CHAPTER III
Requirements: 1939-41
STRENGTH OF MEDICAL DEPARTMENT COMPONENTS
Congressional Responsibilities
Although the Medical Department might estimate itspersonnel requirements for any fiscal year, the number it wasallowed was fixed by Congress or by the War Department within congressionalappropriation. Congress had set the quotas for officers ofthe Regular Army until 1939 and for enlisted men until 1940. Until 1916,the quotas were in terms of numbers of individuals. The National Defense Actof 19161 and its amendments, which formed the National Defense Act of 1920,2based the number of officers and enlisted men on the total enlisted strength ofthe Army, the ratio varying for each corps. In time of actual or threatenedhostilities, however, the Secretary of War was permitted to procure suchadditional numbers of enlisted men as might be required. Thus, in World War I,the maximum strength figure of the Medical Department-343,394-was 92.52per 1,000 total Army strength or 98.52 per 1,000 Army enlisted strength.3In 1922, Congress abandoned the ratio system for officers and againauthorized an absolute number for each corps.
The authorized officer strength of the Medical Department just prior to theemergency period wasestablished by act of 3 April 1939 at 1,424Medical, 316 Dental, 126 Veterinary, and 16 Medical Administrative Corpsofficers in the Regular Army, to be reached by 30 June 1949 through 10approximately equal annual increments.4 Officersappointed in the Medical Administrative Corps after the passage of this act wereto be selected from candidates who were graduates of a 4-year course in pharmacy froman approvedschool. It was contemplated that the then current members of the corps wouldhave left the military service by 30 June 1949. The Medical AdministrativeCorps was never reduced to 16 members. Normal attrition had brought the totaldown only to 58 by 1943, at which time the members wereabsorbed in the newly created Pharmacy Corps. No further changes occurred inauthorizations for Medical Department Regular Armyofficers during the remainder of the emergency and the the war period.
139 Stat. 171.
241 Stat. 766.
3For a detailed discussion of Medical Department strength in World War I, see The Medical Department of the United StatesArmy in the World War. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1923, vol. I.
453 Stat. 559.
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Until 1940, the enlisted strength of the Medical Department remained at 5percent of the total Army strength, the ratio set by the National Defense Act of1920.
Between 9 April and 22 June 1940, all of Western Europeexcept England fell under German control. These events in Europe had atremendous effect on the U.S. military preparedness program. On 13 June,Congress appropriated sufficient funds to bring the Regular Army to its fullstatutory strength of 280,000 set by the National Defense Act of 1920. Beforethis could be accomplished, when the enlisted strength was still only 249,441,Congress passed a bill allowing the Army to be increased to 375,000.5
No further limitations were placed on the size of the Regular Army. The thirdsupplemental appropriations act for fiscal year 1941 (approved on 8 October1940) made it clear that the only limit on the Regular Army`s strength was thatwhich cash appropriations would impose.6
On 31 May 1940, the President asked Congress for authority to bring theNational Guard into Federal service without the existing restriction whichforbade use of the guard outside the United States. The request met withconsiderable opposition, and it was not until 27 August that the President wasauthorized to call up fora period of 12 months the National Guard and other Reserve components, whichhowever were not to be employed "beyond the limits of the WesternHemisphere except in the territories and possessions of the United States,including the Philippine Islands."7
On 16 September 1940, Congress passed the first peacetimeselective service act in the history of the United States. Like the NationalGuard-Reserve Act of 27 August of that year, the inductees were to serve for 12months only, and the same limitation on oversea service was included.8 In August1941, the President was empowered to extend indefinitely the length of servicefor the National Guard, selective service trainees, and Reserve officers shouldCongress find our national interest to be imperiled.
WAR DEPARTMENT RESPONSIBILITIES
Army Nurse Corps
The strength of the Army Nurse Corps was never set byCongress but rather by the War Department within the limits of congressionalappropriations. In June 1939, the strength was set at 675; a year later, 949.This was the Regular Army nurse component, the only one on active duty untilSeptember 1940, when Reserve nurses began to be appointed for that purpose. Theauthorization for Regular Army nurses continued to be raised, however, reach-
5Watson, Mark Skinner: Chief of Staff: PrewarPlans and Preparations. United States Army in World War II. The War Department.Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1950.
6See footnote 5, above.
7S.J. Res. 286, 27 Aug. 1940, in 54 Stat. 858.
