CHAPTER XVI
Okinawa and the Occupation of Japan and Korea
SUPPLYING THE OKINAWA OPERATION
Preparation for the Assault
Even though the fighting continued in the Philippine Islandsuntil late June 1945, plans were concurrently being formulated for an assault onthe Ryukyu Islands which guarded the entrance to the home islands of Japan.
The experience gained in previous Pacific operations helpedto augment the tables of organization and equipment of units which would beparticipating in the assault. A listing of medical units and the authorizedequipment, although approved, was not perfect, and it became necessary torequest additional equipment. These items often did not arrive on schedule. Acritical supply problem developed 2 weeks before the Okinawa operation began,when a ship carrying 48,000 requested jungle kits did not appear at Leyte.
Lt. Col. (later Col.) Stephen G. Asbill, VC, Medical SupplyOfficer, Base K (Leyte), having no alternative but to provide the necessary kitsfrom the 34th Medical Depot at Tacloban, was caught short by requirements forthe landing forces going to Lingayen Gulf ahead of schedule. To cover thedeficit, Colonel Asbill arranged for a stock of 70,000 jungle kits to be sentfrom Hollandia to Leyte on a hospital ship.
To support the early landings on Kerema and Okinawa, the baysof six landing ships were equipped with surgical facilities and were staffedwith U.S. Navy surgical teams.1
On 27 March 1945, the XXIV Corps, consisting of the 7th and96th Divisions, and the 77th Division operating separately, left Leyte en routeto the Ryukyus. The 77th seized the Kerema Islands group on 30 and 31 March,after which the 7th and 96th, augmented by the 1st and 6th Marine Divisions,assaulted the western shores of Okinawa on 1 April (fig. 140).2
Medical Supply Functions
Because of adequate planning and preparation by Maj. Stanley W.Bullis, MAC, Medical Supply Officer, XXIV Corps, sufficient tonnage space andsup-
1(1) Action Reports, Ryukyus, Tenth U.S. Army, 26 March-30 June 1945, Vol. 1. (2) Potter, Laurence A.: Preliminary draft manuscript, XXIV Corps. [Official record.]
2(1) See footnote 1(1), above. (2) Quarterly Report, Surgeon, 7th Division, 1945. (3) Quarterly Reports, Surgeon, 96th Division, 1945. (4) For further details on the tactical phases of the Okinawa Campaign, see Appleman, Roy E., Burns, James M., Gugeler, Russell A., and Stevens, John: Okinawa: The Last Battle. United States Army in World War II. The War in the Pacific. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1948, pp. 249-264.
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plies from Leyte were made available to support the medicalsupply aspect of the operation. Four landing ships, medium, assigned to theCorps Surgeon, Col. Laurence A. Potter, MC, were sufficient to move the corpsmedical battalion and corps medical detachments. Adequate tonnage space formedical supplies was set aside on troop transports and on the cargo shipscarrying the hospital elements so necessary for the success of the operation. Asa result, selected medical units in the assault were able to carry 30 days ofsupplies instead of the usual 10.
The 726th Medical Supply Team, which accompanied the assaultunits on L-day (landing day), took over approximately one-half of each unit's30-day supply, and added it to scheduled resupply increments made up of medicalmaintenance blocks which had been loaded in the allotted medical cargo space.These two groups of supplies made up the initial stocks of the corps medicaldump on the beach (map 51).
The 726th, with separate supply detachments supporting the7th and 96th Divisions, remained under XXIV Corps control until 16 April (L+15),when its duties were assumed by the 843d Medical Supply Team. The 726th then setup an Army medical supply dump (fig. 141), in support of the Tenth U.S. Army inits toughest fighting. In the midst of this fighting, the unit was able not onlyto render effective service, but also to construct enough canvas-coveredshelters to protect about 25 percent of its stock.
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MAP 51.-Medical supply points on Okinawa,1945.
When the 53d Medical Depot Company, consisting of 12 officers, 1warrant officer, and 120 enlisted men, arrived on Okinawa on 8 May (L+38), theunit proceeded to take over the major task of supplying the XXIV Corps from adepot established in the village of Kadena near the airport. Here they remaineduntil 20 July when they moved to Naha, Okinawa, and established a more permanentdepot (map 51).
After the 77th Division successfully drove the Japanese fromthe nearby island of Ie Shima, a medical supply detachment of one warrantofficer and three enlisted men went ashore on 17 April and set up a supply dumpon one of the landing beaches. This dump served all personnel of the division onthe island. This detachment remained on the island with the garrison forcekeeping the dump in operation to serve the 77th Division troops (map 51).3
3(1) See footnote 1(1), p. 531. (2) History, 53d Medical Depot Company, 1944-45. (3) Quarterly Reports, Surgeon, 77th Division, 1945.
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Hospital Assemblies on Okinawa
Hospital unit assemblies for the Okinawa assault werecarefully packed, uniformly marked, and included packing lists which facilitatedboth loading and unpacking. Each unit of the supporting field hospitals wasfurnished with one 2?-ton and one ?-ton truck in which to carry prepackedsurgical instruments and supplies that could be made available immediately uponlanding. Each hospital unit was stored on a separate vessel to provide properdispersal.
Typical of the movement of unit assemblies during the Okinawaassault was the experience of the 69th Field Hospital. Personnel and sixsurgical trucks were unloaded on L+1, and the remainder of its equipment andsupplies, which had been carefully packed and crated for the operation, wasunloaded during the following 7 days. Having learned much from the Leytecampaign, supply organizations preparing unit assemblies packed plenty ofplaster of paris, sheet wadding, and all types of sutures. Some difficulty wasencountered in getting equipment off the beaches as sufficient transportationwas not available (fig. 142). Other than cots, blankets, and tentage, no othermajor items of equipment were lost. For the first few weeks, the 69th had aserious shortage of blankets as 300 of the 1,200 blankets packed were lost onthe beach and in property exchange. To make up for the lack of pillows, blanketswere substituted, and sometimes a shock patient needed as many as six or sevenblankets.
To have a reserve of equipment for another hospital in anemergency, an effort was made to keep the equipment of one hospital unit intact.
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FIGURE 142.-Transferring cargo to smallercraft for delivery to the beach.
With the exception of plaster of paris bandages and sheetwadding, few other items of supply were scarce.4
Followup Supply
Tenth U.S. Army resupply consisted of four different types ofmedical maintenance units. The Medical Maintenance Unit, Block 1, was designedto supply 3,000 men for 30 days and was landed in the early assault phase. Itsupplied units providing first- and second-echelon medical service. Fifty ofthese blocks were originally scheduled to land on L+5, but actually the firstones were unloaded 10 days later, on L+15.
Block 2 consisted of nonexpendable replacement equipmentbased on SGO (Surgeon General's Office) replacement factors. One block was tobe unloaded between L+15 and L+25, but was finally unloaded at L+50. A secondBlock 2 was scheduled for the eighth resupply.
