CHAPTER VI
Medical Replacement Training Centers1
A high quality of professional care for an army in the field can beprovided only when the skills of doctors, dentists, veterinarians, andadministrators are supported by trained enlisted personnel. The trainingof a particular Medical Department soldier varies with the demands placedupon him, but in all cases, it must be detailed, intensive, and diversified.To train medical surgical, X-ray, laboratory, pharmacy, dental, and veterinarytechnicians, schools were established at general hospitals, military posts,civilian colleges, and commercial institutions. In addition, medical soldierswere also trained to work as part of a unit or team, ranging from an opticaldetachment of two enlisted men to a 2,000-bed numbered general hospitalwith 898 officers, nurses, and enlisted men. In short, men had to be trainedto perform special duties in a multitude of medical units in a chain ofevacuation stretching from the frontlines to general hospitals in the Zoneof Interior.
This bewildering array of individual and team specialties was held togetherby a common bond of training designed to produce basic medical soldiersand administrative (or common) specialists. Regardless of later specialization,all medical soldiers had to be acquainted with a body of medical and militaryknowledge basic to their duties. Because they might be stationed in a Zoneof Interior hospital or a frontline aid station, medical soldiers weretrained to work either independently or with a group. First aid under fire,evacuation of the wounded over difficult terrain, and the recognition ofwounds and disease were routine work. Despite their status as noncombatants,medical soldiers had to be trained to protect themselves, their units,and their patients. This common bond of training was provided by MedicalReplacement Training Centers.
Medical Department soldiers of World War II came from all walks of life.Medical Replacement Training Centers, and those of other arms and services,applied the techniques of mass production to military training. In theimage of the industrial process, centers took raw material from receptioncenters, forged a standardized product, and fed their output into medicalunits where the separate parts were finished and linked into the workingwhole. The accent was on economy, speed, uniformity, and volume production.The balance between factors such as housing and classroom facilities, cadreratios, training aids, the flow of trainees from reception centers, andthe rate of unit activations had to be continuously adjusted. Bottlenecksat any stage in the process were immediately reflected through the system.
1Unless otherwise indicated, this chapter isbased on: (1) Goodman, Samuel M.: History of Medical Department Training,United States Army, U.S. Army World War II. Volume V. The Training of Replacements,Fillers, and Cadres, 1939-1945. [Official record.] (2) Zimmermann, EdwardA.: Training in the Medical Department During World War II, pt. I, ch.VII Training of Enlisted Individual Fillers and Replacements. [Officialrecord.]
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The successful operation of replacement training centers required continuousplanning. Preparations for the establishment of Medical Replacement TrainingCenters2 began almost immediately after the publication of TheSurgeon General's Protective Mobilization Plan of 1939. In the spring of1940, the Medical Department conducted studies of potential sites, trainingloads, construction costs, and cadre requirements. In addition to sitesat Fort Meade, Md., Fort Oglethorpe, Ga., and Fort Warren, Wyo., specifiedin The Surgeon General's Protective Mobilization Plan of 1939, the MedicalDepartment also considered sites at posts in Indiana, New York, Missouri,Texas, Oklahoma, and California.3 In the fall of 1940, whilethese studies were being conducted, the War Department issued specificinstructions for the establishment of training centers. These instructionsspelled out the type, number, and size of buildings to be constructed forreplacement training and emphasized the need for rigid economy in constructionprograms.4
In mid-October 1940, War Department and Medical Department trainingpolicies were reviewed and discussed at a conference of Corps Area Surgeons.Topics included in the agenda drawn up by the Director of Training, SurgeonGeneral's Office, ranged from methods of constructing plans for the operationof training centers to techniques for preparing Reserve officers to trainconscripts. Participants in the conference were briefed on the requirementsof Mobilization Training Program No. 8-1, which had been published on 9September, and oriented to policies governing the training of officersand enlisted men for duties as administrative, or common specialists.5
It was not until January 1941, however, that the War Department authorizedThe Surgeon General to establish two Medical Replacement Training Centers-oneat Camp Lee, Va., and the other at Camp Grant, Ill. A third was authorizedon 1 November of that year at Camp Barkeley, Tex.6 At this juncture,the Medical Department began translating theory into practice.
TRAINING CENTERS
Camp Lee and Camp Pickett
When the Medical Replacement Training Center at Camp Lee was activatedin January 1941, on the site of a World War I training camp, little remainedof the
2The official title of Medical ReplacementTraining Centers changed several times during World War II. When the centerswere first established, they were most commonly referred to as medicaltraining centers. On 15 December 1941, they were designated as MedicalReplacement Training Centers. In April 1944, the designation was changedto ASF (Army Service Forces) Training Center. For the purpose of this study,only the last two designations will be used.
3(1) Memorandum, Maj. F. B. Wakeman, MC, for Col. Albert G.Love, 14 Sept. 1940, subject: Enlisted Replacement Centers. (2) Memorandum,Maj. Arthur B. Welsh, MC, to Brig. Gen. Albert G. Love, 11 Mar. 1941, subject:MD ERC's. (3) Memorandum, Maj. Arthur B. Welsh, MC, to Brig. Gen. AlbertG. Love, 29 Mar. 1941, subject: Replacement Centers.
4(1) Letter, The Adjutant General to Chiefs of Arms and Services,Commanding Generals of All Corps Areas, and Commanding Officers of ExemptedStations, 15 June 1940, subject: War Department Construction Policy. (2)Letter, The Adjutant General to Chiefs of Arms and Services, CommandingGenerals of All Corps Areas, and Commanding Officers of Exempted Stations,7 Oct. 1940, subject: War Department Construction Policy Supplement No.5.
5Memorandum, Maj. F. B. Wakeman, MC, for Executive Officer,Office of The Surgeon General, 5 Oct. 1940, subject: Agenda for Discussionat Meeting of Corps Area Surgeons, Week of 14 October 1940.
6Letter, The Adjutant General to Commanding Generals, Seventhand Eighth Corps Areas, Chief Signal Officer, The Surgeon General, andChief of Infantry, 23 Oct. 1941, subject: Activation of Replacement TrainingCenters.
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earlier center except some gunpits and a few emplacements. The site,25 miles from Richmond, was relatively flat and partially wooded, withfew streams that could be used to add realism to exercises, and the climatepermitted year-round training. Since the Medical Department shared thecamp with a Quartermaster Replacement Training Center, room for long termexpansion was limited.
From the beginning, little went according to plan. When Lt. Col. (laterMaj. Gen.) Paul R. Hawley, MC, Lt. Col. (later Col.) Frank S. Matlack,MC, and S. Sgt. (later Lt. Col.) Philip E. G. Fleetwood arrived to activatethe center on 3 January 1941, construction was only partially completed.On 16 January 1941, the center was officially activated as the 1308th ServiceUnit, Medical Department Replacement Center, Camp Lee. The time betweenthen and mid-March, when the first trainees arrived, was used to organizeand activate subunits, procure supplies, and receive personnel assignedto the center.
Officers were assigned to the center from Regular Army posts, privatemedical practice, or civilian jobs, and the enlisted cadre came from postsscattered throughout the United States. Most of the officers assigned tothe training battalions had completed the monthlong refresher course atthe Medical Field Service School, or attended the Cooks and Bakers Schoolat Fort Meade, Md. All lacked experience in handling large groups of trainees.7
The medical training center was designed to house seven training battalionseach containing approximately 1,000 men. The quarters provided for traineeswere two-story, 63-man, cantonment barracks, grouped on a battalion pattern.The barracks for two companies of each battalion were alined side by side,facing the battalion's remaining two companies. The battalion headquartersand supply buildings were separated from troop housing areas by a roadconstructed through the battalion area. Buildings designed as recreationhalls and regimental headquarters were converted into classrooms.8
In common with other training centers during the first year of mobilization,the medical training center at Camp Lee reported a chronic shortage oftraining equipment, and even simple housekeeping stores. At one point,Colonel Hawley, the training officer, complained bitterly to the SurgeonGeneral's Office that "the Quartermaster supply * * * is little short of scandalous. There have been times when we couldnot get enough food to feed our men * * *. Thereis no soap, scrubbing brushes, other cleaning materials and toilet paperto be had at this writing. Clothing is exhausted except in abnormal sizes.We have many selectees wearing nondescript civilian shoes because theycannot be fitted from Quartermaster supply."9 Trainingequipment was even more difficult to obtain and often had to be improvisedor simulated. The shortage of equipment and specialized classrooms madeit difficult to establish a training program for common specialists, andthe schedules set up in mobilization training programs often had to beadapted to existing facilities.
7Annual Report, Medical Replacement TrainingCenter, Camp Pickett, Va., fiscal year 1942.
8A History of the Medical Replacement Training Center at CampLee, Va., and Camp Pickett, Va., From Activation in 1941 to Inactivationin 1943. [Official record.]
9See footnote 1 (1), p. 173.
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FIGURE 19.-Trainees fromCamp Lee, Va., marching to Camp Pickett, Va., to establish the new MedicalReplacement Training Center.
The training of specialists, as well as basic medical soldiers, wasdisrupted by the irregular arrivals and departures of trainees. Fluctuationsin enrollment led alternately to slack periods when supplies and equipmentwere underutilized or wasted and heavy training loads taxed facilitiesand led to unnecessary requests for expansion.
Early in February 1942, the War Department concluded that further expansionof both the Medical and Quartermaster Replacement Training Centers wouldgrossly overtax the resources of Camp Lee and decided to transfer the MedicalDepartment center to Camp Pickett. To avoid interrupting the program, theWar Department suggested moving the medical battalions one by one as theycompleted their training cycles and turning the vacated areas over to thequartermaster center. Battalion cadre and overhead could then be sent toCamp Pickett to begin training a new complement of trainees.
Brig. Gen. William R. Dear, the Commanding General of the Medical ReplacementTraining Center at Camp Lee, objected to the War Department plan, arguingthat it would take 10 weeks to complete the transfer to Camp Pickett, andduring this period, his command would be divided and administrative complicationswould be inevitable. As an alternative, he proposed that all medical battalionsbe moved at the same time, regardless of their state of training. The troopscould
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FIGURE 20.-Tent housingused at Camp Pickett, Va.
be marched from Camp Lee to Camp Pickett, and the property of at leastone battalion could be moved each day by truck.10
The War Department accepted this alternative, and in mid-June, medicaltrainees began a 3-day march over the 42 miles separating the two camps.The center at Camp Lee was officially closed at midnight on 19 June 1942and reopened a minute later at Camp Pickett (fig. 19).11 Toease the transition, the Medical Replacement Training Center transferredall of its training aids, supplies, and equipment to Camp Pickett.12Even then, training was disrupted while new permanent training aids, suchas a sanitary area, an obstacle course, mapping areas, and drill fields,were constructed.
