CHAPTER XIII
Redeployment, Retraining, and Demobilization
PERIOD OF PARTIAL DEMOBILIZATION
As early as January 1943, the Army had begun work ondemobilization planning.1 By April, it becameobvious that only partial demobilization could follow the defeat of the Axis andthat plans for redeployment of troops from the European and Mediterraneantheaters to the Pacific would have to be included in the overall demobilizationplans.
Criteria for Release of Officers
In deciding which persons should be released as a means ofreducing the forces, the intention of the War Department was to consider anumber of factors in addition to those already operating to remove personnelfrom the Army. One of these factors was the adjusted service rating, which mightalso aid in determining whether, even if a man stayed in the Army, he was to betransferred from one area to another. This rating was a point score to be giveneach individual shortly after the surrender of Germany. The score was the sum ofhis credits for length of service in the Army (1 point for each month since 16September 1940), length of service overseas (1 point for each month), number ofcombat awards and decorations (5 points each), and number of children hepossessed under 18 years of age up to a limit of three (12 points each). Thescore must reach a certain total (the "critical score") to beconsidered as a factor working toward his release from the Army.
As part of the plans for redeployment of medical personnel,The Surgeon General, 2 weeks after V-E Day, requested and received authorityfor the transfer of 1,000 Medical Corps officers from the European andMediterranean theaters to the United States so as to help care for the expectedconcentration of patients in the United States after the end of hostilities inEurope. He also obtained approval for certain other policies concerning theredistribution of members of the Medical Department. The War Department plannedto send some medical units to the Pacific by way of the United States, and TheSurgeon General obtained authority to restaff these units by exchanging theirhigh-score personnel for low-score personnel in the United States beforeshipping them to the Pacific. To this end, a complete census was taken of allpersonnel stationed in the United States.
1For a detailed account of demobilization Army-wide, see Sparrow, John C.: History of Personnel Demobilization in the United States Army. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1952. (DA Pamphlet 20-210.)
488
On the basis of this census and in the light of experience todate, criteria were established for withdrawing personnel from units passingthrough this country and for assigning personnel then in the United States tothe units scheduled for the Pacific. Thus, Medical Corps officers in returningunits would be withdrawn if they were 45 years of age or over, or had anadjusted service rating of 75 or over, or had had 12 months` service overseas.The age and oversea service criteria for all other Medical Department officerswere lower-40 years and 6 months, respectively. The critical figure for theadjusted service rating was also lower, being 50 for all other male MedicalDepartment officers and 30 for all female officers of the Department.
The Surgeon General also planned to speed the exchange ofpersonnel with the Pacific as soon as part of the surplus from the European andMediterranean theaters should return to the United States. Finally, herecommended that the European theater, which had more low-score specialists thanthe Mediterranean theater, should exchange them with high-score specialists fromthe latter. This would enable the Mediterranean theater to send units directlyto the Pacific, properly balanced with specialists, and yet avoid keepinghigh-score men in oversea service. Presumably, the latter would be returned tothe United States.2
The Surgeon General`s Office also developed a method ofselecting the Medical Department officers to be separated from the Army inhelping to carry out partial demobilization. According to War Departmentreadjustment regulations, which were given the force of directives upon thedefeat of Germany, all Medical Department officers who were returned to theUnited States as surplus from oversea theaters and defense commands were to beplaced under the jurisdiction of Army Ground Forces, Air Forces, or ServiceForces, depending on which of these commands was responsible for the unit in thetroop basis with which the particular officer had last served. If these officerswere needed by the Air or Ground Forces, they were to be retained by them. Ifnot, they and other surplus Medical Department officers from those commands wereto be turned over to the Commanding General, Army Service Forces, for a decisionas to their essentiality to the Army. The regulations stated that in thisdecision "military necessity must be the controlling factor," but thatother considerations should also be weighed-efficiency, the officer`s desireas to retention, and his adjusted service rating. The Army was permitted to keepofficers otherwise qualified for release if they wished to be retained and hadsatisfactory records.3
On 7 May 1945, the Commanding General, Army Service Forces,delegated his responsibility for determining the essentiality of MedicalDepartment officers to The Surgeon General, although he retained a certainamount of control in that respect. A week before this, The Surgeon General inaccord-
2Medical Department Redeployment and Separation Policy, as revised, 6 August 1945. In Annual Report, Military Personnel Division, Office of The Surgeon General, U.S. Army, 1946.
3Readjustment Regulations 1-5, 30 Apr. 1945.
489
ance with prior planning had established a board of medicalofficers, composed in part of representatives of Army Ground and Air Forces, todeal with the question.4
By the end of July, the Surgeon General`s Office hadevolved a method of selecting the officers who were to be kept in service andthose who were to be released. This method took into consideration theessentiality not of individual officers but of numbers-the number that wouldbe needed and the number that could be dispensed with in each of eight officer5components and in each of certain specialties within the Medical Corps.
The Surgeon General`s Office adopted age and the adjustedservice rating as the factors which might give officers claim to separation.Keeping in mind the number needed in each component and specialty, it set theage or point score at such a figure that the number who could qualify would notexceed the number that could be dispensed with. It might happen, however, thatcertain persons with "irreplaceable experience," even though they wereeligible for release on other grounds, needed to be retained; in such cases,their release could be deferred by applying the principle of military necessitydirectly to them as individuals.6 It appearsthat before the surrender of Japan the point score for release was not arrivedat by any very exact calculation as to how many officers would be made eligiblefor discharge by the figure adopted; in the case of specialists, at any rate,the point score fixed upon was to be retained so long as the number of releasesunder it "would not endanger the efficiency of the medical service,"after which it would presumably be raised or the whole procedure abandoned.
Although The Surgeon General recommended the release ofMedical and Dental Corps officers who were 50 years of age or over, Army ServiceForces headquarters did not put this provision into effect immediately. Manysuch men had been retained in the United States throughout their period ofservice and so had been unable to accumulate many points. The minimum pointscore required for members of the Medical Corps was 100 (120 for specialists ingastroenterology, ophthalmology, otorhinolaryngology, cardiology, dermatology,allergies, anesthesiology, neuropsychiatry, thoracic surgery, plastic surgery,orthopedic surgery, neurosurgery, clinical laboratory work). The minimumseparation ages or point scores required for members of other officer componentswere as follows: Veterinary Corps, 50 years or 110 points; MedicalAdministrative and Sanitary Corps, 45 years or 90 points; Nurse Corps, 40 yearsor 65 points; dietitians and physical therapists, 50 years or 65 points.7
4(1) Army Service Forces Circular No. 175, May 1945. (2) Personnel Service Plan for Period I, Action 66, Office of The Surgeon General. (3) Office Order No. 105, Office of The Surgeon General, U.S. Army, 11 May 1945.
5Members of the Pharmacy Corps, all of whom were officers of the Regular Army, did not fall under this program.
6See footnote 2, p. 488.
7Letter, Chief, Personnel Service, Office of The Surgeon General, to Chief, Historical Division, Office of The Surgeon General, 14 Aug. 1945, subject: Criteria for Separation of Medical Department Officer Personnel.
