CHAPTER X
Europe: Combat Operations on the Continent
MEDICAL SUPPLY SUPPORT ON NORMANDY BEACHES
First Beach Operations
After months of planning and careful preparation, medicalsupply operations began on the continent of Europe with the landing on D-day (6June 1944) of the second squad of the first section, 1st Medical Depot Company,in support of elements of the 1st and 29th Infantry Divisions on Omaha Beach.The remainder of the section was unable to land until D+1 because of intenseenemy action.
Late on the afternoon of D+1, the first medical maintenanceunits were laid ashore; however, before these supplies could be relocated,significant portions were lost to the tide. Because of the strong enemyresistance, the first section, Advance Depot Platoon of the 1st Medical DepotCompany, was compelled to set up issue points virtually at the high waterlineand to use salvaged supplies and reserve stocks.
On the morning of D+2, an advance platoon of the 32dMedical Depot Company, commanded by Maj. (later Lt. Col.) Howard F. White, MSC,landed, and by the afternoon of D+3, the first Army medical supply dump inFrance was established at Saint-Laurent-sur-Mer, less than a mile from OmahaBeach (fig. 75).
Unlike the situation at Omaha Beach, bulk shipments ofmedical supplies did not arrive on Utah Beach until D+2, and the first sectionof the Advance Depot Platoon, 31st Medical Depot Company, arrived ashore on thenight of D+2. By D+3, the second section of the Advance Depot Platoon, 1stMedical Depot Company, arrived and took over the beach issue; the remainder ofthe platoon of the 31st, meanwhile, was setting up the first medical supply dumpin the Utah sector near Le Grand Chemin (map 13), 3 miles from Utah Beach in thevicinity of the landing areas for the 82d and 101st Airborne Divisions.1
Early Supply Problems
During the first few days, the unloading of medical cargo wasirregular, delayed, and confused. One of the biggest problems was locating andgathering medical supply boxes, which were mingled with the mass of othersupplies along the beach areas. Use of supplemental methods of resupply, such
1(1) Annual Report of Medical Activities, First U.S. Army, 1944. (2) Annual Report, 1st Medical Depot Company, 1944. (3) Annual Report, 32d Medical Depot Company, 1944. (4) Annual Report, 31st Medical Depot Company, 1944.
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FIGURE 75.-Medical care on Omaha Beach, June1944. Note the absence of a litter.
as mortar shell cases, assault vest, and two-man carrymaintenance units, averted many emergencies and crises. Block shipments on LST's(landing ships, tank), discharged on the Continent by the Navy as planned,provided a sustaining stock of litters and blankets. In the first 14 days, morethan 30,000 litters, 96,000 blankets, and other replenishment items were broughtashore by this means.
Packing lists, which were to be attached to the outside ofskid-loaded medical maintenance units, were frequently lost, necessitatingopening numerous boxes to locate sufficient quantities of one item to fill asingle requisition. By doing this, the waterproofed packing was destroyed,leaving the supplies unprotected from the weather until they could be placedunder tentage or other covered storage.
It was planned that hospital ships would deliver the bulk ofwhole blood during the first few days of the assault to augment LST deliveriesand build up a comfortable reserve pending air shipments. It was necessary,however, to interrupt hospital ship schedules until mines could be cleared away.The delay caused concern, particularly on Utah Beach. The first C-47 planescarrying blood arrived at Omaha Beach on D+4; shipments to Utah Beach took placea
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MAP 13.-Medical supply depots on the NormandyBeachhead and the Cotentin Peninsula, June-July 1944.
few days later. During late June, the delivery of penicillinalso became a problem. Because stocks were waiting to be unloaded from shipsimmobilized in the English Channel, emergency air shipments had to be sent fromthe United States to ease the situation.
Transshipment of supplies, including blood and penicillin,between the beaches was virtually impossible.
Hospital assemblies.-One of the most serious problemsduring the early days was the inability of hospital units to locate andreassemble components of their equipment. To avoid this situation, Maj. (laterLt. Col.) Kenneth E. Richards, MAC, Medical Supply Officer, First U.S. Army, hadattempted to arrange for complete hospital assemblies to be loaded on onevessel, each assembly to be accompanied by one officer and five enlisted men ofthe hospital unit. The decision was that only the initial shipments wouldreceive this kind of protection during transit. As a consequence, hospitalpersonnel spent many futile days going from dump to dump in search of a few moreboxes of supplies and equipment that might extend the hospital's functionalcapability. Maximum functioning of several hospitals was seriously delayedbecause nearly every unescorted assembly became fragmented.
Emergency requirements.-Despite the confusion andinherent difficulties of war, essential supplies and equipment for medicaltreatment and evacuation
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were delivered to the First U.S. Army. Items in short supplywere requisitioned daily from the United Kingdom. The theater Medical SupplyDivision in Cheltenham maintained a 24-hour duty force, which provided instantaction on priority air shipments and those on the Red Ball Coaster system. Asearly as D+1, emergency shipments of ether and penicillin were dropped byparachute to the medical troops on the beaches. After emergency landing stripsbecame available on D+4, refrigerated whole blood, penicillin, and othercritical items were delivered daily.
By the end of June, landing strips had been improved to suchan extent that the Combined Air Transport Operations Room increased the loadlimit for a C-47 plane to 5,000 pounds. The Medical Department was allowed twoplanes daily, for a total lift of 10,000 pounds. Although this allocation waspredicated primarily on transportation requirements for whole blood, the milkrun, as it was called, was used extensively for other emergency needs as well.2
Visit of the Chief Surgeon.-The Chief Surgeon of the Europeantheater, Maj. Gen. Paul R. Hawley, first visited the Continent on D+5 andreturned on subsequent dates to observe the treatment and evacuation ofcasualties. He was impressed by the organization of the medical service in theFirst U.S. Army and by the morale of the units. In a communication to TheSurgeon General, Maj. Gen. Norman T. Kirk, on 26 June 1944, General Hawleyreported:
Supply has been superb! At every medical unitI visited, from the collecting station to the holding hospital at the evacuationpoint in France, I enquired specially as to the status of supply. I did not geta single answer that was not to the effect that they had everything they wanted(which is always more than they need) and in ample quantities.3
First U.S. Army Report on Supply Difficulties
On 25 June 1944, Major Richards reported substantially asfollows to General Hawley on supply difficulties experienced to that date:
The use of inferior 2.5 Kilowatt generators which failed tostand around-the-clock operations hampered operation of field and evacuationhospitals until they were finally replaced by larger generators.
The use of leaded gasoline caused failure ofgasoline burners, autoclaves, and two-burner stoves, but relief finally camewhen white gasoline became available.
Improper functioning of flow meters foranesthesia apparatus prompted five to six service calls a day.
X-ray grids and screens were smashed,sterilizer gages were broken, and considerable glassware and bottled items werelost. (The fault, according to Major Richards, rested with those responsible forunloading and handling the supplies.)
A greater necessity for spare parts for X-raymachines, autoclaves, anesthesia apparatus, and other machinery was evidenced.
Because of excessive losses experienced duringthe D-day landings, there was a continuous shortage of blank forms.
Many items, such as power saws, suctionapparatus, anesthesia apparatus, oxygen therapy apparatus, and shock team sets,which were not previously authorized, were needed in a variety of medical units.
2(1) See footnote 1(1), p. 307. (2) Report of Operations, First U.S. Army, 6 June 1944-1 August 1944. [Official record.] (3) Annual Report, Supply Division, Chief Surgeon's Office, ETOUSA, 1944.
3Personal Letter, Maj. Gen. Paul R. Hawley, MC, Chief Surgeon, ETOUSA, to Maj. Gen. Norman T. Kirk, The Surgeon General, 26 June 1944.
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Major Richards' opinion was that air shipments were moredesirable than the Red Ball Express shipments because the supplies could be morereadily located upon delivery. He also suggested that the one medical depot perArmy should be supplemented with advance platoons as proved by the 31st and 32dMedical Depot Companies during the assault phase.4
Appearance of More Deficiencies
Despite steps taken in the United Kingdom to augment unitequipment, more deficiencies emerged. Lack of X-ray film-drying facilities inevacuation hospitals was serious. Also, there was a general insufficiency in alloxygen administering equipment. These and similar items were necessarilyrequisitioned from the United Kingdom.
Planning for resupply of litters, blankets, and splints-theproperty exchange items-seemed to be adequate, but suddenly it was found thatlarge quantities of three additional items-pajamas, Levin tubes, andtracheotomy tubes-were being evacuated to the United Kingdom along withpatients, without compensating replacements. Heavy air evacuation of casualtiescaused a serious problem in replacing litters and blankets at forward airfields.Attempts to rectify this condition by the inauguration of weekly replenishment,based on casualties evacuated during the previous week, did not prove entirelysatisfactory. The problem at this point was solved largely by furnishingadditional aircraft based on specified demands. The shipment of blankets,litters, and other essential items was as high as 550 tons in 1 day.
Constantly changing bed capacities during June 1944 causedsome hospitals to turn in unneeded tentage and other equipment while other unitswere inflated to meet sudden, unanticipated needs.5
THE BURGEONING DEPOT SYSTEM
Entrance of Third U.S. Army Units
With the addition of elements of the Third U.S. Army in July1944, Col. (later Brig. Gen.) John A. Rogers, MC, the First U.S. Army Surgeon,faced the problem of supporting an oversized command made more difficult by thechanging tactical situation. To add to the drain upon First U.S. Army stocks,some Third U.S. Army units had lost much of their equipment in transit.
To complement the increased troop strength and supportexpanding medical operations, additional medical depot companies were arrivingto assist those which had participated in the beach phase (map 13). The AdvanceDepot Platoon of the 32d Medical Depot Company, which had set up storage tentsnear Colleville shortly after D-day, was joined in setting up a depot atBricquebec, France, by its base depot platoon which had landed on 20 July.
4Memorandum, Maj. Kenneth E. Richards, MAC, Medical Supply Officer, First U.S. Army, to Maj. Gen. Paul R. Hawley, 25 June 1944.
5See footnote 1(1), p. 307.
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The depot was set up in a large open shed which provedadequate despite heavy rains.
On 23 June, the second advance section of the 33d MedicalDepot Company landed on Utah Beach, proceeded to Le Grand Chemin, where itassisted the 1st Medical Depot Company until 12 July, then moved to Chef Du Pontto open the depot.
After working at Chef Du Pont, the section moved on 17 Julyto La Haye-du-Puits, where it set up a medical dump for supplies arriving fromthe beaches. A detachment of one officer and 20 enlisted men had been sent toCherbourg on 3 July to inspect and sort 40 tons of captured German medicalsupplies.
The Advance Platoon of the 30th Medical Depot Company arrivedon Omaha Beach on 30 June 1944; the second advance section established a dump atL'Etard while the first advance section went to Cherbourg. Approximately 50skid loads of medical property and 100 tons of miscellaneous medical supplieswere received in the first few days of operation. This dump, located in thevicinity of Omaha Beach, received supplies discharged from vessels in that area.The dump, taken over by the Advance Platoon of the 31st Medical Depot Company on10 July and consolidated into Depot M-3 on 1 August, consisted of 300,000 squarefeet of storage space.
Opening of Supply Depots
Closed storage of medical supplies was first opened atCherbourg by half of the advance section of the 30th Medical Depot Company inearly July, and was designated Depot M-1. Lack of proper equipment to handleheavy property handicapped the operation of the depot, which had becomepartially operational after the port of Cherbourg was opened on 16 July. Thisdepot was closed on 12 August as the tactical situation warranted a forwardmove.
Depot M-2 at Chef Du Pont, opened by the recently arrivedbalance of the 33d Medical Depot Company on 15 July, occupied approximately ahalf million square feet of open storage space, divided by hedgerows. Some 3,000square feet of covered storage, however, was achieved by using ward tents.Operation of the dump was taken over by the 13th Medical Depot Company on 24July, 5 days after its arrival (map 13). Approximately 2,500 tons of medicalsupplies, including assemblies for five general hospitals, had been handled bythe 33d.6
Position of Advance Section
From D-day to the establishment of the Army rear boundaries on 1August, the First U.S. Army controlled all supplies and dumps. On 18 July,
6(1) See footnotes 1(4), p. 307; and 2(2), p. 310. (2) Annual Report, 30th Medical Depot Company, 1944. (3) Annual Report, 33d Medical Depot Company, 1944. (4) Annual Report, 13th Medical Depot Company, 1944.
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however, following a conference attended by the Surgeon,First U.S. Army, and his medical supply officer, and by Col. Charles H. Beasley,MC, Surgeon. ADSEC (Advance Section), Communications Zone, and his medicalsupply officer, Maj. (later Lt. Col.) Thomas A. Carilia, MSC, it was agreed thatthe ADSEC Surgeon would be responsible for receiving medical supplies dischargedat the port of Cherbourg and over Utah and Omaha Beaches and for operatingmedical dumps. The three dumps (M-1, M-2, M-3) had a total of 2,875 tons ofsupplies, 25 percent of which were hospital assemblies.
The First U.S. Army's massive attack on Saint-L? andadjoining areas started on 11 July. Augmented by attached Third U.S. Army units,a steady pressure was maintained until the German lines collapsed at the end ofthe month. The Third U.S. Army became operational on 1 August, and the entirefront became fluid, the First and Third U.S. Armies advancing rapidly. At thattime, the Third U.S. Army medical units, the 32d and 33d Medical DepotCompanies, which had been attached earlier to the First U.S. Army, reverted toThird U.S. Army control.7
Establishment of General Hospitals
The 5th and 298th General Hospitals arrived on the Continent on6 and 17 July, respectively, but the unit assembly for the 5th General Hospitalwas delayed; so, the assembly for the 127th General Hospital, which had arrived,was used to establish the 5th General Hospital at Carentan (fig. 76). The 298thGeneral Hospital was established at Cherbourg. Both units became operational andwere receiving patients on 1 August.
By 31 August, 17 general hospital (1,000-bed) assemblies hadreached the Continent, together with 151 medical maintenance units, type A; 49division assault maintenance units, type D, for medical requirements; 211division assault units, type D, for surgical requirements; and 35 supplemental Dunits, plus many tons of other supplies.8
SUPPLY DIVISION ON THE CONTINENT
With the extension of liberated territory in early August, anadvance section of Headquarters, ETOUSA (European Theater of Operations, U.S.Army), moved to Le Mans, and the forward echelon of ETOUSA Headquarters assumedresponsibility for the Normandy area on 14 August. The Chief Surgeon's Office,including the Supply Division, had moved in increments from the United Kingdomto Normandy during July and August. Because of its initial locations nearValognes on the Cherbourg Peninsula, the Supply Division was unable to supervisesupply operations closely. The Armies could contact the rear headquarters inCheltenham for emergency
7Annual Report, Medical Section, Third U.S. Army, 1944.
