Contents

CHAPTER XIX

Estimated and Actual Requirements for Evacuation from Theaters of Operations

Estimating future evacuation requirements was primarily amatter of calculating the probable patient-load of theaters and of determiningthe part that would be transferred to the zone of interior under prevailingpolicies. Early in the war estimates of this kind were practically unnecessarybecause the number of patients to be evacuated was still comparatively small,combat operations were limited, and there was plenty of space for evacueesaboard returning transports. Meeting evacuation requirements amounted simply toinsuring that transports had adequate hospital space, attendant personnel, andmedical supplies, and that they were routed on return trips to places wherepatients had accumulated. In the latter half of the war this situation changed.The number of patients evacuated, which had been less than 1,000 a month beforeNovember 1942 and an average of about 3,300 from then until the middle of 1943,mounted steadily until it reached a peak of more than 57,000 in May 1945. (Table16) Moreover, as the build-up of troops in theaters ceased, the number ofreturning transports declined. Under these circumstances estimates of theevacuation load had to be made so that enough transportation could be assembled to handle it; and estimates had tobe made far enough in advance so that the use of transportation facilities-whichcame to include airplanes and hospital ships as well as troop transports-couldbe properly co-ordinated.

A study which the Surgeon General's Office made in thewinter of 1943-44 of the patient load that would develop during 1944 evoked acritical appraisal early that year not only of plans for supplying the Army withhospitalization but also of plans for evacuating patients from theaters ofoperations.¹

Whether plans for evacuation would be adequate depended uponthe size of the evacuation load and upon the use to be made of transportationfacilities. The Surgeon General's estimate of the potential load wasquestioned by ASF headquarters and the Chief of Transportation. Subsequently, asa result of additional information supplied by the European and Medi-

¹See above, pp. 201-02. The following three paragraphs are based upon"Hospitalization and Evacuation: A Re-estimate of the Patient Load andFacilities," February 1944, and "Hospitalization and Evacuation, AnAnalysis," March 1944, together with memorandums and letters in ASFPlanning Div Program Br files 370.05 and "Hosp and Evac, vol. 3."

