CHAPTER XI
Personnel Protective Armor
Maj. James C. Beyer, MC, William F. Enos, M.D.,
and Col. Robert H. Holmes, MC
The development and field usage of helmets and body armor inwarfare before World War II has been adequately documented by a number ofexcellent books and reports.1 Most of these references have been utilized inthe preparation of this chapter, and in many instances they have provided thesole source of available material.2
HELMET DEVELOPMENT
During modern times, the helmet has had a rapid rise ingeneral troop acceptability with remarkably little variation in design. Thefirst protection provided for the head in World War I came about in a purelyfortuitous manner. General Adrian of the French Army noted that a soldier whohad received a head wound due to a rifle bullet explained his escape from deathon the fact that he had carried his metal food bowl under his cloth cap.Therefore, following initial experiments in 1914, steel cap liners ("casqueAdrian") were issued to French troops in 1915 and led to the characteristicWorld War I French helmet in 1916. Many of the other countries soon realized thevalue of a helmet. The British adopted their own design in 1915; the Germans, in1915; and the Belgians and Italians, in 1916.
1(1) Helmets and Body Armor. Handbook of Ordnance compiledby H. T. Wade. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1919, pp. 413-418. (2)Dean, Bashford: Helmets and Body Armor in Modern Warfare. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1920. (3) Dean, Bashford: Helmets andBody Armor-The Medical Viewpoint. In Medical Department of theUnited States Army in the World War. Surgery. Washington: Government PrintingOffice, 1925, vol. XI, pp. 1-8. (4) Helmets and Body Armor, Office of theChief of Ordnance, Washington, 1 June 1945. (5) Gregg, Anne J.: ProjectSupporting Paper No. 44 Relating to Helmets and Body Armor, 1917-August 1945,Ordnance Department, Washington, D.C. (6) Peterson, H. L.: Body Armor in CivilWar. Ordnance 34: 432-433, May-June 1950, (7) Ward, Gordon B.: PersonnelAnti-Fragmentation Equipment. Library of Congress, Technical InformationDivision, Washington, D.C., July 1955. A bibliography, 63 pages.
2The members of the Historical Division, Office of the Chiefof Ordnance, have been most gracious in locating material in their files and inproviding free access to many of the original manuscripts. The illustrations forthis chapter were made available through the complete cooperation of Dr. H. C.Thomson, chief of the Historical Branch, Office of the Chief of Ordnance. Muchof the material pertaining to helmets can only be written in regard to thehistory of the development of a particular helmet model, and there is a greatlack of medical documentation which really should be the sole purpose of thischapter. Therefore, in many ways, the relating of the development of helmets andpersonnel body armor would seem to be more of a history of the participation ofthe Quartermaster Corps and the Ordnance Department rather than the Army MedicalService. However, it is felt that there has been an intimate association andliaison between all of the interested technical services and that the inclusionof this chapter in the present volume follows a natural and logical selection ofmaterials. Full recognition must be offered to the major participation which theQuartermaster Corps and Ordnance Department had in the development of personnelprotective armor, and the inclusion of the Medical Service for consultation andadvice on development of new prototypes has been gratifying.-J. C. B., W. F.E., and R. H. H.
642
Following the decision in 1917 to equip the AmericanExpeditionary Forces with a helmet, 400,000 helmets were initially procuredthrough the British Quartermaster's Department. Subsequently, the same type ofhelmet was manufactured in the United States under the direction of the OrdnanceDepartment, and approximately 2.7 million helmets, M1917, were produced byArmistice day, 1918. The American helmet was a slightly modified version of theBritish MkI helmet. The helmet was made of 13 percent pressed manganese steelalloy, 0.035 inch thick, and could be ruptured only by a blow of 1,600 pounds ormore. The British helmet had twice the ballistic strength of the French helmet.The helmets of British design produced in the United States had an overallballistic strength 10 percent greater than that of the original British helmet.The ballistics specifications of the M1917 helmet required it to resistpenetration by a 230-grain caliber .45 bullet with a velocity of 600 f.p.s.Numerous experimental models were developed to provide (1) additional protectivecoverage; (2) improved ballistic properties; (3) adaptability for specialfunctions, such as machinegunner, tank operator, aviator, and so forth; (4) amore adequate suspension lining; and (5) a distinctive patriotic design. Becauseof the large numbers of helmets of the M1917 design which were produced in theUnited States, none of the experimental models developed by the U.S. ArmyOrdnance Department received adoption before the end of World War I.
In the interval between World Wars I and II, the UnitedStates continued its research and development program on helmets in an attemptto increase the area coverage, to improve the protection ballistics limit (V50or that velocity level at which there is 50 percent probability of a completepenetration of the test ballistic material by the projectile), and tofacilitate troop acceptance by modification of the suspension system. Changesdesigned to improve the first two factors required careful consideration inorder to be compatible with the weight and comfort limitation imposed by othertesting technical services. Concurrent with the changes in weapon design werethe demands for modification in the helmet specifications. With the advent ofnew weapons in the hands of belligerent countries, countermeasures can followseveral patterns, such as increasing firepower to overcome the advantages of thenew weapon, developing specific antitype weapons, or producing interim personnelprotective devices.
Between 1918 and 1934, interest and progress in helmetdevelopment were maintained by the Ordnance Department and the Infantry Board.Following a series of experimental models (the model 5A was of pot-shaped designand received extensive testing before it was discontinued in 1932) and tests, itwas recommended in 1934 that the M1917 helmet with a modified lining of ahair-filled pad be standardized as Helmet, M1917A1 (fig. 304). The final end itemwith an adjustable headpad weighed 2 pounds and 6 ounces.
A lull in helmet development occurred in the period from 1934to 1940 when the first draft call was issued. With the resurge of military lifeand expenditures, new overtures were made to American industrial firms and to
643
the Metropolitan Museum of Art in New York in an attempt toimprove the protective coverage and ballistic limit of the M1917A1 and to takeadvantage of recent advances in steel alloy manufacture, liner materials, andmass production methods. In addition, a two-piece helmet was considereddesirable to meet the increasing variety and complexity of tactical and climaticconditions.
The following quotation from one of the reports of theInfantry Board reveals the natural evolution of the new helmet from theoriginal M1917 design:
The ideal shaped helmet is one with a dome-shaped topfollowing the full contour of the head and supplying uniform headroom forindentation, extending down the front to cover the forehead without impairingvision and down the sides as far as possible to be compatible with the rifle,etc., and down the back as far as possible without pushing the helmet forwardwhen in a prone position, and with a frontal plate flanged forward as acap-style visor and the sides and rear flanged outward to deflect rain from thecollar opening.
Therefore, the M1917 model was considered suitable forprotecting the top of the head and by removing its brim, by addingsidepieces and rearpieces, and by incorporating the suspension system into aseparate inner liner, the World War II Army helmet came into being.3 Theoriginal test item was known as the TS3, and it received a favorable report fromthe Infantry Board in February 1941.
The Army M1 helmet (fig. 305) was standardized on 30 April1941 and was approved on 9 June 1941. It was of two-piece design with an outerHadfield steel shell and a separate inner liner containing the suspensionsystem. The complete item weighed approximately 3 pounds, with the outer shellaccounting for approximately 2.3 pounds and the inner liner, 0.7 pound.
3Studler, R. R.: The New Combat Helmet. Army Ordnance No.132, 22: 933-934, May-June 1942.
644
Ballistic protection was afforded only by the Hadfieldmanganese steel outer shell with the plastic-impregnated fabric liner serving asa light-weight headpiece outside of the frontline area and facilitating theattachment of the suspension system. Various utilitarian functions were alsoascribed to the outer steel shell. The ballistics properties of the outer shellhad been improved so that it would resist penetration by a 230-grain caliber .45bullet with a velocity of 800 f.p.s. The Riddell type of suspension (fig. 305C)used in football helmets was modified for the inner liner. The principle of theoriginal Riddell suspension did not contain an adjustable headband, and thisfeature was developed for the helmet liner. The M1 helmet was a markedimprovement over former models (fig. 306) since it furnished increasedcoverage (fig. 307) over the sides and back of the head and provided a morecomfortable fit with the partial elimination of the "rocking" tendencyof the older helmets. Following adoption of the M1 helmet, the OrdnanceDepartment retained development and procurement of the outer steel shell and theQuartermaster Department made development and production progress of the innerliner and suspension system.
During the course of the North African campaigns in 1943, therigid hook fastener of the chinstrap was found to be a source of potentialdanger by remaining intact under the impact of a blast wave resulting from anearby detonation and thereby jerking the head sharply and violently with theproduction of fractures or dislocations of the cervical vertebras. Therefore, itwas necessary to redesign the helmet strap with a ball-and-clevis release sothat it would remain closed during normal combat activities but would allow for.a quick voluntary release or automatic release at pressures considerably belowthe accepted level of danger. Following extensive tests by ordnance engineers, anew release device was developed which would release at a pull of 15 pounds ormore. This device (fig. 308) was standardized in 1944
645
The M1 helmet was the standard item of issue to groundtroops, Army and Marine, during World War II and the Korean War. Before thestandardization of the M1 helmet, 904,020 M1917A1 helmet bodies weremanufactured from January to August 1941. During the period from August 1941 toAugust 1945, 22,363,015 M1 helmets were produced. Troop acceptability was fairlyhigh, but a common complaint, was the lack of stability of the helmet. Thisproblem had its origin, in good part, from the type of ballistic test inpractice at the time the helmet was being developed. The caliber .45 pistol ballwas the major test weapon, and this type of projectile with its soft lead coreand thin gliding-metal jacket will deform easily against the Hadfield steel.When the helmet causes the defeat of this missile at service-weapon velocities,it will be deeply indented, and it was deemed necessary to allow a 1-inch offset
646
between the helmet and the head. However, battle casualtysurvey studies during World Wars I and II and the Korean War have shown that theprimary wounding agent among the WIA and the KIA casualties was thefragmentation-type weapon. The World War II experiences are universal except forthe surveys of some of the Pacific island campaigns where small arms missilesaccounted for a greater proportion of casualties. After World War II, fragmentsimulators in a range of 5 calibers were widely used in ballistics evaluationtests of prospective ballistic materials for helmets and body armor. Theadvisability or necessity of the present 1-inch helmet offset requires athorough investigation and evaluation in the development of any new helmet.
A suitable offset will always be necessary to counteract thedenting of a metallic helmet or the transient deformation of a nonmetallichelmet, but the prime objective of any protective military headgear is toprevent the entrance of missiles into the cranial cavity. This entrance might beprevented over a
647
wider range of missile weights and velocities by modificationof the present offset concept in helmet design. The missile defeat might resultin skull fractures in a number of casualties, but the skull fracture type ofinjury is amenable to successful treatment by the neurosurgeon.
