CHAPTER XII
Wound Ballistics and Body Armor in Korea
Carl M. Herget, Ph. D., Capt. George B. Coe, Ord Corps,
and Maj. James C. Beyer, MC
Wound ballistic and body armor studies during the Korean Warcould draw upon the experiences of studies reported in earlier chapters forvaluable orientation and guidance. In addition, results of basic wound ballisticinvestigations (including body armor studies) conducted in the laboratory wereavailable to aid in the interpretation of field findings. Thus, when hostilitiesopened in Korea in June 1950, developments for field protection which had beenplanned during World War II reassumed vitality.
Before the opening of hostilities in Korea, the BiophysicsDivision of the Chemical Corps Medical Laboratories had been carrying out basicresearch in the fields of wound ballistics and body armor.1These studies entailed a comprehensive evaluation of the woundingpotential of many types of missiles, especially small arms projectiles andfragments, when striking animal tissue. Samples of armor material, includingnylon, doron (fiber glass), steel, aluminum, and combinations of these had alsobeen tested to ascertain the relative protection these materials afforded theanimal head, thorax, and abdomen against the different types of missiles. Thiswork was facilitated by background ballistic studies on these materials atOrdnance Department installations, particularly Watertown Arsenal, Mass., andAberdeen Proving Ground, Md.
BATTLE CASUALTY SURVEY-NOVEMBER 1950
With the advent of hostilities in Korea, the BiophysicsDivision, Chemical Corps Medical Laboratories, in coordination with Brig. Gen.(later Maj. Gen.) William M. Creasy, Commanding General, Chemical Corps Researchand Engineering Command, recommended to Col. (later Brig. Gen.) John R. Wood,MC, Chairman, Medical Research and Development Board, Office of the
1(1) Tillett, C. W. III, Herget, C. M., and Odell, F. A.: Preliminary Study on Body Armor Protection From Wounding. CmlC Medical Division Report No. 165, October 1948. (2) Tillett, C. W. III, Banfield, W. G. Jr., and Herget, C. M.: The Effect of a Non-Perforating Missile on the Animal Body Protected by Nylon Armor. CmlC Medical Division Report No. 208, August 1949. (3) Tillett, C. W. III, Banfield, W. G. Jr., and Herget, C. M.: The Effect of a Non-Perforating Projectile on the Animal Body Protected by Steel Armor. CmlC Medical Division Report No. 228, December 1949. (4) Tillett, C. W. III, Banfield, W. G. Jr., and Herget, C. M.: The Mechanism of Thoracic Injury Under Rigid Armor. CmlC Medical Laboratories Research Report No. 93, December 1951. (5) Coe, G. B., Michalski, J. V., Light, F. W., and Herget, C. M.: Effectiveness of Protection From Wounding by Doron and Spot-Bonded Nylon Body Armor. CmlC Medical Laboratories Research Report No. 103, March 1952.
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Surgeon General, that a wound ballistics team be organizedand dispatched to the Far East Command for the purpose of studying casualties.In response to this recommendation, a team was organized and dispatched to theFar East Command on 14 November 1950 under Department of the Army Orders, AGPA-OS200.4. Officer members of the team included Lt. Col. Robert H. Holmes and Capt.Robert F. Palmer of the Medical Corps; Capt. William R. Phillips, OrdnanceCorps; and 1st Lt. George B. Coe, Chemical Corps. The unit arrived at Haneda AirTerminal, Tokyo, Japan, on 26 November 1950, and reported directly to Maj. Gen.Edgar Erskine Hume, The Surgeon, Far East Command.
No specific plan for the actual functioning of this researchunit was previously determined; that is, whether to operate as a completelyindependent unit with or without T/D (table of distribution) or to arrange anattachment to a theater organization. After a local evaluation, it wasrecommended to the operations officer, Office of the Surgeon, Far East Command,that the Wound Ballistics Research Team be attached to the 406th Medical GeneralLaboratory, Tokyo. This recommendation had already been approved by Lt. Col.(later Col.) Robert L. Hullinghorst, MC, commanding officer of the laboratory.The attachment was made, and subsequent events proved the decision most wise.This arrangement afforded a headquarters with easy accessibility, office space,a simple means of supply and a ready source of information as to location ofmedical units and routes of casualty evacuation, and introduction in general toproper channels of command.
Conduct of Survey
After equipment and enlisted personnel were received,approximately 15 December 1950, request was made for entry into the Eighth U.S.Army Area, specifically Pyongyang (fig. 337), for attachment to the 171stEvacuation Hospital. An alternate request was also made for entry into the XCorps Area with attachment to any available MASH (mobile army surgicalhospital). Because of the entry of Chinese Communist Forces into the Korean Waron about 28 November 1950 and the strategic withdrawal of the United Nationstroops to a position below the 38th parallel, the team's entry into Korea wasdenied. The exigencies of such warfare required that all personnel and equipmentpermitted entry should contribute directly and immediately to the survival ofcombat elements.
In the meantime, a study of casualties was begun in Japan atthe Tokyo Army Hospital and the 118th Station Hospital at Fukuoka. Eventually,authority was obtained for certain members of the team to enter Korea. Thesemembers actually went as blood couriers and were then allowed to remain inKorea, where they were attached to the 3d Station Hospital at Pusan. Even thoughthe flow of casualties at this point in Korea was moderate, several hundredpatients with wounds that had received only the minimum in definitive medicalcare were studied by the team. The team also spent 2 weeks in the
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FIGURE 337.-Orientation map, Korea.
prisoner-of-war hospital at Tongnae. Through an interpreter,a thousand wounded North Korean and Chinese Communist soldiers were interviewedas to their mode of wounding, whether it be from aircraft or ground arms andwhat the wounding missile was. This information furnished some idea of theeffect of United Nations weapons on the enemy. A study of U.S. KIA casualties atthe Graves Registration Service was also accomplished at this time. However,this survey, made from records only, was of a statistical nature and is notconsidered a true picture of the type of missiles, wounds, and regional and areafrequency of lethal wounds U.S. KIA actually received. Medical records givingtype of missile and type of wounds were frequently found to be erroneous.Battlefield surgeons often did not differentiate between a gunshot wound and ashell fragment wound by external examination and often confused penetrating andperforating wounds. Correctness of information on these
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points is extremely important for the accuracy of any wound ballistics study.Training in experimental wound ballistics is necessary in order to assureaccuracy of the casualty surveys.2
Basic Scope of a Battle Casualty Survey
The basic object of all battlefield casualty studies is toanalyze the effect of firearms and their missiles upon human or experimentalanimal tissue. Modern warfare has become so versatile and changes in weaponshave been so rapid that for military purposes a study of this nature must becontinuous in both the experimental laboratory and every theater of combatoperations. These studies must extend in range from simple missile laceration tothe complicated effects of atomic weapons explosions and from the first medicalcare in a battalion aid station to the point of maximum recovery in a generalhospital or permanent disposition to a veteran's facility. As each new weaponappears, its wounding properties must be carefully evaluated. This study entailsliaison with military intelligence and ordnance; identification of enemy weaponsand missiles; knowledge of velocities, size, shape, and mass of missiles;percentage incidence of various missiles; and percentage a given body region isinvolved, as well as the proper classification of wounds. The study should alsoevaluate the method, time, and distance of evacuation in relation to primarywound treatment, wound contamination, and all other variables of wound repair. Afield wound ballistics study ideally includes a continuous study of the woundfrom the time of occurrence until the time of maximum repair followed by astudy of the functional effects of that repair and the various adaptationphenomena. Therefore, such a study demands the cooperation and coordination of avertical segment of medical personnel indoctrinated in this continuity of woundevaluation so that sample-type wounds will receive standardized observations andphotographic recording at critical intervals, throughout the scheme of medicalevacuation and hospitalization.
The following criteria were formulated by this first surveyteam and are a natural part of any battle casualty survey investigation:
1. Regional frequency of wounds (number oftimes a region is involved in total number of cases).
2. Regional distribution of wounds (number ofwounds in each region in total number of wounds).
3. Weapon and missile identification.
4. Missile frequency; that is, the number oftimes a given missile type is encountered.
5. Type of wound, distribution, and frequency.
6. Photography of wounds and organs and X-raysof body regions.
7. Special studies; for example, vascular andnerve damage, spinal cord damage, eye and ear damage, fractures, amputations,cold injury, and disease coincident with wounds.
8. SIW (self-inflicted wound) casualties, typeof weapon, missile, regional and area frequency, and distribution.
2Trained personnel of a battle casualty survey unit and indoctrination of medical personnel during peacetime maneuvers would facilitate the gathering of accurate data.-J. C. B.
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9. Studies on wounded prisoners of war and enemy killed inaction to learn the effects of U.S. weapons.
10. The ratio of single to multiple wounding.
11. The effect of wound contamination, tetanus, and gasgangrene.
12. A survey of the casualty flow as sample days in abattalion aid station, mobile army surgical hospital, and evacuation hospital.These studies should represent various tactical circumstances and would aid infuture planning procedures.
13. A study of the mode, distance, and time of medicalevacuation of casualties and the effects upon the different types of wounds.
14. A study of wound incidence, type and causative agent inthe veteran of 60-90 days' combat as compared to the nonveteran of less than30 days and the veteran of more than 120 days.
15. A study of wound incidence in personnel who have receivedsome form of rotation duty in contrast to a similar group who have not receivedrotation.
16. A general study of traumas, other than missile-inflictedwounds.
These points are but a partial listing of the studies required in a completebattle casualty study. Some of them have been accomplished, but others are onlyprojected. Fortunately, there are a few medical observers from World War I andmany with World War II experience available to thrash out their variedimpressions. Of great importance is the fact that many precedents in woundclassification, treatment, evacuation, and disposition have been established.Experienced medical personnel are available to lead the way.3
Sample of Information Desired
A consideration of war wounds thus begins with an emphasis placed upon theaccurate recording of specific medical data. The following items are a moredetailed breakdown of some of the previously listed subjects:
The etiologic agent:
1. What kind of missile was it? Size, weight, shape, typemetal?
2. Did the missile go through the tissues, or was it retained?
3. What was the weapon-enemy or friendly? Air or ground?
4. What was the approximate range of fire? Explosion distance? Angle ofincidence?
5. What was the probable velocity of the missile?
6. Was the missile single or multiple?
7. Was the hit direct fire or ricochet?
8. Are any secondary missiles present, such as equipment, clothing fragments, orother debris?
Accessory military data:
1. What was the individual doing at the time he was struck?Organization? His assignment?
2. Where was he? (in the open, dugout, etc.)
3. What kind of weapon? Terrain? Tactical situation? Weather?
4. Degree of exposure? Fatigue? Time in combat?
5. Previously wounded? When?3Unfortunately, no serious attempt has been made, as yet, toestablish these personnel on a permanent basis and provide them with thenecessary training and liaison with combat and supporting technical services.-J.C. B.
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The wound-general (certain of these factors areapplicable to the wounded in action only):
1. What was the physical state of the individual at the time of wounding?
2. What was his anatomic position when wounded?
3. What clothes or equipment covered the wound?
4. What type of contamination prevails?
5. How old is the wound?
6. What prior treatment has been given?
7. What is the general physical condition of the individual now?
8. What type of wound is it? Contusion? Laceration? Penetration? Perforation, etc.?
9. Are there additional wounds?
10. Is the part warm, hot, or cold, pallid or erythematous?
11. Is it painful or tender? Degree?
12. Is the wound dry, oozing, crusted, infected, clean or dirty?
13. How much blood and plasma have been given? When? Any evidence of reaction?
14. Is there a disease or other injury complicating the missile wound?
15. Has there been undue physical exposure since wounding?
The wound-special:
1. What is the exact anatomic location of the wound of entrance? Missile passage? What are the sizes and shapes?
2. Is there a laceration angle of the wound of entrance? Are the edges inverted? Smooth or ragged? Discolored?
3. Is there a contact ring or erythema?
4. Is there a lymphangitis?
5. Is the wound superficial or deep? Slight, moderate, or severe?
6. Is there a fracture? How much have bone fragments acted as secondary missiles?
7. Is there nerve or vascular damage?
8. Is the tissue crepitant? Is it air or body fluid? What kind of odor?
9. Is there a retained missile? What kind? Exact location?
10. How much muscle damage?
11. What is the size of the permanent tissue cavity formed by the missile's passage?
12. Is there an incarcerated hematoma?
13. How great is the tissue loss?
14. What is the exact anatomic location of the wound of exit? Are the edges inverted? Smooth, wedge-shaped? Size?
The conclusions reached by the first wound ballistics teamconcerning the administrative conduct of such a team are as follows:
A wound ballistics research team should beavailable in every theater of combat operation. The personnel component shouldbe flexible and determined by the nature of the particular mission. No T/D isrecommended. Specific advantages are achieved by having the unit on TDY(temporary duty) to the theater. This permits the complete preservation ofobjectivity in the study, enthusiasm of a small group of interested and trainedpersonnel to see a project quickly and well done, the knowledge of a deadlinefor completion, and the opportunity to leave the war zone and review thefindings in clear perspective.
A letter of introduction and a carefuldefinition of the mission should precede and accompany the team. Considerabletact is essential in preserving proper channels. Future teams are often judgedinitially on the basis of impressions left by their predecessors.
A wound ballistics research team on TDY to acombat theater should be attached immediately upon arrival to a local unit witha senior commanding officer. Supply and
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housing are thus easily managed. A letter ofauthority should precede and accompany the team for the issuance of supplies.
Data regarding regional incidence of woundsand missile frequency should be quickly disseminated to the theater surgeon forhis use in staff presentation.
Findings of Survey Unit
The findings4 of the firstbattlefield wound ballistics team of the Korean War will now be summarized, andtables giving the detailed information will then follow. The body regions andtheir projected percent of the whole were determined according to the method ofBurns and Zuckerman5 using, however, twoadditional views of the prone position. Body regions by this method gave thefollowing mean projected areas (fig. 338) and percentages:
Square feet | Percent | |
Head and neck | 0.50 | 12 |
Chest | .67 | 16 |
Abdomen | .46 | 11 |
Upper extremities | .92 | 22 |
Lower extremities | 1.65 | 39 |
Total | 4.20 | 100 |
FIGURE 338.-Anatomic location of bodyregions.
4Wound Ballistics Survey, Korea, 15 November 1950-5 May 1951, issued by the Medical Research and Development Board, Surgeon General's Office, Department of the Army.
5Burns, B. D., and Zuckerman, S.: The Wounding Power of Small Bomb and Shell Fragments. R. C. No. 350 of the Research and Experiments Department of the Ministry of Home Security.
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Wound ballistic data on 4,600 WIA casualties6indicated the following:
1. Most wounds in WIA casualties in Korea for the period from 15 November1950 to 5 May 1951 were caused by fragments (approximately 92 percent) ratherthan by small arms (approximately 7.5 percent).
2. The shell fragments were primarily mortar and grenade, since the enemy hadused little heavy artillery.
3. Most wounds were of a penetrating (72.7 percent) rather than aperforating (20.3 percent) type.
4. The 4,600 WIA casualties received 7,773 wounds. Therefore, the woundincidence was 1.69 wounds per casualty.
The regional distribution of wounds in personnel wounded in action by bodyregion is shown in table 252.
Analysis of the missile type and regional distribution of wounds in these4,600 casualties is presented in table 253.
The wounding agents and the number of wounds in each area of a body regionare presented in tables 254 through 259.
The type and frequency of the 7,773 wounds analyzed in the 4,600 cases isshown in table 260 with each area of a body region tabulated in tables 261through 266.
