CHAPTER VIII
Medical Department Field Units1
In the summer of 1939, the Medical Department had only five active fieldorganizations. Of these, four were at peace strength, and one was "skeletonized."2During the first year of the limited emergency, the field strength of theMedical Department was modestly expanded, and by 30 June 1940, four medicalbattalions, a medical regiment, and the medical detachments of four RegularArmy combat divisions were in training.3 All, including thoseactivated early in 1940, were designed to provide organic support for combatdivisions.
The first nonorganic medical units were activated following the onsetof limited mobilization. By July 1941, The Surgeon General reported that76 nondivisional medical field units had been activated, including numberedgeneral and station hospitals, evacuation and surgical hospitals, medicalsupply depots and laboratories, a numbered general dispensary, a veterinaryevacuation hospital, and a veterinary general hospital.4 Manyof these units, described as "professional" units by The SurgeonGeneral, were types that would later be trained by the Army Service Forces.
COMMAND AND STAFF RESPONSIBILITY FOR TRAINING MEDICAL DEPARTMENTUNITS
From the beginning of limited mobilization until the reorganizationof March 1942, responsibility for training nondivisional medical unitswas vested in the offices of the field army surgeons through the fieldarmies and General Headquarters. In November 1940, for example, the 2dMedical Laboratory, Fort Sam Houston, Tex., which was the only active nondivisionalunit then in operation, was placed under the control of the Third U.S.Army. A month later, before any other nondivisional units were activated,the War Department directed that 60 nondivisional units whose activationwas being planned be attached to the First, Second, and Third U.S. Armies.This group included 20 station hospitals, 17 general hospitals, 12 evacuationhospitals, six surgical hospitals, a medical laboratory, a general dispensary,a veterinary evacuation hospital, and two medical supply depots. From thestandpoint of training responsibility, such attachments were consideredequivalent to assignments. Corps Areas usually controlled the technicaltraining
1Unless otherwise indicated, this chapter isbased on Goodman, Samuel M.: History of Medical Department Training U.S.Army World War II. Volume VI: A Report on the Training of ASF-Type MedicalDepartment Units, 1 July 1941-30 June 1945. [Official record.]
2Annual Report of The Surgeon General, U.S. Army. Washington:U.S. Government Printing Office, 1940.
3Annual Report of The Surgeon General, U.S. Army. Washington:U.S. Government Printing Office, 1941.
4See footnote 3.
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of units when they were in garrison, but when the unit moved to thefield, training became an army responsibility.5 Responsibilityfor training divisional medical units was vested in the division commander.
The Surgeon General participated in the training of medical units inhis capacity as staff adviser to War Department General Staff, G-3, Operationsand Training, on matters related to medical service.6 The Officeof The Surgeon General, for example, developed the tables of organization,the training programs, the instructors' guides, and the field and technicalmanuals used not only by nondivisional medical units but also by divisionalunits.7 Commanding officers of nondivisional units, such asgeneral hospitals and evacuation hospitals, called upon The Surgeon Generalfor guidance, and he assumed responsibility for explaining to them theirrelationship to the armies and for listing the training programs and instructionalmaterials available for training.8 Representatives of The SurgeonGeneral also conducted technical inspections of both divisional and nondivisionalunits.9
The Reorganization of 1942
The War Department reorganization of March 1942 altered both the systemof command responsibility for medical units and The Surgeon General's relationshipto their training. War Department Circular No. 59, dated 2 March 1942,which authorized the division of the Army into three separate commands,also provided general guidelines for the unit training responsibilitiesof each command. Under the new system, AGF (Army Ground Forces) and AAF(Army Air Forces)
5(1) Letter, The Adjutant General, War Department,to Commanding Generals of All Armies, Army Corps, Divisions, Corps Areas,and Departments; Commanding General, General Headquarters, Air Force; Chiefof Staff, General Headquarters; Chiefs of Arms and Services; Chief of theArmored Force; Commanding Officers of Exempted Stations, 14 Jan. 1941,subject: Organization, Training, and Administration of Medical Units. (2)Letter, The Adjutant General, War Department, to Chiefs of Arms and Services;Commanding Generals of All Armies, Army Corps, Divisions, Corps Areas,and Departments; Commanding Officers of Exempted Stations; and the Chiefof Staff, General Headquarters, 3 Oct. 1940, subject: Organization, Training,and Administration of the Army. (3) Medical Department, United States Army.Organization and Administration in World War II. Washington: U.S. GovernmentPrinting Office, 1963.
6Letter, The Adjutant General, War Department, to All Army Commanders;All Corps Area and Department Commanders; All Chiefs of Arms and Services;Chief of the National Guard Bureau; Assistant Chiefs of Staff, War DepartmentGeneral Staff; Commanding General, General Headquarters, Air Force; Commandants,General and Special Service Schools; and Commanding Officers of ExemptedStations, 14 Mar. 1938, subject; The Protective Mobilization Plan. (TheInitial Military Program.)
7(1) Letter, The Adjutant General, War Department, to The SurgeonGeneral, 10 Feb. 1939, subject: Tables of Organization, and inclosure thereto.(2) Letter, The Surgeon General, U.S. Army, to The Adjutant General, U.S.Army, 14 Aug. 1940, subject: Medical Department Mobilization Training Program8-1. (3) Letter, Capt. T. J. Hartford, MC, Assistant to Chief, TrainingSubdivision, Plans and Training Division, Office of The Surgeon General,to Capt. J. F. Morehead, MC, Headquarters, 28th Surgical Hospital, FortGeorge G. Meade, Md., 3 Mar, 1941. (4) See footnote 4, p. 247.
8(1) Letter, Capt. T. J. Hartford, MC, Assistant to Chief, TrainingSubdivision, Plans and Training Division, Office of The Surgeon General,to Capt. Jordan A. Kelling, MC, Surgeon, 148th General Hospital, Camp Shelby,Miss., 21 Feb. 1941. (2) Letter, Capt. T. J. Hartford, MC, Assistant toChief, Training Subdivision, Plans and Training Division, Office of TheSurgeon General, to Capt. Paul O. Wells, MC, Commanding Officer, 56th GeneralHospital, Fort Jackson, S.C., 4 May. 1941.
9Letter, Lt. Col. G. C. Dunham, MC, Observer, to The SurgeonGeneral, U.S. Army, 27 Aug. 1940, subject: Report of Observations MadeDuring the Third U.S. Army Maneuvers, August 1940.
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were responsible for training their own combat units, and ASF (ArmyService Forces) was responsible for training the units necessary for itsfunctioning. Responsibility for training nondivisional service units, however,was not clearly delineated.10 Each of the three major commandswas charged with training units assigned to it, but the ultimate use ofa service unit could not always be clearly forecast, and many service unitswere common to all commands. In April 1942, and again in May, Army GroundForces requested clarification.11
On 30 May 1942, the War Department issued a more specific statementon training responsibility, announcing that: "In general, the usingcommand will train a unit."12 Through this policy, theCommanding General, AAF, became responsible for training all Air Forceunits, including arms and services with the Army Air Forces. The CommandingGeneral, ASF, was responsible for training units organized to operate installationsand activities controlled by him and those units organized in the UnitedStates solely for Services of Supply installations and activities in overseasgarrisons, bases, and theaters. The Commanding General, AGF, was responsiblefor training all units not falling into one of the other categories. Bymutual agreement, the commanding generals of AGF, AAF, and ASF could transferresponsibility for training certain units to each other. Such transferswere encouraged when one command controlled the bulk of the training facilitiesavailable for a particular type of unit, or when a training program wouldcreate a duplication of existing facilities. The War Department also directedthat: "Facilities such as exist at general and station hospitals andcertain specialized replacement training centers and schools are requiredfor the proper training of certain units and are under control of the CommandingGeneral, Services of Supply [ASF]. The Commanding General, Services ofSupply [ASF], by arrangement with [the] Commanding General, Army GroundForces or Army Air Forces, should take over the responsibility for unittraining which requires the use of these facilities."13While this statement provided limited guidance, it still left doubt aboutthe responsibility for units, such as veterinary evacuation hospitals,field hospitals, and small surgical teams, that might be used in eithercombat or communications zones, and, hence, might be considered eitherAGF or ASF units. The responsibility for training AAF units however, wasclearly defined.
In an effort to further define the responsibilities of the Army ServiceForces and the Army Ground Forces, the War Department asked each command,in June 1942,
10(1) Millett, John D.: United States Armyin World War II. The Army Service Forces. The Organization and Role ofthe Army Service Forces. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1954.(2) Palmer, Robert R., Wiley, Bell I., and Keast, William R.: United StatesArmy in World War II. The Army Ground Forces. The Procurement and Trainingof Ground Combat Troops. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1948.
11(1) Memorandum, Brig. Gen. Mark W. Clark, Chief of Staff,Army Ground Forces, for Assistant Chief of Staff, War Department GeneralStaff, G-3, 9 Apr. 1942, subject: Agency or Agencies to Activate Units.(2) Memorandum, Commanding General, Army Ground Forces, for the AssistantChief of Staff, War Department General Staff, G-3, 9 May 1942, subject:Responsibility for Training.
12Memorandum, Brig. Gen. I. H. Edwards, Assistant Chief of Staff,War Department General Staff, G-3, Operations and Training for the CommandingGeneral, Army Ground Forces; Commanding General, Army Air Forces; and CommandingGeneral, Services of Supply, 30 May 1942, subject: Responsibility for Training.
13See footnote 12.
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to provide a list of the units that it thought it should train. Thelists submitted by the two commands suggest that each desired to controlthe training of all units except those which were clearly organic to themission of the other.14 The first list delineating responsibilitiesfor training specific units was issued by the War Department on 20 June1942, but the compromise was not satisfactory to either headquarters.15During the next several months, these lists were repeatedly altered inan attempt to arrive at a more satisfactory solution. In October 1942,the War Department expanded the responsibilities of the Army Ground Forcesby authorizing that command to prepare the tables of organization, equipment,and basic allowances for units that served ground elements.
By January 1943, the division of responsibility had reached a stateof relative stability, and the Army Ground Forces was responsible for trainingand writing the tables of organization, equipment, and basic allowancesfor the following units: Medical battalions, including those for such specializeddivisions as the motorized, armored, and mountain divisions; medical squadronsfor cavalry divisions; medical regiments; medical companies to serve theairborne divisions; ambulance battalions; animal-drawn companies; veterinarycompanies; evacuation hospitals, including the motorized type; and medicalsupply depots. The Army Service Forces was responsible for training unitsincluding general, station, and convalescent hospitals (human and veterinary);veterinary evacuation hospitals; field hospitals; hospital centers; headquartersof Medical Department concentration centers; general dispensaries; generallaboratories and laboratories of the army or communications zone; surgicalhospitals; sanitary companies; medical gas treatment battalions; hospitaltrains; three types of units concerned with evacuation by sea-
hospital ship platoons, hospital ship companies, and ambulance shipcompanies; auxiliary surgical groups; detachments for museum and medicalarts services; and the medical sections for the headquarters of a communicationszone.