Camp Pickett, located near Blackstone, Va., was initially the home ofthe 79th Infantry Division and other Second U.S. Army units. The prevailingweather was the same at both camps, but the terrain at Camp Pickett wasbetter suited to a varied training program. The surrounding countrysidewas rolling and wooded, with numerous lakes and streams. The soil was ared clay that became a quagmire
10See footnote 8, p. 175.
11(1) Memorandum, Col. John A. Rogers, MC, Executive Officer,Office of The Surgeon General, to All Services, Surgeon General's Office,22 June 1942. (2) See footnote 8, p. 175.
12Letter, The Surgeon General to The Adjutant General, 26 Feb.1942, subject: Movement of Medical Replacement Training Center From CampLee to Camp Pickett, Va.
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FIGURE 21.-This gatheringof troops at the Camp Pickett, Va., stadium on Memorial Day
illustrates the size of the Medical Departmenttraining effort.
after every rain. Initially, trainees were housed in a new, improvedtype of cantonment barrack.
In June 1942, the War Department authorized the center to expand enrollmentby 5,000 trainees per cycle. On 5 August, the center was reorganized toabsorb its new capacity. Negro trainees, who had previously been assignedto companies C and D of the 8th Medical Training Battalion, were organizedin battalion strength, and four white battalions were added, bringing thetotal to one Negro and 13 white battalions. Each battalion was placed underthe control of one of four newly activated training regiments. On 14 December1942, one white battalion was converted to a Negro battalion to accommodatethe increasing number of Negro trainees assigned to the center.13The five training battalions added on 5 August, however, had to be quarteredin hutments and tents (fig. 20) winterized with scrap lumber left overfrom the construction of the camp.
The training center at Camp Pickett (fig. 21) continued to enroll traineesuntil mid-1943, when the declining rate of activations reduced the MedicalDepartment's demand for fillers and replacements, and the Medical ReplacementTraining
13Annual Report, Medical Replacement TrainingCenter, Camp Pickett, Va., fiscal year 1943.
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Center was ordered to close. In October, after the last class graduatedand property accounts were cleared, the center was officially deactivated.14
Camp Grant and Fort Lewis
Preparations for the establishment of a Medical Replacement TrainingCenter at Camp Grant began early in the fall of 1940, under the supervisionof the commanding general of the Sixth Corps Area. The reservation, thenunder the control of the Illinois National Guard, was located on the eastbank of the Rock River, 3 miles south of Rockford, Ill.. The eastern halfof its approximately 3,500 acres of rolling terrain was unusually wellsuited for field operations. At times, however, the climate made trainingdifficult; the temperature varied from 20obelow zero in winter to as much as 104oabove in summer, and between December and March, snow and cold weathermade meaningful outdoor training a near impossibility.
Many difficulties had to be overcome before the center could begin enrollingtrainees. Although the Medical Replacement Training Center was to be themajor activity at Camp Grant, with plans calling for a center headquartersand seven training battalions of 1,000 men each, a reception center withfacilities for 2,500 men was also planned. Since the reception center wasslated to open on 15 January 1941, 2 weeks before the Medical ReplacementTraining Center, it was given priority. Despite the center's low priorityand delays in construction, work was completed on 24 March 1941, 10 daysbehind schedule, but in time to house the first shipment of trainees.
The site assigned to the Medical Department at Camp Grant also proveddifficult to manage. Even before the reservation was surveyed, the commanderof the Sixth Corps had decided not to allow construction in areas occupiedby buildings belonging to the Illinois National Guard. This restrictionleft little space for building in areas with easy access to facilitiesfor sewage and waste disposal and added to the cost of the center. Theconstruction of hard-surfaced roads, and the ditching and leveling of thegrounds had to be postponed when expenditures exceeded appropriations.Hard-surfaced roads and walks could not be provided until the autumn of1941, and the ditching required for surface drainage was delayed even longer.
Buildings at the center were arranged to increase control by the companycommander. Each training company was assigned four barracks, one administrationbuilding, and one messhall, grouped so that the company commander couldkeep close watch over all activities in the company area. When selecteesarrived at the center, they were assigned to standard, semipermanent barracks,designed to house 63 men. Later, at the direction of the War Department,77 men were housed in each barrack. This was accomplished by using a metaladapter to hold one bunk on top of another, an arrangement which provedquite satisfactory since it actually increased the floor space availableto the men. During the summer months, the camp could accommodate an additional6,000 trainees in tents.
14 See footnote 8, p. 175.
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Spring brought with it the unwelcome discovery that every roof in thecenter leaked profusely. The problem was traced to composition roofing,installed during subzero weather to meet construction deadlines, that failedwith the first spring rains. Damage to ceilings was extensive, not to mentionthe discomfort, and repairs could not be completed until fall.
Housing was less of a problem than classroom facilities, however. Initially,each battalion was provided with one recreation building, type RB-1, whichcould be adapted for use as a classroom. An administration building, typeA-12, was later authorized for each battalion, but this provided only twoadditional classrooms. As a result, classes had to be held in barracksand messhalls throughout the winter and during inclement weather. The shortageof classrooms was not eased until late 1942 when an additional recreationbuilding was authorized for each battalion.
The pressure for classroom space was even more acute in programs forcommon and administrative specialists and in the special training unitfor illiterate, non-English speaking, and mentally deficient trainees.When the center was designed, plans did not include classrooms for eithergroup, and there was no provision for housing the special training unit.Extra housing was provided by converting barracks and messhalls originallydesigned for men assigned to regimental headquarters. Efforts to provideadditional classrooms for common specialists were only partially successful,and National Guard buildings requiring extensive structural changes hadto be pressed into use.
Requisitions for the equipment and supplies required for basic militaryand technical training were submitted in December 1940. Between Januaryand April 1941, the center received a few trucks, most of the trainingequipment required for two medical regiments, and seven sets of hospitaltraining equipment. Since training programs focused on the operation ofa medical battalion, training equipment for the center had to be improvisedfrom hospital and regimental sets.
Supplies and instructors for the common specialist schools and the specialtraining unit were provided by the U.S. Office of Education, through theIllinois Board of Vocational Education. Instructors for the Cooks and BakersSchool, the Clerical School, the Motor Mechanics School, and the specialtraining unit were hired on the recommendation of a civilian liaison agentassigned to the center by the Board of Vocational Education. The boardalso furnished tools and garage supplies for the Mechanics School, andmost of the typewriters and machinery used by the Clerical School. Thiscooperative effort continued until 1 December 1941, when the commandantof the center was notified that supplies and instructors would have tobe withdrawn because the U.S. Office of Education could not provide fundsfor their support. Through special arrangements, the equipment providedby the board was retained until February 1942 when the War Department wasable to fill requisitions for replacements. Of the 23 civilian instructors,15 were retained as civil service employees for the duration of the war.The remaining vacancies were filled by military personnel with civilianteaching experience.15
15Annual Report, Medical Replacement TrainingCenter, Camp Grant, Ill., fiscal year 1942.
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By mid-1942, the problems that developed during the activation of CampGrant were under control, and the center was able to settle into the routineof training. Cadre problems, however, continuously plagued the program.On 19 April 1943, control of the Medical Replacement Training Center wastransferred from the War Department to the Sixth Service Command, and shortlythereafter, the center was ordered to replace at least 80 percent of itscadre with limited service personnel. Many of the replacements were foundto have received only 5 weeks of training at Camp McCoy and to be limitedmentally as well as physically. The new system proved far less satisfactorythan did its predecessor, which allowed the center to select cadre fromamong its own trainees.
At the same time, officials at the center were favorably impressed bythe performance of a company of enlisted women-members of the Women's ArmyAuxiliary Corps (usually called Wacs)-assigned to replace men in administrativepositions. Under the terms of their assignment, each woman replaced oneenlisted man, and the vast majority were reported to be both capable andindustrious workers.
After June 1942, Camp Grant also reported a marked reduction in thenumber of doctors and dentists assigned to serve as training officers.In most instances, these positions were filled by young officers in theMedical Administrative Corps. Although many of these new officers lackedexperience, they became accomplished instructors under the proper supervision,and their performance was considered highly satisfactory.
In December 1942, a special program was established to train sanitarytechnicians and meat and dairy technicians for the Army Air Forces. Underthis program, the center was capable of training 55 sanitary techniciansevery 4 weeks, and 175 meat and dairy inspectors every 8 weeks. New housingand classrooms were not authorized, but the center was allowed to add 11officers and 42 enlisted men to the cadre. In July 1943, quotas for theSanitary Technicians Course were reduced to 20 technicians per cycle, andthe quota for meat and dairy inspectors was reduced to 12.16
In May 1944, after the establishment of the preactivation system, theMedical Replacement Training Centers were redesignated as ASF (Army ServiceForces) Training Centers to symbolize the transition to the new system.17At this juncture, Camp Grant was one of three centers training troops forthe Medical Department, and all were being taxed to provide a combinedcapacity of 50,000 trainees. When troop requirements were increased to70,000 in mid-1944, Camp Grant was unable to provide facilities for furtherexpansion. In June 1944, the medical training center began the processof transferring to Fort Lewis where additional training facilities wereavailable. As classes graduated, buildings were closed, and the cadre andequipment were shipped to Fort Lewis. The last of the staff departed forFort Lewis on 30 September 1944, and on 15 October, the center at CampGrant was officially disbanded.18
16Annual Report, Medical Replacement TrainingCenter, Camp Grant, Ill., fiscal year 1943.
17Army Service Forces Circular No. 135, 11 May 1945.
18(1) Annual Report, Army Service Forces Training Center, CampGrant, Ill., fiscal year 1944. (2) Report, Regular Training Branch. InAnnual Report, Training Division, Office of The Surgeon General, fiscalyear 1945.
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Fort Lewis, bordering on Puget Sound, was originally the home of the3d Infantry Division. At the time the medical section of the ASF TrainingCenter at Camp Grant moved to its new site, Fort Lewis housed a numberof activities, including a Corps of Engineers training section. The surroundingterrain was flat, but wooded, and provided natural features well suitedto a diversified training program. The weather was cold and fogs were frequent,but the climate did not seriously limit activities.
