CHAPTER XIX
Animal Farms, CapturedAnimals, and Privately Owned Animals
Though Army horses andmules, Army dogs, and signal pigeons comprised the main reasons for a veterinary servicewith animals in World War II, there were a number of other groups of animalswhich were provided professional careand treatment. Such animal groups presenting the more significant problems were livestock animals, capturedanimals, and troop mascots or petanimals belonging to military personnel.
ANIMAL FARMS
In World War II, the ArmyVeterinary Service provided professional services and supervised operationsat a dozen or more livestock and poultry farms whose animal populationsinvolved at least a thousand cattle and hogs and several thousand chickens.Though farms of various sorts have been operated since the earliest days of theArmy, they were concerned mainly with the growing of vegetables or theharvesting of forage.
While there were a numberof cogent reasons for their operation during World War II, the animal farms were morecommonly used as a means of adding fresh foods to the rationsin Army hospitals. At least two poultry farms were established for this reasonalone, one on New Caledonia (in the South Pacific Area) (1) and the other atTownsville, Australia (in the Southwest Pacific Area) (2). The former,with asmany as 2,800 birds as of December 1944 that were raised from chicks importedfrom Australia, lasted until September1945. In the Zone of Interior, before the Armymonetary system of foodsupply was replaced by the issue-in-kind ration, the output of such farms wasplanned by stations and units to build up so-called ration savings credits whichcould be diverted toward other purposes. Many such farms, having beenoperated throughout the preceding peacetime period by the Quartermaster Corps,Army Exchange System, or separate units,1 were continuedin World War II.The improvement of troop morale was another reason for their establishment orexpanded operations, particularly in the oversea theaters where the farmsprovided a more varied diet of fresh meats and eggs. In the theaters, hog production was favored because, unlike cattleand poultry which required that supplements be imported into the
1Available records indicatethat animal farms, before World War II, were operated at the following camps: Fort Bayard, N. Mex., Fort Belvoir, Va., Carlisle Barracks, Pa., Fort Bragg, N.C., Fort Clark, Tex., Fort Huachuca, Ariz., Fort Oglethorpe, Ga., Fort Reno, Okla., Fort Riley, Kans.,Fort Robinson, Nebr., Front Royal, Va., Fort Leavenworth, Kans., and Jefferson Barracks, Mo. Probably there were others.
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FIGURE 77.-Armyhog farm inLevant Service Command, U.S. Army Forces in the Middle East.
area, the hogs could be fedon the garbage from troop messhalls and could provide, at the same time, ameans of disposing of edible garbage.2 Damaged subsistence, as it became available, was added to thisgarbage. Damaged subsistence was used in the feeding of hogs on farms which wereestablished in the Middle East theater (3) during 1943 at Decamere, Eritrea, and Tel Witwinsky, Palestine (figs. 77 and 78), and in the China-Burma-Indiatheater (4) at Agra, Calcutta, and Ledo,India(figs. 79 and 80). In thelatter theater, "enterprising veterinary officersoperated poultry farms at a few stations, feeding the birds on grain, kitchenwastes, and spoiled canned milk, in an attempt to soften the leatherybirds."
Although food production wasthe main objective of the Army's animal farms, the Army Air Forces at MitchelField, N.Y., found that animals could
2Ordinarily, Army hog farmswere not established in oversea populous areas where the edible garbage found aready market with the local civilian hog producers. Unfortunately, the Army wasoften embarrassed to the extent that such garbage was claimed to lessen hograising, spread disease (notable hog cholera), and, at times, kill the hogs. Thefact was that the civilian hog producers-then provided with large quantities ofArmy garbage-failed to balance or supplement the garbage feed withconcentrates and were unequipped to process (or pasteurize) the Army garbage in compliance with local civilian laws and regulations. Such occurred in the European theater, the Southwest Pacific Area (in Australia), and in the Central Pacific Area (in the Territory of Hawaii). In the latter command, a veterinary officercould find no reason for the Army to expend money to collect and heat garbage ata central point before distribution to commercial hog producers and, at anothertime, joined in an investigation of a pending claim against the Army thateventually showed that Army garbage was not "poisoned" bycontamination in an Army messhall but by a jealous neighboring producer whosesource of supply was suddenly stopped when "his" Army units were movedelsewhere. So far as it was known, the edible garbage was made available withoutcost to the hog producers who could show need for it and could assure regularcollections of such garbage from the messhalls; reasonable precautions weretaken within the Army to incure its nonpoisonous character and edibility forhogs.
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FIGURE 78.-Armyhog farm at Decamere, Eritrea.
be beneficially used inrehabilitating hospital patients (5) and for that purpose procured a farmwhich was operated under the supervision of the airbase veterinarian (figs. 81and 82). Other animal farms which were provided with veterinary servicesincluded those operated in the prisoner-of-war camps at Alva, Okla., and McLean,Tex.