This division of responsibilities was by no means final. Many unitswere altered in name, size, or organization, and some types were abolishedor superseded by units developed to meet special needs. Except for minorreadjustments, however, the allocation of responsibilities between thetwo commands for developing, activating, and training Medical Departmentunits continued to rest upon the basis of the zone of the overseas theaterwithin which they were to be employed. The Army Air Forces trained onlya few medical units designated to meet the special needs of air troops-chieflya medical supply, an evacuation, and a dispensary unit.16
14(1) Memorandum, Col. Walter L. Weible, GSC,Deputy Director of Training, Services of Supply, for The Surgeon General,8 June 1942, subject: Responsibility for Training. (2) Memorandum, Col.John A. Rogers, MC, Executive Officer, Office of The Surgeon General, toDirector of Training, Services of Supply, 10 June 1942, subject: Responsibilityfor Training. (3) Memorandum, Col. F. L. Parks, GSC, Deputy Chief of Staff,AG, for Assistant Chief of Staff, War Department General Staff, G-3, 11June 1942, subject: Responsibility for the Activation of Units, and inclosuresthereto.
15(1) Memorandum, Brig. Gen. I.H. Edwards, Assistant Chief ofStaff, War Department General Staff, G-3, Operations and Training, forthe Commanding Generals, Army Ground Forces, Army Air Forces, Servicesof Supply, 20 June 1942, subject: Responsibility for the Activation ofService Units. (2) See footnote 10 (2), p. 249.
16See footnote 5 (3), p. 248.
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The Surgeon General's Responsibility for Training Under theArmy Service Forces
The reorganization of 1942 did little to alter The Surgeon General'srelationship to medical units trained by Army Service Forces. As The SurgeonGeneral, and the special adviser to the Commanding General, ASF, on mattersrelated to medical service, he continued to prepare the tables of organization,mobilization training programs, medical field and technical manuals, andtraining aids used by all ASF medical units.17 Representativesof the Surgeon General's Office were also entitled to conduct technicalinspections of all medical units under the jurisdiction of the Army ServiceForces.18 In sum, The Surgeon General's powers within the ArmyService Forces were identical to those he had exercised throughout theArmy before the War Department was reorganized.
The Surgeon General's relationship to medical units assigned to theArmy Ground Forces or the Army Air Forces for activation and training,however, was more remote. Since the commanding generals of ASF, AGF, andAAF stood on a par in their relationship to the War Department, The SurgeonGeneral, the Air Surgeon, and the Ground Surgeon were equals when theyfunctioned as the chief surgeons for their respective commands. In theircapacity as command surgeons, the Air Surgeon and the Ground Surgeon wereresponsible for inspecting AAF and AGF medical units, just as The SurgeonGeneral was responsible for inspecting ASF units. In October 1942, authorityto prepare tables of organization, equipment, and basic allowances wasalso dispersed among the command surgeons. With these exceptions, however,The Surgeon General remained the ultimate authority on medical trainingdoctrine, just as he continued to be responsible for doctrine on mattersrelating to the health of the entire Army. In his capacity as the chiefof a technical service, The Surgeon General continued to prepare technicalmanuals, field manuals, and mobilization training programs, or in the phrasecommonly used, to promulgate doctrine, for all medical units of the Army.19
THE ARMY SERVICE FORCES UNIT ACTIVATION AND TRAINING SYSTEMS
The Cadre System
Between September 1939 and April 1944, Medical Department theater-of-operationsunits were activated and trained by a method generally referred to as thecadre system. Under this system, a new medical unit was built upon a nucleusof
17(1) Letter, Brig. Gen. C. R. Huebner, Directorof Training, Services of Supply, to Chief of Chemical Warfare Service;Chief of Engineers; Chief of Ordnance; Chief Signal Officer; QuartermasterGeneral; Surgeon General; Chief of Administrative Services; Commandant,Command and General Staff School; Superintendent, United States MilitaryAcademy, 23 May 1942, subject: Training Publications and Visual Aids, Servicesof Supply. (2) Army Service Forces Manual M 301, 15 Aug. 1944.
18Army Service Forces Manual M 4, April 1945.
19See footnote 5 (3), p. 248.
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presumably trained personnel supplied by another unit. Depending onthe unit being trained, the source of the nucleus, or cadre, might be aZone of Interior medical installation, such as a fixed general or stationhospital, or another theater-of-operations unit or divisional medical unitundergoing training in the Zone of Interior.20
The War Department letter activating a new unit routinely specifiedthe size of the cadre, the installation or unit that would supply the cadre,and the date at which the cadre would report for duty. The same letteralso included a schedule for the arrival of the commanding officer andother officer and enlisted personnel, and specified the sources of personnelother than cadre. The Surgeon General routinely supplied, other than cadre,officers and nurses, for all units except those of the Army Air Forces.The Adjutant General supplied a given number of technicians without requisition.Other fillers were requisitioned from The Adjutant General by the activatingcommand as needed. Unit personnel were usually scheduled to arrive in threeincrements. The commanding officer was to arrive alone on the day of activation,followed in a few days by the other officers and cadre, and finally, bythe unit's enlisted complement.
In theory, the cadre system was designed to provide the commanding officerof a new unit with a nucleus of trained officers and enlisted men capableof administering the unit and training other personnel. It was also assumedthat all personnel would report to the unit within approximately a weekafter its activation. The commanding officer and his cadre were scheduledto arrive at their new post just far enough in advance of other personnelto put administrative and housekeeping affairs in order.
In practice, the cadre system frequently deviated from the theoreticalmodel. In some instances, the designated commanding officer of a unit arriveddays, or even several weeks, after other personnel had reported for duty.At times, the highest ranking soldiers who arrived were privates. Moreoften, however, a lieutenant arriving with the cadre became the temporarycommanding officer and was responsible for securing quarters, establishingthe unit administratively, and initiating a training program. Activationunder a temporary commanding officer did not necessarily work to the disadvantageof a unit, since such officers frequently managed to have training wellunderway by the time the designated commanding officer arrived. In someinstances, however, the training program had to be postponed.
By the same token, unit fillers were supposed to arrive in a group shortlyafter the commander and his staff. In practice, however, few units receivedan appreciable portion of their fillers immediately after activation. Usually,fillers arrived at irregular intervals over a period varying from a fewweeks to many months, and those who were sent varied in their backgroundand training. One group might contain fillers trained by a replacementtraining center, and the next to arrive could consist entirely of recruitssent directly from reception centers. Still other groups might be of veteransof a combat theater or men trained by one of the combat arms
20(1) Annual Report, Headquarters, 37th GeneralHospital, 1943. (2) Annual Report, Headquarters, Fifth Auxiliary SurgicalGroup, 1943.
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or technical services. Each group had to be trained according to itsbackground and experience, and as a result, a large unit, such as a generalhospital, might have to provide several groups of men with different levelsof basic military and technical training at any given time. Because ofthese problems, it was not unusual for unit commanders to require 6 monthsor a year to complete the basic training of all the men in their organization.21
Training under the cadre system was further complicated by the uncertainquality of fillers and cadre assigned to the unit. For the cadre systemto function efficiently, parent organizations had to release at least someof their best men to newly activated units. In practice, however, manyunits used the cadre system to slough their less efficient personnel.22Since such men were frequently given ratings before they were releasedfrom the parent organization, the unit commander who received them wasfaced not only with the problem of administering and training a unit withsubstandard cadre but also with arranging for the transfer of overrated,noncommissioned officers so that he could replace them with qualified menin the same grades.23
Many units also complained of being assigned a high proportion of limited-servicepersonnel.24 Theater-of-operations units were supposed to receiveonly men qualified for service overseas, but some units reported that asmany as four-fifths of their fillers were limited-service personnel whosepresence made it difficult or impossible to conduct marches, calisthenics,or field exercises requiring strenuous physical activity.25The mental inadequacy of many limited-service personnel also made it difficultfor commanders to achieve training objectives.26
Unit commanders who were dissatisfied with their cadre or fillers usuallyattempted to improve their organizations by arranging transfers. This processof transferring and replacing undesirable personnel perpetuated many ofthe evils of the cadre system, and added to the inconvenience caused bythe irregular arrival of fillers. Some organizations required many monthsto attain or approximate their table-of-organization strength and to becomesufficiently stabilized to make meaningful unit training a possibility.27
The procedure for training medical technicians and common specialistsunder the cadre system only added to the problems of unit commanders. Whena new unit was activated, The Adjutant General automatically provided itwith a limited number of technicians who were graduates of the MedicalField Service School, Carlisle Barracks, Pa., the Medical Supply ServicesSchool, the Army School of Roentgenology, Memphis, Tenn., and the MedicalDepartment Enlisted Technicians Schools. A limited number of common specialists,such as cooks, bakers,
21Memorandum, Lt. Col. Tyron E. Huber, MC,for The Historian, Training Division, Surgeon General's Office, 4 June1945, subject: Unit Training, Army Service Forces, World War II, and inclosurethereto.
22(1) Annual Report, Headquarters, 216th General Hospital, CampForrest, Tenn., 1943. (2) Annual Report, Fourth Auxiliary Surgical Group,Lawson General Hospital, Atlanta, Ga., 1943.
23(1) Annual Report, Fifth Auxiliary Surgical Group, Fort SamHouston, Tex., 1943. (2) Annual Report, Fifth Station Hospital, Camp Stewart,Ga., 1941.
24(1) Annual Report, Headquarters, 11th General Hospital, CampLivingston, La., 1942. (2) Annual Report, Headquarters, 216th General Hospital,Camp Forrest, Tenn., 1942.
25See footnotes 22 (1) and 24 (1).
26Annual Report, 41st Station Hospital, Camp Barkeley, Tex.,1942.
27See footnote 22 (2).
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truckdrivers, and clerks, could be obtained from Medical ReplacementTraining Centers by requisition through The Adjutant General. Specialistsand technicians needed in excess of those supplied by The Adjutant General,however, had to be trained by the unit commander. In training common specialists,the unit commander had a choice of options. If there were common specialistsschools at the post at which the unit was located, he could enroll selectedmembers of his organization.28 If there were no such schools,he had to train his own cooks, truckdrivers, and clerks. Often, it waspossible to simplify the task by searching for related civilian skillsamong personnel sent as fillers. When such men were not available, thecommander had to provide special training programs within the unit.