8S. 4164, 16 Sept. 1940, in 54 Stat. 885.
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ing 1,875 in March 1945. Until 1941, the basis for thecalculation of requirements was 1 nurse per 270 military personnel (3.7 per1,000). In that year, the War Department General Staff, on recommendation ofThe Surgeon General, changed the formula to 120 nurses for each 1,000 hospitalbeds, or approximately 6 nurses per 1,000 of Army strength.9
Reserve Officers
During the emergency and war years, Congress placed nostatutory limitations on the number of non-Regular Army officers of the MedicalDepartment. Like the nurses, the number to be added became the responsibility ofthe War Department, acting within the limits of congressional appropriation. Forexample, an act of 3 April 1939 which permitted the calling of 300 Reserveofficers of the Corps of Chaplains and of the Medical Department to extendedactive duty did not specify how many of each branch were to be called. TheGeneral Staff in making the decision allotted 255 of these officers to theMedical Department.10 In December 1939, theGeneral Staff, inanticipation of supplemental appropriations, authorized the corps areacommanders to call up an additional 508 Medical Department Reserve officers. Inthe following September, it authorized the calling of 4,019 Reserve nurses toactive duty, the first time such action was taken during the emergency. Thenumber was increased by 1,000 in January 1941.
Besides setting quotas for personnel on active duty with the peacetime Army,the War Department provided for the establishment of a procurement objective foreach section of the Officers Reserve Corps. No procurement objective wasestablished for the Red Cross nurses` reserve; it might therefore recruitmembers without limit.
In 1939, the elements to be consideredin establishing a procurement objective were reviewed and restated; according toa memorandum prepared in G-1 (8 June 1939), a number of misunderstandingsabout the objective had arisen, among others that it "should include all officers needed for amaximum effort. Actually, the peacetime procurement objective should be limitedto the needs to fill early requirements during mobilization until such time asmobilization procurement cancatch up with currentneeds."11 Amonth later, the War Department published a set of figures giving theprocurement objectives for Reserve personnel to be assigned to the corps areas.Comparison of these figures with the actual membership of the Medical DepartmentReserve Corps
9Annual Reports of The Surgeon General, U.S. Army. Washington: U.S.Government Printing Office, 1940, p. 256; 1941, pp. 243-244.
10Letter, Secretary of War, to Daniel W. Bell,Acting Director, Bureau of the Budget, 27 May 1939.
11Memorandum for Record, signed "ESJ,"and concurred in by The Adjutant General, Assistant Adjutant General, andOfficer in Charge, Reserve Division, War Plans Office, 8 June 1939. (Comparewith Army Regulations No. 105-5, 16 June 1936.)
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TABLE 2.-Procurement objectives (10July 1939), and actual strengths (30 June 1939), of Medical Department OfficersReserve Corps
|
Component |
Procurement |
Actual |
|
Medical Corps |
20,870 |
15,198 |
|
Dental Corps1 |
3,585 |
5,063 |
|
Veterinary Corps |
668 |
1,381 |
|
Medical Administrative Corps |
1,918 |
1,243 |
|
Sanitary Corps |
195 |
454 |
1The large excess of actual strength of the Dental Corps Reserve over the procurement objective is not easily reconciled with the later statement (see p. 57) that procurement was stopped when actual strength of that corps slightly exceeded the objective. Either the figures themselves are incorrect or, possibly, a larger procurement objective was in operation at the time the actual strength was computed. It also seems possible that authorities may have continued to appoint men in the Dental Corps Reserve even after the procurement objective had been exceeded.
Source: (1) Memorandum, The Adjutant General, for CommandingGenerals of all Armies; Commanding Generals, all Corps Areas; Chiefs of all Armsand Services; Commandants, General Service Schools; Superintendent, U.S.Military Academy; Assistant Chiefs of Staff, War Department General Staff; andthe Office of the Assistant Secretary of War, 10 July 1939, subject: ReserveOfficers` Peacetime Procurement Objective for Mobilization, and Assignment andPromotion Procedures for Reserve Officers, of the Corps-Area Assignment Group-Current Instructions Supplementary toMR 1-3 (new number). (2) AnnualReport of The Surgeon General, U.S. Army. Washington: U.S. Government PrintingOffice, 1939, pp. 174-175.
about the same time (30 June 1939) will give some idea of howadequate-in the opinion of the General Staff-the existing Reserves were to meetanticipated needs (table 2). The comparison is necessarily a rough one, as thefigures for the procurement objective covered only allotments to the corpsareas, not to other using agencies. The latter agencies, however, ordinarilyreceived only a very small proportion of total personnel.
