CHAPTER XIII
Offensive Operations: The Solomons to thePalaus
SOUTH PACIFIC AREA
Halting the Japanese Offensive
Because of the Japanese activities at Lae, New Guinea, andGuadalcanal in early 1942, it became obvious to the Allied Command that it wouldbe necessary to launch a counteroffensive to reverse this trend and relieve theapparent threat to Australia. The U.S. Marines opened the campaign onGuadalcanal some 8 months after Pearl Harbor on 7 August 1942, and the 16thInfantry Regiment of the Americal Division entered the scene on 13 October 1942.Other combat elements of the Americal Division, including the 101st MedicalRegiment, arrived on Guadalcanal on 11-12 November 1942.
The medical supply section of the 101st Medical Regimentassumed responsibility for medical supply on Guadalcanal, including the supportof certain Navy and Marine personnel. Fortunately, the Americal Division, at thetime, carried a 60-day supply, and no serious shortage was caused by this addedburden. The only supplies really low were glucose, plasma, and sulfaguanidine.The 101st Medical Regiment was relieved of its supply responsibility for thebase on 4 January 1943 with the arrival of Section 1, Advance Depot Platoon,21st Medical Supply Depot (map 33).
Col. Dale G. Friend, MC, Surgeon, 101st Medical Regiment,made some significant recommendations concerning medical supply on Guadalcanal.Because it was necessary to supply Navy and Marine personnel as well as theArmy, the 60-day supply level proved to be inadequate. Colonel Friendrecommended that equipment of medical troops assigned to combat operations bemade available in small portable waterproof containers which would be capable offloating reasonable periods of time in the event that they would be used inlanding operations and river crossings.
Because plasma bottles and other glass containers were beingshattered by mortar and artillery fire as well as bombings, it was recommendedthat these items be placed in shock-absorbing containers. It was alsorecommended that the new Army-issue and the Navy-type litters replace thecumbersome Army-issue oak litter.
Development of Field Equipment
The combat plan to meet and destroy the enemy, wherever found,meant that units would be sent into difficult jungle country, remote from
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MAP 33.-Medical supply support onGuadalcanal.
sources of supply. This problem was solved by combining Navy,Marine, and Army field equipment. It was found that the Navy and Marinevalise-type medical chest was extremely advantageous in that it could be carriedby one man on the foot marches and contained sufficient equipment to provide fortreatment. Another important item was the so-called combat dressing chest whichwas made up of two watertight tin cans containing various types of dressings.These cans together fitted in a canvas carrying case which one man could carry.Due to the shortage of this particular item, the cans were forwarded from thecollecting station by litter bearer, emptied at the aid station, and thenreturned to the collecting station for refilling.
It is interesting to note that two types of jungle kits (fig.109) were added to the medical supply catalog shortly after the battle forGuadalcanal.1
Supply Points and Storage Facilities, 1943
Late in 1943, there were eight medical supply points inUSAFISPA (U.S. Army Forces in the South Pacific Area). These points, eachoperated by a particular section or detachment of a medical supply depot, werelocated on Esp?ritu Santo, Fiji, Bougainville, New Caledonia, and GuadalcanalIslands. The South Pacific General Depot at Noum?a, New Caledonia,
1(1) Daboll, Warren W.: The Medical Department: Medical Service in the Asiatic Theater. United States Army in World War II. The Technical Services. [In preparation.] (2) Annual Report, 101st Medical Regiment, South Pacific Area, 1942. (3) Whitehill, Buell B.: Administrative History of Medical Activities in the Middle Pacific. [Official record.]
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FIGURE 109.-A. Individual jungle kit used inthe Pacific areas. B. Another version of the jungle kit.
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MAP 34.-Medical supply points, Bougainvilleand the South Pacific Area, 1943-44.
was organized in August 1943 and was operated jointly by thebase platoon of the 11th Medical Depot Company and a section of the 17th MedicalDepot Company. This depot held a 30-day reserve supply for the entire theater(map 34).
By December 1943, approximately 128,000 square feet ofwarehouse space was available in all depots of the South Pacific. There was also26,000 square feet of storage under canvas (fig. 110). The prefabricated woodenwarehouses of New Zealand were easily erected, but of the six warehousesconstructed, only two had concrete floors. Only a limited amount ofmaterials-handling equipment and only a few forklifts and trucks were available.
The lack of floors created an additional problem, thesecuring of dunnage. Approximately 35,000 square feet of dunnage was constructedfrom scrap lumber at the South Pacific General Depot. The necessary powerequipment needed to convert boxes and crates to dunnage was not always availableand had to be obtained in the same "informal" way in which the lumberwas secured. Depots in forward areas often used coconut tree logs, crushedcoral, and ships' dunnage for flooring.
Prefabricated warehouses were not used on Guadalcanal. Thelimited stock available was being held for shipment to more forward areas ascombat
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FIGURE 110.-Storage of medical supplies undercanvas, 68th Medical Depot Company, Guadalcanal.
continued to move north and west. Outside storage was, at itsbest, a poor substitute. Originally, supply of tarpaulins was very short, andmany supplies were lost in open storage in forward areas due to lack ofcovering. By the end of 1943, this condition had been corrected, and all storagewas under some type of covering (fig. 111).
Protection of alcohol, narcotics, and precious metals,although not completely adequate, presented no insurmountable problems.Generally, "strong rooms" in the area consisted of wire meshenclosures. The shortage of lumber, cement, and other building materialsprevented construction of more adequate protective storage areas in most depots.In the Guadalcanal Depot, it was necessary at times to place alcohol in outsidestorage. When this became necessary, armed guards were posted. Major loss ofthese supplies was never a serious problem, probably because all personnel wereso actively engaged in the support of combat, coupled with the fact that nocivilian market existed for its disposal.2
2This section is based on a manuscript covering medical supply in the South Pacific prepared for a preliminary draft of this volume by Col. Joseph C. Thompson MSC.
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Automatic Supply Discontinued
The discontinuance of the automatic supply of medicalmaintenance units was followed by direct requisitioning in January 1944. Betterstock control, curtailment of overages and shortages, and a system of stockreporting followed.
Requisitioning of supplies was closely coordinated byHeadquarters, USASOS (United States Army Services of Supply), South PacificArea. The current status of a requisition could easily be determined because ofthe use of an information copy furnished the base concerned.
Late in 1944, it was required that stock level reports befiled at 10-day intervals. This gave the theater medical supply officer a systemof central stock control. Lack of personnel in the depots and the headquartersas well somewhat handicapped this system. By May 1945, the theater reverted to adecentralized system.
Levels of Supply
With the discontinuance of the medical maintenance unitshipments, supply levels had to be reset. A 150 days' supply was to be on handin depot stock, and 30 days of reserve stock in the form of medical maintenanceunits was to be held by the South Pacific General Depot. This plan gave thetheater a total requisition objective of 300 days.
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Reorganization of Supply Units
Early in 1944, following recommendation of the WarDepartment, the base platoon of the 11th Medical Supply Depot and Section 1,Advance Depot Platoon, 17th Medical Supply Depot, along with its optical repairsection, were reorganized into the 67th Medical Depot Company. The depot unitson Guadalcanal and the other island areas were also reorganized, leaving thebase platoon of the 68th Medical Depot Company on Guadalcanal, the Storage andIssue Platoon of the 68th on Esp?ritu Santo, and sections of the 75th and 56thMedical Depot Companies on Bougainville and Fiji, respectively. The medicalsupply situation at the smaller stations on New Georgia and the Russells washandled by small detachments of one officer and four to eight enlisted men whilethe medical supply officers of individual base hospitals at Auckland, NewZealand, Aitutaki, and Efate handled all local supply problems (map 34).
On 15 June 1944, the islands in the Solomon group, north ofthe Russells, were designated as part of the Southwest Pacific Area, and on 1August 1944, Headquarters, USAFISPA, became the South Pacific Base Command.
This reorganization did not change the logistical mission ofthe command. The three points of discharge, New Caledonia, Esp?ritu Santo, andGuadalcanal, remained the same. All requisitions for the other island bases werefilled from stocks within the area, and supplies not available in the basecommand were extracted to the San Francisco Port of Embarkation.
By the last quarter of the year, the planning for theredeployment of the troops of the area became paramount. Reduction in strengthat bases and the closing of some bases required constant coordination for thesupply of these units. The area had reached its peak in the last quarter of1943 and the first half of 1944. Diversity of climate and distance betweenislands were still factors to be considered in supply. Only after the withdrawalof the larger organizations, followed by some of the hospitals, and the closingof some islands in the eastern part of the area, did this situation become lesscomplex.
Refrigeration.-Refrigeration in general was lackingin the early days of the South Pacific Area. By the end of 1943, walk-in-typerefrigerators were available and utilized at all depots. The originalrefrigerator authorized to medical supply depots by the TOE's (tables oforganization and equipment) was inadequate, but in emergencies, proved valuablefor short periods of time until the walk-in type could be obtained and erected.
Rehabilitation.-Many combat divisions, when relievedfrom actual combat, were rehabilitated in New Zealand and other bases in thetheater. In order not to affect the level of supply at these bases, modifiedmedical maintenance units were assembled and shipped to these divisions by themedical section of the South Pacific General Depot when necessary.
From time to time, modified medical maintenance units wereassembled at the various depots where they were segregated, marked, anddesignated for
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task forces to be mounted-out at that base. These units were turned over tothe task force at the time of embarkation.
End of combat.-Early in 1944, the military situation in the SouthPacific Area had well passed its climax. Guadalcanal, New Georgia, and manyother islands were names indelibly written in history. Passage of time hadcreated a complete change in the picture for the entire South Pacific Area, froma combat area to an area whose mission was that of logistical support.
NEW GUINEA CAMPAIGNS
While Marine and Army units were driving the Japanese from Guadalcanal,American and Australian forces were involved in a long hard struggle toeliminate the possible threat to Australia from New Guinea.
Depot Operations
Through most of 1943, the entire load of medical depot operations for theSWPA (Southwest Pacific Area) was carried by the 9th and the 3d Medical SupplyDepots (map 29). To maintain a supporting position, by 1943, these units werespread along the eastern coast of Australia and New Guinea. Parent units splitoff platoons; platoons sliced off sections; and even sections divided into stillsmaller detachments. Personnel was augmented, organization and equipmentmodified, until all resemblance to a table of organization vanished. Thisfragmentation was necessitated by the number of locations and movements and thefact thatthe existing TOE for medical supply depots was totally unsuitedfor operation under the conditions existing in New Guinea and Australia.
Port Moresby Depot-To say that storage facilities in the SouthwestPacific Area were inadequate would be a gross understatement. The bestunderstanding of conditions as they existed in Australia and New Guinea camefrom Lt. Col. Stephen G. Asbill, VC, 9th Medical Depot commander. "Storagefacilities in Brisbane, Australia," he wrote, "were much better thanin New Guinea, but still were far from ideal. By early 1944, the depot wasoperating from 12 widely separated storage facilities, one 60 miles fromBrisbane. These varied from a basement of a church to college buildings. Veryfew were real warehouses able to support heavy loads; none were modern fireproofbuildings. It was not possible to use materials handling equipment (even if ithad been available)."
