbed to the dropping ground to look over the ration stock pilein the warehouse.

On 8 September we started north on our way back over the old RefugeeTrail. This was another rough climb. The trail led over one ridge downinto the Ngalang Valley, and up to the dropping ground on a shoulder ofNgalang Bum. The net gain in elevation was 2400 feet, most of it in thelast two miles.

⁷¹WSJ: 1st Lt. Christopher F. Hill,330th Engineer Regiment. He was in the 20th General Hospital with scrubtyphus at the same time I was, in December 1943 and January 1944.
⁷²WSJ: In the summer of 1943 he supervised the Namlipand Chang Rang aid stations. When I was there on this trip, he was buildinga 150-bed hospital at Namlip. In November he moved forward with the firstparty of "D" Company, 151st Medical Bn, that took over the Shingbwiyanghospital from Seagrave.

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Sisney's⁷³ dropping ground was a famous alpine resort thatcatered to all transients. He had two comfortable bustees for himself andfor his colored boys of the 21st QM Regiment. (Now part of the 21st QMGroup). The mess hall may not have been tops in sanitation, but the chowwas good. [1st Lt. Lloyd H.] Arnold⁷⁴had a radio station nearby,and [1st Lt. Ashley] Pond⁷⁵ ran an aid station half way downthe south slope.

Ngalang was a beautiful spot. The Bum, 4808 feet, was the highest peakin the immediate vicinity of the upper road. It shut off the view to thenorth and west of the dropping ground, but the panorama of ranges to theeast and south was grand--undulating lines of green clear over to the Chinaborder.

In the morning the hill stuck up out of a snowbank of clouds at ourfeet. Just as we left, Arnold picked up the news flash that Italy had surrendered.We had not even heard that the invasion from Sicily to the mainland hadtaken place.

The twelve miles to Nawng Yang was a double stage coming south; butit could be made in one day going north, because of the drop off Ngalang.We stopped at the 151st Medical Bn aid station on the Tagung River forlunch, and arrived at Nawng Yang at dusk.

The road had been improved during a lucky spell of dry weather in ourabsence. Trucks were getting through from Garo Brook to the Nawng Yangbridge, and a jeep picked up Lawler and the Chinese. Cherry and I spentthe night at Daves' headquarters. On 10 September I went to Ledo to reportto the Surgeon.⁷⁶

IV. ALONG THE TINCHA TRACE

Naga Hills

For me this expedition was an experience in a new mode of travel,⁷⁷and I learned some practical points that stood me in good stead later.

The Naga Hills are a spur of the Himalayas which run from northeastto southwest separating the Brahmaputra from the Irrawaddy River systems.

⁷³1st Lt. Elza R. Sisney, 21st QuartermasterGroup.
⁷⁴A Signal Corps officer--WSJ: "stringing the fieldtelephone wire to Tagap."
⁷⁵WSJ: 151st Medical Battalion. During the summer of1943 he supervised the aid stations at Tagung and Ngalang. During the fightingaround Kamaing he operated the air clearing station at Tingkawk strip.He went as medical officer with [Capt. James H.] Kaminer on the expeditionthat walked from Myitkyina to Paoshan over the Tengchung cutoff in August1944.
Ed.--This last exploit is of special interest: the capture of Tengchung,near the Burma border, by Chinese troops under Stilwell's command showedthat troops could get through from North Burma to the West China front.Stilwell used this point to strengthen his hand during very difficult negotiationswith Generalissimo Chiang. See Romanus and Sunderland, II, p. 435.
⁷⁶Jones submitted a detailed report on his reconnaissance, describingthe trail and terrain, and suggesting to the Base Surgeon the means ofproviding medical service along the Road trace. His colorful style offereda sense of the rigors and limitations in the situation, along with thefacts about trail conditions, hospital sites, and ongoing operations.
⁷⁷WSJ: As a small boy, I shagged all over the countrysidewith my father as he made the rounds of his mission stations; and I becamea pretty fair long-strided walker. Twenty years ago I was not the worstintercollegiate cross-country runner in New England. But I really learnedwhat punishment was on those hill trails.

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Politically this is almost unadministered territory which forms thegeographical boundary between India and Burma. The last Assam police outpostis only about ten miles as the crow flies from Ledo, and the politicalofficers did not venture far beyond that. The Burmese police patrolledup to Shingbwiyang with occasional punitive raids higher into the mountains.

The hills through which the Road was built are known as the Patkai Range.This is rough country. The peaks run between 4000 and 8000 feet; but thevalleys are narrow and steep-sided. It is not uncommon to gain or loseas much as 2000 feet in two or three linear miles. The whole country isbroken up by mountain brooks, fair sized streams, and gorges.⁷⁸Thewhole country is blanketed with virgin jungle. Hardwood trees reach 150to 200 feet into the air, their branches beginning at 100 feet up. Onecommon variety has a silvery gray bark which gleams through the brush andgives it a peculiarly naked look when the shrubbery is cleared away. Betweenare smaller trees and a dense matting of vines. Bamboo patches are scatteredhere and there, but are not plentiful except along the streams. The undergrowthis so dense that it is possible to see only a few yards off the trails.The sun penetrates this tangle with difficulty. In the monsoon season thepath is perpetually wet and slippery. Even when it is not raining the treesdrip moisture. One is soaked with dew and perspiration a quarter of anhour after starting out in the morning.

Mosquitoes, black flies, crickets, and all manner of humming, buzzingand screeching insects keep up a constant undertone of sound, to whichone rapidly becomes accustomed. This noise is loud enough that a man maynot hear a fair sized party approaching on the trail unless they are talking.

There is considerable game in this country⁷⁹ although itis seldom seen. Monkeys, black flying squirrels, and barking deer can beheard. Cat tracks may be found along muddy spots and sand bars. A few mountainlions or panthers, both yellow and black, have been seen. Game howeveris too thin and hard to stalk to make the mountains attractive to tigers,which are found in both the adjacent plains. Semi-wild water buffalo, thecommunal property of the native villages, are found in the more lush riverbottoms.

The inhabitants of this country are rather shy but generally friendlyfolk. The active head-hunting Nagas live farther down on the Imphal-Burmafrontier. The Patkai Nagas are less aggressive. They are subordinate tothe Kachins⁸⁰ to the south and east of them; but they look downon the Kukis who inhabit the hills near Ledo to the west. They averageabout five feet in

⁷⁸WSJ: Colonel [James G.] Truitt hadspent many years in Alaska engineering highways and railroads. On our tripfrom Namlip to Shingbwiyang, he told me this was the most rugged countryhe had ever seen.
⁷⁹WSJ: I heard a British officer who purported to bean authority make the statement that there is "no game in those jungles."Cats big enough to make some of the tracks I have seen require considerabledeer to keep them alive.
⁸⁰WSJ: Seagrave states that the Kachins are the mostwarlike of the North Burma tribes, and are feared by the Shans and Karins.Ngalang Bum ("Hill of the Buffalo") is said to be named for thepeace treaty feast which followed a great Kachin defeat of the Nagas. Agreat bulk of the native levies who joined the Allies in the North Burmacampaigns were recruited from the Kachin villages. [Ed.--As guerilla, reconnaissance,and intelligence troops, the Kachins were invaluable, especially in conjunctionwith long-range penetration operations, such as Merrill's Marauders carriedon. See Romanus and Sunderland, II, pp. 36-37.]

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height and are slightly built and stringy. Although they are great mountainclimbers⁸¹ they do not have the muscular development of theGaros.

They live in groups of three or four families, each in its "bustee"perched on stilts. Each such clan has several hillside clearings whererice is grown. They avoid valleys, possibly because of the mosquitoes andthe "bad air" which brings malaria. They move from one clearingto another when a death occurs or when the soil becomes depleted. Theirwants are simple; deer, monkey, or buffalo meat. Jungle vegetables. Saltand a little cloth. Before the war they were metal-poor and depended onoutside trade for their knife blades. In the great Retreat they acquiredmoney, jewelry, and some small arms.⁸² When the Americans firstcrossed Pangsau Pass cigarettes, candy, or salt would buy almost anything.They would trade for "C" rations to secure the tins. Coin hadlittle monetary value, and was prized principally for making necklaces.Now all these things are commonplace, and they are rolling in luxury withthe profusion of scrap metal that came in with the road building.

Because their desires were few, they could seldom be induced to porteror build. They moved away from any trail that was much used, although theywould come down off the hills to watch the strange Americans work, or totrade wild bananas and eggs to them. The only item in which they showedany consistent interest was raw opium.⁸³

Travel in this country presents several problems, which fundamentallycenter around the necessity of taking your rations with you. Rations meanporters; and porters mean more rations. It was early found that air droppinginto the valleys was impractical. They were too narrow, frequently foggy,and subject to air drafts. The C-47s came over the target at such a heightthat the loss was too wasteful. Dropping grounds were developed on suitablehillsides, but there were not enough good sites at the proper intervals.A Garo porter can not handle over forty pounds efficiently; most will refusea load over thirty-five. He can make five to eight miles in a day, dependingon the terrain. Therefore sufficient rations must be carried to take theentire party to the next dropping ground where the stock is known to beadequate. A little careful planning will enable you to make double stages,as your porters come in light to a good depot.

⁸¹WSJ: Naga trails are the shortestand often the hardest line between two given points. They almost alwaysfollow high shoulders; and they usually cross the highest part of a ridgeinstead of seeking an easier grade over a saddle. The Refugee Trail, whichwas several old trails linked together and slightly improved, followedan almost direct course straight north. Several very sharp ridges couldhave been avoided by swinging to the east, along the course of the presentRoad.
⁸²That is, from the refugee Burmese and Indian civilians whobartered for services or simply left their possessions along the Trailin desperation.
⁸³WSJ: At one time great opium smokers, this practicewas dying out. The British throttled down the import channels, and graduallyreduced the consumption to old habituees. As these died off, there wasinsufficient available opium for the young men to acquire the habit. However,opium remained the most sought-after currency in the hills. It was usedas a reward for military information, for bringing in lost fliers, andfor special work which would not be done for money. I have seen Nagas paidoff in opium for portering and for building construction which they wouldnever ordinarily do. A lump of raw opium balanced on a beam scale againstan eight anna piece would pay six to eight men for a week's labor. Thisquiet and rather small traffic in opium might not please certain elementsof public opinion. But it was "any port in a storm" those days.

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There is a workable minimum of equipment to take on the trail. The followingitems are sufficient to get along; but if porters are packing the equipment,there is no advantage in reducing weight to the point of unnecessary discomfort.One or more blankets, a change of clothing, spare socks if you prefer towear them, a pair of canvas sneakers and a mosquito net can be rolled handilyin a shelter half. The spare clothes and sneakers are for use around campin the evening. For many reasons a folding canvas cot is desirable to thepoint of being essential. The jungle hammock is a relatively fancy newitem. It is too short to sleep in comfortably when tired legs want to stretchout. A raincoat is a nuisance. One is soaked with perspiration in halfan hour anyway, and a little rain water refreshes the hide. Even in thewinter it is hot walking, although a field jacket and extra blankets areneeded at night. Into a musette go small articles. The cot and beddingroll are one fair porter load. The musette bag is added to the shortestpack of rations. My preference of clothing is single-piece fatigues, anda mechanics cap. Pistol and canteen balance well at the waist when wornlow over the hips. If camps are close enough together to forego the canteen,the pistol is more comfortable in a shoulder holster. Selection of shoesis important. Ordinary issue boots allow mud and gravel to work aroundthe ankles. Leggings are not mud proof, and the understrap rots throughin a few days of sloppy going. I used three-buckle issue riding boots,cut down to legging length. This is a convenient height to tuck trousersin, and the tongue is high enough to keep out dirt under ordinary conditions.The new paratrooper boot dispenses with the buckles and is even better.It has the serious disadvantage of composition rubber sole and heel. Asteel-edged heel digs into the earth, and can prevent a bad fall goingdown a steep wet trail. Hobnails are invaluable for traction going up.The cheap grade castor oil used by the Vets, frequently applied, is anexcellent waterproof and leather softener. Rain or shine, cigarettes andmatches must be kept dry. The tin cover of the old issue first aid packageis a good case; it will also hold a wrist watch when it is raining.