In September 1939, The SurgeonGeneral estimated the requirements of a fully mobilized Army of 4 million, whichwas the maximum contemplated by the War Department`s Protective MobilizationPlan with its several augmentations. Reduced to ratios (number ofmedical personnel per 1,000 of total Army strength), his estimates were asfollows: For the Medical Corps, 7.5; for the Dental Corps, 1.875; for theVeterinary Corps, 0.375; for theNurse Corps, 6.25; for the Sanitary and Medical Administrative Corps, 0.75; andfor the enlisted complement, 75.00.12 This estimatewas based onWorld War I experience.
Although the total Medical Department strength of the Officers Reserve Corps(including members on duty and those not yet called) was below the procurementobjective, The Surgeon General, as late as November 1939, expressed the opinion that the Reserves were sufficient for the basic force of
12 Memorandum, Col. A. G. Love, for The SurgeonGeneral, 28 Sept. 1939.
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FIGURE 17.-Maj. Gen. Charles R. Reynolds, The Surgeon General, 1935-39.
1,150,000 contemplated in the War Department ProtectiveMobilization Plan. He was doubtful however that they contained enough of theright types of specialists.13Appointments in the Dental Corps Reserve had been suspended in 1938 with theconsent of The Surgeon General, Maj. Gen. Charles R. Reynolds (fig. 17), whenmembership slightly exceeded the procurement objective.14In December 1939, the General Staff ordered a partial suspension ofappointments to all sections of the Officers Reserve Corps, although neither theMedical Corps nor the Medical Administrative Corps had reached theirauthorized procurement objectives. However, the suspension order excepted thefollowing categories: Graduates of the Reserve Officers Training Corps;applicants for the Air Corps Reserve; and recent graduates in medicine,dentistry, and veterinary medicine who were qualified for duty with the RegularArmy.15
13Magee, James C.: The Medical Department, pp. 10-12 (alecture delivered at the Army War College, 17 Nov. 1939).
14Medical Department, United States Army. Dental Service in World WarII. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1955, p. 51.
15Letter, The Adjutant General, to Corps Area and DepartmentCommanders and Commanders of Arms and Services, 8 Dec. 1939, subject:Suspension of Appointments in Officers Reserve Corps.
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FACTORS AFFECTING DETERMINATION OF REQUIREMENTS
Medical Department Officer Shortages
After Congress enacted the legislation just discussed, the responsibility forits implementation fell on the War Department. With no statutory restrictionsremaining on strength, outside those imposed by congressional appropriations,the Army increased from a total strength of 264,118 on 30 June 1940 to 1,455,565on 30 June 1941.16
Naturally, this tremendous increase in such a short period oftime created many problems. One of the biggest problems in the MedicalDepartment was the shortage of officers. As early as August 1940, before actual augmentation took place, The SurgeonGeneral reported to The Adjutant General and to the Assistant Chief of Staff,G-1, that an acute shortage of Medical Department officers has been the subjectof "very grave concern" to his office for some time and that as of 25 July the deficits for the various corps were as follows(based on an authorized troops strength of 375,000): MedicalCorps, 1,527; Dental Corps, 391; Veterinary Corps, 223. Hepredicted that if the National Guard were called into Federal service theshortages would rise to the following figures: Medical Corps, 5,295; Dental Corps,1,259; VeterinaryCorps, 657. Should "some formof Selective Service" increase the Army still further, the SurgeonGeneral`s Office estimated that in April 1941 thefollowing shortages would obtain: Medical Corps, 8,455; DentalCorps, 2,044; Veterinary Corps, 1,049.17
Problems Created by National Guard Induction
At the time of induction into Federal service (27 August 1940), the National Guard broughtwith it a complement of Medical Department officers and enlisted men. NationalGuard officers had the same rights of resignation as members of the OfficersReserve Corps.18 Many were also relieved from assignment because they weredeemed necessary in an industry or occupation essential to the public interest.Upon mobilization, the medical service of the National Guard consisted ofpersonnel assigned to tactical units only. In the middle of 1941, these units comprised306 medicaldetachments, 20 medical regiments,and 1 medical battalion. The guard had no medical personnel of its own for fixedhospital service or for administrative overhead;19National
16Kreidberg, Marvin A., and Henry,Merton G.: History of Military Mobilization in the U.S. Army, 1775-1945.Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1955, p. 581. (DA Pamphlet 20-212.)