490
Criteria for Release of Enlisted Personnel
Few special provisions concerning Medical Department enlisted personnelappeared in the rules governing the release of the Army`s enlisted members asa phase of partial demobilization. It will be recalled that shortly after V-EDay the War Department permitted the release of all enlisted persons 40 years ofage or over almost without restriction. About the same time, the Secretary ofWar announced that the critical score for enlisted personnel would be 85 points;military necessity, however, might dictate that men having that score-particularlythose possessing special skills-would be held until qualified replacementsarrived. The readjustment regulations provided that the essentiality of enlistedpersonnel would be determined at reception centers where surplus personnel fromthe United States and overseas were to be collected. There, the liaison officerof the Commanding General, Army Service Forces, would pass upon members of theMedical Department, with the possible exception of personnel assigned to the AirForces and certain other combat branches of the Army.8The regulations permitted persons to remain in the Army if they chose todo so, providing they had satisfactory records.
Problems Encountered in Redeployment and Separation
By the early part of August 1945, 3 months after V-E Day, the carrying out ofsome of these plans had not gone as far as might have been anticipated. Thethousand Medical Corps officers from the European and Mediterranean theaters,authority for whose return The Surgeon General had requested in May, had not yetall arrived in the United States. The remainder were en route, but the peakpatient load in the U.S. hospitals had already been reached and passed. Theexplanation for the delay was that "tremendous personnel shifts in thetheaters and the uncertainties regarding individual scores [that is, adjustedservice ratings] which were not available until almost 6 weeks after V-E Day,made it difficult for the theater to return personnel as rapidly asdesired."9
In addition, The Surgeon General`s plan to restaff units passing throughthis country to the Pacific was not too successful, since few units had beenshipped back by early August. His efforts to speed replacements to the Pacificin order to relieve personnel who had been there for a long time were achievingmore success; arrangements had been made to bring back large numbers of nursesand replace them with fresh members of the Nurse Corps. The policy of exchanginglow- for high-score specialists between the European and Mediterranean theatershad also, after some delays, been put into effect.
On the other hand, the separation of Medical Department personnel from theservice as a phase of partial demobilization had no more than begun. In
8Readjustment Regulations 1-1, 12 Feb. 1945, par. 12, and Changes No. 1, 4 May 1945, par. 12a (1).
9See footnote 2, p. 488.
491
July, the chairman of a Senate subcommittee investigating the Army`s use ofdoctors had charged that surplus Army doctors in Europe were not working"more than an hour or two a day" and declared that they should bebrought home to relieve the shortage of civilian doctors.
The Surgeon General`s Office gave reasons why few MedicalDepartment personnel were being discharged from the Army. It pointed out thatvery large numbers of patients continued to come back to the United States evenafter the fighting ended in Europe, so that the patient load at home might beexpected to remain at or near the peak until the fall of 1945. It stated thatwhile Medical Department personnel in Europe no longer had to care for combatcasualties they were occupied with closing hospitals, treating displaced personsfor sickness and injuries in territories overrun by the American armies, andfinally moving toward the United States or the Pacific.10
FULL-SCALE DEMOBILIZATION
The capitulation of Japan on 14 August 1945 put an end toredeployment as a shift from a two- to a one-front war. The process oftransferring units from Europe to the Pacific either directly or by way of theUnited States was abandoned. Gradually, a vast movement of men from overseas tothe United States set in, with a smaller movement outward of fresh personnel tomaintain the occupation forces. Partial demobilization, which had hardlystarted, gave way to full demobilization.
Reduction of Criteria for Demobilization of Enlisted Personnel
Officers as well as enlisted men who possessed the criticalscore could no longer be held in the Army on the ground of military necessity,except in special instances. Adjusted service ratings were recomputed as of 2September 1945. The critical score of enlisted men was then reduced from 85 to80 points, and enlisted men 35 years of age and over who had had at least 2years` service were ordered released on their application; the age forautomatic release of those with less than 2 years` service remained at 38,having been reduced from 40 earlier. Within the next 3 months, the criticalscore for enlisted men was brought down by successive cuts from 80 to 55, whilenew alternatives of 4 years` service or the possession of three dependentchildren also qualified men for discharge.
Medical Department enlisted technicians in certainspecialties were excepted from the rule that men could not be held in the Armyfor reasons of military necessity if they were otherwise eligible for release.Six months was the maximum length of time for which these technicians could beretained. Orthopedic mechanics were among those so held.11In the fall of 1945, the
10See footnote 2, p. 488.
11Memorandum, Surgeon General Kirk, for Commanding General, Army Service Forces, 22 Oct. 1945, subject: Shortage of Medical Department Enlisted Personnel for Zone of Interior Installations.
492
Medical Department was training 75 of these technicians; TheSurgeon General stated that when they completed their training those being heldon duty would be discharged. Expressing his belief that when men were heldbeyond the date at which they became eligible for discharge their morale wentdown, he also urged service command surgeons to consider seriously a one-gradepromotion for those being retained.12 Inlate November, promotions were authorized for orthopedic mechanics.
In early December, The Surgeon General stated thatinformation available to his Office indicated that the situation had improved inthe last 2 weeks, but he warned the Army Service Forces headquarters at the sametime that additional replacements would have to be forthcoming as the dischargecriteria were lowered in the future.13 Afew days later, he reluctantly advised the same headquarters that effective on 1January 1946 men in four critically needed enlisted specialties might beauthorized for discharge-medical and dental laboratory, X-ray, and orthopedictechnicians-provided they had 50 points on the adjusted service record or hadbeen in the Army for 3? years.14 These samecriteria were announced the next day by the War Department as those that wouldgovern the discharge of enlisted men generally after 31 December 1945.
As late as February 1946, the Surgeon General`s Office wasstill trying to make good the losses by recommending that G-1 make enlisted menavailable to the Medical Department for training to replace scarce categorypersonnel, specifically men in the four critical specialties.15All specialists were taken off the list of those critically needed by 1July 1946 in order to comply with the Chief of Staff`s statement that allenlisted personnel with 2? years` service or 45 points be discharged by 30April 1946 and all with 2 years` service or 40 points by 2 months later. Atthe same time, The Surgeon General asserted that the situation had becomeincreasingly worse. He admonished service command surgeons that they must makeexceptional effort immediately to employ soldiers as civilians upon theirdischarge. Furthermore, they were to hold enlisted specialists as long aspossible.16
12(1) Memorandum, Chief, Enlisted Branch, Military Personnel Division, Office of The Surgeon General, for Director, Military Personnel Division, Office of The Surgeon General, 14 Nov. 1945, subject: Survey of Medical Department Enlisted Situation, Eighth Service Command, with Comment No. 2, Military Personnel Division, Office of The Surgeon General, to Legislative and Liaison Division, War Department General Staff, 23 Nov. 1945. (2) Letter, The Surgeon General, to Surgeon, each service command, 28 Nov. 1945.
13Memorandum, Deputy Surgeon General, for Commanding General, Army Service Forces (attention: Deputy Chief of Staff for Service Commands), 6 Dec. 1945, subject: Medical Department Enlisted Personnel.
14Memorandum, Director, Military Personnel Division, Office of The Surgeon General, for Director, Military Personnel Division, Army Service Forces, 18 Dec. 1945, subject: Scarce Categories and Critically Needed Specialists.
15Memorandum, Deputy Surgeon General, for G-1, 8 Feb. 1946, subject: Scarce Category Enlisted Personnel, Medical Department.