The training of technicians posed a more serious problem. Commandershad their choice of two alternatives: One, they could send selected membersof their unit to the post or station hospital for parallel training; ortwo, they could send them to Medical Department Enlisted Technicians Schools.Without close supervision from higher authorities, the training which hospitalunits received depended primarily upon the attitudes of local surgeonsand unit commanders. In some instances, well-planned, on-the-job trainingprograms were established in named hospitals and were coordinated withunit field training. In others, the commanders of named hospitals assignedmen from numbered units to vacant jobs regardless of their training value.In such assignments, technical training suffered because many men did onlymenial work, and controversies developed between hospital commanders responsiblefor postmedical care and unit commanders responsible for technical andfield training of their men.29 The preferred alternative, therefore,was to send men to Medical Department Enlisted Technicians Schools.
Field units, however, were not always successful in obtaining authorizationto send their men to Medical Department Enlisted Technicians School. TheSurgeon General had to allot quotas for these schools indirectly throughthe Service Commands, Defense Commands, and the headquarters of Army Groundand Army Air Forces, which, in turn, subdivided quotas among subordinateunits. Within Army Service Forces, quotas were subdivided a second timeamong posts under ASF jurisdiction. These suballotments were then utilizedby the post for training both technicians from the station hospital andstudents from units being activated at the post. Because of this conflictof interest, it was reported that: "It was unusual for any unit tobe able to send away from the unit over one-third of the * * * technicians that should have received training inMedical Department Enlisted Technicians Schools."30
Unit commanders frequently added to the problem by using the schoolsto train specialists for unrated positions in their tables of organization.Numbered general hospitals, for example, were authorized 84 medical technicians:35 who were rated graduates of enlisted technicians schools, and 49 whowere unrated graduates of schools at medical replacement training centers.Often, a unit commander would
28Annual Report, Headquarters, 10th HospitalCenter, Camp Rucker, Ala., 1942.
29(1) See footnote 21, p. 253. (2) Smith, Clarence McKittrick:The Medical Department: Hospitalization and Evacuation, Zone of Interior.United States Army in World War II. The Technical Services. Washington:U.S. Government Printing Office, 1956.
30See footnote 21, p. 253.
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attempt to fill all of these vacancies with rated graduates of MedicalDepartment Enlisted Technicians Schools, thereby creating a spurious shortageof technicians which made it difficult for other commanders to fill ratedvacancies in their units.31
Whether technicians were qualified for ratings through Medical DepartmentEnlisted Technicians Schools or on-the-job training at post hospitals,their training increased the administrative problems of the unit commander.Many of his future technicians had to be excused from unit training forall or part of the training day while acquiring skills at the post hospital,while others were enrolled at distant schools for periods of 3 or 4 months.Moreover, since schools and post hospitals were capable of enrolling onlya relatively small number of trainees from any given unit at one time,instability frequently continued over a protracted period.32Such instability was further increased when the unit, in its turn, wascalled on to provide cadre for another newly activated unit.
Despite its inherent drawbacks, most units trained during World WarII were activated under the cadre system. In mid-1942, Army Service Forcesbegan to move toward centralizing the activation and training of nondivisionalservice units. On 31 July 1942, representatives of the Surgeon General'sOffice and other technical services met at a conference called by the UnitTraining Branch of the Training Division, ASF, to discuss the advisabilityof establishing a unit training center for ASF units. The Surgeon General'sOffice was reluctant to accept this recommendation, however, since therewere already 12 large Medical Department unit training centers in ArmyGround Forces housing adjacent to large fixed hospitals, and similar facilitieswere under construction at 22 fixed general hospitals and 34 station hospitals.The Surgeon General believed it would be preferable to continue trainingmedical units at a large number of sites adjacent to an active fixed hospitalif Army Ground Forces would provide assurance that these facilities wouldremain available. If not, he requested that the Medical Department be allotteda proportionate share of the facilities at the proposed unit training center.33
In November 1942, a Medical Training Section was established at thenewly activated Services of Supply Unit Training Center (later designatedCamp Plauche), New Orleans Staging Area, New Orleans, La., "with theprimary mission of controlling all training for medical units" atthe center.34 During the next 12 months, the Medical TrainingSection at Camp Plauche was responsible for training approximately 120units, including seven general hospitals, 15 sanitary companies, 38 stationhospitals, 56 hospital platoons, three portable surgical hospitals, andone hospital ship complement. In November 1943, the Medical Training Section'sprimary mission was changed to providing unit technical training for malariasurvey
31Memorandum, Col. John A. Rogers, MC, ExecutiveOfficer, Office of The Surgeon General, for the Director of Training, Servicesof Supply, 28 Aug. 1942, subject: Dissipation of Trained Enlisted Personnel.
32See footnote 21, p. 253.
33Memorandum, Col. John A. Rogers, MC, Executive Officer, Officeof The Surgeon General, to Training Division, Services of Supply (attention:Unit Training Branch), 1 Aug. 1942, subject: Unit Training Center.
34(1) Letter, Lt. Col. B. L. Steger, MC, Director of MedicalTraining, Headquarters, Services of Supply Unit Training Center, New Orleans,La., to Maj. John W. Middleton, MC, Training Division, Surgeon General'sOffice, 9 Dec. 1942. (2) Memorandum, Lt. Col. Donald J. Wolfram, MC, Chief,Readiness and Requirements Branch, Training Division, Surgeon General'sOffice, to The Historian, Training Division, Surgeon General's Office,3 July 1945, subject: History of Unit Training Center, Camp Plauche, La.,and attachment thereto.
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and malaria control units which had been activated and received theirbasic training at other centers. Between August 1943 and November 1945,141 malaria control units and 76 malaria survey units, comprising almostall the malaria units activated in the Zone of Interior, were sent to CampPlauche for technical training.35
After overcoming a series of initial problems, the medical section atCamp Plauche was able to provide a number of services that facilitatedthe activation and training of medical field units. When the officer designatedas director of medical training for the medical section at Camp Plauche,Lt. Col. (later Col.) Byron L. Steger, MC, arrived at the center in November1942, he encountered conditions prevalent, on a lesser scale, at postsand camps throughout the United States. At first, authorities at the camprefused to believe that there was such a position as Director of MedicalTraining, and assigned him duties as a medical instructor. After severalconferences, Colonel Steger persuaded the local commander to assign himthe position he had been sent to fill. Two officers sent to assist himarrived shortly afterward, but the administrative personnel for his sectiondid not arrive for another 6 weeks.
Shortly after the medical section was activated, it was discovered thata number of medical units had already been activated, including 28 generaland station hospitals, and 15 sanitary companies. No control was exercisedover any of these units, and they had no place to turn for advice whenproblems arose. Each hospital sought to train as many men from their organizationat the local station hospital as possible; as a result, the general hospitalwith the senior colonel was getting reasonably good training for his unit,and the remaining units had to fend for themselves.36 The newlyestablished medical section, however, was gradually able to bring theseproblems under control by arranging for an equitable allocation of thetraining facilities available at the post hospital and by securing additionalquotas at Medical Department Enlisted Technicians Schools from the Surgeon
General's Office. Center-level courses were set up for common specialistsand a 4-week refresher course for officers was inaugurated. The medicalsection also organized its own training aid section and provided centralfacilities for producing and distributing lecture and conference material.
A second ASF Unit Training Center with facilities for training MedicalDepartment theater-of-operations units was activated at Camp Ellis, Ill.,on 1 February 1943. At first, the center attempted to operate under a commonheadquarters, but within a short time, it was realized that the specialtraining requirements of each of the technical services made this structuretoo cumbersome. After several reorganizations, the medical section wasestablished as a separate entity early in May 1943. Between May 1943 andJanuary 1945, when the center was deactivated, 266 medical units of alltypes were activated at Camp Ellis.37
35Letter, Maj. Joseph E. Schenthal, MC, Director,Medical Training Section, Third Regiment, Army Service Forces TrainingCenter, Camp Plauche, New Orleans, La., to the Surgeon, New Orleans Portof Embarkation, New Orleans, La., 5 Nov. 1945, subject: Summary of Activities,Medical Training Section, Army Service Forces Training Center, Camp Plauche,New Orleans, La.
36See footnote 34 (2), p. 255.
37(1) Annual Report, Unit Training Center, 1644th Service Unit,Camp Ellis, Ill., 1943. (2) "The Story of Camp Ellis." [Officialrecord.]
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The medical section at Camp Ellis played a similar role in the training of medical units. It operated a school for cooks, bakers, truckdrivers, and other common specialists, and, in addition, conducted courses for unrated medical, surgical, X-ray, dental, and pharmacy technicians. A weeklong orientation course was provided for the unit commander, his adjutant, executive officer, and supply officer, to acquaint them with the problems of unit activation. The medical section also assisted the various units at Camp Ellis to secure training aids and provided them with general, station, and field hospital equipment sets for use on field problems.38
The Preactivation System
Despite the inherent advantages of unit training centers, the Army ServiceForces did not achieve a complete centralization of its training facilitiesuntil the preactivation system was adopted in April 1944, well after thepace of unit activations within Army Service Forces was past its peak.During the final year of the war, facilities for training medical unitswere available at three Army Service Forces Training Centers: Camp Ellis,Camp Barkeley, Tex., and Fort Lewis, Wash. Camp Grant, Ill., also servedbriefly as a center for unit training under the preactivation system, untilits facilities were transferred to Fort Lewis in the summer of 1944. CampPlauche, which by this time was being used exclusively to provide fieldtraining for malaria control and survey teams activated at other centers,was never reorganized to include preactivation training.
Under the preactivation system, ASF Training Centers served as poolsfrom which a unit could draw a full complement of trained enlisted personnelat the moment of activation. Responsibility for training personnel beforeit was assembled as a unit was vested entirely in the training center.When a new unit was scheduled for activation, the center received ordersfor its "preactivation" or, in effect, was informed that it wasrequired to earmark a given number of enlisted men at the center for assignmentto the unit as fillers. Such men then received basic military and technicaltraining at the center, and those selected to become technicians were sentto an appropriate enlisted technicians school. Late in the war, the systemalso served as a device for channeling "spare parts" or men fromoverstrength or deactivated Zone of Interior units into field units scheduledfor shipment overseas.
The ASF preactivation system had several intrinsic advantages over thesystem that it replaced. It relieved the commander of responsibility forproviding his men with basic military and technical training and simultaneouslyeliminated the problems that developed when men were received in incrementsover several months and had to be provided with separate training programs.It also relieved the unit commander of responsibility for finding waysto train the technicians needed to fill his table of organization. Unittraining at ASF Training Centers could thus begin at the end of the 14thweek of the basic training cycle, instead of being delayed for weeks, oreven months, while fillers in the unit were being brought to a common levelof training. In sum, the new system provided the commander with
38(1) See footnote 21, p. 253. (2) Annual Report,Headquarters, Medical Group, 1644th Service Unit, Army Service Forces TrainingCenter, Camp Ellis, Ill., 1944.