Block 3, composed of biologicals, supplemented Block 1. Twoof these were scheduled for the first resupply, one for the second, and one forthe third. However, these blocks landed approximately 10 days later thanscheduled.
Block 4, the standard medical maintenance unit-10,000 menfor 30 days-
4(1) Medical Report, XXIV Corps, Operation ICEBERG. [Official record.] (2) Action Report, XXIV Corps, Ryukyus, Preliminary Planning, April-June 1945. (3) Semiannual Reports, 69th Field Hospital, 1945. (4) See footnote 1(2), p. 531.
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was not unloaded until the fourth resupply and occurred 10days later than scheduled. Each resupply subsequent to the fourth for theremainder of the automatic resupply period of 210 days contained eight or moreBlock 4's, depending on troop strength ashore. By L+180, a sufficient numberof these blocks were ordered to build up a 90-day reserve stock.5
Blood Supply
Specially equipped LST's (landing ships, tank) acted asfloating depots for whole blood, thus assuring timely and adequate delivery.
Ashore, a blood bank was operated by a blood bank detachmentunder the supervision of the medical supply officer, XXIV Corps. Blood wasavailable as far forward as the collecting stations which supported the infantryregiments. Because of the availability of whole blood in the 7th DivisionClearing Station, a soldier who lost portions of all four of his limbs when hisvehicle was struck by a landmine was saved.6
Analysis of Supply Operations
Although no critical shortage of medical supplies occurred onOkinawa for any extended period, a number of shortages arose because ofincreased consumption and inability to unload supplies selectively. When acritical situation seemed imminent, air shipments were used with timely results.Interchange of supplies between Army and Marine supply dumps also helped.Excessive administrative delay did occur, but this was minimized by aggressiveaction on the part of the medical supply officer.
The general success of medical supply on Okinawa wasremarkable, considering that the American casualties on Okinawa were the highestof any Pacific campaign. Also, a significant amount of medical care was renderedto the natives.
Even before the fighting ended on Okinawa, the XXIV Corps wasplanning for its assignment in the assault on Japan. The corps was busilyreequipping and retraining when the war ended. Okinawa was the last groundcampaign of World War II.7
PLANNING THE ASSAULT ON JAPAN
Development of Strategy
By June 1945, the recapture of Luzon, the last importantlarge island objective, was assured, and the way to Tokyo had been opened byseizing Okinawa and its neighbor islands.
Gen. Douglas MacArthur, designated Commander in Chief, U.S.Army Forces in the Pacific, in April 1945, was given the responsibility ofpreparing the final operations against Japan.
5See footnote 1(1), p. 531.
6See footnote 1(2), p. 531.
7(1) See footnote 1(1), p. 531. (2) Quarterly Report, Surgeon, XXIV Corps, 3d quarter, 1945.
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Under the code name, Operation OLYMPIC, an invasion ofsouthern Kyushu Island by the Sixth U.S. Army was to begin on 1 November 1945;and 4 months later, Operation CORONET, an assault on the main island of Honshuby the Eighth U.S. Army from the Philippine Islands, the Tenth U.S. Army fromOkinawa, and three Marine divisions, was to be followed by the redeployment ofthe First U.S. Army from Europe.
Early in the spring of 1945, planning began for theoccupation of Japan and Korea, control of the Armed Forces and civilianpopulation, and enforcement of the prescribed terms of surrender. It was assumedthat Japan might request a cessation of hostilities early in the invasionoperations.8
Medical Supply Planning
Medical supply planning for the invasion of Japan began in April1945, under the direction of Lt. Col. (later Col.) Ryle A. Radke, MC, Surgeon'sOffice, General Headquarters, Manila, a recent arrival from the Mediterranean byway of Washington.
Two factors complicated planning for medical supply: Theprospect of field service in a colder climate and the desire to improve theservice of medical units by adding certain items of equipment which had beenproved invaluable. After careful study, lists of additional equipment wereprepared, submitted, and approved as special changes to supplement the WarDepartment tables of organization and equipment. Complete reequipment of allunits on the troop list was initiated.
To insure delivery of adequate supplies to the invasionbeaches early in the operation, all units were required to carry supplies for 30days. An additional balanced stock of 15 days was carried in division dumps andby separate medical supply units. Stocks were held in reserve on Okinawa and atManila to be drawn upon for emergency airdrops or for movement to any beachheadby water. Balanced stocks were loaded on ships to be used for later resupply.
An adequate supply of whole blood on the beaches of Japan wasto be guaranteed by providing a mobile refrigerator holding 200 pints of bloodfor each corps to be landed on D-day. In addition, each field and evacuationhospital was instructed to carry an initial stock of 100 pints of blood. Forfast resupply, the Navy was to provide four mobile distribution units on LST'swhich would accompany the assault echelons. Further supply of blood was to beairshipped daily from the Navy whole-blood distribution center on Guam.
Medical supply plans were based largely on previousoperations, especially Leyte and Luzon. Although the medical maintenance unitwould provide essentials during combat, many sorely needed items had beenomitted. Using block-loaded ships from the Zone of Interior and new medicalmaintenance
8(1) Medical Supply Plan, Operation OLYMPIC. [Official record.] (2) Basic Outline Plan for Operation BLACKLIST to occupy Japan and Korea. [Official record.]
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units based on theater experience and consumption studiesmade by the Supply Division, medical supply blocks were designed.
Medical Supply Block 1 was designed to supply 25,000 men for30 days during combat operations. Block 2 consisted of 6,800 items, includingspare parts and optical supplies, and was computed on the basis of WarDepartment table of organization replacement factors. Block 2 was designed tosupply 100,000 men for 30 days for fixed-hospital maintenance, and to provide abalanced stock which would permit organizations to requisition items either lostor damaged in combat. These requisitions were submitted by the Medical SupplyDivision, Office of the Surgeon, U.S. Army Services of Supply, to the Zone ofInterior in May 1945.
Medical supplies for Operation OLYMPIC were to be moved intothe target areas in three blocks loaded on standard cargo ships. Twenty-eightships, coded as BOOM, were to carry Block 1 medical supplies. Thirty-five ships,coded as CROW, were to carry Block 2 supplies. Resupply ships were coded asPLUM, with each vessel scheduled to carry supplies for 40,000 men for 30 days.Because of Japan's early surrender, these plans were never put to a test.However, after careful evaluation of the supply plan for OLYMPIC, the StockControl Division, SGO, found that Block 2 greatly exceeded any known oranticipated requirements, while Block 1 was reasonable and realistic. Revisionsand recommendations of the Stock Control Division were accepted by the theater.The quantities of approximately half of the items in Block 2 were revised, with70 percent of the revisions being downward. Theoretically, these supplies wereto cover Operations OLYMPIC and CORONET until the theater could be establishedon a requisitioning basis. The theater was to requisition for the blocks desiredon a prearranged plan. Of the original 35 for Block 2, 16 were canceled, leavinga balance of 19.9
Support for Operations in Japan
Logistical support for operations against the Japanese homeislands were to be carried out by Base X (Manila), Base M (San Fernando),Base R (Batangas), Base K (Leyte), and Base S (Cebu). The major reserve ofmedical supplies and equipment was to be held at Base X (map 52).