Storage facilities at Port Moresby were practically nonexistent in January1943, and there was little improvement for the next 8 months. The medical depotoccupied several small buildings on Ela Beach, the principal dock area,approximately 1 mile from the downtown headquarters. Two of these buildings wereused for storage and loose-issue operations. Although there were no space,tonnage, and occupancy reports at this time, it was roughly estimated that thetotal gross space was no more than 4,000 square feet, with approximately 80 tonsof medical supplies on hand. When the tonnage on hand exceeded the stor-
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age capacity, it was stored in the open and usually covered at night withtarpaulins. A locator system was not used because of the limited and crowdedspace. Stock selection under such conditions was not too efficient orsystematic.
Security storage in New Guinea was improvised. A smalldetached building of not more than 200 square feet was used for storage of ethylalcohol, original cases of whisky, original packages of narcotics, and othersecurity-type items. Opened containers of these items were stored in an old Armyfield safe. Although security was thus minimal, little difficulty wasencountered in handling these items. Refrigerated storage consisted of three orfour kerosene-operated refrigerators of the regular household type.
The receiving operations were always accomplished in an openarea. If the shipment was small, there was no problem. It could be quicklydocumented and placed in storage. Larger shipments, if delivered from docksideat a rate which would permit tally-in as received, had to be stored in the openuntil the same receiving crew could segregate items and remove them to moreadequate storage. There were numerous occasions, after shipments began to arrivedirectly from the United States, where there was no control over rate of arrivalof trucks from dockside. At times, it was necessary to split a handful of meninto two crews so supplies could be received at night as well as in the daytime.Under such circumstances, because of the shortage of personnel and lack ofadequate facilities, supplies were merely off-loaded and stacked in an effort tocontain the entire shipment within available space, with no attempt atidentification.
As the total tonnage increased, it was imperative thatadditional storage space be obtained. Through efforts of the command surgeon,three former Australian troop barracks, located approximately 3 miles from themain operation, were allocated for medical supply. Each was 20 by 100 feet witha center walkway approximately 24 inches lower than the main floor running thelength of the building. Depot personnel immediately modified these structures sothat the entire floor would be at one level. To provide additional relief forthe storage problem, three hospital ward tents were erected in the same area andused for about 2 months.
After about 9 months of improvising in every conceivablemanner, a suitable central location for the depot was selected and approved.This required site preparation by Engineer units and then the construction ofprefabricated buildings. The construction was accomplished by depot personnelassisted by personnel from a nearby medical facility which was not operating atfull capacity at the time.
Brisbane Depot-From 1 January to 31 October 1943, theBrisbane Depot (fig. 112) received 4,511 tons of medical supplies and shipped3,723 tons. Although the tonnage was relatively small, it required a largenumber of men for handling since no equipment, such as forklifts, tractors,warehouse mules, or pallets, was available. All boxes were manhandled from thetime they were unloaded at the dockside until they were loaded back on boardship, including stacking to heights of 15 to 20 feet when the ceiling wouldpermit and the floor-
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FIGURE 112.-Interior view of the 3d MedicalSupply Depot, Brisbane, Australia.
load would allow. This organization worked 24 hours a daywhen ships were unloading medical supplies, which was about 50 percent of thetime. The officers unloaded and manhandled boxes just the same as enlisted menand were authorized just as many sets of fatigues. In addition to the standardmedical supply responsibility, the Brisbane Depot organization handled laundryexchange for hospital ships that put into the port, hospital trains operatingalong the coast of Australia, and hospitals located in the Brisbane area. Theunit also handled local purchasing of medical supplies, surgical instruments,and dental instruments, procuring approximately $15,000 per month during thefirst 6 months.
Deployment of Supply Units
Having spent a brief trial period at Milne Bay and Oro Bay, NewGuinea, in late 1942 and early 1943 (map 29), the 3d Medical Depot Companyrealized the urgent need for additional personnel.
In addition to accomplishing the supply mission, the depotpersonnel at Oro Bay were assigned small arms security for 400 yards of thebeach area adjacent to the depot. Several more men were sent from Port Moresbyto Oro Bay and one or two to Milne Bay. This action, together with normal losses,reduced the Port Moresby force to a low of 23 men at one time.
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MAP 35.-Medical supply depots in Australia,1943.
With the increase in combat activity in the spring of 1943, thevolume of incoming supplies began to increase and additional units were arrivingand increasing the population to be supported. The problem was presented to thebase surgeon who was successful after a few weeks in getting enough men assignedto bring the strength back up to 32 men. Because of the situation whichprevailed, little thought was given to TOE authorizations. The majorconsideration was the problem of obtaining the number of personnel and equipmentrequired to support the assigned mission. This was the situation for 9 months,after which the Port Moresby remnant of the original platoon was replaced byanother platoon from the parent unit in Australia. A few weeks later, thedetachment divided between Milne Bay and Oro Bay was also relieved, and allreturned to Australia for recuperation and reassignment to the parentorganization.
Augmentation of supply units.-Before the departureof the 1st Storage and Issue Platoon for Port Moresby, plans were taking shapefor assignment of the entire depot. The headquarters and base section remainedat Brisbane, Australia; one storage and issue platoon was sent to Townsville andone to Rockhampton. Detachments were located in Toowoomba, Cairns, ChartersTowers, and Darwin (map 35). With the three locations in New Guinea, a depotorganized to operate in four locations was now operating in 10 widely
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scattered areas. Authorized personnel and equipment could notbegin to cope with the situation. Consequently, additional personnel wereassigned as required, when available, without regard to TOE authorization. Onthe Australian mainland, military personnel were augmented by civiliansrecruited under a joint agreement and administered under a system somewhatsimilar to Civil Service procedure, but much less complex.
This situation was particularly true at Brisbane where, atthe peak period, approximately 35 Australian civilians were assisting theheadquarters and base section in all sorts of jobs, such as stenographers,clerks, stock selectors, warehousemen, and ordinary laborers. Practically all ofthe work of posting to the stock record account and maintaining voucher fileswas performed by Australian girls. In the islands between Australia and thePhilippines, any indigenous personnel recruited were strictly laborers. Nativepotential as a labor force, however, was very limited because the average nativeof islands like New Guinea and Biak was small of stature, undernourished, eitherdiseased or weakened from disease, and unaccustomed to sustained periods ofmanual labor. Their habits and living conditions were strictly primitive.
Depot equipment.-Equipment was obtained by eachseparate unit or detachment on an issue or loan basis, depending on its assignedmission and justified by the type and volume of work to be done. Each platoon,detachment, or task group operated almost entirely independently from the parentunit in this respect since each was supporting different areas separated by adistance of 50 to 1,000 miles or more.
Two small powersaws were obtained in the United States. One,retained by the base section, was very valuable as it enabled assigned personnelto make full use of all salvageable lumber to construct crates, boxes, andshelving, to fabricate items for various uses in offices, and to improve livingconditions in the field-type bivouac area. The other powersaw was taken to PortMoresby by the 1st Platoon of the 3d Medical Depot and was put to a similar use.It was not possible to keep the existence of such a piece of equipment a secret,and as soon as other units learned of it, there were numerous requests for aloan. Within a few months, it was worn out and there was no replacement parts.
In the later phases of the operations in Australia, when thebase headquarters staff finally had time to require a review of status ofequipment in units, the medical depot was authorized to retain many items ofequipment not on its TOE and twice the quantity of many authorized items. Thiswas based on a justification, and recognized by the staff, that the depot wasoperating 100 percent in excess of the mission as contemplated by the TOE. Afterequipment became available in the theater, most of the things which werenecessary for the assigned mission were obtained, but there was an initialperiod when operations suffered for lack of this equipment, special tools, andpower tools. Also, there was practically nothing authorized for operation of amaintenance shop.3
3(1) Quarterly Reports, 9th Medical Supply Depot, Southwest Pacific Area, 1943. (2) Quarterly Reports, 3d Medical Supply Depot, Southwest Pacific Area, 1943. (3) Personal recollections of Lt. Col. Stephen G. Asbill, VC, Commanding Officer, 3d Medical Depot Company.
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Obtaining Supplies From the United States
Initially, all maintenance supply (class I) from the UnitedStates was on an automatic basis by means of medical maintenance units. ClassesII and IV medical supplies were obtained by requisition based on TBA (table ofbasic allowances) shortages for class II and 180 days' level for class IV. Inaddition, theater levels of certain critical items which were frozen for useonly, as the name implied, were shipped on an automatic basis from the UnitedStates as the Final Medical Reserve. Automatic shipments of medical maintenanceunits were discontinued in late 1943 and those of Final Medical Reserve units inearly 1944. Stocks of the latter were absorbed into ordinary theater stocks. Itmust be realized that a comprehensive central stock record system was maintainedto compute theater requirements and prepare requisitions. This necessitatedmonthly postings based on inventory reports received from all depots, due-inrecords, maintenance factor cards for each item, troop strength projected atleast 6 months in advance, and TBA consolidated shortages. These centralizedstock control records were, of course, also useful for balancing stocks withinthe theater and for extracting.
This central stock control system was difficult, timeconsuming, and an onerous task using "hand" methods. Electricaccounting machines for the Supply Division would have been welcomed.4
An extremely important facet of computation of requirementswas the problem of adjusting replacement or maintenance factors. No resupplysystem can be any more efficient or accurate than its maintenance factors. Atthe beginning of the war, maintenance factors were inadequate and inaccurate foruse in the SWPA. Many examples of gross inadequacies were detected. Certainly,one of the most vital functions was the continuing readjustment of maintenancefactors based on actual consumption.
On the whole, the Zone of Interior did a good job in gettingmedical supplies to SWPA. There were a few items which plagued the theater fromthe beginning to the end of the war. Among the most troublesome and frustratingshortages throughout the entire war were Atabrine (quinacrine hydrochloride),foot powder, litters, penicillin, some dental items, especially burrs andhandpieces, and spare parts of all types.
The "battle" to keep Atabrine levels up to theaterrequirements was a bitterly contested one. It was a hand-to-mouth-typeexistence. Shortages were always threatening, but, somehow or other, help alwaysarrived at the last moment. This was not entirely due to failure of the UnitedStates to send Atabrine in sufficient quantities. Theater shipping, unloading,and distribution inadequacies caused some of the trouble, as did stowage inships. It was not unusual for 50 ships to be backlogged in a New Guinea port. Itwas almost certain that there was Atabrine on many of these ships. Because ofthe backlog
4(1) Essential Technical Medical Data, U.S. Army Services of Supply, Southwest Pacific Area, for March 1944, dated 1 Apr. 1944. (2) Preliminary draft of Medical Supply History, Services of Supply, Southwest Pacific, by Col. Alfonso M. Libasci, MC.