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all the components necessary for his unit and allowed him to focus hisattention on molding these components into a smoothly functioning team.39
In addition to the intrinsic advantages of the preactivation system,units activated after 15 April 1944 had several other factors working intheir favor. War Department policies requiring Zone of Interior installationsto release general service personnel for service overseas, for example,provided ASP Training Centers with an adequate supply of noncommissionedofficers and experienced enlisted men who could be assigned to newly activatedunits.40 Thus, units activated under the new system were morefrequently provided with the training nucleus of enlisted personnel thatshould have been provided under the cadre system, and less frequently subjectedto debilitating cadre levies. Units activated after April 1944 also hadthe advantage of receiving at least the first 3 weeks of their team trainingat ASP Training Centers, which provided guidance and assistance to theunit commander that formerly had been available only to organizations activatedas ASP Unit Training Centers. As a result, units found it easier to obtaintraining aids and equipment, and the facilities of the post were at theirdisposal.
In June 1942, a Unit Training Branch was organized in the Training Division,Surgeon General's Office, to discharge the newly assigned responsibilityfor preparing Medical Department nondivisional units trained by the ArmyService Forces for functional deployment in the theaters of operations.In addition to maintaining liaison with other elements of the Surgeon General'sOffice and divisions of the Army Service Forces and the War Departmentin matters relating to the activation and training of numbered units atclass I and class IV installations of the Army Service Forces, the UnitTraining Branch was also responsible for inspecting their technical trainingand submitting appropriate recommendations to the Director of MilitaryTraining, ASF. The Unit Training Branch reached its peak strength in December1942, when the staff consisted of two officers and an enlisted clerk. Becauseof its limited staff, and the constantly growing number of medical unitsscattered throughout the Zone of Interior, the Unit Training Branch foundit impossible to conduct frequent and periodic inspections. Control wasmaintained by requiring units to file bimonthly Unit Training Status Reports,developed in the summer of 1942, that provided the Surgeon General's Officewith information on the strength, training programs, equipment, and statusof each medical unit being trained by Army Service Forces.41The Unit Training Branch then confined itself to inspecting units thatwere being prepared for shipment overseas. Whenever inspection of a numberedASP medical unit was required, members of the Unit Training Branch alsoinspected all other medical units at the same post. No record was keptof the number of units inspected before mid-1943, but between June 1943and June 1944, the Unit Training Branch conducted 751 inspections and be-
39(1) See footnote 21, p. 253. (2) Memorandum,Lt. Col. Donald J. Wolfram, MC, Chief, Readiness and Requirements Branch,Training Division, Surgeon General's Office, to the Historian, TrainingDivision, Surgeon General's Office, 3 July 1945, subject: History of UnitTraining Center, Camp Plauche, La., and attachment thereto.
40(1) Army Service Forces Circular No. 26, 24 Jan. 1944. (2)Army Service Forces Circular No. 100, 21 Mar. 1945.
41Annual Report, Training Division, Operations Service, Officeof The Surgeon General, U.S. Army, fiscal year 1943.
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tween June 1944 and June 1945, it inspected all of the 319 units activatedby Army Service Forces.
Until April 1945, inspections conducted by representatives of the SurgeonGeneral's Office encompassed all aspects of training and preparation foroverseas movement, including any discrepancy that might result in a unit'sbeing declared unsatisfactory by the Inspector General.42 Asa result, 104 of the 115 ASF medical units inspected by the Inspector Generalin the 9 months preceding June 1944 were declared qualified to performtheir primary mission. Of the remaining 11, four reported only minor deficienciesand four had not been allowed enough time for refitting and refresher trainingafter returning from overseas service. Only two were rejected for seriousdeficiencies. The following year was equally successful.43
In May 1944, the Unit Training Branch was redesignated as the Readinessand Requirements Branch, to symbolize the transition to the preactivationsystem. After this system was established, representatives of the SurgeonGeneral's Office inspected all nondivisional medical units during theirfirst 3 weeks of unit training at ASF Training Centers. In September 1944,the Surgeon General's Office also prepared a series of training tests consistingof questions and a field problem that was designed to prepare such unitsfor inspection.44 In April 1945, the responsibilities of thesubordinate agencies of the Army Service Forces were redefined, and thechiefs of the technical services were directed to confine themselves topurely technical inspections. Thereafter, representatives of The SurgeonGeneral coordinated their inspections with those of the service commands,and representatives of the service commands inspected units in mattersinvolving administration, supply, and military training.45
ARMY AIR FORCES SYSTEMS
The Army Air Forces trained less than half a dozen types of medicalunits designed to fit the special needs of air troops-primarily a medicalsupply, an evacuation, and a dispensary unit. Because such units were smalland required only limited housing facilities, the Army Air Forces was ableto bring these units together at selected locations and provide specialschools for their training.
The Army Air Forces facilities for training tactical medical units weredecentralized until the spring of 1942 when a new medical detachment atWarner Robins Air Depot in Georgia was called on to furnish Medical Departmentofficers for
42Memorandum, Capt. Harold D. Brennand, MAC,Regular Training Branch, Training Division, Office of The Surgeon General,to the Historian, Training Division, Surgeon General's Office, 5 July 1945,subject: Policy and Procedure Governing Inspection of ASF-Type MedicalDepartment Units by Surgeon General's Office.
43(1) Report, Readiness and Requirements Branch, fiscal year1944. In Annual Report, Training Division, Operations Service, Officeof The Surgeon General, U.S. Army, fiscal year 1944. (2) Report, Readinessand Requirements Branch, fiscal year 1945. In Annual Report, TrainingDivision, Operations Service, Office of The Surgeon General, U.S. Army,fiscal year 1945.
44Memorandum, Col. Floyd L. Wergeland, MC, Director, TrainingDivision, Office of The Surgeon General, for the Director of Military Training,Army Service Forces, 8 Sept. 1944, subject: Test for Training Inspection,Numbered ASF Medical Units, and inclosures thereto.
45See footnotes 18, p. 251; and 43 (2).
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FIGURE 40.-School of AviationMedicine building, Randolph Field, Tex.
tactical units under the Air Service Command. The station surgeon, Maj.(later Lt. Col.) Richard R. Cameron, MC, asked permission to establisha school for this type of training. In the fall, the Medical Training Sectionat Warner Robins Air Depot began training men for a newly created typeof unit, the medical supply platoon (aviation). This unit, consisting oftwo Medical Administrative Corps officers and 19 enlisted men, was designedto supply medical equipment to rapidly moving combat air squadrons in forwardareas where Services of Supply did not maintain depots. In such areas,AAF general depots were furnished with the medical supply platoons (aviation)necessary to supply combat units. The Medical Training Section at WarnerRobins Air Depot eventually developed into the Medical Service TrainingSchool which was established late in 1943 with Colonel Cameron as commandant.46By this time, the school had been assigned the additional mission of trainingmedical dispensary detachments (aviation), a unit consisting of four officersand 24 enlisted men with enough equipment to set up a 36-bed field dispensaryin areas where hospital facilities were not available. It also providedfacilities for training command and administrative specialists.47
Air evacuation of sick and wounded troops was a major responsibilityof the Air Transport Command, which was established in June 1942 as a successorto the former Air Corps Ferrying Command. Responsibility for organizingand training
46See footnote 5 (3), p. 248.
47History, Army Air Forces, Medical Service Training School,Robins Field, Ga., 1942, vol. I. [Official record.]
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troop carrier units, together with personnel for replacements, was delegatedto the I Troop Carrier Command, activated in June 1942 with headquartersat Stout Field, Indianapolis, Ind. In addition to carrying out the typicalresponsibilities of the surgeon of any large command, the Staff Surgeon,Col. Wood S. Woolford, MC, was responsible for the development and trainingof units for evacuating casualties by air. In 1942, the Air Surgeon andColonel Woolford developed plans for a standard unit. In the latter halfof 1942, the 349th Air Evacuation Group was established at Bowman Field,Louisville, Ky., as a training command for personnel assigned to unitsaccompanying patients during air evacuation flights. In June 1943, the349th Air Evacuation Group was established as the Army Air Forces Schoolof Air Evacuation, and in October 1944, it was absorbed into the Schoolof Aviation Medicine, Randolph Field, Tex. (fig. 40).48
ARMY GROUND FORCES SYSTEMS
Medical units attached or organic to AGF organizations were universallyactivated and trained under the cadre system. Nondivisional medical unitsunder the jurisdiction of Army Ground Forces were activated and trainedat a wide variety of posts and camps throughout the Zone of Interior, inapproximately the same manner as those activated by Army Service Forces.Organic units were activated and trained in conjunction with their division.
When Army Ground Forces inherited responsibility for the creation andtraining of combat divisions from General Headquarters on 9 March 1942,it adopted unit activation procedures that were already well developed.In common with ASF units, AGF divisions were established by a letter ofactivation under the cadre system. The commander, assistant commander,and artillery commander were selected by the War Department from a listthat Lt. Gen. Lesley J. McNair, Commanding General of the Army Ground Forces,submitted for their consideration. General McNair was also responsiblefor selecting and designating the heads of the general staff of the newdivision and other key officers for which Army Ground Forces was responsible.The selection of special staff heads and other key service officers wascoordinated with the appropriate chiefs of the technical services in ArmyService Forces.
Each division was assigned a parent unit responsible for furnishingit with trained cadre. The G-3 section of Army Ground Forces then formulatedplans for the division's assignment and issued a letter officially orderingactivation of the unit and instructing all agencies in their respectiveduties. This letter provided for delivery by the service commands, withoutrequisition, of enlisted fillers from reception centers and replacementtraining centers on a schedule worked out by the division and the servicecommand. In addition, War Department General Staff, G-1, Personnel, prepareda memorandum providing instructions for the selection, schooling, and assignmentof commissioned personnel for the division.
Early in 1942, these procedures were expanded to provide special trainingfor
48(1) See footnote 5 (3), p. 248. (2) Link,Mae Mills, and Coleman, Hubert A.: Medical Support of the Army Air Forcesin World War II. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1954.