Troop housing and fixed training aids, however, posed special problems.At a conference at Fort Lewis on 1 July 1944, the capacity of the engineertraining section was set at 18,000, and the medical training section wasauthorized a capacity of 30,000 trainees. Housing in north Fort Lewis wasassigned to the Engineer Corps, and the medical training section was tooccupy quarters, as required, in the southern and northeastern sectionsof the post. Quarters in south Fort Lewis, which housed approximately 60percent of the medical training section, consisted of a few three-story,brick barracks of varying capacity; some one-story, hollow-tile barracks,with a capacity for 58 men each; and a large number of two-story, 63-mancantonment barracks. In northeast Fort Lewis, trainees were housed in one-story,theater-of-operations barracks with concrete floors.
Since these areas were separated by a distance of almost 4 miles, separatetraining facilities had to be constructed at both sites. Few fixed trainingaids existed in the areas assigned to the medical training section, andthose available required extensive repairs. The problem was further complicatedby the fact that the post engineer could not provide manpower for construction.Almost without exception, training aids were built by personnel from themedical training section, with the post engineer supplying only the material.Facilities constructed by the medical training section included classroomsfor the common specialist schools and fixed training aids ranging fromrifle and carbine ranges to bayonet courts, gas chambers, obstacle courses,and demonstration areas. In short, the medical training section had tobuild almost every facility required by the center except housing.
During the period that the center was being transferred from Camp Grant,the medical training section at Fort Lewis temporarily experienced a shortageof cadre. The initial cadre, consisting of 100 officers and 250 enlistedmen, arrived at Fort Lewis between the fifth and 10th of June. Traineesbegan to arrive almost immediately, and within a month, more than 1,000were enrolled. The first training cycle began shortly before the end ofJune. On 26 June, a contingent of 97 officers arrived from Camp Barkeley,followed still later by 70 officers from the Tank Destroyer School, CampHood, Tex., who were assigned to the center for 2 months to help set upthe military training program. Cadre strength gradually increased throughoutthe summer of 1944 as instructors and overhead personnel were transferredfrom Camp Grant. By the beginning of October, the transfer was complete.
The medical training section at Fort Lewis reached its peak strengthat the end of September 1944 when more than 24,000 enlisted men were beingtrained. Four general hospitals, the first table-of-organization unitsestablished at the center under the new system of training, were activatedduring the same month. After October 1944, the level of training activityat Fort Lewis gradually declined. Train-
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ing continued on a reduced basis until February 1946, when the medicaltraining section was notified that it would be transferred to Fort SamHouston, Tex., to become part of Brooke Army Medical Center. The last unitwas transferred late in March, and on 1 April 1946, the medical trainingsection at Fort Lewis was officially closed.19
Camp Barkeley and Camp Crowder
Early in March 1941, while the Medical Replacement Training Centersat Camps Lee and Grant were still under construction, War Department GeneralStaff, G-3, Operations and Training, began to prepare plans for expandingthe Army to 2,800,000 men. Initially, The Surgeon General considered creatingtwo new centers, one in central California, with a capacity of 6,000, andanother in Texas, with a capacity of 8,000.20 A second studyof training center requirements, prepared at the end of March, suggestedexpanding the capacity of Camp Lee, and the establishment of three newcenters: One in Texas or Oklahoma with a capacity of 10,000; a second atFort Leonard Wood, Mo., with a capacity of 5,000; and a third on the westcoast, with a capacity of approximately 4,200. Anticipating the possibilityof further expansion, the War Department authorized the establishment ofa third Medical Replacement Training Center with a capacity of 4,000 traineesat Camp Barkeley on 12 July 1941.
The new Medical Replacement Training Center was located 11 miles southwestof Abilene, Tex., approximately 120 miles north of the geographic centerof the state. The main camp covered approximately 2,500 acres of land andwas located at an altitude of 1,870 feet. Hills to the south and west,which were approximately 400 feet higher, contained over 58,000 acres ofbivouac and maneuver areas. Combat ranges were located in a 9,400-acretract to the west. The climate permitted training to continue throughoutthe year, although the absence of shade and continuous duststorms madethe camp disagreeable during the spring and summer. At the time the centerwas being established, Camp Barkeley was also being used to train elementsof the 45th Infantry Division.
During the early months of operation, the center at Camp Barkeley encounteredproblems similar to those experienced by other Medical Replacement TrainingCenters during their initial stages of mobilization. On 15 August, theWar Department directed the commanding generals of the Medical ReplacementTraining Centers at Camps Lee and Grant to select a specified number ofenlisted men and train them for cadre assignments at Camp Barkeley. Thesecenters provided a total of 519 of the 640 enlisted men authorized forthe new center, and the remainder were selected from trainees completingthe basic training course. Officers selected for the center were sent tothe Medical Field Service School, Carlisle Barracks, Pa. for special trainingin August 1941, and then assigned to Camp Grant for on-the-job
19(1) Remarks, Brig. Gen. James E. Baylis,"Training Center Commander's Problems." In Notes. ArmyService Forces, 5th Training Conference, ASFTC, Camp Barkeley, Tex., 25Oct. 1944. (2) History, Medical Training Section, Army Services Force TrainingCenter, Fort Lewis, Wash., June 1944 to March 1946.
20See footnote 3 (2), p. 174.
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FIGURE 22.-Camp Barkeley,Tex., December 1941.
training. Initially, this cadre proved adequate, but as the center beganto grow, it reported a chronic shortage of staff.
The commanding general of the Medical Replacement Training Center, Brig.Gen. Roy C. Heflebower, reported at Camp Barkeley on 10 September, andon 1 November 1941, the center was officially activated. Heavy rains delayedconstruction, and when the first trainees arrived in mid-November, thebuilding program was several weeks behind schedule. Despite cold, rainyweather, inoperative heating systems, and incomplete classrooms, the firsttraining cycle began on 1 December. Since outdoor training was impractical,classes were held in the barracks, where men wrapped in overcoats sat onthe floor. Trainees accepted these conditions with good spirits, however,since the first cycle coincided with the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.
Construction was completed a few weeks after the beginning of the firstcycle, but the initial shortage of individual, organizational, and trainingequipment proved more difficult to overcome. Although equipment providedby the Medical Department usually arrived on time, and in adequate quantities,other classes of equipment were usually in short supply. As late as June1942, General Heflebower reported that the center was still awaiting suppliesordered in October 1941 and stated that: "In this connection thereis one practice which is not only a cause for annoyance, but results ina waste of time and effort, as well as delay in the ultimate receipt ofsupplies. This is the return of requisitions by intermediate headquartersasking for explanation as to the need for certain items, or questioningthe quantities
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FIGURE 23.-Hutments usedto house trainees at Camp Barkeley, Tex.
of these items requested, when the items appear on a table of allowanceissued by the War Department."21
The facilities constructed at Camp Barkeley in the fall of 1941 weredesigned for the housing and training of 4,000 enlisted men. The originalcenter, located in the northeastern section of the camp, contained standardtwo-story cantonment barracks and one-story general purpose buildings (fig.22). In addition to standard barracks and administration buildings, eachbattalion quadrangle contained two large RB-1 classroom buildings and alarge recreation hall. Other classroom buildings in the center were assignedto specialist schools.
Early in 1942, wartime growth began to produce a shortage of quartersand classrooms. When the capacity of the center was increased from 4,000to 7,600 in February 1942, the additional trainees were housed in an adjacenthutment area previously occupied by the 158th Infantry Regiment of the45th Infantry Division. The one-story 15-man hutments (fig. 23) providedadequate housing, and trainees seemed to prefer these quarters to the moremodern, two-story barracks. As classrooms, however, these long, narrowbuildings with their low ceilings were totally unsatisfactory. The lackof essential classrooms and training aids in this area, and the assignmentof similar facilities at Camp Robinson, Ark., brought forth an officialprotest from The Surgeon General. Expressing a belief that these expedientsmight jeopardize the Medical Department's chances of obtaining permanentfacilities, The Surgeon General warned the Director of Training, ASF, thatthis places "the Medical Department in the position of qualifyingtrainees toward
21Annual Report, Medical Replacement TrainingCenter, Camp Barkeley, Tex., fiscal year 1942.
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mediocrity rather than balanced training, due to the fact that administrativeand occupational specialists cannot be properly trained."22
The shortage of housing and facilities was aggravated at the end ofJune 1942 when the center was again ordered to double its capacity. Theinitial plans for housing the additional 7,000 trainees provided that twobattalions would be located to the north of the center in hutments vacatedby the 45th Infantry Division, and the remaining five battalions wouldbe placed in a tent camp that was to be erected to the southeast of theoriginal center. Before the tent camp could be completed, however, planswere altered to convert it into a hutment area capable of housing all 7,000trainees. As a result of changes and delays, this area was not completedin time to house the center's increasing capacity. The additional traineeshad to be quartered wherever space was available, often in tents at theconstruction site, and battalions had to be moved repeatedly to permitthe construction of hutments. The problem was further complicated by theexpansion of the special training unit which was supposed to contain approximately350 men but grew to a strength of about 2,000. The center was unable toprovide any of the special facilities required for their training. Constructionin the hutment area was not completed until January 1943.
Classroom facilities in the new hutment area were barely adequate. Whenthe area was being planned, the center recommended that classrooms be providedat a ratio of one large classroom and two small rooms per battalion andthat an additional classroom be provided for the Cooks and Bakers School.It gained approval, however, to construct only 15 small buildings (20 by136 feet) and four large ones (one RB-1 and three RB-2 buildings). Thelarger buildings were capable of seating two companies for a lecture orfilm and one for a demonstration or practical exercise. A company couldbe squeezed into the smaller classrooms, but the buildings were so longand narrow, and the ceilings so low, that they were little better thanhutments.