16Letter, Deputy Surgeon General, to Col. John A. Isherwood, Surgeon, First Service Command, 8 Feb. 1946.
493
Reduction of Criteria for Demobilization of Officers
Following V-J Day, the criteria for demobilizing MedicalDepartment officers also were reduced. The first reduction occurred on 10September 1945. The new criteria did not entitle certain Medical Corpsspecialists having an A, B, or C proficiency rating to release; moreover, TheSurgeon General could hold individual specialists who were essential to theproper care of patients. For others, the minimum point score wasconsiderably reduced. Age, which had not previously been an alternative forMedical and Dental Corps officers, was now added for them, while length ofservice became a second alternative for all except female officers (nurses,dietitians, and physical therapists). The criteria for age and length of servicewere so high, however, that few officers could qualify for separation underthem. Consequently, the speed with which doctors were being demobilized met withconsiderable criticism.
Congressional reaction
On 6 November 1945, Senator Clyde M. Reed of Kansas submitteda resolution to the Senate in which he pointed out that the Army had moredoctors on its rolls on 1 September 1945, 2 weeks after fighting had ceased,than on the previous 1 January, when a two-front war was waging. The Senatoralso charged that "from many sources, testimony of undoubted reliabilityhas come to members of the Senate indicating an incredible degree ofincompetency, inefficiency, and general neglect on the part of the Office of TheSurgeon General of the Army, in dealing with the return of the doctors andsurgeons from the Army service where they are not needed, to communities wherethe civilian need for proper medical attention is very great." Actually,the number of doctors in the Army was about the same on 1 September as it hadbeen 8 months earlier and by the time the Senator spoke, it had fallen by 8,000.Furthermore, over 11,000 had been discharged between 1 May and 1 November. TheSurgeon General might have pointed out that in addition to the medical skillsstill needed to provide definitive treatment in Army hospitals even thoughfighting had ceased, some 2,000 doctors had to be stationed in separationcenters to perform the final physical examinations so that other troops could bepromptly released. Senator Reed`s resolution requested the Secretary of War toappoint a board to investigate the situation, fix responsibility, and "takeimmediate steps to remedy the injury done to the doctors, surgeons, and dentistsas individuals and to the communities affected."17
The Surgeon General had let it be known that he would welcomesuch an investigation, as an opportunity to present his own case to the Americanpeople. At the same time, he promised to do everything in his power to speed
17S. Res. 184, 79th Cong., 6 Nov. 1945 (legislative date, 20 October).
494
the overall demobilization. The firm position of The SurgeonGeneral, with its implied promise to expose the organized groups then seeking toinfluence the Congress, strengthened the hand of the Secretary of War, who wasable to persuade the senatorial sponsors of the resolution to drop it. Inreturn, the Secretary promised to give his personal attention to the problem ofdischarging at the earliest possible date all doctors and dentists not actuallyneeded by the Army. In a memorandum of 21 November 1945 to the Chief of Staff,he set forth certain steps to achieve that end; they included determination bythe General Staff of the number of doctors and dentists each theater required,the appointment of a mission to the European and Mediterranean theaters toreport on ways of speeding the process of returning their surpluses to theUnited States, priority of transportation for these surpluses, and investigationof the three major commands in the United States to see that their staffs werecut as fast as their workload permitted and that the criteria for discharge werekept adjusted so as to release the surplus without delay. Col. Durward G. Hall,Chief of The Surgeon General`s Personnel Service, himself headed the missionto the European and Mediterranean theaters, and took with him Lt. Col. BollingR. Powell, Jr., Congressional Legislative Liaison Officer, on the War DepartmentSpecial Staff. The mission traveled on orders from the Secretary of War, withauthority to expedite the return of critical category medical personnel.18Although much pressure continued to be brought for the release ofindividual doctors, no further public attacks were made by Senator Reed or hisassociates.
While the threat of a congressional investigation did notchange basic medical demobilization plans, it probably hastened the execution ofthem. Only a week before the Secretary of War took action, The Surgeon Generalhad informed G-1 that the release of 13,000 doctors by Christmas in fulfillmentof a promise made 6 weeks earlier "should relieve undue pressure fromCongress and other sources."19 But by theend of December, 22,000 had been released in an orderly manner. Nevertheless, itwas not until then that the criteria were substantially reduced. After that,reductions occurred on 1 February, 1 July, and 1 September 1946. Although thedemobilization of critical category personnel, including shipment from overseatheaters, was an outstanding achievement, it was undoubtedly too rapid from thestandpoint of good medical care.20
Differences in criteria for medical and nonmedicalofficers
The principal criteria for the discharge of MedicalDepartment officers differed from those for other Army officers, which after V-JDay were for
18Statement of Durward G. Hall, M.D., to the editor, 27 May 1961.
19The promise of 13,000, or slightly more, separations was made on 31 August. The Deputy Surgeon General later (17 October) promised 14,000 separations and hoped that that figure could be exceeded. (House of Representatives, Hearings before the Committee on Military Affairs, "The Demobilization of the Army of the U.S.," 28 and 31 Aug. 1945; Senate, Hearings before the Committee on Military Affairs, "The Demobilization of the Armed Services," 17 and 18 Oct. 1945.)
20See footnote 18.
495
the most part uniform. As already indicated, the medicalauthorities were permitted to set their own criteria after as well as before thesurrender of Japan, and the function continued to be exercised by The SurgeonGeneral on the advice of a board representing his own Office, the Ground Forces,and the Air Forces.
From early September 1945, at the beginning of thedemobilization period, until 31 August 1946, when the point score was abolishedas a criterion for release, the minimum score set for doctors, dentists, andveterinarians was always (except for the first 3 weeks in October) lower thanthat for non-Medical Department officers. The difference varied from 3 to 10points. When in favor of Medical Department officers, it tended to equalizetheir situation with that of other officers, since a smaller proportion of theformer than of the latter had had the opportunity to serve overseas, and overseaservice plus battle decorations counted in the score. Until it was abolished,the minimum point score for the separation of male Medical Department officerswas never allowed to fall below 60, a figure reached on 1 February 1946. TheSurgeon General`s separation board believed that to have reduced it furtherwould have weighted the criterion too much in favor of officers possessingchildren, and would then have promoted the release of the older professionalgroup.21
Length of service (apart from the point score) became analternative criterion for the release of male Medical Department officers inearly September 1945 and for all other Army officers (except dietitians, to whomit was granted on 1 February 1946) at the beginning of December 1945. Thecriterion was revised downward from time to time, but until 1 September 1946, itwas always considerably lower for Medical Department officers than for others.The attainment of a certain age, a third alternative for release underdemobilization regulations, was applicable to officers of the Medical Departmentonly. In the case of members of the Medical Corps, it was set at 48 years inearly September 1945 and reduced to 45, 2 months later, where it remained untilabolished on 1 September 1946.
OFFSETTING FACTORS
Administration of Demobilization
Before making each successive reduction in criteria, authoritiesin the Surgeon General`s Office had of course to compute how many officerswould be eligible for separation if criteria were reduced by a certain amount.Whenever possible they would forewarn the service command surgeons, and thecommanders of those relatively few installations which were directly under TheSurgeon General`s jurisdiction, who would then report to the Surgeon General`sOffice how many officers and what types of specialists they would
21Memorandum, unsigned, for Deputy Surgeon General, 5 Jan. 1945 [46], subject: Separation of Medical Corps Officers.