8(1) Annual Report, 5th General Hospital, 1944. (2) Annual Report, 298th General Hospital, 1944. (3) See footnote 2(3), p. 310.
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shipments more easily than they could relay messages throughValognes. The Supply Division maintained only rudimentary central stock controlrecords, duplicating to a degree those maintained in the United Kingdom.
Organization
The division was organized into four branches: Administrationand Finance, Depot Technical Control, Stock Control, and an Issue Branch thatincluded Civil Affairs supplies and captured materiel. Division personnelincluded 25 officers, 60 enlisted men, 4 British civilians, and 3 Frenchcivilians, for a total of 92.
Immediately following the liberation of Paris by AlliedForces in early September, the Chief Surgeon's Office moved to that city aspart of Headquarters, ETOUSA. With the establishment of General Hawley'soffice in Paris, the Supply Division was augmented by personnel from the UnitedKingdom and rapidly assumed close supervision of medical supply operations onthe Continent in a manner similar to that instituted in the United Kingdom inMarch 1944.
Stock control.-Stabilization of the depot systemafter 1 September permitted the institution of the stock control system used inthe United Kingdom.
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Depots on the Continent (other than those assigned to armies)submitted stock status reports biweekly to the Supply Division.
Upon receipt, depot reports were rapidly consolidated by theStock Control Branch on electric accounting machines obtained from the New YorkPort of Embarkation or from a French firm. From these reports, the theater-widestatus of each medical item could be determined.
Use of civilian personnel-French civilians performedthe key-punching operation and were able to convert the numerical data intomachine language under the direction of an English-speaking French supervisor.By using couriers to collect depot reports and electric accounting machines toconsolidate the data, the Supply Division could maintain a surprisingly currentand accurate consolidated supply record. The records depended, however, upondepot inventories and reports of quantities on hand, due-in, and due-out, whichwere understandably inaccurate during the first few months on the Continent.
Stock Levels
Consolidated stock reports formed the basis for establishingtheater levels for each item of supply. Before D-day, the need had beenperceived for two separate stock levels to support 125,000 hospital beds andother medical units in the U.K. Base Section and to support the armies andhospitals in the Communications Zone on the Continent. While stock levels werecomputed on actual troop strength for continental operations, U.K. stock levelswere based on bed strength data converted to an artificial troop strength toutilize War Department replacement factors. Moreover, separate levels werecomputed on those items peculiar to definitive treatment in general hospitals.Establishment of these overlapping stocks proved to be a wise decision. Becauseof the wide dispersion of medical installations between the United Kingdom andthe Continent and the difficulties in discharging cargoes from ships arrivingfrom the United States and the United Kingdom, timely support of the fast-movingarmies as well as the hospitals on the Continent and those in the United Kingdomwould have been highly improbable.
In mounting Operation OVERLORD, stock levels were computedfor the buildup of a 7-day reserve stock on the Continent by D+41 (17 July 1944)and an increase to a 60-day reserve by D+208 (1 January 1945). The theaterreorder point was established at 180 days' stock for each item: 15 days'operating stock, 60 days' reserve, and 105 days lagtime (defined as the numberof days elapsing from the date a requisition was submitted to the United Statesuntil supplies were received in an ETOUSA depot).
Replenishment requisitions were computed and submitted to theNew York Port of Embarkation every 2 weeks for each item which had an on-handand an on-order position below the 180-day level. Theoretically, every itemwould indicate a stock level of 165 days at each computation and 15 days'stock would be requisitioned. Stock replenishment would be received 105 dayslater so that the actual stock on hand would fluctuate between 75 and 60 days.In practice,
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consumption of individual items oscillated widely as did theactual time required to deliver the replenishment stock. The overall systemproved exceptionally effective, and medical supply problems on the Continentwould have been minimal had it not been for the transportation difficulties.
As in the United Kingdom before the invasion of France, theSupply Division established stock levels for each depot, depending upon itsmission. Replenishment stocks were distributed to each depot directly from shipsdischarging cargoes at ports of debarkation or by interdepot transfers.Balancing of depot stocks on the Continent was instituted on D+90 (6 September)as the depot system reached a degree of stability.9
Local Procurement
Procurement on the Continent differed in policy and procedurefrom local purchase in the United Kingdom. Theater policy for continentaloperations provided for the maximum use of local resources when such localprocurement would (1) supply items that were in short supply in the UnitedStates or in the theater, (2) conserve essential shipping space, (3) satisfyemergency requirements, (4) accrue to the benefit of the United States, or (5)aid in the rehabilitation of the economies of liberated areas.
Because of the scarcity of medical supplies and equipment inliberated countries, a ban was established by Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower on thepurchase by cash or the procurement through reciprocal aid arrangements, exceptwhere the indigenous government concurred with a specific request.
Procurement from the French was confined to a few items.Arrangements were made with L'Institut Pasteur for the supply of rabiesvaccine as required. The only other items bought in quantity were small clothbags to hold personal belongings of patients, self-retaining catheters,sacroiliac belts, and lipstick which proved most effective for markingcasualties in the field. Because intravenous solutions shipped from the UnitedStates required much cargo space, an attempt was made to procure intravenoussolutions from the French; lack of appropriate facilities to manufacture sterileproducts meeting U.S. standards precluded consummation of contract arrangements.
Early in 1945, arrangements were made to procure dental X-rayfilm and X-ray film sizes 8- by 10-inch and 10- by 12-inch from the Gaevertplant in Belgium. This enabled the theater to return considerable quantities ofX-ray film to the United States for reshipment to other theaters where it wascritically needed.
Although procurement of British items had been severelycurtailed in early 1944, the British continued to furnish special items requiredon "spot" demands. Insulin, heparin, alkathene tubing, medicinal gasesfor the U.K. hospital system, dental burs, and some nonstandard items were thusprocured.10
9See footnote 2(3), p. 310.
10Semiannual Report, Supply Division, Office of the Theater Chief Surgeon, ETOUSA, 1 January-30 June 1945.
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Control of Depot Operations
Depots were operated on the Continent either by singlemedical depot companies, sections or elements of depot companies, or by morethan one depot company simultaneously. Leapfrogging of depots was essential inmaintaining support for the advancing front. Medical supply operations in theUnited Kingdom were conducted primarily in sections of general depots, whereas,on the Continent, virtually all were medical branch depots. To avoid trafficcongestion, medical depot sites on the Continent were seldom located in closeproximity to other supply service depots. Except in the early days in Normandywhere a limited area was involved and a dearth of facilities made selectioneasy, choice of depot sites was a constant problem. Many more sites wereselected than were ever used. Locating suitable plants paralleling the line ofcommunication was a continuing task, and this was usually in competition withthe other supply services. Furthermore, in France and Belgium, only sites whichhad been occupied by the Germans were available for use without long drawn-outrequisitioning procedures.
Dual system of supervision-Chiefs of the supplyservices, including medical, were responsible for distributing stock amongdepots, and for issuing supplies under their cognizance.
This system generally prevailed without any difficulties,except for a short period immediately following the merger of SOLOC (SouthernLine of Communications) with ETOUSA. During this interval, the Chief Surgeon wasnot authorized to contact Depot M-452 at Marseille to direct the shipment ofstocks except through the base section surgeon. The exception was quicklyeliminated by a directive from the theater G-4.11
Medical depot manual-Because medical depot operationsin Normandy were necessarily unsophisticated, the Medical Depot Manual wasrevised to incorporate the lessons learned from operations in the United Kingdomand the early days on the Continent. While mandatory only for CommunicationsZone depots, the manual was furnished to the armies to encourage their depots touse such procedures as were considered feasible. With the absorption of SOLOC,the same procedures were instituted in the Southern Zone depots. This resultedin a uniform operation among medical depots, which facilitated shifting ofpersonnel and depots from one point of operation to another and providedeffective technical and operational control.12
EXPANSION OF DEPOT OPERATIONS ON THE CONTINENT
Mobility of Supply Operations
With the entrance of the Third U.S. Army into the conflict,and the breakout of the Allied armies from the Normandy Beachhead at thebeginning of August 1944, depots had to move rapidly to keep up with the combattroops.
11See footnote 10, p. 316.
12Medical Depot Manual, Chief Surgeon's Office, ETOUSA, 7 Dec. 1944.
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MAP 14.-Medical supply depots operating inFrance and Belgium, August-November 1944.
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Following a basic pattern, an advance section of a depot wouldsupport the army corps making the main combat effort. The second advance sectionwas generally retained with the base depot until the corps medical unitsoutdistanced their supply. The second section could then leapfrog the first,often serving at the same time as an advance party for movement of the basedepot. A second depot company was generally strategically situated with onesection supporting the most distant flank. Advance sections could move quickly,with trucks shuttling equipment and stocks sufficient for 5 to 10 days'requirements.13
Depot Advance to the Siegfried Line
As the medical depot attached to the First U.S. Army, thebase depot platoon of the 1st Medical Supply Depot followed the movement of thecombat situation from Le Molay near the Omaha Beachhead on 28 June 1944,stopping to set up a base dump at Saint-L? on 3 August, and advancing itscenter of operations to Eupen, Belgium, by 10 September (map 14).
Moving from Bricquebec, where its elements had been united on20 July, the 32d Medical Depot Company (fig. 77), in keeping with the tacticalsitua-
13See footnote 7, p. 313.
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tion, advanced to Foug?res on 8 August, and on 14 August,opened a depot at Le Mans in support of the XII, XV, and XX Corps. From there,the company sent out advance sections to Fontainebleau and Dreux before openingan advance medical depot at Verdun on 5 September. This became the Third U.S.Army medical distributing depot and the location of ETOUSA Blood Bank until 23November.
Like the 32d, the 33d Medical Depot Company moved rapidlywith the advance of the Third U.S. Army. After its arrival on Omaha Beach on 11July, the base section helped its advance section in operating Depot M-2at Chef Du Pont, the first Communications Zone medical depot set up on theContinent in support of the Normandy Campaign. By 29 July, the base section hadadvanced to Besneville, remaining there until 10 August, then moved rapidlyacross France to Toul, where it remained in operation until 17 December. Thesecond advance section of the 33d, which had arrived earlier on the Continentand had operated at Le Grand Chemin, Chef Du Pont, and La Haye-du-Puits, movedto Coutances, where it remained until 15 August, then was transferred toRostrenen, Brittany, and placed under the command of the Ninth U.S. Army to aidin the liberation of Brest.
The 30th and 31st Medical Depot Companies, unlike thosepreviously mentioned, were assigned to ADSEC upon their arrival in France.
After the advance sections of the 30th Medical Depot Companyhad operated a medical dump at L'Etard and established Depot M-1 at Cherbourgon 9 July, the base section arrived and was assigned to Depot M-2 (later M-402)at Chef Du Pont to establish and operate that depot. Sending out advanceplatoons to Rennes, where Depot M-404 was established on 20 August and to LeMans where Depot M-405 set up, the 30th began its move from the CotentinPeninsula.
By 27 August, it became necessary to establish an advancedump at Chartres, where, for more than a month, Depot M-406T operated againstdifficult odds.
The 31st Medical Depot Company, similarly assigned to ADSEC,united at Tr?vi?res on 1 August after the advance section had operated dumpson Omaha Beach since D+3. First called Depot M-3 and later designated M-403,this depot remained under the control of the 31st until 15 September, shippingas much as 3,500 tons of medical supplies a week.
As the combat forces liberated Paris in early September 1944,the 31st sent an advance platoon into the city to set up Depot M-407. By 25September, the depot was operational.
The 11th Medical Depot Company, which did not arrive on theContinent until 20 August, opened Depot M-404 at Rennes 4 days later. The depotcompany remained at this location until October. As part of its duties, adetachment of 15 enlisted men and 1 officer was sent to Brest on 21 September tosalvage captured German medical supplies and equipment.
After the departure of the 33d Medical Depot Company fromChef Du Pont on 26 July, the 13th Medical Depot Company was made solely responsi-
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ble for the operation of the depot, handling 34,000 tons ofmaintenance supplies and 800 tons of TOE (table of organization and equipment)equipment. When the 66th Medical Depot Company arrived on 12 September to assumecommand of Depot M-402T, the 13th moved to Reims, where it set up Depot M-408T.14
Early Supply Problems
Two outstanding problems severely handicapped medical supplyoperations during the first 90 days on the Continent: lack of availabletransportation and lack of adequate storage space in the depot areas.
Port facilities-Among the more difficult problems, thelack of ports was one of the most serious. Because deepwater ports did notbecome available as soon as planned, many ships from the United States whichwere destined for continental ports were diverted to the United Kingdom andunloaded; the supplies were then placed in depot stocks, from which they had tobe ordered forward for movement to the Continent by small cross-Channelcoasters. Conversely, some ships scheduled for U.K. discharge were moved, afterconsiderable delay, to the Continent, where they discharged their cargoes overthe beaches. The labor expended in these operations and the delay in arrival ofbadly needed supplies were overwhelming.
Availability of the port of Le Havre in late Septemberprovided some additional facilities. That port could handle, however, only asmall percentage of the waterborne volume arriving from the United Kingdom andthe United States. Although Allied troops captured Antwerp with its huge portinstallation intact early in September, the water approaches to Antwerp were notcleared until mid-November and it did not become operational until 28 November.
Delay in discharge of cargo was perhaps even more serious.With the lack of adequate port facilities on the Continent, priority was givento unloading ammunition, fuel, and lubricants. Unfortunately, ships carryingthese cargoes rarely carried medical supplies. The 130th General Hospital, forexample, was immobilized for 7 weeks because of difficulties in unloading itsequipment on the Continent. The unit had disembarked in France on 5 September1944. Its assembly had been shipped from the U.K. depot on 27 August, but only94 tons arrived in France in September. The balance of 195 tons was not unloadeduntil 25 October.
Trucking problems-Difficulties in trucking medicalsupplies from the port to the medical depot were another drawback to theexpansion of the depot system. As an example, an unusual incident occurred whenone truck convoy from Cherbourg, carrying a 1,000-bed general hospital assembly,and a second convoy, originating at Le Havre and also carrying a 1,000-bedgeneral hospital assembly, met each other during the middle of the night at aroad junction in the interior of France. There the two convoys were mingled,with the result
14(1) See footnotes 1(2) and 1(4), p. 307; and 6(2), 6(3), and 6(4), p. 312. (2) Annual Report, 11th Medical Depot Company, 1944. (3) Annual Report, 66th Medical Depot Company, 1944.