By August 1945, Base K was handling only from 25 to 30percent of the theater supplies while Base X was handling 40 to 50 percent.Estimated medical depot storage requirements for each base were computed in June1945, based on 17 pounds of medical supplies per square foot. Calculations forstorage included some space for unit assemblies as well as for bulk stocks. BaseX was the largest depot, 630,000 square feet of hardstand and 365,000 squarefeet of covered storage; Base S was the smallest, with 110,000 square feetclosed and 50,000 feet open.10
9(1) Semiannual Reports, U.S. Army Forces, Western Pacific, 1945. (2) Owens, J. L.: Preliminary draft manuscript, Closing Months of the War Against Japan. [Official record.] (3) Quarterly Reports, Sixth U.S. Army, 1945. (4) See footnote 8(1), p. 537.
10See footnote 9(1), above.
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MAP 52.-Bases supporting operations in Japan,1945.
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Redeployment of Medical Supply Units
After the successful conclusion of the war in Europe on 8 May1945, the tempo of the Pacific war increased. Staging of redeployed units in thePhilippines was planned at newly expanded bases. Over 50,000 hospital beds wereprogramed for the Philippines. Thus, various types of hospital assemblies andother unit supplies for these redeployed units were received and stored indispersed locations. Earlier lack of sound packing, crating, and documentationof supplies was resolved in later shipments.11
Plans were made in early 1945 for the redeployment of eightmedical depot companies from the European Theater of Operations, U.S. Army.
REORGANIZATION OF THE MEDICAL SUPPLY SYSTEM
Organization and Change
U.S. Army Forces, Pacific, which supplanted and absorbedU.S. Army Forces in the Far East in April 1945, was without a medical supplydivision until 21 August, after the war was over. Before that date, policydirection at headquarters on supply matters was exercised by Col. Paul I.Robinson, MC, deputy to Brig. Gen. (later Maj. Gen.) Guy B. Denit, the TheaterSurgeon.
During the period of island-to-island warfare, the TheaterSurgeon's Office had been limited in size to meet the requirements of a mobileand flexible organization and to better coordinate supervision of medicalcomponents of the various echelons. On 7 June 1945, a logistical command,AFWESPAC (Army Forces, Western Pacific), was organized and thereafter assumedall supply responsibilities in the Pacific. The new command, which replaced theolder Services of Supply organization, was also responsible for supplying theSixth and the Eighth U.S. Armies, and the U.S. Far East Air Forces.
The medical supply units in the Pacific were widely dispersedand were staffed by veterans of the Pacific campaigns who were long overdue forrotation to the United States. A few keymen were retained in the theater, but,overall, experienced medical supply personnel were in critical demand during thelast months of 1945. When plans were being made for Operations OLYMPIC andCORONET, it had been obvious that staff personnel would have to be provided fromexisting Pacific supply depots which were already understaffed. To prevent lossof key depot personnel through misassignment, liaison was established withreplacement depots.
The establishment of Army Forces, Western Pacific, didnothing to enlarge the Medical Supply Division, which was already inadequate forits growing responsibilities. The 17th Medical Supply Depot on New Caledoniacontinued to provide the manpower for the theater stock control mission as
11(1) See footnote 9(1), p. 538. (2) Memorandum, Capt. Charles C. Clark, AGD, Asst. to the Adjutant General, Hqs., USAFWESPAC, for the Commanding General, Sixth U.S. Army, 31 July 1945, subject: Packing and Crating. (3) Quarterly Report, Surgeon, Philippine Base Section, April-June 1945.
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a component of the Technical Services. Under the direction ofMaj. (later Lt. Col.) John W. Fieting, MAC, effective stock control practiceswere established which had been tested and proved in the Zone of Interior. Atheater stock control applicable to all technical services was developed laterby Major Fieting while he was on loan to G-4 (Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4Logistics) Section, AFWESPAC.12
Stock Control
The computation and recomputation of statistics and reportsby manual means was a trying task, alleviated only when electric accountingmachines were installed in the Stock Control Division of the Theater Surgeon'sOffice. These machines proved invaluable in determining theater levels uponwhich to base surplus property disposal actions.
The study of replacement factors on selected items, begun inNovember 1944, was continued. On the basis of this experience, revised factorswere submitted to the San Francisco, Calif., Port of Embarkation for approval.Used thereafter in computing requisitioning factors, a definite improvement intheater stock levels was brought about.
By mid-1945, the limited transportation facilities from NewGuinea had improved. Shipments of stocks were made to the Philippines, thusreducing the necessity for requisitioning on the United States, except forfuture operational requirements.
Col. John A. Worrell, MC, formerly commanding officer of theToledo Medical Depot, was sent on a tour of New Guinea bases in May 1945 toinsure that priority items were shipped from New Guinea according to need, andthat approved packing, crating, and documentation practices were being followed.The job of moving material forward accomplished by the depots was commendabledespite limited facilities and materials. The packing and crating job, however,was done by hospital personnel and was far from adequate. To avoid resupplyingand reequipping hospital units moving forward, depot personnel supervised andassisted in packing and crating.
By June 1945, with the stabilization of military operations,it became advisable to place Army supply points on a requisitioning basis. Thispolicy curtailed many of the shortages and excesses at the consuming level whichhad resulted under the automatic supply procedure.
Establishment of the Depot Operations Branch
In the summer of 1945, the Depot Operations Branch wasestablished in the Medical Supply Division, with the mission of preparing plansand policies for the storage and issue of medical supplies and equipment;computing storage requirements; allocating personnel; and inspecting packing,crating, and marking methods, and depot stock control and inventory procedures.By
12(1) Annual Report, Surgeon, U.S. Army Forces, Pacific, 1945. (2) See footnotes 9(1) and 9(2), p. 538.
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September 1945, an inspection team was sent out from thebranch to check the accuracy of current stock status reports. This team wasinvaluable in improving the overall efficiency and economy of the supply servicewithin the Western Pacific theater.