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TABLE 16-PATIENTS DEBARKED IN THE UNITEDSTATES, 1920-45

Date	Total Patients Debarkeda	Returned by Water						Returned by air
		Number	Percentage of Total Patients Debarked	Troop Transport		Hospital Ship		Number	Percentage of Total Patients Debarked
				Number	Percentage of Total Patients Debarked	Number	Percentage of Total Patients Debarked
1920-40b	15,846	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
1941c	2,390	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
1942	9,248	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
1943d
January	2,475	2,442	98.7	2,442	98.7	0	0	33	1.3
February	2,177	2,136	98.1	2,136	98.1	0	0	41	1.9
March	2,351	2,300	97.8	2,300	97.8	0	0	51	2.2
April	4,777	4,712	98.6	4,712	98.6	0	0	65	1.4
May	5,349	5,242	98.0	5,242	98.0	0	0	107	2.0
June	6,115	5,971	97.6	5,222	85.4	749	12.2	144	2.4
July	5,735	5,350	93.3	5,350	93.3	0	0	385	6.7
August	8,183	7,762	94.9	7,762	94.9	0	0	421	5.1
September	9,425	9,088	96.4	9,088	96.4	0	0	337	3.6
October	7,469	6,884	92.2	6,884	92.2	0	0	585	7.8
November	10,604	10,195	96.1	8,984	84.7	1,211	11.4	409	3.9
December	7,163	6,481	90.0	6,481	90.0	0	0	682	10.0
Total	71,823	68,563	95.5	66,603	92.8	1,960	2.7	3,260	4.5
1944
January	7,724	7,179	92.9	6,018	77.9	1,161	15.0	545	7.1
February	9,763	9,220	94.4	9,220	94.4	0	0	543	5.6
March	8,894	8,172	91.9	6,458	72.6	1,714	19.3	722	8.1
April	7,082	6,249	88.2	4,994	70.5	1,255	17.7	833	11.8
May	9,652	7,965	82.5	4,462	46.2	3,503	36.3	1,687	17.5
June	9,712	7,532	77.6	6,125	63.1	1,407	14.5	2,180	22.4
July	11,593	7,547	65.1	4,841	41.8	2,706	23.3	4,046	34.9
August	14,060	9,708	69.0	8,044	57.2	1,664	11.8	4,352	31.0
September	21,383	15,860	74.2	11,515	53.9	4,345	20.3	5,523	25.8
October	20,894	17,085	81.8	11,530	55.2	5,555	26.6	3,809	18.2
November	19,700	16,846	85.5	11,665	59.2	5,181	26.3	2,854	14.5
December	32,511	28,115	86.5	21,393	65.8	6,722	20.7	4,396	13.5
Total	172,968	141,478	81.8	106,265	61.4	35,213	20.4	31,490	18.2
1945
January	33,382	29,329	87.9	26,191	78.5	3,138	9.4	4,053	12.1
February	38,251	31,989	83.6	26,814	70.1	5,175	13.5	6,262	16.4
March	44,854	36,387	81.1	31,210	69.6	5,177	11.5	8,467	18.9
April	43,839	34,650	79.0	26,982	61.5	7,668	17.5	9,189	21.0
May	57,030	46,099	80.8	36,545	64.0	9,554	16.8	10,931	19.2
June	45,168	34,228	75.8	26,778	59.3	7,450	16.5	10,940	24.2
July	36,873	24,547	66.6	15,379	41.7	9,168	24.9	12,326	33.4
August	26,258	17,469	66.5	9,575	36.5	7,894	30.0	8,789	33.5
September	19,780	12,393	62.7	8,007	40.5	4,386	22.2	7,387	37.3
October	19,618	14,944	76.2	10,081	51.4	4,863	24.8	4,674	23.8
November	13,138	11,061	84.2	3,489	26.6	7,572	57.6	2,077	15.8
December	7,781	6,121	78.7	572	7.4	5,549	71.3	1,660	21.3
Total	385,972	299,217	77.5	221,623	57.4	77,594	20.1	86,755	22.5

^aFigures through April 1943 include Army patientsonly; the remainder include in addition prisoner-of-war patients, some patientsof Allied nations, and a few American Red cross patients.
^bFigures from Annual Report .. . Surgeon General, 1920-41 (1920-41).
^cFigures for 1941 and 1942 supplied by Medical Statistics Division,SGO.
^dFigures for 1943-45 from History .. . Medical Regulating Service .. . They were compiled originally from monthly reports of patients debarked, now located in SG:705 "EvacReqmts, Books I and II"

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terranean theaters, the Chief of Transportation decided touse lower figures. For example, The Surgeon General first estimated that 44,300patients would be evacuated to the United States during September 1944, but theChief of Transportation in March 1944 believed that the figure would be nearer27,000. Neither considered that airplanes would supply any significant capacityfor evacuation. Past performance indicated that few patients would betransported from theaters by air, and air travel-being subject to weatherconditions-was considered uncertain at best. Both officers concentrated theirattention, therefore, on surface vessels.

In determining patient capacities of transports and hospitalships expected to be available, two factors had to be considered. The use ofhospital ships for intratheater evacuation, a matter which had not entered intoconsiderations leading to their authorization, would reduce the number andtherefore the total capacity of hospital ships for transporting patients fromtheaters to the United States. Also, capacities of transports would varyaccording to the standards set for lifeboats and other lifesaving equipment forpatients. Under "desirable" standards, which were the highest in termsof lifesaving equipment, capacities would be least. If standards were lowered,capacities would be increased. Under "adequate" standards a transportwas permitted to load more patients than it had spaces for in lifeboats,provided the latter could accommodate all litter and hospital ambulant patients.For others-mental and troop class patients-only flotation equipment wasnecessary. Under "acceptable" standards even litter and hospitalambulant patients could exceed accommodations for patients in lifeboats, thoughflotation equipment had to be provided for the excess in these categories as wellas for all other patients aboard. Hence, greatest capacities could be achievedby evacuating patients under "acceptable" conditions.