Despite the widespread use of the M1 helmet by all the U.S.fighting forces during World War II, no definite survey was ever conducted toobtain an accurate evaluation of the value of the helmet. Numerous investigatorsin various surveys and separate publications in medical journalsallude to the undoubted value of the Ml helmet in preventing a. considerablenumber of deaths and nonfatal wounds in ground troops. However, because of themarked variability of collection methods and evaluation techniques of theinvestigators, it is most difficult to derive an accurate correlation based onsound statistical methods.
FIGURE 308.-Ball-and-clevis release for chinstrap ofM1helmet.
Some aspects of the value of the M1 helmet are discussed byBeebe and DeBakey in their book on battle casualties.4 More recently,Norman Hitchman5 of the Army's Operations Research Office reviewed some ofthe World War II casualty statistics and reached some important and timelyconclusions regarding the value of wearing a helmet in combat. The followingobservations resulted from this statistical analysis:
1. Of all hits upon the helmet, 54 percent were defeated.
2. For every 100 men wounded while wearing helmets, 9.6 menreceived wounds in the cranium. Without the helmet, it would be expected that11.4 men would be wounded in the head.
3. The M1 helmet prevented a number of incapacitating hitsequal to 10 percent of the total hits on the body.
4Beebe, Gilbert W., and DeBakey, Michael F.: BattleCasualties. Springfield: Charles C. Thomas, 1952, p. 176.
5Hitchman, N. A.: Keep Your Head . . . Keep Your Helmet.Army 8:42-44, September 1957.
648
4. The estimated savings in total battle casualties meansthat the helmet in World War II probably prevented wounds in more than 70,000men. A significant proportion of these men would have been killed had the helmetnot been worn.
5. To get the same amount of saving by protecting otherregions, body armor weighing more than twice as much as the helmet would have tobe provided.
The numerous casualty surveys conducted during the Korean Warprovide more accurate anatomic localization of wounds in the head region coveredby the helmet as related to the total head, face, and neck region, but again itwas not always possible accurately to determine whether the man was wearing ahelmet at the time of wounding. One survey was conducted by Capt. George B. Coe,Cm1C, in an attempt to determine more accurately the relationship betweenincidence of head wounds and the wearing of the helmet. One interestingobservation was related where men wearing the helmet would assume a proneposition to escape missiles from a mortar or an artillery shell and uponstriking the ground the helmet would be released from the head and they wouldsustain a head wound from a second group of shells detonating in the same area.
Accurate information regarding the exact value of the helmetas a protective device is of vital importance in the training and indoctrinationof troops. If it can be graphically shown that the helmet is a main line ofdefense against the greater proportion of projectiles commonly encountered onthe battlefield, troop acceptability might be higher. Against the cast ironfragmentation projectiles which were commonly used by the North Korean andChinese Communist Armies during the Korean War, the M1 helmet probably gave abetter performance than with the steel fragments which predominated during theWorld War II fighting. The relatively soft and brittle character of the castiron fragments would lend itself to low hardness and toughness and to greaterease of refragmentation and defeat upon impact against the helmet. The U.S. highexplosive shell fragment has an average Rockwell "C" hardness of 29-31and the Soviet cast iron shell fragment has a hardness of 8-14.
Research programs following the Korean War have been directedtoward an increase in both the ballistic protection limit and the troopacceptability under varied combat conditions. A multiplicity of factors must bereconciled and coordinated in order efficiently to effect significant changes ineither of these properties. World War II investigations proved the efficacy ofnonmetallic ballistic materials (nylon and doron) alone or in conjunction withmetallic outer shells, but satisfactory field tests were not completed beforethe termination of hostilities in Korea. With the recent success of theseplastics in the body armor developed for ground forces during the Koreanfighting, increased emphasis has been given to all forms of research bearingupon helmet development and design.
Notwithstanding the respectable performance of the M1 helmetduring World War II and the Korean War, continued improvement should be activelysupported. The doldrums of peacetime can prove very lethal to worthwhile
649
and unspectacular research programs directed toward thedevelopment of items of equipment where the present standard items might appearacceptable. Any new helmet, regardless of its V50 superiority, will have topass the ultimate test of combat troop acceptance, and this is primarilydependent upon the fit and stability of the helmet. The frontline combatantmust be indoctrinated and impressed with the protective integrity and necessityof the helmet and equally with the ease and comfort with which it can be worn.Therefore, this is one field of military design where correct tailoring shouldbe obtained commensurate with the imposed limits of the protective ballisticmaterials. Certain testing procedures on newer experimental helmets wouldappear to have been excessively delayed, and active aggressive interest in theproblem has frequently dropped to a very low level.
HELMET DESIGN
Ground Troop Models
In addition to the M1 helmet, a variety of other designs weredeveloped by the Ordnance Department during World War II. These will bediscussed in the paragraphs to follow.
Helmet, steel, M1C (Parachutist's).-This helmet (fig.309) included a modification of the M1 liner (Liner, Helmet, M1, Parachutist's)with a special chinstrap which insured that the helmet would stay on during theopening shock and descent of the parachute. This liner chinstrap was providedwith a chin cup, and two snap fasteners secured the steel shell to correspondingfasteners on the inside of the liner and prevented the separation of the twocomponents during parachute jumping. The regular helmet shell chinstrap was wornbehind the head. This item was standardized in January 1945, and 392,000 helmetswere produced during the period from January to April 1943.
Helmet, T14 series (Signal Corps).-This was anexperimental series of helmets designed to provide the combat Signal Corpsphotographer with maximum protection under extreme operating conditions. Thestandard M1 helmet restricted necessary movement and adjustments of still andmotion picture cameras and prompted the dangerous habit of removing the helmetwhile being exposed to enemy fire. In May 1944, the Signal Corps proposed thatthe front segment of the M1 helmet be cut away and an adjustable, hinged visorflap be placed over the cutaway area. The Ordnance Department prepared testmodels which did not gain wide acceptance during field tests in the Europeantheater. One objection was due to the fact that, when the visor was locked inits upright position, the helmet bore a superficial resemblance to the Germanhelmet. The Metropolitan Museum of Art incorporated this problem in their workon a helmet for the Armed Forces and developed several promising models.Cessation of hostilities in 1945 prevented the completion of an end item.
650
FIGURE 309.-Helmet, Steel, M1C (Parachutist's).
Helmets, T19 and T20 series (Tank).-In November 1940,Headquarters, Armored Force, Fort Knox, Ky., requested the cooperation of theOrdnance Department in modifying the then existing tank helmets to make themmore compatible with the varied functions and hazards of tank crewmen.Concurrently, the Quartermaster Corps was engaged in a design of a new tankcrash helmet which would offer protection from blows to the head. In 1944,subsequent correspondence requested that the tank helmet designs embody (1) aliner, incorporating a crash-type suspension, over which could be fitted amodified M1 ballistic shell and (2) the ballistic steel shell with an integralcrash-type suspension. The proposed military characteristics required that thehelmet would (1) protect the wearer from blows to the head during maneuvers overrough grounds, (2) be relatively light in weight with a comfortable fit, (3)permit full access to and the usage of various sighting devices, (4) permitwearing of radio headsets, (5) allow the forehead of the wearer to rest directlyagainst the tank headrest, and (6) be capable of furnishing either ballistic orcrash (bump) protection.
The Ordnance Department developed six experimental series,and the Metropolitan Museum of Art evaluated the models in accordance with theArmed Forces specifications. Series T8 incorporated a ballistic helmet with acrash suspension and T9 provided a ballistic cover for the existing tank crashmodels (fig. 310). During this same period (1944), extensive work had resultedin a number of prototypes of flyer's helmets, and certain of these wereconsidered as being adaptable to the needs of the combat tank crewmen. The T10series
651
FIGURE 310.-Tank crash helmets in use in November 1941.
(fig. 311A) was very similar to the helmet, T9, but providedan associated crash suspension in the steel shell. Helmet, T12 (fig. 311B) wasbased directly on the Helmet, M3 (Flyer's) with an internal crash suspension,and T13 (fig. 311C) was prepared without the latter feature and was designed tofit over a cut down M1 liner. The T16 (fig. 311D) series was a modified M3 flyer'shelmet with a reduction in certain dimensions to bring it within the limitationsof the requisite military characteristics.
Between October and December 1944, helmets of the T10, T12,T13, and T16 series were tested by the Armored Force Board, Fort Knox, Ky. Allthe samples were found to be excessive in weight and overall dimensions andincompatible with the operation of the various sighting devices. The extensiveoffset and posterior extension of the helmets were developed to accommodate theradio headset and to provide adequate neck protection, respectively.
In 1944 and 1945, a coordinated effort of the OrdnanceDepartment and the Quartermaster Corps was directed toward the development of anacceptable modification of the M1 helmet shell to be used with the crashsuspension-type M1 liner. Helmet, T19E1 (fig. 312) was derived from an M1 helmetshell. Changes in its contour permitted the use of various optical equipmentwhile allowing the helmet to be used in conjunction with the new quartermaster
652
FIGURE 311.-Series of helmets. A.T10. B. T12. C. T13.D. T16.
liner which offered bump protection and clearance for theheadsets. An unfavorable report on this helmet was rendered in May 1945 becauseof the instability of the helmet-liner combination.
After this work on the T19E1 helmet, helmets T20 and T20E1,produced in sample lots, incorporated a head suspension directly within theT19E1 ballistic shell. Finally, the T19E2 and T20E2 series evolved and werebased upon a new contour design developed at the Armored Medical ResearchLaboratory. Definitive reports on these four items were not available before thecessation of hostilities in World War II. However, the consensus was to theeffect that further attempts to produce a helmet for use in tanks bymodifications of the standard M1 helmet should be abandoned and that the searchshould be directed toward a completely new and specific tank helmet design. Morerecent advances in the design of helmets for crewmen of combat vehicles
653
have made increasing use of nonmetallic ballistic materialsand have attempted to provide a headgear with high user acceptability andpossessing primary bump protection and secondary ballistic protection. Figure313 illustrates the present combat vehicle crewman's helmet. The followinginformation on this helmet was released on 25 February 1958 by the PublicInformation Division, Office of the Chief of Information and Education,Department of the Army:
Tank crewmen will have the first helmet specifically designedfor their protection when mass protection tests of a new helmet developed by theU.S. Army Quartermaster Corps are completed. Up to the present time, tanksoldiers have worn either the standard M-1 Steel Helmet with liner or footballhelmets, none of which met their requirements. The new helmet, officiallydesignated Combat Vehicle Crewman's (CVC) Helmet, is constructed ofmulti-layers of laminated nylon fabric, and has a built-in communications systemdeveloped by the U.S. Army Signal Corps. The total assembly weighs about threepounds. Nylon employed in its construction is similar to that of the Army'sarmor vest. Mounted outside the helmet, the communications equipment includes amicrophone on an adjustable boom, a three-way switch for listening or talking byradio or through the tank's intercommunications system, and a cable with aquick-disconnect plug for emergency evacuation from the vehicle. Inside thehelmet, snug-fitting earphones reduce outside noise and help guard the earsagainst injury.