An Equipment, Maintenance, and Repair Section was alsoestablished within the Depot Operations Branch during the period. There had beenconsiderable deterioration of combat equipment, and although emphasis was placedon the importance of first- and second-echelon maintenance, numerous items ofunserviceable equipment needed care because spare parts were not available. Toalleviate this problem, Base X was designated as the key depot for storage ofspare parts and of replacement parts which were rapidly supplied by air. Bases Kand X were designated as the central fourth- and fifth-echelon repair shops,which made possible the successful completion of the rehabilitation andreequipment program for projected operations. The subsequent conversion fromcombat to occupation needs under Operation BLACKLIST and the readjustment ofpersonnel to the United States made the shortage of trained maintenancepersonnel even more critical.13
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS BASE SECTIONS
Organizational Changes and Problems
All Philippine Islands bases encountered the same generalproblems in establishing and operating their respective medical supply systems.Poor storage facilities and insufficient depot personnel were common. Indigenouspersonnel were not suitable for stock control and stock selection. Depots had toborrow personnel from neighboring medical units to operate around the clock atpeak efficiency during the periods of receiving supplies and outfitting unitsfor Operation BLACKLIST. At the same time, large quantities of stocks were beingreceived, exceeding assigned storage space and forcing relocation. In the earlydays of 1945, replacement supplies were mainly medical maintenance units, butthey were gradually replaced by line-item requisitions to balance stocks. Whenshipments from the United States arrived before the receipt of shippingdocuments, tallying-in of the incoming property was delayed. This wasparticularly irritating as stocks had to be stored according to ships'deliveries pending receipt of the shipping documents.
Refrigeration was also a problem, and improvisation orreliance on other sources for refrigerator space were the common alternatives inmost bases.
As of 1 July 1945, strict accountability was placed in effectwithin the Philippines, necessitating the initiation of prescribed inventory andaccounting procedures. The large exodus of units in August under OperationBLACKLIST required the preparation and issue of substantial amounts of equipmentand replacement supplies. As strengths in the bases receded, hospitals and othermedical units began turning in their excess supplies, equipment, and unit
13See footnote 9(1), p. 538.
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assemblies to the depots, which were caught in a squeezebetween the increased workload and the postwar personnel reductions.14
Manila Base Depot Systems
By August 1945, the Greater Manila area contained one of thelargest medical depot systems developed in the Pacific area during the war. Aspart of the base development plan, 365,000 square feet of covered storage and635,000 square feet of hardstand for medical supplies and equipment was beingconstructed in five separate areas during June, July, and August.
From the time that Manila was occupied until the assumptionof logistical support by Base X, the medical depot, located in a Manilaschoolhouse, was operated by the 15th Medical Supply Platoon (Aviation), a SixthU.S. Army unit. When the 49th Medical Depot Company arrived in Manila, it tookover the issue point from the 15th which returned to combat duties.
With the increase of receiving and shipping activities,additional storage facilities of a variety of conditions and locations wereallocated as well as desirable hardstand located at the North Harbor Beach areaand the South Beach area of Manila. DUKW's (amphibious trucks, 2?-ton cargo)were used to haul supplies from the ships backlogged in Manila Bay, to thesupply storage areas faster than the depot crews could tally in and stock them(fig. 143). Fortunately, the use of abundant civilian labor and the dry seasonfacilitated this operation. In the meantime, a former Philippines customswarehouse in the port area replaced the schoolhouse. This new warehouse, with90,000 square feet of covered space, became the nucleus for local storage andissue, relieving added storage problems which had stemmed from the poorpackaging of material shipped from New Guinea bases.
As soon as pierside unloading was available, the North HarborBeach dump was reduced to use as dead storage space for bulky, slow-movingitems. Additional bulk-storage space was acquired on North Bay Boulevard;however, lack of materials for handling equipment hampered operations.
During June 1945, the depot was expanded by constructing a26,000-sq.-ft. prefabricated warehouse adjacent to the issue depot, and sixwarehouses, totaling 200,000 square feet, at Quezon City (fig. 144). Adjacent tothe Quezon City warehouses was 104,000 square feet of hardstand, and anadditional 140,000 square feet of hardstand was acquired when one-half of theZablan airstrip was taken over. The widely scattered locations of warehouse andstorage areas presented problems which would not have been encountered if thedepot had all been under one roof (map 53).
Depot Operations
All issues were made from an issue warehouse where the masterlocator and stock records systems were maintained. Paperwork in the outlyingagencies was kept to a minimum to control and expedite movement of stocks.
14See footnote 9(2), p. 538.
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FIGURE 143.-General view of docking andIncoming ships at Base X port area, Manila, September 1945.
A medical supply liaison section of the depot directed deliveryof medical supplies from the ships to the proper dump or to the warehousefurnishing the depot with advance notice of supplies to be received. A locatorservice on stray medical shipments was also maintained by the medical supplyliaison section.
Additional personnel from various other medical depotcompanies were used by the 49th because its own were insufficiently trained.Soon the policy was established to have the outlying area units operated byseparate detachments. The depot system of Manila was utilized to train new unitson their arrival in the theater. To permit the administrative operation of thesemany groups, the 5261st Medical Depot Group (Provisional) was organized. Thisresulted in more effective administrative control of the numerous depotcompanies which were operating the medical depots and assured a continuity ofeffort in supporting the numerous hospitals and equipping the units mounting forJapan.
As of 15 October 1945, the issue depot was operated by the49th Medical Depot Company; the bulk-storage warehouse in the Quezon City areawas
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FIGURE 144.-Receiving section and warehouse,49th Medical Depot Company, Quezon City (near Manila).
operated by a detachment of the 61st Medical Depot Company; theSouth Beach dump, Depot No. 4, was operated by the 67th Medical Depot Company;and the Zablan Bulk Storage Depot, Depot No. 6, was run by the 48th MedicalDepot Company which had been redeployed from Germany (map 53).
Until the responsibility reverted to the Philippines Commonwealth Government,medical supplies for civilian relief of the Philippine Islands were received,stored, and issued by the 77th Medical Base Depot Company which used the36,000-sq.-ft. Studebaker automobile distributing agency building.
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MAP 53.-Manila base depot system, 1945.
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The tonnage received and shipped by the medical supply depots inManila from the beginning of operation is given in table 8.
TABLE8.-Tonnage:Medical supply depots in Manila, April-September 1945
Month | Received (measurement tons) | Shipped (measurement | Month | Received (measurement | Shipped (measurement |
April | 9,000 | --- | July | 11,600 | 675 |
May | 14,000 | 221 | August | 8,372 | 462 |
June | 9,000 | 360 | September | 7,565 | 290 |
Amounts of supplies shipped do not include the innumerable issues to organizations drawing their supplies locally. While the first 3 months of operation consisted of receipt, storage, and routine issue, June, July, and August found the depots with the additional load of reequipping units for a forthcoming operation.
Following V-J Day, additional problems emerged, such asreceipt, reconditioning, and storage of equipment being turned in byinactivating organizations; supply of occupation forces by shipments from Base Xand other bases; and determination and disposal of excesses.
Maintenance and Repair
To meet the need for repair, a maintenance section of the 49thMedical Depot Company was established in the issue depot (fig. 145). At thebeginning of its operation, repairs had to be accomplished by cannibalization ofitems because of an inadequate stock of spare parts. Fortunately, the workloadwas light until redeployed units began to arrive in the area. Consequently,maintenance sections of the other depot companies were combined to pool theirsupplies, equipment, and personnel, and Manila was designated the key depot forspare parts. While spare parts continued to arrive automatically, many partscould not be used because they were of a different manufacture than the end-itemfor which they were required.