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and because Atabrine was stowed far down in cargo hatches, itwas not possible to get to it. In this situation, an emergency air shipment fromthe United States was necessary to prevent a serious shortage. Another paradoxwas that the Australians always had enough Atabrine and, on many occasions whencalled on, would lend us all we needed. They obtained it on lend-lease from theUnited States!
Foot powder, although the allowance per 1,000 men per monthwas steadily increased from 75 cans at the beginning of the war to 1,000 cansnear the end of hostilities, was never available in the quantities needed.Shortage of this item seemed to cause more concern and more complaints than anyother in the entire theater. Letters, radiograms, and reports of visitors andinspectors were replete with concern over foot powder. In the Tropics, theconstant moisture caused the skin of the feet to be extremely susceptible tofungus infection. Adequate use of foot powder greatly reduced this mostuncomfortable and often disabling condition.
Litters were in short supply in the later stages of the war.The losses from bases and from the theater were very high due to faulty propertyexchange.5
Distribution Within the Theater
As stocks gradually were built up in the theater, standardcatalogs were distributed and replenishment issues of any item became available.Units were instructed to use maintenance factors and TBA's as a basis forrequirements. Requisitioning was on a monthly basis. Depot stocks were balancedby intratheater movement of stocks at first, later by direct shipments from theUnited States to the designated port depots.
All control of depot stocks was centrally vested in theoffice of the Chief, Supply Division, Surgeon's Office, USASOS, where thecentral stock records were kept. Routine requisitions were cleared at basesection level. Items in excess of TBA's or controlled items required theapproval of the Chief, Supply Division.
This was a system based on standard supply practices ofindustry and the military. There was a minimum of wasted efforts, centralizationwas tight only where needed, and no undue obstacles were interposed betweenconsumer and supplier.
During 1943, two ships had been converted in the theater foruse as intratheater hospital ships. These ships, the Tasman and the Maetsuycker(fig. 113), were equipped and staffed with supplies and personnel availablewithin the theater. Their mission was to make scheduled evacuation runs from theNew Guinea ports to the Australian base ports. On their return trips, they wouldcarry medical supplies and units or personnel from Australia. They wereextremely useful because of their regular schedule. The cargo space was con-
5(1) Annual Report, Chief Surgeon, U.S. Army Services of Supply, Southwest Pacific Area, 1944. (2) Check Sheet, G-4, Headquarters, U.S. Army Services of Supply, to Chief Surgeon, 8 Mar. 1945, subject: Joint Supply Survey Board Report of Inspection. (3) Letter, Col. Charles M. Downs, MC, Surgeon, X Corps, to The Surgeon General, 12 Dec. 1944, subject: Shortage of Foot Powder.
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siderable-about 1,100 ship tons for both ships-enough forover 30 days' medical maintenance for 40,000 men. During the first 3 months ofits operation, the Tasman alone carried 2,500 ship tons of medicalsupplies to New Guinea.6
Special Methods for Automatic Supply
Medical supply officers in advance bases on New Guinea, plaguedby heat, humidity, lack of equipment, enemy nuisance raids, and impossibleroads, had concluded that a system had to be devised that would more efficientlysupply advanced bases. Paperwork needed to be reduced, trained personnel wereneeded desperately, and overages and shortages had to be eliminated (fig. 114).
Automatic shipment of supplies was not the answer. Shipmenton a requisitioning basis would eliminate overages and shortages, but this wouldput a load on personnel in the forward bases by asking them to computerequirements.
An effective, yet simple, method of automatic supply toforward areas, based on actual consumption, was developed. Under this system,the requisitioning depot entered on the "Inventory Report" form theamount on hand,
6(1) See footnotes 4, p. 443; and 5(1), p. 444. (2) Historical Report, 4th Quarter, 1943, Hospital Ship Tasman and 2d Portable Surgical Hospital.
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and the issuing depot completed the form indicating suppliesknown to be en route but not received, authorized and estimated requirements,and action taken.
After the computation and completion of the report, it wasforwarded to the appropriate depot for filing. The system worked well as it wassimple, reduced paperwork and the need for trained personnel in the forwardbases, furnished supplies at a rate approximating actual consumption, thuseliminating imbalances which occurred with a strictly automatic method, andprovided a periodic stock status report from forward bases.7
Planning Operation DEXTERITY
At the same time that the Japanese were being driven from theSolomons, the Sixth U.S. Army was establishing its headquarters at Cape Sudest,New Guinea. Plans were made there for Operation DEXTERITY which involved attackson Arawe on 15 December 1943, on Cape Gloucester, New Britain, on 26 December1943, and on Saidor on 2 January 1944. DEXTERITY was the first operation underSixth U.S. Army control.8
While initial medical supply for these operations consistedof those supplies carried in by the units involved, resupply for the Araweoperation came from the 15th Medical Supply Platoon (Aviation) and a platoon ofthe 9th Medical Supply Depot while, on 30 January 1944, the 21st Medical SupplyPlatoon (Aviation) landed at Cape Gloucester with two medical maintenance units,each designed to provide medical support to 5,000 troops for 30 days. This wasthe first time that a medical supply platoon (aviation) was used in operationalsupport, and this action proved so successful that it became a frequentprocedure in later operations.
Shortly after the task force arrived in the objective area,Headquarters, Alamo Force, received an urgent request from the Arawe surgeon forsufficient supplies and equipment to reestablish an operating room. The singleoperating room setup on Arawe had received a direct hit, virtually destroyingall material. With the aid of medical officers, the essential items wereascertained and assembled, and within 18 hours after receipt of the message fromthe Arawe surgeon, the supplies and equipment had been delivered.
To accomplish this swift delivery, the material was airliftedfrom Cape Sudest to Finschhafen, moved to Dreger Harbor by jeep, with the finallap to the beachhead at Arawe by PT boat. Thus, the pattern was set. The manymedical supply emergencies that were to follow would be met in a similarunorthodox fashion by close coordination of land, sea, and air transportation.
7Quarterly Reports, Surgeon, U.S. Advanced Base, 1. Oct. 1942 to 31 Mar. 1943.
8(1) Quarterly Reports, Surgeon, Sixth U.S. Army, 20 Jan.-30 June 1943. (2) Quarterly Reports, Surgeon, Sixth U.S. Army, 1944. (3) Manuscript covering medical supply activities of the Sixth and Eighth U.S. Armies in the Southwest Pacific, prepared for a preliminary draft of this volume by Lt. Col. John M. Hunt, MSC, and Col. Albert E. Minns, Jr., MSC. (4) For further details, see footnote 1 (1), p. 432.
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Meanwhile, the 27th Medical Supply Platoon (Aviation) hadmoved from Milne Bay to Cape Cretin where it staged for the Saidor operation,and then had moved to Saidor on 6 January where it operated a medical supplydepot until 20 March.
Medical Supply for the Hollandia-Aitape Operation
Planning for the assault on Hollandia and Aitape accelerated inApril 1944. The operation, which was spearheaded by two task forces,"Reckless" and "Persecution," began on 22 April withsimultaneous assaults. The 163d Regimental Combat Team struck at Aitape, 125miles southeast of Hollandia, while the 24th and 41st Infantry Divisions landedat Hollandia and marched immediately to the airfields near Lake Sentani. Eachdivision carried 30 days' medical supplies and was backed up by the 21stMedical Supply Platoon which had staged at Oro Bay and Finschhafen sinceFebruary (map 36).9
In addition to being the first full-scale operation in theSouthwest Pacific Area, the Hollandia operation also provided the first reallogistical nightmare despite the fact that enemy resistance at Hollandia wasmuch less than anticipated. To provide dispersion, two beaches were selected,one on Tanahmerah Bay and one on Humboldt Bay. Although available maps indicatedthat both would provide suitable areas for dumps, Tanahmerah Bay soon presentedmany serious problems. Offshore coral reefs prevented the LST's (landingships, tank) from discharging as planned. The area behind the beach, moreover,was swampy, and there was no connecting road between the beach and the mainsupply route which led to Lake Sentani and the airfields. As a consequence, anorder was issued to divert those supplies destined for this beach to theHumboldt Bay area, which by this time was stacked with supplies of all technicalservices. To add to the confusion, a lone Japanese bomber, on the night of D+1,bombed a former Japanese ammunition dump on White Beach. The explosion started afire at the gasoline dump which burned for 2 days, causing extensive damage andjeopardizing the surrounding area.
Fires on the beach resolved the problem of segregating themixture of supplies, which in itself had caused shortages of some items veryearly in the operation. More seriously, however, with more troops arrivingcontinually, the fire created a situation in all types of supply from which thebase was several weeks in recovering. This was the first base at which 62- and112-foot supply vessels were utilized by the supporting base surgeon, Lt. Col.(later Col.) Everett G. King, MC. They proved to be invaluable, being utilizedin the delivery of medical supplies to forward bases, such as Hollandia, and inprocuring items from rear bases as well as movement of patients to and fromships. Meanwhile, supply support at Hollandia was further complicated by heavyrains and landslides that made existing roads useless and entire areasimpassable to troops carrying medical supplies on litters. To compensate for thehan-
9(1) See footnotes 5(1), p. 444; and 8(2), p. 447. (2) Quarterly Reports, 32d Infantry Division, 2d, 3d, and 4th quarters, 1944.
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MAP 36.-Medical supply support for the NewGuinea operations, 1944.
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dicaps, approximately 50 tons of medical supplies and equipmentwere airlifted into the operational area. This, plus the supplies brought in bythe reserve units, promoted a gradual buildup. By the latter part of June 1944,sufficient supplies were positioned to meet most demands.
The 127th Regimental Combat Team of the 32d InfantryDivision, which arrived at Aitape on D+1, received its medical supplies throughthe chain of evacuation. The supplies forwarded overland were carried inlandfrom the end of the ambulance trail by returning litter bearers or nativecarriers. Other medical supplies were airdropped with the rations, with a goodpercentage of recovery. On 1 August, when parachutes were supplied, theairdropping and recovery of litters and glass-contained medical supplies becameperfect, the parachutes cutting the drop sufficiently to avoid all breaking, aswell as furnishing a visible distinguishing marker. Critical items were footpowder and typhus vaccine.
Movement Toward the Philippines
In mid-May 1944, a reinforced regimental combat team, settingforth from Hollandia, captured Toem and nearby Wakde Island with supply supportprovided by the Hollandia Depot. At the end of May, the 41st Infantry Divisionembarked from Hollandia for an attack on Biak with medical supply support comingfrom a platoon of the 27th Medical Depot Company, and with resupply coming fromthe depot at Finschhafen being operated by the base platoon of the 29th MedicalDepot Company, and from Hollandia where the Storage and Issue Platoon of the29th had relieved the 21st Medical Supply Platoon which had begun staging forthe Leyte operation (fig. 115).
By mid-September, Noemfoor Island, midway between Biak andthe western end of New Guinea, bases on Vogelkop Peninsula which fell in lateAugust, and Morotai which fell without major enemy resistance had been clearedof enemy forces, thus setting the stage for further operations in thePhilippines (fig. 116).