Because of variations in standards of lifesaving equipmentand in estimates of the evacuee load, opinions about the adequacy of plannedshipping facilities differed. Both the Chief of Transportation and The SurgeonGeneral agreed that hospital ships already authorized would be sufficient toevacuate to the United States only a portion of the "helplessfraction" (estimated to be about 60 percent of the total number) ofpatients. They disagreed about the adequacy of transports for the remainder ofthe load, including helpless patients who could not be accommodated aboardhospital ships. On the basis of his estimate The Surgeon General concluded thatsufficient shipping would be available for evacuation from the Pacific but that,even under "acceptable" conditions, there would be barely enough spacefor patients from the European theater in hospital ships already authorized andin transports expected to be available. Nor would there be enough for patientsfrom the Mediterranean. Using a lower estimate the Chief of Transportationdecided that the space available under "acceptable" standards would besufficient for the patients from all theaters. In view of this decision and theconstant need for more troop ships, he advised against the procurement ofadditional hospital ships. By the end of March ASF headquarters adopted amiddle-of-the-road course, accepting recommendations' of the TransportationCorps but directing that plans for seven additional hospital ships be drawn tobe used if needed, that provision be made for additional medical personnel for

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sea evacuation, and that more extensive use of air evacuationbe arranged in order to reduce the number of patients carried by water and thusenable higher standards to be observed on ships.²

Events in 1944 justified the course adopted by ASFheadquarters. As a result of co-operative efforts of the Army Service Forces,the Army Air Forces, the War Department General Staff, and overseas wings of theAir Transport Command, air evacuation increased. In the spring of 1944 the AirForces estimated that 800 to 1,910 patients from the European theater and 300 to 1,350from the Mediterranean could be evacuated monthly in transport planes withoutaltering their accommodations and without interfering with normal high prioritytraffic. The installation of special equipment to support tiers of litters inaircraft cabins, it was anticipated, would raise these figures 50 percent. InMay 1944 the Air Forces made plans for placing webbing-strap litter supports insixty-five of the C-54A planes already in use and in all transport planes tobe built subsequently, and the Air Transport Command directed its overseas wingsto prepare for the evacuation of the number of patients planned.³ Inconsequence, the proportion of the total monthly patient load evacuated by airincreased from 11.8 percent in April to a peak of 34.9 percent in July 1944, andof the total annual load from 4.5 percent in 1943 to 18.2 percent in 1944.(SeeTable 16.)

Additional hospital ships became available during 1944-acumulative total of 9 by the end of June, 16 by the end of July, and 22 by the endof September.⁴ This number was insufficient to meet the demands ofall theaters, because the ships had to be deployed in terms of world-wideshipping needs rather than according to the desires of theaters foraccommodations for patients. Some were required for intra-theaterevacuation; others for the transportation of patients to the United States.⁵As troop shipping to the Mediterranean declined during 1944, space forpatients aboard transports returning to the United States became insufficientfor the evacuee load and hospital ships had to be used to a greater extent forthat theater than for others. Consequently, between March and December 1944 morepatients were returned from the Mediterranean by hospital ship than bytransport. The European theater, generously supplied with troop shipping becauseof its combat operations, received fewer hospital ships proportionately than didthe Mediterranean and hence had enough for only a third of the patientsevacuated by water from that theater between April and December 1944. Because ofthe need for hospital ships in the Atlantic and Mediterranean, only one of thosebuilt by the Army was sent to the Pacific before 1945, and not until the latterhalf of 1944 did the three ships built and operated by the Navy for the Army-theHope, Comfort, and Mercy-go into service there. Evacuation byhospital ship from the Pacific during 1943 and