Optical Service of Manila Depots
The optical service in Manila began with the operation of theoptical section shop, run by the 49th Medical Depot Company (fig. 146). Althoughthe workload was light, difficulty was encountered because of the lack of lensesand of spectacle repair parts, a situation resulting from the procedureestablished by the Surgeon General's Office. This procedure required thatrequisitions for lenses and spectacle repair parts be placed for direct deliveryto each individual optical unit. Because of the distances between ports and theshipping backlog, optical units were often short of various supplies. Theshortage of stock during the early stages of operation was partly overcome byrequisi-
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FIGURE 145.-Maintenance Section Shop, 49thMedical Depot Company.
tioning repair supplies from portable optical repair units. Toprevent continuation of such shortages, a key depot, responsible forestablishment of theater levels of optical supplies, and for requisition,storage, and issue to various optical units, was established in Manila. Becauseof the minimal weight of spectacle repair parts, unit stocks were easilyrestored by either mail or air shipments. As additional medical depot companiesarrived in Manila, their optical repair sections, set up in the issue depot,pooled equipment, supplies, and personnel.
Whole-Blood Distribution
One important aspect of the medical depot was the supply ofwhole blood to units in the Manila area. The first issue was made on 11 March1945 by the 15th Medical Supply Platoon (Aviation). There was an average dailyissue of 125 pints during March, 160 to 175 pints during April, and 175 pintsduring the succeeding 3 months. With the cessation of hostilities, the issue ofblood dropped to a minimum. Shipments of whole blood from the United Statesceased on 15 September 1945.15
15(1) See footnote 9(1), p. 538. (2) Essential Technical Medical Data, U.S. Army Forces in the Pacific for September 1945.
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FIGURE 146.-Optical Section Shop, 49thMedical Depot Company.
Airdrops to American Prisoners of War
On 4 July 1945, in anticipation of the collapse of Japan,plans were made to airdrop essential medical supplies to all Americanprisoner-of-war camps in Japan and Korea. The Surgeon's Office, AFWESPAC,developed a list of components, and the depot supply service experimented withand developed suitable packaging (fig. 147 A). The project involved 180 drops,each of which contained 42 essential items including concentrated vitaminproducts, antimalarial drugs, parenteral dextrose solutions, diarrheal remedies,analgesics, and narcotics. The package, limited to 125 pounds, was required tofit into a canvas drop package 14 inches in diameter and 6 feet long. The dropswere made on each prisoner-of-war camp together with appropriate medicalpersonnel shortly after V-J Day (fig. 147 B). Because the liberated Americanprisoners were evacuated so rapidly, the drops were not so beneficial as hadbeen anticipated.16
OCCUPATION OF JAPAN
Operation BLACKLIST Executed
With the sudden and unexpected surrender in August 1945, theblock resupply set up for Operations OLYMPIC and CORONET was no longer
16See footnote 9(2), p. 538.
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needed. Operation OLYMPIC was hastily converted to OperationBLACKLIST, which provided that occupation units would carry medical supplies for30 days.
In numerous supply conferences held between Colonel Robinson,of AFPAC (United States Army Forces in the Pacific), and the medical supplyofficers of key bases and armies, it was decided that resupply would be providedby the block-loaded ship. Army Forces, Western Pacific, hastily developed anautomatic resupply block consisting of 2,680 items based upon ZI(Zone ofInterior) replacement factors for 100,000 men for 30 days. A 500-bed hospitalassembly was shipped to Yokohama as an emergency source of equipment and forother unpredictable needs. Upon arrival, this assembly was diverted forutilization by the 42d General Hospital, which was established at St. Luke'sInternational Hospital, Tokyo (fig. 148). An unplanned and welcome source ofsupplies came from the U.S. Army Hospital Ship Marigold, without theknowledge or requisition of the theater. Apparently, requisitions had beenplaced in the Zone of Interior by the Surgeon General's Office and loaded outof San Francisco.
By 27 September 1945, 30 days' supply for 100,000 men wasstored in the Yokohama Depot which was operated by the 29th Medical DepotCompany. Tremendous quantities of litters, blood plasma, plaster of parisbandages, and similar bulky combat type items arriving in block-loaded shipsfrom the Zone of Interior became a disposition problem. When the 43d InfantryDivision
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and the 1st Cavalry Division departed for the United States,they complicated depot operations further by turning in field equipment.17
Problems of Supply in Japan
Despite the haste with which occupation plans wereformulated and executed, medical supply problems were initially minor.
Winter items, such as pajamas and convalescent suits, notrequired in either New Guinea or the Philippines, were in short supply as theblock-loaded ships provided quantities based on replacement factors only. Theshortage of temperate-zone items required the supply by emergency requisitionsfrom the United States.18
Avoiding Excesses
Considerable pressure was placed on all supply echelons toprevent the buildup of excesses in Japan.
All OLYMPIC requisitions which had not been shipped from theZone of Interior before Japan surrendered were immediately canceled. It wasrecommended to the War Department that fully loaded ships awaiting discharge inJapanese waters be returned to the States unless they were carrying essentialequipment and supplies required in the occupation area. As this complicatedsupply computation, it was requested that emergency requisitions be submitted tothe Philippines for any supplies not received because of ship diversion.
Beginning on 1 October 1945, replacement factors werecomputed on ZI rates upon instructions from U.S. Army Forces in thePacific. Numerous ship diversions occurred from the Philippines to Japan, withmany ships containing hospital assemblies from the European and Mediterraneantheaters of operation. If these assemblies were delivered to the Philippines,they were unloaded; if received in Japan, they were returned to the UnitedStates.19
Postwar Supply System
By 1 January 1946, the medical supply system in Japan waswell established. Col. Stephen G. Asbill, VC, was Chief, Medical SupplyDivision, U.S. Army Service Command, with Capt. Albert Simms, MAC, serving aschief of the Administrative Division. The stock control mission was performed bya separate unit headed by Maj. Cornelius J. Curran, MAC, and was attached to the29th Medical Depot at Yokohama, the key depot in Japan. The 9th Medical DepotCompany, commanded by 1st Lt. Milton A. Kaplan, MAC, arrived at Wakayama(Southern Honshu Island), on 29 September 1945, from Base
17(1) Logistics Instructions for the BLACKLIST Operations, Hqs., U.S. Army Forces, Western Pacific, 15 Aug. 1945. [Official record.] (2) Minutes of Agencies interested in BLACKLIST, 17 Aug. 1945. [Official record.] (3) Annual Report, Planning Division, Office of the Chief Surgeon, AFPAC, 28 Mar. 1945. (4) Quarterly Report, 42d General Hospital, July-September 1945. (5) Quarterly Reports, 29th Medical Depot Company, 1945.