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA
Early Supply Activities of the Sixth U.S. Army in Australia
The Sixth U.S. Army, under command of Lt. Gen. (later Gen.)Walter Krueger, arrived at Camp Columbia, near Brisbane, on 17 April 1943.Intensive training for amphibious and jungle warfare followed, accompanied by amounting incidence of malaria and a growing shortage of Atabrine.
From 17 April to June 1943, a Sixth U.S. Army medical supplysubsection, which consisted of one warrant officer and two enlisted men, wasengaged in planning for the support of the Kiriwina and Woodlark Islandsoperations (Alamo Force) which were to be mounted from Milne Bay. Concurrentlywith inspections and training activities, the first requisition for medicalsupplies was submitted to USASOS to support the operation. Shortly thereafter,the
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FIGURE 115.-Local issue office of the 29thMedical Depot Company, Base F, Finschhafen, New Guinea.
plans were changed, as were most plans, to stage and mount thetask force from Townsville, and it was necessary to submit another requisitionfor the troops in that area.
Combat Supply Lines Begin to Stretch
From June through early September 1943, combined Australian andAmerican forces executed a plan that was to regain that area of New Guineasituated between Buna and Finschhafen. The U.S. Army Services of Supply providedlogistical support to the Army and the Navy with 30 to 90 days of stocks placedat intermediate and advance bases. In addition to the support of the AlamoForce, which was first designed to conduct operations in Woodlark, Kiriwina, andNew Britain under control of General Headquarters, SWPA, and separate fromforces operating in New Guinea, the Sixth U.S. Army was also responsible for thesupport of the 503d Parachute Infantry Regiment which operated directly underGeneral of the Army Douglas MacArthur.
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FIGURE 116.-Conveyor system for bringingsupplies ashore on Morotai Island, September 1944.
On 14 June 1943, the forward echelon of the Sixth U.S. Army,then operating as the Alamo Force, moved to Milne Bay, from which OperationCHRONICLE, involving the Kiriwina and Woodlark Islands, was launched on 30 June(map 37). Medical supply support for Kiriwina was assigned to a detachment ofthe 9th Medical Supply Depot while the medical supply officer of the 52dEvacuation Hospital was responsible for medical supply on Woodlark. Althoughboth operations were unopposed, participating personnel figuratively andliterally got their feet wet by way of introduction to the peculiarities andproblems of actual amphibious landings and operations on the Pacific islands.Steady torrential rains made it difficult to locate, establish, and maintainoperational supply points, or to preserve supplies and equipment. Also, receiptand control of shipments without the necessary documentation became moredifficult as supply lines lengthened and transportation shortages were added toadministrative delays. Unorthodox methods were the rule in overcoming medicalsupply deficiencies.
Logistical problems were constant companions as the AlamoForce went on to develop Milne and Oro Bays. During the early phases of thesecombat
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MAP 37.-Medical supply support for OperationCHRONICLE.
operations, some delays in acquiring supplies were rooted in theadministrative procedures. As an example, supplies requisitioned by the SixthU.S. Army with a request that they be earmarked for Army use in a specificoperation were receipted for and placed in base depots. Units, for which thesupplies were intended, were required to submit formal requisitions through thebase surgeon for editing and approval before supply action. In view of the usualurgency circumscribing each operation, this added step was frustrating to themedical units assigned to combat forces.
On 15 August 1943, Services of Supply assumed responsibilityfor the buildup of Milne and Oro Bays from the Alamo Force which moved toGoodenough Island. At about this same time, the Surgeon, Sixth U.S. Army, beganaugmenting both echelons of his supply staff as the first requisitioned medicalunits began to arrive from the Zone of Interior. Warrant Officer (later Lt.)Leslie C. Scott, MAC, who had been serving as medical supply officer from thedate of Sixth U.S. Army activation, was provided an assistant, Lt. (later Capt.)Irwin Lee, MAC, who was assigned as the rear echelon liaison officer. Thisarrangement ended abruptly on 8 December 1943 when Lieutenant Scott succumbed toa heart attack, and Lieutenant Lee was quickly detailed to the Alamo Force ashis replacement. A permanent replacement for Lieutenant Lee was not forthcominguntil June when Lt. (later Maj.) John M. Hunt, Jr.,
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MSC, was ordered in to assist the stepped-up planning for theinvasion of the Philippines.10
Eighth U.S. Army Supply Activities
Headquarters, Eighth U.S. Army, was established at LakeSentani in September 1944. Col. John F. Bohlender, MC, Surgeon of the AdvanceParty, Headquarters, Eighth U.S. Army, was succeeded by Col. (later Brig. Gen.)George W. Rice, MC, who had been in the Pacific ever since the early days of thewar.
Because the Eighth U.S. Army was scheduled to operate in thewake of the Sixth U.S. Army in a mopping-up role, Colonel Rice directed hismedical supply officer, Maj. (later Lt. Col.) Albert E. Minns, Jr., MAC, to makeimmediate contact with the Sixth U.S. Army medical supply officers to gain theadvantage of their experience, become acquainted with their modus operandi andthe status of medical supplies, and to assure that a cooperative spiritprevailed from the beginning. The first meeting with the medical supplypersonnel of Sixth U.S. Army headquarters resulted in the establishment of thevery finest of working relationships which was to last throughout the war.
The Medical Supply Division, Eighth U.S. Army, consisted oftwo officers, one warrant officer, and three enlisted men. Normal methods ofobtaining supplies, when a unit was preparing for an operation, were usuallysufficient, but there were always urgent appeals for items that had been lost inshipment, destroyed by enemy action, broken in normal usage, or forgotten in thepreparation to move out. Movements of this kind were followed by immediateresupply action.
Colonel Rice, before being designated Surgeon, Eighth U.S.Army, was adviser on medical matters in the G-4 section of General Headquarters.He was thus familiar with the peculiarities and problems of logistics. He hadseen at firsthand how fast action could reduce or, in some instances, eliminatesuffering and, in general, was acquainted with the medical supply situation. Heknew that emergencies would arise and expected his supply personnel to go toalmost any extreme to deal with them. This was both medical supply policy andstanding operating procedure for the Eighth U.S. Army.
In practice, when a radio request for medical supplies wasreceived by the Medical Section, Eighth U.S. Army headquarters, one of the twoofficers or the warrant officer would be contacted regardless of the time of dayor night. The procedure from that point was to go to the nearest medical depot,pick up the requested items immediately, tuck them under the arm of one of thesupply personnel, who would hitchhike by air to the nearest airstrip, thensolicit rides by vehicle or small craft to the final destination, and personallydeliver the items requisitioned. The courier usually would have delivered thematerial within a few hours and returned to home base by the means used inmaking the delivery.
10See footnote 8 (1), p. 447.
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Trips to supply points were often dangerous. Sometimes, theplanes were not able to land either because of enemy action or because ofexcessive mud. On some runs, due to the exigency of the need for the item beingdelivered, the pilot would make a pass over the unit and the items would bedropped in the unit's front yard. Official statistics do not show thetremendous amounts moved forward in that manner.11
CHANGES IN THEATER SUPPLY PROCEDURES
Distribution Functions
In early 1944, a major change took place in supply procedure inServices of Supply whereby all distribution functions of all services werelumped together into two operating field agencies known as DistributionDivision, Headquarters, USASOS, at Sydney, under command of Lt. Col. John D.Blair, MC, and the Distribution Division, Branch A, at Milne Bay, with Capt.Leonard H. Kolb, MC, in command. In each of these, a medical section wasassigned under the supervision of well-qualified medical supply officers. As forthe medical supply division, this change was a crippling one, resulting in neardisaster. The establishment of the new system definitely hindered and playedhavoc with the medical supply system.
The mission of the Distribution Division was to establishschedules to assure the movement of supplies and equipment from the UnitedStates and from Australia to New Guinea in accordance with requirements, effectdistribution of supplies and equipment to maintain prescribed theater levels andbalanced stocks for the theater as a whole, control receipts and shipments toassure proper distribution between Australia and New Guinea and between basesections in Australia, requisition on the United States or Director ofProcurement for supplies and equipment to maintain prescribed theater levels,and prepare status of supply reports required by the Commanding General, USASOS.
Distribution Branch A had a mission to establish schedules toassure movements of supplies and equipment between bases forward of theAustralian mainland in accordance with requirements; to effect distribution ofsupplies and equipment to maintain prescribed levels and balanced stocks inbases forward of the Australian mainland; and to forward requisitions forcritical and controlled items to Headquarters, USASOS, and to the Director ofDistribution, for all other supplies and equipment to maintain prescribedlevels, provided such requisitions were not filled from bases forward of theAustralian mainland. The concern for strict uniformity in all services resultedin "hitching racehorses to mules." One of the semiannual medicalrequisitions was delayed over 2 months lying around or being passed from one toanother and then finally returned for complete retyping to furnish extra copiesfor each
11(1) Quarterly Reports, Eighth U.S. Army, June-December 1944. (2) See footnote 8(3), p. 447. (3) Minns, Albert E., Jr.: Medical Supply, United States Eighth Army: New Guinea to Japan. [Official record.]
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division. This created very serious and almost disastrousshortages later in 1944.
In New Guinea, the situation was even worse. DistributionBranch A at Milne Bay was again merely another echelon, another obstacle in theheadquarters maze. Requisitions from units bounced around from subbases, tobases, to Intersection headquarters, to Distribution Branch A, to the Australianmainland to the Distribution Division, and back again through the same tortuouscycle. It was a wonder the consumers ever got anything at all.
U.S. Army Services of Supply General Depot
In late 1944, still another agency was created on top of all theothers, the USASOS General Depot, whose mission was to adjust maintenancefactors, control theater stock levels, and prepare requisitions on the UnitedStates. All the technical services were represented in this agency. There werenow two completely independent agencies involved in stock control in thetheater, one for intratheater (Distribution Division) and one for control oftheater levels and requisitioning from the United States (USASOS General Depot).It was intended that the latter would eventually become a true depot,responsible for the actual physical handling of supplies.
With the creation of these two agencies, the Chief of MedicalSupply, USASOS, virtually ceased to have operating functions. All phases ofstock control, including control over critical items, were now out of his hands.Even planning for future operations was done by one or the other of the twosupply agencies.
The USASOS General Depot, an independent agency, didaccomplish one useful purpose. A detailed study was initiated on maintenancefactors. By the end of 1944, approximately 700 items had been studied andfactors revised with very encouraging results later. Replacement factor studieswere placed on a continuing basis to further modify the existing factors asapplied to actual consumption in the Southwest Pacific Area.12
NEW GEORGIA CAMPAIGN
Planning the Assault
The initial medical supply plan for the New Georgia operation,scheduled to begin in June 1943, was a joint responsibility of the 43d InfantryDivision and the Navy Task Force. The XIV Corps, on Guadalcanal, was chargedwith the responsibility for furnishing the necessary medical supplies for theoperation, but had no part in the planning.