A waterproof map case to fit in the hip pocket is easily made from apiece of leather blacksmith's apron. Into the map can be folded a few silverrupees. A compass has no great practical value when following establishedtrails. When in doubt take the best beaten path, or look for the glow ofthe sun through the clouds. A trace used by Americans is always markedby a litter of old rations tins, cigarette butts, and chewing gum wrappers.

The Tincha Trace

After Colonel Lee's reconnaissance the regiment prepared to pull upstakes and move forward. The principal problems confronting the MedicalDetachment were: (1) The decision to continue operating the hospital atMile 23 until most of the patients had been cleaned out. Ting would remainbehind to close up. Then he would move with the rear echelon and set upat Thursday River. (2) Reshuffling the medical personnel in support ofthe isolated companies. (3) Arranging for medical supply. This was to becarried in by companies except for what was dropped to the battalion atNamlip. There

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the unit would draw directly from the 151st Medical Battalion Hospital.The Regimental Hospital was functioning smoothly, so I elected to get outwith the lead companies.

On 16 September I went to Nawng Yang and arranged to live with Davesuntil headquarters was in position at Thursday River. Manter came intoLedo on 19 September to report that his construction was proceeding atsnail's pace. The Rice Mission was over. Stone was preparing to send outthe advance elements of the reunited 48th Evac to start operations at Tincha.On 28 September I turned in my sadly battered weapons carrier and movedmy belongings to Lekhapani. Sgt. Cherry came in with a command car to pickme up. We planned to start in the morning, but it had been raining forfour straight days and we did not get started until 30 September.⁸⁴

The situation along the Tincha Trace was not pleasant. Plans had beenmade on anticipated weather. Since the Loglai Valley was practically unexploredcountry, Ledo precipitation figures had been used. The past week of rainhad crossed everybody up.⁸⁵ On 2 October Morgan and I took ahike down the line to see what things looked like. They were a sight tobehold. The dozer track was a lane of mud partially washed out by slidesin places. Large trees were felled across the right of way in every direction.⁸⁶The few bulldozers which had not slid off the hillsides were isolated betweenroadblocks. We walked out almost to Loglai and back, a round trip of seventeenmiles over some of the worst going I have ever seen.

The next six weeks along the Tincha Trace was largely a matter of walkingfrom one end of the line to the other. Jerry [Capt. Gerald] Jones⁸⁷and

⁸⁴WSJ: The road to Pangsau was passable,but there was barely one lane around a landslide at Garo Brook. From Mile45 the road was a quagmire. We were towed into Nawng Yang by a tractor.
⁸⁵WSJ: Quoted from my diary, 1 October 1943: "TheSituation here is not good. Almost six companies of the 10th Engrs andfour companies of the 330th Engrs, in addition to the 48th Evac are aheadbetween Nawng Yang and Gared Ra. There is an acute shortage of portersand rations are slim. Point dozer is below Tincha but not running becauseno gas. Between the road is blocked by fallen trees and slides. Every catfrom here to Tincha is off the road. Looks as if I will sit here for awhile."
⁸⁶WSJ: The mission of the 10th Engineers was to buildbridges and to clear a swath fifty yards wide along the survey trace. Unfortunatelyhalf the regiment was put at clearing to the rear of the point. These Chinesewere not from the big timber country and had little conception of how tohandle large trees. Much of the stuff along the trace was 150 and 200 footerswith two to three foot diameters. The boys chopped and sawed around thetrunks like beavers. The trees fell unpredictably in any old direction,and more than one chopper was crushed or killed by the backlash of thebutt. Several travelers were also killed on the road-bed by falling timber.Traffic was a series of halts and then dashes for safety. The Chinese thoughtit was great fun. The Americans considered it most unhelpful. Actuallyit made an awful mess of the supply line. Dozers can knock standing timberoff the line fairly expeditiously; but these gigantic trunks piled acrossthe road like jackstraws were hard to handle. Those that could not be pushedaside were chopped away by hand. Those too big to chop easily were blasted.Daves showed the Chinese the cute trick of notching a log, laying a stickof dynamite in the crease, and shooting it off with a pistol. They enjoyedthis immensely; but the fusillades of wild shots were so dangerous to thepassing public that the practice had to be stopped. Anyway, the Chineseneeded the dynamite to blow fish from the streams when their rations ranlow.
⁸⁷WSJ: 330th Engineer Regiment. This officer was oneof the unsung heroes of the Nawng Yang to Midway era. As 2nd Bn Surgeon,he operated a bedded dispensary at Daves' headquarters, and cruised forwardto the advanced camps of "D" Company. He used a small bulldozerrigged to carry two litters, and might take as much as five days to completethe round trip. If the cats could not make it, he walked. When he was orderedhome because of illness in his family, the 330th lost the best medicalofficer they ever had.

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I usually alternated our rounds so that we would be approximately atopposite ends. He handled Chinese emergencies in the Nawng Yang area whenI was away, while I would stop at all his companies when I went forward.

The 48th Evac was filtering into Tincha as rapidly as porters were available.Webster and [Capt. Theodore B.] Rasmussen⁸⁸ started the setup,and Leet soon joined them.⁸⁹ They got into position just intime. "D" Company, 330th Engineers had been on the point mostof the summer. They were exhausted and destitute of equipment. Daves wentforward to see them one day and failed to return. On 6 October Morgan andI walked out fourteen miles to see what was going on. Part of "D"Company was at Loglai and part at Tincha; the half that was not sick inbed had no shoes. Every company officer except one was unfit for duty.The lead dozers were out of operation. For all practical purposes the entirecompany was stranded until the road could be cleared enough to reach them.

We found Daves, [lst Lt. Francis A.] Bleecker,⁹⁰and [MajorAlfred K.] Allen⁹¹in bed at Tincha. Since the hospital wardswere not finished, all this personnel was being treated in quarters.⁹²A couple of days later Daves, Bleecker, and [Capt. John G.] Stubenvoll⁹³were able to walk to Nawng Yang and were evacuated to hospital inLedo.

The Chinese were even worse off. At first they thought the trip intothe woods was a lark,⁹⁴but they soon got into a serious rationshortage. The companies between Thursday River and Tincha were suppliedfrom Nawng Yang. They did not fare well, but they did not starve. The troopsfrom the Ngalang crossing to Gared Ra were supposed to be rationed by porterfrom the air drop at Namlip. Since the Garos refused to work for the Chinese,they kept themselves alive by carrying in their own rice and dynamitingfish. On 9 October the company at Ngalang was on one meal a day.

There was a serious shortage of porters at the time. The men on theTrace had been kept over their contracted time, and replacements were comingin behind schedule. As I bitterly reported: "The picture * * * wasthat of more and more men moving in, with less and less supply, over aroad that was getting worse and worse, for the enlightened purpose of fellingmore and more trees across that road."

⁸⁸WSJ: 14th Evacuation Hospital. The14th Evac was newly arrived in Ledo. Their personnel was used as fillers[for other units] pending completion of their hospital at Mile 19. [The14th Evacuation Hospital was affiliated with the University of SouthernCalifornia.]
⁸⁹WSJ: I made their basha my forward base of operations,and eventually stored my footlocker with them.
⁹⁰WSJ: This officer had been with the point dozer fromMidway to Tincha, usually sleeping a few hours during the day and workingnights.
⁹¹WSJ: He came in with Road Headquarters in Colonel York'stime and is still in the section. When he first arrived he annoyed theengineers cutting trace with his "by the book" ideas. After thebout of malaria at Tincha, he was a changed man, and could gripe with therest of them. Popularly known as "Monsoon" Allen.
⁹²WSJ: Webster supervised the thirty-odd enlisted menwho were practically having to build their own installation. Leet and Rasmussendivided the medicine and surgery respectively.
⁹³WSJ: Commanding "D" Company, 330th Engr.Regt. Familiarly known as "Klotz," he was famous for his storiesand for his ability with mess-kit and bottle.
⁹⁴WSJ: Quoted from my diary, 4 October 1943: "Fourfifths of the medical officers took off to Ledo this A.M. under the guiseof evacuating three sick men. This leaves one officer to cover about 1800men in eight camps over a stretch of ten miles." By that time the151st Medical Battalion ambulance relay was making a turnaround at theNawng Yang bridge, but evacuation back to that point was difficult.

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On 10 October I started back⁹⁵to see what could be doneabout both the medical problem and the Chinese ration situation. Two dayslater I was in Ledo reporting to the Surgeon.⁹⁶

Things gradually straightened out as the weather improved and more Americanengineer units were pushed out beyond Pangsau Pass. Every effort was beingmade to build up a stockpile at Nawng Yang. [Lt. Col. James E.] Darby⁹⁷had assumed command of the Hellgate depot and was reorganizing theporter corps. [2d Lt. Arthur C.] Martin⁹⁸was opening a QM warehouse.[2d Lt. George J.] De Broeck⁹⁹was setting up a medical supplydepot across the river from the bridge. By 20 October I was able to ridea weapons carrier clear through to Tincha with [Capt. James H.] Kaminer.¹⁰⁰

I believe the cutting of the Tincha Trace was the bitterest part ofthe building of the Ledo Road. In June, July, and August 1944 things werebad. One practically needed a canoe to get from the Tarung to Tingkawk.¹⁰¹The main bridges were cut. People sloshed around in the muck and cursedall the Gods there be. But the airstrips were open, and the rations camein. On the big bend of the Loglai in 1943 there were no airstrips. Themen at the end of the line knew their daily bread depended on too manyfactors. They fought rain, mud, fallen trees, fuel shortages, porter desertions,and general all round frustration to keep going. That is a nice piece ofroad to drive over

⁹⁵WSJ: Quoted from my diary, 10 October1943: "Walked out from Tincha to Nawng Yang (14 miles-7 hours). Onthe way through Loglai heard a rumor that Chabua had been bombed this a.m.by the Japs. Circumstantial confirmation is the fact that aircraft camenorth of the Loglai Valley before dawn today. Road is improving. Some trucksof rations were towed into Midway last night." Back up the Road aweek later I heard the finale to the bombing rumor: Both Digboi and Ledohad been wrecked.
Ed.--The Japanese had, in fact, attempted an air offensive in October,bombing airfields in Assam and around Imphal. In addition, Japanese fighters,beginning on 13 October and continuing for several weeks, harassed andshot down several cargo carriers over Assam. The official Air Force historydoes not mention bombings at Chabua at this time, although it was hit inOctober 1942 and nearby Dinjan was bombed in December 1943. North TirapLog reports a downed Japanese flier not far from the aid station on28 October. See Romanus and Sunderland, pp. 85-86; Craven and Cate, IV,pp. 432-433.
⁹⁶In his report to the Surgeon, 12 October 1943, Jones describedthe situation as vividly and frankly as he later did in his reminiscences.The quotation from the text above is from the earlier report. Additionalillustrative details were included: "On Sat., Oct. 2, I walked fromNawng Yang to below Midway. On the road I counted about 60 gas cans; theofficer with me tapped each one. All were full. They represented loadsdropped and abandoned by porters * * * For the ten days preceding Oct.10 (when I started out), the point dozer had not moved for lack of fuel* * * On or about Oct. 4, an American soldier died in the Tagung area.It was absolutely impossible to evacuate him before he died. By using acombination of littering and tractor relay, his body was brought throughNawng Yang on Oct. 5 * * * On Oct. 9, I visited the 6 Co. of the 10 Engineersat the mouth of the Tagung. The outfit was celebrating. Reason:--they hadjust received some rice, and were going to have two rice meals that day.For some days previously, they had subsisted on 'porridge,' bamboo shoots,and what fish they could get out of the river with the dynamite on hand* * * At present, the priority for carrying is: (1) rations, (2) gas, (3)more rations * * * This eliminates all medical and other supplies."
⁹⁷21st Quartermaster Group commander.
⁹⁸21st Quartermaster Group.
⁹⁹73d Evacuation Hospital.
¹⁰⁰WSJ: In August 1944 he led a party on a survey ofthe Tengchung cut-off from Myitkyina to Paoshan, China. For this he wasawarded the Bronze Star Medal. [See n. 75, p. 103.]
¹⁰¹WSJ: Quoted from my diary, 19 July 1944: "LeftRoad at 0700 hours. Down Lamung, up Tanai, and up Narrow River by barge.20 miles in the rain in nine hours. Ripped off six shear pins and lostone outboard motor on the way. Got off at Walawbum and caught a truck toTingkawk."