Camp Barkeley, the first Medical Replacement Training Center to be relievedof its exempted status, was placed under service command control in December1942.23 In August 1943, as Camp Pickett was being closed, thetraining center at Camp Barkeley was assigned responsibility for trainingNegro troops. During the following year, the number of Negro trainees assignedto the center varied between 1,000 and 1,400. In March 1944, Camp Barkeleywas again expanded, this time to a capacity of more than 17,000 trainees.The camp again reported a shortage of housing and serious overcrowding,but no further construction was authorized. In April 1944, the MedicalReplacement Training Center was incorporated into the preactivation systemand designated an ASF Training Center. The capacity of the center, includingunits, replacements, and preactivation fillers, was increased to 37,150.The additional trainees were housed in quarters vacated by units of theArmy Ground Forces.24
22Memorandum, The Surgeon General for Brig.Gen. C. R. Huebner, Training Division, Services of Supply, 25 Mar. 1942,subject: Temporary Increase in Training Facilities at Medical ReplacementTraining Center, Camp Grant, Ill.
23Annual Report, Medical Replacement Training Center, Camp Barkeley,Tex., fiscal year 1943.
24(1) Annual Report, Army Service Forces Training Center, CampBarkeley, Tex., fiscal year 1944. (2) Annual Report, Army Service ForcesTraining Center, Camp Barkeley, Tex., 1 July 1944 to 1 April 1945.
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When Medical Department training requirements began to decline latein 1944, Camp Barkeley was gradually phased out of the program. In September,the training load was reduced to 24,894, followed in November by a cutof 10,000. As training requirements declined still further, the Army ServiceForces decided to consolidate the center at Camp Barkeley with the SignalCorps training center at Camp Crowder. The transfer took place betweenthe 11th and 17th of March, and on 1 April, the center was officially closed.Training at Camp Crowder continued on a reduced scale until early 1946when the Medical Replacement Training Center was finally deactivated.25
Camp Joseph T. Robinson
By the time the fourth Medical Replacement Training Center was authorizedon 20 December 1941, experience gained at Camps Lee and Grant providedthe answers to many problems of center activation. The rolling, woodedplateau occupied by Camp Joseph T. Robinson, site of the new center, wasideally suited for basic enlisted training. Trees were scattered throughoutthe center, and the thick woods surrounding the camp provided areas foroutdoor classrooms (fig. 24), field problems, and bivouacs. The sandy soildried quickly after rains, and the climate permitted year-round trainingwithout hardship to trainees.
FIGURE 24.-Open-air classroomsused extensively at Camp Joseph T. Robinson, Ark.
25Annual Report, Army Service Forces TrainingCenter, Camp Crowder, Mo., for period 1 July 1945 through 26 Feb. 1946.
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The area assigned to the medical training center had formerly been occupiedby artillery, engineer, and quartermaster units of the 35th Infantry Division.Hard-surfaced roads, gravel walks, and gravel- or clay-surfaced drill fieldshad been constructed, and there were enough gas-heated, one-story buildingsto provide each company with its own messhall, dayroom, and classroom,and each battalion with a recreation building, branch camp exchange, officers'club, and infirmary. Each company was also provided with one outdoor classroom.Since the units for which the area was originally constructed varied insize, the organization and strength of training units had to be adaptedto existing utilities. This, however, proved only a minor inconvenience.
On 9 January 1942, an advance party of officers reported at Camp Robinsonand began setting up the center. By 15 January, when the center was activated,departments were organized, buildings were allotted, and supplies werebeing requisitioned. About 50 percent of the initial officer cadre arrivedon the day the center was activated, along with a complement of enlistedcadre sent by Camp Lee. Enlisted cadre from Camps Grant and Barkeley reporteda few days later. The first contingent of trainees arrived on 4 February1942, and by 23 February, 5,508 men were enrolled for training.
The first trainees were housed in tents and shifted to hutments as rapidlyas they could be constructed. By 15 August 1942, the transition had beencompleted. A steady stream of supplies and equipment flowed into the center,allowing training to proceed without interruption. Aside from needing morevehicles to perform routine administrative duties, such as drawing rationsand distributing supplies, the center did not report any major problems.
Between February 1942 and October 1943, seven training cycles were completedat Camp Robinson. The center reached its peak capacity on 23 July 1942when it was authorized to enroll approximately 7,000 trainees per cycle.During the following year, enrollment ranged between 5,000 and 7,000. On24 June 1943, the center was notified that it was to be phased out of theprogram. On 14 October 1943, after the last battalion graduated, the MedicalReplacement Training Center at Camp Robinson was officially deactivated.26
Camp Ellis
On 1 February 1943, Camp Ellis was activated and designated as an ASFunit training center. Initially, the post served as a center for trainingunits of the Quartermaster Corps, the Corps of Engineers, the Signal Corps,and the Medical Department. After the preactivation system was established,Camp Ellis also served briefly as a replacement training center. Underthe new program, medical trainees assigned to Ellis were assigned to the30th, 31st, and 32d Medical Training Regiments for 6 weeks of basic militarytraining under ASF programs at facilities controlled by the post commander.After completing this phase, they were transferred to the 28th and 29thMedical Training Regiments, activated on 23 June 1944 under
26(1) Annual Report, Medical Replacement TrainingCenter, Camp Joseph T. Robinson, Ark., fiscal year 1942. (2) Annual Report,Medical Replacement Training Center, Camp Joseph T. Robinson, Ark., fiscalyear 1943.
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the control of the medical group, for technical and tactical trainingunder Medical Department programs. On 10 November 1944, the 28th MedicalTraining Regiment was disbanded, followed on 16 December by the 29th. Duringthis period, the two units were each able to complete two 8-week trainingcycles, and a total of 15,531 men were trained.27
MOBILIZATION TRAINING PROGRAMS
From the beginning of limited mobilization to the end of World War II,nine major mobilization training programs governed the training of MedicalDepartment enlisted men.28 As the war changed complexion andgenerated fresh requirements, the length, scope, and mission of basic trainingprograms had to be adjusted to strike a new balance between objectivesand resources, and incorporate the lessons of combat.
Mobilization Training Program No. 8-1 (9 September 1940)
When war broke out in Europe in September 1939, Medical Department basictraining was governed by a program issued in 1935 for use by medical regimentssupporting infantry divisions. As the war in Europe intensified, the MedicalDepartment began to prepare a program for enlisted training, and on 9 September1940, MTP (Mobilization Training Program) No. 8-1 was published.29In contrast to its predecessor, the program provided guidelines not onlyfor training units but also for training individuals who were destinedto become fillers in newly activated units. This combination of unit andindividual training was designed to meet the requirements of an expandingarmy in which field medical units needed to support newly activated combatdivisions, as well as training centers, would be receiving raw recruitsand draftees.
Under MTP No. 8-1, enlisted men were to receive 13 weeks of basic training.As in the plan of 1935, the training cycle was divided into two phases:The first, a period of basic military training; and the second, a periodof basic technical and tactical training. After 2 weeks of basic militarytraining at the beginning of the cycle, the trainee was expected to beable to display and care for his uniform and equipment, to understand militarycourtesy, and to have acquired a fundamental knowledge of such basic militarysubjects as individual defense and march discipline.
The third to 13th weeks of the program were devoted to basic technicaland tactical training. Training in basic military subjects continued, butafter the second week of the cycle, the program stressed basic technicalsubjects that would
27Annual History of Headquarters Medical Groupfor 1944, 1644th Service Unit, Camp Ellis, Ill..
28(1) Mobilization Training Program No. 8-1, 9 Sept. 1940. (2)Mobilization Training Program No. 8-5, 5 Aug. 1941. (3) Mobilization TrainingProgram No. 8-5, 17 Nov. 1941. (4) Mobilization Training Program No. 8-5,2 Jan. 1942.
29This program superseded all similar programs distributed withcover letter, Gen. Douglas MacArthur, Chief of Staff of the Army, 1 Aug.1935, subject: Sixteen-Week Training Schedule Effective Upon Mobilization(Medical Regiment).
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FIGURE 25.-Trainees setup and operate an aid station as part of their tactical training at CampGrant, Ill.
prepare men either for specific duties or for further training at amedical unit or installation (fig. 25). During this period, men were alsotrained to march and execute tactical movements, to establish and operatebattalion or regimental dispensaries, and to maneuver with the combat armsin the field.
At the same time, men selected to become common or administrative specialistswere trained at schools established at a center. The range of common specialiststo be trained was limited to clerks, mess sergeants, and cooks. The programwas vague as to the means by which common specialists would be trainedand the amount of training required. Commanders were simply notified thata training requirement existed and were allowed a high degree of autonomyin establishing procedures.
Individuals qualified to be trained as technicians were selected atthe end of the fourth, eighth, and 12th week of the cycle and sent to MedicalDepartment special service schools or to enlisted technician schools for8 to 12 weeks of technical training.
Since the first increments of trainees sent to Medical Replacement TrainingCenters were earmarked for assignment to specific units, the centers organizedthem in groups that could be provided with special training. Trainees beingordered to numbered general hospitals, for example, were assigned to onebattalion, and
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FIGURE 26.-Class for clerk-typistsat a common specialists school, Camp Pickett, Va.
those being assigned to numbered station hospitals or evacuation hospitalswere assigned to still other battalions. Through this kind of grouping,battalion commanders were able to tailor the program to the trainee's assignment.
Mobilization Training Program No. 8-5 (5 August 1941)
By mid-1941, the Medical Department was able to turn its attention fromthe training of selectees earmarked for units activated under the limitedmobilization of September 1940 to the training of individual fillers andreplacements. On 5 August 1941, the program issued in September 1940 wassuperseded by MTP No. 8-5, which focused exclusively on the training ofindividuals. The new program retained the 13-week cycle, and provided 2weeks of basic military training, 8 weeks of basic technical training,and 3 weeks of basic tactical training. These periods remained essentiallyunchanged. There were slight variations in the number of hours allottedto each subject but none of major significance.
In contrast to its predecessor, MTP No. 8-5 emphasized the trainingof common and administrative specialists. In addition to training clerks(fig. 26), cooks, and mess sergeants, centers were authorized to providecourses for shipping and
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FIGURE 27.-A class formotor mechanics at Camp Barkeley, Tex., in 1943.
receiving clerks, supply sergeants, bandsmen, truckmasters, mechanics(fig. 27), truckdrivers, and motorcyclists. Common specialties were moreclearly defined, and training procedures for specialists were more preciselyformulated. The program also authorized the centers to provide specialtraining for junior medical and surgical technicians (fig. 28). Such technicianswere to be trained to fill an intermediate level of specialization betweenbasic medical soldiers and the graduates of enlisted technicians schools.Soldiers trained through these programs were not considered eligible fora rating higher than fifth class.