The original plan provided that complete TBA equipment wouldbe on hand, plus such additional non-TBA equipment as was deemed necessary forthe operation. Sixty days' medical maintenance supplies were to be available,30 days' supply to be carried by units, with the remainder in division reserve
12See footnote 5(1), p. 444.
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to be forwarded as soon as practicable. It was also plannedthat a 60-day level of medical maintenance supplies be maintained. Certain vitalsupplies, such as sulfonamide drugs, dried blood plasma, intravenous saline,glucose solutions, battle dressings, morphine Syrettes, and other items whichwere expected to be expended at an abnormally high rate, were to be supplied inamounts 10 times the normal maintenance allowances. Individual jungle kits wereto be supplied on the basis of one per officer and medical department soldierand one per four nonmedics. Antimalarial drugs were to be supplied for 60 daysand maintained at that level.
The Surgeon, XIV Corps, reported that duplication ofrequisitions resulted from an attempt to secure medical supplies in excess ofanticipated needs. Supplies came not only from Guadalcanal, but some were alsosent directly to the 43d Division from the rear. This procedure resulted in lastminute confusion because of the all-out effort to fill all reasonable requestsfor supplies. Supplies were not issued according to actual needs, but on a basisof taking all that could be made available.
Problems of Supply Distribution
Because estimates of cubage and tonnage were made on the basisof days of supplies rather than actual stocks on hand, units arrived on thebeaches with more impedimenta than could be accommodated on assigned watertransportation. Many supplies were left on the beaches to follow at a laterdate. The bulk of critically needed items did not accompany troops on theirinitial move. Only a 10-day medical maintenance supply actually accompaniedunits instead of the usual 30-day, and these were hopelessly mixed with rations,fuel, and ammunition. Radiographic requests for additional medical supplies tookalmost 3 days to reach Guadalcanal. Emergency shipments had to be flown to NewGeorgia.
The division medical supply officer, left at the RussellIslands to service the garrison there and other small garrisons at Wickham, Viru,and Segi, finally came in on his own initiative, but brought with him none ofthe 75 tons of supplies stored on the Russells. These were finally sent on 5August 1943. In the meantime, a 30-day medical maintenance allowance had beensent from Guadalcanal. Despite the obvious mishandling of supplies, medicalservice of the 43d Division was not impaired.
It was learned in this operation that a definite supply levelmust be established and maintained, but without any excess that might hampermovement. Containers must be properly marked to show quantity and nature ofcontents and critical items must be separated and left in the hands of medicaldepartment personnel. A medical supply dump had to be established under adequatesupervision with a central location for reserve supplies. Sufficient personnelto handle supplies properly was also a necessity.13
13See footnote 1(3), p. 432.
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MAP 38.-Medical supply in the New Georgiacampaign, 5 September 1943.
Medical Supply Support in the Field
The 17th Field Hospital, which arrived on New Georgia on 4September 1943, after the island was secured, found that it was short of littersand biologicals and, upon request, received a medical maintenance unit withallowances for 5,000 men for 30 days from Guadalcanal. Until the medical depotwas established by an advance section of the 23d Medical Depot on 8 September,the 17th Field Hospital served as the storage and distribution point for corpsmedical supplies (map 38). These supplies, consisting of biologicals, litters,antimalarial drugs, and various insecticides, were then transferred to the depotand, along with the 30 days' supply brought by the depot unit, provided thesource of supplies for all Army units at the base. When the 37th InfantryDivision moved to the rear, they were instructed by the Surgeon, XIV Corps, toturn in all surplus medical supplies and unserviceable equipment to the 23d
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Medical Depot. This obviated the possibility that manysupplies might be discarded and scattered. As the units moved out, approximately30 tons of supplies, many critical items, were turned in.14
ALEUTIAN ISLANDS CAMPAIGN
While the Japanese offensive in the South and SouthwestPacific was being contained in New Guinea and the Solomons, the Japanese, whohad moved into the Aleutians15in the summer and fall of 1942 andoccupied Kiska and Attu, were posing a threat to the Alaskan mainland.
On 1 April 1943, a joint directive from Commander in Chief,Pacific, and Commanding General, Western Defense Command, ordered theelimination of the Japanese and the occupation of Attu. Directives were issuedto organize a joint Army and Navy force, under overall Navy command. The nucleusof the Army component was to be the 7th Infantry Division.
Planning the Assault on Attu
Late in March 1943, Maj. (later Col.) Laurence A. Potter, MC,Commander, 7th Division Medical Battalion, was recalled from a training exerciseaboard ship off San Diego, and returned to the home station of the division,Fort Ord, Calif. Upon arrival, he (in private session with the commandinggeneral of the division) was informed that he was to become Surgeon, 7thInfantry Division; that the division would form an independent task force forthe recapture of Attu from the Japanese; that he, the surgeon, would goimmediately to Headquarters, Fourth U.S. Army, in San Francisco, to plan themedical support, and prepare and submit requisitions to assure that the flow ofsupplies and equipment to the docks would begin in less than 10 days; that hecould take no one from the medical service of the division with him, nor couldhe discuss with any medical service person in the division the mission or any ofits requirements. Neither the medical supply officer, Capt. (later Lt. Col.)Leland H. Barton, MAC, nor his assistant, Capt. Horace D. Worley, MAC, was to beinformed in any way of the mission.
Colonel Potter, Surgeon, 7th Infantry Division, acting as hisown medical supply officer, proceeded to Headquarters, Fourth U.S. Army, and wasbriefed further with other division staff officers similarly restricted. Afterthe general briefing, he was briefed separately by the Surgeon, Fourth U.S.Army. With the able assistance of members of the Fourth U.S. Army surgeon'soffice and in particular of Lt. Col. Bernard N. Riordan, MAC, 175 separaterequisitions were prepared and submitted to the San Francisco Medical Depot in36
14(1) Annual Report, 17th Field Hospital, SouthPacific Area, 1943. (2) See footnote 1(3). p. 432.
15This section on medical support in the Aleutian IslandsCampaign and on support of the Alaskan Garrison is based on the following documents: (1)Annual Report, Medical Department Activities, 7th Infantry Division, 7 Jan. 1944. (2) McNeil,Gordon H.: History of the Medical Department in Alaska in World War II. [Official record.] (3)Annual Report, Surgeon, Alaska Defense Command, 1942. (4) Annual Reports, Surgeon, AlaskaDepartment, 1943 and 1944. (5) Personal recollections of Lt. Col. Laurence A. Potter, MC,Surgeon, 7th Infantry Division.
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hours. A separate requisition was prepared for each stage ofunloading of each ship carrying Army troops and Army cargo. Each attacktransport was combat loaded for sequential discharge of a fighting force and itssupporting elements, composed of battalion landing teams.
The medical supplies for the 15,000-man task force weredivided into two 3-month groups. One group of supplies was carried on two cargoships, and the other group was carried on the personnel and cargo carriers tosupply units as they landed and progressed inland. They were divided into threeelements for progressive discharge, 15 days carried by the units going ashore,15 days for early unloading, and 60 days for late discharge.
The two field hospitals that provided hospitalization forthe task force were non-TOE outfits, each short on equipment because there hadbeen no time to supply all needed items before departure. Plans for the properdisposition of supplies and equipment were not discussed in detail until thetask force was aboard ship and underway.
Supply Support of the Attu Landings
On 4 May 1943, the invasion force left Cold Bay, landing attwo widely separated points on Attu in a dense fog on 11 May after several days'delay because of bad weather. For the entire 21-day period required to securethe island, it was necessary to provide medical supplies separately for each ofthese two combat elements. The central supply base was with the headquarterssection of the organic medical battalion, whose supply officer served both thebattalion and the division. All medical supplies received during the 7thDivision's 4-month stay on Attu were in the form of medical maintenance units(fig. 117).
Supply Operations on Attu
In the initial stages of the operation on Attu, all equipmentand supplies had to be hand-carried inland (map 39). Chests and rucksacks werenecessarily left behind, to be brought forward by returning litter bearers asresupply. Much of the equipment, of course, would have been useless in anyevent, as tents drew enemy fire.
Because of the rugged terrain of Attu, rising sharply out ofgluey mud, medical supply of the infantry battalions was extremely difficult andhazardous. Eventually, bulldozers were able to peel tundra down to the volcanicgravel of the island and provide a trail over which heavy trailers and sledscould be pulled for the movement of supplies (fig. 118).
Scheduled medical maintenance units arrived soon after theinitial assault and were used to support the 400-bed semipermanent hospital forthe garrison and preparations being made for the Kiska operation.
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FIGURE 117.-Supplies piled on the beach atAttu, AleutianIslands, 20 May 1943.
Medical Supply for the Kiska Assault
While the Attu operation was still in progress,planning began for the invasion of the neighboring island of Kiska. In lateApril 1943, units of the 7th Infantry Division which had not participated in theAttu operation were joined at Adak with the 13th Canadian Infantry Brigade, the17th Infantry Regiment, and the 53d Infantry Regiment (Composite) of the AlaskaDefense Command.
One of the important features of the training program, bothat Fort Ord and later at Adak, was the emphasis given to the lessons learned atAttu. Reports and other material from Attu were made available, and the adviceof those who had participated in that battle was eagerly sought.
To provide support for the battalion landing groups, themedical service force of 3,000 men was decentralized and divided to make eachlanding group medically self-sufficient and self-sustaining. Clearing stationsand field hospitals were to be set up initially in the vicinity of the beach,and the initial 3-day supply for all but field hospital units was to bebackpacked ashore in rucksacks and on packboards, with additional supplies andorganizational equipment combat loaded for early debarkation. Individual medicalkits were expanded, with each officer carrying two pouches, in one of which wasa unit of dried plasma. A 30-day maintenance supply was combat loaded on each
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MAP 39.-Medical supply support in the Attu campaign, 4 May1943.
transport ship, and, in addition, a 60-day maintenance supplywas loaded on cargo vessels. A medical supply dump was to be established on eachbeach to handle these supplies (map 40).
It was considered a possibility that isolated units whichmight not have the services of a medical officer would need emergency medicalsupplies. To meet such an eventuality, 58 medical parachute packs were prepared,packed in 5-gallon milk cans, and turned over to the Air Forces for deliverywhen necessary. Each pack contained morphine tartrate Syrettes, heat pads andrefills, large and small first aid dressings, gauze bandage, muslin bandage,adhesive plaster, paregoric tablets, pentobarbital sodium capsules,sulfanilamide crystals, and a brief list of instructions.
Operational plans for the assault called for the unloading ofall types of supplies for the various branches of the Air Forces as rapidly aspossible, in view of the possibility that the ships might suddenly have to leavethe island. Large dumps of supplies, indiscriminately mixed, soon piled up onthe narrow, muddy beaches. Segregation of organizational equipment had beenplanned, but the system did not work. It became practically impossible to findmuch of the necessary equipment for the field hospitals, as all kinds oforganizational supplies and equipment had been dumped on the beaches.