²See last note-above.
³(1) Memo, SG for CG ASF (Plans and Oprs), 27 Feb 44, sub: Potentialities of Air Evac of Pnts for Overseas to US. SG: 580. (2) Rpt of Conf on Air Evac, 13 Apr 44. SG: 337.1. (3) Memo, CG ASF for ACofS OPD WDGS, 26 Apr 44, sub: Air Evac from Eur and NATO, with inds. OPD: 580.81. (4) Ltr, ATC to Eur Wing, NA Wing, Carib Wing, ATC, 11 May 44, sub: Air Evac from Eur and NATO. SG: 580. (5) Memo, CG ASF for CG AAF, 20 Jun 44, sub: Air Evac for CBI and Pac Areas. HRS: ASF Planning Div Program Br file, "Hosp and Evac." 
⁴See pp. 405-10, and Table 18.
⁵(1) Rads, WD (init by Mvmt Div OCT) to CG NATO, 6 Oct 43, 12 Mar 44; NATO to AGWAR, 8 and 12 Oct, 18 Dec 43; Pacific to AGWAR, 28 Jan 44; ETO to AG WAR, 5 Feb 44; WD (init by Mvmt Div OCT) to CG SOS London, 11 Feb 44. SG: 560.1; 705.1 (N Africa), (Gr Brit), (Pac). (2) Ltr, CofT to CinC SWPA, 29 Jan 44, sub: Hosp Ships, with inds. SG: 560.2.

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1944 was limited therefore to the return of three shiploads of patients-oneby a Navy ship from the Central Pacific in November 1943, another by a Navy shipfrom the South Pacific in October 1944, and the third by the Comfort fromthe Southwest Pacific in December 1944. Despite the lack of enough hospitalships to meet the desires of all theaters, the proportion of patients evacuatedfrom theaters to the United States aboard hospital ships increased, as thoseauthorized became available, from 2.7 percent of the total in 1943 to 20.4percent in 1944.⁶ (See Table 16.)

Increased transportation of patients by airplane and hospital ship reducedthe proportion of the total patient load evacuated by transports from 92.8percent in 1943 to 61.4 percent in 1944. This reduction might have been smallerif theaters had evacuated as many patients by transport as zone of interiorauthorities considered proper. Failure to do so resulted in part from the lowerestimates of capacity that theater officials used in figuring accommodations forpatients aboard transports. To raise these estimates the Chief of Transportationin January 1944 began a survey of all transports to establish their officialcapacities under "adequate" standards.⁷ Even after thesecapacities were set not all theaters used transports to the extent prescribed.Thus the European theater until the end of 1944 adhered rather closely to therecommendation of its chief surgeon, Maj. Gen. Paul R. Hawley, that helplesspatients should be evacuated only by hospital ships, even though the WarDepartment had stated early that year that helpless patients would have to beevacuated by transports as well. Although forced by circumstances-increases inthe patient load resulting from the invasion of the continent, the need tovacate some of the beds in hospitals in the theater, and the lack of sufficientnumbers of hospital ships-to return some helpless patients to the UnitedStates in transports during 1944, the European theater steadfastly refused tomake full use of officially announced capacities.⁸ As a result,patients accumulated in its hospitals while beds in general hospitals in theUnited States remained empty. Theaters in the Pacific complied more readily withWar Department policy on the use of transports and therefore did not developsimilar backlogs, but in the fall of 1944 a problem developed in the SouthwestPacific when the number of mental patients to be evacuated exceeded thecapacities of returning transports for patients of that type. It was solved byevacuating mental patients by air (a practice formerly considered undesirable)and by increasing and improving accommodations aboard transports for mentalpatients.⁹

Toward the end of 1944 attention was focused upon estimatesof the evacuation load for 1945 and upon an evaluation of