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FIGURE 41.-Medical Departmentofficers attend courses at the Command and General Staff College, FortLeavenworth, Kans., where extensive use was made of training aids, includingdemonstration. Here, instructors demonstrate staff work at an infantrydivision headquarters for the benefit of a class at the college.
division cadre officers. Thereafter, when a new division was activated,the commander, assistant commander, and division artillery commander weredesignated by the War Department not later than 78 days before activationand assigned to General Headquarters, or after March 1942, to Army GroundForces, for a week of orientation. The division commander then spent amonth in special training at the Command and General Staff School, FortLeavenworth, Kans. (fig. 41), the assistant division commander took a specialcourse at the Infantry School, Fort Benning, Ga., and the division artillerycommander was sent to the Field Artillery School, Fort Sill, Okla. Officersassigned to the division's general and special staffs, including the divisionsurgeon, joined the division commander for the monthlong course at theCommand and General Staff School. The remaining members of the officercadre were sent to special cadre courses conducted at branch schools underthe jurisdiction of the chief of their arm or service. All Medical Departmentcadre officers, except the division surgeon, attended the Special CadreCourse for Divisional Officers at the Medical Field Service School.
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After completing their special training, the commander and his staffarrived at the division camp 37 days before activation. A week later, theywere joined by the rest of the cadre, and a few days after that, by a complementof 452 officers provided by the War Department from graduates of officercandidate schools, service schools, and officer replacement pools. Theunit was formally activated on D-day; during the next 15 days, the unitreceived its quota of fillers (approximately 13,000 in the case of theinfantry division). After the last installment of fillers arrived, thedivision was ready to begin training.
Between March 1942 and August 1943, when the last of the divisions ofWorld War II was activated, Army Ground Forces made several refinementsin the procedures for division activation. None of these changes, however,had a significant effect on the activation of medical components of thedivision, and from the standpoint of the Medical Department, proceduresremained unchanged after the establishment of the division cadre course.
When the War Department was reorganized in March 1942, Army Ground Forcesinherited a schedule for training newly activated divisions that had onlyrecently been put into effect by General Headquarters. Before 1942, trainingprograms were designed to fill and train Regular Army and National GuardDivisions under peacetime conditions. The previous program had providedneither a specific date for the attainment of combat readiness nor a cleardifferentiation between individual and unit training. Once a unit had completedits initial 13 to 16 weeks of training under the mobilization trainingprograms, its training was governed by a series of annual and special trainingdirectives that prescribed additional unit training and exercises designedto prepare the unit for the next series of maneuvers. Such directives werecouched in the broadest terms and governed not only the training of divisionsand their organic medical support but also the training of all other fieldunits, including those later controlled by Army Service Forces.
On 16 February 1942, General Headquarters issued a training directivedesigned to bring divisions to a state of combat readiness 44 weeks afterthe date of activation.49 This period was divided into threedefinite phases-individual training, unit training, and combined-arms training-anda training guide was set up for each period. During the individual trainingperiod, commanders were required to use War Department mobilization trainingprograms as their guides. Although the mobilization training programs weredrawn up on a 13-week period, General Headquarters allowed an extra 4 weeksto compensate for delays in the arrival of fillers and equipment and topermit testing by higher commands. During the 13-week unit training period,specific guides were available only for infantry, field artillery, engineer,and quartermaster organizations; commanders of other service organizationswere expected to rely on guidance provided by the division and to tailortheir programs to combine elements of their technical specialty with divisionaltraining requirements. The directive of 16 February provided the only guidancefor the 14-week period of combined training.50 Nondivisionalunits of the Army Ground Forces trained on the same schedule but were providedwith only
49See footnote 10 (2), p. 249.
50Wiley, Bell I.: The Army Ground Forces. Training in the GroundArmy 1942-1945. Study No. XI. Historical Section-Army Ground Forces, 1948,p. 4. [Official record.]
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limited guidance beyond their branch mobilization training programs.During 1942, control over the training of nondivisional units, includingmedical units, was vested principally in the armies; it was not unusualfor such units to go for months without being subjected to the tests andinspections that were provided for the guidance of divisional units ateach stage of their training.
The General Headquarters training directive of February 1942 was supersededon 19 October 1942 by an AGF directive designed to guide all existing andfuture units through the training cycle. The new schedule shortened thetraining period for divisions from 44 to 35 weeks, and time was allottedamong training phases in the following pattern: Individual or basic training,13 weeks; unit training, 11 weeks; and combined training, 11 weeks. Reductionof the basic phase from 17 to 13 weeks seemed possible because of the acceleratedpace of inductions, making it possible to fill the division and begin trainingimmediately upon activation. Shortening of the entire training cycle wasconsidered necessary because of the likelihood in 1943 of heavy requirementsfor overseas operations. In addition, the directive added two new trainingtests to the program: a physical training test required for all units,and an infantry battalion combat-firing test.
By late 1942, when the new directive was issued, the training of divisionsassumed a pattern which was basically stable throughout the remainder ofthe war. The 13-week individual training period, based on War Departmentmobilization training programs, was devoted to individual and small unittraining up to the battalion level. As at replacement training centers,the first few weeks focused on basic military subjects such as militarycourtesy, drill, and map reading designed to transform the individual intoa soldier before he began training as a specialist. After the first month,emphasis shifted to technical subjects, and soldiers were oriented to thebasic elements of their unit's specialty. During the last 4 weeks of theindividual training period, training focused on tactical subjects and wasincreasingly conducted in the field. The last few days of the basic periodwere devoted to preparing for the mobilization training program tests givenby corps or army commanders to units on the platoon level.
At the end of the individual training period, the division began 11weeks of progressive unit training that began with the squad and culminatedin regimental exercises, with the goal of developing each unit into a teamcapable of taking its place in the division and carrying out its specialmission in combat. While combat arms concentrated on tactical training,support elements were given practical training in their specialist rolesand taught to work together in platoons and companies. Medical technicians,for example, practiced skills required in first and second echelon medicalservice; and medical companies moved to the field to engage in exercisesrequiring them to evacuate casualties across rivers, set up battalion aidstations, and move casualties from collecting stations to clearing stations.Units were also required to complete a series of tests, such as the AGFplatoon combat-firing proficiency tests for infantry components and theAGF battery tests for the field artillery. Because of their highly specializedmission, however, medical units were required only to complete the AGFspecial battle courses and physical fitness tests.
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Unit training was followed by 11 weeks of combined-arms training designedto weld the elements of the division into a division team. After October1942, this phase consisted of three series of problems: One, regimentalcombat team exercises, culminating in field maneuvers; two, division exercisesand maneuvers; and three, command post exercises. The combined trainingperiod began with regimental combat team exercises, and ended with maneuversby one division against another. Exercises were conducted both by day andat night, in all types of terrain. All exercises were followed by a critique.During such exercises, medical units and other service elements were expectedto function in a supporting role.51
The training received by medical elements of the 89th Infantry Divisionwas typical of the experience of most divisions during World War II. Ordersfor the creation of the new division were issued on 1 April 1942, and approximatelya month later, members of the division cadre reported to Army schools forspecial training. The division surgeon, Maj. (later Col.) Clifford G. Blitch,MC, arrived at Camp Carson, Colo., the home of the new division, on 1 June1942, after completing the monthlong cadre course at the Command and GeneralStaff School along with the commanding general and his general and specialstaff officers. Medical officers who had completed the special cadre courseat the Medical Field Service School reported to the division on 13 June,followed between 3 and 12 July by the unit's remaining Medical Departmentofficer fillers. The latter consisted of 37 Medical Corps, 12 Dental Corps,and five Medical Administrative Corps officers. The 72-man medical enlistedcadre arrived at Camp Carson on 8 June 1942, after completing a cadre courseat Fort Leonard Wood, Mo. On 15 July 1942, the 89th Infantry Division wasofficially activated.
For several months following its activation, the division was engagedin providing basic training for fillers who had been assigned directlyfrom reception centers. Such training, conducted under programs writtenby the chiefs of the arms and services, was nearly identical with thatprovided at replacement training centers. By January 1943, medical unitsof the division were in their final stage of basic training, and duringthe first week of February, an VIII Corps testing team administered individualtraining tests to all units of the division. As a result of these tests,the division received a rating of "very satisfactory" despitethe fact that, during January, it suffered heavy losses from cadre levies.In mid-January, medical elements of the division sent 12 officers to theMedical Field Service School to be trained as cadre for the 66th InfantryDivision, and shortly thereafter, seven more officers were transferredto the 76th Infantry Division. On 31 January, Colonel Blitch was transferredto the 99th Evacuation Hospital, and Maj. (later Lt. Col.) Sydney L. Stevens,MC, regimental surgeon of the 354th Infantry Regiment, was assigned toreplace him.
From 8 February through 24 April 1943, the division and its medicalelements were enrolled in the unit phase of training. Emphasis at all levelswas placed upon realism and battlefield leadership, with the objectiveof developing each team into a unit capable of taking its place in thedivision. All such training was conducted
51See footnote 10 (2), p. 249.
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under simulated tactical conditions. Training began with the smallestunit and progressed to the largest, culminating on 24 April with a demonstrationgiven by the division for President Roosevelt in which the medical battalionplayed a part in evacuating casualties on a litter raft constructed fromthe tarp of a weapons carrier. During the individual and unit trainingphases, a number of enlisted men were also detached to attached specialschools, including 50 men who were sent to Medical Department EnlistedTechnicians Schools for training as medical and surgical technicians, and36 men who received a month of special training at the Camp Carson stationhospital. Between 12 and 17 April, medical personnel participated in physicaltraining tests given by the VIII Corps testing team.
The division's combined arms training began on 10 May, and lasted until19 June. Three collecting companies, each assigned to a regimental combatteam, took part in exercises which were conducted in the Camp Carson andLake George areas of Colorado. Company D, the division clearing company,moved to Lake George to establish a clearing station and to set up a basecamp for the division. During these exercises, all units were able to gainexperience in handling both actual and simulated casualties, including376 men who became sick or were injured in the course of training. Whennot engaged in exercises, the medical battalion practiced evacuation ofcasualties over water obstacles, using facilities provided at Camp Carsonlake. Units were also required to conduct two training sessions on an infiltrationcourse, one by day and one at night, and to train their men to climb cargonets in full field equipment. Combined arms training was completed on 19June 1943 following a critique by the division commander.
On 28 June, the division moved south of the Camp Carson area to an areanear Pueblo, Colo., to hold a series of maneuvers under the direction ofthe VIII Corps. Again, the three collecting companies were employed undercombat team control, while the clearing company remained under the division.In the course of the maneuvers, medical units evacuated a total of 347sick and injured, as well as a number of simulated casualties. These maneuvershad originally been planned to extend to the beginning of August, but on14 July, they were cut short to make time for the division's reorganization.