TABLE 252.-Regional distribution of 7,773wounds in 4,600 WIA casualties
Region | Number of wounds | Percent of total wounds |
Head and neck | 1,275 | 16.4 |
Thorax | 613 | 7.9 |
Abdomen | 481 | 6.2 |
Extemities: | ||
| Upper | 1,948 | 25.0 |
| Lower | 3,394 | 43.7 |
Genitalia | 62 | .8 |
| Total | 7,773 | 100.0 |
6The medical records of a total of 4,600 cases with7,773 wounds were reviewed at the Tokyo Army Hospital from 1 Dec. 1950 to 15Feb. 1951. The data for this section were obtained from those records.
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TABLE 253.-Regional distribution of 7,773wounds in 4,600 WIA casualties, by wounding agent
Wounding agent | Head | Thorax | Abdomen | Extemities | Genitalia | Total wounds | ||
Upper | Lower | Number | Percent | |||||
Fragment | 1,091 | 539 | 414 | 1,616 | 2,825 | 51 | 6,536 | 84.09 |
Mortar | 68 | 27 | 14 | 114 | 151 | 7 | 381 | 4.90 |
Grenade | 29 | 6 | 9 | 40 | 60 | 1 | 145 | 1.87 |
Landmine | 18 | 1 | 2 | 9 | 23 | --- | 53 | .68 |
Bomb | --- | --- | 1 | 1 | 2 | --- | 4 | .05 |
Machinegun | 7 | 5 | 13 | 17 | 56 | --- | 98 | 1.26 |
Rifle | 40 | 31 | 25 | 128 | 242 | 3 | 469 | 6.03 |
Pistol | 1 | 1 | --- | 3 | 8 | --- | 13 | .17 |
Burn | 5 | 2 | 1 | 11 | 9 | --- | 28 | .36 |
Phosphorus | 2 | --- | --- | 9 | 14 | --- | 25 | .32 |
Secondary | 14 | 1 | 2 | --- | 4 | --- | 21 | .27 |
| Total | 1,275 | 613 | 481 | 1,948 | 3,394 | 62 | 7,773 | 100.0 |
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TABLE 254.-Area distribution of 1,275 headwounds in 4,600 WIA casualties, by wounding agent
Wounding agent | Region of skull | Brain | Scalp | Face | Maxilla | Mandible | Nose | Ear | Eyelid | Eyeball | Neck | Cervical vertebra | Total wounds | |||
Frontal | Temporal | Occipital | Parietal | |||||||||||||
Fragment | 56 | 46 | 25 | 66 | 46 | 52 | 163 | 54 | 83 | 21 | 35 | 39 | 254 | 138 | 13 | 1,091 |
Mortar | 4 | --- | 2 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 13 | 2 | 8 | 1 | 3 | 3 | 20 | 7 | --- | 68 |
Grenade | 1 | --- | --- | --- | --- | 1 | 6 | 1 | 1 | --- | 1 | 3 | 12 | 3 | --- | 29 |
Landmine | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | 5 | --- | --- | --- | --- | 2 | 7 | 4 | --- | 18 |
Machinegun | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | 1 | --- | --- | --- | 1 | --- | --- | 1 | 4 | --- | 7 |
Rifle | 2 | 2 | 3 | 6 | 4 | --- | 1 | 3 | 9 | --- | --- | --- | 5 | 5 | --- | 40 |
Pistol | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | 1 | --- | --- | 1 |
Burn | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | 4 | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | 1 | --- | --- | 5 |
Phosphorus | 1 | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | 1 | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | 2 |
Secondary | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | 1 | 2 | 1 | --- | --- | --- | --- | 10 | --- | --- | 14 |
| Total | 64 | 48 | 30 | 74 | 51 | 57 | 195 | 61 | 101 | 23 | 39 | 47 | 311 | 161 | 13 | 1,275 |
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Wounding agent | Number of wounds | Wounding agent | Number of wounds |
Fragment | 539 | Rifle | 31 |
Mortar | 27 | Pistol | 1 |
Grenade | 6 | Burn | 2 |
Landmine | 1 | Secondary | 1 |
Machinegun | 5 | Total | 613 |
TABLE 256.-Area distribution of 481wounds of the abdomen in 4,600 WIA casualties, by woundingagent
Wounding agent | Abdomen1 | Stomach | Liver | Spleen | Small intestine | Colon | Rectum | Anus | Kidney | Bladder | Total wounds |
Fragment | 261 | 17 | 22 | 15 | 35 | 38 | 10 | 1 | 6 | 9 | 414 |
Mortar | 4 | 7 | 1 | --- | 1 | 1 | --- | --- | --- | --- | 14 |
Grenade | 3 | 1 | 1 | --- | 2 | 2 | --- | --- | --- | --- | 9 |
Landmine | 2 | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | 2 |
Bomb | 1 | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | 1 |
Machinegun | 7 | --- | 2 | --- | 1 | 2 | --- | --- | 1 | --- | 13 |
Rifle | 12 | --- | 3 | 2 | 4 | 3 | --- | --- | 1 | --- | 25 |
Burn | 1 | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | 1 |
Secondary | --- | 1 | 1 | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | 2 |
| Total | 291 | 26 | 30 | 17 | 43 | 46 | 10 | 1 | 8 | 9 | 481 |
1Specific region not specified.
Wounding agent | Shoulder | Axilla | Arm | Elbow | Forearm | Head | Fingers | Total wounds |
Fragment | 335 | 13 | 529 | 78 | 238 | 303 | 120 | 1,616 |
Mortar | 36 | --- | 36 | 5 | 7 | 28 | 2 | 114 |
Grenade | 4 | 1 | 10 | --- | 7 | 10 | 8 | 40 |
Landmine | 1 | --- | 4 | --- | --- | 4 | --- | 9 |
Bomb | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | 1 | --- | 1 |
Machinegun | 6 | --- | 7 | 1 | 1 | 2 | --- | 17 |
Rifle | 39 | --- | 28 | 4 | 25 | 27 | 5 | 128 |
Pistol | 1 | --- | --- | 1 | --- | 1 | --- | 3 |
Burn | --- | --- | 4 | --- | --- | 7 | --- | 11 |
Phosphorus | 2 | --- | 2 | --- | 1 | 4 | --- | 9 |
| Total | 424 | 14 | 620 | 89 | 279 | 387 | 135 | 1,948 |
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Wounding agent | Buttocks | Hip | Thigh | Knee | Leg | Foot | Toes | Total wounds |
Fragment | 240 | 131 | 797 | 199 | 941 | 478 | 39 | 2,825 |
Mortar | 12 | 2 | 41 | 10 | 60 | 26 | --- | 151 |
Grenade | 6 | 1 | 10 | 3 | 25 | 12 | 3 | 60 |
Landmine | 2 | 1 | 6 | 2 | 11 | 1 | --- | 23 |
Bomb | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | 2 | --- | 2 |
Machinegun | 3 | 4 | 23 | 1 | 13 | 12 | --- | 56 |
Rifle | 14 | 7 | 87 | 20 | 71 | 41 | 2 | 242 |
Pistol | 1 | 2 | 1 | --- | 1 | 3 | --- | 8 |
Burn | 3 | --- | 1 | --- | 4 | 1 | --- | 9 |
Phosphorus | 2 | --- | 4 | 1 | 6 | 1 | --- | 14 |
Secondary | --- | --- | --- | 1 | 3 | --- | --- | 4 |
| Total | 283 | 148 | 970 | 237 | 1,135 | 577 | 44 | 3,394 |
TABLE 259.-Area distribution of 62 woundsof the genitalia in 4,600 WIA casualties, by woundingagent
Wounding agent | Scrotum | Penis | Testicles | Total wounds |
Fragment | 31 | 17 | 3 | 51 |
Mortar | 4 | 3 | --- | 7 |
Grenade | 1 | --- | --- | 1 |
Rifle | 1 | 1 | 1 | 3 |
| Total | 37 | 21 | 4 | 62 |
TABLE 260.-Distribution of 7,773 wounds in4,600 WIA casualties, by type of wound
Type of wound | Number of wounds | Percent of total wounds |
Penetration | 5,653 | 72.7 |
Perforation | 1,578 | 20.3 |
Laceration | 338 | 4.4 |
Amputation | 96 | 1.2 |
Avulsion | 59 | .8 |
Contusion | 49 | .6 |
| Total | 7,773 | 100.0 |
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TABLE 261.-Area distribution of 1,275 headwounds in 4,600 WIA casualties, by type of wound
Area | Penetration | Perforation | Superficial | Laceration | Contusion | Avulsion | Concussion | Total wounds |
Scalp | 31 | 2 | 4 | 18 | 2 | 2 | --- | 59 |
Region of skull: | ||||||||
| Frontal | 54 | 1 | 2 | 5 | --- | --- | 13 | 75 |
| Temporal | 47 | 1 | 1 | 4 | --- | --- | 2 | 55 |
| Parietal | 71 | 1 | --- | 4 | --- | --- | 2 | 78 |
| Occipital | 23 | --- | --- | 2 | --- | --- | 1 | 26 |
Brain | 38 | 2 | --- | 8 | 7 | --- | 9 | 64 |
Face | 162 | 7 | 6 | 14 | --- | --- | 1 | 190 |
Maxilla | 47 | 3 | --- | 6 | 1 | --- | --- | 57 |
Mandible | 75 | 15 | --- | 4 | --- | 1 | --- | 95 |
Nose | 17 | 5 | 1 | --- | --- | --- | --- | 23 |
| Eyelid | 28 | 3 | --- | 14 | 1 | 1 | --- | 47 |
| Eyeball | 254 | 18 | 5 | 8 | 3 | 6 | --- | 294 |
| Ear | 30 | 3 | 1 | 5 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 43 |
| Neck | 132 | 16 | 4 | 6 | --- | --- | --- | 158 |
| Cervical vertebra | 8 | 3 | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | 11 |
| Total | 1,017 | 80 | 24 | 98 | 15 | 12 | 29 | 1,275 |
TABLE 262.-Distribution of 613 wounds ofthe thorax in 4,600 WIA casualties, by type of wound
Type of wound | Rib cage | Thoracic vertebra | Back1 | Total wounds |
Penetration | 414 | 19 | 80 | 513 |
Perforation | 51 | 3 | 10 | 64 |
Superficial | 11 | --- | 4 | 15 |
Laceration | 10 | 1 | 3 | 14 |
Contusion | 2 | 1 | 2 | 5 |
Avulsion | 1 | --- | 1 | 2 |
| Total | 489 | 24 | 100 | 613 |
1Specific site not specified.
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TABLE 263.-Area distribution of 481 wounds of the abdomenin 4,600 WIA casualties, by type of wound
Type of wound | Abdominal wall | Inguinal region | Lumbar region | Sacral region | Stomach | Spleen | Liver | Kidney | Bladder | Small intestine | Colon | Rectum | Anus | Posterior | Total wounds |
Penetration | 140 | 4 | 28 | 1 | 3 | 7 | 11 | 3 | 6 | 12 | 15 | 4 | 1 | 74 | 309 |
Perforation | 38 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 5 | 3 | 14 | 4 | 3 | 24 | 27 | 5 | --- | 10 | 138 |
Superficial | 4 | --- | --- | 1 | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | 1 | 2 | 1 | --- | 3 | 12 |
Laceration | 4 | --- | --- | --- | --- | 1 | 2 | 1 | --- | 1 | 1 | --- | --- | 3 | 13 |
Contusion | 1 | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | 1 | --- | 1 | --- | --- | --- | 3 | 6 |
Avulsion | 1 | --- | 1 | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | 1 | 3 |
| Total | 188 | 5 | 32 | 3 | 8 | 11 | 27 | 9 | 9 | 39 | 45 | 10 | 1 | 94 | 481 |
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Type of wound | Axilla | Shoulder | Arm | Elbow | Forearm | Hand | Fingers | Total wounds |
Penetration | 13 | 310 | 455 | 67 | 207 | 262 | 90 | 1,404 |
Perforation | --- | 92 | 121 | 26 | 68 | 77 | 32 | 416 |
Superficial | --- | 8 | 15 | 2 | 2 | 7 | --- | 34 |
Laceration | --- | 8 | 6 | --- | 4 | 11 | 3 | 32 |
Contusion | --- | 1 | 3 | 1 | --- | 3 | --- | 8 |
Avulsion | --- | 1 | 1 | --- | 2 | 5 | 4 | 13 |
Amputation | --- | --- | 6 | 2 | 1 | 6 | 26 | 41 |
| Total | 13 | 420 | 607 | 98 | 284 | 371 | 155 | 1,948 |
Type of wound | Buttocks | Hip | Thigh | Knee | Leg | Foot | Toes | Total wounds |
Penetration | 231 | 117 | 644 | 170 | 779 | 377 | 26 | 2,344 |
Perforation | 42 | 20 | 275 | 54 | 283 | 171 | 15 | 860 |
Superficial | 5 | 1 | 11 | 3 | 17 | 5 | --- | 42 |
Laceration | 4 | 4 | 16 | 5 | 14 | 10 | 1 | 54 |
Contusion | --- | 3 | --- | --- | 6 | 4 | --- | 13 |
Avulsion | 7 | --- | 5 | 6 | 3 | 5 | 1 | 27 |
Amputation | --- | --- | 10 | 2 | 25 | 11 | 6 | 54 |
| Total | 289 | 145 | 961 | 240 | 1,127 | 583 | 49 | 3,394 |
TABLE 266.-Areadistribution of 62 wounds of the genitalia in 4,600 WIA casualties, by type of wound
Type of wound | Scrotum | Penis | Testicle | Total wounds |
Penetration | 32 | 15 | 2 | 49 |
Perforation | 3 | 3 | 1 | 7 |
Laceration | 3 | 2 | --- | 5 |
Avulsion | 1 | --- | --- | 1 |
| Total | 39 | 20 | 3 | 62 |
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Single Versus Multiple Wounding
Another analysis was made for the single and multiplewounding for the WIA cases studied. The following possibilities were considered:(1) A single wound in one area, (2) a single wound in one area and a singlewound in another, (3) a single wound in one area with multiple wounds inanother, (4) multiple wounds in one area, (5) multiple wounds in the area understudy (called the local area) and a single wound in another area, and (6)multiple wounds in the local area and multiple wounds elsewhere. Table 267summarizes the incidence of single versus multiple woundings in 4,600 casualtieswith 7,467 wounds known to be either single (2,621) or multiple (4,846). Of thetotal 7,773 wounds, the type of wounding (single or multiple) was unknown for 306 wounds.
TABLE 267.- Distribution of 7,467wounds in 4,600 WIA casualties, by type of wounding
Type of wounding | Number of wounds | Percent of wounds |
Single local, single elsewhere | 3,312 | 44.3 |
Single local | 2,621 | 35.1 |
Multiple local, multiple elsewhere | 1,001 | 13.4 |
Single local, multiple elsewhere | 257 | 3.5 |
Multiple local | 173 | 2.3 |
Multiple local, single elsewhere | 103 | 1.4 |
| Total | 7,467 | 100.0 |
Although each casualty averaged a 1.69 wound incidence, 35percent showed only a single wound in one area and 44 percent showed a singlewound in one area with only a single wound in another area. These findings aresignificant in that such a large percentage of wounded in action (79 percent)shows only one or two wounds. Since approximately 89 percent of the total woundswere caused by shell fragments, usually mortar or grenade, the chance factor ofbeing struck is emphasized even though the missile density is quite great. Itwould appear that a bursting mortar shell or grenade if near enough to produceone wound would have an excellent chance to produce many wounds with itsfragmentation-spray pattern. A few instances of this were seen, but as shown inthe tables most of the fragments actually miss. How many strike anotherindividual is not known. Tables 268 through 273 list the single versus multiplewounding according to the various body regions.