17(1) Letter, The Surgeon General, toThe Adjutant General, 6 Aug. 1940, subject: Shortage of Medical DepartmentPersonnel. (2) Memorandum, Office of The Surgeon General (Col. C. F. Lull), theAssistant Chief of Staff, G-1, 12 Aug. 1940, subject: Shortage of MedicalDepartment Officer Personnel.
18Army Regulations No. 140-5, 16 June 1936, pars. 49, 53.
19(1) Annual Report of The Surgeon General, U.S. Army.Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1941, p. 260. (2) Committee toStudy the Medical Department, 1942, pp. 14-15.
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Guard units, including medical units, were far below full strengthwhen they were called into Federal service, so that personnel from Regular andReserve components had to be assigned to them,20and National Guard officers could not be readily shifted to meet changing needssince certain restrictions on their reassignment were not removed untilSeptember 1941. These three factors considerably increased the demand on theArmy for medical personnel at the time of the induction of more than 250,000guardsmen.
Reserve Shortages
In September 1940, the Army had, aside from the medical units that wereorganic parts of existing divisions, only the following field medical units: Twosurgical hospitals, two evacuation hospitals, two medical regiments, one medical supply depot, and one medical laboratory. In December, this wasincreased to 8 medical battalions, 8 medical regiments, 1 medical supply depot,1 medical laboratory, 1 general dispensary, 15 evacuation hospitals, 6 surgicalhospitals, 22 general hospitals, and 22 station hospitals. By the end of June1941, all units had been activated.21
The next problem was the personnel to staff these units. InOctober 1940, TheSurgeon General asked the War Department General Staff to remove the partialsuspension of appointments to the Reserve imposed in December 1939, and torestore the situation that had existed before that date. This meant thatappointments would be permitted in all corps of the Medical Department up to their procurement objectives, and the General Staffgranted the request in December 1940 in that sense, with the proviso thatapplicants must agree to accept active duty when called upon.22Apparently, The Surgeon General had either disregarded the fact that the Dental,Veterinary, and Sanitary Corps had already passed these objectives or had feltat the time that their uncalled Reserves were sufficiently large and accessiblefor all purposes. Two months later, however, he pointed out that the authoritygranted did not permit commissioning additional dentists or veterinarians in theReserves and urgently recommended that it be "expanded to cover" bothof these corps. The recommendation was unfortunately worded; what he wanted was not an expansion of theauthority to cover these corps-the authorityalready covered them-but permission to exceed their procurement objectives. Hefurther recommended that in view of prospective needs during 1941 and 1942 theexisting procurement objectives for all Medical Department corps be suspended"until
20Letter, The Adjutant General, to Commanding Generals all Corps Areasand Departments, 4 Sept. 1940, subject: Induction of the National Guard of theUnited States.
21Smith, Clarence McKittrick: The MedicalDepartment: Hospitalization and Evacuation, Zone of Interior. United States Army in World War II. The Technical Services. Washington: U.S. GovernmentPrinting Office, 1956.
22(1) Letter, Office of TheSurgeon General, to The Adjutant General, 26 Oct. 1940, subject: Appointments inMedical, Dental, and Veterinary Reserve Corps. (2) Memorandum, Assistant Chiefof Staff, G-1, for Chief of Staff, 1 Nov. 1940, subject: Appointments inMedical Department Reserve. (3) Letter, The Adjutant General, to each CorpsArea Commander and The Surgeon General, 19 Dec. 1940, subject: Appointmentsin Medical Reserve.