⁶(1) Study of Pnt Evac. HD: 705 (Evac). This study consists ofwork sheets on which the ASF Medical Regulating Unit listed monthly, by theaterof operations, the transports and hospital ships evacuating patients and thenumber of patients, by transportation classification, on each. (2) Roland W.Charles, Troopships of World War II (Washington,1947), pp. 327-51.
⁷(1) TC Cir 80-12, 22 Jan 44 and Misc Ltr 28, 14 Jul 44, sub: Capacity of Pers Trans. TC: 569.6. (2) Ltr, SG to South Pacific Base Comd attn Chief Surg, 25 Sep 44, sub: Pers Capacity of Trans. SG: 560. Similar letters were sent to the other theater commands.
⁸(1) Memo for Record, on draft Rad, WD to Hq ComZ ETO, 19 Sep 44. HD: 705 (MRO, Fitzpatrick Stayback, 1484). (2) Interv, MD Historian with Gen Hawley, 18 Apr 50. HD: 000.71.
⁹(1) Memo for Record, on draft Rad, WD (prepared by Mvmt DivOCT) for CinC SWPA, 9 Oct 44. HD: 705 (MRO, Fitzpatrick Stayback, 1496). (2) Memo for Record by Lt Col Lamar C. Bevil, MC (SGO), 1 Nov 44, sub: Conf Ref Evac of Disturbed Mental Pnts from SWPA. HD: MOOD "Pacific."

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the means available or required to handle it. There wereseveral reasons for the inquiry: first, the war was lasting longer than had beenanticipated; second, the patient load in the European theater was becoming heavybecause of a high incidence of trench foot, a larger number of casualtiesresulting from intensified combat activity, and failure to use fully theevacuation space available aboard transports; and third, the possibility ofvictory in Europe during 1945 made it necessary to plan for evacuation in termsof the redeployment of ships to the Pacific.

In a study prepared by the ASF Medical Regulating Unit,adopted by the Joint Logistics and Joint Military Transportation Committees, andsubmitted on 16 December 1944 to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the number ofpatients who would need evacuation was estimated by class, by month, and bytheater, for the period from December 1944 through December 1945. From theseestimates were subtracted the numbers of patients of all classes who could beevacuated each month, from each theater, by troop transports and by airplanes.The remainder represented the number of patients who would have to be evacuatedby hospital ships. Conclusions drawn from these calculations were that a peakload of more than 54,000 patients would require evacuation in August 1945, thathospital ships already authorized would not be able to transport all who couldnot be accommodated in transports and airplanes, and that an additional numberof hospital ships ranging from two in January 1945 to twenty-eight in Aprilwould therefore be needed.¹⁰

This study led the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 21 December 1944to approve the conversion of troop transports to ambulance-type hospital shipsin sufficient numbers (later determined by the Joint Military TransportationCommittee to be six) to provide additional carrying capacity for 5,500 patients.¹¹While neither the Joint Committee nor the Joint Chiefs expected thisaction to eliminate entirely the shortage of space for evacuation, theyanticipated that it would reduce the shortage to manageable proportions.

Steps taken to "manage" the shortage appliedprimarily, though not altogether, to the European theater, which was expected tohave almost as many patients to evacuate early in 1945 as the Pacific andMediterranean theaters combined. It already had a backlog of patients awaitingevacuation and therefore a shortage of hospital beds. Furthermore, the patientswho had accumulated would need to be evacuated from Europe early in 1945 becauseredeployment of transports from Europe to the Pacific would reduce capacitiesfor evacuation from the European theater later in the year.¹² Therefore,on 3 December 1944 the Chief of Staff, on the recommendation of the MedicalRegulating Officer and the Office of the Chief of Transportation, overruledGeneral Hawley's objections and ordered the European theater to exploit fullythe normal patient capacity of transports, even though it

¹⁰(1) Memo, Joint Logistics Plans Cmtee for Lt Col J[ohn] C. Fitzpatrick, 15 Nov 44, sub: Hosp Ship Program. (2) Joint Logistics Cmtee (JLC 221/1), 7 Dec 44, Hosp Ship Program. (3) JCS/l199, 16 Dec 44, Hosp Ship Program, Rpt with Apps "A" to"N", 64 pp. All in SG: 560.2.
¹¹Joint Mil Trans Cmtee, JMTC 89/1, 26 Dec 44,Hosp Ship Program. SG: 560.2 JMTC selected the Saturnia,Republic, President Tyler, Athos II, Columbie, and theUSS Antaeus (ex St. John) for conversion. All but the last were to be converted,manned, and operated by the Army.
¹²Following series of files (1945) deal with evacuationrequirements, adequacy of hospitalization both in theaters and zone of interior,and use of evacuation facilities: HRS: G-4 file, "Hosp, vol. II";HRS: ASF Planning Div Program Br files, "Hosp and Evac";and SG: 705.