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that all the beds arrived at one operating site, while theother site received all the mattresses and pillows. The mixup was detected whenthe two commanding officers called the Supply Division, ETOUSA, within minutesof each other, to report the discrepancies.
Shipment of unit assemblies was only a part of transportationtroubles. Bulk stock movements were not immune. Before the breakthrough atAvranches, distances were short and truck transportation presented no problem,but as armies began to race across France, the situation was reversed.
On 25 August 1944, the famous Red Ball Express beganoperation. Transportation Corps truck companies, using 2?-ton trucks andoperating day and night, hauled supplies from the Normandy Beach areas forwardto the armies. The armies submitted daily requisitions, based on tonnageallocations; these were approved and distributed each night to the varioustechnical services for supply action. Trucking companies reported to theappropriate depots to transport the supplies to forward areas. If supplies werenot received in a certain number of days, the armies submitted new requisitions.This soon led to serious duplications of requirements, and within 3 weeks, aback-order system had to be established to correct these difficulties.
Under this system, nearly all tonnage was allocated to thearmies, and little transportation was available for the buildup of forwardCommunications Zone depots.
Although the Red Ball Express performed a herculean task inmoving supplies, there were many difficulties. Truck drivers were not familiarwith local geography and sometimes became lost. When vehicles broke down, theywere separated from the convoy and the drivers were sometimes unable to findtheir destinations.
Transportation expedients-Difficulties encountered inwater and truck transportation often taxed the ingenuity of medical supplypersonnel. For example, while ships were being loaded at ports in southernEngland during the assault, alert medical supply officers observed that ordnancereplacement vehicles were being shipped empty from the United Kingdom.Arrangements were made with Ordnance Department representatives to load medicalsupplies on the trucks and jeeps. Arriving on the Continent, drivers proceededto the First U.S. Army medical dumps, unloaded their supplies, then deliveredthe vehicles to an ordnance depot. The movement of medical supplies under thisimprovised arrangement was substantial enough to attract the attention of G-4when reports of tonnage moved to the Continent exceeded that allocated to theMedical Department.
A similar arrangement was effected in Normandy when theOrdnance Department had difficulty in moving vehicles to forward depots. Maj.William B. Wagner, MAC, of the Supply Division, was expediting shipments ofsupplies from the beaches. He arranged to borrow drivers from hospitals andother units in staging areas when medical supplies could be loaded on thevehicles for movement to forward depots. During 3 weeks, in late September
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and early October, 564 vehicles were so used to haul 800 tons ofsupplies from the beaches to forward depots.
Individual arrangements were made with hospitals and otherorganizations in the Normandy area, which had trucks not being fully utilized,to haul medical supplies to Depot M-407 in Paris (fig. 78). Needless to say,there was no problem in recruiting drivers as they were permitted to remain inParis for an overnight visit.
A great deal of reliance was placed on moving medicalsupplies by air. From the first airdrop on D+1, the volume of air shipmentincreased rapidly; on 17 September, 50 bombers were used to supplement the milkruns which had started on 14 June. With the liberation of Paris in earlySeptember 1944, a receiving point was established at Le Bourget Airfield, whichthen became the terminus of the milk run from the United Kingdom.
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At Mortain, France, shortly after the Normandy invasion, themost sensational delivery method was successfully employed. A battalion of the30th Infantry Division was temporarily cut off by a German counterthrust;medical supplies were running low, and enemy antiaircraft fire prevented anaccurate airdrop. Urgent calls for medical supplies prompted the decision tofire replenishment supplies in shells. The explosive head was removed from155-mm. shells and the hollow nose was loaded with essential supplies, includingPentothal sodium (thiopental sodium), ether, and cotton (fig. 79). Some losseswere experienced through breakage, but sufficient quantities were delivered tomeet the requirements for the period of isolation.15
Lack of storage facilities-Quite as serious as thetransportation problem was lack of adequate outdoor storage space, a problemthat was accentuated
15(1) Memorandum, Col. S. B. Hays, MC, to Maj. Gen. Paul R. Hawley, 24 Dec. 1944, subject: Difficulties in Moving Medical Supplies and Equipment. (2) See footnote 2(3), p. 310. (3) Annual Report, Medical Department Activities, 30th Infantry Division, 1944.
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by heavy fall rains, which turned the dry fields of July andAugust into muddy quagmires. Particularly bad was the situation at Depot M-402Tat Chef Du Pont and Carentan.
Late in August, news was received at headquarters of theimpending arrival of approximately 9,000 tons of medical supplies on sixseparate ships. It was decided that Depot M-402T, which was set up in an openfield, would be the receiving installation for shipments discharged in theNormandy Base area, but that acquisition of additional space would be necessary.After an extensive search for a suitable storage site, an abandoned airstrip,surfaced with steel matting, approximately ? of a mile in length and located onthe main highway 2 miles east of Carentan, was chosen. Along with it, a fewsmall buildings in the town were acquired for loose issue. Plans were made towarehouse the materiel by medical class on either side of the airstrip; theCorps of Engineers promised crushed stone for entrance and exit approaches, butonly meager quantities were delivered. A detachment from the 30th Medical DepotCompany was retained and approximately 900 prisoners of war were acquired toaugment the 11th Medical Depot Company since materials-handling equipment wasnot available. Once a vehicle left the road leading into the depot area, itcould no longer operate under its own power and two captured German caterpillartractors had to tow immobilized vehicles (fig. 80).
The six ships arrived with the anticipated cargo, and thenext 3 weeks became the most hectic in the history of the 11th Medical DepotCompany. The Transportation Corps pressured the port to unload the ships, theport pressured the truck companies to keep the quays clear, and the truckcompanies pressured the depot to unload and return their vehicles. Soon, theapproaches to the airstrip would not sustain anything larger than a 2?-tontruck, and the steel matting eventually would not accommodate even these. Fornearly 3 weeks, both sides of the highway were lined with 10-ton trailers forapproximately 1 mile, with all interested agencies clamoring for release andmovement of the vehicles.
As the stacks of boxes lining the airstrip began to sinkdeeper into the mud, the strip was abandoned in favor of the fields parallelingthe road. A roller conveyor, manned by many prisoners of war, moved the boxesfrom the stacks on the airfield to vehicles on the sides of the highway. Onesuch conveyor stretched nearly ? of a mile to the most distant stacks. In someinstances, prisoners of war formed bucket brigades to move the boxes. Tosupplement the roller conveyors, the depot built heavy-duty skids to be towed bythe German tractors. The volume of stock that arrived during this periodprecluded an orderly tally, and inventory records suffered for several months.
Despite these handicaps, approximately 700 tons of supplieswere handled daily during the 3 weeks. Shipments averaged 60 requisitions dailyfor the 25 local hospitals, various hospital trains, Communications Zone depots,and hospitals in forward areas.16
16See footnote 14(5), p. 321.
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FORWARD DEPOTS
The last 3 months of 1944 saw the opening of additionalports, the closing of Utah and Omaha Beaches, the arrival of shipments on theContinent directly from the Zone of Interior, the rehabilitation of railfacilities, and the increasing emphasis on moving stocks to forward depots.These factors, plus a stabilized front bordering on Germany, permitted a buildupof hospitals in the Communications Zone. Depots M-407, M-408T, and M-409, thoughpreceding some of the events, were products of those developments (map 14).
Depots in France
Having established Depot M-407 in Paris in early September,the 31st Medical Depot Company effectively used its 257,000 square feet ofstorage space despite a lack of materials-handling equipment.
Early in October, the 31st was joined by the 15th MedicalDepot Company, which was responsible for handling medical supplies arriving byplane
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from England and for shipping emergency medical supplies to thefrontlines. By the end of October, medical supplies were arriving by everyconceivable means (fig. 81), and issue operations were mounting proportionately.The second advance section was sent to Rouen on 2 November to operate adistribution point. With the Battle of the Bulge, which started on 16 December,the depot was overwhelmed with work; however, by the end of January 1945, normaloperations had resumed.
Depot M-408T, under the command of Maj. (later Lt. Col.)Harry S. Green, MAC, was opened at Reims in mid-September by the 13th MedicalDepot Company, and was augmented by a detachment of the 15th Medical DepotCompany.
The depot occupied five one-story, platform-height buildings,totaling 129,805 square feet of storage space and approximately 63,000 squarefeet of open space. Its initial mission was to provide an immediate backup forthe 1st Medical Depot Company of the First U.S. Army, the 32d and 33d MedicalDepot Companies supporting the Third U.S. Army, and the 28th Medical DepotCompany of the Ninth U.S. Army, as well as to open and operate Depot
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M-412 in Reims as a Civil Affairs supply depot. The initialreceipts at M-408T were slow, the first rail shipment arriving on 25 September.
By mid-December, the depot was supplying the needs of theThird U.S. Army, of 30 general hospitals, 3 station hospitals, 166 miscellaneousunits, and 2 airborne divisions. The Battle of the Bulge increased the tempo ofactivities significantly, and two provisional supply points were set up on theMeuse River line. As the tactical situation became extremely critical, emergencyplans were prepared for evacuation of Depot M-408T. In addition to operatingDepot M-412, Depot M-408T was stocked with 2,400 separate items comprising 2,215tons of supplies; hence, it was fortunate that evacuation did not become anecessity.
Depots in Belgium
After performing a special task of classifying, cataloging,and processing five warehouses of captured German medical materiel at Ciney,Belgium, the 66th Medical Depot Company, commanded by Maj. (later Lt. Col.)Charles L. Gilbert, MAC, was assigned to ADSEC to open Depot M-409 at Li?ge, on27 October 1944 (fig. 82). The first issues were made on 7 November and, withhelp from the 165th Medical Battalion, the depot supported the First and
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Ninth U.S. Armies and medical installations of ADSEC andChannel Base Section. From 20 November to 31 December, the operational area ofDepot M-409 was constantly harassed by V-1 and V-2 bombs launched from Germany.
During this period, it was imperative that supplies becleared swiftly from the Antwerp docks, prime target of the German bombardment.Depot M-411 was also established at Li?ge to serve as a sorting point formedical supplies received from Antwerp. While under the operation of the 66thand a section of the 15th Medical Depot Company which had arrived in Novemberfrom Paris, the depot lost about 100 tons of medical supplies when V-1 bombstwice made direct hits on the sorting points.
Despite the nightly bombardment of V-1 and V-2 bombs, depotpersonnel at Li?ge continued operations directly supporting First U.S. Armyunits during the Battle of the Bulge. To safeguard shipments during the battle,Depot M-411 was moved on 24 December to Noirhat, 20 miles southeast of Brussels,and redesignated M-413 (fig. 83). Under the control of the 15th Medical DepotCompany, Depot M-413 operated as a sorting and reconsignment point, with 50,500square feet of covered storage space and 87,000 square feet of open storage.17
Combat Operations of Forward Depots
First U.S. Army depots.-While the large medical depotswere being established at Paris, Reims, and Li?ge, sections of the AdvanceDepot Platoon, 1st Medical Depot Company, by 6 October, had established advancedumps at Malm?dy, Belgium, and Valkenburg, Netherlands, and the base platoonhad moved to Dolhain, Belgium, where it opened the base medical dump in awarehouse (map 15).
On 31 October, the advance section at Valkenburg movedforward and established a dump at Bastogne while the section at Malm?dy joinedthe main body at Dolhain.
During the Battle of the Bulge, a detachment of the advancesection at Bastogne was moved to Libin, Belgium, leaving three noncommissionedofficers and one private at Bastogne to issue supplies to the 101st AirborneDivision and attached units during the siege of the city. By 19 December, seventrucks were secured and medical supplies were removed from Bastogne. On 26December, the first section of the Advance Depot Platoon rejoined the Base DepotPlatoon at Dolhain, and the second section established an advance medical dumpat Huy, Belgium.
Third U.S. Army depots-In support of the Third U.S.Army, the 32d Medical Depot Company, which had operated a large depot at Verdunsince 8 September, sent an advance section to Aumetz on 7 November to serve XX
17(1) See footnotes 1(4), p. 307; 6(4), p. 312; and 14(3), p. 321. (2) Annual Report, 15th Medical Depot Company, 1944.
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FIGURE 83.-Materials-handling equipment atMedical Depot M-413, Charleroi, Belgium, January 1945.
Corps. On 24 November, the medical depot at Verdun was closedand a new depot was opened at Metz (fig. 84) in support of the III, VIII, XII,and XX Corps. By 3 December, the advance section joined the main group at Metz,but, on 20 December, reopened the depot at Aumetz to support Third U.S. Armyunits thrown in to stop the German counteroffensive in the Ardennes (map 16).
The 33d Medical Depot Company, which had advanced its mainbody to Toul by 20 September, remained there until 15 December, but in earlyOctober, the second advance section had established a forward dump at Bastogneafter leaving Rostrenen. By 20 October, this section advanced to Valkenburg,replacing the 1st Medical Depot Company and operating the only dump avail-
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MAP 15.-First U.S. Army medical supply depotsin France and Belgium, October-December 1944.
able to the Ninth U.S. Army until late in November. This dumpwas turned over to an advance section of the 35th Medical Depot Company attachedto the Ninth U.S. Army on 22 December, and the advance section of the 33d movedfirst to Esch, Luxembourg, and then to Longuyon, France, by 26 December.
Meanwhile, the base section of the 33d had left Toul on 15December and set up a dump at Ch?teau-Salins 2 days later. The unit moved on toLonguyon, where it united with the advance section on 30 December.18
Seventh U.S. Army depots-The 7th Medical DepotCompany, commanded by Lt. Col. A. J. D. Guenther, MSC, was responsible forsupplying the
18See footnotes l(2) and l(3), p. 307; and 6(3), p. 312.
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Seventh U.S. Army. After landing in southern France on 16August, this company advanced rapidly up the Rh?ne River Valley, and reached?pinal by mid-October. There the base section remained until 7 December, whenit moved to Sarrebourg, France (maps 8, 9, and 17). On 18 December, theLun?ville depot, no longer in a forward position, was closed and a new depotwas opened the following day at Haguenau, France. The tactical situationcompelled withdrawal of the section on 27 December. The next day, the ?pinalbase was reopened.
Supply functions of SOLOC-In early November 1944,the Communications Zone of the Mediterranean theater passed on to ETOUSA itsfunctions in southern France. On 20 November, SOLOC became responsible for thestandard medical services of the Communications Zone and assumed a primaryfunction, the distribution of medical supplies to the Seventh U.S. Army and theFirst French Army. Lt. Col. Allen Pappas, MAC, was the medical supply officer.