496
need after the proposed cut. Thus it was that, through closecooperation, the service command surgeons were enabled to make certain that nohospital, post, or body of troops was, through the separation of its MedicalDepartment officers, left without adequate medical and allied attention. Onesaving clause that tended to keep this task from becoming even more troublesomeand demanding was a provision that regardless of a Medical Department officer`seligibility for separation, he could be retained until a replacement becameavailable.22 Thus, militarynecessity took precedence over an individual`s eligibility for separation.
Likewise, The Surgeon General had to exercise care that,regardless of the level at which the criteria were fixed, the oversea commandsalways had sufficient Medical Department strength to care for Army personnelremaining there. As the time involved in transporting officers was so great,this aspect of demobilization was probably more difficult than that of keepingservice commands in the United States properly manned. During this period, therewas also more necessity to juggle personnel than had been needed when wholeunits were being sent to theaters of operations. The fact that separationcriteria were being repeatedly lowered during this period caused difficulty ingetting the right men overseas. An officer or enlisted man might be slated forshipment when a lowered set of criteria would make him eligible for separation.As the Chief of Staff pointed out to Congress, the Army had to suffer theinevitable delay between the date of recruiting new personnel and the time itcould put them to work.
New Officer Procurement
During the period of demobilization, various factors helpedpartially to offset the losses produced by it or to prevent it from proceedingas rapidly as possible. One such factor was the continuous procurement of newofficers.
Dentists
In the case of dentists, however, the number fell far shortof the demand. Unlike the Medical Corps, the Dental Corps could no longer relyon graduates of the Army Specialized Training Program to take up the deficit,for the dental phase of the program had ended in April 1945. The medical phaseran until June 1946 and was the main source of procurement for the Medical Corpsduring demobilization. Most if not all of the doctors it produced were held for2 years` service in the Army; those who had spent little of their studentcareer in the program complained that they were compelled to serve as long aftergraduation as those who had spent much time in it.23The case was dif-
22Memorandum, Executive Officer, Office of The Surgeon General, for Chiefs of Services, Directors of Divisions, and others, Office of The Surgeon General, 13 Sept. 1945, subject: Criteria for Separation of Medical Department Officer Personnel.
23War Department, Information and Education Division, Report No. 12-310, 2 Nov. 1946, subject: Attitudes of A.S.T.P. Medical Officers Toward Service in the Regular Army.
497
ferent with students who had received part of their education through theprogram but had not been permitted to continue in it long enough to graduate.They had been relieved of all obligation to serve after finishing their course,and no effort was yet made to compel these men in particular, or even thedentists among them, to come to the relief of the Medical Department. Instead, amore general measure of compulsion was introduced-a draft of dentists-thefirst time in American history that a professional group had been singled outfor conscription. As already stated, such a measure had been agitated before,for doctors and nurses, but it had been avoided even in wartime.
On 17 May 1946, The Surgeon General in a memorandum to the Assistant Chief ofStaff, G-1, stated that only 15 dentists had joined the Army in the past 3months, from which he concluded that volunteering alone would not yieldsufficient recruits. Accordingly, he recommended that the Selective ServiceSystem be requested to deliver enough dentists to meet the procurement objectiveof 1,500, preferably, "both from the War Department`s point of view andprobably from that of the community at large * * * dentists in theyoungest age groups who have not yet been firmly established in civilianpractice."24 His advice wasaccepted and Selective Service issued its call. However, only a very fewdentists, probably not more than four, were actually drafted, others who werecalled preferring to accept commissions instead.25Nevertheless, the drafting of dentists had established a precedent for applyingconscription to professional groups, a precedent that was followed 4 years laterin the case not only of dentists, but of doctors as well.
Physicians
Before this latter event took place, another piece of evidence indicated thatit might become necessary to draft physicians. In November 1946, the WarDepartment conducted a poll of Medical Corps officers-former members of theArmy Specialized Training Program-to discover the attitude of graduates of theprogram toward volunteering for the Regular Army Medical Corps. All but 1 of the385 who answered the questionnaire stated that they were not planning to applyfor commissions in the Regular Army. Among the main reasons given weredissatisfaction with assignments, inadequate opportunities for training,insufficient financial compensation, and dissatisfaction with living conditions.Also, 267 of the 385 said they would like to get out of the Army at once, ifpossible.26
Effects of procurement
Procurement for most of the Medical Department officer components did littleor nothing to offset losses through demobilization and other factors be-
24Memorandum, Surgeon General Kirk, for G-1, subject: Procurement Objective for Dental Corps Officers.
25Medical Department, United States Army. Dental Service in World War II. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1955.
26See footnote 23, p. 496.
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TABLE 67.-Medical Department officersseparated, V-E Day-31 December 1946 (cumulative)
|
End of month |
Medical Corps |
Dental Corps |
Veterinary Corps1 |
Sanitary Corps1 |
Medical Administrative Corps |
Army Nurse Corps |
Hospital dietitians |
Physical therapists |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
May |
230 |
50 |
10 |
10 |
220 |
300 |
10 |
5 |
|
June |
570 |
115 |
30 |
30 |
330 |
600 |
20 |
10 |
|
July |
1,140 |
450 |
60 |
60 |
490 |
900 |
30 |
20 |
|
August |
2,170 |
610 |
80 |
100 |
720 |
1,200 |
40 |
30 |
|
September |
4,220 |
1,025 |
130 |
195 |
1,250 |
4,200 |
80 |
70 |
|
October |
11,750 |
2,530 |
330 |
565 |
3,420 |
15,900 |
310 |
225 |
|
November |
17,630 |
3,960 |
520 |
905 |
5,790 |
24,000 |
530 |
370 |
|
December |
22,590 |
5,185 |
730 |
1,265 |
8,500 |
29,300 |
680 |
500 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
January |
27,100 |
7,375 |
900 |
1,400 |
11,140 |
33,600 |
790 |
685 |
|
February |
30,750 |
8,950 |
1,075 |
1,530 |
13,230 |
36,600 |
810 |
765 |
|
March |
32,900 |
9,750 |
1,225 |
1,700 |
15,370 |
39,700 |
1,020 |
835 |
|
April |
34,750 |
10,290 |
1,425 |
1,900 |
17,200 |
41,925 |
1,075 |
875 |
|
May |
37,000 |
10,825 |
1,475 |
2,025 |
17,290 |
43,750 |
1,120 |
930 |
|
June |
39,000 |
11,500 |
1,500 |
2,100 |
17,500 |
45,600 |
1,180 |
1,030 |
|
July |
40,950 |
12,100 |
1,550 |
2,200 |
17,800 |
46,850 |
1,205 |
1,080 |
|
August |
42,000 |
12,540 |
1,600 |
2,260 |
18,100 |
47,725 |
1,225 |
1,110 |
|
September |
42,775 |
13,175 |
1,650 |
2,320 |
18,400 |
48,350 |
1,255 |
1,130 |
|
October |
43,900 |
13,450 |
1,700 |
2,380 |
18,600 |
48,900 |
1,280 |
1,150 |
|
November |
44,500 |
13,850 |
1,750 |
2,440 |
18,800 |
49,850 |
1,305 |
1,170 |
|
December |
45,050 |
14,200 |
1,770 |
2,460 |
18,900 |
50,325 |
1,325 |
1,190 |
1Figures for Veterinary andSanitary Corps are estimated.