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TABLE 268.-Area distribution of 1,189wounds of the head in 4,600 WIA casualties, by type of wounding
Type of wounding | Region of skull | Brain | Scalp | Ear | Face | Maxilla | Mandible | Eye | Nose | Neck | Cervical vertebra | Total wounds | |||
Frontal | Temporal | Occipital | Parietal | ||||||||||||
Single local | 19 | 13 | 10 | 39 | 10 | 23 | 10 | 21 | 12 | 37 | 64 | 2 | 41 | 4 | 305 |
Single local, single elsewhere | 23 | 25 | 12 | 24 | 36 | 24 | 23 | 69 | 32 | 46 | 140 | 15 | 53 | 6 | 528 |
Single local, multiple elsewhere | 4 | 3 | 1 | 3 | 2 | --- | 1 | 8 | 2 | 1 | 40 | 3 | 15 | --- | 83 |
Multiple local | 2 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 1 | --- | 7 | --- | 2 | 24 | --- | 1 | 2 | 46 |
Multiple local, single elsewhere | 1 | 1 | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | 13 | --- | 2 | 1 | --- | 6 | --- | 24 |
Multiple local, multiple elsewhere | 8 | 4 | 1 | 5 | --- | 3 | 4 | 74 | 9 | 7 | 68 | 2 | 18 | --- | 203 |
| Total | 57 | 47 | 26 | 73 | 50 | 51 | 38 | 192 | 55 | 95 | 337 | 22 | 134 | 12 | 1,189 |
Type of wounding | Pulmonary | Rib cage | Heart | Thoracic vertebra | Back | Total wounds |
Single local | 1 | 179 | --- | 9 | 26 | 215 |
Single local, single elsewhere | 2 | 221 | --- | 12 | 47 | 282 |
Single local, multiple elsewhere | --- | 12 | 1 | --- | 3 | 16 |
Multiple local | --- | 10 | --- | --- | 2 | 12 |
Multiple local, single elsewhere | --- | 6 | --- | 1 | 4 | 11 |
Multiple local, multiple elsewhere | --- | 42 | --- | 1 | 15 | 58 |
| Total | 3 | 470 | 1 | 23 | 97 | 594 |
708
Type of wound | Abdominal wall | Posterior | Stomach | Liver | Spleen | Small intestine | Colon | Rectum | Anus | Kidney | Bladder | Lumbar vertebra | Sacral vertebra | Total wounds |
Single local | 59 | 27 | 2 | 5 | 1 | 4 | 7 | 3 | 1 | --- | 1 | 14 | 1 | 125 |
Single local, single elsewhere | 102 | 46 | 5 | 14 | 8 | 29 | 28 | 8 | --- | 7 | 8 | 13 | --- | 268 |
Single local, multiple elsewhere | 8 | 3 | --- | 2 | --- | --- | 3 | --- | --- | --- | --- | 1 | --- | 17 |
Multiple local | 5 | 3 | --- | 2 | --- | 1 | 2 | --- | --- | --- | --- | 2 | --- | 15 |
Multiple local, single elsewhere | 3 | 3 | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | 6 |
Multiple local, multiple elsewhere | 11 | 15 | 1 | 2 | --- | 3 | 1 | --- | --- | --- | --- | 2 | --- | 35 |
| Total | 188 | 97 | 8 | 25 | 9 | 37 | 41 | 11 | 1 | 7 | 9 | 32 | 1 | 466 |
709
| Type of wounding | Buttocks | Hip | Thigh | Knee | Leg | Foot | Toe | Total | |
| Single local | 80 | 49 | 412 | 118 | 406 | 285 | 23 | 1,373 | |
Single local, single elsewhere | 133 | 77 | 403 | 86 | 404 | 173 | 10 | 1, 286 | |
Single local, multiple elsewhere | 7 | 6 | 12 | 1 | 28 | 14 | 2 | 70 | |
| Multiple local | 7 | 2 | 14 | 10 | 15 | 19 | --- | 67 | |
Multiple local, single elsewhere | 3 | --- | 2 | 4 | 23 | 7 | --- | 39 | |
| Multiple local, multiple elsewhere | 47 | 13 | 85 | 24 | 189 | 50 | 9 | 417 | |
| Total |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| Type of wounding | Penis | Scrotum | Testicles | Total wounds | |
| Single local | 1 | 2 | --- | 3 | |
Single local, single elsewhere | 15 | 30 | 3 | 48 | |
Single local, multiple elsewhere | 1 | 1 | --- | 2 | |
| Multiple local | --- | 1 | --- | 1 | |
| Multiple local, multiple elsewhere | 2 | 2 | --- | 4 | |
| Total |
|
|
|
|
710
Incidence of Fractures
Among the 4,600 casualties, there was a total of 1,762 fractures (table 274). The incidence of fractures of theknown body areas was 44.4 percent for the lower extremities, 34.8 percent for the upper extremities, 13.5 percent for the head,4.5 percent for the thorax, and 0.9 percent for the vertebral column.Approximately one out of four casualties had a fracture and almost one out oftwo was evacuated to the Zone of Interior.
TABLE 274.- Distribution of1,762 fractures in 4,600 WIA casualties, by site of fracture
| Site of fracture | Number of | Percent for body |
| Lower extremities: | ||
| Foot | 261 | 33.4 |
| Leg | 246 | 31.4 |
| Femur | 164 | 21.0 |
| Knee | 57 | 7.3 |
| Toe | 30 | 3.8 |
| Hip | 24 | 3.1 |
| Total | 782 | 100.0 |
Upper extremities: | ||
| Arm | 154 | 25.2 |
| Hand | 150 | 24.6 |
| Forearm | 108 | 17.7 |
| Shoulder | 90 | 14.7 |
| Fingers | 63 | 10.3 |
| Elbow | 46 | 7.5 |
| Total | 611 | 100.0 |
Head and neck: | ||
| Mandible | 66 | 27.7 |
| Parietal lobe | 56 | 23.5 |
| Frontal lobe | 37 | 15.6 |
| Temporal lobe | 21 | 8.8 |
| Maxilla | 13 | 5.5 |
| Nose | 7 | 2.9 |
| Face | 6 | 2.5 |
| Ear | 3 | 1.3 |
| Eye (orbit) | 2 | .8 |
| Vertebra (cervical) | 23 | 9.7 |
| Unknown | 4 | 1.7 |
| Total | 238 | 100.0 |
Thorax: | ||
| Ribs | 68 | 85.0 |
| Vertebra | 12 | 15.0 |
| Total | 80 | 100.0 |
Abdomen: | ||
| Lumbar vertebra | 15 | 94.0 |
| Sacral vertebra | 1 | 6.0 |
| Total | 16 | 100.0 |
Site unknown | 35 |
711
Excluding 51 fractures (16 vertebral and 35 site unknown), it was found thatslightly more than 90 percent of the fractures were compound comminuted.
Of the 4,600 WIA casualties, 34 (0.7 percent) died of wounds. Of theremaining 4,566 casualties, 2,893 (62.9 percent) were evacuated to the Zone ofInterior and 1,673 (36.4 percent) were returned to duty (table 275).
TABLE 275.-Disposition of 4,566 WIA casualties, by region wounded
| Region wounded | Returned to duty | Evacuated to the Zone of Interior | Total casualties | |
| Number | Number | Number | ||
Extremities: | ||||
| Lower | 938 | 1,209 | 2,147 | |
| Upper | 284 | 767 | 1,051 | |
| Head | 230 | 502 | 732 | |
| Thorax | 132 | 226 | 358 | |
| Abdomen | 83 | 167 | 250 | |
| Genitalia | 6 | 22 | 28 | |
| Total | 1, 673 | 2, 893 | 4, 566 |
Peripheral Nerve Injuries
A study of peripheral nerve wounds was also made, at the Tokyo Army Hospital,on 200 cases sustaining this type ofinjury, and the data were analyzed for causative agent (table 276). In order toobtain these 200 peripheral nerve cases, it was necessary to examine the recordsof 1,872 cases.
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Anatomic location of nerve | Missile unknown | Gunshot | Mortar | Shell fragment, caliber unknown | Hand grenade | Artillery shell | Landmine | Machine gun | Total cases |
Head: | |||||||||
| Facial | 7 | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | 7 |
| Mandibular | 2 | 1 | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | 3 |
| Maxillary | 1 | 2 | 1 | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | 4 |
| Total | 10 | 3 | 1 | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | 14 |
Upper extremities: | |||||||||
| Axillary | --- | 2 | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | 2 |
| Radial | 24 | 7 | 7 | 2 | --- | 1 | --- | --- | 41 |
| Ulnar | 23 | 9 | 4 | 1 | --- | 1 | 1 | --- | 39 |
| Median | 13 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | --- | --- | 19 |
| Brachial | 4 | 2 | --- | 2 | --- | --- | --- | --- | 8 |
| Total | 64 | 21 | 13 | 6 | 1 | 3 | 1 | --- | 109 |
Lower extremities: | |||||||||
| Tibial | 19 | 1 | 2 | 1 | --- | --- | --- | --- | 23 |
| Femoral | 7 | 1 | --- | 1 | --- | --- | --- | 1 | 10 |
| Peroneal | 14 | 3 | 2 | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | 19 |
| Popliteal | 4 | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | 4 |
| Plantar | --- | --- | --- | 1 | 1 | --- | --- | --- | 2 |
| Cutaneous | 4 | 2 | 1 | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | 7 |
| Sciatic | 8 | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | 1 | 9 |
| Pudendal | 2 | 1 | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | 3 |
| Total | 58 | 8 | 5 | 3 | 1 | --- | --- | 2 | 77 |
| 132 | 32 | 19 | 9 | 2 | 3 | 1 | 2 | 200 |
Vascular Wounds
Concurrently, a survey was made on vascular wounds, records of which wereavailable on 100 cases (tables 277, 278, and 279). In order to obtain thissample, it was necessary to examine the records of 2,609 battle casualties.
713
TABLE 277.- Distribution of 100 cases of vascular damage, by type of wound
| Type of wound | Artery | Artery and | Vein | Total |
| Penetrating | 42 | 12 | 1 | 55 |
| Perforating | 39 | 3 | 1 | 43 |
| Lacerating | 1 | --- | --- | 1 |
| Contused | 1 | --- | --- | 1 |
| Total | 83 | 15 |
| 100 |
TABLE 278.-Distribution of 100 cases of vascular damage and associated bone and nerve injury
| Vascular and associated injury | Artery | Artery and | Vein | Total | |
| Fracture | 5 | 3 | --- | 8 | |
| Nerve damage | 19 | --- | --- | 19 | |
| Fracture and nerve damage | 39 | --- | --- | 39 | |
| Fracture, nerve and vascular to be determined1 | 7 | --- | --- | 7 | |
| Aneurysm | 3 | 11 | --- | 14 | |
| Vascular damage alone | 10 | 1 | 2 | 13 | |
| Total | 83 | 15 |
| 100 |
1In these cases, there was clinical evidence of vascular and/or nerve damagebut its exact location had not been defined.
TABLE 279.-Distributionof 100 cases of vascular injury, by type of missile causing damage
Type of missile | Artery | Artery and | Vein | Total | |
| Missile, unknown | 58 | 13 | 2 | 73 | |
| Shell fragment, unknown | 3 | --- | --- | 3 | |
| Shell arms | 11 | 2 | --- | 13 | |
| Machinegun | 3 | --- | --- | 3 | |
| Mortar | 8 | --- | --- | 8 | |
| Total | 83 |
|
|
|
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The regional and area frequency of the vascular damage in the 100cases was as follows:
| Number of cases | |
Head and neck: | |
| Artery not specified | 4 |
| Temporal artery | 1 |
| Mandibular artery | 2 |
| Carotid artery | 1 |
| Carotid artery and vein | 3 |
Thorax, artery not specified | 1 |
Lumbar vertebra, artery not specified | 1 |
Upper extremity: | |
| Shoulder, artery not specified | 1 |
| Axillary artery | 2 |
| Brachial artery | 10 |
| Brachial artery and vein | 2 |
| Radial artery | 9 |
| Radial artery and vein | 2 |
| Ulnar artery | 2 |
Lower extremity: | |
| Pudendal artery | 2 |
| Femoral artery | 14 |
| Femoral artery and vein | 3 |
| Femoral vein | 2 |
| Popliteal artery | 3 |
| Popliteal artery and vein | 2 |
| Tibial anterior artery | 5 |
| Tibial anterior artery and vein | 1 |
| Tibial posterior artery | 3 |
| Tibial posterior artery and vein | 2 |
| Artery not specified | 20 |
| Sural artery | 1 |
| Peroneal artery | 1 |
| Total | 100 |
Self-Inflicted Wounds
A study of self-inflicted wounds, both accidental and deliberate, revealed that,in the 2,605 wounded casesstudied, 116 (4.4 percent) were self-inflicted (table 280).
TABLE 280.-Distribution of 116 self-inflictedwounds in 2,605 casualties, by region
Region | Number of wounds | Percent of total wounds |
Left lower extremities | 53 | 45.7 |
Right lower extremities | 36 | 31.0 |
Left upper extremities | 18 | 15.5 |
Right upper extremities | 5 | 4.3 |
Miscellaneous | 4 | 3.5 |
| Total | 116 | 100.0 |
715
Survey of Turkish Brigade
The opportunity presented itself to make a casualty survey onwounded personnel all from one unit who were injured during a known period ofcombat. Members of the Turkish Brigade were interviewed at the Tokyo ArmyHospital. This Brigade had been in action for 3 nights and 3 days (from thenight of 27 November 1950 to the dayof 30 November 1950) in the vicinity of Kunuri, Korea. A total of 407 injuredwere evacuated to Japan of which 387 were considered to have been hit by enemymissiles (the remainder were disease cases or nonbattle casualties). Of the 387wounded in action, 286 were individually interrogated. This represented 74percent of all the WIA casualties evacuated to Japan. The number of WIAcasualties who remained in Korea was not known, but the number was believed tobe small, and it was thought all were promptly returned to duty.
Interrogations, aided by Turkish officers who were availableas interpreters, lasted from 5 to 15 minutes per casualty. What error, if any, was introduced by this procedure is unknown. Answers wereusually prompt and direct. Most of the Turkish soldiers appeared very certain ofthe type of the weapons producing the missiles with which they were hit,sometimes stating the enemy was so close that the weapons were visible, orotherwise being able to give good reasons for distinguishing between mortar andgrenade hits. The interrogation was accompanied by examination of the casualty.
The 286 WIA casualties incurred a total of 950 wounds (fig.339), as listed in table 281.
Body region | Hits on- | Total hits | Percent of total body area | ||||
Anterior surface | Posterior surface | ||||||
Number | Percent | Number | Percent | Number | Percent | ||
Head | 61 | 6.4 | 15 | 1.6 | 76 | 8.0 | 12.0 |
Chest | 21 | 2.2 | 117 | 12.4 | 138 | 14.6 | 16.0 |
Abdomen | 31 | 3.3 | 16 | 1.6 | 47 | 4.9 | 11.0 |
Extremities: | |||||||
| Upper | 69 | 7.3 | 119 | 12.5 | 188 | 19.8 | 22.0 |
| Lower | 253 | 26.6 | 248 | 26.1 | 501 | 52.7 | 39.0 |
| 435 | 45.8 | 515 | 54.2 | 950 | 100.0 | 100.0 |
716
FIGURE 339.-Location of wounds in 286 Turkish soldiers wounded in action.
The missiles responsible for these wounds are listed in table 282.