A more patent reason wasgiven for the establishment and operation of farms by Army task forces on twoisland bases in the Central Pacific Area (6). Vulnerable to isolation andstarvation in the event of a Japanese naval blockade after the Pearl Harborattack, the Christmas Island forces in February 1942 assumed control over afew cattle, hogs, and poultry which had been imported earlier by the U.S.EngineerDepartment at the start of construction on an airfield; later in that year,150 hogs and 125 chickens were shipped from the Hawaiian Islands to the Army task force on Canton Island (fig. 83). With thewestwardretreat of the Japanese Navy, the task force farms lost their immediate militarypurpose, and the farm animals on Canton Island were disposed of by slaughter in June 1943.The larger and more diversified farm (including 27 dairy cows and 2 dairybulls, 88 sows and 3 boars, and 375 poultry, as of December 1942) on Christmas Island was continued, however, until after V-J Day.The latter, under the control of a veterinary officer, provided a fresh milk, egg, and meat supply to the hospital as well as to the garrison's troop messhalls; during the period from November 1943 through September 1944, thefarm's production had a monetary value of $14,700 (6). It may be noted thatthe original potential as "living food reserves" ofthese task force farms in the Pacific had gained military importance from theearly reports that Army horses and mules and
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locally procured carabaowere the last sources of meat supplied to the defenders of the PhilippineIslands before their surrender to the Japanese at Corregidor (in April 1942) (7, 8, 9). The veterinary officers included in these Philippine forces, subsequently as prisoners of war of the Japanese, were frequently detailed to stock farmsat prison camps.
Whenever animal farms wereoperated, veterinary officers rendered the required professional services,supervised their sanitary aspects, and maintained regulatory controlsagainst animal diseases. During World War II, these activities were greatlyincreased and usually included the actual operation of the animal farms wherethe veterinary officers were the only qualified personnel available. In thisconnection, the veterinary officers of Army Garrison Forces in the CentralPacific Area were called upon to attend the animal livestock farms which wereestablished by the Navy's CA/MG (Civil Affairs/Military Government) units,following the invasion landings on Guam, Saipan, and Tinian (in the MarianaIslands). Similar assistance was
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FIGURE 80.-Armyhog farmat Ledo, India
FIGURE 81.-Hospital patientworking on the animal farm at Pawling Convalescent Center, N.Y.
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provided by the ArmyVeterinary Service in the South Atlantic theater at the joint Army-Navy hog andpoultry farm which was maintained for about 2 years at Recife, Brazil; also, inNatal, Brazil, the U.S. Office of Inter?American Affairs called on a veterinaryofficer to assist Brazilian authorities on a hog production project (10). Theadded wartime responsibilities included that veterinary officers (1) surveythe farm sites, (2) plan the farm construction and abattoirs, (3) recommend thekinds and breeds of livestock and poultry most practical to raise, (4)investigate the water and local food supply as to availability and adequacy, and(5) obtain such command support necessary to insure the maintenance of the farm on a high level of efficiency.
The professional problemscentered on the control of animal diseases to insure farm animal efficiency andto protect troop health. These diseases included a peculiar type of respiratorydisorder, observed in the chickens on New Caledonia, which was attributed to animbalanced diet, andpig anemia, on the farm onChristmas Island. In the MarianasIslands and elsewhere, hogs were routinely immunized against hog cholera. Unfortunately, the establishment of adequatemeasures for the protection of troop health was more difficult. The fresh milkproduction from some of the Army's dairy herds
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FIGURE 83.-Armytask forcedairy herd, Christmas Island.
was unpasteurized or handledunder elementary hygienic conditions (11), andthe meat-producing animals were too often slaughtered in makeshift abattoirs.Some of the health dangers of the Army's fresh-milk production were reduced,with continued emphasis on farm sanitation and the examination of the dairycows for freeness of disease. While a test and eradication program had beenadopted against tuberculosis in Army cattle in 1929, a similar programagainst brucellosis (Malta fever) was not undertaken until a much later date. Infact, the unexpected finding of this disease in the dairy herd on ChristmasIsland-after 3? years of virtual isolation and repeated examination-causedthe immediate discontinuance of the local milk supply program and thesubsequent closing of the farm.
CAPTURED ANIMALS
Except in the Europeantheater, captured animals were an invaluable asset to the U.S. and Alliedmilitary forces. In the European theater, captured animals played anunimportant role (21). There may have been as many as 15,000 of them. Alargenumber of these animals were used for pack transport purposes and a few forcavalry-type reconnaissance, in the campaigns against the Germans inSicily and Italy and in the fighting against
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the Japanese in Burma, thePhilippine Islands, and Okinawa. At other times, captured animals were used inareas back of tactical divisions and field armies to haul supplies or to mountguard patrols in depots and prisoner-of?war compounds. The real value ofcaptured animals in the motorized and mechanized Army that fought overseas inWorld War II, however, was not so much in their redeployment into militarycampaign as it was the more urgent need to return them to the civilianpopulations in liberated and occupied countries for the early reestablishmentof local civilian economy and agricultural rehabilitation. During World War II,the animals were released not only at the cessation of active hostilities, butalso during the war period, dependent on the tactical situation and the CA/MGprograms in liberated and occupied countries.