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FIGURE 118.-Tractor bogged down in mud at Massacre Bay, Attu, 16 May 1943.
In one instance, it took 2 days to locate certain hospitalequipment, which it was then possible to move by Caterpillar tractor only as faras an intervening creek. From that point, it had to be manhandled another 450 or500 yards and finally hauled up a 50-foot embankment by rope.
The problems of gathering and properly caring for the widelydispersed medical supplies were numerous. A large number of medical maintenanceunits had been landed at North Beach, Gertrude Cove, and Kiska Harbor inaddition to the other beaches. The almost complete lack of transportation hadcomplicated the problem from the beginning, and tons of heavy equipment had tobe moved by hand. The establishment of medical supply dumps in the main camp andin the Gertrude Cove area was handicapped by a shortage of lumber and cover, aswell as a shortage of trained personnel (map 39). The organizational equipmentof the field hospitals and of the Canadian and American medical units had to beretrieved and cared for by the Air Forces medical supply officer. Poorly markedand packed equipment added further complications, along with the largeamount of pilfering which occurred. Further, the medical supply dump was movedfour times on orders from higher authority before it was permanently located.
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MAP 40.-Medical supply onKiska.
ALASKAN GARRISON, 1943-44
Problems of Supply Organization
The surgeon of the Alaskan theater, who was responsible formedical supply, was handicapped in his operation because he had to comply withthe policies and procedures of three levels of command in addition to his own: the War Department, The Surgeon General, and the OverseasSupply Branch, Seattle Port of Embarkation.16
The necessity to function from one end of the territory ofAttu, which is 3,201 air miles from Seattle by way of Fort Richardson, toAnnette Island, 702 miles from Seattle, was also a distinct handicap. Despitethe central location of Fort Richardson, the distance to the more remote postswas formidable.
This isolation of posts made it sometimes impossible to maintain the required quarterly and weekly reports on medical supply. An inventory of all medical supplies and equipment on hand as of 31 December 1942 was ordered by the theater surgeon in an effort to obtain an up-to-date and accu-
16See footnote 15, p. 459.
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rate picture of the status of supplies in the command, and toprovide the supply agencies in the United States with the required and pertinentinformation.
Supply Procedures
Initial requisitions for equipping a new station hospitalwere prepared and submitted by the Surgeon, Alaska Defense Command, or by ahigher echelon of command which had assumed responsibility for the supply of theinitial troop movement. In most instances, the Overseas Supply Branch, SeattlePort of Embarkation, acting on the recommendation of the Surgeon and availableinformation concerning the strength of new stations and the plans forhospitalization, initiated the necessary requisitions for equipment andsupplies, including medical maintenance units to provide a sufficient margin ofmaintenance for isolated Alaskan posts. Beginning in 1943, control over thisinitial planning passed into the hands of the theater surgeon, who assumed theresponsibility for the medical equipment and supplies for the new stationsestablished during that year.
In the early period, the function of the theater surgeon inthe maintenance of adequate resupply was limited. By means of the medicalmaintenance unit, automatic shipment was made by the Seattle Port of Embarkationto each of the stations in Alaska from the summer of 1942 until November 1943.It was then discontinued on the recommendation of the theater surgeon becauseoperating conditions made a requisition system more desirable and possible. Thesurgeon, however, had stated: "Without this Unit it remains doubtfulwhether medical supplies would have been on hand at the critical time."
Requisitions submitted for supplies in excess or not suppliedby medical maintenance units received a preliminary editing in the surgeon'soffice and were then forwarded to the Seattle Port of Embarkation for furtherediting or submitted to The Surgeon General for a final decision. The theatersurgeon in editing requisitions followed a policy of limiting specialrequisitions according to existing conditions.
Levels of Supply
On 4 August 1943, new supply levels were authorized. Group I(for easily accessible stations) was set at 30 days' operating, 60 days'reserve; group II (the majority of Alaskan stations), 30 days'operating, and 180 days' reserve; and group III (icebound), 270 days'operating and 180 days' reserve. Subsequent changes were made in theselevels to reduce the prescribed figures as supply procedures became moreregular. On 30 December 1944, the following levels for classes II and IVsupplies were announced: Nome and Galena (icebound), 300 days; Shemya Island(inadequate harbor facilities), 210 days; and for all other stations, 105 days.
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FIGURE 119.-Arctic first aid kit.
Experimenting With Medical Supplies
The Experimental Board, Alaskan Department, which had beenestablished during 1941 to conduct tests during maneuvers, conducted experimentsto determine the appropriate items to be contained in chests and kitsneeded by small detachments. These kits when developed were confirmed by theiruse in the 1944 maneuvers (fig. 119).
To determine the effects of freezing on common medicalsupplies, an extensive test was conducted in February 1943. Eighty-nine items,mostly Medical Catalog classes 1 and 9, were subjected to a temperature of -20?F., and then thawed and examined for any changes. Many of the itemssuffered no ill effects although frozen solid. For example, 50 units of bloodplasma were subjected to freezing temperatures and the distilled water wasfrozen solid in the bottles. Only a very few bottles were cracked and, althoughthe rubber stoppers were raised about 1/8 inch, no seals were broken.There was no precipitation or other obvious change in the appearance of thedistilled
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water. Another test with medical supply implications showedthat the batteries for medical instruments froze and became useless when exposedto the extremely low temperatures.
The Deemphasis and Closing Down of the Alaskan Theater
After the elimination of the Japanese from the Aleutians, theWar Department ordered a drastic reduction in the command from a peak strengthof 147,000 in 1943 to approximately 50,000 by the end of 1944. Of the 34 postsactivated during the period 1940-43, only 11 posts were large enough to havestation hospitals. This introduced the problems peculiar to closinginstallations, packing and crating, and disposition of excesses in the wake of a reduced strength. At the outset, stations shipped surpluses directly to theZone of Interior, but it was found more proficient to have the stations reporttheir surpluses by radio to the surgeon at Fort Richardson. Thereafter, reportswere screened for lateral distribution before the surgeon reported the items tothe Zone of Interior as surplus.
BOUGAINVILLE CAMPAIGN
Planning the Campaign
While the Japanese were being driven from theAleutians, thus removing the threat to the Alaskan mainland, American forcesmoved on Bougainville, the largest and most northerly island of the Solomonsgroup. The invasion was launched on 1 November 1943 by the 3d MarineDivision. A week later, the first elements of the 37th Infantry Division joinedthe battle, which became exclusively an Army affair when the Americal Divisionrelieved the Marines in the latter part of December. Supply support for the 37thDivision was carefully planned on the basis of that unit's own experience inthe New Georgia campaign. Each element was supplied with 10 days'maintenance, including special items required by local conditions, so that eachwould be self-sustaining. Nondivisional units, although they requested manyitems of medical supply, received only those that did not interfere with the37th Division supply needs.
Supply of Replacement Units
The Americal Division arrived on Bougainville in 1943 with a90-day supply of medical items (fig. 120). A 30-day supply was carried by eachinfantry combat team, and a 30-day supply for the entire division wasbrought in with the division medical supply of the medical battalion (map 41).
Since it was generally difficult to obtain emergency medicalsupplies by air from Guadalcanal, certain items believed to be mostvaluable were added to the equipment of the clearing company. Most importantwere the autoclaves, anesthesia machines, aspirator, laryngoscopes, X-rayequipment, demountable fracture table, laboratory incubator, and refrigerator.
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By February 1944, the medical maintenance unit method of supply had beenreplaced by the requisition from the service command.
Because of last minute loading, schedule changes resulted in leaving muchequipment and medical supplies at the staging areas. When these supplies weremost needed at the time of landing, they were not available.Base medical supply in the combat area was not set up for 2 or 3 months afterthe beginning of the operation.17
CENTRAL PACIFIC AREA
Early in 1943, following a period of rebuilding and expansion, the HawaiianDepartment became a huge staging area for a number of infantry divisions which would later participate in numerous assaults on strategicPacific islands. On 14 August 1943, the Hawaiian Department, previously expandedto include Midway, Christmas, and Canton Islands, was redesignated the CentralPacific Area.
17See footnote 1(3), p. 432.
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MAP 41.-Medical supply support of the Bougainville campaign,1943.
Supply Support of Operation GALVANIC
The Gilbert Islands, located approximately 2,400 miles west of the island ofOahu, were chosen as the target for the first assault launched in themid-Pacific.
The 27th Infantry Division, in this joint Army, Navy, and Marine Corpsoperation, was given the objective of assaulting Makin Atoll on 15 November1943. In this amphibious assault, the most essential medical supplies were removedfrom Medical Department chests, packed in canvas containers, and
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MAP 42.-Operations in the mid-Pacific, 1943-44.
carried on the backs of medical personnel. The battalion aidstation operated for about 5 hours, using the supplies contained in these canvasbags before more supplies became available in quantity.
Supplies and equipment were also carried in jeeps equippedwith litter frames, which had been priority loaded in the holds of the ships.Equipment sufficient for a 50-bed clearing station had been loaded for eachclearing platoon. Extra instruments, cots, blankets, an electric portablesuction apparatus powered by a small generator, and an 8-cu. ft. kerosenerefrigerator, as well as supplies for 10 days based on a 20-percent casualtyrate, made up the equipment.
This equipment was successfully unloaded on one of theassault beaches. It was followed by medical maintenance units, divided into 10-dayand 20-day increments packed in special boxes not weighing over 100 pounds, sothey could be easily handled. By D+4, supplies were collected and brought inlandto a central dump at Hen Village. Resupply was in two sections, each a crosssection of a medical maintenance unit. Three 10-day cross sections, one for eachbattalion landing team, were carried on the ships with the troops andturned over to the battalion supply officers upon landing. Two 15-daycross sections, loaded on two different ships, remained in division control uponlanding (map 42).18
18(1) See footnote 1(3), p. 432. (2) AnnualReport, Surgeon, 27th Infantry Division, 1944. (3) Essential Technical Medical Data, United States ArmyForces in the Central Pacific Area, for February 1944, dated 5 Mar. 1944.Inclosure 1, subject: Medical Service in Amphibious Operations.
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Support of the Marshalls Campaign
After the successful invasion and capture of Makin andTarawa in the Gilbert Islands, attention was focused in January 1944 on theMarshall Islands. Kwajalein, the largest of 80 islands and islets, was thetarget for a combined Army and Marine assault. The 7th Infantry Division,veteran of the Aleutian Islands Campaign, was assigned the responsibility ofcapturing the southern half of Kwajalein Atoll and also Majuro.
As they did in the assault on the Gilbert Islands (OperationGALVANIC), medical personnel carried most of the essential supplies on theirbacks. Among the successfully used carrying devices were rucksacks, waterproofedstandard packboards, and BAR (battery acquisition radar) belts.
Medical sections were supplied varying amounts of plasmaaccording to their projected needs. A total number of 1,156 units was carried bythe task force. In addition, 1,000 morphine tartrate Syrettes were issued tomedical personnel with each company aidman carrying 10 (map 42).