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in the opinion of The Surgeon General an adequate Reserve isavailable for the defense program with rapid expansion, if such should berequired."23 Thisdid not mean that The Surgeon General was willing to accept unlimited numbers in the Reserves. If the surplus became larger than necessary to meet futureneeds, it might mean granting virtual deferment of service to a considerablegroup.24
Because of the difficulties in procuring officers for certain corps, somesubstitution of one type of officer for another was permitted in meetingrequirements. As early as February 1940, the Medical Department receivedauthority to substitute reservists of the Medical Administrative Corps andSanitary Corps for members of the Medical Corps Reserve in meeting the quotasfor active-duty assignments.25In 1941, after the Medical Replacement Training Centers for enlisted men at CampLee, Va., and Camp Grant, Ill., had been functioning for several months, thetask of obtaining sufficient numbers of medical, dental, and medicaladministrative officers to staff them properly led The Surgeon General tosuggest that "branch immaterial"26 officers be used in battalion and centerheadquarters aswell as in the companies. The recommendation was approved. At this time, TheSurgeon General stated that each company could be adequately and properlystaffed with six Reserve officers: Two medical, two dental, one medicaladministrative, and one branch immaterial.27
Enlisted Personnel
With the increased medical facilities, the MedicalDepartment had an additional problem of securing an adequate supply of enlistedpersonnel. As early as February 1939, General Reynolds, declaring that the 5percent maximum allowed by the National Defense Act of 1920 would beinadequate in an emergency, recommended that Congress be asked to amend the lawso as to permit enlisting "in time of actual or threatened hostilities * ** such additional number of men as the service mayrequire." Higher authority in the War Department, however, rejected theproposal on the ground that the reasons for giving priority to the MedicalDepartment in this matter were not apparent. Several months later (May 1939),The Surgeon General repeated his request, but it was not until 1940 that heachieved his objective when Congress raised the Medical Department`s quotato 7 percent and empowered the President
23Letter (not found),from Senator Pepper, which enclosed a protest from the American DentalAssociation on selection for training of dentists not commissioned in theReserve, with 2d endorsement, The Surgeon General to The AdjutantGeneral, 18 Feb. 1941.
24Compare the argument advanced by a spokesman of the DentalDivision, Office of The Surgeon General, against a large increase in the size ofthe Dental Corps Reserve. (Letter, Office of The Surgeon General (Lt. Col. R. F.Craven), to The Adjutant General, 8 Oct. 1941.)
25Letter, The Adjutant General, to TheSurgeon General, 19 Feb. 1940, subject: Added Reserves for Active Duty WithRegular Army.
26"Branch immaterial" personnel were those whose training wasin basic subjects without arm or service specialization.
27(1) Memorandum, Procurement Branch,Military Personnel Division, Office of The Surgeon General, for Director,Historical Division, Office of The Surgeon General, 20 Apr. 1944. (2)Memorandum, Office of The Surgeon General, for The Adjutant General, 18 Aug.1941, subject: Utilization of Branch Immaterial Officers in ReplacementTraining Centers, with 1st endorsement thereto, 3 Sept. 1941.
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(and hence the War Department) in the event of actual orthreatened hostilities to authorize such additional enlistments as heconsidered necessary.28 This did not insure that the GeneralStaff would immediately raise theMedical Department`s authorizations even to 7 percent, for as late as June 1941 theseamounted to less than 6 percent, although by that time actual strength had apparentlyrisen to a little more than 7 percent.
Nor did it settle the question as to whatratio of enlisted men should be allocated to tactical units on the one hand andto nontactical units and headquarters other than The Surgeon General`s Office on the other. Differencesof opinionarose, particularly on the latter point. Until the middle of 1939, The Surgeon General had been using enlisted menfor nontactical assignments to the extent of a little more than 4 of the 5 percentauthorized him at that time, leaving less than 1 percent for tactical use. Atthe existing strength of the Army (174,000 enlisted men), this permitted themaintenance in this country of no more than two medical regiments and a medicalsquadron-all at modified peace strength. Surgeon General Mageereported on 30 June 1939 that the following units were to beorganized: Two additional medical regiments, one veterinary company, oneambulance battalion, and one medical squadron. Outside the country, there were two medical regiments, one of which was composed of Filipinos. GeneralMagee did not propose to transfer any personnel from nontactical activities,having (as he asserted) already less than enough for those activities;nevertheless, he called attention to the dearth of medicalpersonnel for tactical units.29 Subsequent increasesin theauthorized strength of the Army to 227,000 during 1939 madepossible the creation of more tactical medical units and detachments. GeneralMagee welcomed this increment; in May and June 1940 whenfurther enlargement of the Army to 375,000 was underway and Congress raisedthe Medical Department`s ratio of enlisted men from 5 to 7 percent or more, he recommended theestablishment of more tactical medical units, at least of certain types, thanthe General Staff was ready to approve-for example, fourevacuation hospitalsas against two, and four surgical hospitals as against two. No hospitals ofeither type had yet been activated, and up to this point, the Army was entirelylacking in field units to provide medical service above the division or corpslevel.30 From then on, expansion of the Army proceeded even morerapidly-especially after the introduction of selective service in1940-and withit the need for tactical medical units, including those at the divisionallevel.