On 1 August 1943, the 89th Infantry Division was reorganized and redesignatedas the 89th Light Division. After the reorganization, the officer strengthof medical elements was reduced from 51 Medical Corps, 12 Dental Corps,and 12 Medical Administrative Corps to 38 Medical Corps, eight Dental Corps,and nine Medical Administrative Corps, respectively, while enlisted strengthwas reduced from 896 to 582. The medical battalion was placed under a newtable of organization, and its allotment of vehicles was reduced to eightjeeps and four trailers. During the period from 1 August to 15 November,the unit spent its time in maneuvers designed to test the capabilitiesof the 89th Light Division. On 15 November, the 89th Light Division completedits training at Camp Carson and moved to the Louisiana Maneuver Area forcorps and army maneuvers, and eventual shipment overseas.52
The growth of training systems for nondivisional units of the Army Ground
52Medical History and Progress of the 89thInfantry Division for the Calendar Year 1943.
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Forces during 1943 and 1944 paralleled the development of unit trainingsystems in Army Service Forces. In mid-1942, the Army Ground Forces beganto experiment with the use of group headquarters to control the 700-oddunits that were then being trained under corps and army jurisdiction. Inthe summer and fall of 1943, after group headquarters proved effectivein controlling the training of tactical units, group organization was extendedto service units. By 31 December 1943, 12 group headquarters had been organizedto control the training of nondivisional medical units.53 Latein 1942, the Army Ground Forces also adopted a systemized activation procedurefor nondivisional units. The system was followed closely for approximately6 months, but after mid-1943, the dwindling manpower supply made rigidapplication nearly impossible.54
Throughout 1942 the basic training of AGF nondivisional units was guidedby mobilization training programs prepared during the General Headquartersperiod by chiefs of the appropriate arms or services. Since most mobilizationtraining programs did not extend beyond the basic training phase, unitsin advanced stages of training did not have detailed programs to follow,and training was conducted under weekly schedules drawn up by the unitcommander in accordance with the very general guidelines provided in directivesissued by higher headquarters. No effort was made to revise these programsuntil late 1942; then, deficiencies observed in combined training exercisesand in the theater focused attention sharply on the fact that many mobilizationtraining programs were obsolete, and that unit training programs had neverbeen prepared for the guidance of service units. Early in 1943, the specialstaff sections of Army Ground Forces were instructed to revise mobilizationtraining programs covering the individual training period and to prepareunit training programs covering the unit training period. By the autumnof 1943, all of the staff except the Ground Surgeon had submitted revisedmobilization training programs. In January 1944, the medical section submitteda unit training schedule, and shortly afterward, the mobilization trainingprogram for AGF medical units was published.
Before the end of 1944, Army Ground Forces also adopted a series ofMOS (Military Occupational Specialty) tests designed to test individualsin their proficiency as specialists. Most of these tests were already inuse by subordinate commands, or modified versions of tests prepared bythe chiefs of the services were used. Usually, MOS tests were divided intotwo parts: One, theoretical questions involving the duties and skills requiredin a particular specialty, and, two, practical exercise requiring the applicationof specialized techniques. Tests for personnel in quartermaster and medicalunits were supplemented by exercises designed to check the ability of theunits to perform their primary mission. The test for members of a medicalcollecting company, for example, required the unit to collect and transportcasualties under tactical conditions. Because such tests were already inuse by many subordinate commands, the tests published by Army Ground Forceswere not mandatory.55
53See footnote 10 (2), p. 249.
54Wiley, Bell I.: The Army Ground Forces. Problems of NondivisionalTraining in the Army Ground Forces. Study No. 14. Historical Section-ArmyGround Forces, 1946. [Official record.]
55See footnote 10 (2), p. 249.
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On 14 April 1944, approximately 2 months after Army Service Forces adoptedthe preactivation system, the Army Ground Forces also published an acceleratedtraining schedule for nondivisional units. Under the new system, trainingschedules varied according to the source of the unit's fillers and, becauseof the diverse duties assigned AGF nondivisional units, according to theunit's mission, branch, or service. In medical units, only the period ofindividual or basic training varied: Units that received the bulk of theirfillers directly from reception centers were required to complete a 14-weekprogram of individual training; those whose fillers were sent from unitsof replacement training centers of another branch were required to provide5 weeks of individual training; and units whose fillers were provided bya medical unit or Medical Replacement Training Center were required onlyto complete a 1-week refresher course. Following this phase, all medicalunits were required to complete 9 weeks of unit training and 3 weeks ofcombined training. Thus, depending on the unit's source of fillers, thetraining period for medical units ranged from 13 to 26 weeks. By comparison,the training time required for other technical service units ranged from13 to 42 weeks.56
The final year of the war produced a marked decline in AGF trainingactivity. Efforts focused on converting unneeded organizations and excessZone of Interior personnel into units required for support in the theaterof operations. The accelerated system made it possible to tailor the trainingof each unit according to its needs. The most serious problem created bythe program involved the training of technical personnel. Most nondivisional.technical service units, including medical units, contained a large numberof men whose duties required qualification as technicians or specialists.Getting these men to school without disrupting the training program andimpairing the integrity of the unit had been a serious problem even underthe former system. Under the accelerated program, the problem became increasinglyacute. Schooling was accomplished in many instances at the cost of havinga majority of the unit's personnel absent after the completion of basictraining. Despite this problem, however, the system remained in effectthrough the end of the war.57
PROGRAM GUIDES AND TRAINING LITERATURE
The Medical Department's prototype for World War II mobilization trainingprograms was created in 1935 when The Surgeon General directed the staffat the Medical Field Service School to prepare a 16-week training programfor the mobilization of medical regiments. This program, issued by theWar Department on 1 August 1935, served as a model for mobilization trainingprograms throughout the war. Under this program, instruction was roughlydivided into three phases: The first phase included both military and technicalsubjects, with emphasis on military subjects such as drill and militarycourtesy; the second, emphasized technical subjects, such as first aid,nursing, ward management, litter drill, and the organization and functionsof the Medical Department; and the third, was devoted primarily to
56See footnote 54, p. 267.
57See footnote 10 (2), p. 249.
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field activities and a review of basic military training. The programalso contained special annexes outlining the training of common specialists,such as cooks, clerks, cobblers, horseshoers, wheelwrights, and motor mechanics,and, in addition, prescribed the training for medical, surgical, and veterinarytechnicians.58 Programs utilized during World War II differedwidely from the 1935 prototype in details but did not radically alter itsform.
The program of 1935 was superseded, on 9 September 1940, by a 13-weekprogram bearing the designation Mobilization Training Program No. 8-1,entitled "Medical Department Mobilization Training Program for MedicalDepartment Units at Unit Training Centers and Medical Department Replacementsat Enlisted Replacement Centers." In contrast to its predecessor,which was designed to train specialized units within the medical regiment,the new mobilization training program was a general program written toguide the training of specialists within the unit, regardless of the unit'sultimate mission. As in the previous program, the new schedule was dividedinto three phases, which, for the first time, were broken up into threedistinct chronological periods. At the end of the first 2 weeks of training,or the basic period, the soldier was expected to be able to care for hisuniform and equipment, to march and pitch shelter tents, and to understandthe fundamentals of technical subjects prescribed by the program.
The technical period, which lasted from the third through the 10th weekof the cycle, focused on providing the individual with technical skillsthat would enable him to fill a specialized position in his unit. Duringthis period, members of the unit received the same amount of training andattended a number of common classes in basic military subjects. Those whowere selected to become common specialists and technicians, however, spentthe bulk of their time in specialized training, while the remaining membersof the unit continued their basic military and basic technical training.At the end of this period, trainees were also expected to be familiar withbasic tactics and logistics.
In the final month of the cycle, units turned their attention to tacticaltraining. At the end of the 13th week of the cycle, medical units wereexpected to be able to march and execute tactical movements, to establishand operate stations, to collect and treat casualties in the field, tooperate battalion or regimental stations, and to participate in field exerciseswith the combat arms under tactical conditions. Having trained his menas individuals, the unit commander was responsible at this stage for trainingthem as a team through the employment of appropriate field exercises. Commanderswere expected to adjust the program to the needs of their unit during allphases of training, and during the tactical phase, tailoring was particularlyimportant. Indeed, commanders were notified that:59
* * * The character of operations which will be required,the character and armament of the enemy, the probable theater of operations,including the geographical, topographical, sanitary, and climatic conditionstherein and the results that may be expected should always be considered.The programs may, therefore, require modification to adapt them to thetype of medical unit to
58Letter, Gen. Douglas MacArthur, Chief ofStaff, 1 Aug. 1935, subject: Sixteen-week Training Schedule-Effective UponMobilization (Medical Regiment).
59Mobilization Training Program No. 8-1, 9 Sept. 1940.
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be trained, to meet the status of the individual or unit,to shorten or lengthen the time of training in order to conform to thetime available, to make the best use of existing facilities and of trainingexpedients, and to conform to the climatic or other conditions of the trainingsituation. Progressive and balanced training in subjects essential to accomplishthe training mission, however, must be preserved at all times.
In addition to these general guidelines, special programs were providedfor units organic to divisional medical service, including the collecting,clearing, and ambulance components of the medical regiment and medicalbattalion.
In January 1941, the Medical Department published a mimeographed "Instructors'Guide" that had been prepared by the staff at the Medical Field ServiceSchool to supplement Mobilization Training Program No. 8-1. By themselves,mobilization training programs were little more than outlines that presentedcourse titles, time allocations, and text references in tabular form. Theschedule for 13 weeks of unit training under the program of September 1940,for example, consisted of six pages and charts and explanatory notes. Incontrast, the four-volume "Instructors' Guide" specified thelocation, references, and instructional aids for each hour of training,and provided the instructor with a detailed outline of the subject. Commanderswere not required to use the guide, but they were assured that "ifthe outlines for the subjects scheduled for the various hours are followed,a satisfactory standard of proficiency will be attained."60Commanders were also urged to consult field manuals that would providethem with a detailed knowledge of the mission of their unit and the specialtraining it required. As each new mobilization training program was issuedduring the course of World War II, it was followed by a comparable "Instructors'Guide," and as the war progressed, the guides became increasinglymore detailed and complete.
With minor changes, the mobilization training program for medical unitsissued in September 1940 remained in effect until September 1943. On 18February 1942, the original document was superseded by a revised versionthat eliminated schedules for programs at replacement training centers.61Except for small refinements in the allocation of training time, and amodernization of references, however, the new unit training schedule remainedidentical with its predecessor.