Throughout December 1944, SOLOC and Headquarters,Mediterranean theater, worked closely together to level stocks, to build up a45-day reserve, and to transfer complete responsibility to SOLOC.
Because of a sudden influx of German POW's (prisoners ofwar), the need for POW hospitals increased greatly. By 31 December, a total of3,000 beds in four separate units had been set up and adequately equipped.19
19(1) Annual Report, 7th Medical Depot Company, 1944. For more detail on the activities of the 7th Medical Depot Company in southern France, see chapter VIII. (2) History of the Medical Section, Headquarters, SOLOC, ETOUSA, 20 November 1944-1 January 1945.
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MAP 16.-Third U.S. Army medical supplydepots, October-December 1944.
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MAP 17.-Seventh U.S. Army medical supplydepots in northern France, 17 October-December 1944.
Ninth U.S. Army depots.-When the Ninth U.S. Army becameoperational on the Continent on 5 September 1944, it was initially assigned themission of clearing enemy troops from the Brest Peninsula. The medical supplysupport for this operation remained based at Rostrenen, with the second advancesection of the 33d Medical Depot Company, temporarily detached from the ThirdU.S. Army. Deliveries of medical supplies were extremely slow because of theemphasis on movements to the east. As a consequence, the buildup to a 14-daylevel was never attained during the Brest mission. Brest Peninsula was clearedof enemy forces by 20 September, after which Headquarters, Ninth U.S. Army,moved first to Arlon, Belgium, and then to Maastricht, Netherlands. Pendingarrival of its own depots, with their hard-to-come-by balanced depot stocks, theNinth U.S. Army was supported by the second advance section of the 33d MedicalDepot Company at Bastogne. Be-
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MAP 18.-Ninth U.S. Army depot operations,September-December 1944.
cause of the delay in delivering stocks during the last part of1944, the advance section of the 33d continued to support Ninth U.S. Army combatoperations from its position at Bastogne and later at Valkenburg.
The 28th Medical Depot Company, commanded by Lt. Col. (laterCol.) Lyman J. Clark, MAC, and the 35th Medical Depot Company, under Maj.Stanley Darling, MAC, were assigned to the Ninth U.S. Army in October 1944.While the 35th did not join the Ninth U.S. Army until December, the 28th beganto issue supplies at Maastricht in mid-November. In preparation for the nextphase of the army's operation, the 35th was sited at Heerlen, Netherlands, butwas moved to Melveren, Belgium, with the advent of the Battle of the Bulge. Atthis point, the 35th collected and stored equipment not required by evacuationhospitals to expedite their withdrawal to more strategic positions.
The newly positioned Ninth U.S. Army on theBelgium-Netherlands front was served by a detachment of the 33d Medical DepotCompany (Third U.S. Army) at Valkenburg, until 22 December 1944 (map 18). Atthat time, the first advance section of the 35th Medical Depot Company took overthe operation.20
20(1) See footnote 6(3), p. 312. (2) Annual Report, Medical Section, Ninth U.S. Army, 1944. (3) Annual Report, 35th Medical Depot Company, 1944.
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Impact of the Battle of the Bulge.-The Germancounteroffensive in December 1944 caused two major supply problems: rapiddepletion of stocks through equipment losses and accelerated issues, and removalof depot stocks from threatened areas and their relocation in strategic sites ata time when they were most needed.
When the enemy offensive began, the base depot of the 1stMedical Depot Company was located at Dolhain. The first advance section atBastogne, and the second advance section at Malm?dy, were threatenedimmediately and movement was imperative. The entire stock of the second advancesection at Malm?dy was evacuated to Huy by trucks infiltrating the area.Movement of the first advance section from Bastogne was not quite so simple. Onesmall contingent necessarily stayed on with a residue of supplies to supportcombat troops in Bastogne through the siege (fig. 85). The remainder of theadvance section commandeered empty ambulances returning to the rear to evacuateas many items of critical supply as possible to Libin. However, even thatposition was threatened and the section was forced to withdraw to Carlsbourg,
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Belgium. Shortly thereafter, First U.S. Army G-4 directedthat all major supply installations withdraw to the army rear area. The basesection was moved by rail to Basse-Wavre, Belgium, taking with it the opticaland maintenance sections, but leaving the blood bank detachment and the firstadvance section to operate the heavily stocked Dolhain site (map 19).
The early German successes in the Battle of the Bulge causedgreat concern for the vast quantities of U.S. Army supplies in the forwardareas. Not only had advance depots in France, Belgium, and the Netherlands beenstocked by transporting supplies from Normandy, Le Havre, and Rouen, but theport of Antwerp, for a few weeks, had been the funnel through which immensequantities of materiel had been poured.
Certain parts of the Geneva Convention agreements were thebasis of the recommendations of the Chief Surgeon, ETOUSA, on 22 December 1944,that most medical supplies be destroyed in the event of imminent capture by theenemy. Items such as instruments, penicillin, morphine, microscopes, needles,and dental gold were to be saved if time permitted. Fortunately, the tide ofbattle changed and the German drive collapsed before higher headquarters had todecide irrevocably to destroy any medical depots.
During the Battle of the Bulge, the need for combatreplacements was critical, and physically fit enlisted personnel werereassigned from Communications Zone depot companies as replacements for lossesin the line, with reclassified ex-infantrymen assigned to the depots. Somedepots lost almost 80 percent of their personnel. The impact, though serious,affected depot operations only temporarily.21
RECURRING PROBLEMS OF MEDICAL SUPPLY
During the period from mid-September to 31 December 1944,problems that had earlier plagued the supply program in the European theaterrecurred, but, for the most part, were solved.
Split Shipments
During the spring and summer of 1944, split shipments were rarebecause special efforts were made to load each unit assembly on a single ship,but in October this problem reappeared. Ships with portions of assembliesunloaded at different ports, some in the United Kingdom and others on theContinent. Even when all the ships discharged in the United Kingdom, theygenerally were unloaded at different ports, making it necessary to ship thesegments to a depot for reconstitution of the assembly. During October and
21(1) See footnote 1(2), p. 307. (2) Memorandum, Maj. Gen. Paul R. Hawley, Chief Surgeon, ETOUSA, for Chief of Staff, ETOUSA, 22 Dec. 1944, subject: Destruction of Medical Supplies to Prevent Capture by the Enemy. (3) Larkey, Sanford V.: Administrative and Logistical History of the Medical Service, Communications Zone, ETOUSA, chapter X. [Official record.] (4) Solinger, Lt. Col. Leo P., MSC, Maj. Gen Silas B. Hays (Ret.), and Col. R. L. Parker, MSC: Combat Support on Continent. A manuscript prepared for a preliminary draft of this volume.
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MAP 19.-Supply depot movement in the Battleof the Bulge, December 1944.
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November, assemblies for 13 general hospitals were involvedin split shipments to the United Kingdom. By year-end, none of these had arrivedon the Continent.
General Hawley, on 15 December, in a personal letter toGeneral Kirk, reported that hospital assemblies in November were badly split,with one assembly coming in on as many as seven ships. The various parts weresupposed to be reunited in a U.K. depot under existing procedure, but thisapparently was not being done. General Hawley also protested to the New York andBoston Ports of Embarkation, asking vigorous action to assure loading of eachhospital assembly on one ship only. This problem was successfully resolved bycorrective action at the ports of embarkation.
The equipment for 44 general hospitals (thirty-eight1,000-bed, three 1,500-bed, and three 2,000-bed units) and 14 station hospitals(one 750-bed, seven 500-bed, five 250-bed, and one 150-bed units) had beendelivered to the hospital sites and the units were in operation by year-end.Continental depots had also assembled and issued thirty-five 500-bed expansionunits.
At the close of 1944, assemblies for an additional seven1,000-bed general hospitals were at the sites, awaiting clearance or completionof plant construction. Of 22 assemblies en route to the Continent from theUnited States, 11 were in the United Kingdom awaiting shipment across theChannel and 3 were being discharged at continental ports.
Movement of the Unit Assembly
In addition to split shipments, the difficulties experienced in dischargingand moving the larger unit assemblies on the Continent were persistent andtormenting, notwithstanding adherence to an exacting operating procedure, whichwas modified repeatedly to prevent recurrence of the latest mishap. A specificinstance is a 500-bed hospital assembly which was aboard ship in the EnglishChannel for several weeks until perseverance by the Supply Division produced apriority for unloading. Around-the-clock off-loading over the Cherbourg areabeaches had discharged approximately 60 percent of the assembly when aneighboring vessel hit a mine. The vessel discharging the medical assemblyceased unloading operations and sailed for the safety of English ports. Dayslater, the residue of the assembly was transferred to another ship which dockedfor discharge at Le Havre instead of Cherbourg. Following several weeks'delay, the two parts of the unit assembly were merged at the hospital site innorthern France.22
Rail Shipments
By 16 November 1944, the French and Belgian railroads hadbeen rehabilitated, and the Red Ball Express was discontinued. The theater G-4
22(1) See footnotes 2(3), p. 310; and 15(1), p. 324. (2) Personal Letter, Maj. Gen. Paul R. Hawley to Maj. Gen. Norman T. Kirk, The Surgeon General, 15 Dec. 1944.
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then initiated a system of daily rail tonnage allocations, butbecause of rail operating difficulties, the Chief of Transportation decided tomove only solid trainloads from one siding in Normandy to a forward consignee.G-4 had not allocated to the medical service sufficient tonnage to comprise asolid trainload. As a result, medical stocks were not moved for 12 days, and theallocations did not serve their basic purpose. Not until the medical supplysituation became acute was approval given to move solid trainloads of medicalstocks from Normandy to Depot M-407 in Paris, where individual cars werereconsigned to the armies and to forward depots (fig. 86). In early December,medical supplies began to move forward in volume. Rail shipments then acquiredfrustrating problems similar to those experienced with Red Ball shipments.Individual cars broke down and were placed on sidings; and cars were misrouted,lost, and, in some instances, disconnected from the rear of the train and thecontents pilfered.
Hospital trains were used to move medical supplies forward tothe maximum extent possible, but their usefulness was limited since the trainscould not be delayed or diverted from their primary mission of evacuating casu-
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alties. Movement of supplies by hospital train from DepotM-407 in Paris to Depot M-409 in Li?ge, where a hospital center was located,proved to be successful.
Air Shipments
Heavy reliance was placed on the air shipment of medicalsupplies, and the importance of this mode of transportation grew as the warprogressed. Obtaining planes to airlift supplies to the forward areas was aproblem until a squadron of 20 C-46's, which nobody wanted, was obtained. In 3months, this squadron transported 30,000 pints of whole blood and 463 tons ofother medical supplies, and evacuated 1,168 patients.
The peak of air shipments was reached during the Battle ofthe Bulge when 150 planes were loaded by the medical section of Depot G-45 inthe United Kingdom for airdrops to the encircled troops at Bastogne. By the endof 1944, a total of 61,467 pints of whole blood, approximately 45,000 litters,426,000 blankets, and innumerable emergency shipments had been moved to theContinent by air. From D-day to V-E Day, more than 10,000 tons of medicalsupplies were moved within the European theater; this was equivalent to themedical equipment for 49 general hospitals.23
Property Exchange Items
In the European theater, as in other theaters, property exchangeitems were a matter of serious concern and constant trouble. In the very earlydays of the invasion, many casualties were evacuated to England by LST's whichwere stocked with exchange items; this meant that the property exchange systemcould be used and, by exchanging the proper number of items at each end of thecross-Channel run, stocks in the forward elements could be replenished.
Evacuation of patients by air rapidly replaced the use of LST's.Inasmuch as the planes were not stocked with property exchange items, separatesupply methods had to be used to move these supplies forward. Difficultiesincreased as the front advanced to and beyond the German border and as supplylines lengthened. It was frequently necessary to resort to various expedients tosupplement the normal supply lines and the property exchange system.
The problem of property exchange items not only concernedinternal operation within the European theater, but there was also a constantloss to the Zone of Interior. This was not so serious because 63 percent of thecasualties were returned to duty in the European theater, while many others whowere litter-and-splint cases originally became ambulatory before being returnedto the Zone of Interior. When evacuation was by water as contrasted to air,litters were not necessary and blankets were furnished. To sustain the internaland external pipelines, huge quantities of exchange items were stockpiled inEngland before the invasion. For example, 300,000 extra blankets
23See footnotes 2(3), p. 310; and 15(1), p. 324.
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were distributed to U.K. depots. Moreover, substantialquantities of various exchange items, far exceeding established factors, wereincluded on routine requisitions to the Zone of Interior.24
MEDICAL MAINTENANCE AND SPARE PARTS
Early Difficulties
Each medical depot company assigned to continentaloperations included, as a part of its organic capability, a maintenance sectionto repair Medical Department equipment and an optical section to repair andfabricate spectacles. These two sections usually accompanied the base sectionand headquarters platoon and were placed in operation immediately upon arrivalon the Continent. These sections were staffed with specialists from themaintenance and optical schools of the St. Louis Medical Depot. In addition to adepot company's third and fourth echelon maintenance capability, each hospitalwas authorized one or two maintenance technicians for first, second, and thirdechelon repairs, depending on the hospital's size and the complexity of itsequipment. Technicians were never sufficiently plentiful to meet allrequirements. Each graduate technician was authorized a specialist's repairkit, but the scarcity of certain essential components until mid-1944 prevented acomplete distribution upon graduation from the school in St. Louis. Not only wasthere a shortage of technicians, but a number of technicians were temporarilywithout kits.
To cope with the dual shortage, available technicianswith kits were concentrated in the depot maintenance sections of selectedhospitals operating in the United Kingdom and in hospitals phased onto theContinent. Technicians and kits, as they became available in the theater, werefurnished to the hospitals.
Reports from France during the first few days after D-dayindicated that repair and maintenance was a persistent problem. Principalproblems involved equipment damage suffered in transit or abnormal incidents ofmechanical breakdowns of apparatus used in around-the-clock operation. As aresult of this combination, a more elaborate maintenance and repair setupwas needed than had been contemplated.
Maintenance requirements constantly exceeded the authorizedcapability in ETOUSA. The gap was filled mainly by unit personnel withmechanical aptitude and by skilled POW's. While medical maintenance supportwithin units was outstanding, the major workload fell on depot maintenancesections.
From the moment depot companies arrived in France, the maintenance sections were besieged with work. Affording close support, their men attempted to visit all units to perform periodic checks, to review preventive maintenance measures, and to furnish needed repairs. That approach proved difficult be-
24(1) See footnote 21(4), p. 337. (2) Memorandum, Lt. Col. Bryan C. T. Fenton, MC, for Lt. Col. [Leonard H.] Beers, 1 May 1944.