Platoons of the clearing company embarked separately, eachwith a battalion landing team. Each clearing platoon carried 20 litters, 2blankets, 1 splint set, and 9 waterproofed boxes containing medical supplies,additional blankets, cots, and an electric portable suction machine. An electricrefrigerator and other valuable pieces of equipment were carried by eachclearing platoon to establish an effective surgical unit and, if necessary, a200-bed hospital.
Medical maintenance for the assault forces consisted of anaccompanying shipment of 30 days' supply divided into two lots, one for 10days and one for 20 days, both loaded for the assault. These units came ashorein excellent condition because of the care taken in packing boxes and in usingwaterproof paper and pallets. The medical maintenance unit for the resupply ofthe assault forces consisted of an accompanying shipment of 30 days' supplywhich was divided into ten 10-day lots, each of which accompanied a battalionlanding team and division artillery. The 20-day lot for medical detachments andhospital units was subdivided into two units of 10 days each for 7,500 men. Allnonessential items were eliminated from these supplies, which were packed in 18-and 22- by 30-inch boxes and palletized.
Nine shore parties, assigned to the 7th Infantry Division tohandle combat supplies, began functioning on the Kwajalein beaches on 1 February1944, D+1. Resupply of aid stations was successfully accomplished by ambulancesand litter bearers who brought up supplies on their return from the rear.Because of this system, medical maintenance units did not have to be used in theearly stages of the operation.
The addition of blood transfusion equipment in the clearingcompany saved many lives. It was noted that advance medical units should carryL-splints in place of Thomas splints, one jet Coleman gas-burning stove,tarpaulins, and at least 18 litters and blankets. It was also recommended thatmore refined gauze compresses be used in lieu of the smaller Carlisle dressings.
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Waterproofing was found to be most essential in thepreservation of supplies and equipment.
After the successful elimination of the Japanese fromKwajalein, field supplies left by tactical units were used for some time. Anexcess of supplies was experienced in the 31st Field Hospital and also in the1st Station Hospital. Supplies were issued regularly every Tuesday except foremergency supplies which were issued as requested. To offset the deteriorationof supplies caused by salt water spray, rain, and high winds, a program oflubrication and protection of surgical instruments was established. A medicalsupply subdepot was established at Provisional Station Hospital No. 2 withdirect support coming from the 5th Medical Supply Depot in Hawaii.19
Medical Supply Activities on Eniwetok
The assault on Eniwetok, essentially a Marine operation,began on 17 February 1944 (map 42). Elements of the 106th Regimental Combat Teamof the 27th Infantry Division supported the Marines and were instrumental in thecapture of Eniwetok Island itself.
All medical units of the 106th Regimental Combat Team carriedplasma, battle dressings, morphine Syrettes, and sulfanilamide powder. Theprovisional portable surgical hospital was equipped with instrument sets, aportable electric suction machine, a portable orthopedic table, operating lamps,a 1?-kilowatt electric power unit, and a complete set of blood transfusionapparatus. Its clearing company carried enough extra equipment to care for 400patients.
The collecting platoons and battalion medical sectionscarried their essential supplies with them when they landed. Resupply of aidstations was through the regimental aid station using a battalion landing teammedical maintenance unit, and by property exchange with the collecting platoonsand the naval beach party in the early days of the operation, avoidingembarrassment which might have occurred because of delays in the landing ofsupplies.
Each battalion landing team carried a 7-day medicalmaintenance unit in the assault personnel carrier, and a 30-day unit, all boxedand palletized, was on the cargo vessel. As a result of this and previousoperations, the medical maintenance unit was streamlined and a standard speciallist of equipment was developed by the Central Pacific Base Command consistingof items in excess of TOE's that would be needed to support a particularoperation. These lists served to standardize authorizations for requisitioningmaterials and were subject to modifications as experience dictated.
Modification of the medical pouch by better waterproofing andenlarging was recommended after the Eniwetok campaign. The subsequent adoptionof this modification made it unnecessary to carry the 3-day medical supply ofplasma, sulfanilamide dressings, and morphine previously required.20
19(1) See footnote 1(3), p. 432. (2) Report, Surgeon,7th Infantry Division, to the Surgeon, United States Army in the CentralPacific Area, 27 Mar. 1944, subject: Medical Report, 7th Infantry Division,Reinforced, "Flintlock" Operations. (3) Annual Report, Army GarrisonForces, Kwajalein, 1944.
20See footnote 1(3), p. 432.
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Medical Supplies for Operation FORAGER
The strategically placed Marianas Islands were selected asthe next U.S. target in the mid-Pacific. An attack force consisting of the 2dand 4th Marine Divisions, backed up by the 27th Infantry Division, landed onSaipan Island on 15 June, covered by units of the U.S. Fifth Fleet. Theintensity of the fighting brought the 27th into action earlier than anticipated.
Medical supplies for the assault either were carried inwaterproofed bags on the backs of aid personnel, or were loaded on jeeps withlitter frames. Supplies for the second echelon medical personnel were priorityloaded on ?-ton trucks, which were unloaded first, and 2?-tontrucks for the hospitalization units, or palletized in 2- by 2- by 3-foot boxeswhich had been loaded as broken stowage (fig. 121).
To facilitate handling, supply items were further dividedinto groups "A" and "B." The "A" groupconsisted of items needed initially by a battalion surgeon or a collectingstation. This group, because it would be rapidly consumed, was given highpriority in both loading and unloading. The "B" group consisted ofitems needed primarily by hospitalization units and would probably not be neededfor at least 72 hours. This group required only normal unloading. Packing listswere given to each medical officer, and each box was numbered in the event thatthe pallets were unloaded on the wrong beaches.21
Special items to be used in Operation FORAGER were preparedby the Surgeon's Office, Central Pacific Area. Jungle kits for all Armyassault forces and pack equipment for medical assault elements were approved foruse.
All units carried a 10-day medical supply, and the fieldhospital carried an additional 20 days' maintenance. Supplies for the 27thInfantry Division were so packed that 10 days' supply would land with theassault forces and 20 days' supply would be delivered later to serviceechelons of the divisions for issue to units in the field. Each first and secondechelon medical unit carried organically a 1-day reserve of certain rapidlyexpendable items, such as plasma, morphine Syrettes, and first aid dressings.The clearing company carried a 3-day reserve so that resupply would not benecessary immediately when the division would be operating from dumps along theshore.
Equipment other than the initial combat equipment, whichgenerally proved to be adequate, was landed between 48 and 72 hours after thehospitalization platoons. Combat-loaded 2?-ton and ?-tontrucks, landed a few hours after the combat troops, in some instances lost 5 to10 percent of the major items of equipment either in transit or on the beaches.The late landing and slow procurement of organizational equipment and suppliescreated a heavy initial demand on division maintenance supplies and so depletedthe stock of certain items that they had to be drawn from the garrison forces.
Resupply to the Marianas was placed in action by 20 June andwas accomplished by automatic block shipments consisting of 3,000-men, 30-day
21See footnote 1(3), p. 432.
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FIGURE 121.-Medical supply dump onSaipan.
maintenance units, modified from time to time according tothe requests of the island surgeon for Saipan. Emergency resupply was on airshipment by emergency requisition.
Medical resupply in first and second echelon units waseffected by request through channels from battalion aid stations to thecollecting stations, to the clearing stations, to the division medical supplydump, or, in some instances, to the field hospitals. The supplies were thenbrought forward by ambulances returning from the rear. Because the activities ofthe regimental aid stations were limited, they were able to replenish suppliesof battalion aid stations. The portable surgical hospitals were resupplied bythe organization to which they were attached.
Only once when property exchange between the hospitals ashoreand the hospital ships faltered did this method of resupply break down. Littersand blankets often remained too long with the dead at the cemetery, and when aheavy volume of casualties drained the supply of litters and blankets, thesebecame the most critical items of supply. Patients had to be evacuated inmakeshift litters. The shortage was corrected several days later when the volumeof casualties decreased and the litters from cemeteries were reissued.
Shortages of intravenous sets, whole blood, X-ray machines,generators,
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and washing machines were notable. Salt water and highhumidity rendered generators and X-ray machines useless.
The organizational equipment of a 400-bed field hospital wasnot sufficient when it had to be expanded to 900 beds. On the other hand, theclearing company found itself overburdened with supplies and understaffed withpersonnel in many instances. Because of this situation, most of its equipmentand supplies had to be left at a beach dump.
The medical supply officer of the Army Garrison Force, Saipan,arrived on D+10 and set forth with his medical supply sergeant, who had arrivedearlier, to comb the beaches for scattered supplies. By 27 June, supplies hadbeen accumulated at the temporary dump and were issued to troops.
To alleviate the shortage of personnel, eight men fromvarious detachments were assigned to the Army Garrison Force Depot. Troops of amedical sanitary company were used as stevedores.
Early in July, the supply dump was moved to its permanentlocation at Magicienne Bay where supplies were stacked on dunnage and covered by atarpaulin. Some time later, a frame building was constructedfor use as a narcotic vault.
Supply activities of the Army Garrison Force Depot includedthe salvaging and issue to civilians of captured Japanese medical supplies, therehabilitation of the 27th Division before departure from Saipan, aiding the77th Division before departure from Guam, and processing requisitions from Guam,Tinian, and later Angaur, Peleliu Island, and Ulithi.
After Saipan, the next target was Guam, where the assaultunits, the 3d Marine Division and the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade, weresupported by the 77th Infantry Division. In the Guam landings, quantities ofmedical equipment and supplies, including a large number of cots, were lost. Asa result, the sick and wounded had to be placed on the ground. Much equipmentwas water-soaked and broken in the initial assault which occurred on 21 July1944, less than 1 week after Saipan. Because of the barrier reef and deep water,difficulty in landing and unloading supplies was experienced. Despite initialproblems, the type and amount of medical supplies on hand for the operation wasadequate.
The capture of Tinian, the sister island of Saipan, was thethird phase of Operation FORAGER. The Northern Attack Force, composed of the 2dand 4th Marine Divisions and elements of the 27th Infantry Division, launchedthe attack on 24 July.
As Tinian was close to Saipan, casualties were shippeddirectly to Saipan with LST's serving as hospital ships. Approximately 2,400beds were made available on Saipan for the Tinian campaign. The only Army unitsthat actually landed on Tinian were one battery from the 106th Field ArtilleryBattalion of the 27th Division Artillery and an engineer battalion. Because ofthe limited Army participation in the Tinian campaign, no drastic supplyproblems were encountered.
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Support for the Palau Campaign
Capture of the Palau Island Group by American forces wasessential to provide a Western Pacific airstrip for operations against theretreating Japanese. Again, as in previous operations, supplies were priorityloaded with the basic load, a 3-day medical supply, being carried in by medicalpersonnel or loaded on jeeps. A floating reserve consisted of a 10-day medicalsupply per each battalion landing team and a 20-day supply loaded aboard ship asbroken stowage.