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now. There are individuals in these parts of late who do not comprehendwhat it cost to build it.

12 to 16 October was spent in the Ledo area, helping Ting make finalplans to move the Regimental Hospital up to Thursday River. The 14th EvacuationHospital plant at Mile 19 was almost complete and the unit was preparingto start operation. The 151st Medical Battalion was being redeployed, anda detachment of the 14th Evacuation Hospital under Major [Walter J.] Farr¹⁰²was taking over at Namgoi.

On the way back into the hills I stopped at Hellgate to visit Holdsworthand [2d Lt. Philip U.] Farley.¹⁰³ Here [Capt. Gail R.] Palmer¹⁰⁴and [Capt. Roy A. W.] Krows¹⁰⁵ were planning an expedition toNamlip and Tagap to study hospital and warehouse construction requirements.I was anxious to inspect the camps of the Chinese 1st Battalion in theGared Ra-Namlip area, so arranged to go with them.

I proceeded out to Tincha, where they joined me on 21 October. Nextday with six fresh porters we made the run to Namlip. In many ways thiswas a worse trip than the last time over this route. The Chinese had felledso many trees across the right of way that between a quarter and a thirdof the trail was impassable. The three of us clambered and slid the thirteenmiles in ten hours. The porters were delayed by having to move their loadsacross the fallen timber. They spent the night in the woods and did notcatch up with us until the following afternoon.

The last five miles into Namlip had been in driving rain. We found "C"["A"?] Company, 151st Medical Battalion settled down and operatingthe new hospital. They had a census of about 150 Chinese and Americans.The non-active wards were full of American transients moving forward toTagap.¹⁰⁶

[Capt. Bernard G.] Schaffer,¹⁰⁷ [lst Lt. Richard W.] Trotter,¹⁰⁸and [1st Lt. Henry A.] Settlage¹⁰⁹ loaned us dry clothes andblankets; and we slept on litters in one of the wards. That night we wereawakened by an earthquake which was felt in Ledo and throughout the hills.While waiting for the porters I visited all the nearby Chinese camps. Thingswere in pretty

¹⁰²WSJ: 14th Evacuation Hospital. Thisofficer commanded at Namgoi for several months until he was injured * ** In the summer of 1944 he was with the detachment of the 14th EvacuationHospital which operated the installation in the Staging Area where Merrill'sMarauders were hospitalized.
¹⁰³WSJ: 48th Evacuation Hospital. He served at Hellgateduring the summer of 1943 in the dual capacity of Medical Inspector andAdjutant of the subdepot.
¹⁰⁴Forward Area Engineer.
¹⁰⁵WSJ: 45th Engineer Regiment. He was one of the officerswho surveyed the trace from Namchik to Pangsau Pass. When Hellgate becamethe advance subdepot, he worked as Palmer's assistant on forward construction.He specialized in timber surveys, procuring construction materials, andhandling native labor.
¹⁰⁶WSJ: The hospitals were usually in operation beforethe QM moved forward to set up depot installations. All along the tracethe medics dispensed professional service and ran transient hotels. [Jones'sidentification of Captain Schaffer and other information on the 151st suggeststhat the detachment at Namlip was from A Company.]
¹⁰⁷WSJ: Commanding Company A, 151st Medical Battalion.When the hospital at Namlip was closed, he moved back to Tincha and tookover that installation from the 48th Evac Det. March 1944.
¹⁰⁸WSJ: 151st Medical Battalion. During the summer of1944 he operated a 25-bed dispensary at the Tanai River. During the periodthat the Tarung and Tawang bridges were out, this served as station hospitalfor a troop strength of some 2,300.
¹⁰⁹151st Medical Battalion.

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good shape. Malaria and dysentery were falling off¹¹⁰ andthe rate of timber accidents was not excessive. Supplies were flowing fairlysmoothly. The three of us had dinner with [Capt. Taylor S.] Womack,¹¹¹whose camp was half a mile from the hospital.

On 24 October we made the four miles to Chang Rang in time for lunch.The 151st Medical Battalion aid station was a comfortable setup of fourbamboo shacks. The small group of enlisted men¹¹² had been atthe station all summer and were getting jungle happy. Their isolation hadrecently been relieved by the field telephone line from Namlip to Tagap,and by the increasing number of transients moving over the trail. We putup for the night in the empty ward basha, after an afternoon of washingclothes and bathing in the Yung Sung.¹¹³

Next day came the gruelling twelve mile haul to Tagap, which took sixand a half walking hours. We followed the Refugee Trail to the bluff overlookingChinese Midway.¹¹⁴ Here we turned east on the shortcut, andclimbed to the Naga village on the other side of the narrow valley. A littlebeyond was a Chinese ration dropping ground where [lst Lt. Edgar M.] Smith's¹¹⁵Trail branched off to the east to make another shorter shortcut. Not wantingto break our legs on this, we continued down the Chinese path to the Namyung.The high ground south of the river was studded with rifle pits and mortaremplacements, as a secondary defense if the Japanese should break throughthe Nathkaw position. The 12th Engineers had not

¹¹⁰WSJ: When the new camps with cleanlatrines were established, dysentery among the Chinese would fall off.After a few weeks of active fly breeding it rose again. When the companymoved forward the whole cycle would be repeated.
¹¹¹WSJ: Company C, 45th Engineer Regiment. In August1943 it was decided to leapfrog three bulldozers over the old Refugee Trailfrom Nawng Yang into Namlip. It was hoped that by the time the Tincha Tracebroke into Namlip there would be a road already cut to below Chang Rang.The 330th Engrs took the cats in, after a rugged run over Ngalang Bum.(On Sept. 9 I met them coming down off the ridge about half a mile northof Tagung) * * * It was Womack's "C" Co that tried to keep theCombat Road open at Walawbum in June and July 1944. When Stilwell calledfor more ammunition, a convoy of trucks was gambled in an effort to getit through. The colored boys worked the clock around hauling 6x6's throughthe mud. The convoy got through, but most of the vehicles never returnedto Ledo until after the monsoons.
¹¹²Jones identifies a CBI Roundup article of 23 September1943 about one of the 151st Medical Battalion aid stations, and a pictureon 15 October which showed the Chang Rang station and one of its aidmen,Pfc. Gomer Williams, who, Jones states, died of malaria in the same month.See North Tirap Log, p. 25.
¹¹³WSJ: The Yung Sung is a pleasant little stream thatmeanders from the east to join the Namlip. At that season the water waslow and the sandy floor clearly visible. One of the enlisted men bathingwith us picked up a Victory Medal from World War I, evidently dropped bysomebody during the retreat from Burma the year before.
¹¹⁴WSJ: Not to be confused with the Midway between ThursdayRiver and Loglai on the Tincha Trace. Here was a camp of the 12th ChineseEngr. Regt. They were building their "Jeep Road" from both ends.The link between this camp and the Namyung was not yet completed. The campwas on a high ridge of land between two streams. From the Refugee Trailone went several hundred feet down a perpendicular wall to the first stream;up again about half that distance; down to the second stream; and up anothersteep bluff to an elevation a couple of hundred feet higher than the start.It took the porters better than an hour to negotiate this climb. Abouthalf a linear mile was traversed.
¹¹⁵WSJ: He was with Rupert on the survey from Chang Rangto Tagap. The trace had to make an easy grade from near Chinese Midwayto the Namyung bottoms, but for foot travel Smith cut himself a shortcut.This dropped almost straight southeast from the dropping ground to theriver. Smith threw a suspension bridge across a relatively narrow gorgeby swimming the lead line across himself. The path then joined the RefugeeTrail a mile or so up the hill. This route saved several miles, but wasso steep and difficult that it was little used. The remains of this suspensionbridge could be seen as late as the early spring of 1945.

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completed their wooden bridge¹¹⁶ so we waded and swam theNamyung, which was not very deep but running strong. Then came the fivemile, 2300 foot climb to Tagap.

This post in the fall of 1943 was an interesting spot, humming withactivity. The 38th and elements of the 22nd Chinese divisions were massingfor the thrust into the Hukawng Valley. They had just started to feel theirway down the trail from Nathkaw four miles to the south. The Tagap campwas on the northern down slope of an east-west ridge of about 3200 feetelevation. It extended about a mile across from [Lt. Col. Gordon] Seagrave'sHospital¹¹⁷ on the east to the pack animal corrals on the west.Water was running low with the onset of the dry season, so the new hospitalwas being started near a stream beyond the horse area. Due north was aseparate knoll called the "Chinese Outpost," connected with themain ridge by a flat shoulder. On this saddle was the dropping ground,with its sentinel tree.¹¹⁸

Tagap on a clear afternoon or evening is one of the most beautiful spotsin the world. The near ranges are green; the distant ones fade from blueto purple; and all the way across the northern horizon stretch the snowcappedHimalayas. In the fall the nights are cold and we slept rolled up withparachutes outside our blankets. The open hearth fire at Rupert's campwas very welcome.

We started back to Ledo on 27 October, taking Rupert with us. We usedas porters some Nepalese that Palmer was relieving because their contractswere up. They were in poor shape and made slow time.¹¹⁹ Thetrip to Namlip and over the Refugee Trail to Nawng Yang took four days.

Back at Ledo I found I was working for a new Surgeon. [Major John T.]Smiley¹²⁰ had been in the hills and had a sound appreciationof the terrain, construction, and supply problems we were up against outthere. On 2

¹¹⁶WSJ: The Namyung is a treacherousstream which flashes into sizable floods in heavy rains. The bridge mentionedwas the first of at least four vehicular structures that have washed out.
¹¹⁷WSJ: This installation at Tagap was the hospital inthe jungle Seagrave mentions in the last chapter of his book Burma Surgeon,which has recently been published. When I was there this time Major [JohnH.] Grindlay was in charge. In an issue of Life magazine early in1944 appeared an article about it, entitled "Life Visits an Army Hospitalin Burma." The shots of the wards illustrate the bamboo buildingsand the use of "chungs" [bamboo cots] for Chinese patients. Thistype of bamboo construction was standard for all the hospitals in the areaat that time.
¹¹⁸Referring to a CBI Roundup article on 23 September1943, with accompanying pictures, Jones identifies the dropping site onNgalang Bum--Lt. Elza R. Sisney's "famous alpine resort" (seep. 103). In a later set of pictures in the Roundup (15 October),he identifies the "sentinel tree" at the Tagap dropping grounds.He continues in his note: "This [tree] was located at a somewhat inconvenientspot near the drop, but it was not cut down because it served a usefulpurpose. For nine months in the year the early morning fog rises from theNamyung Valley and blankets the hills. The supply planes would begin tocircle around about 0900 hours. As the mist burned away, the Tagap ridgewould show, then the Chinese outpost. When at last the top of the treecame through the fog carpet, the C-47's had their pinpoint, and would comeroaring over the target."
¹¹⁹WSJ: On the climb from the Namyung River to ChineseMidway Krows and I had to carry the loads for two of them. They finallyquit at Ngalang, and Sisney loaned us some of his Nagas to get into NawngYang.
¹²⁰Hitherto the 151st Medical Battalion Executive Officer; hesucceeded Lt. Col. Victor H. Haas, a Public Health Officer serving withthe Army. Of Smiley, Jones wrote in a note: "He was tactful, shrewd,and extremely hardworking, with a gift of getting people to cooperate forhim. He built an effective operating team out of a skeleton staff. Withit he bucked uphill against a continuous series of difficulties and crises:supply shortages, construction problems, the necessity to develop an impromptuevacuation system on short notice, and hospitals overcrowded with Americanand Chinese casualties. All this with sometimes rather dubious supportfrom higher echelons * * * It is my considered opinion that John Smileymade the most important contribution to the medical support of the LedoRoad construction, and of the North and Central Burma campaigns, of anysingle individual in the Theater."

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November I returned to Regimental Headquarters which was now establishedat Thursday River.