Helmets, T21-24 (ground troops).-Throughout theWorld War II period, investigative work continued in an attempt to improve thestandard M1 helmet. In conjunction with the Ordnance Department and the AeroMedical Labora-
654
FIGURE 313.-Combat vehicle crewman's helmet, February 1958.
tory, at Wright Field, Ohio, the Metropolitan Museum of Artdesigned the T21, T22, and T23 series.
The T21 (fig. 314) was patterned after the crown of Helmet,M5 (Flyer's), but without the earflaps and with a brim contour based on the M1shell. Its shape had been established through anthropometric studies of thehuman head (fig. 315) and provided a curvature in all directions at all pointson the body of the helmet. This latter feature was purported to provide adecrease in the size of the helmet with no sacrifice in area coverage whileincreasing the strength and protection beyond previously possible limits. The shell weighed 2 pounds and 2 ounces and was to be worn withtheconventional inner plastic liner.
Helmet T22 was smaller than T21, was a one-piece unitincorporating a head suspension, and was designed to be worn without a liner.Conversely, the T23 was larger in size than the T21 and permitted the use ofthicker liners. In the interim between 1945 and the outbreak of the Korean War,modifications of the series just mentioned and additional new series weredeveloped but none obtained approval or standardization.
Shortly after the adoption of the M1 helmet, variousinvestigations revealed that other materials might possess superior ballisticprotective limits
655
FIGURE 314.-Ground troop helmet, T21.
and that these materials might obviate certain metallurgicaland production difficulties inherent in the Hadfield manganese steel. In 1942,a one-piece helmet was fabricated from the resin-impregnated glass fiberlaminate known as doron (p. 682). At this time, doron was under considerationprimarily for use in a proposed nonmetallic helmet for civil defense workers,but subsequent tests by interested military agencies showed that existingprototypes did not stand up well when exposed to the rigors of combat life.
Aluminum and nylon in combination had received extensiveballistic testing in the development of body armor for ground troops and flyers,and by 1945 samples of helmets utilizing these materials were being produced.Coupled with the high degree of protection against fragmentation-type weaponswas the additional possibility of furnishing equivalent coverage to the Mlhelmet with an appreciable reduction in weight. Therefore, the T24 helmet wasproduced consisting of an outer aluminum shell, modeled after the M1, with aninner laminated-nylon liner. Despite the cessation of World War II hostilities,the helmets were tested and deficiencies noted in the ability of the nyloninsert to resist delamination and warpage. The T21E utilized the aluminum andnylon elements but was based upon the contour pattern of the T21. This patternhad evolved from scientific anthropometric studies of the human head andpermitted a lower silhouette and closer fit than the M1 design. At the presenttime (1958), the Helmet, M1, is still the standard item of issue to Armyground troops.
656
FIGURE 315.-Aero Medical Laboratory standard head models.
Flyer's Models (World War II)
Despite the fact that the development of protective devicesfor air forces combat personnel in World War II is somewhat beyond the scope ofthis volume, it is believed that a brief discussion of the development of someof the helmet models is very appropriate since many of the problems which wereencountered were very similar to those seen in the development of certainforms for ground force personnel. The complete story of the development ofprotective devices for air force personnel has been written by Link and Coleman.6This work should be consulted by all those who are interested in the medicalparticipation in the development of helmets and body armor in the Army AirForces in World War II.
By 1943, it had become very apparent that the standard Armyhelmet required redesigning to make it adaptable to the needs of air forcescombat personnel.7 Similar in nature but more extensive in scope,the problem
6Link, Mae M., and Coleman, Hubert A.: Medical Supportof Army Air Forces in World War II. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1955, pp. 617-635.
7In 1943, Col. Loyal Davis, MC, senior consultant inneurological surgery in the Office of the Chief Surgeon, European Theater ofOperations, U.S. Army, found that the regular issue steel helmet furnishedexcellent protection against craniocerebral injuries for the soldier but that itdid not provide the same excellent protection for crews of aircraft. He realized the necessity for a helmet designed specifically for air force combat personnel.For an account of his efforts to obtain a helmet, designed for this personnel,which would allow free and unrestricted movements, would not interfere in anyway with the field of vision, would be lightweight and afford protection fromheat and cold, and, most important, would provide protection, at least equal tothat afforded by the regular issue steel helmet, against craniocerebralinjuries, see chapter IV in "Medical Department, United States Army,Surgery in World War II. Surgical Consultants. Volume II." [Inpreparation.] See also Davis, L.: A Helmet for Protection Against Craniocerebral Injuries. Surg. Gynec. & Obst. 79: 89-91, July 1944.-J. C. B.
657
paralleled the work performed for the Armored Forces. Combatairmen were faced with the situation of wearing oxygen masks and goggles andearphones but still requiring some ballistic protective device for the head.Before an acceptable helmet was available, 35.7 percent of unarmored bombercombat crews sustained lethal wounds in the head region. After introduction ofthe "Grow helmet" or M4 helmet, this number was substantially reduced.A few of the helmet models which were developed and standardized are discussed inthe paragraphs which follow.
Helmet, steel, T2 (Flyer's), standardized as Helmet, M3.-Thiswas a direct modification of the M1 steel helmet shell with an associatedadjustable head suspension and cutaway on each side of the helmet body toaccommodate earphones. A hinged earplate provided protection over the cutawayearphone area. Because of the immediate need for a flyer's helmet, the T2received extended service tests and was eventually standardized in December 1943as Helmet, M3 (fig. 316). This helmet weighed 3 pounds and 3 ounces. Between December 1943 and April 1945, 213,543 helmets of this type wereproduced. During its development, it was recognized that this type of helmetwas unsuitable for a number of confined combat stations where a closelyfitting skullcap type of helmet was necessary.
FIGURE 316.-Flyer's Helmet, M3.
Helmet, steel, T3 (Flyer's), standardized as Helmet, M4.-Duringthe early part of 1943, the Eighth Air Force had combat tested a skullcaptype of helmet, and the Ordnance Department proceeded to develop prototypesbased
658
upon this design and field experience. By September 1943, this model was being tested in conjunction with the T2 model. It consisted ofoverlapping Hadfield steel plates which were enclosed in cloth pockets andmounted in the skullcap cover of fabric and leather. Openings were available onthe lateral aspect of the helmet to permit the wearing of headphones.Notwithstanding the decreased protective coverage of this helmet, it could beworn in the restricted space of aircraft turrets where a larger one would notbe acceptable. This helmet was standardized as Helmet, M4, in December 1943(fig. 317A). It weighed 2 pounds and 1 ounce. In February 1944, it wasrecommended that the length of the M4 be increased to provide an adequate fitover all types of summer and winter leather flying helmets.
Helmet, T3E3 (Flyer's), standardized as Helmet, M4A1.-Shortlyafter the M4 became standard issue, it was apparent that armoredearplates were required, and a number of experimental models were developed andtested. Finally, by April 1943, the T3E3 was adopted to replace the M4 and wasstandardized as the M4A1 (fig. 317B). It differed from the M4 by having a slightincrease in length and by being equipped with attached metal earplates over thetemporal regions. This helmet weighed 2 pounds and 12 ounces. A method was alsodevised to equip the existing M4 helmets with a fitted hood containing metalearplates. In addition, the M4A1 was later modified (M4A2) to improve theattachment of the earplates and to increase its compatibility with other flyinggear. After the adoption of the newer model, a considerable number ofexperimental helmets were developed and tested in a continuing effort to producea universal air force helmet with extended area coverage, increased protectiveballistics limits, wearer acceptability, and compatibility with associatedflying goggles and headphones. Because of fabrication difficulties with theoverlapping steel plates in M4 helmet series, emphasis was centered upon aone-piece closely fitting helmet bowl with attached earplates. In addition tothe Hadfield manganese steel, a number of other metallic materials wereconsidered, and at one time aluminum seemed to provide the promising combinationof comparable ballistic protection at a somewhat lower weight. However, duringWorld War II, Hadfield steel continued to be the principal ballistic materialfor helmets.
Helmet, steel, T8 (Flyer's), standardized as Helmet, M5.-Thehelmet, T6E4, had a single steel bowl with no associated suspension system,fitted close to the head, and had large hinged earflaps. It was a most promisingmodel, and future modifications originated from the T6 series. The T8 modelswere based upon the specifications of the T6E4 but incorporated numerous designchanges which increased its acceptability over previous models. The helmetconsisted of a one-piece steel bowl with a head suspension system and hingedearplates or cheekplates which extended down on to the sides of the face inline with the leather flyer's helmet. The usual webbing suspension system wasaugmented by a nape strap that held the front of the helmet against the foreheadso that there would be no interference with vision. The cheekplates permittedthe wearing of earphones and goggles. One additional mod-
659
FIGURE 317.-Flyer'shelmets. A. M4. B. M4A1.C. M5.
ification provided a slight roll to the back of the helmetto reduce the possibility of injury to the neck region during crashlandings. InJanuary 1945, the T8 was standardized as Helmet, M5 (fig. 317C), and wasdesignated for all combat aircraft positions except the upper turret gunner ofthe A-20 and the ringsight gunner of the B-29. The M4A2 was still used in the two positions just mentioned. The M5 helmet weighed 2 pounds and 12 ounces.Between February and August 1945, 93,495 helmets of this type were produced.
During the period from October 1943 to July 1944, numerousdesigns for face armor were studied concurrently with the development of flyers'helmets. Most of the models were intended to be worn in conjunction with thehelmet and were to provide protection over the lower part of the face, theneck, and the oxygen mask. Both metallic (fig. 318) and nonmetallic materialswere tested. The project was suspended in 1944 because of the lack ofspecific requirement for this type of armor.
660
FIGURE 318.-Face armor (T6 type) designed to be worn inconjunction with the flyer's helmet.
BODY ARMOR
"Body armor is not new."8 Some form of personnelprotective device has probably been used in every war which has been recordedin the pages of history.