18See footnote 9(2), p. 538.
19See footnotes 9(1) and 9(2), p. 538.
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MAP 54.-Postwar medical supply system inJapan and Korea, 29 September 1945.
M. It was initially assigned to Headquarters, Sixth U.S. Army,and later to I Corps, and it operated depots at Nagoya, Wakayama, and Kōbe(map 54).
The 78th Medical Base Depot Company, commanded by Capt.(later Maj.) Leroy M. Martine, MAC, arrived at Otaru, Hokkaido, on 5 October1945, with 180 measurement tons of medical maintenance units to supply 20,000troops in that area. This unit experienced difficulty in protecting its suppliesfrom the freezing temperatures of that location. An improvised structure ofapproximately 10,500 cubic feet was built from framing and tarpaulins and washeated with gasoline tent stoves.
On 20 October 1945, the 80th Medical Base Depot Company,commanded by Capt. F. R. Glascock, MAC, arrived in Yokohama and was attached tothe 29th Medical Depot Company.
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During October 1945, the Medical Supply Division, AFWESPAC,requested inventories from the various command levels to establish accuratetheater on-hand figures. At the same time, medical supply procedures werefurnished these commands, since AFWESPAC was to provide logistical support until1 March 1946, when the Eighth U.S. Army was scheduled to assume responsibility.20
MEDICAL SUPPLY OPERATIONS IN KOREA
Organization
Japan's sudden surrender found the staff of the XXIV Corpsstill planning for the invasion of Japan. The corps was furnished with medicalsupport units necessary to perform its independent operation as an occupationforce in Korea, and was designed to support a force of 100,000 men and amilitary government organization. An initial mission of the corps was recovery,processing, initial care, and evacuation of U.S. prisoners of the Japanese inmainland prison camps.
Medical Supply Responsibilities
Responsibilities of the medical supply officer, XXIV Corps,ranged from supervising medical-supply manufacturing installations which Japanhad established in Korea to reestablishing production in a variety of factoriesin Korea.
Another peculiarity of the supply program was the arrival ofassigned hospital units less all personnel except one lieutenant and onecorporal. These units were completely equipped, but because of the rotationpolicies, they had lost all personnel at their points of origin, either inOkinawa, Tinian, or Luzon, or back in Australia or Hawaii. Soon a mountain ofunprocessed supplies, equipment assemblages, and paper piled up beside theinadequately staffed 58th Medical Base Depot Company. It was not surprising thatit took many months to work out this backlog. Unmanned units were never mannedbecause the planned strength of the occupation force was reduced to 40,000, andso the disparity between supplies and personnel continued to grow.21
Rehabilitation Activities
Medical supply personnel were called upon to make significantcontributions to the medical service in Korea by a number of activities. Theyoutfitted and put into service a hospital train, established supply stores inKorean hospitals, reestablished medical schools, and set up a previouslydismantled smallpox vaccine manufacturing laboratory and distributed its productto the civilian population, thereby combating a full-scale epidemic.
20(1) See footnotes 9(1) and 9(2), p. 538; and (5), p. 536. (2) Quarterly Report, 9th Medical Depot Company, July-September 1945. (3) Quarterly Report, 78th Medical Base Depot Company, October-December 1945.
21(1) Quarterly Report, Surgeon, XXIV Corps, October-December 1945. (2) Quarterly Reports, 58th Medical Base Depot Company, 1945.
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The medical supply system was also instrumental inestablishing standards for drug purity by promulgating codes of conduct for thedrug manufacturing industry.
Early in October, a classical smallpox epidemic began to cropup in the civilian population which had not been vaccinated for 5 years, as thevaccine laboratory near Taegu had been diverted to meet the needs of theJapanese Forces. Through the efforts of Capt. Ernest R. Tinkham, MAC, thelaboratory at Seoul was reestablished, and vaccine became available.
In early November, with the recognition of the first U.S.case of smallpox and a serious outbreak of smallpox among civilians, allpersonnel of the command were ordered revaccinated. A new consignment of vaccinewas obtained from Philippine Islands laboratories. Because some cases ofsmallpox among U.S. personnel remained in evidence, the medical supply officerrequired high-potency vaccine to be airshipped from California. All members ofthe command were given this vaccine. From then on, all personnel arriving inKorea were vaccinated aboard ship before debarking.22
CIVILIAN AID
Civilian Medical Supply in the Philippines
Supplies for Philippine Islands civil affairs units werereceived, stored, and distributed by Army medical supply personnel. Reliefstocks were distributed proportionately under the operational control of theSixth and Eighth U.S. Armies. On 1 July 1945, full responsibility for civilaffairs supply was transferred to the Eighth U.S. Army to release the Sixth forfuture operations. The Eighth was responsible for maintaining necessary recordsto insure that supplies were not over-requisitioned. Issues from Army stockswere made in emergency only if Army stocks were in a favorable position.
With the cessation of hostilities, the supplies forPhilippine Islands civil affairs units, which were stored in civil affairsmedical depots in Manila and Leyte (fig. 149), were inventoried to determinesupplies ready for issue to the civilians of Japan and the Philippines. Thesesupplies were transferred to the Foreign Economic Administration, which turnedthem over to the Commonwealth of the Philippines Government on 9 October 1945,thus releasing the Army from further responsibility for civilian supply in thePhilippines.23
Civil Affairs Supplies in Japan
Late in August 1945, plans for the supply of the civilianpopulation of Japan were begun by Col. (later Brig. Gen.) Crawford F. Sams, MC,surgeon of the Japanese Allied Military Government group and his medical supplystaff, in coordination with the AFWESPAC Medical Supply Division. Colo-
22(1) Essential Technical Medical Data, XXIV Corps, for November 1945. (2) Essential Technical Medical Data, XXIV Corps, for December 1945. (3) For further details on the smallpox epidemic in Korea, see Medical Department, United States Army. Preventive Medicine in World War II. Volume IV. Communicable Diseases. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1958, pp. 156-161.
23See footnote 9(1), p. 538.
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FIGURE 149.-Civilian relief supplies atTacloban, Leyte Island.
nel Sam's group took the position that, because the war wasover, civilian requirements should be given priority over military requirements.The Supply Division, on the other hand, believed that, because medical suppliesin the theater were Army stocks, only excesses could be applied to civilianrequirements and then only after SGO approval. Failure to establish delineationof responsibility between the Allied Military Government and the Eighth U.S.Army was another confusing factor. Since neither group had sufficient personnel,the task fell on the 29th Medical Depot Company at Yokohama.