The Last Takeoff

By the first week in November, supply trucks were getting into Tincha.The road was barely passable beyond there, from south of the Ngalang Rivercrossing almost to Gared Ra. Timber had been cleared off the trace downto Chang Rang Hi. Three companies of the 330th Engineers were poised atGared Ra, prepared to move into the Namlip-Chang Rang-Namyung area as soonas their lead dozers connected with Womack's party at Namlip. The 849thEngr Avn Bn¹²¹ was moving up to improve the surface from NawngYang to Tincha.

It was time for the 10th Engineers to shove ahead of the line again.At a conference at Thursday River, 10 November, Colonel Lee briefed hisbattalion and company commanders. Wang was now a Lieutenant Colonel andwould take over the 1st Battalion. This would pull out of Namlip, and spreadsouth from new headquarters at the Namyung bridge to Nathkaw. The 2nd Battalionwould finish the bridge work between Ngalang and Namlip, while the 3rdBattalion would leapfrog into the Chang Rang-Namyung stretch. Later, the2nd Battalion would leapfrog them both, and extend from Nathkaw to Shingbwiyang.Presumably the Regimental Hospital would be put into operation somewheresouth of Tagap. Until then, the personnel could be used to reinforce thecompany dispensaries.

Colonel Lee planned to make a reconnaissance below Tagap, as far asShingbwiyang if possible. Wang and I were to accompany him; and he insistedthat Ting, who had always avoided these walking jaunts, should come along.The advance party of Regimental Headquarters was to start at once to establishcamp below Namlip, and our party was to rendezvous there on 13 November.Following this officers call, there was a grand dinner to introduce thenewly assigned Vice Commander and to celebrate Wang's promotion. The afternoonwas spent prodding and cajoling the medical officers of the hospital topack and report at the advance companies. They hated to break up the comfortableestablishment they had enjoyed at Thursday River. Aside from the gloomon their part, however, there was a hum of anticipation in the nearby camps.The regiment had bitter memories of the rain, muck, falling timber, andscanty rations along the Tincha Trace. Any change would be welcome. Furthermore,new American units were crowding up the line, with better equipment anda refreshing enthusiasm. The Chinese boys caught the general feeling thatthe whole mechanism was winding up for a great thrust forward. Their spiritsperked, and they wanted to be out ahead of the point again.

¹²¹Reached CBI in September 1943.

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We were hitting for Shingbwiyang. Since April that name on the map hadbeen the goal for everybody building the Road. Now it seemed in sight justover the next few hills. It would be a long hard hop, but it would be fun.

This was to be my last takeoff. Seven months service with the 10th Engineersended three weeks later.

V. THE REFUGEE TRAIL

To Nathkaw

On 11 November I hooked a ride to Tincha, where I found Krows. The hospitalconstruction there was pretty well along. He wanted to move forward, butthe porters Palmer was to send him had not showed up. It was rumored thatone could get by jeep to within a mile of Namlip. The obvious thing todo was to lay over a day. Then we could proceed by porter or truck dependingon whether the road was open. After dark Major Stone and [lst Lt. RobertE.] Dietz¹²² pulled in with a supply convoy. Roy [Krows] gota message that there would be no porters, and that he was to remain atTincha.

Next morning, a ration truck took me to below the Ngalang bridge; soona command car came by bound for Gared Ra. Here were Col. Gleim and Major[Clarence L.] Lyle of the 330th Engrs. "E" Co. was camped onthe pass and [Capt.] Frank [H.] Haines'¹²³ lead dozer had brokenthrough to Namlip. The four of us rode a jeep into town, where there wasa great taking of pictures of the first vehicle to arrive.¹²⁴

The point was climbing the slope to Chang Rang Hi, where Womack turnedthe operation over to Lyle. The 10th Engineers were building a headquartersa mile and a half south of the hospital, at the new log bridge crossingthe Namlip River, near the point where the Yung Sung empties into it. Col.Lee had taken off down the trace an hour before, with Major Ting and ahandful of soldiers. It was not clear whether he had actually started toShingbwiyang. Since Lt. Col. Yang also understood that the rendezvous wasfor the next day, he presumed that the Colonel would return; and he proposedto sit tight. I had lunch with Womack, and went back to the hospital. Thesituation called for a demonstration of oriental patience.

That night two of the American wards were crowded with transients. Elementsof the 3rd Bn, 478th QM Regt, of the 115th Ordnance Co, and officers andmen of "D" Co, 151st Med Bn were heading south for Tagap andShingbwiyang. Also present were a handful who said they were the

¹²²WSJ: 36th Quartermaster Battalion,21st Quartermaster Group. During the spring and early summer ot 1943 thisyoung officer was in charge of one of the supply drops on the "WestAxis" trail. [See North Tirap Log, n. 34, p. 11.]
¹²³330th Engineer Regiment.
¹²⁴WSJ: Later it developed that Colonel Lee had stolena march on Colonel Gleim. He got through in a jeep on the heels of thebulldozer shortly after dawn.

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advance party of the 1905th Engr Avn Bn, an outfit none of us had everheard of before.¹²⁵

Next morning at the 10th Engr Hq I learned that a runner had come induring the night with orders for Yang to join Col. Lee at Namyung immediately.He started at dawn, leaving word for me to follow as soon as I could. Thisdid not look promising, as there were too few troops in camp to ask theAdjutant to detail me porters. [2d Lt. John] Pica¹²⁶ at Namlipwas extremely short of Garos, and Darby had instructed him to give portersto no one.

While I was talking to Pica, Major Lyle drove up with a Colonel of Engineerswhom he introduced as Col. [James G.] Truitt.¹²⁷ It seemed thatthe latter had just arrived from the States, had flown over the trace oncein a cub, and now was under orders to proceed by foot to Shingbwiyang.He had authority to draft porters wherever he could find them. Lyle toldhim I knew the country to Tagap, and he asked if I would take him all theway through to the Hukawng Valley. This providential request solved mytransportation problem. Pica coughed up ten porters with good grace.

The rest of 14 November was spent oiling equipment, talking over plans,and swimming. The water was cold, as the days were getting chilly alongthe river bottoms. Everybody soaked up the sun for the few hours it shoneinto the narrow valley. All day muddy convoys of American engineers, Chinese,and rations rolled through town to the new road head.¹²⁸

It was decided to take the old trail through Chang Rang to the Namyungbridge. To follow the dozer track to the point, and jump off along theblazed trace, would mean taking an unknown route through rugged country.If any of the porters failed to keep up, there was the uninviting prospectof spending the night at Chinese Midway. We got off to an early start andmade the Chang Rang station before noon. The place was not too crowded.Most of the American parties moving south had instructions from NCAC tospend the night at or beyond Chinese Midway.¹²⁹

During the noon swim the dozers could be heard plowing along the highground to the east. I had been tempted before to explore down the YungSung toward its confluence with the Namlip, and the sound of machinerywas a lure to Col. Truitt. We followed the stream as it flowed north andeast. There were some sand bars where the walking was good, and where evidenceof game was abundant; but most of the way was over slippery

¹²⁵It had just reached CBI among other reinforcementsfor the roadbuilding operation, now--since 17 October--under the directionof Col. Lewis A. Pick.
¹²⁶An Ordnance officer supervising porter crews with the 330thEngineer Regiment.
¹²⁷Road Location Engineer.
¹²⁸WSJ: It was interesting to observe the reactions ofthe Nagas, who were attracted down from their villages by all the commotion.Bulldozers they were familiar with, but these were the first wheeled vehiclesever seen in those hills. They perched along the small cliff across fromthe hospital, where the cut skirted the stream. The "beebees"(young girls) slapped their hands and squealed with delight.
¹²⁹WSJ: This was apparently on the theory that it wasnearer the halfway mark to Tagap than was Chang Rang. The filthy conditionof Midway, and the fact that it would be packed with 10th Engineers andother Chinese moving forward, had not been taken into consideration. Mostof the Americans could find no shelter. Some went on that night to thesheds on the Chinese dropping ground. Many more went all the way to theNamyung after dark, and slept on the planks of the bridge.

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rocks in twelve to eighteen inches of water. After a couple of miles,we were in a narrow little gorge. The dozers seemed to be immediately aboveus on the summit of the steep shoulder of Chang Rang Hi on our right. Aprecarious trail led up in the general direction of the Naga village. Weclimbed it hand over hand for three quarters of an hour. The point crewwas found plowing through the bamboo thickets down a gently sloping saddlewithin half a mile of the village. This had been deserted at the approachof the road, leaving the fall wild rice crop unharvested. A company ofthe 330th Engineers were hauling their vehicles behind cats to a new campsite close behind the point. After an exchange of greetings and comparingmaps, we worked down a small gully to the river and back to camp.¹³⁰

The early morning of 16 November found us Tagap-bound. Lt. Col. Yang,pushing back north, came up as we were taking a break at the fork of thepath near Chinese Midway. He reported that Col. Lee and Ting were a daybeyond us, headed for Shingbwiyang. The double gorge climb through Midwayand over the dropping ground was not attractive. To save wind for the finalclimb to Tagap, we took the longer but easier original Refugee Trail. Wereached there in time to clean up at Rupert's old camp, and had dinnerwith [John P.] Willey.¹³¹ Major [Lillard N.] Simmons, the NCAC¹³²forward echelon Surgeon was present. I arranged to meet him at Shingbwiyangin a few days, when the Headquarters moved there to be closer to the fightingat Ningam Sakan.

Next morning we stopped briefly at the small cub strip the 12th Engineerswere building by hand labor at Kumkidu, on the crest of the Tagap ridge.Half way to Nathkaw the 9th Co, 10th Engineers were setting up camp. Herethe east slope of Hill 4257 saddles over the long north-south shoulderof which Nathkaw is the high point. The steep-walled little gorge thusinclosed was known as Tiger Valley because the trace parties had so slashedup and down its sides, looking for a grade and looking for each other inthe dense underbrush. At the head of this valley was the lean-to camp of[1st Lt. Thomas A.] Hardison's¹³³ party, where we stopped forlunch. From there to the next camp downstream was a little over a mileas the crow flies, but the

¹³⁰WSJ: Col. Truitt's fine new mosquitoboots were totally ruined. Thereafter he never took the trail without issuefoot gear. For a man who wanted to start a long march easy, he was certainlya game little walker. Every day "off" during the trip he wasout on some kind of a hike for his own amusement. My journey to Shingbwiyangwith him proved to be the most pleasant and congenial of all of them.
¹³¹Chief of Staff for Headquarters 5303d (Provisional) CombatCommand under General Boatner; later Commanding General of the 5332d Brigade("Mars Task Force").
¹³²NCAC: Northern Combat Area Command, the 1944 designationof the former Headquarters 5303d (Provisional) Combat Troops. See n. 17,p. 81. Col Vernon W. Petersen, MC, succeeded Simmons as NCAC Surgeon andserved in that capacity throughout the Second Burma Campaign.
¹³³WSJ: 330th Engineer Regiment. He was another of themany fine junior officers who faithfully spent many months in the jungle,to the detriment of their health and of their chances for promotion. Ithas been said with some justice that a considerable length of the LedoRoad was built by "orphans"--the special and temporary men. Thisapplies to both the rough advance field work and to the staff functions.In the first two and a half years, the Surgeon's Office was organized aroundthe nucleus of seven key officers. Three of these were assigned to theHeadquarters allotment most of the time. The remaining four were presentin the Ledo area a total of 104 months. Of these an aggregate of 71 months(68%) were on a special duty basis. It was possible to obtain promotionsfor only four of the seven, only two to field grade. The same situationpertained with important enlisted men. Other branches of the service canprobably present a comparable record.

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old trail climbed up to the ridge at Nathkaw and down the shoulder ina circuit of about three and a half miles.

The position at Nathkaw commands the two valleys east and west of theridge, and the only accessible trail up the slope between them to Tagap.It had been occupied since the great retreat in the spring of 1942, inrecent months by troops of the 38th Chinese Division. It was well dug inand fortified, with a clear field of fire and a barbed wire and brush abatis.The ground was liberally strewn with old 50 caliber shells, evidence ofthe Jap raid in April 1943.

The Refugee Trail

People wonder at the mass flight of the civilian population known asthe refugee retreat of 1942. The following background was told me by Mr.[B. C.] Case,¹³⁴ who had been for many years an agriculturalmissionary in Burma. I cannot vouch for its entire accuracy; but it isplausible enough, and I have never heard it denied.