During the Civil War,9 anumber of types ofprotective shields and breastplates were developed by interested parties, andsome of these were considered for possible official military usage. However, nostandard official form of armor was available, and all forms were purchased byindividual soldiers. Two types have been described as being most popular amongUnion soldiers. These consisted of the "Soldiers' Bullet Proof Vest"manufactured by the G. & D. Cook & Company of New Haven, Conn.,and the second most popular
8I have used this simple statement as the introductoryremarkin numerous lectures given on the subject of the history of body armor, and itcertainly expresses the course of body armor development in modern times.-W.F. E.
9See footnote 1 (6), p. 641.
661
type of breastplate was manufactured by the Atwater ArmorCompany, also of New Haven. Both types consisted of metallic ballistic materialmade up of a number of steel plates. The product from the Cook & Companyconsisted of two pieces of steel inserted into pockets in a regular blackmilitary vest. The infantry vest weighed 3? pounds, and another model forcavalry and artillery weighed 6 pounds. The purchase price of a vest for anofficer was $7 and for that of a private was $5. The Atwater armor consisted offour large plates of steel held in position on the body by broad metal hooksover the shoulders and a belt around the waist. In addition, smaller piecescould be attached to the bottom of this cuirass. This vest was heavier thanthe Cook models and cost approximately twice as much. The supply of thesefinished commercial products was augmented by specimens of armor apparently ofindividual manufacture by some local blacksmith.
During the course of his investigations, Dr. Bashford Dean ofthe Metropolitan Museum of Art was able to test the Atwater armorplate and foundthat it would defeat a jacketed bullet fired from a caliber .45 pistol at adistance of 10 feet. In his short but excellent discussion of body armor in theCivil War, Harold L. Peterson felt that the chief factors in the discontinuanceof body armor at that time were the inconvenience due to the extra weight andbulk and the marked ridicule of those individuals who were wearing the armor bytheir comrades who did not avail themselves of the protection.
Dr. Dean in his "Helmets and Body Armor in ModernWarfare" presents a complete account of the history of body armor duringWorld War I. Most of the participating countries developed various forms ofprotective devices for the torso and the extremities, but the excessive weightor lack of adequate protection restricted their general use in combat. Some formof body armor was seen on all fronts from 1915 through 1918, but only onexperimental basis, and body armor was never in general usage. The mostsuccessful use of armor was by sentinels, members of patrols, and stationarymachinegun crews. Despite the relative low troop acceptability because ofexcessive weight, it was generally believed that these forms of personnel armorhad great potential value.
General Adrian who was instrumental in developing the Frenchhelmet was also interested in a number of other devices, including an abdominalshield, a breastplate, and leg armor. Some of the medical officersinvestigating the casualties of British forces through the year 1916 indicatedthat more than three-quarters of the wounded men could have been saved if someform of armor had been worn. This assumption was based upon a study of the typeof wounds (penetrating rather than perforating) and the preponderance ofcausative missiles being derived from fragmentation-type weapons (eithershrapnel or shell fragment). Similar statistics were derived from studies ofFrench casualties where it was believed that 60 to 80 percent of all wounds wereproduced by missiles of low to medium velocity.
Maj. Charles H. Peck, MC, Assistant Director, SurgicalService, American Expeditionary Forces stated: "Wounds caused by missilesof medium and low
662
velocity constitute about 80 percent of all." Therefore,numerous test models were developed by the Ordnance Department and a few ofthese did reach the stage of field testing, but no final standardization wasever achieved.
The British were interested not only in metallic but also innonmetallic ballistic material. They developed a silk-lined necklet which waspurported to stop a 230-grain pistol ball at 600 f.p.s. However, the primarymaterials, extremely difficult to obtain, deteriorated very rapidly under combat conditions and were considered costly ($25). In addition, the Britishalso studied a 6-pound body shield that was approximately 1 inch thick and wasmade of many layers of linen, cotton, and silk hardened by a resinous material.Certain responsible military authorities were also convinced of the possiblepotential value of body armor, and in 1917 General Pershing said: "Effortshould be continued toward development of a satisfactory form of personal bodyarmor."
In the interim between 1918 and the onset of World War II, experimentation in body armor materials and design was maintained at a verylow level. However, in conjunction with its general program of developing andtesting ballistic materials, the Ordnance Department was aware of thepossibilities of certain materials' being utilized for a protective garmentfor the individual soldier.
In the fall of 1941, the British Army was producing a modelof body armor in preparation for a field test, and samples of this model werefurnished to the United States. The armor weighed 2 pounds and 12 ounces andconsisted of three plates of 1 mm. thick manganese steel. Two plates were to beworn over the front and one over the back of the body. In addition, the OrdnanceDepartment was considering two other forms of British body armor; namely, theArmorette and the Wisbrod Armored Vest. The Armorette was composed of metalplates embedded in a vulcanized rubber-duck foundation which imparted a highdegree of flexibility to the model. The Wisbrod vest utilized cloth-coveredsteel plates which overlapped to provide protection to the front of the thoraxand abdomen. Both of these latter two models had been under consideration sincethe early part of 1941. The models were studied by various testing boards of theinterested technical services, but all reports indicated that any advantages ofsuch armor would be very slight as compared to the overall loss of combatefficiency and to the increase in the soldier's carrying load. Therefore,individual body armor for ground troops seemed to be a military luxury whichcould not be indulged in during an all-out global conflict, and there was noapparent requirement for a standard item of issue. This latter decision wasofficially reached in November 1942 and led to some decline in the overallinterest and developmental program for body armor for ground troops. But shortlyafter this, an extensive program was initiated for the development of protectivearmor for the Air Forces. It is of some interest to note that in April 1943 anendorsement was written to the Army Air Forces by the Army Ordnance Departmentin which it was felt that body armor for general use by ground troops had beenrejected because of the apparent loss of mobility of the troops and that anapplication might well be considered for
663
combat Air Forces personnel. It was felt that ballisticprotection could be provided either by use of personnel body armor or by use ofplates or curtains which might be placed in strategic places within theaircraft.
Air Forces (World War II)
The history of the development and usage of body armor bycombat crewmen of the Army Air Forces during World War II is adequatelydiscussed in the publication by Link and Coleman. The development of these itemswas so intimately connected with various casualty surveys-some of which arereported in this volume-and by research work of the Army Ordnance Departmentthat a brief r?sum? would be appropriate in this chapter. No attempt will bemade to give a complete coverage of all items and the rationale behind theirdevelopment, but the more important models will be described since many of thesebear a very close relation to subsequent development for Army ground troops.
The initial impetus to the development of body armor for theAmerican flyer was due to the research and field testing which the British hadperformed in an attempt to develop some form of personnel armor for their groundtroops operating in North Africa. Subsequent to this, in early October 1942, ananalysis of wounds incurred by U.S. Eighth Air Force combat personnel revealedthat approximately 70 percent were due to relatively low velocity missiles. Inone survey involving 303 casualties and conducted before the adoption of bodyarmor, it was found that flak fragments were responsible for 38 percent of thewounds; 20 mm. cannon shell fragments, 39 percent; machine-gun bullets, 15percent; and secondary missiles, 8 percent. A later survey of 1,293 casualtiesrevealed a similar breakdown of missiles. In addition, it seemed that protectionprovided to the regions of the chest and abdomen would bring about the highestrate of return in reducing both fatalities (mortality) and total numbers of hits(morbidity).
Therefore, it appeared to Col. (later Brig. Gen.) Malcolm C.Grow, MC, then surgeon of the Eighth Air Force, that some type of body armormight serve to protect aircrew members and save a considerable number of livesamong the combat crews. The initial consideration of a ballistic material wasbased upon previous British experiments which had revealed that a manganesesteel plate 1 mm. in thickness would resist penetration of a caliber .303 bulletat a velocity of approximately 1,250 f.p.s. In addition, this material wasshatterproof, had high resistance, and was comparatively light in weight. Afterdeciding on this ballistic material, Colonel Grow, in association with theWilkinson Sword Company, Ltd., of London, formulated plans for a vest made up ofoverlapping plates of manganese steel. These 2-inch square Hadfield steel plateswere secured in pockets and sewed to a backing of flax canvas. Preliminarytesting of the armor was so favorable that Lt. Gen. Carl Spaatz, CommandingGeneral, Eighth Air Force, approved the recommendation on 15 October 1942 forthe order of 10 suits of armor for experimental testing. Following this,
664
sufficient armor for crews of 12 B-17's were ordered andreceived about 1 March 1943. Later, Lt. Gen. Ira C. Eaker who had assumedcommand of the Eighth Air Force directed that sufficient armor be produced inEngland to equip all heavy bombers located there and also recommended that armorsuits be provided for all heavy bomber units destined for the Eighth Air Force.
The original armor provided complete protection for theanterior and posterior aspects of the thorax. The vest was placed across theshoulder and fastened by closing the dot fasteners over one shoulder. Inaddition to the vest, a sporran apron section was suspended from the vest byfasteners and provided protection for the abdomen, crotch, and part of the lowerextremities. A number of models were made to be worn by various crew members,depending upon their position and function in the aircraft. The pilot andcopilot wore a half vest only in the front, and bombardiers, navigators, andgunners wore full vests to secure both front and back protection. A full-widthsporran was for men who had to stand during the performance of their combatduty. Other forms were tapered toward the bottom. The full vest weighed 16pounds; half vest, 7 pounds; full sporran, 6? pounds; and taperedsporran, 4? pounds. The armor was made to wear over all other clothing andequipment and eventually was constructed so that the complete suit could bequickly jettisoned (fig. 319) by pulling a ripcord.
Numerous casualty surveys10 conducted at various timesfollowing the introduction of flyer's armor showed a variable reduction in thetotal wounds incurred and in the number of fatal wounds over the parts of thebody protected by armor. Despite the variability expressed by the varioussurveys, they all showed one thing in common; namely, that flak suits for combatcrewmen were a highly successful and valuable adjunct in decreasing the totalnumber of wounds and the number of lethal wounds in the thoracoabdominal region.
Surveys conducted among heavy bomber combat crew membersbefore and after the adoption of body armor showed the following results. Thesurveys in the period before the use of body armor were conducted from Marchthrough September 1943. The period of survey after the use of body armor wasfrom November 1943 to May 1944. During the March through September 1943 period,137,130 combat crew members went on bombing missions, and 746 casualtiesresulted with a total of 896 wounds. This gave a casualty rate of 5.44 menwounded and 6.53 wounds per 1,000 crewmen dispatched on missions. This gave aratio of wounds received compared to crew members on missions of 0.646 percent.In the November 1943 to May 1944 period, 684,350 crewmen went on missions, 1,567men were casualties, with a total of 1,766 wounds. This gave a casualty rate of2.29 casualties and 2.58 wounds per 1,000 crewmen on missions. This gave a ratioof wounds received compared to crew members taking off of 0.248 percent.Therefore, there was a reduction of 58 percent in persons wounded and areduction of 60 percent in total number of wounds sustained per 1,000 crewmen onmissions.