Mobilization Training Program No. 8-5 (17 November 1941)
The accelerated pace of unit activation in the fall of 1941, after Congressvoted to extend the tours of men on active duty and continue selectiveservice for an additional year, produced a demand for basic soldiers andcommon specialists beyond the capacity of existing training centers. Thisdemand could be filled in one of two ways: by expanding existing centersand activating new ones; or by shortening the
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FIGURE 28.-Unrated surgicaltechnicians view a demonstration of operating room procedures with a simulatedpatient during training conducted by the Medical Training Section, FortLewis, Wash., in 1944.
training cycle. In November 1941, the Army adopted both techniques.On 1 November, the third Medical Replacement Training Center was activatedat Camp Barkeley, and on 17 November, a new mobilization training programwas put into effect which shortened the training cycle to 11 weeks. Asin previous programs, 2 weeks were allotted for basic military training,and 3 weeks for basic tactical training. The time devoted to technicaltraining, however, was reduced from 8 to 6 weeks. The reduction was achievedby decreasing the time devoted to each subject in the program.
Mobilization Training Program No. 8-5 (2 January 1942)
The pace of unit activation was even further accelerated after the UnitedStates entered World War II. To meet the demand for trained medical soldiersand common specialists, the fourth Medical Replacement Training Centerwas activated at Camp Joseph T. Robinson, and the capacity of existingcenters was expanded. At the same time, the period of basic training forfillers and replacements was reduced to 8 weeks. Under the 8-week trainingprogram, Medical Replacement Training Centers continued to provide recruitswith 2 weeks of basic military training, but the technical training phasewas shortened from 6 to 4 weeks, and the tactical
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phase was reduced by a week. Specifically, the program was shortenedby decreasing the time devoted to subjects such as interior guard, drill,marches and bivouacs, physical conditioning, anatomy and physiology, fieldsanitation, medical aid, night combat, and the technical and tactical employmentof arms.
Mobilization Training Program No. 8-5 (1 August 1943)
Between January 1942 and August 1943, two additional programs governedbasic training at Medical Replacement Training Centers.30 Thefirst, issued on 15 November 1942, when the pace of unit activations wasbeginning to decline, returned the centers to an 11-week training cycle.The second, published on 12 May 1943, restored an additional week to theprogram.
While these changes were taking place, the Allied war effort moved fromthe defensive to limited offensives in North Africa and the South Pacific,and combat tests of the training provided Medical Department enlisted menproduced changes in organization and doctrine. On 1 August 1943, when trainingrequirements were
FIGURE 29.-Trainees negotiatingthe obstacle course at Camp Pickett, Va., under live machinegun fire.
30(1) Mobilization Training Program No. 8-5,15 Nov. 1942. (2) Mobilization Training Program No. 8-5, 12 May 1943.
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at an ebb, a new training program was published that reflected boththe reduced demand for fillers and lessons learned in combat.
Under the new program, trainees were provided with 17 weeks of basictraining: 6 weeks of basic military training, followed by 8 weeks of technicaland tactical training, and 3 weeks of intensive field training. Experiencein the theater was reflected by the addition of subjects such as hand-to-handcombat, demolition, boobytraps and mines, infiltration, village fighting,and knots and lashings. Commanders were urged to move trainees into thefield whenever possible and to train them under simulated combat conditions(fig. 29).
Mobilization Training Program No. 8-1 (1 June 1944)
On 15 April 1944, training centers under the jurisdiction of Army ServiceForces were revamped to shift emphasis from training fillers for newlyactivated units to providing replacements for units in the theater.31Before this revision, ASF medical units were activated wherever adequatehousing and training facilities were available. While units were supposedto be assigned fillers who were graduates of replacement training centers,they were frequently required to provide basic training for a few who wereshipped directly from reception centers. This burden grew heavier afterOctober 1943, when the capacity of the Medical Replacement Training Centerswas reduced to the point that only replacements could be trained. By thistime, Camps Pickett and Robinson had been deactivated, and the flow oftrainees through Camps Barkeley and Grant was reduced to a prescribed numberof replacements. Medical Replacement Training Centers could no longer serveas "feeder belts" providing trained enlisted men to newly activatedunits, and units were required to assume almost the entire burden of conductingbasic military and technical training.
In April 1944, the Army Service Forces attempted to eliminate this problemby transforming Medical Replacement Training Centers into ASF TrainingCenters. Under their new designation, training centers were to act as "collectingpoints" for the training of all medical personnel and units and as"pools" providing units with trained enlisted men.
The men assigned to the center for basic training were to include thefollowing: Selectees from reception centers, surplus personnel from servicecommand or Zone of Interior installations, surplus personnel from table-of-organizationunits and deactivated units, designated personnel from the Army SpecializedTraining Program, men from War Department reassignment centers who requiredretraining, and unassigned personnel from ASF schools and general hospitals.ASF Training Centers, in turn, were to train these men for assignment asloss replacements, rotational replacements, cadre, and fillers for ASFtable-of-organization units and Zone of Interior installations. Centerswere required to keep 95 percent of their trainees available for assignmentas replacements. Whenever the number available fell below 95 percent ofthe input allotment, enlisted men being trained for other purposes hadto be reassigned.
31Army Service Forces Circular No. 104, 15Apr. 1944.
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On 1 May 1944, the Army Service Forces issued MTP No. 21-3 which governedthe training of all male enlisted personnel under its jurisdiction. TheASF program continued the 17-week cycle established by MTP No. 8-1 on 1August 1943: 6 weeks of basic military training, followed by 8 weeks ofbasic tactical and technical instruction, and concluded by 3 weeks of basicteam training. For the first time, however, the programs controlling basicmilitary training, and the technical training of nonmedical common specialists,were standardized throughout the Army Service Forces. In sum, the ArmyService Forces took over the responsibility for writing training programsfor common specialists such as mechanics, drivers, and cooks, and the MedicalDepartment was limited to writing programs for such medical specialistsas sanitary and veterinary technicians. The framework of documents governingthe system was completed when a Medical Department program for the trainingof units and medical common specialists was published on 1 June 1944.32
Under the standardized basic program prescribed by Army Service Forces,Medical Department enlisted men were required to participate in 96 hoursof training in the use of weapons, including the rifle, the carbine, thebayonet, and grenades.33 Field training was increasingly emphasized,and commanders were urged to conduct as many night exercises as possible.During the last year of the war, emphasis was placed on conditions likelyto be encountered in the Pacific, and information from that theater wasmade available to all training centers, regardless of whether it conformedto doctrine.34
After completing their basic military training, most enlisted men wererequired to participate in some form of technical training. The new system,however, had greater flexibility than the one it replaced. Men who weredisqualified for overseas assignment were given as much basic militaryand technical training as they were capable of absorbing, and those whopossessed usable occupational skills could be assigned appropriate dutiesafter their basic military training. Men selected for training as enlistedtechnicians, who formerly would have been assigned to a unit or installationafter graduating from Medical Department Enlisted Technicians Schools,were returned to the training center and credited with completing the technicalphase of instruction.35 At the end of this phase, all men wererequired to complete 3 weeks of unit or team training.
While the program at ASF Training Centers was established primarilyto train enlisted replacements, it was also used to guide the trainingof fillers and cadre for Medical Department units being activated underASF control. Men earmarked as fillers and cadre were separated from thebasic training program at the end of the 14th week of the cycle, alongwith men who had completed their training for enlisted technicians schools,and assigned to units scheduled for activation at the centers. When suchunits were activated, they were required to complete 3 weeks of field trainingcomparable to the team training phase of the replacement program,
32Mobilization Training Program No. 8-1, 1June 1944.
33Mobilization Training Program No. 21-3, 1 May 1944.
34Memorandum, Lt. Col. Charles H. Moseley, MC, Deputy Director,Training Division, Office of The Surgeon General, to Commanding General,Army Service Forces Training Center, Camp Grant, Ill., 15 July 1944, subject:Information From the Field.
35See footnote 33.
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and 3 weeks of special unit training. Because of its special provisionsfor training units, the program was commonly referred to as "preactivationtraining" or the "preactivation system."
As the war entered its final phases, the program at ASF Training Centerswas revised to provide even greater flexibility. Medical sections of ASFTraining Centers were receiving enlisted men from a variety of sources,and constant adjustments were necessary to provide each man with trainingsuited to his needs. Enlisted men sent to medical training centers fromother arms or services, for example, usually did not need to repeat thebasic military phase of the program. By the same token, many Medical Departmenttechnicians who were being sent overseas as loss replacements after longperiods of service in the Zone of Interior needed only military and teamtraining. These were only minor problems, however, compared to those encounteredin the retraining of enlisted men who were returning from duty overseas.Frequently, such men had more experience than their instructors and wereinclined to take a dim view of anything that smacked of basic training.
On 5 February 1945, the War Department took an important step towardincreasing the flexibility of the system by urging commanders at all echelonsto give personal attention to the training and assignment of men who hadreturned from the theaters. Commanders were reminded of their responsibilityfor evaluating the background, experience, and physical and mental capacityof enlisted men before committing them to a program of training. In addition,the War Department made it clear that soldiers with combat experience didnot automatically have to satisfy requirements written into programs fornewly inducted trainees. Men who had been returned to the Zone of Interiorfor redeployment were to be trained separately from inexperienced replacements,so they would not feel that they were repeating basic training.
Mobilization Training Program No. 8-1 (15 April 1945)
Special retraining programs for enlisted men were formally establishedby a revised basic military training program published by the Army ServiceForces on 10 March 1945 and by a Medical Department technical and teamtraining program issued on 15 April.36 Under these procedures,ASF Training Centers were required to screen the records of men sent forretraining and evaluate each individual's qualifications. Men who had completedmobilization training at an Army Service Forces or AGF (Army Ground Forces)training center, or who had participated in redeployment training within6 months before being transferred to the Army Service Forces, were exemptedfrom further basic military training. Men who could not satisfy these qualifications,and those who had been trained at AAF (Army Air Forces) training centers,were required to complete basic military refresher courses. The qualificationsof men from both groups were then evaluated to determine whether they shouldbe retained at the center for technical and team training, or
36(1) Mobilization Training Program No. 8-1,15 Apr. 1945. (2) Mobilization Training Program No. 21-4, 10 Mar. 1945.
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assigned directly to a unit or Zone of Interior installation. The programfor newly inducted trainees remained unchanged.