The true Burmese are related to the Malay stock and appear to have comeinto the country from the sea. They inhabit principally the southern andwestern lowlands. In the mountainous section to the north and east, alongthe China and Indo-China border, they met another racial group [with] whichthey had never amalgamated wholly. Due to the mountain barrier betweenIndia and Burma, the cultural and economic relationships of the latterleaned more toward China, to which nation it paid a nominal tribute.¹³⁵

The British conquered the Burmese in two wars at the end of the nineteenthcentury. Mostly Indian troops were used; and the civil service and policeforce were recruited in India. Behind the flag came in enterprising merchantsand capital. In the next fifty or sixty years, they upset the agriculturalBurmese economy. Eventually Indians dominated small business and becamethe large land owners. An additional irritant was the policy of settlingretired Indian and Gurkha soldiers and police on the land. The basic hostilityof the Buddhist Burmese toward the Hindu and Moslem Indians was reinforcedby the resentment against being economically overwhelmed. Eventually theBritish were forced to separate Burma from the control of the Indian Governmentand make it a separate colony. This did not completely satisfy the Burmese,and the independence movement welcomed the Japanese as a means of gettingrid of the Indians.

¹³⁴WSJ: He is the Mr. Case mentionedin Seagrave's well-known book Burma Surgeon. In the summer of 1943he was attempting to improve the diet of Chinese troops in the Ledo areaby encouraging them to plant gardens. The following winter he worked withthe Kachin refugees at Namyung. He was drowned in the Mogaung River, summer1944, when his pontoon boat tipped over in the swollen stream. [See Seagrave,Burma Surgeon, p. 180.]
¹³⁵WSJ: These Kachins, Shans, and Karens are descendentsof the ancient Tai (or Thai) empire which once covered Southwest China,North Burma, and parts of Northern Indo China and Siam. This confederationwas broken up by the Chinese in Marco Polo's time. His Travels recounthis part in one of these expeditions. The Kachins and Shans were crowdedwest across the Salween. The Siamese were pushed south into the land theynow call Thailand. The latent hostility between the Burmese and these mountainpeople explains why the latter accepted British rule fairly peaceably.It is this element of the native population which remained anti-Japanese,and which joined the Allies in the reoccupation.

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Viewed in this light, one understands why the native Burmese remainedon the land, and appear to have lived a not too discontented life duringthe Japanese occupation. It also explains why almost everybody one meetswho fled in the retreat are Indians, British, Anglo-Indians, Anglo-Burmese,or Chinese.¹³⁶

How many people took part in that flight will probably never be known.¹³⁷One of the first British officers to arrive in the Tagap area¹³⁸told me that he counted over 5,000 corpses on that hillside when it wascleared off to make the old air dropping ground and camp. 20,000 peopleare supposed to have died in the Namyung bottoms, or attempting to getacross the river which was then in flood. Judging from what I saw belowNathkaw, it is possible to believe a figure around 100,000. The loss oflife from exhaustion, disease, and starvation must have been even greaterfurther up towards Pangsau Pass. Another large mass escaped into Manipurover the Stilwell line of retreat. The remnants of the 22nd and 38th Divisions(Chinese), together with parties of British and Indian troops came outthrough Shingbwiyang.

The upper section of the route had remained in Allied hands, and hadbeen pretty thoroughly cleaned up by burial squads wherever the trail wasused. Large numbers of skeletons were still to be found, as above Hellgate,where the new road bypassed sections of the trail, or in the jungle aroundregular stopping places. The 151st Medical Battalion stationed at Namlipand Chang Rang had sizable collections of skulls.

Below Nathkaw had been no man's land until late October 1943. The Japanesedid what patrolling there was. As one started down the slope below theperimeter, signs of a great human disaster were only too evident. At thattime the trail had been opened only about three weeks, and had been usedby parties too heavily loaded with rations and equipment to do much souvenirhunting. The abodes of the weary dead had hardly been disturbed. At everyslightly level spot, the path was bordered by small fork-stick lean-toswith brush roofs. After a year and a half in the open, the skeletons hadbeen picked and weathered clean; and most of the clothing had rotted away.The little family tragedies and the large group tragedies could easilybe reconstructed. In isolated bustees would be the skeletons of one ortwo adults and two or three children. The obvious family grouping confirmedstories that relatives would stick together when the weakest lagged orfell. By that time the rest would be sick and food had run low. In thenext camp

¹³⁶WSJ: That the vast bulk of the refugeeswere of this category is borne out by the physical evidence along the route.There was a profusion of characteristically Indian clothing, utensils,idols, and other personal possessions to be found along the trail northof Shingbwiyang.
¹³⁷WSJ: Edgar Snow: "Some 400,000 Indians startedback from the occupied territories, and those who got home had gruesometales * * * to relate. Thousands of Indians had died of thirst, starvation,and disease an the so-called Black Road." People on Our Side,New York, 1944, p. 33.
¹³⁸WSJ: Major Leedham, an English police official wholived in the Myitkyina-Bhamo area. His estimate is that a minimum of 80,000and more probably 120,000 souls started into the hills from the HukawngValley. Leedham married an Anglo-Burmese girl, who escaped into India byair. He was a rather unorthodox official, with sympathy and considerableregard for the mountain tribes. We spent two weeks together in hospitals;and he gave me part of the background presented relative to the Nagas.He used to patrol up to Shingbwiyang yearly; and had been into the hillsas far as Ngalang Bum.

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or so they would lie down to die. Large potters fields were at eachstream crossing and at the top of all tough hills. Here crowds stayed nearwater rather than attempt the next hill; or having made the climb, wereout of water and could go no further. At Saturday River, on the hill justnorth of Taga Sakan, and all down the south face of Kabkye Bum were hundredsof bustees containing remains of bodies. Along here the timber was highand shady, and the undergrowth thin. In these open parks the eye couldsweep around large camps. I have no idea how many thousands of skeletonsI saw in those three days, or how many more could be found in the brushin a few yards off the trail.

The masses of dead became depressing enough; but the small things weremore pitiful. When [2d Lt. Clement C.] Chinquist¹³⁹ clearedhis camp site at Saturday River, they came across a soldier with his riflebeside him. In his thorax were a Victory Medal, one apparently for thePalestine campaign during World War I, and a Wazaristan campaign decoration.His arms were around a woman clothed in the remnants of an embroideredsari. About a mile south, the sun glinted on something at the top of alittle knoll. In the center of a small clearing were two skeletons. A largetin suitcase close by had apparently been opened by looters who had flungthe clothing carelessly away. The surrounding low bushes were draped withsaris worked in gilt and silver. Sufficient cloth remained to hold thefabric together and to give splashes of color. The effect was that of tinselhanging from a ring of fantastic little Christmas trees. The path was litteredfor miles with the flotsam and jetsam of families retreating in panic;crockery, shreds of blankets, brass bowls, suitcases, and shoes. The worstof all to see were the children's shoes and sandals. People desperatelyretained their dearest personal possessions. On the very top of a highhill two days from Shing, a fourteen-inch pile of records stood besidean expensive Victrola. A genuine English pewter mug with a cracked glassbottom was in an orderly row of skeletons and rifles at one military camp.

Near the top of Kabkye Hill, more than a day out of Shing, and threethousand feet above the valley level, were the frames of two rusty bicycles.Coming down hill near Taga Sakan, a hollow log lay closely parallel tothe trail. In its mouth was the skeleton of a small baby, wrapped in theremains of a blanket. Cattle had been driven up the first few hills. Oftentheir skeletons were in bustees beside those of their owners. In one suchlean-to was what was left of a little girl in a pink dress with her armacross the flank of the family calf.

There were plenty of rifles, hobnail boots, bayonets, and pack saddlesalong the way. A battle field is bad enough; but men go to war and arelicked for some purpose. This picture of the useless starvation, exhaustion,and weary death of so many fathers, women, and children is something thatcannot easily be forgotten.

¹³⁹330th Engineer Regiment.

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Down to the Hukawng Valley

We spent the night of 17 November with Chinquist at Saturday River.His place was crowded, and his cook facing a ration crisis. Seven of usslept in one pyramidal tent, and a party of the 151st Medical Battalionin the other. The valley was so deep and narrow that the sun shone intoit only between 1000 and 1400 hours. A small fire of bamboo slats in asandbox was very welcome during the bitterly cold night. The next morningCol. Truitt and Chinquist started up the valley to try to connect withHardison by following the sound of shots. They missed him, but finallyworked their way to Nathkaw, and came back down over the trail late forsupper. I scouted around the river crossing looking for a dispensary site,and it was obvious that this would be a logical place for a transient campa day from Tagap. The trace party would soon move out; and a night campin the hills meant an aid station or vice versa.¹⁴⁰

On 19 November we made the ten miles to Chinglow, taking Chinquist along.We passed and were repassed by elements of the 151st Medical Battalion,moving down to Shingbwiyang under forced draft.¹⁴¹

The trail started from about 2750 ft. up a sharp rise to 3500 ft., wherethere was an abandoned Chinese perimeter. Then a sharp drop to Taga Sakanat 2500 ft. This pretty little stream was littered with rotting basketsof rice, which had missed the target when air-dropped. On the north bankwas a level bench occupied by a fortified Chinese camp. This was latercleared off, and Captain Sam Clark ran an aid station here with a detachmentof the 48th Evacuation Hospital. From Taga there was a long steady climbto the top of Kabkye Bum at 3772 ft. At the top of this hill was anotherunused Chinese fort. About a quarter of the way down the almost precipitoussouth slope was the Chinglow dropping ground, run by an officer and threecolored boys. It was inside the perimeter of a Chinese post used now principallyby transients. Here we met Col. Lee and Major Ting on the way back fromShingbwiyang. The Colonel hoped to throw his forward battalion into theTaga-Shing area ahead of schedule, and was concerned about the hospitalsituation there. The Seagrave Unit was pulling out, and the 151st MedicalBattalion was not yet established. In the course of the conversation, Tingtold me he had seen a number of cases of "Felix-Weel Disease, youknow Teefus" at Shing. This hardly seemed likely, as the 38th Divisionwas not known to be lousy at the time. If they had become infested afterleaving Ledo, one would expect them to come down with typhus before reachingShing.

The next morning we clambered down the steep face of Kabkye and madethe last eleven miles. The fallen log that served as a bridge at Salt

¹⁴⁰WSJ: The terrain is to be consideredin spotting such locations. There must be plenty of water for drinkingand bathing, not too near a native camp. A short, stiff, uphill stretchoutweighs a long, easy slope on the other side. If this is not possible,the camp should be sited so that the worst of the climb can be made whenfresh in the morning. Wherever camps appear to be irregularly spaced onthe maps, these factors have determined the choice of location.
¹⁴¹D Company, shifting from Namgoi to replace the Seagrave unitat Shingbwiyang, as the latter moved on to support Chinese infantry incontact with the enemy.

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Springs had rotted away at one end so we took off our pants and wadedthe stream. The rest was more level going, and numerous bicycles and abandonedcarts littered the way. Shingbwiyang, long the distant objective of allour efforts, was a sad disappointment. The original village lay in a clearingin a semicircular bend of the Tawa [Tawang] River. The place had been bombedby the British to cover the retreat a year and a half before; and had sincebeen thoroughly strafed to discourage the Japs from developing a base there.One fairly intact Kachin bustee with a damaged roof stood on its stilts.Only two other hardwood house frames remained. The village paddy fieldwas being leveled off into a small airstrip. At the time only rations,ammunition, and equipment for the 151st Med Bn were being dropped in. Cargoplanes could not use the field for about another week. Around several acresof flat land extended the heavily patrolled Chinese perimeter. The Japposition at Ningam Saken some fifteen miles away due east was under attack;but another Jap force was above Taro to the southwest in such a positionas to make a flank raid possible.¹⁴²

Near the village headman's ex-house was Forward Echelon, NCAC. Thiscomprised a dilapidated tent housing Major Leedham¹⁴³and twovery weary looking young American officers. Leedham's Kachin levee guardswere camped around it.