10Grow, M., and Lyons, R. C.: Body Armor. Air SurgeonsBull. 2:8-10, January 1945.
665
FIGURE 319.-Jettisoning of flyer's armor by means of ripcord and quick-release fasteners.
Since there was the important question of whether theforegoing results were due solely to the usage of body armor or due to a numberof tactical conditions, such as change either in combat formations or in enemytactics, a survey was done of the battle damage to aircraft during the samesurvey period. In the period before the use of body armor, 26.46 percent ofaircraft returning to their bases from bombing missions were found to havebattle damage. In the period after the use of body armor, 21.47 percent ofreturning aircraft had battle damage. Therefore, in a comparison of the twoperiods, one finds a 60 percent decrease in total number of wounds sustained bycrewmen following the introduction of body armor and a concomitant 18 percentdecrease in aircraft battle damage. Therefore, some of the reduction in thenumber of casualties and in the total number of hits sustained by the casualtieswas undoubtedly due to factors other than body armor, but there can be no doubtwhatsoever that the main reduction was due solely to the introduction of bodyarmor.
A study pertaining to the anatomic location of woundssustained during the two survey periods revealed a reduction of 14 percentin wounds of the head
666
and neck, 58 percent in wounds of the thorax, and 36 percentin wounds of the abdomen. During the survey period among the heavy bomber combatcrew members, there was a reduction in fatality of thoracic wounds from 36 to 8percent and of abdominal wounds from 39 to 7 percent. This meant that after theintroduction of body armor there was a reduction of 77.1 percent in the fatalityrate of thoracic wounds and a reduction of 82.8 percent in the fatality ofabdominal wounds. During the survey period, it was also shown that body armorprevented approximately 74 percent of wounds in the body region covered. Aftertermination of hostilities in Europe, a comprehensive survey of casualty figuresshowed that the fatality rate for individuals with thoracic wounds fell from34.9 percent in the unarmored group to 15.3 percent in the individuals wearingbody armor. In those individuals sustaining abdominal wounds, the fatality ratewas reduced from 32.5 to 15.7 percent. Therefore, because of the untiringpioneer work of General Grow and his fellow medical officers, the value of bodyarmor for combat crewmen in the Army Air Forces was definitely established, butnot until the Korean War was a similar situation attained in regard to combatground troops.
Initially, the flyer's armor, or flak suit, as it was morecommonly known, was produced solely by British manufacturers. However, it soonbecame apparent that they should not be required to be the sole source of supplyfor the critically needed manganese steel. Nevertheless, a total of 600 suitswere made in England. Samples suits were received in the United States in July1943, and the Army Ordnance Department took over the task of quantity productionand improvement in design. From that date until the termination of World War IIhostilities, the Ordnance Department and various civilian institutions wereresponsible for producing approximately 23 types of flyer's armor. The armorworkshop of the Metropolitan Museum of Art became the main design researchlaboratory in the development of flyer's armor. The Air Force Materiel Commandat Wright Field, Ohio, had also been interested in development and production ofarmor, but this function was also turned over to the Ordnance Department.
The initial production of the armor in the United States wasbased solely on the design which had been developed by General Grow and hisBritish advisers. Hadfield manganese steel plates, of the same composition asthat used in the M1 helmet, provided the ballistic protection. These plates weresewed into cloth pockets and fastened to a cotton-duck backing. However, by theend of 1943, a nylon-duck cloth was substituted for the cotton material. Thenylon duck weighed 20 ounces to the square yard and increased the ballisticprotection limits of the vest.
The Flyer's Vest, M1 (fig. 320), was a close copy of thedesign which had been submitted from the Eighth Air Force in England. This wasmade up of two sections which provided protection for the front and back of thebody and was fastened at the shoulders by quick-release dot fasteners. It wasintended to be worn by gunners, navigators, bombardiers, and radio operatorswhose combat duties required them to move about so that they
667
FIGURE 320.-Flyer's Vest, M1. A. Frontsection. B. Interior of back section.
would be exposed to injury from both the front and the back.The complete M1 vest, including both front (fig. 320A) and back sections (fig.320B), weighed 17 pounds and 6 ounces and provided an area protection of 3.82square feet. Between August 1943 and August 1945, 338,780 M1 vests wereproduced.
The Flyer's Vest, M2 (fig. 321), was made up only of anarmored front section, very similar to the frontpiece of the M1 vest, and anunarmored backpiece. It was intended to be worn by pilots and copilots and othercombat personnel whose duties would allow them to sit in a seat which could havean armored back and provide the protection for the back of the body. The weightof the front section for the M2 vest was 7 pounds and 15 ounces and provided anarea of protection of 1.45 square feet. Between August 1943 and July 1945,95,919 M2 vests were produced. Both the M1 and M2 vests were standardized on 5October 1943. As mentioned previously, the ballistic protection was provided by2-inch square overlapping Hadfield manganese steel plates which were enclosed inpockets, and since the original linen canvas stock for the backing was notavailable in the United States a cotton canvas stock was utilized and laterreplaced by ballistic nylon stock.
The Flyer's Apron, M3 (fig. 322A) had a constructionsimilar to the frontpiece of the M1 vest and consisted of a roughly triangularpiece of armor intended for use in turrets and other positions in the aircraftwhere space limitation was a factor. It could be fastened to the front of the M1or M2 vests by means of dot fasteners and had a total weight of 4 pounds and 14ounces. It gave an area protection of 1.15 square feet. The Flyer's Apron, M4(fig. 322B), was similar to the M3 but was larger in size and was intended foruse by waist gunners and other individuals who could utilize a full lengtharmor. It had a weight of 7 pounds and 2 ounces and an area protection of 1.66square feet.
668
FIGURE 321.-Flyer's Vest, M2. Interior of armoredfront section.
FIGURE 322.-Flyer's apron.A. M3. B. M4.
In addition to the flyer's apron, it was also believed thatsome protection should be provided to the groin, the abdomen, and the thighs forpersonnel who remained seated. The first test item was a groin armor, T12 (fig.323A), designed in 1943. It consisted of 10 steel plates which were shaped andhinged to give protection to the anatomic areas just listed. The armor weighedapproximately 8 pounds and gave an area protection of 235 square inches. A latermodification known as T13 was received from the Eighth Air Force in January 1944and consisted of three sections of overlapping steel plates and weighedapproximately 14 pounds and gave an area protection similar to that of the T12.The T13 was modified in March 1944 and standardized as Groin Armor, M5 (fig.323B and C). It was made in three sections so that the central area could bedrawn up between the legs. The side section spread out to provide protection forthe upper aspect of the thighs.
669
FIGURE 323.-Flyer's groin armor.A. T12. B and C. M5, showinginterior view.
The entire piece could be attached to the M2 vest. It weighed15 pounds and 4 ounces and provided an area protection of 3.72 square feet. Allforms of the armor just described were equipped with quick-release dot fastenersand tapes and thongs connected by a ripcord for rapid jettisoning of the armorby the wearer.
The continued research of the Ordnance Department in anattempt to provide an equal or higher level of ballistic protection with anincrease in area coverage and a decrease in total weight of the armor soon ledto the development of other models utilizing different ballistic materials. TheFlyer's Vest, M6 (fig. 324), was standardized on 1 July 1945. This vest hadthe same function as the M1 vest but was made of aluminum plates with a nylonback padding. The vest weighed 14 pounds and 9 ounces, or 2 pounds and 14 ouncesless than the M1 vest, and had an area protection of 4.09 square feet ascompared to the 3.82 square feet of the M1 model. The Flyer's Vest, M7, wasof the same construction as the M6 and was made to replace the M2 vest. With
670
the shift of emphasis to back-packed parachutes in thePacific areas, the armor design had to be modified to fit over the parachutes.This gave rise to two models (M6A1 and M7A1) which fulfilled this function. Themodels were constructed of aluminum and nylon. In addition to these last twoitems, a number of other experimental models were developed by the OrdnanceDepartment and the Metropolitan Museum of Art. The T5 series of flyer's armorcontained larger overlapping armorplates and were held snugly against the bodyby an elastic webbing. This provided an increase in area protection with adecrease in weight of the end item.
Concurrent with the interest by both the Army and Navy inlaminated layers of woven glass fabric impregnated with plastic (doron), thismaterial was considered in flyer's armor. The T37 series in experimentalmodels showed a replacement of the steel plates in the M1 vest by flat doronplates 2 inches square and 0.130 inch thick. A later modification utilizedthicker doron plates that had an outer curvature. However, with the advent ofimproved aluminum and nylon ballistic material, the doron project for flyer'sarmor was discontinued.
671
FIGURE 325.-Flyer's neck armor.A. T44. B. T59E1.
In addition to the improvement in the flyer's vest, similarend items and experimental models were developed in aprons and groin armor. TheFlyer's Apron Armor, M8 and M9, were standardized in July 1945 and were to beused with the M6 and the M7 vests. Both of these were constructed of aluminumand nylon; the M8 apron armor weighed 4 pounds and 11 ounces while the M9weighed 6 pounds and 8 ounces. Additional apron armor to correspond with theM6E1 and M7E1 were also developed. With the replacement of the Hadfield steelplates by aluminum and nylon, a similar change occurred in groin armor. TheGroin Armor, M10, standardized in July 1945, was made of aluminum and nylon andwas to be used in conjunction with the newer vest. At the termination ofhostilities, many very interesting tests were being performed to see if flyer'sclothing and equipment could be made of nylon-type cloth and by itself providesome ballistic protection. This would then have reduced the weight of thealuminum-nylon-cloth combination ballistic armor and might have provided ahigher protection ballistic limit with a decrease in total weight of the armorend item.
At one time, it was felt that protection should be given tothe region of the neck which might be exposed between the helmet and the armoredvest. Therefore, a T44 series (fig. 325A) of experimental models was developedand consisted of a Queen Anne's type of neckpiece which was made to rest onthe shoulders and attached to the M4 series of helmets. This had the sameconstruction as the M1 vest and consisted of 2-inch square Hadfield steelplates. The development of this item was terminated in June 1945 when a shiftwas made to aluminum and nylon as the ballistic material. The T59 series (fig.325B) consisted of curved aluminum plates with a nylon-duck backing which wasmade to fit the contour of the shoulder and neck. Both frontpieces andbackpieces were made to be attached to the armored vest of similar construction.One of the experimental models, T59E2, was standardized as M13 in
672
September 1945. Tables 249 and 250 show some of the production figures forthe various types of flyers' armor and a summary of the weight and areaprotection. All of the statistics have been derived from various sources andmight show some variation from other compilations.