The revised mobilization training programs also allowed the MedicalDepartment to regain control over the training of all its common specialists.Courses for these specialists, and all other enlisted men trained by theMedical Department, were refocused to prepare trainees for service in thePacific theater. Special training was provided, for example, in the preventionand control of tropical diseases such as malaria, dengue, filariasis, typhus,and plague. Periods were also set aside for instruction in subjects suchas the protection of equipment from moisture and fungus, stream crossing,and the identification of Japanese uniforms and equipment. Emphasis onrealism, field experience, and night training reached its wartime peak.
By the end of World War II, a highly flexible and refined system hadbeen developed for training Medical Department enlisted men. Training cyclescould be lengthened or shortened to meet the demand of the moment, andcourse content could be adjusted to meet the needs of the theater. Individualand unit training had been linked together under the preactivation system,and many of the problems of unit activation had been minimized. Finally,a working system was developed for retraining men who were being rotatedto and from the Zone of Interior.
TRAINING PROGRAMS FOR ARMY AIR FORCES ENLISTED PERSONNEL
Until the reorganization of the War Department in 1942, enlisted medicalpersonnel serving in the Army Air Corps received their basic training atMedical Replacement Training Centers along with men scheduled for assignmentto all other components of the Army. Requisitions for personnel requiredby Army Air Corps units and installations were submitted to the War Department,which allocated the output of centers on the basis of need. In November1941, for example, the Chief of Staff approved a plan that required theMedical Department to provide the Army Air Corps with 11,282 white and844 Negro medical soldiers by the end of February 1942. Approximately two-thirdsof these men were to be provided by Medical Replacement Training Centers,and the balance were to be reassigned from medical units.37
During the reorganization of 1942, responsibility for training men assignedto ASWAAF (Arms and Services With the Army Air Forces) was transferredto the Air Forces. For several months after the reorganization, the WarDepartment assigned arms and services personnel trained by the Army ServiceForces to the Army Air Forces by redesignating replacements who were notneeded in the theater as fillers. Army Service Forces could not hope tofill AAF requirements through this system, however, since the War Departmentrefused to allow further expansion of its already strained facilities,and the Air Forces would not allow trainees earmarked for Army Air Forcesto be diverted through ASF centers. By August 1942, Army Air Forces wasreporting a shortage of more than 97,000 ASWAAF fillers. When the Chiefof Staff of the Army Air Forces, Maj. Gen. (later Lt. Gen.) George
37Memorandum, Lt. Col. C. H. Karlstad, GSC,Chief, Mobilization Branch, for Chief, Operations Branch, 26 Nov, 1941,subject: Personnel for Arms and Services with the Army Air Forces.
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TABLE 10.-Output of MedicalReplacement Training Centers, 1942-45
Trained personnel | Fiscal year 1942 | Fiscal year 1943 | Fiscal year 1944 | Fiscal year 1945 | Total |
Medical Replacement Training Centers1 | |||||
Camps Lee and Pickett | 39,492 | 44,922 | 8,903 | ----- | 93,317 |
Camp Grant | 26,566 | 31,672 | 21,323 | ----- | 79,561 |
Camp Barkeley | 11,322 | 45,256 | 21,320 | ----- | 77,898 |
Camp Robinson | 2,384 | 36,325 | 4,081 | ----- | 42,790 |
Total | 79,764 | 158,175 | 55,627 | ----- | 293,566 |
Men shipped to Enlisted Technicians Schools, discharged, and so forth2 | (3) | 3(21,259) | 37,459 | ----- | 37,459 |
Total | 79,764 | 158,175 | 93,086 | ----- | 331,025 |
Common or occupational specialists | 14,615 | 41,957 | 14,588 | 9,368 | 80,528 |
Preactivation, loss, rotational, and others4 | ----- | ----- | ----- | 40,482 | 40,482 |
Grand total | 94,379 | 200,132 | 107,674 | 49,850 | 452,035 |
1Basically trained Medical Department enlistedmen.
2Of this number, approximately 58,718 were sent to EnlistedTechnicians Schools, 4,534 to Army Specialized Training Units, and othersto Officer Candidate Schools just before, or soon after, completion ofbasic training.
3Included in total figure immediately above.
4Includes personnel trained under Army Service Forces CircularNo. 104, 15 Apr. 1944.
Sources: (1) Annual Report, Training Division, Office of The Surgeon General,fiscal year 1944. (2) Annual Report, Training Division, Office of The SurgeonGeneral, fiscal year 1945.
E. Stratemeyer, complained to War Department General Staff, G-3, on3 October 1942, that Army Service Forces had failed to provide Army AirForces with an adequate number of enlisted men, and demanded authorityto establish AAF training programs for arms and services personnel, theDirector of Training, ASF, pointed out that such training had been an AirForces responsibility for more than 5 months, and agreed that Army AirForces should, indeed, establish training programs.38 For theremainder of the war, medical soldiers serving with the Army Air Forceswere provided with basic training centers under adaptations of technicaltraining programs designed by the Medical Department. The Surgeon Generalcontinued to coordinate all training policies, plans, and activities withinArmy Service Forces, Army Ground Forces, and Army Air Forces, and to trainreplacements and fillers for Army Ground Forces and Army Service Forces.39
38(1) Memorandum, Maj. Gen. George E. Stratemeyer,Chief of the Army Air Forces, for Chief of Staff, 3 Oct. 1942, subject:Assumption of Responsibility for Training ASWAAF Personnel by AAF. (2)Memorandum, Brig. Gen. C. R. Huebner, Director of Training, Services ofSupply, for Commanding General, Army Air Forces, 7 Oct. 1942, subject:Assumption for Training ASWAAF by the AAF.
39(1) Annual Report, Training Division, Operations Service,Office of The Surgeon General, fiscal year 1943. (2) Memorandum, Maj. WilliamA. Moore, MC, to Col. Wood S. Woolford, MC, Acting Air Surgeon, 4 Dec.1942, subject: Training of Medical Department Enlisted Men. (3) Memorandum,Maj. William A. Moore, MC, to Col. Wood S. Woolford, MC, Acting Air Surgeon,9 Dec. 1942, subject: Report of Conference on Training at Hq. T.T.C., KnollwoodAirport, Southern Pines, N.C. (4) Letter, Col. Wood S. Woolford, MC, ActingAir Surgeon, to Director of Individual Training, Headquarters, Army AirForces, 11 Dec. 1942, subject: Basic Medical Training for Medical DepartmentEnlisted Men at Basic Training Centers of the Air Force Technical TrainingCommand.
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CHART 3.-Periods oftraining, Medical Replacement Training Centers, 1941-46
Source: Goodman, Samuel M.: Charts on EmergencyTraining Agencies and Courses. Volume X. [Official record.]
OUTPUT OF MEDICAL REPLACEMENT TRAINING CENTERS
The rate at which the Medical Department was able to train fillers andreplacements was governed by three major factors: (1) The supply of traineesprovided by induction centers; (2) the combined capacity of the centersper cycle, usually expressed in terms of housing; and (3) the length ofthe training cycle. In the course of World War II, each of these factorshad to be adjusted to enable the Medical Department to meet War Departmenttraining quotas. For more than a year after the first training centerswere established, for example, Medical Replacement Training Centers wereunable to come to capacity training levels because reception centers couldnot fill their quotas. The trainees who were shipped were usually behindschedule, producing a lag between cycles and idle capacity.40It was not until mid-1942 that training centers reported a relatively constantflow of inductees from the reception centers.
The output of Medical Replacement Training Centers was most frequentlyaltered by adjustments in the length of the training cycle. Output percycle could be increased only by providing additional facilities, and constructioncould not keep pace with demand. By shortening the training cycle, however,the War Department could increase the number of cycles in any given period.
The interaction of physical capacity and cycle length can be illustratedby a comparison of the Medical Department's annual training capacity inmid-1942
40Annual Report, Medical Replacement TrainingCenter, Camp Grant, Ill., fiscal year 1941.
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CHART 4.-Length oftraining cycles, Medical Replacement Training Centers, 1940-46
SOURCE: Goodman, Samuel M.: The Training of Replacements,Fillers, and Cadres, 1939-1945. Volume V. [Official record]
and mid-1943. On 30 June 1942, Medical Replacement Training Centershad a combined capacity for training 36,000 enlisted men every 10 weeks,or an annual capacity for training 187,200.41 By June 1943,these centers were capable of training more than 44,349 enlisted men percycle. At this point, however, the length of the cycle had been increasedby 4 weeks, and the annual capacity was reduced to 164,091.42The reverse effect was produced whenever the cycle was shortened. The annualoutput of training centers, the length of the training cycle, and the centersin operation during World War II are illustrated in table 10 and charts3 and 4.
TRAINING PROCEDURES
Three parallel trends are evident in the development of procedures fortraining Medical Department soldiers: ever greater "realism,"increased emphasis on the principle of "learning by doing," andcontinuous growth in the amount of time devoted to field problems. Thesetrends developed, in part, through changes in the mobilization trainingprograms, but they were shaped as well by developments at the Medical ReplacementTraining Centers and the Office of The Surgeon General.
Field Training
Changes in the mobilization training programs guiding the training ofenlisted men provide an index to trends in Medical Department trainingprocedures. The first mobilization training programs did not set asidean unbroken period for field exercises. Subjects included in the tacticalphase of training were simply enumerated, and the individual training centerswere allowed to determine how and where the subjects would be taught.43
41Annual Report, Training Division, OperationsService, Office of The Surgeon General, fiscal year 1942.
42See footnote 39 (1), p, 199.
43See footnotes 28 (1) and (2), p. 189.