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might have to reduce its evacuation policy to 90 days tosupply enough patients for this purpose.¹³Meanwhile, American andBritish officers, both in the zone of interior and in the theater of operations,were discussing more extensive use of some of the larger and faster Britishvessels for evacuation. Subsequently they agreed to arrangements for enlargingthe capacities of the Queen Mary and Queen Elizabeth for litter andhospital ambulatory patients to 2,000 and 2,500 respectively and for troop classpatients to 1,000 each. This agreement was approved by the Combined Military Transportation Committee on16 January 1945.¹⁴Athird step was to increase the evacuation of patients byair, for it had fallen from a peak of 2,846 patients returned from Europe inJuly1944 to 987 in November. Again on the recommendation of the ASF MedicalRegulation Officer, the Chief of Staff directed the European theater on 25December 1944 to arrange to use air evacuation to "the fullest practicalextent". Soon afterward, the theater Air Priorities Board agreed toallocate spaces on planes for the evacuation of 3,000 patients per month.¹⁵A fourth step was taken in March 1945 after a re-evaluation of theevacuation load indicated that estimates made in December for the SouthwestPacific and European theaters were perhaps too low. With the concurrence of TheSurgeon General, the Chief of Transportation directed that restrictions imposedby lifeboat standards upon patient capacities should be waived, as they had beenfor the Queens, for seventeen Army transports and three Navy transports,and that those vessels should be prepared to carry "maximum" loads ofpatients.¹⁶

By these measures sufficient facilities were provided to meetevacuation requirements during the first half of 1945 and to carry a peak load of 57,030 patients in May, just after V-E Day. During this period the major portion of patients came from the European theater, which was most affected by the measures adopted. In compliance with the Chief of Staff's order of 3 December 1944, it began to use space aboard transports more fully, sending to the United States in transports during that month 15,682 patients as compared with 4,665 in November, and increasing the number steadily during the early part of 1945. The number of patients evacuated by air from the European theater also grew, rising from 987 in November 1944 to more than 2,500 in February 1945. By March, arrangements for enlarging the capacities of the Queens had been completed and each of those vessels returned as many as 2,000 to 3,000 patients per trip. Gradually, also, greater numbers of patients were evacuated aboard transports for which maximum loading was author-

¹³(l) Diary, ASF Planning Div, 2 Dec 44. HD: 705 (MRO, Fitzpatrick Stayback, 1584). (2) Interv, MD Historian with Col Fitzpatrick, 18 Apr 50. HD: 000.71. (3) Rad CM-OUT-72113 (3 Dec 44), WD (init by Mvmt Div OCT) to ComZ ETO. HRS:G-4 file, "Hosp, vol. III."
¹⁴(1) Tel Conv WD-TC-1367, Washington and London (OCT officials), 27 Nov 44. SG: 337. (2) Rad CM-OUT-76241 (12 Dec 44), WD (init by Mvmt Div OCT) to ETO ComZ. SG: 560.2. (3) Rad CM-IN-16292 (17 Dec 44), UK Base Sec to WD. SG: 705. (4) Memo CMT 67, 16 Jan 45, sub: Combined Mil TransCmtee, Return of Pnts and other Pers Westbound on the Queen Elizabeth and Queen Mary. Same file.
¹⁵(1) Ltr, CG AAF to CG ASF (SG), 4 Oct 44, sub: Air Evac,ETO. SG: 580 (Gr Brit). (2) Memo, SG for CG ASF, 23 Dec 44, sub: Evac of Pnts,ETO. Same file. (3) Memo, ASF Planning Div for ASF Plans and Oprs, 6 Feb 45,sub: Air Evac to ZI. SG: 580. (4) Rad CM-OUT-82083 (25 Dec 44), WD to HqComZ ETO. OPD: In and Out Messages.
¹⁶(1) Ltr, CofT for CGs BPE, NYPE,and HRPE, 5 Feb 45, sub: Pnt Capacities, Amer Trp Trans. SG: 705. (2) Memo, CofT for Naval Trans Serv, 22 Feb 45, sub: Pnt Capacity, Mount Vernon,Wakefield, and West Point. TC: 569.5. (3) Rads, CofT to PEs and ETO, 16 and 22 Mar 45. Same file.