An attemptwas made to determine the mean estimated length of trajectories for thecausative agents from the site of origin to the man hit. No attempt was made todiscard any data (such as mortar shell fragment hits alleged to have occurred ata 200-400 meter range). The reported mean ranges were given to establishorders of magnitude, as follows:
| Type of missile: | Mean estimated length of trajectories |
| Rifle | 112.5?101.0 |
| Machinegun | 70.7?83.1 |
| Mortar fragments | 9.7?18.8 |
| Hand grenade fragments | 5.1?4.6 |
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TABLE 282.-Distribution of 950 hits on 286 Turkish WIA casualties, by type of missile
Type of missile | Number of hits | Percent of hits |
Small arms: | ||
| Rifle | 149 | 15.7 |
| Pistol | 10 | 1.1 |
| Machinegun | 59 | 6.2 |
| Submachinegun | 18 | 1.9 |
| Unknown | 21 | 2.2 |
| Total | 257 | 27.1 |
Fragment: | ||
| Mortar | 559 | 58.9 |
| Hand grenade | 111 | 11.7 |
| Secondary missile | 2 | .2 |
| Unknown fragment | 20 | 2.2 |
| Total | 692 | 73.0 |
Antitank gun1 | 1 | .1 |
| 950 | 100.0 |
1Not considered a small arms hit nor a fragment hit.
When the estimated ranges were broken down for missilescausing perforating and penetrating wounds, the results were generally in linewith the expectation that missiles producing perforating wounds would come fromshorter ranges (that is, have higher velocities):
Mean estimated ranges | ||
Missiles causing | Missiles causing | |
Type of missile: | ||
| Rifle | 109.0 | 118.0 |
| Machinegun | 55.3 | 102.7 |
| Mortar fragment | 39.6 | 8.8 |
| Hand grenade fragment | 1.2 | 6.0 |
It will be noted, in the tabulation just listed, that themortar fragments are reversed from the normal expectation. Had the allegedoccurrence of perforating mortar fragment wounds at ranges of over 100 metersbeen discarded as an error in judgment of range, the mean values would havebecome 4.3 meters for the perforating missiles and 8.1 meters for thepenetrating ones. This relationship is in the proper order.
Degree of damage from various wounding agents was assessed ona 1 to 4 scale (table 283).
718
TABLE 283.-Distribution of 233determinations of the degree of damage caused by each type of missile
| Type of missile | Degree of damage1 | Total determinations | ||||
1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | |||
Small arms: | ||||||
| Rifle | 67 | 10 | --- | 2 | 79 | |
| Pistol | 2 | --- | --- | --- | 2 | |
| Machinegun | 22 | --- | 5 | --- | 27 | |
| Submachinegun | 7 | 1 | 2 | --- | 10 | |
| Unknown | 15 | 1 | 1 | --- | 17 | |
| Total | 113 | 12 | 8 | 2 | 135 | |
Fragments from- | ||||||
| Mortar | 53 | 10 | 1 | 5 | 69 | |
| Hand grenade | 19 | 3 | 1 | 2 | 25 | |
| Unknown missile | 2 | 1 | --- | --- | 3 | |
| Antitank gun | --- | --- | --- | 1 | 1 | |
| Total | 74 | 14 | 2 | 8 | 98 | |
| 187 | 26 | 10 | 10 | 233 | |
1Degree 1.-Size of wound of entrance in any one dimensionnot more than three times the size of missile, provided the missile was notgreater than 1 cm. in any dimension.
Degree 2.-Size of defect of the wound of entrance greaterthan 3 cm. in any one dimension (regardless of missile size) but less than 5 cm.in its greatest dimension.
Degree 3.-Same as degree 2 for defects from 5 to 10 cm. intheir greatest dimension.
Degree 4.-Same as degree 3 for defects measuring over 10cm. in any one dimension.
It was also possible to analyze the incidence of casualtiesoccurring during the day and during the night. A total of 216 casualties wereavailable but, because 30 sustained hits from more than one type of missile, itwas necessary to list these more than once. Therefore, the data total 250casualties and are prescribed in table 284.
Finally, it was possible to estimate the number of enemycasualties resulting from the efforts of 108 Turkish soldiers (table 285). Notshown in the table are the numbers of enemy casualties which the Turks claim tohave produced after they (the Turks) had been wounded.
Autopsy Study of DOW Casualties
The reports of autopsy findings on 125 WIA casualties whowere hospitalized and died later were made available for study by the 406thMedical General Laboratory. An analysis of the missile type involved in thesecases and the immediate cause of death are shown in tables 286 and 287. Thehead, the thorax, and the abdomen were the principal regions involved, with
719
| Type of missile | Day of casualties | Night casualties | |||
Number | Percent | Number | Percent | ||
Small arms: | |||||
| Rifle | 67 | 26.8 | 19 | 7.6 | |
| Pistol | 1 | .4 | 1 | .4 | |
| Machinegun | 19 | 7.6 | 12 | 4.7 | |
| Submachinegun | 6 | 2.4 | 5 | 2.0 | |
| Unknown | 9 | 3.6 | 8 | 3.2 | |
| Total | 102 | 40.8 | 45 | 17.9 | |
Fragments: | |||||
| Mortar | 31 | 12.4 | 38 | 15.2 | |
| Hand grenade | 15 | 6.0 | 13 | 5.3 | |
| Unknown | 4 | 1.6 | 1 | .4 | |
| Antitank gun | --- | --- | 1 | .4 | |
| Total | 50 | 20.0 | 53 | 21.3 | |
| 152 | 60.8 | 98 | 39.2 | |
Weapon | Enemy killed or wounded | Turkish soldiers involved |
| Number | |
M1 rifle | 268 | 65 |
Carbine | 5 | 2 |
Pistol | 4 | 2 |
Machinegun | 838 | 16 |
Submachinegun | 45 | 6 |
Browning automatic rifle | 6 | 1 |
Hand grenade | 100 | 17 |
Bazooka | 6 | 3 |
Bayonet | 22 | 9 |
Knife | 1 | 1 |
Strangled | 3 | 1 |
Burned | 3 | 1 |
| Total | 1,301 |
720
14.4 percent of the cases showing involvementof the extremities alone. Small armsfire accounted for 56.6 percent of the casualties, andthis approximates the incidence seen in KIAcasualties. Cases with head wounds showed an averagesurvival time of 12.6 days; thoracic wounds, 4.5 days;abdominal wounds, 14 days; extremity wounds, 7.6 days; andwounds of the spine, 19 days.
TABLE 286.-Frequency ofcausative agent producing wounds in 125 DOW casualties,by body region
Body region | Unknown missile | Gunshot | Shell fragment | Mortar | Grenade | Mine | Bayonet | Crushing | Chemical burns | Total casualties (number) |
Head | 11 | 14 | 7 | 3 | 1 | --- | --- | --- | --- | 36 |
Spine | 1 | 4 | 1 | 1 | --- | --- | 1 | --- | --- | 8 |
Thorax | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | 4 |
Abdomen | 6 | 7 | 1 | 2 | 2 | --- | --- | 1 | --- | 19 |
Thorax and abdomen | --- | 10 | 1 | 1 | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | 12 |
Extremities | 2 | 6 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 1 | --- | 1 | 18 |
Abdomen and extremities | 1 | 5 | 2 | --- | 1 | --- | --- | --- | --- | 9 |
Thorax and spine | --- | 3 | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | 3 |
Abdomen, thorax, and spine | --- | 1 | 2 | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | 3 |
Head and extremities | --- | 1 | 2 | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | 3 |
Abdomen and spine | --- | 2 | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | 2 |
Miscellaneous | 2 | 4 | 1 | 1 | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | 8 |
| Total | 24 | 58 | 21 | 10 | 5 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 125 |
Source: Autopsy reports from 406th Medical General Laboratory, Tokyo, Japan.
Study of KIA Casualties
A survey of the records of 1,500personnel killed in action was conducted at theQuartermaster Graves Registration unit, Pusan, Korea, during January 1951.Of the KIA casualties sustained by the United Nations forces during thisperiod, 63 percent were due to enemy small arms fire, 26.9percent to shell fragments, 2.8 percent to mortar, 2percent to mines, 0.7 percent to grenades, 0.5 percent toartillery, and 4.1 percent to miscellaneous agents. Thiswas in marked contrast to the results obtained from ananalysis of the WIA cases whichshowed that fragments of all types were responsible forabout 92 percent of the wounds. Table 288 shows theregional frequency of fatal wounds in the 1,500 KIA casualties.
721
TABLE 287. -Anatomic cause of death andbody region wounded in 125 DOW casualties
Anatomic cause of death | Head | Vertebra | Thorax | Abdomen | Thorax, abdomen | Extremity | Abdomen, extremity | Thorax, vertebra | Thorax, abdomen, vertebra | Head, extremity | Abdomen, vertebra | Miscel- laneous | Total |
Brain damage | 14 | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | 14 |
Cerebellar hemorrhage | --- | --- | 1 | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | 1 | 2 |
Brain abscess | 5 | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | 5 |
Meningitis | 5 | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | 5 |
Japanese B encephalitis | 7 | --- | --- | --- | --- | 1 | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | 8 |
Japanese B encephalitis and peritonitis | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | 1 | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | 1 |
Poliomyelitis | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | 1 | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | 1 |
Pneumonia | --- | 4 | --- | --- | --- | --- | 1 | --- | 1 | 1 | --- | 1 | 8 |
Other pulmonary | 4 | 2 | 3 | --- | --- | --- | --- | 3 | --- | --- | --- | --- | 12 |
Myocarditis | --- | 1 | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | 1 |
Mediastinal hemorrhage | --- | --- | --- | --- | 1 | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | 1 |
Peritonitis | --- | --- | --- | 7 | 4 | --- | 1 | --- | 2 | --- | 1 | 1 | 16 |
Fat embolization | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | 2 | --- | --- | --- | 1 | --- | --- | 3 |
Shock | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | 1 | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | 1 |
Anesthetic | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | 1 | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | 1 |
Lower nephron nephrosis | 1 | --- | --- | 2 | 3 | 5 | 1 | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | 12 |
Lower nephron nephrosis with peritonitis | --- | --- | --- | 10 | 3 | --- | 4 | --- | --- | --- | 1 | 1 | 19 |
Lower nephron nephrosis and fat embolization | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | 3 | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | 1 | 4 |
Lower nephron nephrosis and shock | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | 2 | --- | --- | --- | 1 | --- | --- | 3 |
Lower nephron nephrosis and gas infection | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | 1 | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | 1 |
Lower nephon nephrosis and meningitis | --- | 1 | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | 1 |
Lower nephron nephrosis and transverse myelitis | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | 1 | 1 |
Lower nephron nephrosis and pulmonary | --- | --- | --- | --- | 1 | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | 1 | 2 |
Tetanus | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | 1 | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | 1 |
Arteriovenous fistula | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | 1 | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | 1 |
Laryngeal obstruction | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | 1 | 1 |
Source: Autopsy reports from the 406th Medical General Laboratory, Tokyo, Japan.
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TABLE 288.- Regional frequency of fatal wounds in 1,500 KIA casualties, by anatomic location
| Anatomic location | Number of casualties | Percent of casualties |
Head and neck: | ||
| Head | 375 | 25.0 |
| Neck | 60 | 4.0 |
| Face | 38 | 2.5 |
| Total |
| 31.5 |
Upper extremities: | ||
| Arm and shoulder | 56 | 3.7 |
| Hand | 6 | .4 |
| Total | 62 | 4.1 |
Thorax | 367 | 24.5 |
Abdomen | 143 | 9.5 |
| Total | 510 | 34.0 |
Lower extremities: | ||
| Leg | 39 | 2.6 |
| Buttock | 13 | .9 |
| Thigh | 12 | .8 |
| Hip | 6 | .4 |
| Foot | 4 | .3 |
| Total | 74 | 5.0 |
Multiple wounds, region unknown | 381 | 25.4 |
| 1,500 | 100.0 |
Prisoner-of-War Study
The data in the preceding tables represent the effects ofenemy fire. A comparison with the effects of United Nations action against theenemy was made possible through the study of prisoner-of-war casualties madeduring January 1951 at the 3d and 14th Field Hospitals at Tongnae. Data from1,000 prisoners were gathered through interrogations of the prisoners via aninterpreter. An additional 2,000 medical records of prisoners admitted to thesehospitals were analyzed for wound frequency studies, as follows:
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| Number of cases | Number of cases | ||
Head and neck: | Lower extremities: | ||
| Head | 53 | Thorax | 102 |
| Face | 51 | Abdomen | 63 |
| Eye | 22 | Leg | 408 |
| Neck | 20 | Thigh | 304 |
| Ear | 3 | Foot | 249 |
| Nose | 1 | Knee | 93 |
| Total | 150 | Buttocks | 61 |
Upper extremities: | Hip | 46 | |
| Arm | 220 | Total | 1,326 |
| Hand | 131 | | 2,000 |
| Shoulder | 78 | ||
| Forearm | 70 | ||
| Elbow | 25 | ||
| Total | 524 | ||
The mode of wounding of the 1,000 prisoners of warinterrogated revealed the following:
| Number of cases | ||
Casualty-producing agent: | In air action-Continued | ||
| In ground action: | Rocket | 30 | |
| Gunshot | 430 | Napalm | 44 |
| Shell fragment | 235 | Total | 277 |
| Grenade | 12 | Nonbattle casualties | 46 |
| 677 | Total | 46 |
| In air action: | |||
| Bomb | 109 |
| 1,000 |
| Aircraft machinegun | 94 |
General Observations and Conclusions of Survey Team
From observations and interrogations, this first woundballistics survey team was able to conclude that the maximum ranges at whichwounding occurs are comparatively short. Thus, this team's report states:"Most wounds caused by shell fragments occur within 8 meters of the shellburst. Most wounds caused by small arms occur within 100 meters to 200 meters,rarely beyond 500 meters."
Perhaps the most important of all the conclusions reached bythis team concerned the feasibility of body armor. Team members had beenimpressed by the large number of penetrating wounds in which the missileremained in
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the body. They also noted the protectiveeffects of ordinary items of clothing, finding,for example, small arms bullets retained in the foot evenwhen the shot was at very close range, as inself-inflicted wounds. Here the combat shoe seemed to makea considerable reduction invelocity. On the basis of large numbers of this kind of supporting observation,the team was able to conclude:
Whereas most wounds are caused by shell fragments and are ofa penetrating rather than a perforating nature, it is believed that some typeof body armor is feasible. Requirements for this protective clothing arefundamentally that it be light, flexible, comfortable, be able to screen outmissiles with velocities of 1200 ft/sec. or more, and will not handicap combateffectiveness. It is further believed that although the casualty rate per se maynot be appreciably reduced, there will be a valuable reduction in the number ofwounds and in their severity. This solves a considerable problem inevacuation, treatment time consumed, and total hospital days. If the chest andabdomen are protected, it may well change many KIA's to WIA's. The problem isnot alone that of overall reduction in casualty rate. Thepsychological effect upon soldiers knowing that they have some protection forvital areas appears obvious, although needing evaluation by field trial.
Although the hospital mortality rate has fallen below 2% andis approaching an irreducible minimum, the killed in action rate and missingin action rate continue quite high. Utilizing publicly released figures, about14% of the total casualty rate is KIA and approximately a similar percentageexists for missing in action. This means that every fourth casualty is killed ormissing. Actually if the 2% hospital mortality rate were added to the KIA andMIA rates, 30% of the total casualties would be KIA, MIA, and wounded diedlater. It is, therefore, apparent that any further appreciable reduction incasualty rate lies in 1) use of body armor, 2) faster evacuation of casualtiesfrom the battlefield. The hazard now of battlefield recovery has not halted thecourageous company aid man, but he also becomes a casualty occasionally andreplacement in a moment is difficult. The time when he is needed most probablyoffers the greatest chance for his being wounded. It is believed that body armorfor him would aid materially in the performance of his duty.
Recommendations made by the first wound ballistics surveyteam follow:
1. Attach a Medical Officer to all graves registration unitsfor KIA Survey.
2. Institute exact area frequency for wounds study ratherthan regional designation; include type wound, severity, disposition.
3. Survey large numbers of WIA and KIA involving thorax andabdominal wounds charting exact area of wound, e.g., ventral, dorsal, flank, andquadrant.