Neither program provided guidance for units that had completed the 13-weekbasic training cycle, and there were no published guidelines for the advancedtraining of units that had completed Mobilization Training Program No.8-1 until mid-1942. Before the War Department reorganization of 1942, theOffice of The Surgeon General instructed unit commanders to look to theheadquarters of the combat organizations to which they were attached forguidance after completing the basic training cycle. On 29 July 1942, however,after the reorganization placed many types of nondivisional medical unitsunder the jurisdiction of Army Service Forces, the Medical Department prepareda mobilization training program for the advanced training of numbered hospitalunits containing personnel that had completed their basic training eitherunder Mobilization Training Program No. 8-1 or at a Medical ReplacementTraining Center. Reflecting the technical orientation of
60Instructors' Guide for Medical DepartmentMobilization Training Program No. 8-1. Volume I. Basic Military Training,January 1941.
61Mobilization Training Program No. 8-1, 18 Feb. 1942.
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ASF units, the program provided 1 week of review and orientation forall personnel and 12 weeks of advanced training for officers, common specialists,and technicians. During this period, specialists and technicians were expectedto participate in on-the-job programs in a hospital on the post to whichthe unit was attached, while officers attended classes in administrationand sanitation. In October 1942, the program was amended to provide trainingfor nurses, and the following March, a program for sanitary technicianswas added.62
The basic and advanced training programs remained the only unit trainingguides available until mid-1943, when the Medical Department prepared threespecial advanced programs for specific types of units. The first, MobilizationTraining Program No. 8-21, a guide for training malaria survey and malariacontrol units, was published on 4 May 1943. Based on the assumption thatall personnel would have at least 8 weeks of basic training in anotherunit, a Medical Replacement Training Center, or a Medical Department EnlistedTechnicians School before assignment to a malaria unit, the new programoutlined two 4-week programs, one for survey units, and one for malariacontrol units. Both programs contained similar introductions to malariologyand entomology, but major emphasis in the program for survey units wasplaced on parasitology and the use of malaria survey equipment, while theprogram for control units stressed mosquito control methods and appliances.
The program for malaria units was followed on 21 May 1943 by a specializedguide, Mobilization Training Program No. 8-15, providing 13 weeks of advancedtraining for army and communications zone medical supply depots. Underthis program, men selected to work in the headquarters, transportation,optical repair, or depot sections of medical supply depots were assignedto comparable sections of Zone of Interior depots for on-the-job training.During the final stage of training, all members of these units participatedin an 85-hour field problem.
The third guide written for a specific unit was a mobilization trainingprogram for portable surgical hospitals, Mobilization Training ProgramNo. 8-22, issued on 20 August 1943, approximately 2 months after the firstof these units was activated. Assuming that personnel assigned to the unithad already received basic training, the program for portable surgicalhospitals prescribed 4 weeks of intensive training designed to preparethe unit for jungle warfare. Included in the unit's program were militarysubjects such as scouting and patrolling; hasty entrenchment and camouflagedefense against chemical, mechanized, and airborne attack; and heavy tentpitching, map reading, and litter carrying over difficult terrain. Themedical portion of the program also focused on jungle warfare and includedsuch topics as tropical disease, malaria, and field sanitation.
On 1 September 1943, the basic-unit training program, Mobilization TrainingProgram No. 8-1 of February 1942, was superseded by a new guide designatedMobilization Training Program No. 8-101, "Mobilization Training Programfor Medical Department Units of the Army Service Forces." In linewith the increasing length of basic training cycles throughout the Army,the revised program extended
62Mobilization Training Program No. 8-10, 29July 1942, with changes 1 and 2, dated 21 Oct. 1942 and 13 Mar. 1943, respectively.
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the period of basic training to 16 weeks. Renewed emphasis on militarysubjects was reflected by the use of the additional time to expand thebasic military phase of the program from 2 to 6 weeks. By comparison, thetechnical training phase remained unchanged at 7 weeks, and the tacticaltraining phase was reduced from 3 weeks to 2.
On 10 January 1944, this program was supplemented by a guide for unitsthat had been assigned such numbers of limited service personnel that theywere unable to sustain the normal pace of training.63 This supplementarymobilization training program for substandard units could be utilized onlyafter a unit had been in training for 6 weeks and had demonstrated thatit was staffed by substandard personnel. With the approval of Army ServiceForces, such units were placed on a decelerated schedule during their seventhweek of training, and allowed an additional 19 weeks to complete the cycle.By this technique, substandard units were able to spend a total of 25 weeksin basic training.
The mobilization training program for substandard units was the lastissued for unit training under the cadre system. After the cadre systemwas replaced by the preactivation system on 15 April 1944, all unit trainingprograms had to be rewritten. Under the new system, which shifted the entireresponsibility for basic training to the replacement training centers,all male recruits, regardless of their branch, assigned to Army ServiceForces were provided with 6 weeks of basic military training under a commonprogram written by Army Service Forces.64 In their seventh weekof training, those soldiers who were assigned to medical components ofthe Army Service Forces began an 8-week technical training phase, or itsequivalent at an enlisted technicians school, under Medical DepartmentMobilization Training Program No. 8-1, "Mobilization Training Programfor Medical Department Enlisted Personnel of the Arm Service Forces,"published on 1 June 1944. At the end of the 14th week of the cycle, menwho had been selected for assignment as replacements were scheduled for3 weeks of basic team training. Those who were earmarked for assignmentas fillers were separated from the basic training program and transferredto newly activated units.
During the final year of the war, three mobilization training programsgoverned the training of all Medical Department units. The first, a newprogram published by the War Department on 1 July 1944, provided medicalunits established under the preactivation system at ASF Training Centerswith 6 weeks of basic training before they entered the advanced trainingcycle. On 10 May 1945, the War Department issued a revised version of thesame program that left training schedules virtually unchanged, but forthe first time during the war provided a lengthy discussion of the scope,content, and purpose of the program.65
Under this program, members of hospital units, general dispensaries,hospital trains, laboratories, and medical groups devoted their first weekof training to classes in military and medical subjects and squad and platoonexercises. The second and third weeks were spent in field exercises designedto train the unit to perform
63Mobilization Training Program No. 8-101A,10 Jan. 1944.
64Mobilization Training Program No. 21-3, 1 May 1944.
65(1) Mobilization Training Program No. 8-2, 1 July 1944. (2)Mobilization Training Program No. 8-2, 10 May 1945.
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its mission under tactical conditions with a minimum of confusion anddelay. In addition, units were also required to participate in 8 hoursof night training each week. The last 3 weeks of the program were usedto provide unit personnel with additional parallel or on-the-job trainingat fixed installations and hospitals and to prepare the unit for overseasmovement. Malaria control units, malaria survey units, and sanitary companies,the latter consisting entirely of Negroes, were provided with separateschedules that substituted practical exercises in their technical specialtyfor parallel training at fixed installations. After completing the 6-weekbasic training program, units were expected to be prepared to move to thefield or the theater of operations on short notice or, if time permitted,to complete an advanced unit training cycle.
The second program, a mobilization training program issued in 1943 toguide the advanced training of medical supply units, was the only programof that period to remain in effect under the preactivation system. Thethird and final program was published on 1 July 1944 as a revised versionof Mobilization Training Program No. 8-10, the guide originally issuedin 1942 to govern the advanced training of numbered hospitals and nondivisionalunits of the Army Service Forces. During the first 10 weeks of the program,specialists and technicians spent half of each day in on-the-job trainingat local hospitals and installations; the remaining time was divided betweenclasses in military and technical subjects. After the technical phase wascompleted, the cycle concluded with 3 weeks of field exercises. Officers,including for the first time dietitians and physical therapists, were providedwith 4 weeks of classes in military, technical, and administrative subjects.The final section of the program contained the schedules prepared by theGround Surgeon in January 1944 for AGF divisional and nondivisional unitsduring their advanced or unit phase of training.
PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT
During the early years of World War II, medical units were plagued bya chronic shortage of personnel and equipment. In part, these problemswere the result of a nationwide shortage of the specialized men and materielrequired by the Armed Forces and, in part, from confusion and controversyover the role to be played by numbered medical units in the Zone of Interior.Details of this controversy have been discussed at length in another volumein this series, but certain aspects need to be considered here.66To a great extent, this controversy developed because The Surgeon Generalcontended that numbered medical units should be used primarily as schoolsfor tactical training that would furnish cadres and fillers to affiliatedhospitals and other medical units, while the War Department, and laterthe Hospitalization and Evacuation Branch, ASF, believed that such unitsshould be used to operate hospitals in the Zone of Interior. At times,shortages and changes in military requirements forced each party to modifyits position, but the basic controversy dominated training policies untilearly 1943.
When mobilization began in the fall of 1940, The Surgeon General plannedto
66See footnote 29 (2), p. 254.
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issue only field training equipment to numbered hospital units and toassign only the two to five officers required for tactical and administrativetraining. In principle, these policies were opposed by the General Staff,which published a statement on 3 January 1941 stating that hospitals shouldbe immediately available to operate in either the United States or a theaterof operations in an emergency.67 Despite this policy, however,shortages of officers, men, and equipment forced the General Staff to adoptThe Surgeon General's position. Units activated during 1941 were initiallyprovided with a cadre of Regular Army enlisted men, between two and fiveofficers each, and only enough selectees-from either reception centersor Medical Replacement Training Centers-to provide them with approximatelyhalf of their table-of-organization enlisted strength. The General Staff'sposition on issue of equipment also differed from The Surgeon General's.In December 1940,68 the staff announced that all Army unitscould obtain complete issues of equipment, except for controlled items(those in short supply and issued only with War Department permission),by submitting requisitions to corps area headquarters. Two weeks later,it issued a special directive making this policy specifically applicableto Medical Department units.69 When units were first activatedin 1941, however, shortages of supplies and equipment again made it impossiblefor the Medical Department to comply with War Department policies.
Events during the first half of 1941 tended to reduce the areas of disagreementbetween The Surgeon General and the War Department on personnel policies.In May 1941, difficulties encountered by the Medical Department in drawingcomplements from named hospitals in the United States for newly establishedhospitals in overseas areas and units required by task forces being formedto protect the French West Indies, and the inherent threat of such leviesto medical service in the Zone of Interior, persuaded The Surgeon Generalto ask the War Department to authorize full complements of officers, nurses,and enlisted men for the 17 hospitals activated earlier in the year. Bythis step, he hoped to simplify the problems of converting training unitsinto functional organizations. At the same time, however, he requestedauthority to withhold all supplies and equipment from such units excepttraining equipment, individual equipment, vehicles, and controlled items,until they were assigned missions involving medical care. In July, theWar Department approved increases to bring 11 of these units to full table-of-organizationenlisted strength, and their officer and nurse allotments to 50 and 75percent, respectively. It also authorized withholding full issues of hospitalequipment to these units, and, at least for these units, approved a practicealready adopted by the Medical Department. A month later, however, theWar Department refused to approve a request for authority to apply thispolicy to all units, and when the
67Letter, The Adjutant General to Chief ofStaff and Commanding Generals, Armies and Corps Areas, 3 Jan. 1941, subject:Purpose and Training of Certain Medical Corps Units To Be Activated WithSelective Service Men.