TABLE 249.-Production figures1for flyers' armor in World War II, 1943-45
Type of armor | 1943 | 1944 | 1945 | Total |
Flyer's Vest: | ||||
| M1 | 111,842 | 130,937 | 96,001 | 338,780 |
| M2 | 42,373 | 29,546 | 24,000 | 95,919 |
| M6 | --- | --- | 1,075 | 1,075 |
Flyer's Apron: | ||||
| M3 | 57,513 | 54,571 | 30,730 | 142,814 |
| M4 | 68,467 | 84,665 | 56,012 | 209,144 |
Flyer's groin armor, M5 | --- | 41,872 | 68,029 | 109,901 |
Flyer's neck armor: | ||||
| T44 | --- | --- | 10,969 | 10,969 |
| T59E1 | --- | --- | 100 | 100 |
1These figures have been compiled from various sources and do not represent final Ordnance Department compilations.
TABLE 250.-Flyers' armor and corresponding weight and area protection
Material and type of armor | Weight | Area protection | |
Lb. | Oz. | Square feet | |
0.045-inch Hadfield manganese steel: | |||
| Vest: | |||
M1 | 17 | 6 | 3.82 |
M2 | 7 | 13 | 1.45 |
| Apron: | |||
M3 | 4 | 14 | 1.15 |
M4 | 7 | 2 | 1.66 |
| Groin Armor, M5 | 15 | 4 | 3.72 |
0.102-inch 24 ST aluminum and 7-ply 19 ounce nylon duck: | |||
| Vest: | |||
M6 | 14 | 8 | 4.09 |
M7 | 7 | 13 | 1.82 |
| Apron: | |||
M8 | 4 | 11 | 1.23 |
M9 | 6 | 8 | 1.89 |
| Groin Armor, M10 | 13 | 11 | 3.62 |
0.102-inch 75 ST aluminum and 6-ply 13 ounce nylon duck: | |||
| Vest: | |||
M6A1 | 16 | 15 | 5.88 |
M7A1 | 7 | 12 | 2.08 |
| Apron: | |||
M8A1 | 4 | 4 | 1.23 |
M9A1 | 5 | 12 | 1.89 |
| Groin Armor, M10A1 | 12 | 5 | 3.62 |
| Neck | 3 | 13 | 1.33 |
673
Following the widespread use and adoption of flyer's armor,a considerable number of other sections of the fighting forces became interestedin its possible usage. In October 1943, Motor Torpedo Boat Squadron NumberTwenty Five became interested in possible revision or modification of the flyer'sarmor for their usage. Similarly, the Cavalry Board at Fort Riley, Kans., wasalso interested in its possible use for mechanized cavalry personnel. Inaddition, one of the companies producing flyer's armor also submitted samplesof a modification of the original design for possible usage in amphibious andother invasion landings. These designs were of various types; some providedonly thoracoabdominal protection, and others provided protection for theextremities.
Ground Troops (World War II)
Unlike helmet design, which had a considerable carryover fromWorld War I development and experience, little if any information was availableat the advent of World War II on the possible design of a body armorfor ground troops. Numerous military authorities had advocated the use of bodyarmor during World War I, but it had only reached a preliminary testing stagebefore it was generally rejected. During World War I, the United Stateshad developed several types of armor. One, the Brewster Body Shield, was made ofchrome nickel steel, weighed 40 pounds, and consisted of a breastplate and aheadpiece. This armor would withstand Lewis machinegun bullets at 2,700 f.p.s.but was unduly clumsy and heavy. In addition, the Metropolitan Museum of Art inFebruary 1918 had designed a breastplate based upon certain 15th century armor.Again, this model weighed 27 pounds; all investigators considered it to be verynoisy and thought that it markedly restricted all movements of the wearer.Another extremely interesting model was the scaled waistcoats or jazerans whichwere constructed of overlapping steel scales fixed to a leather lining. Thearmor was closely fitting and was considered comfortable. The total weight was11 pounds.
Numerous investigators in the Ordnance Department and in theother technical services had contemplated the development of armor for groundtroops in the early stages of World War II. However, very preliminaryinvestigations had shown that most models were too heavy, were incompatible withstandard items of equipment, and tended to restrict the mobility of thesoldier. Therefore, the development of armor for ground troops was initiallyrejected as an unsound idea, and the development of a flyer's armor receivedmore or less full attention. However, continued investigation in the developmentof lighter weight metallic ballistic material and in the relatively new fieldof nonmetallic ballistic material led to a resurge in interest for armor forground troops. Therefore, the historical study must be traced through both typesof ballistic material, and initially the types of armor utilizing metallicmaterial will be discussed.
It is difficult to ascertain exactly when the redevelopmentof armor for ground troops was initiated, but it apparently began sometime nearthe middle
674
FIGURE 326.-Japanese body armor; the type studied by Lt. Col. I. Ridgeway Trimble, MC.
of 1944. In June 1944, the Army Service Forces requestedarmor for the protection of soldiers from antipersonnel mines. Another majorinitiating feature was undoubtedly due to some of the excellent work performedby Lt. Col. I. Ridgeway Trimble, MC, then chief of the surgical service at the118th General Hospital, Sydney, Australia. Colonel Trimble became veryinterested in reports concerning the use of armor by Japanese ground troops.After a great deal of difficulty and personal disappointment, he was able tosecure a copy of Japanese armor (fig. 326). Based on the Japanese design and hisown personal observation as to the areas to be protected and the most commonlyencountered wounds and causative agents, he developed a model for ground trooparmor.11
In addition to Colonel Trimble's persistence in presentinghis material, various other members of the consulting division of the MedicalDepartment of the Army were very instrumental in overcoming some of theprejudice which was present on the part of the services which would use the bodyarmor.
11A chronological report of his development of a designfor body armor for ground troops has been prepared by Dr. Trimble and ispresented on pages 685-689. It is of considerable significance to note thegeneral course the development followed, and it is also of some personalinterest to us to see the great many obstacles which had to be surmounted beforethe responsible individuals developed any great interest and respect for thesubmitted item. As mentioned by Dr. Trimble, a report of the body armordesign and photographs of the Japanese armor were submitted to Dr. George R.Harrison, Chief of the Research Section, General Headquarters, Southwest PacificArea. The initial report was tendered in April 1944, but owing to the accidentalloss of the report and pictures, it was not until 23 May 1944 that the reportwas finally on its way to Washington. After a review of the material, Dr. KarlT. Compton, Chief, Office of Field Service, Office of Scientific Research andDevelopment, War Department, advised the Commander in Chief, Southwest PacificArea, that the Ordnance Department was extremely interested in Colonel Trimble'sdesign and felt that it represented an improvement over the one which they werecurrently considering.-J. C. B., W. F. E., and R. H. H.
675
FIGURE 327.-Japanese body armor. A. Type III. B. Type II.
Other types of Japanese body armor (figs. 327, 328, and 329)which were captured in the Pacific consisted of an anterior thoracoabdominalshield with and without lower extremity protection. Various other members ofcasualty surveys in the Pacific areas, notably in the New Georgia andBougainville campaigns, were also convinced of the apparent importance whichbody armor might have in reducing total number of wounds and number of lethalwounds in ground troops.
Based upon the armor submitted by Colonel Trimble and on thevarious other specimens collected by technical observers of the OrdnanceDepartment in the Southwest Pacific Area, an experimental model was developedand this design was known as vest, T34. The armor consisted of 0.684-inch thickcarbon steel plates. Owing to the excessive weight of the end item and also tothe development of lighter weight ballistic materials, the T34 series wasdiscontinued. Various other experimental models were being tested at about thesame time and one of these consisted of the armor, breast, T36, which waspatterned somewhat after a World War I model. The vest, series T39, consisted ofa small piece of anterior armor with a stitched nylon-webb backing and utilized various metallic ballistic materials, such as steel or aluminum, inthe form of overlapping plates. Numerous other experimental models were
676
FIGURE 328.-Japanese body armor, Type III, disassembled.
developed, but only those which resulted in a standardizedend item will be discussed.
The vest, T62E1, consisted of two pieces, front and back,which were fastened together at the shoulder by quick-release fasteners. Theballistic materials consisted of 0.102-inch thick aluminum plates and a backingof 5-ply nylon cloth. All of the aluminum plates had a slight overlapping toprovide thorough protection, and there was a small anterior flap on thefrontpiece which was designed to give additional protection to the region ofthe heart and great vessels. The vest weighed 9 pounds and 10 ounces and had anarea protection of 3.45 square feet. The vest, T62E1, was modified in order toprovide additional ballistic protection and resulted in the T64 series which wasstandardized in August 1945 as the Armor, Vest, M12 (fig. 330).
This M12 vest was made of thicker aluminum plates than theT62E1 series and had additional layers of nylon cloth. It weighed 12 pounds and3 ounces and provided an area protection of 3.45 square feet. The design hadbeen modified to provide greater protection for the anterior portion of thethorax both by increasing the width of the main frontpiece and also byincreasing the size of the anterior flap over the heart and great vessels. Inaddition, some increase in protection was provided for the axillary regions.However, the areas of the junction of the neck and thorax and of the axillaryregions were still relatively uncovered and, as it was seen during the use of
677
FIGURE 329.-Japanese body armor, Type III, assembled.
the M12 vest during the Korean War, provided a ready accessfor the entrance of missiles into the thorax. An Apron, Model T65, was alsoproduced to be attached to the M12 vest in order to provide ballistic protectionfor the lower part of the abdomen and the groin region. The apron could beattached to the bottom of the vest by quick-release fasteners. It was made of21-ply nylon cloth, weighed 1 pound and 9 ounces, and had an area protection of0.66 square feet.
A considerable number of the vests and aprons were producedand were scheduled for field testing and observation by a jointmedical-ordnance-infantry team12 just at the cessation of the war in thePacific. In July 1945, 1,000 T62E1 vests with the T65 apron and 1,200 T64 vestswere shipped to the Pacific theater for field testing, but this was neveraccomplished. Therefore, the vest received considerable experimental testing,but it was not until the Korean War that it was utilized in the field. With therebirth of body armor during the Korean War, the M12 vest was used initially byAmerican troops in conjunction with the newer all-nylon-type vest. Following thecompletion of the initial surveys and standardization of the final end item, allU.S. frontline troops were equipped with the newer all-nylon or doron vests, andthe M12 vests were used by Republic of Korea troops.