Source: Chart, "Medical Department Officer Separations since V-E Day-30June 1947 (cumulative)," Resources Analysis Division, Office of The SurgeonGeneral.
tween August or September 1945 and March 1946, the periodwhen the greatest losses occurred. This is indicated by a comparison of thestrength figures (table 1) with the figures for separations, by month, in table67.27 The Medical Administrative Corps,however, obtained enough new recruits to make up for most of its losses throughNovember 1945, after which it too lost members more rapidly than it gained them.No figures are available for procurement or losses of Medical Departmentenlisted personnel after June 1945.
Reference to table 1 will show that the ratio of MedicalDepartment officer strength to Army strength increased markedly during theperiod of heaviest demobilization. Since procurement was at a very low ebb, thismeans that Medical Department officers were being discharged more slowly thanmembers of the Army in general. A similar lag occurred in the case of mem-
27In comparing these two tables, it will be noticed that in a number of instances the decline in strength shown is greater than the number of separations. As it is unlikely that losses from causes other than separations amounted to any appreciable number, especially after hostilities had ceased, some of the figures must be inaccurate. In fact, those in the table on separations and some of those in the strength table are obviously mere approximations.
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TABLE 68.-Civilians and prisoners of waremployed in medical activities within Army Service Forces in the United States,30 March 1945-30 April 1946
|
|
Civilians1 |
Prisoners of war2 |
Total |
|
1945 |
|
|
|
|
March |
72,690 |
15,237 |
87,927 |
|
April |
73,096 |
17,098 |
90,194 |
|
May |
73,313 |
20,322 |
93,635 |
|
June |
3(75,258) |
3(20,528) |
3(95,785) |
|
July |
77,202 |
20,733 |
97,935 |
|
August |
75,353 |
20,485 |
95,838 |
|
September |
72,714 |
18,518 |
91,232 |
|
October |
72,492 |
16,731 |
89,223 |
|
November |
67,407 |
14,767 |
82,174 |
|
December |
61,021 |
11,992 |
73,013 |
|
1946 |
|
|
|
|
January |
60,337 |
10,678 |
71,015 |
|
February |
59,990 |
9,491 |
69,481 |
|
March |
54,512 |
6,054 |
60,566 |
|
April |
51,354 |
5,063 |
56,417 |
1Figures obtained by adding figures for civilians in the following tables of Army Service Forces Monthly Progress Reports: (1) "Service Command Operating Personnel and Prisoners of War" (subhead "Hospital and Medical Activities"); (2) "Technical Service ZI Operating Personnel and Prisoners of War, by activity" (subheads "Station Medical at Staging Areas" and "Debarkation Hospital and Station Medical at Ports"); (3) "ASF Personnel Authorizations and Strengths" (subhead "Surgeon General").
2Figures obtained by adding figures for prisoners of war in thefollowing tables of Army Service Forces Monthly Progress Reports: (1)"Technical Service ZI Operating Personnel and Prisoners of War"(subhead "Hospital and Station Medical Activities"); (2) "ServiceCommand Operating Personnel and Prisoners of War by Activity" (subhead"Hospital and Medical Activities").
3Figures in parentheses indicate the interpolation of a figurehalfway between those immediately following and preceding it for one that wasobviously incorrect.
Source: Monthly Progress Reports, Army Service Forces, War Department, for thedates indicated.
bers of the individual Medical Department officer components.On the other hand, Medical Department enlisted men, and also officers andenlisted men taken together, were apparently being released more rapidly thanmembers of the Army as a whole, for their ratio to Army strength, which had beendeclining since November 1944, continued to decline throughout the period ofheaviest demobilization.
During the same period, a decline also occurred in the numberof civilians and prisoners of war employed in Medical Department activitieswithin Army Service Forces in the United States, as is shown in table 68.
Voluntary Continuance
Another offsetting factor was the choice of various officers andenlisted men to remain in the Army. Since the beginning of demobilization, menof both categories had been permitted to extend their terms of service under
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certain conditions if they so chose. In December 1945, the War Departmentrequired a statement from each non-Regular Army officer as to whether he wishedto be released at once, to be kept on active duty indefinitely, or to remain fora specified time. In the last mentioned case, the stated discharge date was tobe 31 December 1946, 30 June 1947, or some other date agreed upon between theindividual and his commanding officer that involved a continuance of at least 60days but would not be later than 30 November 1946.
For medical and dental officers, as we shall see in the following section,one of the inducements to remain in the Army for an additional period was aprogram of refresher training for those about to return to civilian practice.
PROFESSIONAL RETRAINING
In addition to the technical and military training that was a continuingfunction of the Medical Department throughout the war, there were two phases ofprofessional training that were carried out primarily by the Personnel Divisionof the Surgeon General`s Office rather than by the Training Division. One ofthese was the retraining of Army of the United States officers returning tocivilian life. The other was the preparation of Regular Army officers, most ofwhom had been serving in administrative rather than professional capacities, toresume the complete responsibility for the medical care of the Army as a wholethat was their peacetime mission. These Regular Army medical officers would alsobe called upon to care for the thousands of casualties of the war who wouldremain in Army hospitals long after the specialists who first treated them hadreturned to civilian practice.
Army of the United States
Even before the attack on Pearl Harbor, The Surgeon General hadbeen faced with the problem of uneven distribution of professional opportunitiesfor Medical Corps officers on active duty for a year or two and its resultanteffect on morale. After the declaration of war, he became increasingly concernedabout the failure of his efforts to produce an effective rotation system whichwould permit an exchange of medical officers between hospital and tacticalassignments. This was due in large measure to the decentralization of control ofmilitary personnel which, while no doubt responsible for the acceleration of thewar efforts, posed peculiar problems for the Medical Service.
Tradition and history agree that great scientific advancement occurs during awar between major powers. General Kirk was not alone in believing that thepressures of World War II had advanced medical science out of all proportion tothe duration of the conflict. All of this professional advancement did not takeplace in the large hospitals. Much of it was in the field of preventivemedicine, such as the development of Atabrine (quinacrine hydrochloride) andDDT; and some was by way of improvisations on the
501
field of battle in the treatment of shock or the management of various typesof wounds. There were improvements in medical supplies and equipment, anddecided advances in the fashioning of artificial eyes and limbs. It wasnevertheless the work going on in the large hospitals, and particularly in thespecialty centers, that enticed young officers who had been primarily on fieldduty in the forward areas.
The Surgeon General fully sympathized with the desire of these young doctorsto take back with them to civilian practice the best of wartime gains inmedicine and surgery and was prepared to give them every encouragement, both tostrengthen civilian medicine the country over and to insure for the nextemergency a nucleus of men widely experienced in the special requirements ofmilitary medicine. With these purposes in mind, various means were explored wellbefore the war was over whereby the professional advances stemming from theconflict might be made available to the largest possible number of Army of theUnited States officers.28
The American Medical Association was also interested in various phases ofplanning for the return to civil life of the doctors in the military service.Among its recommendations was further education to supplement the trainingavailable in the military service and to facilitate reorientation to civilianpractice.