A year or more before the outbreak of the war, planning for the number ofunits (and therefore of enlisted men as well as officers) which would be
28(1) Memorandum (excerpt), The Surgeon General, forThe Adjutant General, 15 Feb. 1939, with endorsements thereto, 27 Apr. 1939 and 26 May 1939. (2) 54 Stat. 214.
29Annual Report of The Surgeon General, U.S. Army, Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1939, pp. 173, 181.
30(1) Letter, The Surgeon General, to The Adjutant General, 20 Jan. 1940, subject: Enlisted Personnel, Medical Department. (2)Letter, The Surgeon General, to The Adjutant General, 19 June 1940, subject:Deficiencies in Corps and Army Medical Units. (3) Annual Report of the Surgeon General, U.S. Army. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1940, p. 175. (4) See footnote 21, p. 59.
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needed in the event of actual hostilities had produceddisagreements between The Surgeon General and the General Staff. General Mageeregarded the War Department`s Protective Mobilization Plans for 1939 and 1940as totally inadequate in the number of hospital centers and general and stationhospitals projected for tactical use in wartime. The General Staff hesitated toincrease this number, presumably because of the limited initial forcecontemplated in the mobilization plans and also because of a desire to emphasizein them combat units rather than service units. Eventually, however, in August1940, the Staff modified its plans so as to include the number of generalhospitals asked for by The Surgeon General-102-instead of the 32 originallyspecified. It was in connection with the mobilization plans and in order tocreate a reserve of officers to staff these hospitals that The Surgeon Generalobtained permission to revive affiliated units in various civilian medicalschools and hospitals.31
The quota of enlisted men for nontactical units andheadquarters was less easily agreed upon than the size of the MedicalDepartment`s tactical force, just discussed. In February 1940, General Mageedeclared that Medical Department enlisted strength for these purposes was belowthe 4.0715-percent ratio which had prevailed before 1 July 1939 and which, hesaid, was itself inadequate. In June 1940, he proposed 4.85 percent of totalArmy strength as the desirable ratio and continued to argue in terms of thisfigure until at least the middle of 1941. The argument was bound up with hisobjection to "displacing" enlisted men by civilian employees innontactical hospitals to the extent of more than 20 percent. (His use of theword "displacement" may not have been quite apt. Little or no actualdisplacement of enlisted men had taken place-civilians had been employed mainlyif not entirely to supplement them.) If a permanent displacement of 50 percentwere accepted, where, he asked, would the Medical Department, whose hospitalswere continually losing trained personnel to form cadres, get trained cadres fornew nontactical hospitals and tactical units? He argued further that adisplacement of more than 20 percent would seriously impair the training oftactical units then being activated, for personnel of the latter must receivetheir instruction as understudies in nontactical hospitals actually in operationand rendering patient care. Enlisted men of tactical units could not receivetheir training as understudies of civilian employees in nontactical hospitalswhen the civilians themselves had to be trained, and furthermore did not stayvery long in their jobs. The Surgeon General`s Office justified the 4.85-percentratio on the ground that this figure was indicated conclusively by "theexperience of the Medical Department extending over many years, both in peaceand war."32
31See footnote 21, p. 59.
32(1) Memorandum, The Surgeon General,for Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, 13 Feb. 1940. (2) Letter, The SurgeonGeneral, to The Adjutant General, 3 Sept. 1940, subject: Employment ofCivilians. (3) Memorandum, Acting Surgeon General, for Assistant Chief ofStaff, G-1, 1 Apr. 1941, subject: I. Increase in Authorization for MedicalDepartment Enlisted Men for Corps Area, Service Command, and War DepartmentOverhead. (4) Letter, Maj. Gen. Norman T. Kirk, to Col. John B. Coates, Jr., MC,Director, Historical Unit, U.S. Army Medical Service, 12 Dec. 1955. (5) Letter,Col. Paul A. Paden, MC, to Col. John B. Coates, Jr., MC, Director, HistoricalUnit, U.S. Army Medical Service, 10 Dec. 1955.