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FIGURE 87.-Repairing field autoclaves at the Medical Maintenance and Repair Shop, Depot M-407.
cause of the constant change in unit locations, the inabilityto effect repair of equipment on site which resulted in a large volume ofturn-ins of unserviceable equipment and requisitioning of the necessaryreplacement item, and the development of a backlog of deadlined material at eachdepot.
Soon after the invasion, maintenance personnel were facedwith repairing technical equipment of foreign manufacture. Major breakdowns wereimpossible to repair unless the required parts could be fabricated orcannibalized. Maintenance personnel were extremely ingenious and capable, andreturned much of this equipment to use.
Except for the high-mortality spare parts packed with unitequipment and stocked by the depot maintenance sections phased-in during theearly landings, prescheduled shipments to the Continent did not include spareparts. They had to be requisitioned as required.
After Communications Zone stock control had been establishedon the Continent, spare parts continued to be a problem. Many of theless rapidly moving items were stocked only in one key depot in the UnitedKingdom, and one on the Continent. Moreover, units lacked the ability toadequately identify all of the required spare parts on their requisitions. Thissituation was improved with the publication of a theater spare parts catalog bythe base maintenance shop at Depot M-407 early in 1945 (fig. 87).
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Base Maintenance Shop
To increase the maintenance capability, an advance medicalmaintenance and repair unit was transported to the Continent on 14August 1944, and attached to the 13th Medical Depot Company to set up a fourthand fifth echelon repair section at Depot M-2 (later M-402). The unitconsisted of 2 officers and 10 enlisted men, all qualified technicians fromMedical Maintenance Depot M-400 in the United Kingdom. Shortly after theestablishment of Depot M-405 at Le Mans, the maintenance and repair unit wasmoved to that installation and it became the supply source for repair parts,buttressed by Depot M-400 in the United Kingdom. Following its relocation withDepot M-407 at Paris, the unit was redesignated the Medical Maintenance andRepair Shop, Depot M-407, on 12 October 1944, and became the key depot forspare parts on the Continent.
The 13th was soon operating a mobile machine shop (truckmachine shop M-4) to repair, weld, install, and service generally all damagedX-ray, anesthesia, and similar medical equipment returned by combat units orother medical depot companies. Additionally, the unit inaugurated a mobilethird, fourth, and fifth echelon spare parts replacement dump (spare partstruck, M-2) to service forward depot maintenance sections, including AdvanceSection, Armies, and Ninth Air Force Service Command. Two maintenance teams oftwo men each, with portable maintenance equipment, serviced hospitals in thevicinity of Depot M-407 and assisted maintenance sections of medical depotcompanies in forward areas.25
Fabrication of Spectacles
The two-man team assigned to the Advance Platoon, 31stMedical Depot Company, set up its portable optical fabrication equipment on D+3 and began to repair and fabricate spectacles. On D+14, a mobile optical unitwas set up. By the end of June 1944, these units had repaired or replaced 1,250pairs of glasses. By February 1945, 54 portable optical units were in usethroughout the theater. Furnished with jeeps, they were placed in direct supportof combat forces as well as being used, when possible, at general hospitals andmedical depots.
From D-day until October 1944, the fabrication of spectacles, which was beyond the capability of mobile units, was accomplished by the ETOUSA Base Optical Shop located in Blackpool, England. As depots were moved to forward areas, it was necessary to activate a similar installation on the Continent. In October 1944, a base optical shop, commanded by Capt. Chester E. Rorie, MAC, was established at the 7th General Dispensary on Rue Helder in Paris. Personnel were assigned from the 31st Medical Depot Company, aug-
25(1) For more detail, see chapter IV. (2) Informal routine slip, Col. [S. B.] Hays to Chief Surgeon, ETOUSA, 26 June 1944, subject: Shortage of Spare Parts and Maintenance of Medical Equipment on Far Shore. (3) See footnotes 6(4), p. 312; and 10, p. 316.
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mented by the optical section of the 15th Medical DepotCompany. The shop moved in January 1945 to larger quarters, at which time theoptical section of the 11th Medical Depot Company was added to the staff (fig.88).
The base optical shop supplied mobile optical units on theContinent, established levels of supply for all echelons of optical repair,compiled theater optical supply requirements, filled prescriptions beyond thecapability of mobile units, issued optical equipment, and filled prescriptionsfor spectacles needed in the local area (fig. 89).
The value of the optical program in terms of conservingfighting strength was extremely high. The field armies placed portable units inthe division area so that combat soldiers whose spectacles were lost or damagedusually were back on duty with a minimum loss of time. The optical program asexecuted in the European theater prevented the evacuation of thousands ofindividuals each month.26
INNOVATIONS IN SUPPLY TECHNIQUE
Requisitions
Shortly after their arrival on the Continent, many units weretraveling long distances to the medical depots for supplies. Prevailing depotprocedures and workload dictated that units submit requisitions, then return aday or so later to pick up the supplies. Seeking ways and means to processrequisitions while the customer waited, the 32d Medical Depot Company discoveredthat more than 95 percent of the requisitions involved the same 250 fast-movingitems. This led to a procedure that opened with a 10-minute visual edit by awell-qualified noncommissioned officer, who was fully cognizant of the supplyposition of the 250 fast-moving items. When the supply of a fast-moving item waslimited, the noncommissioned officer rationed the available supply to makecertain that equitable distribution would be effected. Following the edit, onecopy of the requisition was immediately sent to the warehouse for selectingbulk supplies while a second copy was sent to the Loose Issue Section forselecting less than case lots. Upon completion of the selection of stock, therequisitions were compared to make certain that all supply action had beeneffected and that information was posted to both copies of the requisition. Onecopy was released to the requisitioner for his voucher file, and he returned tohis parent unit with the available materiel. The second copy was forwarded tothe depot stock record account for "post-posting" action. Depotrecords were necessarily brought up to date during the late evening hours and noloss of control was experienced.
This procedure permitted rapid supply action, savedunnecessary trips to the depot by consuming units, and was widely hailed bycommand and staff elements and the using agencies of the Third U.S. Army. It waspointed out
26(1) See footnote 1(4), p. 307. (2) ETO BaseOpticalShop. [Official record.]
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FIGURE 88.-Fabricating spectacles at the base optical shop, Paris, February 1945.
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that, in support of a fast-moving field army, feworganizations carried more supplies than they actually required and if therequisition item was in stock in the depot, it was issued.
Storage of Supplies
The storage sections of the depots were organized under threewarehouse foremen: medical class 1 (drugs) was under one foreman, classes 2through 6 under a second foreman, and classes 7 through 9, under the thirdforeman. This was particularly desirable where storage was scattered through anumber of small buildings, especially during winter months when responsibilityfor around-the-clock heating could be placed on one individual. Moreover, thisfixed responsibility enabled the personnel to gain familiarity with the stockand to derive added benefits from daily visual checks. Stock locator cards weremaintained although the personnel were usually familiar with stock locations.
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Prosthetics Laboratories
In addition to dental prosthetic devices, the laboratoryattached to the 32d Medical Depot Company fabricated many ear plugs from acrylicresins for issue to personnel assigned to chemical mortar and artillerybattalions. The plugs contributed substantially to a reduction of rupturedeardrums and injuries to the inner ear.
Maintenance Sections
Maintenance sections started operation soon after the depotsbecame situated on the Continent. Unserviceable equipment was delivered to thedepots by the using organizations, and repair was performed immediately, ifpossible, or a replacement item was issued to the unit and the unserviceableitem was repaired and returned to stock. Where major repair and rebuilding wererequired, the item was shipped to a Communications Zone depot. Experience soonindicated that there was a definite advantage in having a depot maintenanceteam, consisting of one officer and two enlisted men, visit all hospital unitsperiodically to inspect preventive maintenance procedures and to make necessaryrepairs. These visits had the added virtue of permitting maintenancepersonnel to observe and instruct the using personnel in the correct use andcare of the equipment, thereby reducing the volume of major repairs that wererequired in the early days.
Optical Sections
The optical section in the depot base section was equippedwith a mobile optical unit, mounted on a truck. Initially, all operations exceptmounting and dispensing were performed in the vehicle. It was found expedient,whenever space permitted, to remove the equipment from the truck and set it upin a building. The equipment could be dismantled and set up in the buildingswithin an hour, and the additional space allowed a more efficient operation. Themost persistent problems confronting the optical sections were the improperlyprepared prescriptions and the omission of frame sizes.
Blood Bank Detachments
Blood bank detachments were frequently attached to medicaldepot companies. A blood bank detachment consisted of 1 officer and 22 enlistedmen with eight 2?-ton, 6 by 6 trucks, each mounted with a refrigerator, and onetruck mounted with a storage refrigerator having a 600-pint capacity.
An advance Army blood bank detachment was attached to the 33dMedical Depot Company on 20 June 1944 for cross-Channel movement and earlyoperations on the Continent. In August, two blood distribution trucks wereassigned to the advance section of the 33d Medical Depot Company while it waslocated at Ducey, France, to service hospital units on the Brittany Peninsula.At that time, 20 percent of all blood furnished to the Third U.S. Army
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was being distributed to the VIII Corps sector, whichwas engaged in clearing the German defenses of the Brittany Peninsula.
An effective means of delivering blood was inaugurated inNovember 1944. Two blood distribution trucks were used to service each corpszone daily, one carrying blood for evacuation hospitals only, and one for fieldhospital platoons. After the loss of a driver and truck, presumably captured,the truck destined for field hospital platoons reported daily to the corpsmedical battalion and picked up a guide, thus assuring prompt delivery.Additionally, each corps medical battalion maintained a level of 30 to 40pints of blood (fig. 90).
Depot Pharmacies
Recognizing early the need to compound certainpharmaceuticals for divisions and smaller units which were not authorizedpharmacists, depot officers unofficially established pharmacies in depots.Registered pharmacists among the assigned personnel welcomed the opportunity tocontinue their vocation, and the practice gained momentum. Depots acceptedprescriptions prepared by medical officers from the various units until theSurgeon's Office, Third U.S. Army, discovered that prescriptions wereexceeding the intended capability of some units. Depot pharmacies weretemporarily closed until the necessary
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controls could be established. The Third U.S. Army Surgeonpublished a list of authorized preparations, such as ointments, cough remedies,and solutions, which could be drawn from the depots, and on 29 October 1944, thepharmacies were reopened. All other prescriptions had to be approved by theThird U.S. Army Surgeon's Office.
Quartermaster Laundry Sections
Quartermaster laundry sections were often attached to depotcompanies to launder soiled items, such as pajamas, blankets, surgical drapes,and similar textile items, for depot stock replenishment and to support smallerarmy medical units. The need to site laundries within buildings and near availablewater supply sometimes led to locations at a distance from the depots.27
SUPPLY ACTIVITIES, UNITED KINGDOM BASE
Base Section Organization
With the movement of Headquarters, ETOUSA, from England tothe Continent in July and August 1944, the administration of Communications Zoneactivities that were to remain in the United Kingdom was assigned to the U.K.Base, which was activated on 1 September 1944. The base section was subdividedinto four districts-Eastern, Western, Southern, and Central-comprisingnearly the same areas previously designated as U.K. Base Sections.
The U.K. Base Section Surgeon, Col. (later Brig. Gen.)Charles B. Spruit, MC, assumed control of 112 hospitals, consisting of64 general, 43 station, and 5 field hospitals, and 3 hospital center organizations-more than130,000 beds in all. Maj. Robert R. Kelly, MC, was designatedchief of the Supply Division, which was responsible for the support ofactivities in the United Kingdom and for bulk supply support of continentaloperations. Major Kelly was succeeded by Lt. Col. Robert L. Black, PhC, on 1 December 1944.
In supply matters, hospital group commanders had broad authority to control the supply for hospitals (including centers) undertheir jurisdiction. Their responsibilities were to insure that the approvedsystem of station stock control was in operation, to conduct periodicinspections, and to assist the medical supply officers of each hospital in anysupply problems. The organization of these groups assisted considerably in theadministration of medical units in the United Kingdom.
United Kingdom Depot System
On 1 September 1944, 16 depots in the United Kingdom wereengaged in the medical supply mission, 3 medical branch depots and 13 medicalsec-
27See footnote 1(3), p. 307.
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tions of general depots. One storage depot (M-403) had beenclosed on 7 July 1944.
With the buildup of continental depots and thedeployment of increasing numbers of medical units to the Continent, the missionof U.K. depots focused mainly on the support of the U.K. hospital system. Duringthe period from 1 September to 31 December 1944, the missions of four depotswere changed and six medical depot activities were closed. In September, themission of the medical section of Depot G-22 was changed from distribution tostorage, and the depot was closed in the fall of 1944. During October, DepotM-401 and the medical sections of Depots G-14, G-15, G-16, G-40, and G-55,all with storage missions, were closed. In November, the mission of Depot M-410Mwas changed from distribution to storage. During December, the medical sectionof G-45 became a distribution depot and that of G-50, a storage depot.
The mission of the medical section of Depot G-30 was toreceive British items that had been procured through reciprocal aid arrangementsand to provide Medical Department blank forms, medical books, teeth, andspecial air shipments from the Zone of Interior, and also to receive, store,and issue all United States of America Typhus Commission stocks in the UnitedKingdom. The Medical Supply Officer, Lt. Col. George T. O'Reilly, MAC,Commanding Officer of the 64th Medical Depot Company which provided thepersonnel, also served as the medical procurement officer for Britishprocurement. Located in a freight terminal building on Commercial Road in London'sEast End, Depot G-30 had been subjected to air raids in the early days andto V-bomb attacks after D-day. Part of the depot roof, windows, and therailroad cars in the nearby marshaling yards periodically suffered damage. Depotoperations continued in spite of the attacks, with only minor personnelinjuries.
Diversion of shipments from continental to U.K. ports becauseof split assemblies and the nonavailability of ports on the Continent not onlydelayed their arrival and placed an added workload on the U.K. depots, butincreased the load of already overburdened British transportation facilities andinterfered with moving desperately needed supplies and equipment to theContinent.
Distribution Mission
Depot closures during the last 4 months of 1944 required arealinement of the distribution areas for depots remaining open. When depotrealinement was completed at the end of the year, four depots were servicing 103hospitals in the United Kingdom (table 5).