Captured animals presentedseveral veterinary problems. One of these comprised the safeguards-includinganimal quarantine procedures and the conduct of mallein test for glanders-toprotect the health of Army horses and mules. Another veterinary problemconcerned the protection of troop health through proper disposition of capturedanimals which might be affected with diseases transmissible to man. The ArmyVeterinary Service provided professional services and technical supervision overthe care and management of captured animals while in military custody, andspecial precautions were suggested or adopted prior to their release ordisposition to prevent the spread of animal diseases in a military command oramong civilian livestock populations. The extent of these veterinaryactivities depended on the availability of Veterinary Corps officers and animalservice units, the availability of veterinary equipment and supplies, and theplanning on the military deployment or disposition of the animals.
European Theater
In the European theater,captured animals generally presented an intolerable veterinary situation. Thisdid not improve until after V-E Day (12, 13).After the assault and landings on the European Continent in June 1944,the horses, cattle, and other animals which had fallen into the hands of theadvancing divisions and armies were immediately released or "farmed out," to the local civilian populations byCA/MG detachments (14, 15).These animals were regarded or handled as liabilities to be disposed of at once, rather than as assets. There was no intention to fully determinewhether they were infected with a serious contagious disease that could bedisseminated among the civilian animal populations. The Seventh U.S. Army,coming into southern France from the Mediterranean theater and accompaniedby a provisional remount depot organization (the 6835th) and the 17thVeterinary Evacuation Hospital, seemingly had sufficient personnel and equipmentto partially process the captured animals before releasing them to the civilianpopulations, but, even in this army, an enzootic of sarcoptic mange occurred.
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Elsewhere in the armycombat areas, no precautions were taken against the collection and dispositionof captured animals which might have been diseased. Aside from the shortagesin the numbers of Veterinary Corps officers in such areas, little could havebeen accomplished anyway because, in the spring of 1944, there was a shortageof veterinary animal service equipment and supplies which was not relieveduntil the winter of 1944-45. In the interim, captured German Army animals,untested for glanders, were being used at a ground forces replacementdepot and a prisoner-of-war inclosue in the Seine Base Section and theBrittany Base Section of the theater's communication zone (16).Subsequently, a minimal amount of animal service equipment and supplies whichhad come into the theater were used by veterinary personnel to providefirst aid treatment and to examine these captured animals. During the springof 1945, when it had become obvious that more animals would be capturedand that some of these were being moved back from Germany into France,the theater veterinarian suggested that the captured animals should betaken care of by German Army veterinarians until the animals could bedistributed by the CA/MG detachments and that such animals, ifreleased or moved to France, should be examined by French civilianveterinarians. This pertained equally to horses as well as cattle, the latteralreadyhaving been involved in the threatening spread of foot-and-mouth diseaseinto the Lowland Countries (17, 18). Thesuggestions which had been made to prevent the widespreaddissemination of animal diseases in North Central Europe were answered by theQuartermaster Corps with the statement-approved by the theater G-5 (CivilAffairs/Military Government)-thatno animals should be captured because of the feeding problem involved.
However, in October 1945,the theater quartermaster became responsible for the care, use, and dispositionof 7,300 horses (19). At that time, a few were retained for the SpecialServices program of recreational riding, and, before the middle of 1946, 235were shipped to the Zone of Interior; the others were disposed of bydistribution to the Germans through the Office of Military Government forGermany.
Mediterranean Theater
Veterinary service forcaptured animals in the Mediterranean theater was first rendered during thesummer months of 1943 in the 34th Infantry Division3 inNorth Africa (20). During the next few years, thousands of such animals fell into thehands of the Allied military forces, many being actually used in the SeventhU.S. Army's campaigns on Sicily (during July and August 1943), and later in the FifthU.S. Army in its northward advances against the Germans on theItalian peninsula. In fact, almost any
3At that time, the divisionveterinarian was caring for 116 captured animals; no communicable disease was reported.
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kind of animal that couldbe found was used to transport supplies or to aid in reconnaissance during theSicilian campaign. The same situation prevailed during the early months offighting in the southern Apennines when the divisions of the Fifth U.S. Armyformed and operated their own provisional pack trains. Few or no preliminaryphysical examinations were made at this time by the divisional veterinariansbecause animals were so urgently needed, many being killed by enemyartillery and mortar fire and snipers during their first pack trip to theoutpost positions. By the spring and summer of 1944 when U.S.-supervisedItalian Army pack mule trains replaced the provisional pack trains of the combatdivisions and the military needs for animals were less urgent, the capturedanimals were assembled by CA/MG officers in the combat area, and thoseunusable for military purposes were distributed to the Italian civilianeconomy. The captured animal situation remained more or less unchanged fromearly 1944 until the spring of 1945.