68Letter, The Adjutant General to Chief of Staff, General Headquarters;Commanding Generals, Armies, Corps Areas, and Departments; Chief of theArmored Force; Commanding General, General Headquarters, Air Force; Chiefsof Arms and Services; Chief of the National Guard Bureau; and CommandingOfficers of Exempted Stations, 30 Dec. 1940, subject: Current Supply Policiesand Procedure.
69Letter, The Adjutant General to Commanding Generals of allArmies, Army Corps, Divisions, Corps Areas, and Departments; CommandingGeneral, General Headquarters, Air Force; Chief of Staff, General Headquarters;Chiefs of Arms and Services; Chief of the Armored Force; Commanding Officersof Exempted Stations, 14 Jan. 1941, subject: Organization, Training, andAdministration of Medical Units.
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number of medical units activated and earmarked for task forces wasincreased from 11 to 31 in August 1941, different supply procedures hadto be applied to the two groups of units.
The controversy reached a critical point in the fall of 1941 when theWar Department pressed The Surgeon General to provide hospitals with fullassemblages and asked for his recommendations. In response, he pointedout that five hospital assemblages had been issued, and 20 others wereready. Pointing to slow deliveries by manufacturers, however, he againasked for authority to hold assemblages in depots until units were assignedmissions requiring the actual care of patients. To support this recommendation,he argued that units in training did not require a full issue of equipment,that storage in the field was inadequate, that careless handling by unitmembers would result in breakage and deterioration, and that units werenot trained to repack assemblages for overseas shipment. In response, theWar Department refused to abandon its position, but recognized the possibilityof storing scarce supplies, and, on 6 December 1941, directed The SurgeonGeneral to earmark and hold all available equipment until it could completea survey of warehousing facilities. Thus, by the time the United Statesentered the war, The Surgeon General and the War Department had arrivedat a common policy of providing units with less than a full quota of officersand nurses, and at times, a reduced complement of enlisted personnel. Theydisagreed, however, on the question of providing units with full issuesof supplies and equipment, and the dispute continued unabated during thefirst half of the war.
By 7 December 1941, the Medical Department had activated 22 general,24 station, 17 evacuation, and eight surgical hospitals as training units.Of this group, three station hospitals had been sent overseas, and 12 general,nine station, four evacuation, and three surgical hospitals were includedin task force pools and authorized almost 100 percent of their table-of-organizationenlisted strength, and from 50 to 75 percent of their commissioned strength.The balance had half or less of their enlisted strength and from threeto five officers each. In addition, the Medical Department had organizedan unactivated reserve of affiliated units that included 41 general, 11evacuation, and four surgical hospitals. Such units consisted primarilyof a professional complement of doctors and nurses and, under prewar plans,were to be called to active duty immediately after the outbreak of war,supplied with equipment and enlisted personnel, and pressed into servicewithout further training. Supplies for these units consisted of five assemblagesthat had already been issued, 20 being held in reserve, and 41 that werein various stages of packing.
Early in January 1942, The Surgeon General outlined his plans for full-scalemobilization.70 Affiliated units were to be called to activeduty and provided with half their enlisted strength from training units,and the balance from reception centers, Zone of Interior installations,and other medical units. Training units that transferred such personnel,in turn, were to retain a cadre to train additional fillers. Some trainingunits, especially station hospitals, were to be brought to authorized
70Memorandum, Lt. Col. John A. Rogers, MC,Executive Officer, Office of The Surgeon General, to the Assistant Chiefof Staff, G-3, 13 Jan. 1942, subject: Activation of Numbered ProfessionalMedical Units, and inclosures thereto.
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enlisted and commissioned strength, and sent overseas as needed. Everyunit was to draw individual clothing, equipment, and vehicles at its homestation. Hospital assemblages would be provided only to those being sentoverseas, preferably at the port of embarkation.
Shortly after this system was proposed, The Surgeon General realizedthat it would have to be modified. The practice of activating trainingunits at half strength, adopted in 1941, resulted in units being hurriedlyassembled at ports of embarkation. Members of units going overseas frequentlyhad little time to become aquainted with each other's capabilities beforeembarkation, and installations from which fillers were drawn were oftendrained of personnel. In February 1942, therefore, The Surgeon Generalrecommended that all units be activated at full table-of-organization enlistedstrength.71 In May 1942, after receiving both ASF and AGF support,the policy received War Department approval.72
The Surgeon General, Maj. Gen. James C. Magee, received only partialsupport, however, for his stand on the issuance of assemblages. After lengthydiscussion, he accepted a compromise whereby unit assemblages were declaredcontrolled items and placed under War Department control, and the MedicalDepartment was authorized to make fractional issues of training equipment.73Although The Surgeon General agreed to this compromise, he did not giveup hope of being able to hold assemblages in medical depots until numberedhospitals were assigned operational missions. Once unit assemblages hadbeen declared controlled items, he sought this control indirectly. On 6February 1942,74 he succeeded in persuading the War Departmentto include a paragraph in movement orders for units ordered overseas, directingThe Surgeon General to ship appropriate assemblages to ports of embarkationor staging areas. Neither of these measures, however, settled the controversyover equipment.
Under the compromise reached in January and February 1942, units wereto receive only field training equipment, individual equipment, and vehiclesfor use in field training. Technical training and experience with professionalsupplies and equipment were to be gained at Zone of Interior hospitals.As long as one or two units were activated at a particular post for training,this method seemed satisfactory, but delay in the construction of housingoften caused units to be grouped wherever housing was available. Too often,this system produced overcrowding and inefficient training.
In March 1942, the entire system was challenged by the Hospitalizationand Evacuation Branch of Army Service Forces, which took the stand thathospital units could best be prepared for overseas service by receivingcomplete assemblages
71Memorandum, Brig. Gen. Larry B. McAfee, ActingThe Surgeon General, for the Assistant Chief of Staff; G-3, 28 Feb. 1942,subject: Organization and Dispatch of Medical Department Theater of OperationsUnits.
72Letter, The Adjutant General to the Commanding Generals, ArmyGround Forces; Army Air Forces; Services of Supply; Armored Force; Armies;Army Corps; Corps Areas; Air Forces; Departments; Divisions; Base Commands;and Defense Commands; Exempted Station and Force Commanders, 6 May 1942,subject: Allotments of Grades and Ratings and Authorized Strengths to TacticalUnits (less Air Corps and Services with Air Corps).
73Letter, The Adjutant General to The Surgeon General, 21 Jan.1942, subject: Equipment for Medical Department Units.
74Disposition Form, Maj. Gen. Brehon Somervell, Assistant Chiefof Staff, War Department General Staff, to The Adjutant General, 6 Feb.1942, subject: Proposed Modification of Movement Orders, and inclosurethereto.
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and being required to function as hospitals in the Zone of Interior.This stand strengthened when Army Ground Forces submitted a similar recommendationin May, believing that units should be trained in the storage, maintenance,and repair of hospital equipment, and that they should be capable of managingtheir own messes and administration. In the paper duel that followed, TheSurgeon General reached the point by September 1942 of agreeing to issuehousekeeping equipment, but he continued to insist that all other equipmentbe withheld until units were assigned operational missions.
At this point, controversy over the issuance of assemblages was absorbedby a larger and inconclusive dispute over the use of numbered hospitalsto provide medical service in the United States that lasted until mid-1943.By late 1942, many units were becoming restless from long periods in trainingwithout an opportunity to function, and reports of doctors sitting idlein army camps were beginning to reach the public. Moreover, reports fromthe theater indicated the desirability of training units to pack theirown equipment and to reduce its size and weight by eliminating unnecessaryitems. On 16 September, and again on 12 October, Army Service Forces directedthe Medical Department to prepare a plan for employing numbered medicalunits in the Zone of Interior,75 and on 17 September 1942, itrequested The Surgeon General's comments on a draft of a policy requiringthe issuance of complete assemblages to all hospital units.76In response, The Surgeon General repeated his earlier recommendations,and supported by almost every argument that had been used since 1940, tooppose the issuance of assemblages. As a result, Army Service Forces publisheda compromise policy in January 1943 by which assemblages would containonly Medical Department supplies and equipment, while items needed by hospitalsbut supplied by other services, such as the Quartermaster Corps, couldbe furnished to units upon requisition.77 Although The SurgeonGeneral was not satisfied with this compromise, the policy remained ineffect until the end of the war. Debate continued until mid-1943, whenrapid reductions in the troop strength in the Zone of Interior broughtit to an inconclusive end.
In contrast to the hospital units trained by Army Service Forces, evacuationunits trained by Army Ground Forces were charged with providing medicalservice during their training in the United States. To fill this dual role,they required both personnel and equipment and usually suffered from ashortage of both. In the absence of an adequate number of Medical Corpsofficers, Army Ground Forces was unable to assign full complements to unitsin training. The ratio of Medical Corps officers to table-of-organizationauthorizations varied from time to time and unit to unit, but often itwas less than 50 percent. Shortages of medical officers continued through1943 and 1944, and at times, units were brought to full table-of-organizationstrength only after being scheduled for shipment overseas. Whenever possible,
75(1) Memorandum, Brig. Gen. LeRoy Lutes, AssistantChief of Staff for Operations, Services of Supply, for The Surgeon General,16 Sept. 1942, subject: Assignment, Training, and Utilization of Theaterof Operations Medical Units. (2) 1st Indorsement, Brig. Gen. LeRoy Lutes,Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations, Services of Supply, to The SurgeonGeneral, 12 Oct. 1942.
76Memorandum, Brig. Gen. LeRoy Lutes, Assistant Chief of Stafffor Operations, Services of Supply, for The Surgeon General, 17 Sept. 1942,subject: Medical Unit Assemblages, and inclosure thereto.
77War Department Memorandum No. W700-4-43, 18 Jan. 1943.
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however, The Surgeon General agreed to provide AGF units with a fullcomplement of professional personnel during the maneuver phase of training.78
Shortages of equipment were most severe during 1942 and the first halfof 1943. During that period, the Ground Surgeon repeatedly petitioned theSurgeon General's Office for more complete allowances of supplies and equipment,and it was repeatedly notified that production of medical supplies wassufficient only to meet the needs of units scheduled for shipment to thetheaters of operations. In mid-1943, however, the situation began to improve,and by the end of the year, some units reported all of their equipmenton hand. By early 1944, the Ground Surgeon was able to report that allmedical units engaged in maneuvers in Louisiana had between 95 and 100percent of their authorized equipment.
78Shambora, William E.: Army Ground ForcesMedical Training During World War II. [Official record.]
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