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In September 1940, when General Magee presented the4.85-percent ratio as a formula for allocating newly inducted personnel of theNational Guard and selective service to the Medical Department, the reaction ofthe General Staff was mixed. G-1 considered the ratio reasonable. G-3(operations) thought it might be acceptable for planning purposes, but proposedthat as no "studied determination" of medical personnel requirementsfor nontactical units and headquarters had apparently been made, the actualneeds of each such entity should be determined; The Surgeon General should thenmeet part of their requirements by "affiliating"33 with them the tactical units of a similartype-it seemed to G-3 that such affiliation would also facilitate the trainingof these units. Commenting that the allotments already tentatively made seemedgenerous, G-3 recommended that no change be made in them for the present. Anotation in the file containing this correspondence dated 1 January 1941 statesthat General Magee`s recommendations were "adjusted" in conference,and in a memorandum dated 16 April, G-1 promised that any furtherincreases in Army strength would include a recommendation that MedicalDepartment personnel be allocated in the ratio of 4.8 percent. The context ofthe latter document indicates that the 4.8 percent applied to nontactical unitsand headquarters and was therefore very close to General Magee`s 4.85 percentfor these purposes. But in May 1941,34and probably until the very end of this period (December 1941), actualauthorizations ran far below the desired ratio.
Although the War DepartmentGeneral Staff allotted a much smaller number of enlisted men to nontacticalunits and headquarters than the Surgeon General`s Office and G-1 thoughtproper, it authorized the employment of considerable numbers of civiliansto make up the difference. In April 1941 when the enlisted allotment was only2.2 percent, the civilian authorization amounted to 15,000 or 33 percent of thetotal allotment, military and civilian. This, according to G-l, still left a shortage of 22,000 enlisted men (on the basis of the4.85-percent ratio). Interms of actual strength, comparable figures for which are lacking, theproportion of civilians may of course have been somewhat different. InDecember 1941, General Magee reported that it had been necessary to supplementthe enlisted men allotted to hospitals by civilians to the extent of 50 percent,and by the temporary employment of tactical hospital units in nontacticalhospitals.35 He agreed that civilians might replace enlisted men in certaintechnical positions (those in which an enlisted man could not hope to attainproficiency without long education) and certain "scullery jobs" (which had no training value forhim).36But he contended that the hiring of civilians itself presented problems; forexample,
33G-3 did not explain what it meant by this term.
34Memorandum, Col. H. T. Wickert, for General Magee,6 May 1941, subject: Enlisted Personnel, Medical Department.
35(1) Memorandum, G-1, for The Surgeon General, 16 Apr. 1941, subject:I. Increase in Authorization for MedicalDepartment Enlisted Men for Corps Area, Service Command, and War DepartmentOverhead. (2) Memorandum, The Surgeon General, for G-3, 11 Dec. 1941, subject:Personnel for Arms and Services With Army Air Forces.
36(1) See footnote 32 (2), p. 62.(2) Report, The Surgeon General`s Conference With Corps Area Surgeons, 14-16Oct. 1940.
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their housing, messing, and the impermanence of theiremployment if they were later replaced by enlisted men. Such problems proved tobe matters of some moment, although apparently they did not prevent thehospitals from rendering adequate service. Moreover, the use of newand relatively untrained enlisted men also presented some difficulties.
The War Department General Staff enabled nontactical installations andactivities of the various services, including those of the Medical Department,to utilize personnel of the field forces. In October 1940, when the latter wereplaced under commands separate from those of the corps areas, their commanderswere required to furnish the corps area commanders with such commissioned andenlisted personnel as they might request to operate their installations, pendingprocurement of the required personnel in the corps areas. In February 1941,announcement was made that field force personnel would be used to augmentstation complements whenever field forces were present on a post. This was partof a policy which aimed at restricting permanent station complements to the sizenecessary to maintain services when tactical forces were absent. It representeda departure from the former policy of providing station complements large enoughfor all contingencies so that tactical units could devote the proper amount oftime to training. According to the General Staff, this expedient was necessaryin order to prevent a material reduction of the number of troops assigned tofield forces. Whether or not the policy resulted in a diminution of theallotments of Medical Department personnel to nontactical installations, itcertainly enabled the latter to increase their complement of enlisted men, atleast on a temporary basis.37
G-3`s opinion that a study of the personnel needs of individual MedicalDepartment installations would afford a firmer basis for allotments was probablynot shared by the Surgeon General`s Office; at any rate, no such studieddetermination seems to have been made. If it were not made, the reason may havebeen that the number of officers then available did not permit them to spend thetime away from their day-to-day operations. Whether such a study would haveenabled allotments to be calculated with complete accuracy may be doubted. Toachieve that end in a period of rapid expansion, when the workload and otherresponsibilities of medical installations were constantly shifting, the studywould have had to be continuous. Nevertheless, a thorough survey of thepersonnel situation at each hospital, for example, might have disclosed facts ofconsiderable value to the policymakers. If it did not buttress General Magee`sdemand for an enlisted ratio of 4.85 percent, the survey might have enabled himto see a little more clearly how he could get along without it-ashe actuallyhad to do.