Following the start of theFifth U.S. Army's final offensive through Bologna which saw the capitulationof the German Armies in northern Italy on 2 May 1945, an estimated 5,000German Army horses and a few mules were found in the Po Valley (20). These werebrought into a main collection point at San Martino in Spino and gradually were taken over from the FifthU.S. Army by the 2610th Quartermaster RemountDepot (Overhead) of the theater's Peninsular Base Section. The depot'sveterinary personnel took care of as many animals as it could but for the mostpart operated only as a clearing station for evacuating sick and injuredcaptured animals to four veterinary hospital organizations moved into the PoValley. These hospitals, belonging to the Peninsular Base Section, were the2604th Veterinary Station Hospital (Overhead) and the Italian 1st VeterinaryStation Hospital, arriving at San Martino in Spino on 3 May 1945 (fig. 84).Several miles distant, and supporting these hospitals, were the 2605thVeterinary General Hospital (Overhead) and the Italian 2d Veterinary GeneralHospital-bothsetting up operations at Mirandola at about the same time.The movements of these hospitals and the evacuation of the disabledanimals were accomplished by the 643d and 644th Veterinary EvacuationDetachments. Duringthe month of May, which saw these hospitals and units in actual use for thefirst time since their organization in March 1945, they provided veterinaryhospital support for the remount operations at San Martino in Spino, totalingmore than 500 stable patients (table 58). The condition of the captured animals revealed the swift and chaoticretreat of the German forces just before their surrender; the horseshoes werewornpaper thin or were missing from one or more of the feet. While some of there were sick-a fewhaving epizootic lymphangitis-themost serious disability in these horses was burns (figs. 85 and 86). Whetherthe burns were caused by Allied artillery fire and aerial bombing or by theGermans setting fire to their abandoned material was undetermined.
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Hospital | Admissions | Died or destroyed1 | Treatment days | ||
Total | Disease | Injury | |||
2604th Veterinary Station Hospital (Overhead) | 218 | 46 | 2173 | 5 | 1,340 |
2605th Veterinary General Hospital (Overhead) | 288 | 101 | 3187 | 3 | 4,172 |
1The specific causes of theloss of 8 animals included the following diseases and injuries: Fractures, 3;and 1 each on account of cataract, equine influenza, separation of sole,synovitis, and torsion of colon.
2Includes 25 battlecasualties.
3Includes 11 battle casualties.
The captured animals at SanMartino in Spino were not kept for any great period of time because the area wasthe assigned responsibility of the British military forces; in mid-May 1945, theveterinary hospitals were withdrawn southward, the U.S. organizations thenbeing disbanded and the Italian hospitals being released to the ItalianGovernment.
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FIGURE85.-Extensive second-degree burns on acaptured German horse.
China-Burma-India Theater
In the various areas of theAsiatic-Pacific theater, captured Japanese animals were used by the groundforces or found their way into the civilian economy in a manner somewhatcomparable to the methods employed in the European and Mediterranean theaters (4).In the China-Burma-India theater, where animals were urgently needed bythe U.S.-sponsored Chinese military forces, captured animals often constituteda major replacement supply to the combat teams fighting in the Burmese jungles(p. 363).
The main objection againstthe use and mingling of captured Japanese animals in the U.S. combat teams(Merrill's Marauders and the MARS Brigade) and the Allied Chinese militaryforces was the constant threat of surra.
Southwest Pacific Area
Surra, the disease that wasmost feared in the Burma campaigns and which eventually took its toll among theanimals in the China-Burma-India theater, was discovered in the captured animalsthat made up the provisional pack train of the 33d Infantry Division whileoperating near Baguio, Luzon, in the summer of 1945. Over a period of 2months, that divisional train's animal strength was reduced by 50 percent,largely on account of a test and
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eradication program againstsurra-the program being undertaken by a veterinary officer of the XI Corps incooperation with a medical laboratory unit (21).
Central Pacific Area
Few Japanese horses werecaptured on the island bases in the Central Pacific Area until after the TenthU.S. Army's invasion of the Ryukyu Islands (6). On Angaur (in the Carolines)three were found, and two were found on Saipan (in the Marianas), but, in theRyukyus, more than a thousand had been captured on Okinawa by 1 June 1945, andanother 375 horses were taken on Ie Shima. With the exception of a fewfurnished to the U.S. Marine Corps to mount an ammunition pack train onOkinawa, these horses were controlled by the CA/MG officers who then"farmed out" as many as were needed in the recovery of the localagricultural economy. Veterinary officers provided the required professionalcare over the captured animals and took the necessary precautions against theissue of horses which were in poor physical condition or had contagiousdiseases.