On 22 September, a medical maintenance unit was shipped tothe Hiroshima area, along with as much penicillin and other essentials as couldbe spared. In response to a request of the Eighth U.S. Army, a full medicaldepot company was provided to operate the Civilian Aid Program for the AlliedMilitary Government group. Late in September, the SS Tuscon was divertedfrom the Philippines to Japan. Eleven hundred cases of supplies and a largequantity of relief supplies for the Philippines were segregated in 35,000 squarefeet of covered storage by the 29th Medical Depot Company. At a later date,Japanese Army stocks were diverted for civilian requirements, and a program tobuild civil affairs units from excess U.S. Army stocks was started by ArmyForces, Western Pacific.24
DISPOSAL OF EXCESSES AND SURPLUS PROPERTY
Organization and Early Work
After V-J Day, advantageous disposition of the huge excessesof medical supplies and equipment became one of the prime missions of the ArmyForces, Western Pacific. Early in September 1945, Maj. Raymond F. Linn, MAC, was
24See footnote 9(2), p. 538.
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designated as the medical member of an AFWESPAC surplusproperty disposal team which visited New Guinea bases with the objective ofdelivering all supplies in excess of a 6-month maintenance requirement to theDutch Government. After inventorying and pricing stocks at these bases, thevalue was set at $4.8 million.
On 25 October 1945, disposition of surplus property wasassigned the highest priority by G-4, AFWESPAC. Despite clearly refinedrelationships between G-4, G-5 (Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5, Civil Affairs),Technical Services, and the Office of the Foreign Liquidation Commission,disposition of surpluses was hampered by the computation of requirements for aWar Reserve Stock to be maintained in the Philippines. However, by 2 November,declarations of surpluses had been initiated.25
Closeout of Philippine Islands Bases
Closeout of the Philippine Islands bases came next in the rollupof the rear. The 34th Medical Depot Company experienced typical problems inclosing Base K. With only a few experienced officers remaining assigned to thedepot and only an inexperienced combination of inexperienced depot enlisted men,enlisted men from a tank destroyer battalion, Filipino civilians, and 325Japanese prisoners of war, 29,431 measurement tons of supplies were processedfor shipment to either Manila, Japan, Korea, or the United States. Packing andcrating materials were adequate. However, certain essential items such asstencil machines were not available, and packages had to be marked in freehand.
The disposition of surplus property in the Philippines was arace against time since the tools for accomplishment-manpower and shippingspace-were rapidly diminishing. The Supply Division was fortunate to have Maj.(later Lt. Col.) Clarence Retzky, MAC, as stock control officer. Electricaccounting machines were used in the repeated computing of levels and theissuing of appropriate disposition instructions.26
UNUSUAL PROBLEMS OF MEDICAL SUPPLY
Loss of Drugs
The loss of biological products as a result of passingexpiration dates in the theater was of considerable concern to the AFWESPACsupply service, and plans were developed to provide biologicals within theoptimum use to units. Smallpox vaccine with a 3-month expiration date underroutine supply processing would be outdated before it was received in thetheater. As a result, key depots at Hollandia and Manila were established withstock levels based on consumption studies. All stocks of vaccine were shippedfrom the United States on class I priority, and shipments within the area weremade by air to
25See footnote 9(2), p. 538.
26See footnote 9(2), p. 538.
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insure use before expiration dates. Undoubtedly, a highpercentage of "outdated" biologicals were potent and suitable for use.Development of potency determination facilities by theater medical laboratoriesappeared feasible to permit the salvaging of a large quantity of these products.
The shortage of biological and pharmaceutical sets at medicaldepots presented a problem which was solved by designating the 19th MedicalGeneral Laboratory at Luzon as the central storage and issue agency for theseproducts. Requisitions went directly from hospitals and consuming units to thelaboratory. Items not manufactured by the laboratory were requisitioned from theUnited States for direct delivery to the 19th Medical General Laboratory.
Another factor in efficiency of storage operations anddeterioration of supply packaging was the low priority given warehouseconstruction. The use of newly developed plastic sheeting as an interim measureseemed desirable as canvas tarpaulins were not available for depot use in thequantities required.
Because of the studies of the Schistosomiasis Commission andother laboratory requirements, an unusually large requirement for laboratoryanimals developed. Australian sources were becoming exhausted, andtransportation from the United States was an important consideration. It wasdecided to establish a breeding colony at the 19th Medical General Laboratory.Four airplane loads of breeding stock were obtained from the United States fordirect delivery to Manila. The final shipment of 10,000 white mice, 600 guineapigs, and 200 hamsters was received on 29 September 1945. Losses en route werenegligible. Food pellets were requisitioned from the United States until sourceswere developed in the Philippines.
Probably the most acute problem of the medical service in thePhilippines was the loss of medical supplies by pilferage. Depot areas were notfenced until late 1945, and truck convoys en route from the port area to thenumerous depot locations were frequently hijacked. Medical supplies broughtfantastic prices on the black market. Pilferage was not confined to theshoplifting tactics experienced in U.S. depots, but consisted of organized armedraids by day and night. As a result of this problem, penicillin was actually inshort supply status early in 1946.27
Supply for Other Services
The Army Medical Supply System provided essential medicalsupplies to the Navy, Army Air Forces, Marines, Royal Australian Air Force, andother services toward the end of the war. In June 1945, 70 tons of supplies wereprovided the naval station at Subic Bay. In routine procedure, Army medicaldepots supplied Navy ships in their areas. In November 1945, issues wererestricted to requisitions authenticated by appropriate Navy commands. Typicaldaily-diary entries showed unanticipated requirements for U.S.O. shows, ahearing aid for General Yamashita to enable him to hear his interpreter duringthe War Trials, and requests for equipment for a Coast Guard dispensary
27See footnote 9(2), p. 538.
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and for 100,000 Atabrine (quinacrine hydrochloride) tabletsfor the Royal Australian Air Force.28
GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
REGARDING MEDICAL SUPPLY IN WORLD WAR II
Introduction
The story of medical supply in World War II was one offrequent frustration and confusion which evolved into success.
After the Japanese severely crippled the U.S. Pacific Fleetat Pearl Harbor and followed up by driving U.S. forces from the Philippines, thesupply service in the Pacific had to start on a shoestring. The hard lessonslearned in those early weeks and months furnished the experience and taught thelessons put to good use in later campaigns, particularly in the invasion of theEuropean Continent.
Prewar Planning
Numerous errors of judgment made in the period of austeritybetween World Wars I and II prevented adequate supply planning. Based on thefalse assumption that the outbreak of the war would be preceded by a formalmobilization day and the equally false assumption that there would be a manpowerceiling of 4 million men, the supply posture was much too rigid, and planningwas totally inadequate. Lack of funds and a woefully inadequate reserve ofmedical supplies and equipment were responsible for the use of obsolete medicalkits, chests, and hospital assemblies.