One substitute for such a detailed study was an estimate ofneeds according to the size of installations. For nontactical station hospitals,an estimate of this kind existed in the form of a table of organization showingthe normal
37(1) Letter, The Adjutant General, to Commanders ofArms and Services, 3 Oct. 1940, subject: Organization, Training, andAdministration of Army. (2) See footnote 21, p. 59.
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personnel requirements for station hospitals of various bedcapacities in the Zone of Interior in time of war.38Early in 1940, the War Department issued directions on the use of this table inresponding to a request from a corps area commander for instructions concerningthe employment of civilians in the event of mobilization. The table was toserve as a guide, the local situation determining actual need, pending issuanceof a new table similar in purpose which would be included in MobilizationRegulations. The old table stated requirements only in terms of militarypersonnel; the General Staff therefore at the same time publicized a list of"appropriate positions recommended by The Surgeon General that may befilled by civilians in Station and General Hospitals, Zone of Interior, duringmobilization."39 This list was reissued in June 1940.
Meanwhile, General Magee was asked for recommendations as to the form andcontent of a new table for converting bed requirements into personnelrequirements. The General Staff probably expected that the new table would staterequirements in terms of civilian personnel. General Magee, however, inDecember 1940 submitted a guide for determination of Medical Departmentpersonnel in Zone of Interior station hospitals, which followed the form of theold table of organization in specifying only military personnel, and merelystated that corps area commanders and chiefs of arms and services could"replace in part, decrease or augment the authorized enlisted men shownin the guide by qualified civilian employees." When G-4 (logistics) askedfor a revision of the guide to show requirements for civilian as well asmilitary personnel, General Magee`s Office gave assurance that thesubstitution would be made on a man-to-man basis, an explanation whichsatisfied G-4.40 The new guide also, however, raised the requirements forenlisted men above those of the old table of organization. This causeddiscussion within the General Staff as to whether if the the guidewas approved it might not compel larger allotments to the Medical Departmentthan those already made, which had been based upon the old table. The finaldecision was that it would not, and the guide was published on April 1941 with the understanding that it embodied requirements, not availabilities. Thus,the General Staff saved itself from sanctioning an increased allotment. On theother hand, General Magee avoided the necessity of again committing himself,except in vagueterms, to the principle of substituting civilian employees for enlisted men. Nor did the Surgeon General`s Officeapparently use the guide as a new factor in estimating the general requirements for enlisted men innontactical units and headquarters,for that Office continued to talk in terms of the 4.85-percent ratio. TheActing Surgeon
38Table of Organization 786, W, 1 July 1929.
39(1 ) Letter, Surgeon, Third Corps Area, to The SurgeonGeneral, 22 Jan. 1940, subject: Civilian Employees for Station Hospitals, with endorsements thereto, 23 Feb. 1940 and 28Mar. 1940. (2) Letter, The Adjutant General, to all Corps Area and DepartmentCommanders, 28 Mar. 1940, subject: Use of Civilian Employees in StationHospitals.
40Two months after this explanation was forthcoming(March 1941), the Surgeon General`s Office informed the corps area surgeons thatcivilians should replace enlisted men on a three-for-two basis. (Minutes, TheSurgeon General`s Conference with Corps Area Surgeons, 10-12, Mar. 1941.)
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General urged publication of the guide so that it could be used for planningpurposes and for the assistance of corps area surgeons in procuring properlybalanced staffs.
Civilians
No global figure or ratio was set during the emergency period to determinethe number of civilians who could be employed by the Medical Department. Theonly formula affecting them which appears to have been discussed at this timewas the proper percentage to be employed in nontactical hospitals-a proportionwhich, as we have seen, The Surgeon General held should not exceed 20 percent.