Another group of animalscoming into the category of "captured" was the livestock totaling2,400 cattle and carabao, 700 goats, 1,100 hogs, and 3,600 poultry found in theMarianas Islands bases captured or retaken from
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the Japanese. Presumably,many belonged to the native inhabitants, but others had belonged to theJapanese. They were assembled by CA/MG sectionsand were cared for by the veterinary officers accompanying the Armygarrison force for each such base. It made little difference that the CA/MG onan island was a Navy responsibility and was Navy controlled, except that themedical sections of the Army garrisons forces could not justify the releaseof their veterinary officers (usually one to an island base) when Navy CA/MGsuddenly and unexpectedly needed them.
PRIVATELY OWNED ANIMALS
Private mounts of officerswere given the same protective care and professional treatment as providedfor Army horses and mules. However, a more controversial group of privately ownedanimals which was provided professional services in the Army included the dogs, cats, and other pet animals or troop mascots belonging to militarypersonnel and organizations. These were controversial to the extent that, from time totime, a few individual veterinary practitioners in civilian communitiessurrounding the Army camps posed a question of infringement of rights or of unfair competitionon the part of Veterinary Corps officers whowere practicing veterinary medicine on these animals. There can be no doubt thatthese professional activities accrued great benefits to the Armed Forces,involving such matters as upholding troop morale, maintaining medicalintelligence on the disease conditions of such animals as might have abearing on troop health, and, of course, offering professional experience andcontinuing interest in veterinary medicine which related to animals of the kinds not used by the Army.
These treatment services,important as they may have been to the individual owners and militaryorganizations, however, remained secondary to the phase of Army VeterinaryService with privately owned animals that was concerned with the regulatorycontrols over the traffic of such dogs, cats, and other pet animals between theArmy camps. These controls meant that veterinary officers conducted physicalexaminations on the animals prior to their transshipment and rendered veterinaryhealth certificates such as were officially made whenever Army horses andmules were issued, transferred, or sold; upon arrival at their destination inanother Army camp, the privately owned animals were kept under a certain degreeof veterinary observation or in quarantine until found to be free of contagiousdisease.4 After 1928 these regulatory controls were advanced by the obligatoryprogram of immunizing dogs, cats, and similar animals against rabies atmany Army camps
4At most Army camps, theprovost marshal was responsible for maintaining the records on privately ownedanimals which were kept or housed there. Newly arrived personnel were requiredto register their dogs with the provost marshal following their preliminaryexamination and "clearance" by the station veterinarian. Theprogram of vaccinating dogs and cats against rabies, repeated each year,frequently became the basis for the owners to renew the registrations of theiranimals with the provost marshal. Unregistered animals and strays were collectedand impounded by the provost marshal, who was also authorized to dispose ofthem.
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FIGURE 87.-Antirabiesvaccination, Chatham Army Air Force Field.
(fig. 87). In thismanner, the Army accomplished more thanany statutory?constituted civil authority to prevent the introduction ordissemination of animal disease by dogs and cats which were movedintrastate or interstate, or imported into the United States.Eventually, in 1946, the U.S.Public Health Service was granted congressional authorization to regulate theimportation of any or all dogs and cats, military and civilianalike.
Before World War II, thenominal number of animals which were brought into the United States bymilitary personnel was well regulated by the Army. The only Federal or civilianregulatory controls over such traffic were maintained by the Bureau of Customs,U.S. Department of the Treasury, and, in the instance of parrots or psittacinebirds, by the U.S. Public Health Service since 1930.
The onset of World War IIalmost brought a halt to this animal traffic as increasingly larger numbers ofArmy troops were shipped from and not into the United States. This decreasedincoming traffic, which had come about more or less by natural means andlasted only for the active war period, was further reduced in January 1944 whenthe Transportation Corps regulations of the Army (22) were amended to providethat "the carrying of pets or mascots on U.S. Army transports and vesselswholly allo-
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cated to the War Departmentis not permissible." In the interim, however, when the incoming shiptraffic of animal pets, especially on troop transports, had come to a halt,the wartime expansion of the Army Air Forces led to increasingly large numbersof these animals being brought into the United States by airplane.Aircraft-ferrying crews and the combat pilots on rotation further complicatedthe problem by entering the United States at airbases not normally under anykind of Federal or medical surveillance. In the spring of 1944, the WarDepartment directed that animals were not to be carried on Army airplanes andships unless a prior permit was secured from the U.S. Department of Agricultureand requested airplane and ship commanders as well as all Armypersonnel to cooperate with that department's inspectors at ports andairfields (23, 24). There can be no doubt that this announcement may have lessened the military traffic of pet animals into the United States, but,actually, the U.S. Department of Agriculture was without statutory authorization to prevent theseimportations5 and neither was there amilitary veterinary record to indicate that the U.S. Department of Agriculturepersonnel conducted such inspections or impounded pet animals belonging tomilitary personnel. In the European theater, the Army Veterinary Serviceinquired as to how military personnel could obtain the required permit from theU.S. Department of Agriculture before departing for the United States (25).