12Monthly Progress Report, Army Service Forces, WarDepartment, 31 July 1945, Section 7: Health, p 15.
678
679
The following tabulation shows some of the production figures for ground-typearmor in World War II:
Type of armor: | Number produced: |
| Vest: | |
T62E1 | 14,100 |
M12 | 253,352 |
| Apron, T65 | 18,060 |
| Crotch, T16E4 | 312,220 |
| Eye, T45E6 (M14) | 4100 |
1For June 1945.
2For June, July, and August 1945.
3For January-June 1945.
4For September 1945.
The production of the M12 vest was slated to continue to a certain degreeafter August 1945, and before the termination of hostilities it was estimatedthat 100,000 vests of this model would have been produced by September 1945.Table 251 is a summary of the type of armor and its corresponding weight andarea protection.
TABLE 251.-Ground troop armor and corresponding weight and area protection
Type of armor | Weight | Area protection | |
Lb. | Oz. | Square feet | |
Vest: | |||
| T62E1 (0.102-inch 24 ST aluminum plates and 5-ply nylon duck) | 9 | 10 | 3.45 |
| M12 (0.125-inch 75 ST aluminum plates and 8-ply 13 oz. nylon duck) | 12 | 3 | 3.45 |
Apron, T65 (21-ply 13 oz. nylon duck) | 1 | 9 | .66 |
Crotch, T16E4 (manganese steel and nylon) | 3 | 6 | 1.15 |
Eye, M14 (manganese steel) | 7 | ||
Following the termination of hostilities in the Mediterranean and EuropeanTheaters of Operations, it soon became very evident that some type of protectivedevices would be required by personnel engaged in minefield clearance. As earlyas June 1944, the Office of the Chief Engineer was engaged in the development ofa protective device for the combat boot. The overall project was latercoordinated with the Ordnance Department and led to the development of the T16series of crotch armor.
The model T16E4 was based on a previous flyer's model and originallyconsisted of a central crotch section with two overlapping metal plates whichwere hinged on the sides. Later, the central hourglass-shaped section wasdeveloped with two lateral phalanges made up of nylon material. The central areacontinued to be made of small overlapping metal plates and was fastened by meansof straps to the cartridge belt. A later model, the T16E6, provided a reducedarea coverage through elimination of the central protection in the
680
FIGURE 331.-Crotch armor, T16E4. A. Front view. B. Back view.
rear and a reduction in the size of the lateral leg phalanges. However, some increased protection was provided in the region of the groin and genitalia. This model was also constructed of a combination of 2-inch square manganese steel plates and nylon-duck material. It was believed that the crotch armor could be used in conjunction with other items of personnel armor and some locally improvised lower extremity protection for those individuals engaged in mine clearance. The model T16E4 (fig. 331) weighed 3 pounds and 6 ounces and provided an area protection of 1.15 square feet.
There is a dearth of medical statistics in regard to the positive importance of crotch armor for such personnel. However, numerous casualties were seen during the Korean War who suffered extensive saddle-type injuries due to detonation of landmines. It is very conceivable that protection in the region of the groin, the upper part of the thighs, and the buttocks would have been of some value for these individuals. Therefore, in conjunction with the development of the thoracoabdominal vest during the Korean War, an all-nylon crotch armor was produced, but it was not intended for general usage. It was advocated only for personnel engaged in specialized tasks, such as mine clearance.
In May 1945, samples of eye armor were being manufactured by the French Army, and designs to fit the U.S. M1 helmet were collected for testing by the Army Ordnance Department. These models were not considered adequate, and a new series of eye armor, T45 (fig. 332), was developed. This consisted of a plate of manganese steel, the same as that in the M1 helmet, and was provided with small vision slits. The entire structure was mounted in a rubber dust-goggle frame. Close coordination between the Ordnance Department,
681
FIGURE 332.-Eye armor, T45 series.A. T45E4. B. T45E6.
Engineer Corps, Army Ground Forces, and the Office of theSurgeon General showed that the T45E6 (fig. 332B) was the most acceptabledesign, and it was standardized on 10 January 1946. Notwithstanding thecessation of hostilities by this time, it was believed that a standard item wasrequired for the clearance of minefields in occupied countries.
It is of some interest to note that other types of protectionfor ground troops very similar to that which was tested in World War I also sawsome consideration during World War II. An example of this was a project onmobile shields (fig. 333) which was initiated in September 1943. It wasconsidered that the device could be manipulated by a single man and that itwould provide protection against rifle and machinegun bullets at a very closerange. This would permit the soldier to close in on highly fortified positionsand provide protection for soldiers stationed in advanced observation posts. Itwas believed that the ballistic protection would have to be provided byarmor-plates of considerable weight and thickness and that the entire devicewould have to be transported by means of wheels. In order to provide the degreeof ballistic protection considered necessary, the planners thought the weightwould have to range in the neighborhood of 150 to 200 pounds. After a very briefconsideration, the entire project was discontinued.
The use of nonmetallic ballistic material for body armor wasa result of close liaison between various developmental agencies in both theArmy and Navy and only reached the possibility of a possible end item in theNavy. However, because of the association of the Army Quartermaster Corps andOrdnance Department in its development, some brief mention of it would beappropriate at this time. The search for a nonmetallic ballistic materialstemmed partially from a desire to reduce the overall weight of metallic bodyarmor and also because of the critical shortage of the metallic material duringWorld War II. Therefore, an active search was carried out by research anddevelopment people in all branches of the military services. Two of the mostactive sites of research were the Research and Development Branch of theMilitary Planning Division, Office of the Quartermaster General, and the NavalResearch Laboratory. The Quartermaster Corps was interested in
682
FIGURE 333.-Mobile shield, T1E2.
obtaining a nonmetallic material both for body armor forground troops and for usage in civilian defense helmets. The Naval ResearchLaboratory was interested in the possibility of body armor for use by Marineground forces and certain shipboard personnel. The Army Ordnance Department wasalso actively engaged in this search and was responsible for all ballisticevaluation tests. Woven glass-fiber fabric impregnated with plastic (doron) hadbeen considered in August 1944 for use in flyers' armor, but the program wasdiscontinued following the favorable test results with aluminum-nyloncombinations. The doron was to be utilized in the form of 2-inch square plates,0.130 inch thick.
A number of industrial concerns instigated active research programs, and in May 1943 the Dow Chemical Company laminated a fibrous glass fabric which immediately proved very promising. The initial product consisted of layers of glass filaments of Fiberglas bonded together with an ethyl cellulose resin under high pressure. Some of the individuals working with Col. (later Brig. Gen.) Georges F. Doriot, then director of the Military Planning Division, Office of the Quartermaster General, decided that the project should be known as the "Doron Project" in his honor. Therefore, the glass fiber laminate manufactured by the Dow Chemical Company became known as and continued to be called doron.
The initial material was known as doron, Type 1, and future modifications consisted primarily of variations in the bonding resin in order to give a more adequate ballistic performance over a wider temperature range. Most of the
683
body armor developed during World War II utilizing doron wasprepared from a form known as doron, Type 2. In addition to the militarydevelopmental agencies, numerous private industries were also involved in theresearch, development, and production of doron material. These included theWestinghouse Electric Corporation, the Continental-Diamond Fibre Company, theUnited States Rubber Company, the Hercules Powder Company, the American CyanamidCompany, the General Electric Company, The Firestone Tire and Rubber Company,The Formica Company, the Monsanto Chemical Company, and numerous others.13
Because of biservice interest in the possible usage ofdoron, a Joint Army-Navy Plastic Armor Technical Committee was established.This committee included members from the Office of the Army QuartermasterGeneral, the Naval Research Laboratory, the Navy Bureau of Ships, the Office ofthe Army Chief of Ordnance, the Navy Bureau of Medicine and Surgery, and theNavy Bureau of Aeronautics.14 The purpose of the committee was tocoordinate all research and development efforts and also to facilitate theproduction of doron. Ballistic research had provided sufficient information sothat it was possible to calculate that a 1/16-inch plate of 8-plydoron, Type 2, would have a protection ballistic limit sufficient to stop acaliber .45, 230-grain bullet fired from the standard service automatic pistolat a velocity of 800 f.p.s. Therefore, in order to provide some degree of safetyover this calculated minimal V50, it was felt that the material for body armorshould be made up of 1/8-inch 15-ply doron, Type2.15 The Army Ordnance Departmentfelt that a better correlation could be attained between the use ofnylon-aluminum combinations and protection ballistic limit, body coverage, andtotal weight of the finished item. Therefore, doron was tested in a considerablenumber of experimental models, but the consensus was that Hadfield steel oraluminum-nylon combinations were superior. Therefore, no end items weredeveloped in the Army program utilizing doron as the ballistic material.However, the Navy felt that doron was a most promising material and continuedtoward the development of some form of armor for Marine ground troops andshipboard personnel.
The 1/8-inch thick doron plates were utilized by the Navy intwo forms; namely, (1) by placing eight panels into pockets on the outside ofthe Navy kapok lifejacket and (2) by sewing plates on the inside of the pocketsof the standard-issue Marine Corps utility jacket. The armor used in bothjackets weighed 4 pounds and covered a body area of approximately 3 square feet.
In an attempt to provide a more drastic demonstration of theballistic properties of doron and also to determine whether the doron armorcould be closely applied to the body or would require some offset, a mostcourageous demonstration was conducted by two Navy officers. Lt. Comdr. EdwardL. Corey, USNR, wore the new armored lifejacket vest and permitted anassociate, Lt. Comdr. Andrew Paul Webster, USNR, to fire at him with a caliber.45
13(1) Fuller, P. C.: Laminated Glass Cloth Used as BodyArmor. The Frontier 8:8, December 1945. (2) Fetter, Edmond C.: Doron Armor. Chemicaland Metallurgical Engineering, February 1946, p. 154.
14King, L.: Lightweight Body Armor. QuartermasterRev. March-April 1953, p. 48.
15Webster, A. P.: Development of Body Armor. Hosp. CorpsQuarter. 18:31-33, October 1945.
684
pistol. There was complete defeat of the bullet, and this demonstration wasrepeated 21 times with no serious injury.
As a result of the total testing procedure, the Marine Corps requested that afull battalion of landing troops be equipped with armored jackets. Approximately1,000 jackets were prepared and were intended to be used with a Marine divisionduring the Okinawa operation. A survey team from the Naval Research Laboratoryand from the Office of the Quartermaster General of the Army were to conductsurveys on both armored and unarmored men in an attempt to ascertain the jacket'sactual value and also guide future design in developmental programs.Unfortunately, the Marine division which was to conduct these tests was notemployed in the Okinawa operations. A few of the armored jackets were probablyused in the last phases of the fighting on Okinawa, but no large-scale surveywas conducted.