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The concept of a tactical training period "largely devoted to fieldand applicatory exercises" began to develop when a Medical Departmentmobilization training program issued in November 1941 set aside 3 weeksfor field training.44 A second stage in the development of theconcept was produced by a training program published in August 1943, whichmerged tactical training with technical and logistical training, and lengthenedthe training cycle to 17 weeks by the addition of a 3-week "fieldtraining period" at the end of basic training. During this period,men were required to apply their newly acquired skills under "fieldand simulated war conditions," and the program directed that "wherepracticable and facilities permit, the soldier should be moved into thefield and should live under field conditions * * *."45
These concepts provided only limited guidance, however, and MedicalReplacement Training Centers frequently pioneered the development of methodsthat were later incorporated into the mobilization training programs. Oneof the first steps was taken at Camp Lee, where a specially designed orientationprogram dramatically presented the mission of the Medical Department totrainees a few days after their arrival. Unaware of their destination,trainees were marched under cover of darkness to a natural amphitheaterin the woods, where they watched the staging of a mock battle in whichaidmen moved forward to treat simulated casualties. Sound effects wereprovided by dynamite blasts and amplified recordings of bombs, artillery,and small arms fire, and while the cast played its part, a narrator indoctrinatedtrainees in the combat mission of medical soldiers.46 When CampRobinson adopted this technique, attacks by low flying aircrafts and chemicalattacks with smoke and tear gas were added to the simulated battle conditions.Camp Robinson also constructed an infiltration course before one was requiredin medical programs, so that trainees could practice emergency treatmentand evacuation of casualties under enemy observation and fire.47
The emphasis on field training was carried still further at Camp Barkeleyin 1942 and 1943, when each battalion was required to complete a 5-dayfield exercise at the end of the training cycle. During this period, thebattalion marched to a maneuver area, set up field kitchens, slept in sheltertents, and functioned as regimental medical detachments, or as medicalbattalions responsible for operating aid stations, collecting stations,and clearing stations. Simulated casualties of all types were used to provideexperience in diagnosis, treatment, and the transportation of patientsin the field. Emphasis was placed on the selection of sites; camouflage;cover and concealment; individual security; defense against air, mechanized,chemical, and airborne attacks; the care and handling of equipment; andpersonal hygiene and sanitation. During the course of the problem, traineeswere rotated so that each man assisted in the operation of each type ofstation. All trainees, whether they were basic medical soldiers or commonspecialists such as motor mechanics, chauffeurs, and cooks, were requiredto participate in the exercise.48
44See footnote 28 (3), p. 189.
45Mobilization Training Program No. 8-5, 1 Aug. 1943 (Tentative).
46(1) See footnote 8, p. 175. (2) Letter, Brig. Gen. W. R. Dear,Medical Replacement Training Center, Camp Pickett, Va., to Col. Frank B.Wakeman, MC, Office of The Surgeon General, 11 Nov. 1942.
47See footnote 26 (2), p. 188.
48Annual Report, Army Service Forces Training Center, Camp Barkeley,Tex., fiscal year 1944.
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Wartime trends in technique reached their culmination on 15 April 1945,when the final program of the war was published. The new program deniedtraining centers any latitude in deciding whether the "field trainingperiod" would actually be spent in the field, and eliminated escapeclauses such as "where practicable and facilities permit." Thelast 3 weeks of the 17-week cycle were set aside for "team training,"and the program directed that "the trainees [would] be bivouackedin the field during the 3 weeks' team training and [would not] be quarteredin a permanent camp except in emergency."49 The program alsorequired a minimum of four moves to new bivouac sites, with two being madeat night. Instructors were urged to make every aspect of the problem realistic,and surprise air, gas, and mechanized attacks were required. At least oneof these attacks had to result in an emergency movement to an alternatebivouac area that had been mined and booby trapped by an advance party.
Improvisation in the use of field expedients was particularly stressed.Trainees were required to mess on emergency field rations for at least48 hours, and dehydrated foods were prepared for other meals. During theseperiods, the unit was not allowed to operate a field mess. Maneuvers werenot to be halted merely because they interfered with a scheduled meal.Trainees were expected to perform for long periods under continuous pressureand to exert maximum effort for short periods.
To produce these effects, a master field problem encompassing the medicalsupport of an infantry division was incorporated into the training program.The problem was designed for one training battalion and required a maneuverarea with sufficient depth and frontage to permit the installation of medicalunits performing first and second echelon evacuation. During the firstof four phases of the problem, one company of the training battalion actedas infantry, while a second played the part of medical detachments supportinginfantry regiments. A third company was cast in the role of a collectingcompany, and the fourth acted as a clearing company. Each training companywas called upon to select sites, set up its equipment, and function asit would in combat. At the end of each period, the companies were rotated,and the trainees changed jobs, so that every man would have an opportunityto practice a job in each unit. Specialists such as mechanics, truckdrivers,clerks, and medical technicians performed the job for which they were beingtrained.
At the beginning of the problem, the unit received a complete writtenfield order covering the first period of operation. Trainees were thenmarched from the camp to bivouac areas under simulated combat conditions.Front and rear guards were posted, and march discipline was enforced. Theproblem opened with an attack in which trainees became simulated casualtiesand were given emergency medical treatment by other trainees acting ascompany aidmen. Treatment at this echelon consisted of controlling hemorrhage,treating shock, applying improvised or issued splints, bandaging, givingplasma, and preparing slings. Litter bearers then evacuated casualtiesto the battalion aid station where they were checked and given additionaltreatment. After treatment, records were initiated, and casualties weresorted for further evacuation. Collecting company litter bearers evacuatedcasualties to a collecting station, where more elaborate treatment wasprovided,
49Mobilization Training Program No. 8-1, 15Apr. 1945.
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FIGURE 30.-See legendon opposite page.
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FIGURE 30.-Trainees atCamp Joseph T. Robinson, Ark., learn to evacuate wounded men from tanksby practicing on wooden models.
and the system of property exchange was put into operation. After beingtreated at the collecting station, casualties were evacuated by ambulanceto a clearing station, where additional treatment was provided, and mocksurgical operations were performed. After additional records had been initiatedand an emergency medical tag had been filled out, the problem was terminated.
While the maneuver was in progress, instructors were required to provideclose supervision and make on-the-spot corrections of errors. Traineeswere expected to handle casualties by approved techniques and to use fieldexpedients whenever patients had to be transported over difficult terrain.Commanders were encouraged to add any difficulty they thought might beencountered in combat to the program.
Training Aids
The use of training aids to provide vicarious experience grew apacewith emphasis on "realism" and "learning by doing."In the early years of the war, training centers had to rely almost exclusivelyon their own resources. Higher authorities usually confined themselvesto preparing manuals and rationing supplies needed for the program. Medicinesand equipment were in such short supply that the pace of training couldoften be maintained only by rotating them between battalions. Trainingsets were few in number, and those that were issued to the centers frequentlyhad to be adapted to uses for which they were not originally intended.
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Under these conditions, centers had to devise their own training aids.Every center contained a carpentry shop and an art shop that could be turnedto the task, and these shops produced a wide range of devices, some ofwhich were later perfected and issued as standard training equipment. AtCamp Lee, for example, skilled enlisted men made plaster casts of the body,and painted them to show all types of fractures and injuries. Cross-sectionalmodels were similarly constructed to show the location of muscles and organs.Store mannequins were used to depict war scenes, and puppet shows wereoccasionally used to illustrate lessons in military courtesy. At some centers,miniature battlefields were constructed to demonstrate the deployment ofmedical installations in combat. Murals designed to impress the medicalsoldier with the importance of his mission were painted in dayrooms, recreationbuildings, and other areas where trainees gathered, and posters were usedto reinforce this indirect indoctrination. Terrain features such as streamsand lakes were employed not only to train men in methods of transportingthe wounded over water barriers but also to train them in the use of landingnets and in methods for boarding and disembarking from transport vessels.50Mock hospital trains, tanks (fig. 30), and C-47's were also constructedat the centers to provide equipment for training in the evacuation andtransportation of the wounded.
In mid-1942, the Surgeon General's Office began to take a more activerole in the development of training aids. A set of three-dimensional trainingaids and rubber moulages designed by the Training Division were used extensivelyto orient trainees to the wounds they would encounter in combat. The TrainingDivision also made a large number of graphic materials available, includingtraining films, filmstrips, and still prints, and a series of sketcheson first aid.51 When medical supplies became available for trainingpurposes, the Training Division recommended that first aid packets be distributedto enlisted men so that exercises in the use of the packet could be incorporatedinto all basic training programs. By the end of the war, the Surgeon General'sOffice had also developed a training set for use in teaching the administrationof blood plasma and a simulated morphine Syrette.
By mid-1944, when the Medical Replacement Training Centers were integratedinto ASF Training Centers, the supply of training equipment had increasedto the point that units undergoing preactivation training could be providedwith a substantial portion of the equipment they would use in the theaterof operations. Individuals and units were no longer trained to use equipmentthey saw only in diagrams. At each center, a field hospital was permanentlyset up for use in demonstrations, and on two occasions, hospital trainswere routed through the centers so they could be examined by trainees.52During the last year of the war, training aids were available to supplementalmost every phase of instruction.
CADRE AND STAFF TRAINING
Medical Replacement Training Centers were plagued by cadre problemsthroughout World War II. Inadequate numbers, lack of training, the lossof quali-
50See footnotes 8, p. 175; 16, p. 181; and26 (2), p. 188.
51See footnote 39 (1), p. 199.
52See footnote 18 (2), p. 181.
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fied instructors to other units, and frequent expansion and contractionof the training program combined to create a seemingly unending personnelproblem. Prewar plans provided little guidance. The Surgeon General's ProtectiveMobilization Plan of 1939, for example, placed a higher priority on assigningcadres to newly activated units than to training centers, and then madethe centers responsible for cadre training.53 With the onsetof mobilization, the shortcomings of prewar planning came sharply intofocus.
The pioneer centers established at Camps Lee and Grant early in 1941ran headlong into the problem of creating a training staff. A majorityof the officers sent to Camp Lee had attended a monthlong refresher courseat Carlisle Barracks, Pa., before their arrival at the center, but theirpreparation proved inadequate to qualify them either as instructors oras commanders of training units. Few Regular Army officers had either commandedunits or trained green troops, and the preparation of most of the Reserveofficers assigned to the center was limited to ROTC (Reserve Officers'Training Corps), correspondence courses, and an occasional 2 weeks at summercamp.54
The first group of officers assigned to Camp Lee so unsettled ColonelHawley, the Director of Training, that 5 days before the first shipmentof trainees was due to arrive, he fired off a tart letter to the TrainingDivision, Surgeon General's Office, stating that "if the new officershave no more experience and training than the ones just sent us, they willbe utterly worthless for at least one month. The Surgeon General's Officecould help a little by getting this green material in as early as possibleso that we can do something with it before the selectees arrive."55The commanding general of Camp Grant, after encountering similar problems,stated flatly that "without exception, company commanders were unqualifiedfor their work." Both centers established special cadre schools toindoctrinate officers in the fundamentals of instruction and responsibilitiesof leadership. At Camp Grant, however, weather closed in before the centeropened, confining the school to indoor instruction.