On 7 July 1944, The Surgeon General constituted a committee to formulateplans for postwar refresher courses for medical officers scheduled to beseparated from the military service. It was understood that at first most ofthese would be leaving for physical reasons; later, the general demobilizationwould take place. At the committee`s first meeting, Lt. Col. (later Col.)Durward G. Hall, MC, Chief of Personnel, was appointed chairman. Under hisleadership, the committee undertook to survey the various possibilities relatingto types of courses, where they should be conducted, and the means of financingthem. It was later determined that this committee should handle both theinservice refresher courses and the postwar courses.
During the summer of 1944, the Chief of the Personnel Service and arepresentative of the Training Division worked closely together. By 20September, they were agreed on who should be eligible for the proposed training,in terms of rank, previous assignments in the Army, and type of work they haddone in civil life. Consideration was given both to on-the-job training and todidactic courses, as well as to the feasibility of sending officers still in theservice to civilian institutions. Among the numerous problems that arose, one ofthe most threatening was a requirement that officers could be detailed to theMilitary District of Washington for duty in excess of 30 days only with theconcurrence of the Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff.29 Be-
28One direction of Medical Department thinking along these lines is exemplified by a 4-week refresher course offered to Medical Corps officers of the Army Ground Forces at various general hospitals early in 1944. Designed primarily for junior officers who were scheduled for combat duty after a year or more in training units, the course reviewed the principles of medicine and surgery as they related to battle casualties, including treatment of burns, tropical diseases, and psychiatric cases.
29War Department Memorandum W-500-44, 13 Mar. 1944.
502
cause of this requirement, it was necessary to get special approval to sendfive officers at a time to Walter Reed Hospital for professional medicaltraining.
On 30 November 1944, in accordance with the recommendations of The SurgeonGeneral, hospitals were designated within each service command at which 12 weeksof on-the-job training would be given. A quota, divided between medical andsurgical services, was established for each hospital. The limit was set at sixofficers for either medical or surgical refresher training at any one hospitalat the same time, and it was stipulated that no additional personnel orfacilities would be granted for the purpose. Officers returning from overseaswere first to participate in this instruction. Applications were processed bythe Personnel Service, and selection was made with the advice of one of theprofessional consultants. Only those officers whose assignments had removed themfrom responsibility for the professional care of patients for 12 months orlonger were considered eligible. After the German surrender, similar refreshercourses were set up in the European theater for men awaiting redeployment orreturn to the United States. Instruction was given in medical and surgicalspecialties for those who had had little opportunity for hospital practice,while qualified specialists were given an opportunity for furthering theireducation in their own specific fields.
In March 1945, the Dental Division of the Surgeon General`s Office tooksteps to provide courses for the professional retraining of dental officerswhose military assignments had removed them for 12 months or more from thedirect practice of dentistry. The program was approved by the CommandingGeneral, Army Service Forces, in April. Courses were approved the followingmonth for the retraining of laboratory officers of both Medical and SanitaryCorps under conditions comparable to those laid down for doctors and dentists.
Regular Army
The Medical Corps of the Regular Army went underground professionally duringthe war. Its shining hour in that respect was to come later, on 1 January 1947,when the Army Medical Residency Program which has brought so much favorableattention to the Army Medical Service was officially launched. In between is astory of unusual courage and loyalty in response to an almost cruel demand.
Soon after the outbreak of World War II, The Surgeon General had availablethe cream of the medical profession with which to staff the hospitals of theArmy. Outstanding doctors from civilian life were appointed in the Medical Corpsby the thousands. This rapid growth brought with it a tremendous demand forMedical Corps officers to fill administrative, command, staff, and trainingassignments. The almost inevitable decision was made that the Regular Armyofficers were the best fitted for these positions.
It had been planned that, after a year or two, when Army of the United Statesofficers had had the opportunity to demonstrate their command and
503
administrative abilities, at least some of the Regular Armyofficers would be returned to professional assignments in the large hospitals inthe Zone of Interior where they could share in the unusual professionalopportunities then available, and receive instruction and guidance from some ofthe outstanding doctors who would then be on duty in these installations. Thewisdom of the decision is still debatable. The premise that the Regular Armymedical officer would fill the administrative and command positions with creditwas amply sustained. On the other hand, there was no question but that a fewRegular Army medical officers could have made a much greater contribution to thewar effort had they remained on purely professional duty. While leadership canbe developed, it must be based on an inherent characteristic. The record doesnot show that this was an exclusive possession of the Regular Army officer. ManyArmy of the United States medical officers made outstanding contributions to thewar effort in medical staff and command positions. As the theaters becamevirtually autonomous and the war spread around the globe, it never becamepossible to reassign any substantial number of Regular Army medical officers toprofessional work. All those who were physically qualified were used inadministrative, tactical, or command assignments throughout the war.
When the decision was made to place all Regular Army medicalofficers in staff or command assignments, they were given a correspondingprimary MOS (military occupational specialty) classification. Even though theywere well established professionally, the professional consultants in the Officeof The Surgeon General were reluctant to award them a secondary MOS indicatingany appreciable degree of proficiency on the theory that, as most of them lackedformal specialty training and there was no opportunity to observe themprofessionally, they could not be properly evaluated. Only if an officer hadbeen certified by one of the professional specialty boards was he given a"B" prefix to his secondary MOS. Thus, for most of the Regular Armymedical officers, there was no official record of professional ability in theClassification Branch. The Surgeon General was able, nevertheless, to convincethe various civilian medical organizations concerned that the professionalpotential of the Regular Army was great enough to justify a graduate programcomparable to those offered in the approved civilian teaching hospitals.
It was important that plans be formulated in time to utilizethe professional skill then available to the best advantage. Early in the year1945, the Personnel Service prepared a study for the consideration of TheSurgeon General. It was for planning purposes only, designed to show what couldbe done professionally with the then current Regular Army Medical Corps by wayof staffing nine permanent hospitals with a view to training Medical Corpsofficers for board certification. The study showed both those certified andthose who, though not certified, were sufficiently experienced to qualify in aspecialty. It also showed the total number of board members needed to staff thehospitals where approval for residency training was desired, and theboard-certified officers who might serve within their appropriate specialties.Included in this group were names of men who obviously would remain in admin-
504
istrative work. The consultants in the office aided in thepreparation of the list. It was through the results of this study that TheSurgeon General was able to make a rather convincing presentation to the Councilof Medical Education and Hospitals of the American Medical Association inseeking approval of Army hospitals for formal training.30
Long before V-E Day, it was apparent that considerablepreparation would be needed before the Regular Army medical officer would beable to take over completely the professional care of the Army. Necessarydeviations from Department of the Army and Army Service Forces policies wereauthorized, and on 7 July 1945, a Professional Training Committee was appointedby The Surgeon General. Two months later, by Office Order No. 223, The SurgeonGeneral assigned to the various divisions of his Office specificresponsibilities for the problem.