The development of doron was sufficiently advanced so that armored doronjackets could have been available for the troops at the time of the invasion inNormandy and undoubtedly would have been very instrumental in saving aconsiderable number of lives. However, there is always a great deal ofreluctance and inertia which has to be overcome before the using agencies willaccept body armor. This is not meant as a reflection upon the Ground Forces butrather exemplifies their innate and natural desires for a battle to reach aswift and successful conclusion. This can only be accomplished by having thelargest number possible of active fighting men who can swiftly and completelyperform all combat duties. Therefore, any form of personnel armor has to becompletely compatible with all equipment required for the performance of theseduties, impose a minimal additional weight load, be comfortable in all climaticconditions, impose little if any restriction on mobility, and finally have ahigh degree of troop acceptability. If it can be graphically demonstrated thatbody armor can be constructed so that it will meet all imposed militarycharacteristics, there is a more general acceptance of the item by the GroundForces.
Naturally, the Medical Corps is immensely interested in any item which bringsabout a reduction in morbidity and mortality of battlefield casualties. DuringWorld War II, medical treatment of the battle casualty had reached a high degreeof excellence, and if hostilities had continued it would have soon becomeapparent that some additional means would have to be provided for the reductionof total number of wounds and number of lethal wounds. In other words, somethingwould have been required forward of the battalion aid station level in anattempt to prevent men from being wounded and to reduce the number of men whowere being killed instantly. Unfortunately, this lesson of body armor was notlearned until late in World War II, and it was not until the Korean War that thenumerous sceptics were convinced and body armor was accepted wholeheartedly.
Let us hope that peacetime stagnation will not completely shackle thedevelopmental program so that in the advent of any future hostility body armorwill be available at its immediate onset.
685
REPORT OF DEVELOPMENT OF A DESIGN FOR BODY ARMOR FOR THE FOOT SOLDIER
On or about 1 September 1942 I read in the Sydney newspapersabout an armored Japanese vest captured in New Guinea by Australian soldiersduring the Papuan campaign, and consulted Dr. Dew, Professor of Surgery atSydney University, as to where I might procure such a vest. He wrote to ColonelW. J. Hailes, Medical Directorate, L.H.Q. Victoria Barracks, Melbourne, whoseletter of 12 September 1942 told me that work along these lines was beingstudied in the Middle East by a member of the Medical Research Council of GreatBritain. Lt. Colonel R. V. Graham's letter of 16 November 1942 written fromthe 103rd Australian General Hospital stated that he had asked his son who wasin New Guinea at the time to try to procure such a vest for me.
Colonel C. A. Jillet, D.D.O.S. First Australian Army, wrote30 November 1942 that the First Army had not received such equipment.
Letters written to the Police Departments of the cities ofNew York, Chicago, Pittsburgh, and Los Angeles resulted in replies duringJanuary and February 1943 telling of the protective armor used by them.
19 November 1942 I wrote Brig. General Hanford MacNiderasking him to try to procure a vest for me in New Guinea, and asking him for hisideas on protection for foot soldiers.
Colonel C. N. Kellaway, of the Australian Army, and Directorof the Walter and Eliza Hall Institute of Research in Pathology and Medicine,personally brought me from Melbourne information relative to work done by theBody Protection Committee of the Medical Research Counsel of Great Britain.
25 November 1942 I called on Colonel C. C. Alexander, Chiefof Staff to Maj. General Richard Marshall, Commanding General, SOS, to ask himhow to procure a Japanese vest telling him that I had for a long period thoughtsome practical armor protection could be worked out for ground troops. ColonelAlexander was most interested and advised me to see Colonel Carroll, the ChiefSurgeon, and Colonel Thorpe of G2. Colonel Carroll was enthusiastic and spoke ofhis having thought of including the spade of the entrenching tool as bodyprotection. Major Suave in Colonel Thorpe's office promised to obtain theJapanese vest for me.
9 January 1943 a letter came to me from G.H.Q., SWPA., RearEchelon entitled "Captured Japanese Bullet Proof Vests," whichattached a letter from the office of the Director of Staff Duties, L.H.Q.,Australian Army, acknowledging my request on 24 November 1942 for the loan of aJapanese Bullet Proof Vest, adding that the only one in the possession of theAustralian Army was being tested at the Broken Hill Pty. Steel Works, Newcastle,N.S.P., and suggesting that I inspect the vest at these premises.
17 February 1943 I received a captured Japanese vest (fig.334) from Commander J. C. Morrow of the Australian destroyer "Arunta" through one of his officers, Midshipman Norman H. Smith. I showed it to Colonel Carroll and Colonel Alexander and on 26 Feb. 1943 had the Signal Corps make drawings and pictures of it.
16 April 1943 the U.S. Quartermaster Department of G4, SOS,asked me to try out some plastic material as possible use in body armor so MajorColeman of that department and I made some firing tests on the shooting range atLong Bay, N.S.W., the plastic material being easily pierced and fragmented bythe caliber .45 automatic pistol and Thompson submachinegun bullet.
22 March 1943 Mr. R. M. Service of the Australian ArmyInventions Directorate forwarded to me the analysis of the armor plate of thecaptured Japanese vest and that of some Australian steel submitted by anAustralian civilian, a Mr. R. Welch, who was trying to interest the Australianand American armies in a steel jacket made of individual pieces of steelapproximately 4 inches square, linked together with a hinge on all four edges.Mr. Welch's armor was put on by inserting one's head through a hole in thecenter of the gar-
686
FIGURE 334.-Lt. Col. I. Ridgeway Trimble, MC, wearing capturedJapanese vest.
ment, like putting on a poncho. Beginning at this time, atthe request of Mr. Welch and Mr. Service, Lt. Colonel D. Garrison of the U.S.Ordnance and myself tested Mr. Welch's vest on the firing range as well as amodel based on the Japanese vest in my possession and made for me by chiefoperating room nurse, 1st Lt. A. M. Seney. The plates for my vest were six largeones (fig. 335), overlapping and placed inside the vest, in accordance with theJapanese plan (fig. 336). However, my plates were made from plaster castsmoulded on a man of 150 lbs, 5 ft. 7 in. in height and covered more of theregions of the collar bones, the upper part of the breast bone, the flanks andthe lower abdomen than did the Japanese.
Mr. Welch kindly offered to hammer out for me some steelplates in exact accordance with my plaster casts, and we used these new platesof mine to test on the firing range as well as testing his linked steel armor.
His armor proved entirely unsuitable, because a missilestriking a hinged joint would penetrate the armor in the majority of instances.
25 March 1943 I sent to Brig. General C. C. Alexander, Hq.USASOS, APO 501 the first summary of my study on protective body armor, tellingof my possession of the Japanese vest and recommending a vest "constructedalong the lines of the captured Japanese one" for our own army. This reportwas forwarded by General Alexander to the Chief Surgeon and the Chief OrdnanceOfficer, SOS Headquarters, APO 501.
13 June 1943 Brig. General J. L. Holman wrote to merequesting that my set of Japanese armor be sent to the Chief Ordnance Officer in Washington,D.C. through Base Section 3, APO 923. This armor was sent by me 17 June 1943, andacknowledged by General Holman 20 June 1943.
687
16 September 1943 I wrote General Holman objecting to apublic demonstration of body armor before the press by Mr. R. Welch at BaseSection 7. The armor was apparently that of his design since the Sydneynewspaper account, dated 15 September 1943, spoke of light steel plates linkedtogether; but the enclosing tunic in the photograph published by the newspaperwas similar to my modification of the Japanese one. Mr. Welch's original armorhad no tunic. The performance of the vest against various types of firearms wasreported in this paper. The demonstration was made without consulting our armyor intelligence at any time.
688
FIGURE 336.-Japanese body armor, showing internal construction.
23 December 1943 Colonel W. C. Cauthen, Chief OrdnanceOfficer, USASOS, APO 501, wrote asking that the vest which I designed besubmitted to the Chief of Ordnance. This vest was taken to the Ordnance at APO501 by me 2 January 1944 and kept by Ordnance 501 for me until my return fromduty in New Guinea, 15 April 1944.
15 February 1944 Maj. General N. F. Twining, CommandingGeneral of the 15th Air Force, wrote, asking me to bring my vest to theattention of the Head Flight Surgeon of the 5th Air Force. I was in New Guineaat the time but submitted the vest to the office of the Flight Surgeon at APO501, 15 April 1944.
20 April 1944 a complete set of blue prints of my vest wasmade at the office of the Surgeon, 5th Air Force.
23 April 1944, at the direction of the Chief Surgeon, USASOS,APO 501, I submitted a final report of the body armor to the Research andDevelopment Board, Hq., GHQ, APO 500 with an endorsement by the Chief Surgeon, Brig. GeneralG. B. Denit. The receipt of this information was acknowledged by Dr. G. R. Harrison,Chairman of this Board. The final model of the vest submitted by me differed from theJapanese in the following particulars:
"a. The vest and its metal plates are designed in alarger size than the Japanese. The plates were hammered out of steel fromplaster casts moulded on a soldier 5'7" in height weighing 150 pounds.These plates should fit all soldiers except those of an extremely small or largestature. (A marking of "medium" in Japanese characters on one of theirvests indicates that they are manufacturing them in more than one size.)
b. The space at the base of the neck just above the breastbone and the region of the large blood vessels just beneath the collar bones arecovered in the new design.
c. Better metal protection is given the flanks and the lowerpart of the abdomen.
d. A metal plate is added on the inside of the back of thevest to cover the base of the spine and the kidney areas.
e. The button arrangement of fastening the vest down thefront has been eliminated because it takes too long to discard the vest by thismethod. The front of the vest should be in one piece. The vest should befastened by one or two clasps along the left side of the chest and flank, and bya clasp on each broad shoulder strap of the vest. These last two
689
clasps should be arranged sufficiently low on the shoulder so as not to bepressed on by the rifle when carried on the shoulder or by the butt of the riflewhen firing. By this arrangement the vest can quickly be discarded in anydirection even with overlying cartridge belts, etc.
f. A small curved strip of metal should be incorporated into each shoulderstrap to help prevent the wounds incurred by missiles entering the chest throughthe space above the collar bones, when a man is charging with the upper part ofthe body bent forward.
g. In soldiers or sailors in stationary positions, where extra weight is notso important, such as crews of antiaircraft guns, additional metal plates couldbe added to protect the back and shoulders from gun fire."
I. RIDGEWAY TRIMBLE,
Lt. Colonel, MC,
Chief of Surgical Service,
118th General Hospital, APO 927