In addition to the supply of U.K. hospitals, from 1 Septemberto 31 December 1944, TOE equipment and supplies were distributed to 9 infantrydivisions, 3 armored divisions, and 142 other units. Port assemblies were issuedto 147 units arriving in the United Kingdom. During the same period, 6,744 longtons of maintenance supplies were received from the Zone of Interior,
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TABLE 5.-Hospitals serviced by medical depots in the United Kingdom, December 1944Depot | Number of hospitals | Approximate number of beds |
G-18-20 | 37 | 49,641 |
G-23 | 9 | 9,964 |
G-35 | 37 | 49,967 |
G-45 | 20 | 23,599 |
| 103 | 133,171 |
including 1,700 long tons diverted from continental ports. Outgoingshipments to the Continent during this 4-month period were as follows:
Type of shipment | Long tons shipped |
Bulk shipments | 5,977.04 |
Red Ball shipments | 801.95 |
General hospital assemblies | 3,605.53 |
Coaster shipments (bids submited by G-4) | 2,535.17 |
Coaster shipments (priority A) | 320.30 |
Air shipments | 2,341.64 |
| 15,581.63 |
Depots processed nearly 24,000 requisitions during theperiod, shipping a total of nearly 894,000 packages while receiving 897,000.Depot stocks on hand approximated 36,000 long tons.
Operations in 1945
As of 1 January 1945, the staff of the Supply Division,Surgeon's Office, U.K. Base, consisted of 15 officers, 25 enlisted men,and 1 Wac. The personnel strength of the nine active U.K. depots numbered 1,321-753military and 568 others, consisting of civilians, POW's, and Italian servicetroops (table 6).
During January and February 1945, in addition to supporting U.K. hospitals, depots shipped sixteen 1,000-bed general hospitals and one 250-bedstation hospital to the Continent. To assure that the assemblies reachedtheir destination, a security detail of one officer and eight enlisted men fromthe hospital unit accompanied each assembly from the U.K. depot to the hospitalsite on the Continent.
Stock levels were constantly revised. On 31 January 1945,they were based on a maximum of 75 days' stock in depots. During the latterpart of April, levels were established at a 60-day stockage after they had beenreduced three times since the end of January.28
28(1) Annual Report, Surgeon's Office, United KingdomBase, 1944. (2) See footnotes 2(3), p. 310; and 21(3), p. 337. (3) MonthlyReports, Surgeon's Office, United Kingdom Base, January, February, and April1945
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TABLE 6.-United Kingdom depot status report,15January 1945Depot | Tonnage on hand (long tons) | Personnel |
| |||||||
| ||||||||||
Covered | Open | Total | Military | Civilians | Prisoners of war | Italian service troops | Total | |||
|
| ||||||||||
| Officers | Enlisted men | ||||||||
G-18-20 | 11,137 | 663 | 11,800 | 7 | 105 | 28 | 0 | 86 | 226 | |
G-23 | 2,250 | 1,500 | 3,750 | 4 | 46 | 8 | 50 | 0 | 108 | |
G-24 | 4,657 | 3,826 | 8,483 | 6 | 56 | 1 | 90 | 0 | 153 | |
G-30 | 1,913 | 281 | 2,194 | 7 | 105 | 23 | 0 | 0 | 135 | |
G-35 | 2,964 | 386 | 3,350 | 9 | 110 | 82 | 50 | 0 | 251 | |
G-45 | 2,556 | 625 | 3,181 | 7 | 143 | 3 | 75 | 0 | 228 | |
G-50 | 1,794 | 116 | 1,910 | 6 | 90 | 22 | 23 | 0 | 141 | |
M-400 | 565 | --- | 565 | 3 | 38 | 7 | 0 | 0 | 48 | |
M-410M | 700 | 3 | 703 | 1 | 10 | 20 | 0 | 0 | 31 | |
| 28,536 | 7,400 | 35,936 | 50 | 703 | 194 | 288 | 86 | 1,321 | |
Source: Annual Report, Supply Division, Chief Surgeon's Office, ETOUSA, 1944,section II, exhibit I.
MEDICAL DEPOT SUPPORT OF THE ADVANCE INTOGERMANY
Depot Support of the ArmiesFirst U.S. Army-Despite poor weather conditions and theadverse effect of the German counteroffensive in the Ardennes, the Alliesrenewed their offensive early in January 1945. The First U.S. Army, handicappedgreatly by poor roads and a nearly complete destruction of possible storagefacilities, was fortunate to be strongly supported by the 1st Medical DepotCompany.
Early in January, the base section moved forward toBasse-Wavre from Dolhain, where it had been since mid-December. A month later,the base depot platoon sent out sections to Brand, Germany, and Malm?dy, whereadvance dumps were set up (map 20).
To give close support at the division level, depot sectionsmoved frequently-so frequently at times that it was necessary to obtainclearance from corps and division headquarters before a selected depot site wasoutdistanced.
By early March, the 1st Medical Depot Company had advancesections moving first into Frenchen, Germany, then Dollendorf, and finally toHonnef, just across the Rhine. The base platoon, meanwhile, was established atMechernich.
A section of the base platoon was deep inside Germany byApril when the supply of exchange items again demanded attention because mostcasualties leaving the army area were evacuated by air. Normal replenishmentchannels were too slow, and routine property exchange was circumvented.Consequently, arrangements were made with the Medical Supply Division,Communications Zone, to stock exchange items at the holding units supporting airevacuation points.
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MAP 20.-First U.S. Army medical supply depotsin Belgium and Germany, January-May 1945.
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Toward the end of April 1945, the first advance section ofthe 1st Medical Depot Company, attempting to maintain a supporting position,took advantage of available airlift to move from Dollendorf, Germany, to Wetzlar. For the first time, the rapid advance of depot personnel, equipment,and stock by air was accomplished successfully.
The base platoon of the depot selected a site well forwardand moved to Korbach, leaving 200 long tons of excess and slow-moving items tobe taken over by ADSEC. To support troops on the left flank, the second sectionadvanced to Duderstadt, Germany, and opened for issue on 16 April. At that time,the supply system appeared to be in a comparatively good position. Envelopmentof the Ruhr pocket, however, created a situation that demanded the employment ofanother advance section.
The first advance section of the 47th Medical Depot Companyhad been assigned earlier to the First U.S. Army and it was decided to positionit at Seigen, Germany, to support the XVIII Corps (map 21). Forty-eight tons ofmedical supplies, constituting a balanced stock for an advance section, wereshipped by air from the United Kingdom and Depot M-407 in Paris to airstrip Y-84,where it was picked up by the section. As the Ruhr pocket was eliminated, theentire stock and the depot section reverted to control of the Fifteenth U.S.Army.
As the First U.S. Army pushed across Germany, supply ofhospitals and miscellaneous medical installations for the rapidly surrenderingprisoners and large numbers of displaced persons constituted an onerous task.For the most part, captured materiel was sufficient, but quantities of liberatedGerman medical supplies necessitated the establishment of an organizationcapable of collecting, classifying, and distributing them. The First U.S. Army,operating with only one medical depot company, was compelled to request, and wassuccessful in acquiring, two additional advance depot sections. The firstadvance sections of the 33d and 35th Medical Depot Companies were attached tothe First U.S. Army to establish and maintain issuing points for captured enemymateriel.
A large captured German medical depot at Ihringshausenpresented an excellent nucleus for a base issuing depot, and stocks from thecollecting points and outlying locations were concentrated there. One hundredlong tons of medical supplies were issued from that point during April. A secondlarge German medical depot, equaling in tonnage the one at Ihringshausen, wasuncovered at Treuen (map 22). As a result of a conference with representativesof the Chief Surgeon, ETOUSA, the entire stock was evacuated by ADSEC to acentral depot under the control of the Third U.S. Army.
With the First U.S. Army ceasing all operations on 9 May1945, medical supply functions were turned over to the Ninth U.S. Army. Thisaction was preceded by a series of conferences with supply representatives ofthe
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MAP 21.-Third U.S. Army medical supply depots in Germany, January-May 1945.
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MAP 22.-Captured enemy supply dumps in Germany, February-April 1945.
Surgeon's Offices, First and Ninth U.S. Armies, to fullyacquaint the latter with the existing situation and plans.29
Third U.S. Army-While the First U.S. Army was crossingthe Rhine River to the north and plunging into the heart of Germany, the ThirdU.S. Army, supported by the 32d Medical Depot Company, which had been at Metz,crossed the Rhine at Oppenheim and headed northeast (fig. 91). By 21 March, thebase section was situated at Saint-Wendel, where it remained until 13 April.
29(1) Semiannual Report, 1st Medical Depot Company, 1January-30 June 1945. (2) Annual Report, Medical Section, First U.S. Army,1945.
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The first and second advance sections had moved forward inlate March to W?rrstadt and Frankfurt. The second advance section, aftercrossing the Rhine and setting up at Hersfeld on 2 April, had advanced by 11April to Eisenach where it was joined two days later by the base depot. AtEisenach, the 32d employed 40 Serbians and Yugoslavs who had been German slavelaborers. These workers stayed with the depot for the remainder of the campaign.
By 25 April, the base depot had moved from Eisenach to Weiden,and finally to Straubing, Germany (map 21), where it remained until itsdeactivation.30
The 33d Medical Depot Company, operating in support of theThird U.S. Army's drive to pinch off the Ardennes salient of the Germancounteroffensive, was located in January 1945 at Longuyon. After operating astorage area and issue section at Longuyon for nearly a month, one advancesection was sent to Bastogne on 27 January to afford closer support for troopsin the Ardennes battle. Moving to Ettelbruck, Luxembourg, on 25 February,
30Semiannual Report, 32d Medical Depot Company, 1January-30 June 1945.
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MAP 23.-Operations of the 33d Medical Depot Company, 1945.
the advance section was joined by the base section on 27February. By 4 March, an advance section had moved to Bitburg, Germany,and on 23 March, the base depot moved into Germany at Kastellaun. Here, aMilitary Government supply section was set up on 20 April to handle medicalsupply of requisitions for displaced persons and civilians. By 30 June, 80 tonsof supplies had been received and 477 requisitions were filled.
Making its final move of the war, the depot was moved toFurth, Germany, on 28 April 1945 (map 23), where it operated 218,541 square feetof open storage space and 139,623 square feet of closed storage space for10,952 long tons of supplies.
During its operations in Germany, the 33d had smalldetachments supervising operations of several captured enemy supply dumps atTrier, Isaar, Oberstein, Mainz, Bingen, Lauterbach, Fulda, Kassel, and Treuen(map 22). Supplies totaling 7,000 tons were consolidated by the 33d.31
Seventh U.S. Army-Having returned to Sarrebourg from?pinal early in January 1945, the 7th Medical Depot Company, with help fromthe Advance Platoon of the 46th Medical Depot Company, carried the basic medicalsupply load of the Seventh U.S. Army.
On 12 February 1945, SOLOC was dissolved and its personneland functions were absorbed by Communications Zone, ETOUSA. As a result of thereorganization, the SOLOC medical section's supply personnel were transferredto the Supply Division of the Chief Surgeon's Office, ETOUSA. Col. Charles F.Shook, MC, was made Deputy Surgeon.
31Semiannual Report, 33d Medical Depot Company, 1 January-30 June 1945.
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MAP 24.-Seventh U.S. Army medical supply depots in France and Germany, 1945.
With the beginning of the Seventh U.S. Army offensive inMarch 1945, the 7th Medical Depot Company set up depots at Retschwiller, France,and Kirchheim, Germany. The Seventh U.S. Army's first supply point east of theRhine River was established at Die Burg, Germany, on 31 March. Following theclosing of the main depot at Sarrebourg on 31 March, the base depot was moved toWalthurn, Germany, where it remained until 2 May. At that time, all depot stockswere consolidated at Schw?bisch Hall, Germany (map 24). During the period from16 August 1944 to 30 June 1945, the 7th Medical Depot Company had processed20,356 requisitions and issued more than 2,500 tons of supplies in support of aforce which grew to nearly 400,000 men.32
Ninth U.S. Army.-After moving north into the Netherlands inlate 1944, the Ninth U.S. Army had the 28th and 35th Medical Depot Companies formedical supply support.
32(1) See footnote 19(1), p. 332. (2) Semiannual Report, 7thMedical Depot Company, 1 January-30 June 1945.
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In January 1945, after the collapse of the Germancounteroffensive, the Ninth U.S. Army engaged in a holding action along the westbank of the Roer River with five divisions. The first advance section of the35th Medical Depot Company at Valkenburg distributed to the 29th and 102dInfantry Divisions, the 41st and 91st Evacuation Hospitals, and the 1st and 2dHospitalization Units of the 48th Field Hospital (fig. 92). All other units weresupplied by the 28th Medical Depot Company at Maastricht and through a
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supply point established near Brand. Several supply pointswere also established with supply personnel from medical battalions tofacilitate the handling of fast-moving items to small units and clearingstations, with requisitioning on an informal basis, oral or written.
The first advance section of the 35th Medical Depot Company,which went to Heerlen in early February 1945, supported XIII Corps unitsin that vicinity during that month. The first advance section of the 28thMedical Depot Company was located in Aachen, Germany, to supply XIX Corpswhile its base depot, still at Maastricht, provisioned XVI Corps and thesurrounding units during this same period.
Following the Roer crossing, which occurred in bitter coldweather, the depots at Maastricht and Aachen were closed, and the sections ofthe 28th Medical Depot Company then rejoined to open at Rheydt, Germany, on 5March, to supply the XIII and XIX Corps units and the Army troops in thevicinity. Over 500 long tons, 260 truckloads, and 29 trailer loads, weretransported to Rheydt within 8 days. The first advance section of the 35thMedical Depot Company at Heerlen closed and reopened at Aldekerk, Germany, on 12March, with part of a blood bank unit to serve XVI Corps and Army unitsin that vicinity. Meanwhile, the three corps of the Ninth U.S. Army begandeploying along the west bank in preparation for crossing the Rhine River.
The crossing of the Rhine River by the Ninth U.S. Army beganon 24 March 1945. On 30 March, the first advance section of the 28th MedicalDepot was transported in 21 trucks, with 36 tons of supplies, from Rheydt toDinslakenerbruch to supply troops of the XVI and XIX Corps. Upon completionof the Rhine crossing, the Ninth U.S. Army moved rapidly across Germany untilthe 113th Cavalry met the Russians at the Elbe River on 30 April 1945. The mopupof German troops was completed rapidly and the depot companies had difficulty inkeeping contact with the rapidly moving troop units. The 28th Medical Depot andits sections set up in rapid succession at Dinslakenerbruch, Aldekerk, Bevensen,Drensteinfurt, Helmstedt, Hameln, and Wiedenbr?ck. The 35th Medical DepotCompany, including its advance sections, operated at Aldekerk, Hameln, andWiedenbr?ck, as well as in Viersen, Burgdorf, L?denscheid, and Ihringshausen.Even with the succession of locations, the depots were unable to maintain supplypoints within the limitations of depot transportation to provide supply impetusfrom the rear for some units which were 50 miles distant (map 25).