These regulatory directivesof the War Department were augmented by the regulatory controls establishedand operated in the oversea theaters during the active war period. The Europeantheater, for example, provided for the movement of pet animals to the UnitedStates to the extent only that such would be made in compliance with theexistent directives (26, 27). This meant that dogs, cats, and pet animals could betransported to the Zone of Interior if the individual owners could or shouldmake their own arrangements with any commercial transportation agencies whichmight be operating between Europe and the United States; of course, few sucharrangements could be made during the period of active hostilities. The same wastrue for the Central Pacific Area, but no veterinary health certificates wereissued for dogs or cats which may have been at one time or another on anyisland base outside of the Hawaiian Islands (6). Elsewhere, the theaters imposedgreater restrictions. During May 1943, the Southwest Pacific Area expresslyprohibited the shipment of animals into the United States (28).
5Though the U.S. Departmentof Agriculture, chiefly through its Bureau of Animal Industry, was the Federalagency statutorily responsible to prevent the spread or introduction of animaldisease across State boundary lines and into the United States, its control overthe traffic of animals was limited by the legal definition of "domesticanimal"-the latter not including dogs or cats, which are regarded aschattel. This legal definition with the exclusion of dogs as animals was onlygradually applied because the Bureau of Animal Industry Regulations of 1918 and1919 provided that all dogs coming into the United States would be inspected,especially the collie, shepherd, and sheep dogs which could be quarantinedagainst tapeworm infestation (Taenia coenurus). Then, the Bureau of AnimalIndustry Regulations of 1927 referred only to the inspection of importedcollie, shepherd, or other dogs which were to be used in handling sheep orother livestock.
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Following the cessation ofactive hostilities, the return of the millions of troops which had beendeployed overseas to win the Allied victories over Germany, Italy, and Japan wasaccompanied by the threat of the greatest mass importation of dogs, cats, andtroop mascots in the history of the United States. The existent safeguards,against the chance introduction of new diseases or augmentation to thosediseases already prevalent, were seriously reviewed by Medical Departmentofficers. They described the subject as important not only as it concerned thesafeguarding of the of the Nation's livestock but the protection of its civilian health as well. By October1945, the European theater already had completed arrangements for transportingany number of dogs, cats, and other animals,6 at owners' expense,on commercial transportation facilities (29, 30, 31, 32). As though this was not sufficiently disconcerting, theVeterinary Division, Surgeon General's Office, which had assumed to at leastmaintain a respectable safeguard against animal diseases coming into the UnitedStates, soon found that the Transportation Corps was negotiating with the WarShipping Administration to move animals from areas, particularly those farremoved from normal trade routes or shipping lanes, wherein commercial shippinghad not, or would not, become available (33). At that moment, the SurgeonGeneral's Office appealed to the U.S. Public Health Service to review itsstatutory authorizations and regulatory provisions which might be used to stopor control such importations as would affect the Nation's health, but noassistance was forthcoming at that time (34). Anobvious reason for referring the request to the U.S. PublicHealth Service was that the two, since mid-1943, had been meeting in conference ofan Interdepartmental Quarantine Commission which sought toformulate a coordinated civil and military control over military traffic.7 The U.S. Department ofAgriculture had refused to participate duringthe constructive days of that Commission, when the subject matter underconference study evolved about the aerial traffic of internationally recognizeddiseases of the human being.
During February 1946, theSurgeon General's Office entered into discussions against renewed proposalsby the Transportation Corps to utilize War Shipping Administration vessels tobring out (or import) the pet animals owned by troops located in those certainareas, particularly in the Asiatic?Pacific theaters, that would be outside ofpostwar commercial ship traffic (35). Acquainted with the genuine lack ofcongressional authorization in any or all recognized Federal civilian health anddisease-control agencies to protect the Nation against such animal importations, theSurgeon General's Office could
6An estimate was made that1 percent of the troops returning to the United States would want to importdogs from the European theater.
7The InterdepartmentalQuarantine Commission was formed following an agreement reached between theFederal Security Agency, including the U.S. Public Health Service, and a numberof Federal and military agencies, including the War Department. In July 1943,a medical officer was designated as War Department representative to theCommission-being designated as ArmyQuarantine Liaison Officer. The lattersubsequently established operations within the Surgeon General's Office. In thefall of 1944, the Bureau of Animal Industry, U.S. Department of Agriculture, wasespecially advised of this action in the Surgeon General's Office, but,seemingly, there was no further intercommunication until February 1946.