4. Follow carefully 50 casualties involving each anatomicregion by means of serial photographs at critical intervals with appropriatesurgical notes. This should begin at the Mobile Army Surgical Hospital. Themode/time/distance of evacuation should be included.
5. Field trial of a combination doron and nylon armored vestfor Medical personnel in combat units, particularly Medical Company Aid men. Iffound feasible recommend use for all field troops.
6. Specific orientation of Medical officers in a basicknowledge of wounds, classification, and weapon and missile identification.Medical officers stress the etiology of disease, and many years are spentlearning about the varied causative agents. The etiologic agent of a war woundis a missile, and yet with rather rare exceptions members of the medicalprofession know little about weapons and missile identification. It is no longeradequate for a physician to receive his medical training directed only towardcivilian practice, because all doctors now may anticipate military service orthe responsibility for civilian populations under the fire of every conceivableweapon.
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Since medical officers usually fill in the EMT, and subsequentfield records, and since so frequently those doctors are relatively new to theservice, a few items are worthy of emphasis and indoctrination:
a. Ask the casualty what hit him. He frequently knows. Specifywhether or not he is a battle casualty, has a missile wound or injury, and theactual missile, e.g., small arms (rifle, carbine, Burp, Grease, machinegun),grenade, mortar, artillery, landmine, or shell fragment unknown, etc. Avoid theuse of the term shrapnel. Never be content to list just "missile".
b. State whether it was enemy or friendly fire, air or ground.
c. Self-inflicted wounds may be accidental or intentional. Ifit is known, so state.
d. Describe the treatment given.
e. Record the mode, time, and distance of evacuation.
f. Record disposition and the patient's condition at thattime.
Preparation for Field Trial of Body Armor
The first team returned to the United States and prepared its reports in May1941. The recommendation to The Surgeon General, Department of the Army, for afield trial of an armored vest was readily accepted.
Laboratory tests already completed at that time made it apparent that itwould not be possible to defeat most bullets with any reasonable weight of bodyarmor material then available. Within practical ranges, the velocity of bulletsis too high. However, it had been found that about 92 percent of the missilesproducing WIA casualties were fragments. Of these fragments, 73 percent did nothave enough velocity to cause perforating wounds or extensive tissue damage,suggesting that in this important class of wounding missiles the majority werein a lower velocity, lower energy range. It was assumed that a large number ofthese could be defeated by an armor which would stop fragments having velocitiesof 1,200 f.p.s. or lower. It was immediately apparent that steel could not beincorporated into any type of thoraco-abdominal protective clothing with anydegree of success because of its lack of flexibility and excessive weight.Aluminum proved to have a relatively low ballistic limit. It was not flexibleand would have proved difficult to tailor into a protective vest. Nylon cloth(12 layers of 2 x 2 basket weave) was found to have a ballistic limit of 1,275f.p.s. against a 17-grain simulated fragment, and its great flexibility wasthought to offer most feasibility for fabrication into a protective vest. Doron(multiple layers of fiber-glass cloth laminated by a methacrylate resin) alsoproved highly effective in defeating these simulated fragments. Doron surpassednylon in performance when struck by the .45 caliber pistol ball but lacked theflexibility of nylon. Doron could, however, be molded to conform to the contoursof the body.
The Naval Field Medical Research Laboratory at Camp Lejeune, N.C., had forsome time been working on the development of a slipover type of vest, usingdoron armor. That installation had pioneered the use of curved doron
726
plates in body armor and had established the fact that theballistic properties of doron were unaffected by the manufacturing process.Models of such a vest were in existence, and the Naval Field Medical ResearchLaboratory possessed necessary experimental tailoring facilities to make modelsof various designs. Accordingly, members of the first survey team met withpersonnel at Camp Lejeune, and it was agreed to incorporate into the vestcertain modifications suggested by the Korean battle casualty surveyexperiences. The most significant contribution was the addition of 12 layers ofnylon to the area covering the shoulder girdle. The modified vest (figs. 340 and341) was described as follows:7
A slipover, semi-flexible thoraco-abdominalvest weighing 6.1 lb. made of 2 x 2 basket weave nylon covering the upper chestand shoulder girdle, and a lower portion made of 16 curved doron plates coveringthe lower chest and upper abdomen. Ballistic properties as follows: Capable ofstopping a .45 caliber pistol or Thompson submachine gun bullet at the muzzle;all the fragments of the U.S.A. hand grenade at three feet; 75% of the fragmentsof the U.S.A. 81 mm. mortar at ten feet; and the full thrust of an Americanbayonet.
7Medical Project-Body Armor, Korea, 14 June to 13 October 1951, issued by Joint Army-Navy Mission, Medical Research and Development.
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FIGURE 341.-Threeviews of doron slipover vest on soldier.
In June 1951, 50 such vests were fabricated at the NavalField Medical Research Laboratory, partially aided by funds allocated by theArmy Quartermaster Corps.
JOINT ARMY-NAVY BODY ARMOR FIELD TEST,
14 JUNE-13 OCTOBER 1951
Upon invitation by Colonel Wood to Adm. Herbert L. Pugh, Chiefof the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery, Department of the Navy, a joint Army-Navymedical mission was organized and dispatched to the Far East Command on 14 June1951 for the purpose of field testing, under actual combat conditions in Korea,an item of equipment designed as body armor for protection of the chest, theshoulders, and the abdomen. Officer members of the team were (Army) ColonelHolmes, Captain Phillips, Lieutenant Coe, (Navy) Comdr. John S. Cowan, MC, andLt. Comdr. Frederick J. Lewis, Jr., MSC.
Upon arrival in Tokyo, the unit was attached to the 406thMedical General Laboratory for logistical and administrative support. Afterdrawing the necessary equipment and supplies, the team departed for Korea,arriving at Headquarters, 5th Regiment, 1st Marine Division, on 4 July 1951.
The specific mission at this time was to (1) determine andevaluate the reaction under combat conditions of Medical Department personnel,particularly company aidmen, to the proposal of wearing body armor, and (2)determine and evaluate the reaction under combat conditions of personnel of the
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various services to the proposal of wearing body armor.During the course of the following 2 months, these 50 vests were worn byapproximately 6,000 soldiers and marines. Tests were performed with the 5thMarine Regiment and the 23d and 38th Infantry Regiments of the 2d Division.
Conclusions of Body Armor Test Team
The conclusions reached by this team were as follows:
1. That body armor or protective clothing of some type for thevital anatomic areas is almost unanimously desired by all combat troops,particularly the combat veteran after several actual fire fights with the enemy.
2. That the body armor vest was received quite favorably bymost Commanding Officers, who were eager for its trial, feeling that thepsychological effect upon the troops would be of considerable morale value.
3. That the troops of all arms and services were completelycooperative and constructive in their trial of the body armor, appearing tosense the responsibility of their judgment upon an item of equipment designed tosave their lives as well as others.
4. That thorough indoctrination of all troops should precedethe wearing of any body armor. Such indoctrination should include familiaritywith percentage relationships of the various wounding agents, the anatomicdistribution of hits, and the most common lethal wounds. The protectiveballistic properties of the body armor should be thoroughly demonstrated.
5. That the body armor vest, which weighed 6.1 lb., was notconsidered an excessive weight, and that such a weight per se did not hinder orhandicap the wearer.
6. That the weight of the body armor was tolerated and carriedeasily because of its proper distribution and suspension from the entireshoulder girdle.
7. That such body armor (6.1 lb.) could be and was worn overmountainous terrain of extremely rugged nature in a hot, humid climate, withonly a few adverse complaints of the weight factor from the men.
8. That such body armor, in the Korean summer, received itsseverest criticism as being excessively hot.
9. That a water-proof or water-resistant covering fabricshould be used to prevent gain in weight from perspiration or rain. Gain inweight due to such reasons was 1? to 2 lb. for the armored vest tested.
10. That such armor should be utilized as organizationalequipment rather than individual equipment, and as such should be transportedvia organizational vehicles to the closest possible point of enemy contact.
11. That tests of body armor are far more significant whendone under combat conditions than when performed under training or simulatedcombat conditions.
ARMY BODY ARMOR TEST TEAM, FEBRUARY-JULY 1952
Upon returning to the United States in September 1951, the team recommendedthat approximately 1,400 vests incorporating those changes suggested by thefield test in Korea be further tested in actual combat in order to determine theeffectiveness of the vest in defeating missiles from enemy weapons. Accordingly,the Army developed a model (fig. 342) made of 12 plies of 2 x 2 basket weavenylon weighing 13 ounces per square yard. The layers of nylon were triangularlyspot bonded together. The Marine Corps realized that expediency was of paramountimportance and developed a design based upon
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doron-nylon combination and proceeded to its standardizationby 16 November 1951. The Army all-nylon vest was covered with a vinyl-coatednylon poncho material, olive drab in color, with a one-quarter inch layer ofsponge rubber beneath the covering over the ribs and the shoulder girdle. Thesponge rubber provided an offset of the vest away from the body since it wasfelt that contusions or fractures might result from impact of nonpenetratingmissiles upon the vest. The vest was provided with two rectangular gusset-typepockets closed by a triangular flap and a snap fastener. The frontal closure waseffected by means of three dot-type fasteners. Loops or straps of nylon wereprovided, two front and two back, for supporting cartridge and pistol belts. Thevest was fabricated in two sizes as follows:
1. Size 42; area of protection, 6.7 square feet; weight, 7pounds and 12 ounces.
2. Size 46; area of protection, 7.4 square feet; weight, 8pounds and 4 ounces.
On 18 February 1952, an Army body armor team departed forKorea with the following objectives:
1. To determine the relative effectiveness ofthe various body armor prototypes against various types of enemy fire, deliveredunder a variety of environmental and tactical situations.
2. To determine the dimensions of soldieracceptance and use of body armor.
3. To determine the most satisfactorymethodology to orient soldiers in the use of body armor.
4. To determine the relative reduction inwound incidence, extent, and severity in soldiers wearing body armor.
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At this time, the team consisted of officers representing the Medical Corps,the Army Field Forces, the Ordnance Corps, and the Quartermaster Corps.
During the course of the test in Korea, the team numbered 24 officers and 33enlisted men. Initially, the team was directed by Lt. Col. Andrew A. Aines, QMC;later, Lt. Col. William W. Cox, MC, assumed the role of team commander.8
Special equipment which was not available in the theater in the Zone ofInterior and accompanied the test team to Korea. These items
FIGURE 343.-Mapshowing disposition of Body Armor Test Team, March-July 1952.
8Additional officer personnelserving with the Body Armor Test Team were as follows:
On TDY from the Zone of Interior to Korea: Maj. Henry F. Breezley, Ord C,Development and Proof Services, Aberdeen Proving Ground, Md.; Maj. William F.Enos, MC, Armed Forces Institute of Pathology, Washington, D.C.; Maj. John W.Irving, QMC, Quartermaster Board, Capt. William H. Bailey, MC, HQ, Army ChemicalCenter, Md.; Capt. William L. Camper, Inf., Army Field Forces Board No. 3, FortBenning, Ga., Capt. Anthony J. Daniels, QMC, Quartermaster Board; Capt. John M.Nowell, MSC, Walter Reed Army Medical Center, Washington, D.C.; Capt. MackStrauss, QMC, HQ, Fort Lee, Va.; and Lt. Richard B. Stoughton, MC, HQ, ArmyChemical Center.
Detailed from Eighth U.S. Army units in Korea: Maj. Rodney O. Capps, QMC, 23d QMGroup; Capt. William Barber, QMC, 23d QM Group; Capt. Robert H. Bessey, Jr.,Inf., 15th Infantry; Capt. Henry E. Davis, QMC, 23d QM Group; Capt. Gene P.Eardley, MC, 25th Evacuation Hospital; Capt. Richard W. J. Fasey, Inf., 32dInfantry; Capt. Ellwood R. Lambert, Inf., 15th Infantry; Capt. Robert L. Mignery,QMC, 23d QM Group; Capt. Leonard K. Pierce, QMC, 23d QM Group; Capt. Donald C.Tanner, MC, 25th Evacuation Hospital; 1st Lt. Gilbert D. Cheney, Inf., 32dInfantry; 1st Lt. William B. Gillett, Inf., 233d Infantry; and 2d Lt. Rodney M.Brigg, Inf., 160th Infantry.
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included photographic equipment, weather recording equipment,tape recorders, instruments for ballistics studies, and other miscellaneousexpendables. All other classes of supplies and equipment were obtained fromtheater stocks. These were requisitioned by, and assembled at, team headquartersin Seoul. From this point, they were issued to subteams operating in forwardareas (fig. 343). Each subteam was self-sufficient for supply, administration,and operation. Except for rations and petroleum products, no supply burden wasimposed on units participating in the tests. Because of the magnitude of thetest, the team was not attached to the theater medical general laboratory butoperated as an independent unit assigned to Headquarters, Eighth U.S. Army,Korea.
Conduct of Test, 1 March Through 15 July 1952
During the course of the test, the Army nylon vest was worn byover 15,000 soldiers for an aggregate of approximately 400,000 man-hours. TheEighth U.S. Army organizations which participated in the test are shown in table290. In addition, other United Nations troops using vests on a limiteddistribution were (1) Philippine forces attached to I Corps, 3d Division, 7thRegiment; (2) ROK (Republic of Korea) troops of the 1st ROK Division, attachedto I Corps, 11th Regiment; (3) Ethiopian forces attached to IX Corps, 2dDivision, 23d Regiment; (4) Colombian forces attached to IX Corps, 7th Division,31st Regiment; and (5) French Forces attached to IX Corps, 2d
TABLE 290.-Eighth U.S.Army units participating in test of Army nylon vest
Unit | Date entered | Date terminated | ||
Corps | Division | Regiment | ||
1952 | 1952 | |||
I | 3d | 7th | 1 Mar | 25 Apr |
I | 3d | 15th | 29 Mar | 25 Apr |
I | 3d | 65th | 13 Apr | 25 Apr |
I | 45th | 179th | 1 May | 15 Jul |
I | 45th | 180th | 1 Jun | 15 Jul |
I | 45th | 279th | 1 May | 31 May |
IX | 2d | 23d | 9 Apr | 25 Apr |
IX | 2d | 38th | 30 Mar | 13 Apr |
IX | 7th | 17th | 7 May | 15 Jul |
IX | 7th | 31st | 7 May | 15 Jul |
IX | 7th | 32d | 16 Apr | 15 Jul |
IX | 40th | 160th | 4 Jun | 30 Jun |
IX | 40th | 223d | 4 Jun | 30 Jun |
IX | 40th | 224th | 4 Jun | 30 Jun |
X | 25th | 14th | 2 May | 10 Jun |
X | 25th | 27th | 18 Apr | 10 Jun |
X | 25th | 35th | 18 Apr | 2 May |
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Division, 23d Regiment. Other personnel using vests onspecial studies were pilots serving I Corps; pilots of helicopter detachmentsserving the 8063d, 8076th, and 8209th Mobile Army Surgical Hospitals; and the 3dAir-Sea Rescue Squadron.
In this period, there were 2,099 battle casualties and 322soldiers killed in action in the divisions in which body armor was used. It mustbe emphasized that the total body armor available to division personnel wasexceedingly small, averaging about 350 vests per division during the period ofthe test. A total of 1,400 vests were available during the test period and thesewere received by the team from the Zone of Interior as follows (48 vestsaccompanied the initial team members):
|
| Number of vests |
Feb. 18 | 48 |
Mar. 6 | 50 |
Mar. 26 | 200 |
Apr. 10 | 200 |
Apr. 13 | 200 |
Apr. 21 | 200 |
Apr. 24 | 200 |
May 4 | 200 |
May 8 | 102 |
| Total | 1,400 |
Wound Ballistic Studies on WIA Casualties
A total of 1,591 wound ballistic studies, in many instancesincluding pictures and X-rays, were made on soldiers from all of the Americandivisions on the frontline. These studies included battle casualties, accidentalwounds, and self-inflicted wounds. Table 291 lists the regional distribution ofwounds in 908 WIA casualties not wearing body armor.