If the Medical Department was hard pressed to furnish qualified trainingofficers, it found it even more difficult to provide enlisted trainingcadre. War Department mobilization plans gave the formation of tacticalunits priority over the training of selectees, and the few Medical Departmentenlisted men who had received military training before the war had beenassigned to newly activated units. Frequently, Medical Replacement TrainingCenters appeared to be taking the leftovers. The enlisted men sent to CampsLee and Grant as cadre were supposed to have been trained, but they weredescribed by the commanding general of Camp Grant as "a conglomeratemass" and a "pitiful group."56 Both centers attemptedto train these men for their duties before opening, but at Camp Grant,weather kept both officers and enlisted men indoors.
53(1) The Surgeon General's Protective MobilizationPlan, 15 Dec. 1939, with annexes. (2) Goodman, Samuel M.: History of MedicalDepartment Training, U.S. Army World War II. Volume I. Draft of IntroductoryChapter. [Official record.]
54See footnote 15, p. 180.
55See footnote 1 (1), p. 173.
56See footnote 15, p. 180.
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During the first few months that the centers were in operation, WarDepartment replacement policies made it difficult to eliminate uselessand unfit enlisted men from the cadre. Under the existing system, centerswere required to submit requisitions for personnel to The Adjutant General3 months in advance of their assignment. While the system was adequatefor long-range planning, it created serious problems for agencies chargedwith training peacetime draftees during their single year of service.
In mid-1941, the War Department began to reconsider its unit activationpolicies. In July 1941, the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, informed thechiefs of the arms and services that the establishment of cadre trainingcamps and special service schools was being considered and invited themto comment.57
In reply, The Surgeon General strongly endorsed the establishment ofcadre training schools. The Medical Department's experience indicated thatonly basic medical soldiers and lower administrative specialists couldbe trained during a 13 week cycle. A few men with technical skills acquiredin civilian life might be qualified for the third and fourth grades ofenlisted rank, but too few to meet cadre requirements. The capacity ofthe Medical Field Service School noncommissioned officers' course was only200 per year and obviously inadequate for mobilization. To break this bottleneck,The Surgeon General recommended the establishment of noncommissioned officers'schools at replacement training centers. By careful selection and an additional6 to 10 weeks of training, he thought the Medical Department would be ableto qualify at least part of the corporals and duty sergeants required innontechnical positions.
Officers, The Surgeon General believed, should undergo similar training.During the first year of mobilization, the Medical Department had beenable to qualify commissioned cadres through refresher courses at the MedicalField Service School. Once the pool of Reserve Corps and National Guardofficers was exhausted, however, the Medical Department would have to commissionrecent graduates of medical schools who had no previous military training.The basic course at the Medical Field Service School would have to be extendedto 3 months, and the facilities of the school expanded. These men couldthen be qualified for service in tactical units and installations by amonth or two of service at replacement training centers.58
While these schools were originally intended to prepare enlisted mento staff newly activated units, they also became a major source of trainingcenter cadre. On 25 September 1941, after Selective Service and the termsof men already drafted were extended for an additional year, the War Departmentexempted replacement training centers from the restrictions of the standardreplacement system and authorized them to select men necessary to replacecadre losses from qualified graduates of the center.
Long before this policy was announced, Medical Replacement TrainingCenters began using their graduates to replace cadre losses. Training centersadopted
57Memorandum, Brig. Gen. Harry L. Twaddle,Assistant Chief of Staff, War Department General Staff, G-3, for The SurgeonGeneral, 17 July 1941, subject: Training of Cadres for New Units at ReplacementTraining Centers.
58Memorandum, The Surgeon General for the Assistant Chief ofStaff, War Department General Staff, G-3, 26 July 1941, subject: Trainingof Cadres for New Units at Replacement Training Centers.
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this policy shortly after the beginning of the first training cycle,when it was discovered that trainees with ROTC and CMTC (Civilian MilitaryTraining Camp) experience were often better prepared to conduct classesand act as squad and section leaders than the Regular Army enlisted menassigned to serve as cadre. Following the exchange of communications betweenThe Surgeon General and the Assistant Chief of Staff in July 1941, noncommissionedofficers' schools were established at both Medical Replacement TrainingCenters. Because a special training program had not been authorized, classeswere held at night or between training periods. A measure of their effectivenesscan be found in the experience of Camp Grant, where, in the period immediatelyfollowing the establishment of the schools, approximately 20 percent ofthe cadre were graduates of the center.59 By continuing theprocess of replacing inefficient cadre members with graduates of the schools,centers were able to develop a highly competent staff. These schools continuedto be a major source of cadre replacements until 15 March 1944 when theywere replaced by leadership training courses.
Once Camps Lee and Grant had lifted themselves by their bootstraps,they were able to supply cadre for the new centers that were being activated.In November 1941, for example, the two centers sent a total of more than560 officers and enlisted men to staff Camp Barkeley, and a similar numberwere sent to Camp Robinson when it was activated early in 1942.
For a time, cadre schools provided an answer to the problem of securinga training staff. While quality improved, quantity remained a problem,and during periods of expansion, almost every replacement center reporteda shortage of cadre and overhead personnel. Beginning in April 1943, however,a struggle to provide a qualified cadre was renewed. This time, the problemresulted from a War Department policy requiring Medical Replacement TrainingCenters to replace 80 percent of their enlisted cadre strength with limitedservice personnel.60 Highly qualified enlisted men suitablefor overseas duty had to be replaced at a rate of not less than 5 percenta month, and their replacements were not necessarily qualified as instructors.Indeed, a large proportion of the replacements sent to the centers werelimited not only physically but also mentally. At Camp Grant, for example,over 50 percent of the 451 limited service personnel sent as replacementswere found to have scored in the lower two classes on the Army GeneralClassification Test.61
Even limited service men who were mentally alert required extensivetraining before they could be used as instructors. Camp Barkeley had toarrange with the Eighth Service Command to transfer permanent general servicepersonnel from center and regimental headquarters to cadre positions andto replace them with branch immaterial limited service personnel. Sincemost of these men were familiar with Medical Department doctrines, it provedless difficult to train them as instructors. Unfortunately, only a smallnumber of such men were available. Early in 1944, Camp Barkeley also obtainedpermission to conduct 4 weeks of training
59See footnote 15, p. 180.
60(1) See footnotes 16, p. 181; and 23 (1), p. 186. (2) Letter,The Adjutant General to The Surgeon General, 7 Apr. 1943, subject: Utilizationof Limited Service Personnel.
61See footnote 16, p. 181.
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for limited service personnel sent as replacements. Those who provedacceptable could be retained, and the remainder were to be returned tothe Eighth Service Command for reassignment. The course began on 13 March,but was discontinued on 28 May, when it was concluded that the low qualityof the men being sent to the school made its continuation uneconomical.62
War Department rotation policies also made it difficult to retain competenttraining officers. By careful selection and supplementary training, centershad been able to overcome initial difficulties and develop a skilled officercadre. Beginning in mid-1943, however, an increasing number of experiencedtraining officers were sent overseas as replacements for officers scheduledfor rotation, and training centers were required to train a growing volumeof returnees as instructors.63
In July 1944, Army Service Forces directed schools and training centersto review the qualifications of all instructors and to revise their instructortraining and guidance programs to meet minimum ASF standards.64Standards outlined in the directives were considered minimal, and commanderswere urged to expand their programs to meet local needs. As a result, courselength and content varied from center to center. The shortest course establishedlasted 2 weeks, and the longest was 1 month. Content was divided betweenmilitary techniques of instruction, and specific military subjects. Classesin military techniques of instruction included topics such as trainingliterature, lesson preparation, lecture preparation, demonstration methods,training films, filmstrips, and the preparation and use of sand tables.Specific military subjects included map reading, first aid, military sanitation,malaria control, and other topics of military importance.65The purpose of these programs was to qualify officers as instructors beforethey were assigned to any particular unit. Almost all pool officers participatedin the program, and those who demonstrated their proficiency were retainedas instructors.66
In March 1944, Army Service Forces directed the establishment of troopleadership schools for enlisted personnel at all ASF training centers andauthorized commanders to enroll 3 percent of the strength of the center.Men attending these schools were chosen from trainees who had completedbasic training and demonstrated a capacity for leadership and from enlistedmen permanently assigned to the cadre. The 9-week program at troop leadershipschools was divided into two phases. During the first phase, which lasted3 weeks, students received formal instruction in teaching methods and inthe duties of noncommissioned officers. The second 6 weeks of the programwas devoted to the application of these principles. In this phase, studentswere assigned the rank of acting corporal and were attached to companiesundergoing their first 6 weeks of basic training. By serving as sectionleaders, students were given an opportunity to develop leadership qualities.After completing the course, men were either retained at the center ascadre
62See footnote 24 (1), p. 186.
63Annual Report, Army Service Forces Training Center, Camp Grant,Ill., as of 15 October 1944.
64(1) Army Service Forces Circular No. 201, 1 July 1944. (2)Army Service Forces Circular No. 220, 14 July 1944.
65Officer Instructor Guidance Program, Army Service Forces TrainingCenter, Camp Barkeley, Tex., 26 July 1944.
66See footnote 18 (1), p. 181.
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replacements, assigned as cadre for newly activated units, or sent overseasas replacements.67
By the end of World War II, the Medical Department had developed a highlyflexible and refined system for training cadre, fillers, and replacements.Training centers were no longer plagued by shortages of housing and equipment,and training aids were abundantly available. Cycles could be lengthenedand shortened to meet the demands of the moment, and content could be adaptedto meet the needs of the theater. By integrating lesson plans, trainingaids, and maneuvers, centers were able to develop a highly realistic trainingprogram for Medical Department enlisted men. And by the same token, thetraining of draftees, returnees, and rotational replacements had been combined,under the preactivation system, into a highly efficient mechanism for fillingMedical Department units and installations in the theater and in the Zoneof Interior.
67(1) Letter, Commanding General, Army ServiceForces, to Commanding General, Sixth Service Command, 15 Mar. 1944, subject:Establishment of a Leadership Training Course. (2) Letter, Commanding General,Army Service Forces, to Commanding General, Sixth Service Command, 11 Apr.1944, subject: Establishment of a Leadership Training Course. (3) Memorandum,Col. R. G. Melin, GSC, to Colonel Sanford, Director, Military Training,13 May 1944. (4) Army Service Forces Circular No. 150, 20 May 1944.
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