In August 1945, a letter was addressed to all Regular Armyofficers by the Deputy Surgeon General stating that the Chief of Staff hadapproved a plan for courses of instruction in professional training for RegularArmy Medical Corps officers, that the plan called for the assignment of theseofficers to installations where professional training leading eventually toboard certification would be carried out and also for training in outstandingcivilian installations.31 The plan contemplatedthat those qualified as potential chiefs and assistant chiefs of service wouldinitially be assigned to such positions as understudies, and that officers withless training and experience would receive selected professional assignmentsbased upon their qualifications with the opportunity under competitive selectionto receive the training that would eventually lead to board certification. EachRegular Army officer was requested to submit a statement to the Chief ofPersonnel, Office of The Surgeon General, giving his preference as to eitherprofessional or administrative assignment and including specific training.
During the latter part of 1945, those who had indicated adesire for specialized professional training were placed in the program as theyreturned from overseas. Among the large number still out of the country,however, were many who would have to seek certification by one of the specialtyboards at an early date if the formal training program was to start within thenext few years. The Surgeon General, early in January 1946, persuaded theAssistant Chief of Staff, G-1, to have radiograms sent to the various theaters,Defense Commands, and Departments asking for the return of certain namedofficers at the earliest possible date. General Kirk supplemented this radiogramin some instances with direct communication either to the commanding general orto the surgeon concerned. Most of the men requested were returned within thenext few months to begin their arduous course of preparation. It was not easyfor men in their late 40`s and even early 50`s, who were long out
30Army Regulations No. 350-1010, 11 Feb. 1946.
31The date was rubber stamped, and varied somewhat. The actual distribution of the letter was questionable. Certainly, many officers overseas never received it.
505
of school, to undertake the strenuous study that would be needed to passsearching oral and written examinations before civilian boards.
It should be remembered that the Regular Army officers hadnot the same economic reasons for seeking certification as civilian specialists.A good many were already in the grade of colonel, so rank was not a factor. Theyhad been separated from their families, some over 3 years, and were weary fromtheir war experience. What they quite honestly needed was some rest and quiet,rather than intensive study with always the fear of failure haunting them. Theywere some of the unsung heroes of the war, and to their credit, most of themwillingly accepted the challenge and came through with flying colors.
In their efforts, they had a tremendous assist fromoutstanding members of the medical profession-men who not only verballysupported the idea, but stayed on active duty in its interest well beyond thetime that they were eligible for discharge and frequently at considerableinconvenience to their families and financial loss to themselves. Several ofthese later became the nucleus of the consultant group, who from the verybeginning lent their knowledge and prestige to the teaching program. Aid andencouragement also came from those Regular Army medical officers who carried thefull burden of administrative responsibility while their fellow officers were intraining. Needless to say, the graduate professional training program could nothave been established nor carried on without the continuing aid and cooperationof civilian medicine. The Council on Medical Education and hospitals of theAmerican Medical Association, the American College of Surgeons, the AdvisoryBoards of the American Specialty Boards and the various specialty boards, allrendered invaluable service.
POSTWAR PLANNING
Two important aspects of postwar planning, both growingdirectly out of the needs and the experience of the conflict, properly belong inthis volume. These are the program for integrating Reserve officers into theRegular Army, officially called the Regular Army Integration Program, and theestablishment of the Career Management Plan for Regular Army officers.
The Integration Program
Realizing that postwar conditions would necessitate an Armyconsiderably larger than that of prewar days, the War Department recommended andCongress authorized late in 1945 an increase in the commissioned strength of theRegular Army to 25,000.32 The act provided thatappointments in the various
32(1) 59 Stat. 663. (2) Memorandum, Maj. James H. Mackin, MSC, Office of The Surgeon General, for Chief, Personnel Division, Office of The Surgeon General, 24 June 1948, subject: Commissioning of Male Officers in the Various Corps of the Medical Department During the Integration Period, 1946-47.
506
corps of the Regular Army were to be made in the grades ofsecond lieutenant, first lieutenant, captain, and major, subject to certainconditions and limitations. One condition was that these appointments were to bemade not later than 8 months following the date of the enactment of the act.This limitation of time was placed in order to attract as many officers aspossible who had served in World War II before they had returned home and becomereestablished in civil life. Their combined experience was invaluable to themilitary service, gained as it was in fighting all over the world, in every kindof climate from the tropics to the arctic, and under most difficult fieldconditions.
The War Department moved immediately to implement the new lawby establishing eligibility for appointment and setting up rules for determiningservice credit and grades to which individual appointments would be made. Noofficer was to be appointed in the Regular Army in a grade higher than thatwhich he held during wartime.33 Less than 8months later, on 8 August 1946, Congress authorized the procurement ofadditional male officers to increase the commissioned strength of the RegularArmy to 50,000.34 It is of interest to notethat separate means for determining qualifications for appointment were notestablished for any corps of the Medical Department, thus doing away with thelongstanding requirement that applicants must pass a written or oralprofessional examination.
The Surgeon General was charged with final responsibility forselecting applicants for the various corps of the Medical Service. To carry outthis responsibility, the Central Medical Department Examining Board wasdesignated to make suitable recommendations regarding each applicant.35There was also a screening board and review committee in the Surgeon General`sOffice, and an Integration Section was established in the Procurement Separationand Reserve Branch of the Personnel Division which was responsible for thenecessary recordkeeping, processing of cases, and preparation of finalizedappointment lists. The Army Service Forces Review Board reviewed the cases ofall applicants whose appointments were not recommended by The Surgeon General.This board was appointed by the Secretary of War to assure that the integrationprogram was conducted on a fair and impartial basis. This function was latertaken over by the Secretary of War`s Personnel Board.
Throughout the integration period, the vast majority of thoseof the Medical Corps whose age required their appointment in the grade of majorwere selected because of outstanding professional qualifications and in mostcases were required to be diplomates of one of the American specialty boards.This policy undoubtedly resulted in passing over many applicants in the olderage groups who, though they had rendered highly satisfactory wartime service,were not established professional specialists.
33War Department Circular No. 392, 29 Dec. 1945.
3460 Stat. 925. Implemented by War Department Circular No. 289, 24 Sept. 1946.
35War Department Special Orders No. 255, 25 Oct. 1945.
507
Medical and Dental Corps
The last appointments into the Medical Corps of the RegularArmy prior to the integration program were made in 1944. The strength of thecorps on 1 January 1946 was 1,214. Integration gains amounted to 374, whilelosses during the period amounted to 367. Thus, the integration period produceda net gain of only seven officers for the Medical Corps. Although 3,000 of the50,000 officer spaces under the two integration statutes had been allotted tothe Medical Corps, only 1,221 had been assigned as of 31 December 1947, leaving1,779 vacancies.
The last appointments into the Dental Corps, Regular Army,prior to the integration program, were made in January 1944. The strength of thecorps on 1 January 1946 was 261. Integration gains amounted to 234, while lossesduring the period amounted to 60. Thus, the integration period produced a netgain of 174, but left the corps still short by 308 officers of its authorizedstrength of 743.