On entering the post from the north, one passed the temporary installationout of which the Seagrave Unit was moving. This was being operated by ahandful of the 151st Med Bn, pending completion of their new hospital.Here we looked at and discussed the patients the Chinese thought had "Teefus."Some had rashes, and the clinical symptoms and course were suggestive.¹⁴⁴

We put up at the new hospital a mile or so away behind the airstrip.Construction was going slowly. Personnel were housed under an open framelean-to with a tarp roof. The kitchen was barely functioning. The messcrew was busily rushing construction of a stove. There were so many five-footcart wheels lying around that men were busily chopping them up for

¹⁴²WSJ: Capt. [Frederick W. S.] Leixand Capt. [Ewing L.] Turner [73d Evacuation Hospital] were on this flankwith the Chinese. They spent several weeks south of Hkalak Ga at Wang Gaand Ngajatzup. One of their enlisted men was killed while acting as aidmanon a patrol. Both of these officers were awarded the Bronze Star Medalfor this mission.
Ed.--Leix, Turner, and 12 enlisted men were alerted on 14 October for theirmission as a surgical team with the 3d Battalion, 112th Infantry, 38thChinese Division. They marched from the roadhead to Hkalak Ga, hurriedon to Wang Ga, and finally reached Ngajatzup, where the Chinese had dugin after encountering the Japanese. For 3 months, in a small bamboo hutcovering an underground operating room, the team treated a steady flowof sick and wounded averaging 70 per day. All supplies and equipment wereairdropped; evacuation was impossible until the battalion was extricatedby other Chinese troops in January 1944. Enlisted men were frequently sentout with Chinese patrols. One of them, T4c. Ronald M. Brown, was killedby enemy fire from ambush. The Chinese company he was with fled in disorder,leaving behind its dead and wounded despite the protests of an Americanmedical liaison officer. See Stone, Medical Service in Combat, I,pp. 196-201.
¹⁴³WSJ: Capt. Harold Hocker, DC, Capt. Irwin I. Rosenthal,MC, and Capt. Alphonse R. Deresz, MC. Our arrival coincided with that ofHocker and Rosenthal. In their pockets were new railroad tracks [captain'sinsignia] for Deresz and Barker, who were unaware that they had been promotedunder the new policy of upgrading Medical Corps lieutenants.
¹⁴⁴WSJ: Seagrave was said to have asserted that therewas no typhus in North Burma. At any rate, something was going on. Patientswere dying daily. Later Major Leedham told me that he had seen similarcases among natives in his journeys into this area. Because of the sustainedfever and rash, they had been called Typhoid in lieu of a better diagnosis.

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kindling, and hammering the steel rims into grates. Subsistence wasair-dropped C and D ration, but the chow smelled good.

The next day I went over the site of the old refugee village at theend of the airstrip. It was another pitiful sight. Every few feet in thetall rice were bundles of bones. There were hundreds of skeletons scatteredaround, together with all manner of household possessions lying with theirowners or abandoned by those who started into the hills. There were somany brass pots and vases that everybody had enough and it was too muchtrouble to collect any more.¹⁴⁵

It appeared that the medical facilities at Shing would be adequate aslong as Seagrave could handle the casualties at Ningam, and provided thetyphus-like outbreak did not develop into an epidemic. (DDT was unheardof in those days).¹⁴⁶ Supplies and equipment were dropping in.The 10th Engineers would be provided for, although the [151st Medical]Battalion had no instructions as to supplying them.

Back to Ledo

On 22 November, the return journey commenced with Kabkye hill. Thisfirst leg northward was reminiscent of the climb up Ngalang Bum. The trailwas almost perpendicular in places; and the gain in elevation was 3,100feet in the last three linear miles. All day long we met small groups ofmedics, quartermasters, and ordnance men. We arrived at Chinglow camp bymid-afternoon. The dropping ground here was a narrow strip, surroundedby tall timber, running up the hillside well below the crest. The planeshad no chance of making a saddle approach, which would require a swingup and over after the drop. They had to come in close, with careful eyeon the cliffs to the right. Consequently many parachutes were danglingfrom trees. The heavy influx of transients had made the ration situationnone too good. Cooks looked wistfully at the dangling loads. By that timethe porters were pretty destitute of clothing and they eyed the parachutes.It was not difficult to arrange a deal for them to keep the chutes fromevery load they salvaged. This kept them busy scrambling around in thetrees until dark. The next day we made Saturday River.

We dropped Chinquist at his camp and climbed to Tagap the next morning.¹⁴⁷The trail from Nathkaw to Tagap was littered with brown, wax covered boxes.It was the first time I had seen or heard of K rations.

That afternoon I visited the hospital.¹⁴⁸ They as yet hadvery few Chinese

¹⁴⁵WSJ: Barker showed me a gracefullittle silver loving cup, trophy of a tennis match, which he had foundplaced like a headstone on a child's grave.
¹⁴⁶Not unheard of, of course, but DDT and other insecticideswere very scarce in India.
¹⁴⁷WSJ: At Nathkaw we ran into a platoon of the 1905thEngr Avn Bn. They had pulled in during the rain the night before, carryingfull packs and reserve rations. They were a lost, sorry looking lot.
¹⁴⁸WSJ: C Co, 151st Med Bn, recently moved in. Presentat the time were Capt. Eugene L. Cook, MC, and Capt. Wilton M. Lewis, MC.Both these officers had been at Jorhat [India] and other places in theAssam valley in the summer of 1943. Elements of C Co coordinated with the48th Evac in the Rice Mission. This 151st Med Bn hospital at Tagap wasin operation for several months servicing American engineer and convoytroops in the hills, along with Chinese and Indians whenever necessary.

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patients; but they were prepared to care for and supply all of the 10thEngineers in the area.

Coming down the hill the morning of 25 November we met the lead dozer¹⁴⁹widening the old jeep Road. Considerable progress had been made on thetrace since we went south. We ate Thanksgiving dinner at the Namyung bridge,¹⁵⁰and visited the nearby Chinese camp.

Working south from Chang Rang Hi the dozers had got onto the old RefugeeTrail above Chinese Midway. They followed this line down to the river bottomsabout a mile from the 12th Engineers log bridge. The track thus made wasa lane of soft dirt and mud, but a few supply vehicles were using it. Wethumbed a ride into Namlip, where we found the hospital crowd having roastduck in lieu of turkey dinner.¹⁵¹

Next day I went over to see Ting. We agreed that he would proceed assoon as possible to get his dispensary into operation at Nathkaw. We reviewedthe deployment of the companies, and arranged the medical supply channels.I would rejoin and live with him at Nathkaw on my return from Ledo. Thatafternoon Major Daves picked me up at Namlip, and we spent the night athis camp by the Ngalang bridge. Next day to Ledo by jeep to report to theSurgeon.

Washed Up

About two days later one of the numerous leech bites on my leg appearedinfected.¹⁵² On 2 December I was in the hospital with ScrubTyphus.¹⁵³

¹⁴⁹WSJ: C Co, 330th Engineer Regiment,commanded by Capt. Paul J. Bamberger, CE.
¹⁵⁰WSJ: We were guests of Mr. Baretta and his assistant.This Anglo-Burmese had escaped in 1942, and had been working for Darbyas civilian supervisor of porter labor. The meal was C rations eaten fromthe can, standing around a split log table. The hot tea tasted good eventhough there was no milk.
¹⁵¹WSJ: As called for in the Theater menu. Some of theoutfits as far out as Chang Rang actually received an issue of canned turkeyand cranberry sauce.
¹⁵²On 20 February 1944, Jones sent a report to Maj. FrancisC. Wood, chief of medical service of the 20th General Hospital, whereinhe described the "Subjective Symptomology of Mite-Borne Typhus"in his own case. He opened his report by describing his activities in November,his whereabouts, and his contact with patients at Shingbwiyang who weresuspected typhus cases. "I looked around [the Seagrave hospital] casually,without handling or carefully examining any of the patients * * * Duringthis trip I sustained a few leech bites on my legs, and numerous blackfly bites on my arms and neck. As far as I know, I had no tick or mitebites. I was in excellent physical shape and weighed about 150 pounds stripped.When I returned to Ledo I was tired but feeling well." Jones's reportconstitutes the remainder of this section.
¹⁵³Scrub or mite typhus is a serious infectious disease causedby the rickettsia R. orientalis and transmitted to man by the Trombicula,a genus of mites. Encountered during the war in the South Pacific islandsand in Burma, it was not statistically an important cause of sickness.However, for several reasons, fear of it far outweighed its mere incidenceamong troops. Americans knew very little about it. The specific mite ofNorth Burma which carried the disease had never been identified. The reservoirhost and other aspects of the ecology of the disease were unknown. Finally,it was very dangerous. Of all infectious and parasitic diseases, it rankedfourth in the mortality rates for overseas troops. Among CBI troops, itcaused the highest death rate from infectious and parasitic diseases--14.6per annum per 100,000 troops. Methods of prevention could not be developedwithout additional information--and it was precisely the danger of acquiringsuch information that was the problem.
When cases of apparent typhus first appeared among the troops of the Chinese38th division at Shingbwiyang, the Theater Surgeon, Col. Robert P. Williams,and his medical inspector, Col. E. E. Cooley, rushed to Ledo to study thesituation. Under the supposition that louse-borne typhus might be present,they called for air shipments of vaccine. A correct diagnosis soon followedthe rapid rise of the incidence of the infection, and by December, a fewAmericans were among the victims of the disease. A lull occurred thereafterfor several months The disease reappeared in May among troops of Merrill'sMarauders, subsided, and then attacked the Mars Task Force which completedthe Second Burma Campaign. All told, 804 cases and 64 deaths from scrubtyphus occurred in American forces in the China-Burma-India Theater. Abouttwo-thirds of all cases appeared in combat troops. No reliable recordsexist to indicate its incidence among Chinese troops. It would be properto suppose that the rate would be as high or higher, since they were operatingunder the same field conditions as the American infantry. British forces,too, suffered from the disease.
Studies which medical officers carried out in the winter of 1943-44 suggestedlittle more than the possible location of two dangerous areas along theroad. Instructions to troops then and later were of the empiric order:prompt detection and evacuation of those with the disease, avoidance ofgrounds once cleared and subsequently overgrown, use of insect repellent(dimethyl phthallate on skin and clothing). At the 20th General Hospital,extensive and cautious care--no specific measures of therapy were available--pulledmost patients through. And vigorous, although often inefficient, measuresto guard troops against mite-bites by impregnating clothing with repellent,apparently afforded some protection. At least, medical data from Japaneseforces, which did not make much use of insect repellents, showed that theyhad a higher level of morbidity and mortality from scrub typhus (as istrue for all the major tropical diseases which the troops in Burma encountered).See U.S. Army Medical Department, Communicable Diseases * * * Respiratoryand Alimentary Tracts, pp. 26-29, 39-40; Environmental Hygiene,pp. 231-232. For British experience, see With Wingate's Chindits, chaptersIV and V. For American combat force experience, see Marauders, chapterVII.

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On 29 November I [had] noted an itching, mosquito bite-like lesion overthe tibia at the lower third of the left leg. By the next day this wasa raised, purplish-red lesion about the size and shape of a small bean.It was painful rather than itchy. The corresponding inguinal glands weresore but not enlarged. There were no systemic symptoms. Since this wasin the area of recent leech bites, it was assumed that one of them hadbecome infected. Hot saline soaks and sulfathiazole were started. The nextday the lesion was the size of a nickel with surrounding induration, andwas developing a yellowish moist surface. The inguinal glands were egg-sized,and there was an increasing sensation of general malaise. In the eveningtemperature went to 102°, and I had a slight chill. On 2 December thelesion had increased somewhat in size, and the scab was turning a darkbrown. Malaise was severe, with temperature about 101°. A malarialsmear done by the technician at the Lekhapani Hospital was negative. Aboutnoon I had a severe chill with temperature rise to 103°. In the earlyafternoon I turned in to the 20th General Hospital, and was admitted tothe Surgical Service as an infected bite with lymphadenopathy.