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not believe that the Armyshould encourage animal traffic into the United States from areas from which few or anyanimals had been imported in the past and that "in theinterests of public health and animal disease control, * * * importation should bediscouraged, particularly as far as the introduction of pets from the Orient isconcerned, where diseases are more rampant, and methods of control arepractically nil" (36). Against these veterinary arguments, theTransportation Corps proposal had the singular advantage that services andfacilities would be equal for all Army troops, whether they were located inthe European theater or were isolated on some island base in the Pacific.
The two aspects of theproblem were compromised on 20 March 1946, when the War Department removed thewartime prohibitions against the transportation of dogs, cats, and other animalpets on Army ships and imposed new requirements for these animals, when cominginto the United States, to be previously immunized against rabies and to bephysically examined and certified to be free of any demonstrable diseases asmight be evidenced by the skin, jaundice, emaciation, diarrhea, or symptomsinvolving the nervous system (37 through 41). These Army veterinary sanitaryrequirements were favorably agreed to by the Deputy Chief of Staff, ArmyService Forces, but not without questioning the moral justification of the Armyas an agency of Government to impose regulatory controls on soldier-owners ofpet animals when such were not legislatively imposed on civilians; also, aquestion arose over the continued need for the Army to assume civil or Federalregulatory functions in the Zone of Interior (42).
In fact, the Army haddemonstrated its willingness to cooperate with the Bureau of Animal Industry,U.S. Department of Agriculture; the Fish and Wildlife Service, U.S. Departmentof the Interior, and the U.S. Public Health Service, Federal Security Agency.However, when advised in February 1946 of the Army's intent to lift itsstringent impositions against the traffic of dogs, cats, and other privatelyowned animals, only the U.S. Public Health Service was sufficiently interestedor able to give promise of action for civilian regulatory control over theirimportation (43, 44, 45). Within a short period of time, the U.S. PublicHealth Service developed a regulatory order-in cooperation with the SurgeonGeneral's Office as well as with representatives of Army Air Forces, the Navy,and other agencies-which wassubsequently (on 29 May 1946) entered intoFederal law (46, 47, 48). There remains no doubt that the Army VeterinaryService alone in the immediate postwar period had successfully intervenedagainst the threatened introduction of additional or new animal diseases intothe United States by the hundreds of privately owned animals belonging tomilitary personnel who were returningfrom the oversea theaters. To date, despite theconfusing multidivision of the Federal civilcontrols against importations that ordinarily precede and comprise the legalbasis of most military quarantine processes in the Zone of Interior, the recordis clear of any blame on the Army that its animal pets
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and troop mascotsconstituted a source of animal disease spread to the Nation's civilian andanimal populations; more significant, however, the fact remains that theNation's health and livestock were protected.
References
1. Durrant, M. J.: WorldWar II History of the Army Veterinary Service, New Caledonia, South PacificArea. [Official record.]
2. Weisman, L. G.: World War II History of the Army Veterinary Service,Southwest Pacific Area. [Official record.]
3. Lawrence, W. A.: World War II History of the Army Veterinary Service,African?Middle East Theater. [Official record.]
4. Mohri, R. W.:World War II History of the Army Veterinary Service, China?Burma-lndiaTheater. [Official record.]
5. Letter, Maj. W. C.Todd, VC, Veterinarian, Mitchel Field, N.Y., to Surgeon, First Air Force, 22 Dec.1943, subject: Veterinary Reports for Farm Animals.
6. Kester, W. O., and Miller, E. B.: World War II History of the Army Veterinary Service, CentralPacific Area. [Official record.]
7. Worthington, J. W.:Personal notes as prisoner of war.
8. Gochenour, W. S.: Personal notes asprisoner of war.
9. Frank, C. W.: Personal notes as prisoner of war.
10. Miller, R. R.: WorldWar II History of the Army Veterinary Service, South Atlantic Theater. [Official record.]
11. Letter, Lt. Col. H. K. Moore, VC, Veterinary Division, SGO, to Veterinarian, Quartermaster RemountDepot, Fort Robinson, Nebr., 12 Dec. 1941, subject: Sanitary Inspection of DairyFarm.
12. Perkins, C. B.: Report,Veterinary Division, Office of the Chief Surgeon, USFET, for first half, 1945.
13. Sperry, J. R., andHuebner, R. A.: World War II History of the Army Veterinary Service, EuropeanTheater. [Official record.]
14. Report of Operations,First U.S. Army, 20 Oct. 1943 to 1 Aug. 1944, Annex 15 to 20.
15. Informal RoutingSlip, Office of the Chief Surgeon, ETOUSA, from Col. C. B. Perkins, VC,Veterinary Division, to Historical Division, 10 Dec. 1944, subject: WeeklyDivisional Activity Report,Week Ending 2400 Hours 9/24/44.
16. Informal Routing Slip,Office of the Chief Surgeon, ETOUSA, Col. C. B. Perkins, VC, VeterinaryDivision, to Historical Division, November 1944, subject: Weekly DivisionalActivity Report, Week Ending 2400 Hours 25/11/44.