The results of the integration program as it related to theMedical and Dental Corps in no way compared with the results for the RegularArmy as a whole. Of the more than 45,000 eligible medical officers who hadserved in World War II, only slightly over 500, hardly more than 1 percent, hadseen fit to apply for a Regular Army commission. The program did, however,provide new vigor for this corps as a good many of the losses were retirementsfor age or physical disability while the new appointees were either professionalspecialists trained in some of the best medical centers of the United States, oryoung officers with a high military potential. It served to keep the corpsafloat while new legislation to make it more attractive to the medicalprofession was being planned, and professional training programs established.While the Dental Corps filled a larger percentage of its new authorizations,much of the above discussion is also applicable. Indeed, the situation was notpeculiar to the Army. The Navy and the Public Health Service were encounteringthe same retention and procurement problems. This created an awareness, not onlyin the top levels of the military service but also among members of Congress,that in order for the military services to maintain Medical and Dental Corps ofsuitable size and quality, some special provision would have to be made fortheir members to compensate for the extra time and money invested in theireducation and training, and permit them to have a standard of living at leastcloser to that of their civilian counterparts.
On the recommendation of the Secretary of War, the necessarylegislation was enacted on 5 August 1947.36 Itincreased the pay of doctors of medicine and dentistry in the militaryservices by $100 per month and authorized the procurement of officers in allgrades up to and including the grade of colonel.
3661 Stat. 776; War Department Bulletin 21, 1947.
508
This was the first major legislative breakthrough in thespecific interest of these corps.
Veterinary Corps
The Veterinary Corps was in a more favored position than theMedical or Dental Corps in that it experienced an excess of qualified applicantsover the number of vacancies available. The strength of the corps as of 1January 1946 was 113. Integration gains amounted to 118, while losses during theperiod amounted to 31, producing a net gain of 87. The strength of the corps hadbeen established at 186. In order to permit the integration into the RegularArmy of as many qualified veterans of World War II as possible, authority wasgranted to carry a temporary overstrength of 14 officers, giving a strength of200 as of 31 December 1947.
Medical Service Corps and its components
While provision was made in the law for appointment in theMedical Administrative Corps up to the grade of captain, Circular 392 authorizedthe appointment of Medical Administrative and Sanitary Corps officers of theArmy of the United States in the Pharmacy Corps, under the provisions stated forthat corps. This authority was the result of strong recommendations by TheSurgeon General that these officers be given the advantage of the higher ranksavailable in the Pharmacy Corps. As this was an interim measure pending thesecuring of legislation authorizing the Medical Service Corps, the specialeducational requirements for the Pharmacy Corps had to be waived and additionalones added.
This corps was in the most favored position of all. It wasconsidered an extremely good "buy" in relation to the line.Consequently, it attracted the interest of many officers who had served invarious corps, other than those in the Medical Department, during the war. Over2,500 individuals applied for commissions in the Pharmacy Corps, approximately2? times the ultimate number of vacancies.
The strength of the corps on 1 January 1946 was 66.Integration gains amounted to 727, while losses during the period amounted to30, thus producing a net gain of 697. The authorized strength of the corps as of1 January 1946 was 72. This was increased to 1,022 when the allocation of the50,000 officers was made. As of 31 December 1947, there were 763 assigned and259 vacancies. In the meantime, on 4 August 1947, Congress passed the Army-NavyMedical Service Corps Act of 1947 which established the Medical Service Corpsand abolished the Medical Administrative Corps, Sanitary Corps, and PharmacyCorps.37
One might wonder why all the vacancies were not filled inview of the large number of qualified applicants. This is accounted for by thefact that
3761 Stat. 734.
509
the vast number of applicants for commissions in the Medical Service Corpswere qualified only for appointment in the Pharmacy, Supply, and AdministrationSection of the corps, which had been tentatively allocated only 60 percent ofthe position vacancies, the remaining 40 percent being distributed between theAllied Science Section, Sanitary Engineering Section, and Optometry Section. Thevacancies existing at the conclusion of the program were in these threesections. It was not considered desirable to fill these vacancies withindividuals who were not qualified for one of these three sections, since shouldqualified individuals become available later for appointment there would be noposition vacancies in which they could be placed. Several attractive programswere then under consideration with a view to procuring officers for thesesections. Some involved additional education at Government expense. Most wereeventually put into effect.
Career Management Program
All the advances during World War II were not made in theprofessional or scientific fields. As the war in Europe progressedsatisfactorily, and action was being taken toward speeding up the contemplatedinvasion of Japan, the one alarming shortage that appeared on the horizon wasnot of arms, food, or strategic material, but of manpower. This shortage was notlimited to the military services but was being keenly felt in many of theindustries and factories of the country. While some personnel management courseswere available in several of the colleges and universities prior to the war, itwas considered a new and somewhat untried field. Many large businessorganizations with modern, streamlined programs in other fields had completelyignored this one or were just becoming aware of its potentialities. The Army`splan, while not archaic, could hardly have been called progressive. During thewar, however, many studies were made on various levels which brought out theneed for more advanced thinking in this regard. "You`re in the Armynow" could no longer be accepted as the standard reply to any young officer`srequest for information concerning his job or its future.
It had been clearly demonstrated that most young Americans really are, asoften stated, rugged individualists and that they make a better contribution ina field in which their interests lie, or for which they have a particularaptitude or skill. It also showed that job classification not only improvedmorale but increased production levels. Consequently, after the MOS system ofjob descriptions had been published and the success of the classification systemseemed assured, the War Department made plans for the establishment of a careermanagement program for the Regular Army. The chiefs of the various arms andservices were called upon for assistance in the development of the plan. TheSurgeon General welcomed this opportunity. Such a program would fit naturallyinto the already conceived Professional Training Program for the development ofthe specialists needed in the Medical Service and would permit The SurgeonGeneral, for the first time, to
510
give some assurance to the young physician, dentist, or allied scientist thatthroughout most of his career in peacetime he would continue in the specialty ofhis choice.
By way of implementation, The Surgeon General prepared andsubmitted to the War Department a graphic representation of a pattern for eachcorps under his jurisdiction. Each pattern showed the various types ofassignment and training available to the members of that particular corps duringspecific time intervals within a 30-year period. Later, it was contemplated thata similar personal pattern for each officer would be prepared showing not onlythe opportunities in his particular field but also those for transfer to broaderfields as he advanced in rank and experience. While the program was notofficially announced until June 1948 by The Adjutant General, it was one of thebetter byproducts of the war and, no doubt, was a tremendous factor later inprocurement for, and retention in, the Regular Army of many outstanding andespecially qualified young officers,38 whowere to prove their worth in Korea.
Thus, well before the end of hostilities, The Surgeon Generalhad turned his attention not only to planning for the orderly return ofpersonnel to civilian life, and for maintaining a large and qualified Reservegroup composed of both active and inactive members, but also to strengthening ofthe Regular Army. All factors were assessed and gains consolidated. The SurgeonGeneral, together with members of his staff and representatives of variousechelons of the War Department, had envisioned changes and planned necessarylegislation that would result within the next 2 or 3 years in a tremendousincrease in the authorized strength of each corps of the Regular Army, andadequate provision for the Reserve Corps, and would give to the MedicalDepartment a large Medical Service Corps, composed of many outstandingadministrative and managerial officers as well as those qualified in the alliedsciences. The changes brought about also permitted nurses, physical therapists,dietitians, and occupational therapists to become an integral part of theRegular Army. A much closer liaison with civilian medical and allied professionswas established and plans were well underway for excellent and modernprofessional and military training and career guidance programs.
38War Department Technical Manual 20-605, Career Management for Army Officers.