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ized, some carrying 2,000 or more patients per trip in May.In addition, some of the hospital ships which had been used in the Mediterraneanwere sent to the European theater, as were the last two of the twenty-fourauthorized in July 1943 and the first of the five authorized in December 1944.All of these were in service by April 1945. As a result, during the first halfof 1945, seventeen hospital ships made from one to four trips each from Europeto the United States. The patient load from the Mediterranean theater, which wasconsiderably smaller by the early part of 1945 than before, was carried in thehospital ships still assigned to that theater, and in transports and airplanes.¹⁷By April 1945, enough evacuation facilities were available for the WarDepartment to decide, with the approach of V-E Day, to speed the flow ofpatients from both the European and Mediterranean theaters. Accordingly, in Mayit placed these theaters on 60-day evacuation policies.¹⁸

Evacuation from the Pacific continued to be primarily bytransport. Although plans were made as early as April 1945 to transfer hospitalships from the Atlantic to the Pacific, only one Army hospital ship-sent to thePacific in the latter half of 1944-made a trip carrying patients from thatarea to the United States in the first half of 1945. The number of patientsevacuated by air from the Pacific rose from 2,763 in April 1945 to 4,665 thefollowing June. From all theaters, 262,524 patients were evacuated to the UnitedStates during the first half of 1945. Of these, 19 percent were returned by air,14.5 percent by hospital ship, and 66.5 percent by troop transport. (SeeTable 16.)

Evacuation requirements fell off during the last half of 1945with the cessation of hostilities. By September the patient load of the European and Mediterraneantheaters had been so reduced that it was possible for them toreturn to a normal 120-day evacuation policy and to send patients to the UnitedStates thereafter almost exclusively by either hospital ship or airplane. Sincethe Pacific had no great backlog of patients, evacuation from that area in 1945caused no problem. In the latter half of 1945, Navy hospital ships, Army andNavy transports, airplanes, and the three hospital ships operated by the Navyfor the Army evacuated large numbers of patients to the United States. To thesewere added ten Army hospital ships transferred from the Atlantic. Just before V-JDay space for evacuation from the Pacific was so ample that the War Departmentordered a reduction in its evacuation policy to 60 days to provide enoughpatients to make full use of available transportation. After V-J Day thePacific was ordered to return all of its patients as quickly as possible. Thepatient load was in consequence reduced by October to a point that it waspossible for the theater to lower its ratio of beds to troop strength and toreturn to a 120-day evacuation policy.¹⁹ (See Table 14.) Duringthe latter half of 1945, of the 123,448 patients evacuated from all theaters,29.9 percent returned to the United States by air, 31.9 percent by hospitalship, and 38.2 percent by transport. This represented a reversal of thesituation during the first half of the year, when approximately two thirds ofall patients were evacuated by transport. During the entire year, 385,792patients were evacuated from all theaters: 22.5 percent by air, 20.1 percent byhospital ship, and 57.4 percent by transport. (See Table 16.)

¹⁷Study of Pnt Evac. HD: 705 (Evac). 
¹⁸See p. 300.
¹⁹Study of Pnt Evac. HD: 705 (Evac).Also see p. 301.

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