At the end of April, the 1st Medical Depot Company from theFirst U.S. Army had joined the Ninth U.S. Army for operation at Korbach,Jena, and Duderstadt in support of the VII, VIII, XIII, XVI, and XIXCorps, which were comprised of 17 infantry and 5 armored divisions,totaling more than 650,000 troops by the end of the war, 9 May 1945.33
33(1) Semiannual Report, Medical Section, Ninth U.S. Army, 1January-30 June 1945. (2) See footnote 20(3) p. 335. (3) Organizational Diary,35th Medical Depot Company, 26 December 1943-3 November 1945.
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MAP 25.-Ninth and Fifteenth U.S. Army depotoperations in northern Europe, 1945.
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Fifteenth U.S. Army.-The Fifteenth U.S. Army was thelast field army deployed to the European theater, arriving on the Continent on28 December 1944. Because of the limited scope of its combat operations, itnever faced the medical supply problems which beset the other armies.
The initial mission of the Fifteenth U.S. Army was theresponsibility for supervising the rehabilitation and reequipping of combatforces withdrawn from action after, and as a result of, the Ardennes offensive.Since the Fifteenth U.S. Army had no depots operational at the time, thisinvolved merely the processing of requisitions to supporting Communications Zonemedical depots. During this period, some field and evacuation hospitalsarrived from the United States and were assigned to the Fifteenth U.S. Army fortraining. The Army Surgeon, Col. L. Holmes Ginn, Jr., MC, through his medicalsupply officer, Maj. Joseph J. Strnad, PhC, took the opportunity torequisition and obtain special hospital allowances of other technical serviceequipment, such as additional generators, tentage, switchboards, and waterpurification equipment, which proved invaluable to hospitals in later combatsupport.
On 1 April 1945, the Fifteenth U.S. Army assumed the defenseof the west bank of the Rhine River from Bonn to Neuss and was directed to beprepared to occupy, organize, and govern the Rheinprovinz, Saarland, Pfalz, andthat portion west of the Rhine River as the eastward advance of the Alliedarmies uncovered these areas.
To support this mission, the 47th Medical Depot Companywas assigned to the Army and established a base depot at Elsdorf, Germany,during March 1945. With the aid of past experience of other field armies, abalanced stock was issued to the depot, enabling the 47th to render excellentmedical supply support to Fifteenth U.S. Army units.
In connection with the Fifteenth U.S. Army's responsibilityto handle the delousing of civilians and POW's traveling from east towest, the Chief Surgeon took over the distribution of the necessary dusters andDDT powder. In coordination with Civil Affairs/Military Government,requirements were met for operation of delousing stations along the Rhine.
The immense problem was that of providing medical supplysupport for approximately 300,000 displaced persons in the Fifteenth U.S. Armyarea. While the German civilian population had primary responsibility forsupplying essential commodities to displaced persons camps, frequent demands forspecific medical supply items were met from Civil Affairs/Military Governmentsupply packs issued for this purpose and from captured enemy materiel which hadpreviously been consolidated into the Army medical depot at Elsdorf. Sincemedical and nursing personnel in displaced persons' camps were familiar withdrugs and equipment of German manufacture, the latter practice proved highlysuccessful.34
34Semiannual Report, Medical Section, Fifteenth U.S.Army, 1 January-30 June 1945.
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Operation of Support Depots in the Rear
As the depots supporting the field armies moved into Germanywith the troops, several large depots remained in operation in France andBelgium (table 7) and one (M-416T) was opened in Germany (map 26).
TABLE 7.-Depots on the Continent, 1 November 1944Depot | Gross space allocated | Net usable space | Space occupied | |||
| Open | Covered | Open | Covered | Open | |
M-402, Carentan, France | 12,000 | 884,878 | 9,500 | 532,891 | 5,700 | 238,667 |
M-405, Le Mans, France | 112,694 | 243,636 | 70,321 | 186,074 | 31,278 | 2,465 |
M-407, Paris, France | 257,300 | 17,500 | 157,600 | 17,500 | 85,000 | 10,000 |
M-408T, Reims, France | 129,805 | 62,790 | 64,902 | 31,395 | 41,323 | 3,500 |
M-409, Li?ge, Belgium | 56,978 | 12,000 | 33,132 | 8,182 | 4,500 | 8,182 |
SOURCE: Annual Report, Supply Division, Chief Surgeon's Office, ETOUSA, 1944, section II, exhibit 4a.
Depot M-402 at Carentan, in early January, was beingoperated by the 11th Medical Depot Company. On 5 January, the 11th was relievedby the 26th Medical Depot Company, assisted by the 16th MedicalDepot Company, which remained until 8 March when it departed for duty at M-407in Paris. During the early days of 1945, Depot M-402 was consolidated fromthree separate areas, at Carentan, Chef Du Pont, and a nearby airfield, to twoby the closing of the Chef Du Pont open storage area and the redistribution ofits stocks. By April, the airstrip was cleared and closed also. With thedecrease in depot size and the forward movement of thousands of tons of medicalsupplies, it was possible to send a detachment of the 26th to Le Mans to relievethe 30th Medical Depot Company in the operation of Depot M-405.
As troop activities in the Le Mans area diminished inFebruary, March, and April 1945, the necessity of keeping Depot M-405 openalso lessened. By 20 May 1945, the depot was closed after all area hospitalshad built up a 90-day supply level, and the remaining depot supplies were sentforward to Depot M-417 at Elbeuf, France.
Depot M-407 at Paris had rapidly become the largest depoton the Continent-157,600 square feet-and served as a backup point for allforward areas and the key depot for certain selected items. It was operated bythe 11th Medical Depot Company, commanded by Lt. Col. Roland H. Iland, MAC.Despite pilferage, the depot used indigenous personnel because of theiravailability and the problems involved in the control of POW's in a big city.
The large in and out shipments made it necessary to augmentthe 11th with the Advance Platoon of the 16th Medical Depot Company on 30January and later, on 9 March, the Headquarters and Base Section, making a totalof two medical depot companies serving at Depot M-407. On 25 April, Depot
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MAP 26.-Rear support depots, Belgium, France,and Germany, 1944-45.
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M-407A was established at Trilport, 20 miles east of Paris,in a former mattress factory.
As the receipts and issues of Depot M-407 declined in earlyMay, the Headquarters and Base Platoon of the 16th Medical Depot Company weresent forward to Depot M-418 at Mourmelon-le-Petit, France.
The 13th Medical Depot Company had opened Depot M-408 atReims in September 1944 and, with the help of detachments of the 15th and 48thMedical Depot Companies, operated this depot until the end of the war.
By 31 January, the effects of having additional ports andimproved transportation facilities were evident. In one 10-day period thatmonth, 375 cars of medical supplies were received and processed by Depot M-408T.Thereafter, except for a period in February when roads in the area began to thawand break up, transportation difficulties subsided and the operation at DepotM-408T became somewhat routine for the balance of the war.
Because of the large number of Communications Zone troopsconcentrated in the Li?ge area, Depot M-409 was a consistently heavyoperation. The depot was operated exclusively by the 66th Medical Depot Companyuntil 10 March, when the 48th Medical Depot Company arrived at Li?ge and helpedwith the operation while training in ETOUSA supply operation before leaving on 9April for the forward area depot at Duisdorf.
The U.S. Armies were preparing to move forward and it wasnecessary to establish a depot (M-412) forward of Reims to supply the Thirdand Seventh U.S. Armies and to handle captured supplies and stocks for the CivilAffairs Division.
Rapidly established in late December 1944, after V-1 bombsforced the abandonment of Depot M-411 at Li?ge, Depot M-413 at Noirhatserved as a sorting and reconsignment point for medical supplies receivedthrough the port of Antwerp. Despite being handicapped by poor buildings andlack of roads, the depot, operated by elements of the 11th and 15th MedicalDepot Companies, ran smoothly.
Following extensive reconnaissance, a foundry at Foug,France, 4 miles west of Toul was selected as the site for Depot M-414, and adetachment from the 31st Medical Depot Company opened at the new location on 4February 1945. Although the depot was not as forward as was desired, the ThirdU.S. Army would not allow Communications Zone depots within its area. This site,however, did favor a number of Communications Zone hospitals in the immediatevicinity. Additionally, Depot M-414 assumed the mission of Depot M-451 atDijon, which closed on 10 May.
Depot M-417 at Elbeuf came into being unexpectedly.Shipments from the United States started to arrive on the Continent through theLe Havre and Rouen areas without warning in October 1944; they included hospitalunit assemblies and bulk medical stocks. With the bulk stocks scheduled fordelivery to Depot M-407 and the unit assemblies to be shipped directly totheir operational sites, the workload exceeded the port capabilities tosegregate the stocks for transshipment. A detachment from the 15th Medical DepotCom-
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pany was sent to Rouen in early November to accomplish thesorting. By January 1945, operations had increased to the point that adetachment from the 30th Medical Depot Company was added. As receipts increased,additional space was acquired in an old silk factory at Elbeuf. This site wasinitially established as the 11th Port Medical Transit Depot on 13 February1945. With the port receiving shipments around the clock, it was essential thatthe medical section follow suit, operating with a few medical military personnelserving in a supervisory and administrative capacity while POW's were usedextensively. Although this depot originated as a storage and sorting point, G-4directed that each Supply Service open issue points to serve units in the Rouenvicinity. To meet this requirement, the 239th Medical Supply Team was assignedto the operation, and on 30 March 1945, Depot M-417 was activated with anissue mission area.
The last depot established in France was opened at Mourmelon-le-Petitby the 16th Medical Depot Company in the spring of 1945 and designated Depot M-418.With the anticipated ending of hostilities and the planning for redeployment ofequipment to the Pacific area, it was advisable to establish facilities forreceiving, sorting, disassembling, and reassembling medical equipment other thanhospital assemblies, including all types of kits and chests. None of theexisting depots was suitable for such an operation and a site at Mourmelon-le-Petitwas selected for the construction of Depot M-418. It was located within theAssembly Area Command, which was being formed to receive and process troopswithdrawing from Central Europe.
Depots in southern France-With the consolidation of SOLOCand Communications Zone, ETOUSA, two medical depots, M-351 atDijon and M-352 at Marseille, came under the control of the European theater.
The Dijon depot was operated by the 70th and 71st MedicalBase Depot Companies in support of the Seventh U.S. Army and the FirstFrench Army. With the consolidation, the depot assumed the parallelposition of the advance section depots and moved along with the advance of theSeventh U.S. and First French Armies into the Rhine area.
Depot M-352 (later M-452) at Marseille, operated by the231st Medical Composite Battalion, served as a port, filler, and reserve depotand, later, as an assembly depot. Consisting of 250,000 square feet, this depotwas one of the first to use mechanical handling equipment on a large scale.
Depots in Germany-A site at Weinheim, east of theRhine River, was selected for Depot M-416T. Although rail service had beenreestablished, the site was about 10 miles from the rail line. The 30thMedical Depot Company opened Depot M-416T on 1 May 1945. As the depot was inprocess of being organized, units began to turn in equipment for redeployment,and the magnitude of receipts made it necessary to augment the depot with adetachment of the 30th Medical Depot Company, which had been assigned to Depot M-417in Elbeuf since early January 1945.
As the armies drove into Germany, the Medical Department waspressured to select a depot site on the extreme right flank of the Ruhr area.However, Col.
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Silas B. Hays, MC, Chief of Supply Division, Chief Surgeon'sOffice, believed that Depot M-409 at Li?ge was adequate since any relocationwould be temporary because the British were scheduled to take over the area assoon as the Ruhr drive had been completed. A compromise site was selected byADSEC at Duisdorf, close to Bonn, and on 9 April, the newly arrived 48th MedicalDepot Company assumed operation of Depot M-415.35
SUPPLY FUNCTIONS IN 1945
Medical Maintenance
By the end of 1944, the medical maintenance program wasfunctioning effectively, and planning was started on the redeployment ofequipment to the Pacific theater. On 16 March 1945, the Maintenance and RepairSection of the Supply Division, Chief Surgeon's Office, ETOUSA, was created,and plans were made to reclaim and salvage medical equipment and to locateredeployment maintenance centers. The 317th Medical Service Detachment wasmoved from Normandy Base (Depot M-402T) to establish a maintenance shop atDepot M-408T at Reims while the 321st Medical Service Detachment was movedfrom Depot M-407 in Paris to Depot M-409 in Li?ge to meet the regionalredeployment maintenance requirements.
To supplement the 15th Medical Depot Company, medicalservice detachments were assigned to various depots. The 233d and 235th MedicalService Detachments were assigned to the medical maintenance and repair shop atDepot M-407.
Repair parts were a constant problem until the Chief Surgeon,ETOUSA, inaugurated the system of having a repair parts truck make scheduledvisits to the army area. More than 3,500 items were repaired by the army depots'maintenance shops from January to June 1945.
Selected officers and enlisted men from maintenance shopswere sent to the tropicalization and fungusproofing course conducted by theSignal School at La Jonch?re, France. Attendance at the course was supplementedby 2 days of application at the maintenance and repair shop at Depot M-407.Shortly thereafter, a standing operating procedure for moisture-fungus-proofingof Medical Department technical equipment was completed and distributed to allmedical maintenance shops on the Continent and in the United Kingdom.Concurrently, serviceability standards for Medical Department technical itemswere developed for daily operations and for redeployment.
35(1) See footnote 10, p. 316. (2) Annual Report, 15th Medical Depot Company, 1945. (3) Annual Report, 13th Medical Depot Company, 1945. (4) SemiannualReport, 66th Medical Depot Company, January-June 1945. (5) Semiannual Report, 31st Medical DepotCompany, January-June 1945. (6) Annual Report, 70th Medical Base Depot Company, 1945. (7)Semiannual Report, 231st Medical Composite Battalion, 1 January-30 June 1945. (8) AnnualReport, 30th Medical Depot Company, 1945. (9) Semiannual Report, 48th Medical Depot Company, 1 January-30June 1945.
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Airlifts Into Germany
In January 1945, seven C-47 transports replaced the 20small C-46's operating out of Paris, and a daily airlift of 17? tons ofmedical supplies was established. Frequently, these C-47's were used to pickup supplies in the United Kingdom and deliver them directly to army depots.After the armies crossed the Rhine River, far in advance of Communications Zonedepots and in territory where rail transportation had been completely disrupted,C-47's provided the essential means to medical supplies.
Captured German Medical Supplies
Before entering Germany, all captured enemy equipment in thehands of units was turned in to the army medical depots. Those few items whichwere considered suitable substitutes for U.S. items were placed in open stocks.All other expendable items were turned over to the Civil Affairs Division whilenonexpendable items were evacuated to Communications Zone depots.