During the next two days with hot soaks, elevation, and sulfa drugs,my leg became less painful and obviously better. Equally obviously, I wasgetting worse. Temperature was spiking to 104°. Malaise, headache,and backache were severe; and I realized that I was becoming mentally confused.Repeated malaria smears were negative; but because of the close similarityof symptoms, I insisted that I must be coming down with another dose ofmalignant tertian. On 5 December temperature was 104° and I had a seriesof chills. I was then transferred to the Medical Service, moved to WardD-21, and routine anti-malarial therapy started. The only response to thiswas that it made me vomit as usual. On 7 December, while bathing, I notedgeneralized adenopathy and a fine macular rash on my chest. I drew

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this to the attention of Major [James E.] Cottrell, and mentioned thealleged typhus I had seen at Shingbwiyang. A provisional diagnosis of mitetyphus was made, and anti-malarial therapy stopped.

For the last two or three days, I had been becoming increasingly confused,but would come back into good contact when stimulated. About 7 or 8 December[I drifted] out of Ward D-21 into a world of my own. The charted material,and the nurses' and physicians' notes for the next two weeks, give a goodpicture of the objective clinical course:

8 Dec. Sustained temperature 103-104°. No delirium or confusion,but mental fatigue and irritability. Rash fading but lymph nodes larger.No spleen. Hgb. 14; RBC 4.2; WBC 11,600 with shift to left. Chest clearexcept for crackles at right base.

9 Dec. Transfusion attempted, but only 100 cc introduced. (Alltransfusions were given in the left arm, as the veins on the right hadbeen thrombosed by intravenous quinine the previous summer.)

10 Dec. Disc margins blurred and veins very tortuous.

11 Dec. Sleeping but restless. Continues to moan and groan. At1300 hours thinks it is night. Response very sluggish when called. Conditionunimproved.

12 Dec. Patient shows myoclonic twitching of hands and jaws,especially when sleeping. Neck slightly stiff. Discs blurred. No furtherrash or adenopathy. Transfusion 500 cc. Condition serious. Confused attimes. Apprehensive and restless. Intermittent pulse. Put on SeriouslyIll list. (This radio went out of Hq, Base Section #3, but apparently wasnot forwarded from Delhi. My family never received notification from theWar Dept., and frantically wondered what had happened to me for a monthas no mail came in.)

13 Dec. Generalized twitching. Talking incoherently at times.Respirations shallow and rapid. Talking and moaning in sleep.

14 Dec. Patient appears stuporous. Must awaken for fluids. Talkingincoherently.

15 Dec. Temperature seems to be breaking. Occasionally irrational.Face twitches.

17 Dec. Seems much more rational today. BP 96/68.

18 Dec. Temperature still up and down, but downward trend. Seemsslightly but distinctly better.

22 Dec. Patient shaved himself today. (With disastrous results.)

23 Dec. Temperature under 99° all day for first time sinceadmission. (In addition to the above, there were frequent nurses' notesof incontinence of bowels and bladder during this period.)

(27 Dec. Walked to latrine without assistance.)

(28 Dec. Removed from Seriously Ill list.)

(13 Jan. Walked outside ward and sat in sun.)

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(16 Jan. Afternoon temperature 100° to 101° past twodays. X-ray shows patch of consolidation at left middle. This is not sameas the shadow at right base during acute stage of typhus. Diagnosed AtypicalPneumonia and put back to bed.)

(24 Jan. Out of bed.)

(28 Jan. Put on uniform for first time in eight weeks.)

(9 Feb. Scab fell off initial mite bite lesion. Weight 138. Dischargedto quarters. In hospital ten weeks to the day. In those days patients werenot picked up automatically into Detachment of Patients at the end of 60days hospitalization.)

The diagnosis of Mite or, as it is now called, Scrub Typhus was notmade for several days after the appearance of the rash. This clinical entitywas not then known to occur that far north in Burma. A few sporadic casesof what were probably mild scrub typhus had been seen; for want of a betterterm they were loosely called "CBI Fever." Within a week of thetime I was admitted, the Shingbwiyang air strip was landing cub planes.Four other liaison or engineer officers were flown into Ledo [with scrubtyphus]. All blood agglutinations were positive for OXK and negative forOX19. A sixth case was picked up in an Air Corps officer who was makinga slow recovery from a walk out of the jungle. It was recognized that aminor epidemic was in progress, and Lt. Col. [Alexander G.] Gilliam wassent out to investigate. After one field trip, he got typhus too, and wasin the next bed to me. Sometime in the spring of 1944, Life magazinepublished an article on tropical diseases. In the section on typhus therewas an illustration of a rack of eggs inoculated with rickettsia from allparts of the world. One egg was labeled "GILLIAM-ASSAM-1944."I own about one-seventh of the stock in that egg.

For two months the thin, hungry, irritable group of officers who growledaround the far end of Ward E-34 were known as the "Typhus Tigers."

Shortly after I was discharged, the literature describing a similardisease in the Southwest Pacific arrived in Ledo. All except two of theseven of us returned eventually to duty. When the long period of debilitywas later recognized, severe cases of this type were routinely dispositionedhome.

From these data it might be supposed that the patient was more or lessan inanimate object. On the contrary, I lived in an interesting, ratherbizarre, but to me perfectly rational world of my own. Many of the detailsare as clear in my memory now as they were two months ago. Either justbefore or just after being transferred to Medical, I began to live on anisland in the harbor of Fremantle, Australia. My bed was placed at theopen end of a large warehouse which stretched away to my left. I couldsee the rafters quite clearly in the semi-darkness, but could not get agood view of the rest of the interior. At my head and obliquely to my rightwas a wall which shut off my view. In front and half-right, the lawns andcement walks of the tip of my island sloped gently down to the water sometwenty or thirty yards away. At water's edge the island was surroundedby a low ornamental brick wall, pierced at three or four points by smallbrass cannon. The whole pic-

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ture was characteristically British. I was sure the location was inFremantle from my limited view of the harbor, and because of the fact thatthe peculiar pattern of the brick work of the wall was identical with thatof the Perth Hospital, which I had visited. While I could hear voices onthe other side of the wall to my right, I saw nobody while I lived on thisisland. The location was sunny and warm, and I had a peaceful enjoyabletime except for two major discomforts.

The first was the prodigious amount of noise from the other side ofthe wall on my right. This consisted of the rattling of chains, the clashof metals, and the grinding of gears, which I assumed came from nearbydocks. All these noises set up terrifically painful vibrations in my head.At times it seemed as if I would be lifted bodily off the mattress by thepain in my skull. The second annoying feature was the problem of my bowels.Under my bed and around the tip of the island ran a small narrow gaugetrack. Once or twice a day, a small vehicle, about the size of a foot lockerset on edge with a trap door in the top, trundled around the circuit ofthis track. Apparently this at one time had been an ammunition carrierfor the cannon; and was now used to cart refuse. I was vaguely aware ofthe fact that I was having incontinent bowel movements, and was naturallymost embarrassed about it. So every time the little trundle cart came by,I would struggle to stop it and defecate in it--without much success.

After a number of days on my island, I shifted abruptly to a new environment.(Probably corresponding to the move from Ward D-21 to E-34.) This was abizarre and rather uncomfortable setup. I was at the stern of what appearedto be a small luxury excursion or nightclub boat. At my left was an ornatelycarved and gaudily painted bulkhead, with a door at the foot of the bed.I seemed to be out on the deck itself; but at my right was a light wallor screen which shut off part of my view. Across the foot and half-rightof my bed I could see the rail of the boat pitching against the distanthorizon. The bed itself was a large grand piano with the mattress placedon the closed lid. It seemed to be dark much of the time, and there wasa great deal of activity on the boat. People walked by the foot of thebed; frequently they were peculiar in that I could see only their heads.Sometimes they were carrying musical instruments. Often I could hear musicon the deck. On the other side of the wall to my right there was a lotgoing on; laughter, music, sometimes the smell of cooking. But nobody seemedto pay much attention to me. I particularly resented not getting any ofthe food. I came to the conclusion that the boat was some kind of entertainmentconcession. Here as on the island, noise, especially that of music, botheredme. There was an added feature of torture in the form of Gremlins who camein the night and tried to pry up the lid of the piano I slept on. Theyused to dance on my feet, which were very tender. I recall sitting up mostof one night swatting them away from my feet with a rolled up magazine.

Curiously enough, although the above would indicate that I was hungry,I have no recollection of either eating or drinking during this period,either

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actually or in fantasy. I am told that I constantly demanded fluids.Having been trained in the early days of massive intravenous fluid therapy,I apparently had a deeply enough ingrained instinct for fluids to keepmy water balance.

Most of this well organized system of hallucinations had a basis offact to which it referred. In both Wards D-21 and E-34 I occupied the extremefar bed in the right hand corner. Because of the bed screen on my left,I could see only the roof of the warehouse on the island and the lefthandbulkhead on the boat. The wall to my right was the end wall of the ward,on the other side of which the convalescent patients washed and shaved.The march of the bodyless ghosts past the foot of my bed was the paradeto the latrine, on the other side of a low screen separating me from theaisle. The dockyard noise on D-21 was the truck traffic along the roada few yards from my bed. (The E area was under construction at the time.The only access road was past the D area.) On E-34 the music was from theradios and victrolas belonging to other patients. Why the boat rocked continuallyI am not certain. It probably referred to a mild vestibular upset associatedwith the deafness. The Gremlins dancing on my feet referred to pressurefrom bedclothes, which was later a major discomfort. (Bed hoops were notconstructed until later. In the early cases, it was not realized that pressurepain in the extremities was a common symptom of scrub typhus. The readermust recall that we were the first clinical guinea pigs of a disease aboutwhich American medical officers knew little or nothing. Some of the commentsI made at the end of this report are now rather standard procedure.)

During all this time I remember only about half a dozen incidents inwhich I was in contact with reality. These were all produced by fairlystrong stimuli, physical or mental. I recall being transported from thesurgical ward to D-21, and from D-21 to E-34. Later I have been remindedof other visits and incidents in which the visitors thought I was in fairlygood contact. After careful thought, I can hazily remember some of these.But for all practical purposes, most of three weeks in December 1943 islost to my cerebral storehouse.

About 20 December I began to notice that I was being laboriously spoon-fedby some patient nurse. Gradually the periods between feedings began tofill in with details of the life around me. Then suddenly on 22 Decembereverything cleared up. I was amazed to learn the date, and to hear detailsof what had been happening around me. I was even surprised to find thatI was in a new ward. Although I clearly remembered being moved, it hadnot impressed itself on my mind as a reality. I insisted on sitting upon the side of my bed and shaving, as sort of a token to myself that Iwas operating on my own again. But by the time I had nicked myself forthe third time, I wished I had never started. (With a three weeks growthof beard masking a gaunt face, I was a reasonable facsimile of one of Wingate'sRaiders.)

From then on, the outstanding subjective symptoms grouped themselvesas follows:

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1. General Weakness--When first weighed (29 Dec.) I was 122 pounds,a loss of thirty pounds. This was regained very slowly, in spite of a ravenousappetite. On discharge at the end of the tenth week, weight was 138. Withan initial height of 6'1" and weight of 150 odd, it is obvious thatmost of this loss must represent muscle atrophy. Some tremor remained atthe end of the eleventh week. The same symptoms in the legs and feet weremore serious. Walking was slow and painful. In the twelfth week a certainamount of pain on walking continued in the knees and arches of the feet.

Transfusions of whole citrated blood (500 cc) were given on 24 and 26December. Each of these effected an appreciable physical lift.

2. Deafness--During the period 20-22 December, I had an ideathat the auricles of my ears were set off from my head at the end of eustaciantubes about six inches long. I used to feel around for them periodicallyto be sure they were there. As I regained consciousness, it was apparentthat I was extremely deaf. As contrasted with the deafness to ordinaryexternal wave sounds, however, loud noises penetrating to the sensoriumwere built up as tremendously painful vibrations in my head. The sensationwas somewhat like being close to a very loud, highpitched steamer or factorywhistle. A bed scraped along the concrete floor was uncomfortable. In thefourth week, a patient at the other end of the ward played a victrola withrags stuffed into the amplifier. It was so uncomfortable that I put myhead under the pillow. This sensation gradually diminished as my hearingimproved. By the end of the sixth week hearing was practically normal,and loud noises were no longer annoying. (Slight deafness remained forseveral months. As late as the summer of 1944, I had to listen closelyto follow the conversation at staff conferences.)