In the group of WIA casualties who were not wearing bodyarmor, there were 278 wounds in the region of the body (chest and upper part ofthe back) that would have been covered by the vests. An estimate of the effectof the vest, had it been worn, is that it would have probably prevented thewound in 204 (73.4 percent) cases; might possibly have prevented the wound in 17(6.1 percent); been of questionable value in 27 (9.7 percent); and would havehad no effect in 30 (10.8 percent).
A total of 552 soldiers were wounded in action while wearingbody armor (table 292).
A breakdown of 1,460 battle casualties who were studiedduring the test period by causative agents and by type of wounding (that is,multiple or single) is shown in tables 293 and 294, respectively. Typicalfragments and missiles removed from the casualties are shown in figure 344.
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TABLE 29l.-Regionaldistribution of 1,474 wounds in 908 WIA casualties not wearing body armor
Body region | Number of wounds | Percent of total wounds |
Head | 208 | 14.1 |
Neck | 48 | 3.2 |
Chest | 167 | 11.3 |
Back: | ||
| Upper part | 111 | 7.5 |
| Lower part | 103 | 7.0 |
Abdomen | 60 | 4.1 |
Extremity: | ||
| Upper | 359 | 24.4 |
| Lower | 408 | 27.7 |
Genitalia | 10 | .7 |
| Total | 1,474 | 100.0 |
TABLE 292.-Regionaldistribution of 850 wounds in 552 WIA casualties wearing body armor
Body region | Number of wounds | Percent of total wounds |
Head | 121 | 14.2 |
Neck | 23 | 2.7 |
Chest | 40 | 4.7 |
Back: | ||
| Upper part | 34 | 4.0 |
| Lower part | 78 | 9.2 |
Abdomen | 14 | 1.6 |
Extremity: | ||
| Lower | 294 | 34.6 |
| Upper | 241 | 28.4 |
Genitalia | 5 | 6 |
| Total | 850 | 100.0 |
A further breakdown of the fragments that caused these wounds is as follows:
| Percent | |
Mortar | 38.6 |
Grenade | 24.0 |
Artillery | 16.2 |
Mine | 9.5 |
Undetermined | 11.7 |
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TABLE 293.-Distributionof 1,460 armored and unarmored WIA casualties, by causative agent
Causative agent |
Armored casualties | Unarmored casualties | Total casualties | |||
Number | Percent | Number | Percent | Number | Percent | |
Shell fragment | 467 | 84.6 | 769 | 84.7 | 1,236 | 84.7 |
Small arms | 85 | 15.4 | 139 | 15.3 | 223 | 15.3 |
| Total | 552 | 100.0 | 908 | 100.0 | 1,459 | 100.0 |
TABLE 294.-Distributionof 1,460 armored and unarmored WIA casualties, by type of wounding
Type of wounding | Armored casualties | Unarmored casualties | Total casualties | |||
Number | Percent | Number | Percent | Number | Percent | |
Single wounds | 326 | 59.0 | 485 | 53.4 | 811 | 55.5 |
Multiple wounds | 226 | 41.0 | 423 | 46.6 | 649 | 44.5 |
| Total | 552 | 100.0 | 908 | 100.0 | 1,460 | 100.0 |
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The character of the wounding agent in the 1,460 WIAcasualties indicates that the type of fire to which the vest and nonvest wearerswere exposed was in general the same and thus can not account for the observeddifference in the wound distribution.
Studies on KIA Casualties
During the period of the test, 547 post mortem examinationswere made on soldiers from American divisions along the frontline who had beenkilled in action. The wounding agent was determined in 415 cases of the 547 postmortem examinations that were made (table 295). The regional frequency of thewounds and their relationship to the cause of death is shown in table 296.
A study was made of the chest wounds in this group of 547 KIAcasualties,
TABLE 295.-Distributionof 415 KIA casualties, by wounding agent
Wounding agent | Number of casualties | Percent of casualties |
Shell fragments | 278 | 67.0 |
Small arms | 106 | 25.5 |
Mines | 25 | 6.0 |
Blast and burns | 6 | 1.5 |
| Total | 415 | 100.0 |
Anatomic location | Lethal wounds | Associated wounds | Regional total | Percent regional wounds fatal | ||
Number | Percent | Number | Percent | |||
Head | 221 | 40.4 | 28 | 249 | 23.8 | 88.7 |
Neck | 23 | 4.2 | 42 | 65 | 6.2 | 35.4 |
Chest | 154 | 28.1 | 72 | 226 | 21.6 | 68.1 |
Back: | ||||||
| Upper part | 37 | 6.8 | 27 | 64 | 6.1 | 57.8 |
| Lower part | 17 | 3.1 | 35 | 52 | 5.0 | 32.7 |
Abdomen | 35 | 6.4 | 31 | 66 | 6.3 | 53.0 |
Extremities: | ||||||
| Upper | 9 | 1.6 | 138 | 147 | 14.0 | 6.1 |
| Lower | 38 | 7.0 | 138 | 176 | 16.8 | 21.6 |
Genitalia | --- | --- | 2 | 2 | .2 | --- |
Miscellaneous | 13 | 2.4 | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Total | 547 | 100.0 | 513 | 1,047 | 100.0 | |
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and an estimate (using the previously described criteria) ofthe possible beneficial effect of the vest was determined, as follows: For thetotal 226 chest wounds, the vest would have prevented a lethal wound in 61 (31.9percent) of the primary chest wounds and 24 (24.2 percent) of the associatewounds; would probably have reduced the severity of the wound in 47 (24.6percent) of the primary wounds and 24 (24.2 percent) of the associate wounds;and in 58 (30.4 percent) of the primary and 12 (12.2 percent) of the associatewounds would have been of questionable value.
These studies indicate that 30 to 40 percent of the fatalchest wounds incurred by soldiers in combat would have been prevented by the useof body armor. From another point of view, this seems to indicate that 10 to 20percent of the soldiers who were killed in action would have survived if theyhad worn body armor. The effectiveness of the vest in preventing chest wounds inthe KIA casualties was not so marked as in the WIA casualties. One explanationof this disparity lies in the higher incidence of small arms wounds in the KIA(approximately 25 percent) as compared to the WIA casualties (approximately 15percent).
Study of Vests Used in Test
During the test, 254 vests were recovered which were hit(fig. 345) while worn by soldiers in combat. A study revealed that of the groupof soldiers
FIGURE 345.-Typical missiles removed from vest, armor, T52-1, in Korea.
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wearing the vests, 52 (20.5 percent) were returned to duty, 128 (50.4percent) were evacuated because of wounds, 55 (21.6 percent) were killed inaction, and in 19 (7.5 percent) the disposition of the soldier was unknown. Ofthe 128 soldiers who were evacuated, 35 (27.3 percent) sustained wounds throughthe vest.
Of the 55 who were killed in action, 24 (43.6 percent) were killed by woundsthrough the vests, and 31 (56.4 percent) were killed by wounds in areas thatwere not covered by the vest. The wound-missile ratio on these groups is shownin table 297. In evaluating these figures it should be borne in mind thatapproximately 85 percent of wounds were due to fragments which accounts for theapparent ineffectiveness of the vest against fragmentation.
TABLE 297.-Causativeagent and disposition of 254 vest-wearing KIA (55) and WIA (199)casualties
Disposition | Wound through vest | Wound not through vest | Total casualties | |||
Number | Percent1 | Number | Percent1 | Number | Percent1 | |
Small arms | ||||||
Wounded in action: | ||||||
| Returned to duty | --- | --- | --- | --- | 7 | 13.5 |
| Evacuated | 15 | 42.9 | 16 | 17.2 | 31 | 24.2 |
Killed in action | 14 | 58.3 | 14 | 45.2 | 28 | 50.9 |
Unknown | --- | --- | --- | --- | 1 | 5.3 |
| 29 | 49.2 | 30 | 24.1 | 67 | 26.4 |
Shell fragments | ||||||
Wounded in action: | ||||||
| Returned to duty | --- | --- | --- | --- | 45 | 86.5 |
| Evacuated | 20 | 57.1 | 77 | 82.8 | 97 | 74.8 |
Killed in action | 10 | 41.7 | 17 | 54.8 | 27 | 49.1 |
Unknown | --- | --- | --- | --- | 18 | 94.7 |
| Total | 30 | 50.8 | 94 | 75.9 | 187 | 73.6 |
| 59 | 100.0 | 124 | 100.0 | 254 | 100.0 |
1Percent for dichotomy small arms versus shellfragments.
Among the 254 vests which sustained hits and were available for study,complete information regarding the type of wound and the disposition of the
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casualty was collected in 235 cases. These latter cases were studied andbroken down in the following categories:
Number of cases | Percent of total | |
| 1. Missiles which did not perforate the vest and which caused no abrasion or contusion of the underlying area | 101 | 42.9 |
| 2. Missiles which did not perforate the vest but which caused an abrasion or contusion of the underlying area | 23 | 9.8 |
| 3. Missiles which perforated the vest but which did not enter the body | 30 | 12.9 |
| 4. Missiles which perforated the vest and entered the body only a short distance; that is, subcutaneously | 22 | 9.3 |
| 5. Missiles which perforated the vest and penetrated into one of the major body cavities or organs | 20 | 8.5 |
| 6. Missiles which perforated the vest and which perforated the body or which resulted in death | 39 | 16.6 |
| Total | 235 | 100.0 |
In categories 1, 2, and 3 are classified those missile hits which werecompletely defeated by the body armor. Wounds with a reduction in expectedseverity are seen in category 4. In category 5, the wounds are severe but wouldhave been even more severe or fatal if body armor had not been worn. In category6 are placed those wounds in which there has been little, if any, change inwound severity due to the wearing of body armor.
The penetrations as compared to the perforations of the vests, resulting fromall missile hits, are shown in table 298.
TABLE 298.-Distributionof 874 hits on 254 armor vests, by causative agent
Causative agent | Vests hit | Penetrating hits1 | Perforating hits2 | |||
Number | Percent | Number | Percent | Number | Percent | |
Small arms | 63 | 24.8 | 30 | 24.4 | 93 | 75.6 |
Shell fragments | 184 | 72.4 | 549 | 75.7 | 176 | 24.3 |
Unidentified | 7 | 2.8 | 14 | 53.8 | 12 | 46.2 |
| Total | 254 | 100.0 | 593 | 67.9 | 281 | 32.1 |
1Missiles were defeated by vest, and no wound wasproduced.
2Missiles succeeded in perforating vest and in producing a wound.
From the tabulation presented for the 235 casualties, the figures indicatethat wounds of the anterior and posterior aspects of the chest and of the upperquadrant of the abdomen were prevented (fig. 346) in 154 (65.6 percent) of thecasualties. There were 81 (34.4 percent) casualties who sustained wounds throughthe region covered by the vest (fig. 347), and within this group there
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was definite evidence that the severity of the wound had beenreduced in 22 (27.2 percent) of the cases, that it was difficult to statewhether the vest had an effect on the severity of the wound in 20 (24.7 percent)cases, and that there was no evidence that the vest reduced the severity of thewound in 39 (48.1 percent) cases. In these 39 cases, 24 (61.5 percent)casualties were killed by the missiles which perforated the vest.
Conclusions of Body Armor Team
The body armor team reported9 itsconclusions under the conditions of the test as follows:
a. The Armor, Vest, Nylon T-52-1, is much more effectiveagainst fragment type missiles than small arms missiles. During the test period67.9% of all type missiles hitting the armor were defeated. 75.7% of allfragments were defeated and 24.4% of all small arm missiles were defeated.
b. This prototype was acceptable to the majority of soldierswho wore it in combat. The extent of acceptability was, in addition to manyother factors, influenced by the unique
9Cox, W. W., Irving, J. W., Breezley, H. F., and Camper, W. L.: Report on the Use of Body Armor in Combat-Korea, February 1952-July 1952. Issued by the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4 Logistics, September 1952.
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character of the Korean campaign. A desire forbody armor was evident early in the test period, and this prototype was the mostsuitable armor of its nature available to satisfy this demand. Acceptance wasinvariable, often qualified with suggestions for improvements.
c. Of the methods used to orient troops in theuse of Nylon Armor, the best results were obtained by orienting company sizedgroups in reserve areas. This may not be the most suitable method of orientationfor the Army as a whole, as selection of methods was determined by conditionsexisting in Korea.
d. The Armor, Vest, Nylon T-52-1 worn bysoldiers in combat during the test period, reduced the incidence of chest andupper abdominal wounds by 60 to 70%. It is estimated that 25 to 35% of the chestand upper abdominal wounds sustained by combat soldiers wearing the armor duringthis test period were reduced in severity.
The team also considered the psychological effects andstated:
a. Research of body armor would be incompletewithout an understanding of the psychological structure of body armor use andrequirements. Factors to be considered are legion, but some of the mostimportant are motivation, the effect on confidence, the effect onaggressiveness, the effect on morale, and finally the acceptance by the soldier.
b. The use of body armor is motivated by oneof the most powerful impulses in our psychological makeup, i.e., the desire tosurvive. In the heat of actual combat, soldiers have reported later, time andagain, that they rarely notice the weight and bulkiness of the vests (fig. 348).In these tense periods it seems that the desire for protection outweighs the
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physiological deficit resulting from the added burden. On theother hand, interviews with soldiers returning from patrols which had no firefights or skirmishes with the enemy, indicate that the men are less disposed towearing body armor and are more critical of its weight and limitation ofmobility.
c. The action in Korea is unique in our military history inthat the lack of specific battle goals and the prolongedtruce talks resulted in a feeling of caution in all combat echelons. Commanders,under these conditions, are not quite so ready to sacrifice personnel on thebattlefield, This lack of an overpowering motivation may have an importantbearing on the seemingly widespread acceptance and desire for body armor on thepart of the troops and their commanders. This unique situation suggests, too,the possibility that the need for body armor by our soldiers in Korea isaccentuated if they are to fight with their usual verve and aggressiveness.
d. The effect of body armor on confidence is probably bestexpressed in the results of the post-use interviews where over 85 percent of themen stated that they felt safer and more confident when wearing body armor, Thisfeeling of increased safety and assurance is undoubtedly of paramount importancein explaining the widespread acceptability of body armor in combat.
e. Interviews with commanders, who have led troops wearingbody armor in combat, have repeatedly emphasized that aggressiveness isincreased and that there is more of a desire and willingness to engage the enemyat close quarters. Since one of the great deterrents to aggressiveness in combatis fear of being wounded or killed, it would seem that the feeling of increasedsafety and confidence, in part at least, accounts for the increasedaggressiveness noted by the troop commanders.
f. A poll of over 100 front line physicians and surgeons hasresulted in the almost unanimous expression of opinion that the use of bodyarmor would result in an increase in morale among combat troops. The measurementof morale is difficult and varies with many factors which cannot be controlledwhile another unknown factor is being tested. In spite of the rather poormotivation for combat during the period of test, the morale of the troops wasgenerally good, and the test team members were unable to detect any changes inmorale in the units that were using body armor. It is rational to conjecture,however, that the morale of our troops would be elevated as long as theypossessed an item which would give them superiority over the enemy and thusdiminish their chances of being wounded or killed. It would seem that if, andwhen, the enemy develops a similar vest or devises effective countermeasures toour vest, that the effect of the vest on morale would then be negligible.
g. Under certain conditions the effect of body armor on moralemay not be good. For example, during the last month of the test period therewere several instances where soldiers who had previously used body armorexpressed a reluctance to their unit leaders to go out on patrols when bodyarmor was not available. These instances were precipitated by the fact thatthere was not enough of the item to go around or that the vests had been movedto other sectors or units for more favorable testing. In any situation where thetroops had previously used body armor and for some reason it became limited insupply or not available, it is conceivable that the effect on morale would bevery unfavorable.
h. If the willingness or lack of willingness on the part oftroop commanders and their troops to return body armor to the test team officersafter use may be used as an index of acceptability, then there is no doubt thatthe test item is almost universally approved of. Many times, especially duringthe last period of the test and in areas where there was a lot of action, it wasdifficult for the test team officers to tactfully get the troop commanders andthe troops to release their physical possession of the armor when it becamenecessary to shift the vest to other personnel. There seems to be no doubt thatthe desire for protection in the minds of the men is utmost, and outweighs thephysiological handicaps imposed by the added weight and bulkiness.
i. This is well illustrated by an action of the 45th Divisionin securing a hill in advance of the MLR. The action which lasted for severalweeks was extremely heavy and the casualties were high. Demand for the vestbecame so acute that the test team members
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lost control of the vest study. Because of thelimited quantity of vests available there were not enough to equip each soldierwith one. Soldiers who were wearing the vests and who were wounded werefrequently relieved on the battlefield of their armor by other soldiers who didnot have vests. The vests that reached the forward aid station were usuallytaken away by the combat troops before the test team members had an opportunityto study them. In addition there were several instances where soldiers would hewearing vests in the usual manner and then in addition have other vests wrappedabout the lower abdomen, groin, and thighs. Other instances were reported inwhich an additional vest was fitted in some fashion about the face and head.
j. Many factors have been discussed previouslyas to why the soldiers in Korea have accepted body armor so wholeheartedly. Onefinal feature to be considered in regard to acceptance is the factor of initialcontact with any new item (body armor). To what extent is this acceptancecolored by a fad-like reaction because of the newness, the exclusiveness, thewidespread publicity and the fashionability? Only time will tell. It is ofinterest to note, however, that prior to the arrival of the Body Armor Team inKorea, several thousand of the earlier M12 type body armor vests (figs. 349 and350) were in supply rooms and were infrequently used. After the team had been inKorea for several months with its attendant publicity and information campaign,body armor of any type was at a premium (fig. 351) and was difficult to supplyin sufficient quantities (fig. 352). Even the supply of M12's, whichheretofore had not been in demand, was rapidly exhausted (fig. 353).