17. Anslow, R. O.: World WarII History of the Army Veterinary Service, Civil Affairs/Military Government,European Theater. [Official record.]
18. Todd, F. A.: VeterinaryPreventive Medicine in Civil Affairs and Military Government in NorthwestEurope from D-day to V-day. J. Am. Vet. M. A. 110: 209-212, April 1947.
19. Letter, HQ USFET, 18Oct. 1945, subject: Riding Horses for Recreational Purposes.
20. World War II History ofthe Army Veterinary Service, Mediterranean Theater, for 1943. [Official record.]
21. Bliss, G. D.: Quarterly Medical History, 33d Infantry Division, 1 April-30 June 1945.
22. AR 55-485, Changes 2, 7Jan. 1944.
23. WD General Orders 32, 20 Apr. 1944.
24. WD General Orders 36, 1 May 1944.
674
25. Disposition Form, Col.E. M. Curley, VC, Veterinary Division, Chief Surgeon's Office, ETOUSA, toChief Surgeon, ETOUSA, 6 Aug. 1944, subject: GO #32 WD 20 Apr. 44.
26. Letter,Office of the Chief Surgeon, ETOUSA, to army and base section surgeons, 13 Feb.1945, subject: Transportation of Animals to the United States.
27. Circular No. 78,Headquarters, ETOUSA, 9 June 1945.
28. Circular No. 24, USAFFE, 8 May 1943.
29. TWX S 25959, USFET toWD, 1 Oct. 1945.
30. TWX S 20240, USFET to WD, 25 Oct. 1945.
31. Circular No. 231, HQ Theater Service Forces,USFET, 7 Dec. 1945.
32. Letter, Col. J. R. Sperry, VC, Veterinary Division, Chief Surgeon's Office, ETOUSA, to Col. J. F.Crosby, VC, Veterinary Division, SGO, 22 Dec. 1945.
33. Memo routing slip, Capt. T. E. Shaffer, MC, Acting Army Quarantine Liaison Officer, SGO, toPreventive Medicine and Epidemiology Divisions, SGO, 12 Oct. 1945.
34.Letter, Col. R. J. Carpenter, MC, Executive Officer, SGO, to Surgeon General,U.S. Public Health Service, Federal Security Agency, 15 Oct. 1945, subject:Importation of Pets by Individuals in Military Service, and letter of reply, F.W. Kratz, Foreign Quarantine Service, U.S. Public Health Service, 23 Oct.1945.
35. Memorandum for file,Maj. T. E. Shaffer, MC, Acting Army Quarantine Officer, SGO, 12 Feb. 1946,subject: Transportation of Pets and Mascots.
36. Memorandum, Col.J. F. Crosby, VC, Veterinary Division, SGO, for Lt. Col. Knies, MC, ArmyQuarantine Liaison Officer, Preventive Medicine Division, SGO, 11 Feb. 1946.
37. First memorandum indorsement, Surgeon General's Office to Chief ofTransportation, ASF, 7 Mar. 1946.
38. Radiogram WCL 26588,WD to oversea commands and ports of embarkation in the Zone of Interior, 20 Mar. 1946.
39. Mimeo letter, TheAdjutant General to oversea commands, 29 Mar. 1946, subject: Examinationand Vaccination of Pets and Mascots Prior to Shipment to United States.
40. WD Circular No. 83, 22 Mar. 1946.
41. AR 55-485, Changes 3,21 May 1946.
42. Memorandum, Lt. Col. C.O. Garver, TC, Executive Officer, Administrative Division, Office of theChief of Transportation, for The Surgeon General, 13 Feb. 1946, subject:Importation of Pets and Mascots.
43. Letter, The SurgeonGeneral, to Chief, Bureau of Animal Industry, U.S. Department of Agriculture,14 Feb. 1946, and letter of reply, B. T. Simms, Chief, Bureau of AnimalIndustry, U.S. Department of Agriculture, 18 Feb. 1946.
44. Letter, The SurgeonGeneral, to Director, Fish and Wildlife Service, U.S. Department of theInterior, 14 Feb. 1946, and letter of reply, D. J. Chaney, Chief Counsel, 26Feb. 1946.
45. Letter, The SurgeonGeneral, to Surgeon General, U.S. Public Health Service, Federal SecurityAgency, 14 Feb. 1946, and letter of reply, W. F. Draper, Acting SurgeonGeneral, U.S. Public Health Service, 1 Mar. 1946.
46. Memorandum forfile, Maj. T. E. Shaffer, MC, Acting Army Quarantine LiaisonOfficer, SGO, 21 Feb. 1946, subject:Transportation of Pets and Mascots.
47. Memorandum for file,Maj. T. E. Shaffer, MC, Acting Army Quarantine Liaison Officer, SGO, 28 Feb.1946, subject: Importation of Animals Into the United States.
48. Federal Register, vol.II, No. 105, 29 May 1946.