Personnel Problems
In September 1939, 4 officers and 27 civilians were on duty inthe Finance and Supply Division, Office of The Surgeon General. By the time ofPearl Harbor, the division had become one of the 12 major divisions of theSurgeon General's Office with a complement of 16 officers and 201 civilians.As a result of expanding supply needs after Pearl Harbor, many willing butinexperienced supply officers came into the system overnight. It was not until1943, when formal training for medical supply officers became a part of thecourse at the St. Louis Medical Depot Maintenance School, that the supply oftrained officers began to meet the demand. By bringing in leading businessmen,such as Herman C. Hangen, J. C. Penney Co.; Edward Reynolds, Columbia Gas andElectric Corp., who became chief of Supply Services; and many others fromcivilian life, adequate leadership for the supply program became a reality.
Depot Organization
To eliminate the merry-go-round procedure used to requisitionitems, the key depot system was established. Certain depots were responsible forcertain
28See footnote 9(2), p. 538.
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types of supplies and equipment. Efficient depot operationsin the United States eliminated hoarding and rushed the requisitioned suppliesto their assigned destinations. Storage space expanded from 1 million to 13million square feet in the course of a year amid a mad rush for depot space. Newdepots or medical sections were established in Kansas City, Kans., Seattle,Wash., Atlanta, Ga., and Richmond, Va., to handle the expanding need for medicalsupplies.
Automatic Supply
Shortly after Pearl Harbor, the MMU (medical maintenance unit),a standard assemblage, comprising about 700 items and weighing 15 tons andintended for automatic supply of 10,000 men for 30 days, was developed.
Designed primarily for use in overseas theaters and forwardbases for the initial phases of development, the medical maintenance unit had aprimary weakness of inflexibility. Forward echelons often relied on these unitsfor a longer period of time than was intended, with a resulting serious shortageof some items and an oversupply of others.
An even more serious weakness of the medical maintenanceunit, particularly in the European theater, was its inability to ship completeunits. Split shipments occurred most frequently in the days preceding D-day inEurope.
To compensate for these weaknesses, other types of MMU'swith a smaller number of items of less tonnage were developed and usedsuccessfully in Sicily and in Italy, as well as in the Pacific.
Maintenance, Repairs, and Spare Parts
The maintenance program of the Supply Division, SGO, was born ofnecessity. Virtually nonexistent at the beginning of World War II, it became afully functioning program in all theaters by the end of the war. The servicingof medical equipment was strictly a wartime policy. Maintenance of medicalequipment before the war was handled at on-post shops by other technicalservices or by local manufacturers of the specific equipment. Poor planning forrepairs in North Africa precipitated numerous problems with broken X-rayscreens, as well as shattered glass tubing and damaged knobs on steamsterilizers. Without an established maintenance program, the repair of brokenitems was almost nil, and only superb and ingenious Rube Goldberg techniquessaved a catastrophe. By the time of the invasion of Europe, some provision formaintenance had been made and, gradually, full operation was reached with themaintenance section's being attached to the base platoons of the medicaldepots. Well-trained graduates of the St. Louis Medical Depot Maintenance Schoolfilled the need for trained technicians.
In the Pacific theaters, medical equipment repair was moredifficult because of the lack of trained technicians and the distance betweenisland bases. Late in the war, it was found practical to send two bargesoutfitted with equipment and staffed with trained personnel on a scheduled roundof the various bases to make repairs and dispense spare parts.
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During World War II, it was learned that the MedicalDepartment should not depend on manufacturers' shops to maintain equipment inan emergency. Cannibalization of parts or exchange was not a satisfactorysolution because of the huge backlog of unserviceable items which developed.
Development of Special Items of Equipment
Perhaps one of the most outstanding contributions of themedical supply service in World War II was the development of artificial(acrylic) eyes, camouflage dressings, jungle kits, aluminum litters, archsupports, and orthopedic braces.
The optical program itself became an important part ofoperations in the European theater. More specifically, a mobile optical repairunit was on the beaches of Normandy as early as 3 days after D-day.
More than 180,000 pairs of spectacles were repaired fromD-day to June 1945, and more than 120,000 pairs of glasses were issued.
Until early 1944, when the new acrylic eye was developed byEuropean theater dental officers, large numbers of artificial (glass) eyes hadto be purchased in Italy. The development of the acrylic eye eliminated theproblem of source of supply and the necessarily wide assortment of sizes,shapes, and colors which would be required.
To protect the wounded soldier from sniper fire, particularlyin the jungle-infested areas of China, Burma, India, and the Pacific, olive-drabcamouflage dressing was created and used with care to avoid any probabletoxicity which might occur because of the dyes involved.
Another item used successfully in the Pacific was the junglekit which was adopted after the Guadalcanal Campaign. Varying in size from asmall pouch, which was carried on the individual soldier's belt, to a muchlarger unit carried on the back, the jungle kit contained antimalarialwater-purification tablets, salt tablets, skin disinfectants, insect repellants,and vitamins.
Early in the war, it became obvious that in a fluid type offighting such as in the Pacific and in Italy, it would be necessary to transportboth medical equipment and patients over rough terrain in an expeditious yetcomfortable manner. Jeep brackets were developed so that a jeep could carrythree litters easily from the forward area to the rear. When available, aluminumlitters were widely used because of their light weight.
The development of the blood bank and blood plasma made blooda standard item of supply, as it was handled in the European theater andthe Pacific as part of the Medical Supply System.
Development of Packaging and Packing
At the beginning of World War II, some of the first shipmentssent overseas fell apart, and glass containers shattered. It became necessary todevelop better packaging specifications. The handling of loose or mixed issueswas par-
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ticularly poor at the beginning of the war, and because of the lack ofstandardization, packing in a variety of containers was in use.
After much experimentation in the North African and Siciliancampaigns, waterproof medical packs weighing 70 pounds were developed and usedin the invasion of Italy and led to the use of waterproof boxes in both Europeand the Pacific. As a result of the Voorhees mission to the European theater, anexpanded packing and crating program was swiftly and successfully carried out.
With the development of a skid-loading program which had beenintroduced in the Attu Campaign of April 1943, supplies were moved rapidly fromthe depot to the field. By using this method, surgical instruments were packedtogether as were other special items.
One of the greatest boons to unloading of supplies was firstused on the beaches of North Africa. The marking of packages and boxes with thecolor appropriate to the technical service allowed for effective sorting ofboxes by natives who could not read the accompanying shipping documents.
Overcoming Weaknesses
Numerous shortcomings, tragedies, handicaps, and errors hinderedsupply operations. Despite losses which resulted from sinking of ships, poorhandling of supplies on the beaches, enemy destruction of depots and medicalinstallations, lack of control of transportation, nonmedical use of medicalitems, pilferage, and ineffective property exchange, medical supplies weredelivered and used in sufficient quality and quantity to allow the effectivetreatment of the wounded and the noncombatant disabled casualty. The effectiveuse of missions to the various overseas commands helped straighten out some veryintolerable and seemingly impossible situations.
As the war came to a close, careful planning, newinnovations, and sheer industriousness had made the supply of the Philippinesand Okinawa campaigns much more efficient. The massive movement of units andsupplies from Europe to the Pacific never was necessary because of the suddensurrender of Japan.