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Recommendations of Body Armor Team
Recommendations based on findings submitted by the team were as follows:
a. That continuing study be conducted in the development ofbody armor materials to obtain the optimum in protection versus weight, withthought toward a material that will stop light, medium velocity sub-machine gunbullets, as well as fragments, and to improve the comfort and utility value.
b. That logistical problems in supplying the body armor totroops be studied.
c. That additional testing be conducted under controlledconditions for improving functional suitability and compatibility with otherclothing and equipment.
d. That the use of body armor as an item of clothing bethoroughly explored.
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e. That the tactical significance of body armor and methodsfor employing it be studied.
f. That load studies and climatic factors in relation to bodyarmor be completely evaluated.
g. That consideration be given to the role of body armor inatomic warfare.
h. That the protective qualities of body armor againstradiation and blast injury be studied.
i. That the protective qualities of body armor againstincendiary weapons, especially white phosphorus, napalm, and flame throwers beevaluated.
j. That consideration be given to modifying the presentprototype * * *.
There followed a list of specific changes which in general were intended toincrease flexibility, improve fit and make the vest in general more comfortable.Others aimed at increasing the area of protection particularly under the arm,
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and making easier removal from casualties. Only a few of them will belisted and illustrated.
3. Change the method of closure. Recommend an easily operatedzipper with a protecting fly, provided with an alternate closing method (fig.354).
6. Replace the cover with a durable material which has moresurface resistance to prevent slippage or carrying straps. The cover materialshould be non-reflecting (fig. 355), water resistant and of a color which blendswith natural terrain features. It should not create sound when flexed or rubbedagainst other objects.
8. Replace the pockets with dash-type pockets * * *.
9. A means for carrying grenades be provided on the front ofthe vest * * *. A tape above the pockets into which the handle of the grenadecould be inserted would satisfy this requirement.
10. Replace the present method of side fastening with one thatis adjustable, elastic, and with a quick release mechanism which will permiteasy removal from casualties.
11. Construct the vest so as to give maximum protection to thearea under the arm (figs. 356 and 357).
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12. Eliminate metal in the construction of thevest wherever possible to reduce secondary missile potential.
13. Eliminate the sponge rubber layer insidethe nylon armor.
During the test period recommendations for modifications ofthe model T52-1 were solicited from the troops who had worn it in combat. Theseproposed changes were forwarded to the Research and Development Division of theOffice of the Quartermaster General. Some of these tentative designmodifications were incorporated into a new vest, model T52-2 (fig. 358). A totalof 276 of the new models were received on 9 July 1952. Unfortunately, these werein use for only 6 days when the mission of the Body Armor Test Team wascurtailed. A cursory survey revealed that the T52-2 was much more acceptablethan its prototype.
Upon return of the body armor team in July 1952, three of itsmembers, Colonel Cox, Major Irving, and Captain Daniels, with the assistance ofMr. William Persico, Clothing Development Branch, Philadelphia QuartermasterDepot, Pa., designed and fabricated a nylon body armor vest based upon the full,final recommendations of the team. This resulted in the armored vest,
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T52-3 (fig. 359). Among other improvements, it included a newcovering material, a two-piece sliding back, lace-type expandable side closure,combination metal zipper and snap front closure, and a more flexible type ofspot welding of the layers of nylon cloth. This was the prototype which finallybecame the Army standard item of issue in the fall of 1952. The first shipmentof the standard Army nylon vest left the Philadelphia Quartermaster Depot on orabout 3 December 1952.
MEDICAL STUDY OF KIA CASUALTIES
At the same time that the body armor team was operating inKorea, concurrent studies at the Graves Registration Service Group, Kokura,Japan, on the killed in action casualties were being accomplished. These woundballistics studies entailed a careful examination of each remains as to:
a. Exact anatomical location of all wounds(this to be demonstrated by both pictures and charts).
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FIGURE 355.-Reflectionof light from surface of body armor, T52-1.
FIGURE 356.-Unprotectedarea under arms in body armor, T52-1.
b. Type missiles causing wounds, i.e., shell fragments orsmall arms. (By the use of X-rays it was possible in most cases to determine thetype missile, provided, of course, it remained within the body.)
c. Type wound or wounds, i.e., penetrating or perforating;penetrating meaning a wound having an entrance point but not an exit,perforating meaning a wound having both an entrance and an exit.
d. Tracing out the missile path and determining the cause ofdeath.
e. Recovery of all wounding missiles when possible so thatthese may be photographed, weighed and identified.
f. Take sections of tissue for microscopic study.
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FIGURE 357.-Recommendedprotection and side closure, in body armor
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The initial survey of KIA casualties10was begun in March 1952 by Lieutenant Coe, who was joined in April 1952 byMajor Enos. During the month of March 1952, the number of remains that weresuitable for autopsying were relatively few. The majority of the bodies whicharrived at Kokura were badly decomposed and offered little for a wound ballisticstudy. During the winter months, the method of using ships for transporting thebodies had been adequate, but with the coming of warmer weather this method waswholly unsatisfactory. On 6 April 1952, an air evacuation plan11was placed in effect. Specifically, this meant that the remains arrived inKokura in approximately 24 to 36 hours after death on the frontlines in Korea.During part of this time, the bodies were kept in reefers (refrigerators) sothat their condition upon arrival at Kokura was excellent.
KIA Casualty Survey, 20 March-1 July 1952
In the period from 20 March to 23 April 1952, 268 currentdeaths were processed through the American Graves Registration Service Group atKokura. Of these cases, 173 with 618 wounds were examined for the area andregional frequency of wounds and also for the type of wounds. Because of thelack of time and the shortage of personnel, it was impossible to examine everycase. Therefore, it was decided to examine in detail only cases in which deathcould be unquestionably attributed to enemy action and which presentedreasonable promise of furnishing a rather complete picture. Autopsies wereperformed on 81 cases. Missiles were often hard to recover, but when found theywere photographed, identified, and weighed. Most of the casualties during thisperiod were incurred by personnel not wearing an armored vest when the lethalinjury was sustained because the number of all types of armored vests availablewas small. Because of the small number of cases available, no attempt was madeto draw conclusions.
During the remaining 15 months of the war, numerous woundballistics teams from the Zone of Interior conducted surveys at the GravesRegistration Service Group, Kokura, and made surveys of WIA casualties at theTokyo Army Hospital. The work at Kokura was continued by Major Enos who, duringthe period from 24 April 1952 to 1 July 1952, examined 346 cases with a total of1,346 wounds. Autopsies or wound track dissections were performed on all cases,and the information was forwarded to the Biophysics Division of the ChemicalCorps Medical Laboratories for analysis. This revealed the regional distributionof wounds presented in table 299.
10(1) Coe, G. B.: Wound Ballistics, Killed in Action, Korea, 20 March 1952-23 April 1952. CmlC Medical Laboratories Research Report No. 116, June 1952. (2) Coe, G. B.: Wound Ballistics, Killed in Action, Korea, 24 April 1952-12 July 1952, vol. II. CmlC Medical Laboratories Research Report No. 144, October 1952. (3) Coe, G. B., Stoughton, R. B., and Debiec, R. P.: Wound Ballistics, Killed in Action, Korea, 12 November 1952-1 March 1953, vol. III. CmlC Medical Laboratories Research Report No. 221, October 1953.
11Cook, J. C.: Graves Registration in the Korean War. The Quartermaster Rev., pp. 18 and 131-144, March-April 1953.
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TABLE 299.-Regionaldistribution of 1,346 wounds in 346 KIA casualties
Region | Number of wounds | Percent of wounds |
Thorax: | ||
| Upper left side | 149 | 11.1 |
| Upper right side | 101 | 7.5 |
| Lower left side | 78 | 5.8 |
| Lower right side | 65 | 4.8 |
| Total | 393 | 29.2 |
Head and neck | 351 | 26.1 |
Extremities: | ||
| Lower | 325 | 24.1 |
| Upper | 207 | 15.4 |
| Total | 532 | 39.5 |
Abdomen | 70 | 5.2 |
| 1,346 | 100.0 |
The 346 cases showed 209 (60.4 percent) with single woundsand 132 cases (39.6 percent) having multiple wounds, or a ratio of 1.5 singlywounded to multiply wounded. Regional breakdown showed this ratio was 4.4 forthe head and neck (140 cases), 1.7 for the thorax (137 cases), 1.2 for theabdomen (20 cases), and 1.5 and 1.4 for the upper (10 cases) and lower (39cases) extremities, respectively. Fragmentation-type missiles accounted forabout 66 percent of the wounds (table 300) and about 71 percent of the woundswere penetrating (table 301). Table 302 shows the regional distribution of 128lethal wounds in 103 of the KIA casualties which were examined during thisperiod. The partial selection of the casualty sample is apparent in the highnumber of lethal wounds of the thorax and in the low number of lethal wounds ofthe head.
Comparison of Army and Marine Corps Casualties
In the period between July to November 1952, another surveyteam (Colonel Holmes, Capt. James C. Beyer, MC, and Capt. Joseph V. Michalski,MSC) worked at Kokura. Approximately 3,000 current death cases were reviewed andinformation was obtained on wound distribution in 1,500 KIA casualties. This wasa period of great flux in regard to body armor. The Marine Corps hadstandardized a combination doron-nylon vest. This consisted of 13 layers ofnylon cloth over the upper part of the thorax and the shoulder girdle area and20 overlapping doron plates over the remainder of the thorax and the upper partof the abdomen. This vest (M1951) (fig. 360) was standardized by 16 November1951, and by 14 July 1952 approximately 9,772
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Causative agent | Number of wounds | Percent of wounds |
Fragments: | ||
| Shell | 485 | 36.0 |
| Mortar | 246 | 18.3 |
| Artillery | 68 | 5.0 |
| Landmine | 44 | 3.3 |
| Grenade | 39 | 2.9 |
| Total | 882 | 65.5 |
Small arms: | ||
| Type unspecified | 217 | 16.1 |
| "Burp" gun | 144 | 10.7 |
| Rifle | 22 | 1.6 |
| Pistol | 14 | 1.1 |
| Total | 397 | 29.5 |
White phosphorus | 2 | .2 |
Burns | 65 | 4.8 |
| Total | 67 | 5.0 |
| 1,346 | 100.0 |
TABLE 301.-Distributionof 1,346 wounds in 346 KIA casualties, 24 April-1 July 1952, by type of wound
Type of wound | Number of wounds | Percent of wounds |
Penetrating1 | 952 | 70.7 |
Perforating2 | 244 | 18.1 |
Avulsion3 | 133 | 9.9 |
Decapitation | 17 | 1.3 |
| Total | 1,346 | 100.0 |
1Wounds of entrance but no exit;missile retained.
2Wounds of entrance and exit.
3Traumatic loss of large sections of a body area; amputationsincluded.
vests were on hand in the 1st Marine Division in Korea.Therefore, all Marine Corps frontline personnel were probably equipped with bodyarmor before this latter date. During this time, the Army was still conductingits field testing of all-nylon body armor. In order to provide their frontlinetroops
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Body region | Number of lethal wounds | Percent of lethal wounds |
Head | 13 | 10.2 |
Neck | 3 | 2.3 |
Thorax | 77 | 60.2 |
Abdomen | 22 | 17.2 |
Extremities: | ||
| Upper | 4 | 3.1 |
| Lower | 9 | 7.0 |
| Total | 128 | 100.0 |
with protection, 13,020 Marine vests (M1951) were requestedon 11 August 1952 by the Army. The requests continued through March 1953 and by19 September 1952 approximately 19,705 vests were supplied to the Army. Thisnumber was increased (approximately 63,000) until the Army vest was standardizedand in production. The first shipment of this latter vest (T52-3) was releasedin the early part of December 1952 (see fig. 359). From December 1952 throughSeptember 1953, approximately 26,161 vests of this type were
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shipped from continental United States. Before theavailability of the Marine-type body armor, Army units were supplied with alimited number of M12 vests developed during World War II.
A comparison of Marine Corps KIA casualties from 1 July to 1November 1952 and Army KIA casualties from 15 June to 1 September 1952 revealedthe regional distribution of wounds shown in table 303. The Marine Corpspersonnel can be considered to be wearing body armor and the Army personnel weregenerally unarmored. There is a reduction of 9.6 percent in the total wounds ofthe thorax in the Marine Corps casualties and a 1.1 percent reduction in woundsof the abdomen as compared to the Army casualties.
Body region | Army personnel, without armor | Marine Corps personnel, with armor | ||
Number | Percent | Number | Percent | |
Head | 236 | 6.7 | 198 | 8.6 |
Face | 202 | 5.7 | 136 | 5.9 |
Neck | 191 | 5.4 | 108 | 4.7 |
Thorax | 942 | 26.7 | 390 | 16.9 |
Abdomen | 219 | 6.2 | 118 | 5.1 |
Extremities: | ||||
| Upper | 663 | 18.8 | 513 | 22.1 |
| Lower | 1,045 | 29.7 | 836 | 36.2 |
Genitalia | 28 | .8 | 9 | .4 |
| Total | 3,526 | 100.0 | 2,308 | 100.0 |
1Surveyed from 15 June to 1September 1952.
2Surveyed from 1 July to 1 November 1952.
The Marine Corps casualties included 355 cases with a totalof 2,308 wounds for a 6.5 wound incidence per casualty. Among the wounds, 80.9percent were penetrating in type, 14.9 percent were perforating, and 4.2 percentwere amputations. According to the causative agent, 85.4 percent were producedby fragmentation-type weapons, 12.8 percent by small arms, and 1.8 percent wereunknown.