Although problems allied with captured enemy medical materielwere encountered early in France, the quantities uncovered in Germany surpassedthe capacity of the Army depots. Consequently, provisional platoons wereorganized to classify, process, and effect proper disposition of themateriel. Aside from the volume, scarcity of trained personnel, lack ofuniformity in German packing, differences in language, nomenclature, and unitsof measure hampered identification, inventory, and stock control procedures.
German medical supplies and equipment were found in manyplaces in great quantities in the drive to the Elbe River (fig. 93). At theoutset, large quantities were wantonly ransacked and destroyed due to failure toprovide proper guards. This oversight was soon corrected. Nine supply dumps tosegregate, store, and issue the supplies were established in quick succession.Some supplies, after being sorted and salvaged, were used by U.S. units, and theremaining stocks were turned over to displaced persons centers, Germanhospitals, military governments for civilian use, and similar agencies.36
In Germany, the Third U.S. Army used the personnel ofcaptured medical depots, usually Wehrmacht troops, and Germancivilian employees to operate its own depots, under supervision of a limitednumber of American military personnel. This staffing was rather significantbecause POW's, who had been attached to assist in processing captured medicalmateriel in France, could not be taken into Germany. The prohibition of the useof German prisoners in Germany for augmentation of depot staffs made itnecessary to recruit personnel from displaced persons camps and to employ Germancivilians.37
36See footnote 10, p. 316.
37Semiannual Report, Medical Section, Third U.S. Army,1 January-30 June 1945.
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Depot Closures in the United Kingdom
Further curtailment of medical depot activities in the UnitedKingdom was effected in January 1945. After the 36th Station Hospital innorthern Ireland was closed on 12 January 1945, action was taken to close DepotM-410M, also in northern Ireland, on 25 March. On 12 February, the 16thMedical Depot Company closed out the medical section of Depot G-50 inpreparation for early movement to the Continent. Remaining U.K. depots wereoperated by four medical depot companies (6th, 63d, 64th, and 65th) and anon-TOE group of 4 officers and 26 enlisted men. This group also operated theU.K. Base Optical Shop under the command of Capt. Joseph B. Handley, MAC.
Increasing pressure to close the depots was exerted on theU.K. Base Section during February 1945 by theater headquarters. On 18 February,a report was submitted to Lt. Gen. John C. H. Lee, Commanding General,Communications Zone, ETOUSA, stating that it would be impossible to contemplateany further reduction of either personnel or installations at that time becauseof (1) anticipated workloads in the deactivation of hospitals, (2) re-
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assembling, repacking, and redeploying of hospital assembliesand depot stocks, and (3) servicing the heavy hospital patient load. As aresult, there were no further depot closures until May 1945.
Deactivation of Hospitals
With emphasis on the continental hospital system and theresultant shortening of the evacuation lines, plans were prepared in February1945 for the phased transfer of U.K. hospital units to the Continent. In all, 21hospital assemblies were shipped to the Continent.
On 20 March, the Surgeon, U.K. Base, directed that hospitalunits being closed for movement would turn in equipment to their servicingdepot. Unfortunately, when the first few hospitals were closed, distributiondepots were engaged in building hospital assemblies for shipment to theContinent. As the uncrated and unpacked supplies from closing hospitals weredelivered to depot docks, the resulting confusion necessitated an immediatechange of plans; one depot, G-24, was designated to receive the supplies andequipment turned in by hospitals.
The magnitude of the receipts of supplies and equipment fromhospital closures required prompt action to establish methods and proceduresfor sorting, repairing, packing, marking, and shipping the materiel.Approximately one-half of the officers and enlisted maintenance technicians ofDepot M-400 were transferred to Depot G-24 to supervise the sorting andrepairing of technical equipment.
In May, 10 hospital locations were closed simultaneouslyon orders of the Surgeon, U.K. Base. Large quantities of supplies and equipment,in all degrees of serviceability, were literally thrown into the depot.Technical equipment was turned in either without accessories or with accessoriesin unlabeled boxes. Serviceability of this equipment was not indicated, Britishand American items were not separated, and scrap and salvage were sent to thedepot along with technical services equipment. Articles of clothing were notsorted according to size, and combinations to safes were not furnished. Thesedeficiencies resulted from failure to comply with the provisions of thedirective. To prevent similar recurrences, Colonel Black, Chief of the SupplyDivision, met with medical supply officers of approximately 50 hospitals and thevarious hospital centers at Depot G-24. There, the officers were oriented inthe proper method of returning medical supplies and equipment as their hospitalsclosed. They were conducted through the depot to see at first hand the problemsthat had been created, and to impress on them the necessity for complying withthe directives covering turn-in of supplies. The orientation and series ofinspections corrected the major deficiencies in the turn-in of hospitalassemblies in May and June 1945. At the same time, additional personnel weresecured to assist in receiving materiel at Depot G-24. Medical, surgical,X-ray, and dental technician personnel were obtained on temporary dutyassignments to help classify and identify supplies and equipment.
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A serious operational problem developed within the depots aspackaging and crating lagged behind the sorting process, and large quantities ofindividual items began to accumulate. Textiles were baled on a 24-hour schedulewith the help of POW's, but the backlog of packing and crating continued tomount. Military personnel records were screened for qualified carpenters; 15 solocated were put to work promptly, prefabricating boxes and crates. Two sanitarycompanies were also attached to Depot G-24 to expand operational capacities.
Shortages of various types of packing materials compoundedproblems. Although one officer in London was constantly attempting to purchasepacking and crating material, these items were not available. On one occasion, aplaneload of excelsior was flown from France to enable continuation of thepacking operation. Deliveries of packing and crating materials from the Zone ofInterior were woefully behind schedule (fig. 94).
Disposition of British Items
As has been mentioned, hospitals in England were equippedwith both American and British items. Housekeeping items, such as beds,mattresses, and bedside tables, had been furnished by the British and were to bereturned
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upon deactivation of the units. Many items of equipment whichhad been procured from British sources through reciprocal aid arrangements werenot considered desirable for shipment to other theaters, or to the United Statesbecause of parts peculiarity and different electrical voltages. Consequently,supplies in hospitals were segregated into three categories: British reciprocalaid items which would have to be disposed of as surplus, housekeeping itemswhich were to be returned to the British, and American items which were furthercategorized as to items in excess of overall American requirements and itemswhich would be required either for redeployment or return to the United States.
Return of housekeeping items presented a rather complexproblem because adequate records had not been kept on the items furnished by theBritish. Further complications were caused by the transfer of many items fromone installation to another as necessity demanded. The problem was finallyresolved by having the local British barracks officers furnish the U.S. Forceswith receipts for all British accommodation stores which were returned. Noattempt was made to correlate items turned in against the list of itemsinitially issued.
Disposition of unserviceable items was another problem. TheBritish controlled the salvage operations and were reluctant to accept any itemsunless they met established salvage criteria. Unserviceable vehicles were notaccepted until all wood and rubber were removed. Ordnance had a number ofunserviceable ambulances, which were concentrated in a large field, dousedliberally with gasoline, lighted, and thereby reduced to the desirable state ofmetal only.
All hospitals had many open packages of laboratory chemicalsand drugs which could not be returned to the depots. Arrangements were made withthe British Ministry of Supply to turn such items over to local charities inexchange for a signed release from liability for any error in label or content.Closing hospitals were informed to destroy any open packages whose contents werein doubt.
With the declining distribution and maintenance workloadresulting from hospital closures after 1 May 1945, further adjustments were madein the depot system. The repair workload at Depot M-400 had diminisheddrastically so that it was practical to close the depot on 15 May and totransfer the personnel and equipment to Depot G-45 where a medical maintenanceand repair section was established.
On 20 June, Depot G-45 was designated the soledistribution depot in the United Kingdom, thus allowing the medical sections ofDepots G-20 and G-35 to begin to close and transfer to Depots G-24 and G-45stock not required for the assembly programs. On 27 June, Depot G-24was turned over for the exclusive use of the Medical Department and wasredesignated as Depot M-424. On 30 June, Depot G-30 was officially closedand the procurement office was moved to the U.K. Surgeon's Office.
Planning was completed for closure of Depot G-23 on 21July, and Depots G-20 and G-35 on 31 July. Depot G-45 continued to operateas a distribution depot, including the medical maintenance and repairshop.
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Depot M-424 continued its mission as a filler depot andrepository of stocks from hospitals and units closing in the United Kingdom,including a program of sorting, classifying, and repacking supplies andequipment. The depot also served as a storage point for surplus propertyawaiting disposition by the U.K. General Purchasing Agent.38
CIVIL AFFAIRS MEDICAL SUPPLY
Preinvasion Planning
Preinvasion planning for Civil Affairs medical supply, underthe direction of Col. Stuart G. Smith, MC, conceived of the Supply Division asresponsible only for the distribution of Civil Affairs supplies. Requirementswere to be determined by SHAEF (Supreme Headquarters, Allied ExpeditionaryForce) and the Combined Chiefs of Staff, based upon the expected civilianpopulation to be liberated during successive stages of the invasion. These needswere to be satisfied principally in terms of the BMU (basic medical unit), andthe assembly of 189 cases containing drugs, dressings, surgical instruments,general practitioner's sets, and layettes. The so-called BMU was capabletheoretically of meeting minimum requirements for 30 days for 100,000 civiliansin liberated areas and for 1 million civilians in conquered territories whensupplemented by various other smaller assemblies, such as basic veterinaryunits, basic laboratory units, and similar items.
Change in Concept Following Invasion
Although 85 basic units were allocated for distributionduring the first 90 days of the invasion, only 5 were actually issued-1 eachto Valognes, Coutances, Avranches, Rennes, and Paris. Civilian requirements weresatisfied during that period principally by use of indigenous supplies, capturedenemy medical supplies at Cherbourg and Isigny, and to some extent, by drawingupon regular U.S. Army stocks.
It became apparent after the breakthrough at Avranches inJuly 1944 that the whole concept of Civil Affairs medical supply had to berevised because of numerous difficulties. Only in the larger cities, and thenonly after the battleline had moved far forward, was civilian authoritysufficiently reconstituted to accept and distribute an entire unit of supply ofsuch magnitude. The arrival of basic units in France on seven different shipsposed the difficult problem of marrying-up the component parts into a wholeunit. Transportation was in such short supply that critical items were removedfrom the units and moved forward while the depleted remains stayed on or nearthe beach. Enemy materiel had been captured in quantity at no fewer than 14locations in France, permitting the selection of needed items. Health
38See footnotes 10, p. 316; and 28(3), p. 352.
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conditions in France and Belgium, moreover, were better thanhad been anticipated.
Confronted with these factors, yet aware that a hard winterand the advance into Germany lay ahead, the Supply Division, in cooperation withrepresentatives of SHAEF and the 12th Army Group, made a fundamental revisionin the Civil Affairs supply concept: Basic medical units and other largeassemblies would henceforth be issued only to governmental authority inliberated areas when and as such authority would reassert itself. Capturedmateriel would be inventoried and prepared for issue at "retail" torefugee camps, POW compounds, Civil Affairs teams, and villages in forwardareas, and 10 BMU's would be broken down for issue of component items.
By the end of 1944, French authorities had accepted 23 BMU'sfor distribution in Paris, Reims, Le Havre, Nantes, Caen, Rennes, Tours, Lille,and Nancy.
Captured Materiel Program
The captured materiel program, however, adapted itself mostefficaciously to meeting civilian needs.
Establishment of captured materiel depot-Since sevenwarehouses of high quality medical supplies and equipment of French,German, and Italian origin had been uncovered in Reims, it was determined to setup Depot M-412 in that city, both to classify and distribute the materielcaptured there and to marshal and collect all other materiel captured west ofthe Rhine.
To staff the depot, 3 officers and 15 enlisted men of theEuropean Civil Affairs Division were detached from headquarters and one platoonof the 13th Medical Depot Company was placed on temporary duty. From time totime thereafter, personnel familiar with foreign nomenclature were assigned toDepot M-412 on temporary duty ranging from 5 to 60 days.
Captured materiel teams were formed at Depot M-412 to assayall such materiel in northwest Europe. Items which were of high quality and inshort supply in regular U.S. Army stocks were transferred to nearby medicaldepots for issue; items of French or Belgium origin insofar as practicable weredelivered to nearby officials of those countries, and the balance was thentransferred to Depot M-412.
All of the captured items so collected were identified,inventoried, assigned supply numbers, and cross-referenced with their U.S.counterpart. By mid-winter of 1944, some 3,150 items, including more than 1,000drugs, were in stock at Depot M-412.
Such efficient use of captured materiel brought numerouscommendations from higher authority, including visitors from the War Department.But perhaps the most significant innovation by Depot M-412 in terms of CivilAffairs supply was the so-called Pannier program (fig. 95).
Medical kits devised-The earlycampaign haddemonstrated the need for balanced, compact units of supply to be used indisplaced persons camps
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or in forward areas where distribution of a BMU would havebeen wasteful and where there were no personnel capable of requisitioningcaptured materiel selectively. Accordingly, in cooperation with U.S. PublicHealth and French medical officers, the Supply Division devised separate CivilAffairs drug, dressing, and surgical instrument kits (referred to as Panniers),containing 46, 43, and 18 items, respectively.
Depot M-412 personnel, with the assistance of availableprisoners, assembled the items in captured portable trunks or in wicker baskets.Within 45 days, 5,646 kits were assembled and issued to displaced persons campsand Civil Affairs teams. The prudent selection of component items and theportability of the chests brought widespread acclaim for the Pannier program.
As the military operation swept across the Rhine and intoGermany in the early months of 1945, French authority was able to acceptdelivery of 28 additional BMU's, and 400-bed Civil Affairs hospitals were setup in 20 French cities and towns. With the delivery of these units,responsibility for distribution of civilian supplies to our Western EuropeAllies substantially came to an end.
Distribution of captured materiel-When the fighting ended,the Supply
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Division took over numerous German medical depots, includingthe Neuhof salt mine with its 3,200 tons of supplies. Much of the capturedmateriel was required to service POW enclosures and hospitals and thebalance was used, in the main, for displaced persons camps.39
Antityphus Supplies in Germany
Although the Quartermaster Corps was nominally in chargeof antityphus supplies, the Medical Supply Division through Depot M-412issued almost 650,000 pounds of DDT and 4,600 hand-dusters and airlifted 40power-dusters from the United States and the United Kingdom. Thus, Depot M-412became the nerve center of all antityphus supply activity.
39See footnotes 2(3), p. 310; and 10, p. 316.