During the assault on Angaur Island by the 81st InfantryDivision on 17 September, the "weasel" proved impractical as it threwits tracks on the rough terrain. Jeeps were used successfully in movement ofpatients and supplies. The beachmaster directed the unloading of the palletizedsupplies, which were brought ashore in LVT's (tracked landing vehicles), DUKW's(amphibious trucks, 2?-ton cargo), and other landing vehicles. Supplies wereunloaded by hand until cranes were brought ashore sometime later (fig. 122).Medical battalion personnel collected all medical supplies in a central area andmoved them as rapidly as possible to a medical supply dump. Many containers werediscovered broken open and certain items, such as cots, litters, and alcohol,were pilfered. A satisfactory property exchange with the naval beach sectionmade needed dressings, plasma, blankets, and litters available.
Division medical resupply was established on a 30-day basis,palletized, and located according to size of unit and the length of time thesupplies were to last. One pallet weighing a ton supplied 2,000 men for 10 days.Two additional pallets of this size were set up for division special troops andreserve. A 20-day resupply for 7,500 men was set up on four pallets. An extrasix pallets of medical supplies and one pallet of food were carried by eachclearing platoon. Resupply of litters and blankets worked satisfactorily as didthe resupply all down the line.
In this operation, it was evident that there was a need foran additional 2?-ton, 6X6 truck with a 1-ton trailer, one ?-ton truckwith water trailer, and one ?-ton truck. There also was evidencethat salt tablets needed to be kept dry in a waterproof container.
In the Peleliu operation, the 321st Regimental Combat Teamtook only a small amount of supplies with them on the initial assault.Difficulty in unloading cargo from the ships forced the unit to borrow suppliesfrom the Marines. Absence of proper laundering and sterilizing equipmenthandicapped operation in the clearing station until a field sterilizer was sentfrom the 17th Field Hospital.
Owing to the absence of enemy troops on Ulithi Atoll, whichwas seized on 21-22 September, no problems of medical supply were encountered.22
22See footnote 1(3), p. 432.
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FIGURE 122.-Docks at Red Beach,Angaur, showingunloading of supplies, September 1944.
Improvements in Medical Supply
As a result of the experience gained in combat operationsduring 1944, waterproofing and packaging techniques improved, timelycomputations of the total TOE requirements were more thoroughly checked againstdepot stocks, and shortages were submitted as a bill of materials to the WarDepartment for approval. The dispatching of separate requisitions whichreflected the date, place, and time that the approved items would be neededexpedited delivery of the materials to the using units before theirdeployment. Recognizing that the standard medical maintenance unit was notexactly suited for garrison needs, the Central Pacific Base Command in October1944 compiled a modified equipment list, "Annex H Medical Maintenance Unit,Ten Thousand Men, 30 days," which was submitted to the San FranciscoPort of Embarkation for subsequent delivery to advance bases as determined bythe command. In addition, a medical maintenance unit was developed by thecommand to fill the demand for a streamlined block of medical supplies toaccompany small groups of personnel moving to forward bases. By utilizing thesenew medical mainte-
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nance units, medical supplies were dispersed more nearly on aper capita basis.23
Transition to Requisitioning in the Mid-Pacific
Experience resulting from the Marianas and the Palauoperations in mid-1944 revealed that garrison forces were incapable ofpredicting and preparing the necessary requisitions for supply requirementsimmediately subsequent to the termination of automatic supply. This stemmed fromthe fact that resupply requirements had to be initiated at such an early dateafter the islands had been secured that the stock records in force were notaccurate for requisitioning purposes, nor was the medical supply staff oftensufficiently informed of current conditions to enable it to compilerequisitions at such an early date. To circumvent this condition, a plan wasexercised whereby the supply section of the Surgeon's Office, Central PacificBase Command, in consultation with the task force surgeon, prepared initialrequisitions and a phasing schedule before the departure of the garrison force.The items and quantities were based upon past consumption tables prepared in themedical supply section of the Central Pacific Base Command as well as theconsiderations of the task force surgeon.24
VOORHEES MISSION TO THE PACIFIC
Organization of the Survey Team
In the fall of 1944, a survey team headed by Col. Tracy S.Voorhees, JAGD, was sent by the Surgeon General's Office to the Pacificto make a survey of medical supply similar to the one performed in the Europeantheater during February 1944.25
Colonel Voorhees was accompanied by Mr. Charles W. Harris,Deputy Chief of Supply for Storage, Surgeon General's Office, Lt. Col. LouisF. Williams, MSC, and Maj. Gordon S. Kjolsrud, MAC, of the Medical Branch,Overseas Supply Division of the San Francisco Port of Embarkation.
Survey of the Supply Situation in Hawaii
Arriving in Hawaii in early October 1944, the Voorhees teaminspected depots on the islands of Hawaii, Kauai, and Maui and concluded,because of the excellent steamer service from Oahu, the site of the 5th MedicalSupply Depot, that depots and warehouses were not needed on those outer islands.Great excesses and much old stock were stored in these depots following the oldprinciple of dispersion invoked after Pearl Harbor.
23(1) See footnote 1(3), p. 432. (2) Manuscript, coveringmedical supply in the Hawaiian Department, the Central Pacific, and PacificOcean Areas, prepared for a preliminary draft of this volume by Maj. Gen. PaulH. Streit, USA (Ret.), and Lt. Col. Allan W. Phelps, MSC.
24See footnote 23(2), above.
25This section is based on Voorhees, Tracy S.: Story ofPacific Trip, Oct-Dec. 1944. In Colonel Voorhees' personal file.
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To consolidate stocks in the Hawaiian Depot, the Voorheesteam recommended that branch depots on the islands of Hawaii, Kauai, and Maui beclosed and all supplies for the hospitals be requisitioned from the main depoton Oahu.
Two hundred people were engaged in preparing medicalsupplies for expeditions and assembling medical maintenance units which could bedone on the mainland. By closing down this activity, it was hoped that some ofthese people could be used on Saipan, where there was a serious shortage oftrained supply personnel.
The consolidation of the office of the medical supply officerof the Central Pacific Base Command surgeon with the depot was recommended as itwould save much time and personnel involved in preparing the monthly stockreport which would be unnecessary. It was suggested that one officer be mademedical supply officer and commander of the 5th Medical Depot Company.
Supply Problems of the South Pacific
Upon arrival at New Caledonia on 25 October, a survey teamdiscovered a great excess of medical supplies stored in two depots that weremanned by an entire medical depot company. Although some excesses had beenreported to the War Department, the depot was using the Surgeon General'sOffice consumption rates and had failed to develop any of their own.
It appeared that no one from command headquarters hadinspected the depots on Guadalcanal and Esp?ritu Santo in the past 4 to 6 monthsand that excesses similar to those in New Caledonia also existed there.
As a result of the Voorhees survey, it was recommended thatsurpluses discovered in the inventory of stocks be reported to the SurgeonGeneral's Office and nonusable stocks be shipped to the United States. Thiswould reduce the depot workload.
Survey of New Guinea and the Philippines
In the survey of New Guinea which commenced on 7 Novemberwith the landing at Nadzab, New Guinea, the team found that the harbor atHollandia was crowded with ships, many of which were waiting to be unloaded.Delays in requisitioning, caused by red tape, had created a serious shortage ofcertain items. All requisitions from the United States were processed throughthe Distribution Division, then located at Oro Bay, near Buna.
Shortages which existed at the depot at Hollandia were causedby the fact that the depot was not allowed to requisition directly. Therequisitions had to clear through the Distribution Division and G-4 atBrisbane before reaching the depot at San Francisco. The basic weaknessspotted in the supply system of the Southwest Pacific Area was thatrequisitioning was still being conducted on a theaterwide basis although depotswere spread over 2,500 miles. No dependable transportation existed betweenbases, thus handicapping the transfer of supplies. While the three members ofthe survey team went on to Saipan,
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Colonel Voorhees went to Leyte where the supply situationwas "worse than critical" because of poor planning, excessive redtape in the requisitioning process, and the absence of suitable sites for depotsand hospitals.
Because of the discrepancies found in consumption rates inthe Southwest Pacific Area and the South Pacific Base Command, it appeared ofprime importance that the Pacific theaters develop their own specific ratesafter careful study of actual rates for the more active items based upon issueexperience for 1944. This was expected to result in great dividends inconservation of warehousing space, man-hours, and stocks.
Medical Supply Problems on Saipan
The supply team discovered that, because of failure to ordersupplemental items not in the medical maintenance unit in advance, stocks ofcertain items were seriously low on Saipan.
It was also noted that only one medical supply team of 2officers and 20 men was handling the supply situation. At least one medicaldepot company was needed. The available personnel, although doing an exceptionaljob, lacked training in requisitioning.
To relieve this personnel problem on Saipan, it wasrecommended that a medical depot company be sent there to speed up supplyfunctions and implement the necessary consolidation of supplies.
Recommendations for Improved Supply Operations
To avoid the shortage of supplies such as the one whichoccurred on Saipan, the Voorhees mission recommended that the necessary itemsnot included in the medical maintenance units always be requisitioned well inadvance of D-day of any operation. The approving office was encouraged to returna copy of the approved requisition to the ordering unit so that they might knowwhat to expect before it arrived. The practice of back ordering was to bedropped to avoid duplicate requisitions and the keeping of a large number ofunnecessary records.
It was further recommended that no island depot separate fromthe base depot was necessary. Consolidation of depots such as recommended forHawaii and the South Pacific Area would save space as well as personnel and alsowould eliminate the intermediary step in distribution of supplies.
The survey team reported that the chief of the SupplyService, Central Pacific Base Command, should have clear-cut supervisoryresponsibility over medical depot operations, and the depot commander shouldreport directly to him rather than to the surgeon.
To help with stock control and storage methods, it wasrecommended that an experienced depot officer be brought to the theater for 60days.
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Major Changes
Close scrutiny of the total Voorhees mission report revealsfundamentally that the absence of a closely knit medical supply organization hadmagnified some of the problems. The 3,700 miles that separated Hawaii, thesupply base, from the Marianas did not permit a close-knit supply system.
Picking up the concern of many and the necessity for change,the Voorhees mission attempted to unscramble the situation and make a moreproficient operation possible. Virtually all of the mission's recommendationswere accepted and inaugurated, although gradually, as in the development ofbetter storage facilities on Saipan and the arrival of additional supplypersonnel.
To offset the lack of a medical supply officer in the PacificOcean Areas, Maj. (later Lt. Col.) Donald E. Remund, MAC, an expert onwarehousing, was assigned to the Surgeon's Office, Pacific Ocean Areas, asmedical supply officer, but his influences on supply operations were less thanexpected. Because his responsibilities were not fully defined, his dealings withbase commands were largely informal.
With the replacement of Brig. Gen. Edgar King by Brig. Gen.John M. Willis, as Surgeon, Headquarters, Pacific Ocean Areas, it appeared thatthe responsibility of the medical supply officer would increase. General Willisrequested that Colonel Williams, a member of the Voorhees mission, be assignedas medical supply officer.