3. Pain in Hands and Feet--Probably the most annoying and persistentsymptom was tingling and pain in the hands and feet. The pathological findingsin typhus are said to include multiple small thrombi in the capillaries,including those of the extremities. This may be associated with the commonfinding of engorged retinal vessels and blurred discs. It may also accountindirectly for the deafness. Because of the tingling, as distinguishedfrom the pain, I was inclined to suspect that the mechanism was neurologicalrather than directly vascular. Careful observation failed to show any coloror heat changes that I could observe. The sensations in the hands wereannoying but never severe. By the end of the fourth week they had prettywell disappeared. Pain and tingling in the feet were a real problem. Thearea involved included the soles over the ball of the foot, the soles ofthe toes, around the nails, and down the dorsum of the toes to the terminaljoint. The dorsum of the foot was not involved. It was common to wake atnight with pain from pressure of the bedclothes on the toes. Walking waslimited the first two weeks more from pressure pain than from weaknessor any other factor. It was the eighth week before I could get my feetin shoes. The symptoms in the hands disappeared by the sixth week. In thetwelfth week, I still had a certain amount of soft tissue pain (as distinguished

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from painful arches), and could keep my shoes on only a few hours aday. (In June I did most of my work in the office sitting in a wicker chairwith my feet on the desk. As late as that, I was wearing either mosquitoboots or shoes a size larger than normal.)

4. Blindness--In spite of findings of papilledema and tortuousretinal veins which persisted into the ninth week, at no time was I blind.Nor did I ever have any difficulty in reading fine print.

5. Eschar--The scab fell off the ulcerated lesion on my shinat the end of the tenth week.

On the basis of my own experience, I would suggest the following minorpoints in nursing technic for severely ill typhus patients:

1. A gatch bed if the state of the circulation allows. The flat positionover a period of time becomes most uncomfortable. It is also difficultfor a very weak patient to get up on his elbow for feedings.

2. Insofar as possible, keep the patient on a quiet ward at the backend of the lot. Cotton plugs in the ears might relieve the discomfort.This seems trivial, but one has to experience the extreme discomfort fromnoise to appreciate it.

3. Bed hoops for pain in the feet. In this connection, I am under theimpression that in their anxiety to start walking to the latrine, patientsare apt to talk the ward officer into allowing walking too soon.

4. I was much impressed by the increased feeling of well-being aftertransfusion. This might be tried more frequently in a small series of cases.¹⁵⁴

After ten weeks in the 20th General and two more months in quarters,¹⁵⁵I began to get itchy again. In April Smiley asked me if I felt up to goingdown to Yupbang to straighten out some minor difficulties with the 10thEngineers, who then had no liaison officer with them.¹⁵⁶ Thiswas an interesting trip, but it convinced me that I was washed up for anyfield duty for some months to come. I hauled my carcass behind the deskI have been digging my spurs into ever since.

I would not have missed those seven months with the Chinese. The workand the diplomatic finagling were demanding, but whatever could be accomplishedwas well worthwhile. In addition, roving up and down the trails was anexperience. It gave an unparalleled opportunity to watch the Ledo Roadbuilt, and to get to know the men who did the job. The malaria, hunger,dysentery, sore legs, and typhus were not much fun; but they were compensatedfor by other things. There is a certain rather dubious satisfaction inbeing the first American officer to contract scrub typhus in Burma. Itso happened simply because I was one of the first Americans to walk overthe hills into the Hukawng Valley, before the Ledo Road was punched through.

¹⁵⁴Here Jones's report on scrub typhus ends.The text of his reminiscences is resumed and concluded in the next twoparagraphs.
¹⁵⁵WSJ: There were no convalescent facilities in thosedays. While I was fretting around at the 48th Evac, the call for volunteersfor Merrill's Marauders came in. That would have been a good detail.
¹⁵⁶WSJ: It was quite a thrill to fly from Ledo to Shingbwiyangin less than an hour. The last time I had been there it was a good eightday trip by jeep and foot.

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Index of Names¹⁵⁷

Allen, Alfred K., Maj., CE, Ledo Road Headquarters
Arnold, Lloyd H., 1st Lt., Signal Corps
Arrowsmith, John C., Col., CE, Commanding Officer, Base, Section 3, S.O.S.,1942-43
Bagaskas, Adam, T4c., 48th Evacuation Hospital
Bamberger, Paul J., Capt., CE, 330th Engineer General Service Regiment
Baretta, ----, supervisor of porters
Barker, Robert C., 1st Lt., MC, 151st Medical Battalion
Beck, Irving A., Capt., MC, 48th Evacuation Hospital
Bleecker, Francis A., 1st Lt., CE, 330th Engineer General Service Regiment
Boatner, Haydon L., Brig. Gen., Deputy Commander, Chinese Army in Indiaand Headquarters Company 5303d Combat Troops
Breidenbach, Paul H., 1st Lt., Ord, 115th Ordnance Company
Brown, Ronald M., T4c., 73d Evacuation Hospital
Burgett, George M., Capt., CE, 330th Engineer General Service Regiment
Canfield, Rolden F., 1st Lt., VC, 1st Veterinary Company
Case, B. C., English agricultural expert originally at Pyinmana, Burma
Chang, ----, Captain, Asst. Regimental Surgeon, Chinese 10th Engineer Regiment
Cherry, Monroe H., Sgt., 330th Engineer General Service Regiment
Chinquist, Clement C., 2d Lt., CE, 330th Engineer General Service Regiment
Chow, ----, Major, Acting Vice Commander, Chinese 10th Engineer Regiment
Clark, Samuel D., Capt., MC, 48th Evacuation Hospital
Conde, George F., Capt., MC, 48th Evacuation Hospital
Cook, Eugene L., Capt., MC, 151st Medical Battalion
Cottrell, James E., Maj., MC, 20th General Hospital
Dabal, Frank J., Pfc., 48th Evacuation Hospital
Darby, James E., Lt. Col., QM, 21st Quartermaster Group
Daves, Edmund H., Jr., Maj., CE, Commanding Officer, 2d Battalion, 330thEngineer General Service Regiment
De Broeck, George J., 2d Lt., MAC, 73d Evacuation Hospital
Deresz, Alphonse R., Capt., MC, 151st Medical Battalion
Dietz, Robert E., 1st Lt., QM, 21st Quartermaster Group
Dziob, John S., Capt., MC, 48th Evacuation Hospital
Farley, Philip U., 2d Lt., MAC, 48th Evacuation Hospital
Farr, Walter J., Maj., MC, 14th Evacuation Hospital
Fitzhugh, Thomas, Lt. Col., MC, 20th General Hospital
Garber, Israel E., Capt., MC, 48th Evacuation Hospital
Gilliam, Alexander G., Lt. Col., Public Health Service
Gleim, Charles S., Lt. Col., CE, 330th Engineer General Service Regiment
Grindlay, John H., Maj., MC, Seagrave Hospital
Haas, Victor H., Lt. Col., Public Health Service, Surgeon, Base Section3, 1942-43
Haines, Frank H., Capt., CE, 330th Engineer General Service Regiment
Hardison, Thomas A., 1st Lt., CE, 330th Engineer General Service Regiment
Hill, Christopher F., lst Lt., CE, 330th Engineer General Service Regiment
Hocker, Harold, Capt., DC, 15lst Medical Battalion
Holdsworth, Hubert, 1st Lt., MC, 48th Evacuation Hospital
Jones, Gerald, Capt., MC, Surgeon, 2d Battalion, 330th Engineer GeneralService Regiment
Kaminer, James H., Capt., CE, Ledo Road Headquarters
Korb, Milton, lst Lt., MC, 48th Evacuation Hospital
Kriegel, Franz, M.D., a civilian doctor with the Chinese Army in India
Krows, Roy A. W., Capt., CE, 45th Engineer General Service Regiment

¹⁵⁷Identifications are those given by Dr. WalterS. Jones, occasionally supplemented by the editor. In cases where the officeor functional title of the individual is given, it may be assumed thathe was on duty with Services of Supply Headquarters, Base Section 3, atLedo.

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Lawler, Fay H., British civilian interpreter with Chinese10th Engineer Regiment
Lee, L. C., Col., Commanding Officer, 10th Chinese Engineer Regiment
Leedham, Charles L., Col., MC, Commanding Officer, 48th Evacuation Hospital
Leedham, ----, Maj., British political officer
Leet, William L., Capt., MC, 48th Evacuation Hospital
Leix, Frederick W. S., Capt., MC, 73d Evacuation Hospital
Lewis, Wilton M., Capt., MC, 151st Medical Battalion
Lyle, Clarence L., Maj., CE, Commanding Officer, lst Battalion, 330th EngineerGeneral Service Regiment
Manter, Wilbur B., 1st Lt., MC, 48th Evacuation Hospital
Marazzi, Walter J., T3c., 48th Evacuation Hospital
Martin, Arthur C., 2d Lt., QMC, 21st Quartermaster Group
Morgan, Embree W., Jr., Capt., CE, 330th Engineer General Service Regiment
Palmer, Gail R., Capt., CE, Forward Area Engineer
Pepper, Dickinson S., Maj., MC, 20th General Hospital
Perry, Thomas, Jr., Capt., 48th Evacuation Hospital
Pica, John, 2d Lt., Ord, 330th Engineer General Service Regiment (?)
Pond, Ashley, 1st Lt., MC, 151st Medical Battalion
Rasmussen, Theodore B., Capt., MC, 14th Evacuation Hospital
Ravin, Joseph, T5c., 48th Evacuation Hospital
Rice, Earle M., Lt. Col., MC, CBI malariologist, 1943
Romberger, Floyd T., Jr., Capt., MC, 151st Medical Battalion
Rosenthal, Irwin I., Capt., MC, 151st Medical Battalion
Rupert, Russell M., Capt., CE, 330th Engineer General Service Regiment
Schaffer, Bernard G., Capt., MC, 151st Medical Battalion
Seagrave, Gordon S., Lt. Col., MC, the "Burma Surgeon" of Namhkam
Settlage, Henry A., 1st Lt., MC, 151st Medical Battalion
Simmons, Lillard N., Maj., MC, Forward Echelon Surgeon
Sisney, Elza R., 1st Lt., QMC, 21st Quartermaster Group
Smiley, John T., Maj., MC, originally Executive Officer, 151st MedicalBattalion; became Surgeon, Base Section 3, in 1943
Smith, Edgar M., 1st Lt., CE, 330th Engineer General Service Regiment
Smith, William J., 2d Lt., Sig. C., Base Section 3 Signal Detachment
Stankard, William F., 1st Lt., MC, 48th Evacuation Hospital
Stilwell, Joseph, Lt. Gen., CBI Commander
Stone, Eric P., Maj., MC, 48th Evacuation Hospital
Stubenvoll, John G., Capt., CE, Commanding Officer, D Company, 330th EngineerGeneral Service Regiment
Sun Li-jen, Brig. Gen., Commanding General, 38th Chinese Division
Tamraz, John M., Col., MC, Services of Supply Surgeon, CBI
Ting, ----, Major, Regimental Surgeon, 10th Chinese Engineer Regiment
Trotter, Richard W., 1st Lt., MC, 151st Medical Battalion
Truitt, James G., Col., CE, Ledo Road Location Engineer
Turner, Ewing L., Capt., MC, 73d Evacuation Hospital
Wang, ----, Major, Commanding Officer, 3d Battalion, 10th Chinese EngineerRegiment
Watson, Douglas F., Capt., VC, Commanding Officer, 1st Veterinary Company
Webster, Frederick A., Capt., MC, 48th Evacuation Hospital
Wheeler, Raymond A., Maj. Gen., Commanding General, CBI Services of Supply
Willey, John P., Col., Inf, Chief of Staff, Headquarters 5303d Combat Command
Williams, Gomer, Pfc., 151st Medical Battalion
Womack, Taylor S., Capt., CE, Commanding Officer, C Company, 45th EngineerGeneral Service Regiment
Yang, ----, Lt. Col., Chinese 10th Engineer Regiment
Yang Hun Hsin, orderly from 10th Chinese Engineer Regiment, assigned tothe author, Walter S. Jones
York, Robert E., Col., CE, Commanding Officer, 330th Engineer General ServiceRegiment, Ledo Road Engineer

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