The Army casualties included 354 cases with a total of 3,526wounds for a 9.9 wound incidence per casualty. According to wound type, 87.9percent were penetrating; 9.1 percent, perforating; and 3.0 percent,amputations. Fragments were responsible for 86.2 percent of the wounds, smallarms for 11.7 percent, and 2.1 percent were unidentified.
Table 304 lists the regional distribution of lethal wounds inthe two casualty samples. The armored Marine Corps casualties show a 12.1percent reduction in lethal wounds of the thorax and a 1.1 percent reduction inlethal wounds of the abdomen as compared to the Army personnel.
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Region wounded | Army personnel, without armor | Marine Corps personnel, with armor | ||
Number | Percent | Number | Percent | |
Head | 155 | 31.6 | 178 | 32.1 |
Face | 30 | 6.1 | 52 | 9.4 |
Neck | 28 | 5.7 | 47 | 8.5 |
Thorax | 177 | 36.1 | 133 | 24.0 |
Abdomen | 46 | 9.4 | 43 | 7.8 |
Extremities: | ||||
| Upper | 10 | 2.0 | 26 | 4.7 |
| Lower | 44 | 9.1 | 75 | 13.5 |
| Total | 490 | 100.0 | 554 | 100.0 |
1Surveyed from 15 June to 1 September 1952.
2Surveyed from 1 July to 1 November 1952.
Tables 305 and 306 summarize the types and numbers of body armor vestsavailable to the Eighth U.S. Army, 31 December 1952-29 February 1953.
TABLE 305.-Status ofarmor vests, available to major Army units,131 December 1952
Unit | Type of body armor vest | |||
Marine2 | Army nylon3 | M124 | Total | |
| Number | Number | Number | |
2d Division | 4,062 | 600 | 1,017 | 5,679 |
3d Division | 4,064 | 948 | 269 | 5,281 |
7th Division | 4,604 | 460 | 938 | 6,002 |
25th Division | 4,600 | 1,063 | 492 | 6,115 |
40th Division | 4,064 | 598 | 1,111 | 5,773 |
45th Division | 4,064 | 598 | 315 | 4,977 |
5th RCT | 1,454 | 91 | --- | 1,545 |
Army troops | 560 | 226 | 644 | 1,430 |
Reserve and maintenance | 504 | --- | 6,081 | 6,585 |
1st BCW Division | 1,558 | --- | --- | 1,558 |
| Total | 29,534 | 4,584 | 10,867 | 44,985 |
1Data derived from Staff Report, Quartermaster Section,Headquarters, Eighth U.S. Army, November and December 1952.
2Constructed of doron plates and nylon cloth.
3T52-l and -2 all-nylon body armor. This was the type used during theArmy body armor test period.
4Army World War II body armor; aluminum plates with nylon cloth.
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TABLE 306.-Status ofarmor vests, available to major Army units,129 February 19532
Unit | Type of body armor vest available | ||
M12 and Marine standard issue | Standard Army issue | Total | |
| Number | Number | |
2d Division | 7,500 | 3,523 | 11,023 |
3d Division | 6,100 | 3,508 | 9,608 |
7th Division | 5,500 | 3,514 | 9,014 |
25th Division | 6,800 | 4,914 | 11,714 |
40th Division | 6,100 | 3,663 | 9,763 |
45th Division | 6,500 | 3,646 | 10,146 |
5th RCT | 3,470 | --- | 3,470 |
1st BCW Division | 1,900 | --- | 1,900 |
United Nations units | 2,755 | --- | 2,755 |
| Total | 46,625 | 22,768 | 69,393 |
1Data derived from Staff Report,Quartermaster Section, Headquarters, Eighth U.S. Army, February 1953.
2In January and February 1953, armored vests were issued to bringeach division up to or over its authorized level of 8,390 vests. Approximately8,400 excess M12 vests were turned over to the Republic of Korea Army.
After body armor had become widely used, information wasdesired on the effect of the body armor vests on the regional frequency oflethal wounds. A survey of killed in action was accomplished at Kokura duringthe period of November 1952 to March 1953 by Lieutenant Coe and 1st Lt. RichardB. Stoughton.12 During the period ofthis survey, there were approximately 60,000 vests in use by U.S. Army divisionson the frontlines in Korea. Therefore, only those cases wearing body armor atthe time they received the lethal wound or wounds were used in this survey. Itwas necessary for members of the team to travel to every unit on the frontlinesof Korea and talk with personnel in the casualty's squad, platoon, or companyto determine accurately if body armor had been worn at the time the lethal woundwas inflicted. From approximately 600 cases investigated, 500 definitely werewearing armor at time of death. Only these cases were used. These data were thencompared with previous surveys conducted between April and July 1952 duringwhich time armor was not widely used. The general tactical situation hadremained appreciably the same over the whole period of these surveys. Actionconsisted largely of aggressive patrolling with stable main lines of resistance.Enemy use of artillery had increased, but there were no massive withdrawals oroffensives by friendly forces during the time between the compared surveys.Table 307 shows the comparison of lethal wounds in the two casualty samples.
12See footnote 10 (3), p. 753.
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| Entrance location | Without armor | With armor | Percent | ||||
| Number | Percent | Number | Percent | ||||
Head | 25 | 12.1 | 207 | 41.4 | +29.3 | ||
Neck | 11 | 5.4 | 72 | 14.4 | +9.0 | ||
Thorax | 119 | 57.8 | 110 | 22.0 | 3-35.8 | ||
Abdomen | 28 | 13.6 | 41 | 8.2 | -5.4 | ||
Extremities: | |||||||
| Upper | 5 | 2.4 | 13 | 2.6 | +.2 | ||
| Lower | 18 | 8.7 | 57 | 11.4 | +2.7 | ||
| Total | 206 |
| 500 | 100.0 | |||
1Survey 20 March to 1 July 1952;154 KIA casualties with 206 lethal wounds.
2Survey 15 November 1952 to 1 March 1953; 500 KIA casualties with 500lethal wounds.
3The value of body armor for the thorax appears higher than in othercomparable surveys due to the fact that a selection of cases was made in thefirst survey period. Initially, the main interest was in wounds of the thoraxand abdomen only and a considerable number of cases with wounds in other bodyregions, for example, head, were excluded. Later, all types of cases werestudied, but the early selection is still reflected in the overall figures.-J.C. B.
There was an apparent reduction of approximately 36 percent13in lethal thoracic wounds in the group wearing the armored vest. The nylon vestalso covered part of the upper part of the abdomen, especially the liver and thekidneys. This may account for the 5.4 percent reduction in lethal abdominalwounds among those wearing the armored vest.
Among the 500 KIA casualties wearing body armor, there were3,510 total wounds recorded. The types of wounds were distributed as follows:3,068 wounds (87.4 percent) penetrating, 198 wounds (5.7 percent) perforating,170 avulsions (4.8 percent), 50 lacerations (1.4 percent) (superficial butextensive wound), and 24 (0.7 percent) decapitations. With this same casualtysample, the causative agent for the wound was recovered in 437 instances. Afragment was identified in 293 (67.1 percent) of the cases and small arms in 110(25.1 percent) of the cases. Table 308 lists the regional distribution of the3,510 wounds in the 500 casualties. Multiple wounds were present in 364 (72.8percent) of the cases and 136 (27.2 percent) had only a single wound.
The importance of multiple wounding in casualty productioncannot be overemphasized. In the survey on casualties wearing body armor, therewas an average of seven wounds per case. This figure is below the actual numbersince it was almost impossible to count every wound on some of the cases.Compared with this, for WIA casualties, the average is about two wounds. In anyone region an additional wound, aside from the lethal wound, might conceivablyincrease the chances of death by additive or even synergistic effects. Also, itis quite possible that one missile entering a body cavity, such as the thorax,would not strike a vital area, but additional missiles entering the cavity
13Other surveys would indicate a reduction of only approximately 12 percent.-J. C. B.
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Region | Number of wounds | Percent of wounds |
Head | 473 | 13.5 |
Neck | 160 | 4.5 |
Thorax | 553 | 15.7 |
Abdomen | 260 | 7.4 |
Extremities: | ||
| Upper | 700 | 20.0 |
| Lower | 1,364 | 38.9 |
| Total | 3,510 | 100.0 |
would increase the chances of the heart or great vesselsbeing hit. Another possibility is that KIA casualties are slower to be evacuatedthan the wounded from the battlefield. They are thus exposed to enemy firelonger and might sustain additional hits after receiving a lethal wound.Whatever the reason or combinations of reasons, reduction of the number ofwounds is extremely desirable.
Collection of Battle Casualty Data
In the early days of the Korean War, medical records ofbattlefield wounding were too inexact in their nomenclature to permit exhaustivewound ballistic studies. In 1951, an effort was made to correct this. Medicalpersonnel were requested to record the exact type of wounding missile on the EMT(emergency medical tag). For example, instead of recording "shellfragment" or "shrapnel," they were asked to identify the missileas being artillery, mortar, hand grenades, landmine, and so forth. It was alsofound that the casualty was frequently able to identify the exact nature of themissile causing his wound. By making the effort to get this information on thespot, when events were fresh and the information most readily available, thedata would then appear on all the patient's medical records and be readilyaccessible for compiling into wound ballistics data. The results of this effortwere reflected in the more exact nature of the weapon frequency charts compiledlater in the war. In the first casualty survey, approximately 85 percent of thetotal number of wounding missiles were listed by the ambiguous term "shellfragments." In the last survey conducted in the Korean War, only 39.6percent of the wounds were identified as being due to "shellfragments."
In 1952, medical officers and battalion aid station personnelwere asked to note on the record accompanying each KIA casualty whether he hadbeen wearing an armored vest and helmet at time of wounding. This request metwith considerable success in the latter stages of the war, but with constant
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changes in personnel many cases came through without anotation concerning the wearing of a vest or a helmet.
Indoctrination of medical personnel on the importance ofaccurately recording wound ballistics data on the EMT could best be accomplishedat the Medical Field Service School. A recommendation was made by all woundballistic teams operating in Korea that the present EMT be modified by theadding of "body armor worn or not worn," "helmet worn or notworn," and "type missile causing wound." This would be ofparamount importance in future wars for the successful operation of all woundballistic teams. In addition, a simple but comprehensive method for locatingwounds, for example, an anatomic chart with body regions demarcated, would be ofgreat value. Figure 361 illustrates the demarcation of body regions14which is advocated for use by battle casualty survey units. This was theregional demarcation used by the survey team at Kokura from July to November1952 and also by Major Enos and Captain Beyer in the KIA survey from May toAugust 1953.
14Holmes, R. H., Enos, W. F., and Beyer, J. C.: Demarcation of Body Regions. U.S. Armed Forces M. J. 5:1610-1618, November 1954.
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Helmet Survey
During the period from 9 January to 1 March 1953, a study onthe battlefield performance of the M1 steel helmet was conducted in Korea byLieutenant Coe.15 The study was madeby collecting all available helmets hit on the battlefield by enemy fire. Thehelmets were then forwarded through Graves Registration channels to the CentralIdentification Unit, Kokura, with information on (1) the type of missilethat hit the helmet (grenade, mortar, "burp" gun, and so forth), (2) acomplete description of what happened to the individual wearing the helmet, (3)the type of wounds sustained, and (4) the exact location of the wounds. Afterproper coordination with the Medical and Quartermaster Sections, an orderimplementing this was published by the Adjutant General, Headquarters, EighthU.S. Army, Korea, and sent to all division surgeons for their information andcoordination with their battalion aid station personnel.
A total of 45 helmets were received during this period oftime. It had been hoped that many more helmets would be recovered and forwardedwith the information requested. Personal contact with battalion aid stationsurgeons at a later date revealed the numerous difficulties involved inrecovering the helmets. Soldiers who had sustained hits on their helmets withoutreceiving a wound did not want to give up their helmets and in many instancesdid not turn them in. There was also added danger in attempting recovery ofdamaged helmets from exposure to enemy fire during the time required forrecovery.
The 45 helmets examined sustained a total of 71 hits. Abreakdown on these is as follows:
| | |
Missile perforated steel shell and liner | 60 |
Missile perforated steel shell but not liner | 3 |
Missile was completely defeated by helmet | 7 |
Missile perforated liner only | 1 |
| Total | 71 |
Although 85 percent of the hits did go completely throughboth helmet and liner, not all of these resulted in death or even in a seriouswound. In some instances, the steel shell and liner were perforated with theindividual not sustaining a wound. The wounds sustained in these cases revealedthe following:
|
| |
Wounded through helmet | 16 |
Helmet hit, no wounds | 7 |
Helmet hit, wounded elsewhere | 2 |
Killed through helmet | 16 |
Helmet hit, killed by wound elsewhere | 4 |
| Total | 15 |
15Coe, G. B.: BattlefieldPerformance of the M-1 Steel Helmet. CmlC Medical Laboratories Research ReportNo. 248, February 1954.
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Thus, 16 of 45 cases were killed as a result of helmet defeat by the missile.In 13 of 45 cases the missile was defeated successfully, although some of thesecases resulted in death from wounds elsewhere on the body. Many of the 16nonlethal wounds sustained through the helmet were potentially lethal. (This wasjudged from the direction the missile was traveling.) Therefore, in assessingthe effectiveness of helmet protection, these reductions in wound severity mustbe considered. From the tabulation just presented, it can be seen that in overhalf the cases studied, possible death resulting from head wounds was preventedby the helmet.
Analysis of the types of missiles involved in the 71 hitsshowed the following:
| |
Mortar | 32 |
Artillery | 16 |
Small arms | 10 |
Shell fragment, type unknown | 9 |
Landmine | 1 |
Hand grenade | 1 |
Secondary missile | 1 |
Unknown | 1 |
Not all soldiers wore their helmet, because of its weight,lack of stability, and so forth. Many men on patrols complained about the noisemade by the helmet when it came in contact with bushes and twigs and felt alsothat the helmet interfered with their hearing. For these reasons, some men onpatrol preferred not to wear their helmets. These objections to the helmet canbe overcome by continuing indoctrination and by improving the helmetcharacteristics, especially its stability on the head.
Information was received on two cases in which soldiers hadto seek cover hurriedly from incoming mortar fire. In both cases, the helmetcame off when the soldier hit the ground. Both men were then killed by headwounds, from fragments of the next incoming round. It cannot be said that thesemen would have been saved had their helmets not come off; however, from the 45cases studied, it can be seen that they would have had an increased chance ofsurvival had their helmets stayed on.
LOWER TORSO ARMOR
In addition to the development of the all-nylon body armorvest, a lower torso armor was also fabricated (fig. 362). The new armor wasdesigned to be worn with the Army's armored vest and, like the vest, was madeof 12 layers of flexible, spot-laminated nylon duck inclosed within awater-resistant vinyl layer with an outer covering of 6 ounce nylon fabric. Thelower torso armor provided for the hips, abdomen, and groin the same degree ofprotection the armored vest gave the upper torso, and there was some degree ofoverlapping between the two garments. The new lower torso armor resembled boxer'sshorts and was supported by suspenders worn under the armored vest.
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IMPROVISED ARMOR FOR SPECIAL PURPOSES
In addition to these experimental and standard items ofissue, a considerable number of armored "suits" were devised by thepersonnel in Korea in an attempt to provide protection to individuals engaged inminefield clearance. Some of these models were produced from the ballisticmaterials in the World War II M12 vest and portions of the World War II flyer'sarmor (fig. 363). Others were developed from either the Army or Marine Corpsupper torso armor in conjunction with overlapping plates of doron applied to theabdomen and upper and lower extremities (fig. 364).
It is difficult to summarize quantitatively the effects of body armor in theKorean War; however, certain tentative conclusions are permitted by thebattlefield studies and by the impressions gained by the team members.
1. There was a decrease in the number of personnel killed in action.
2. There was a decrease in the number of personnel wounded in action.
3. There was a decrease in the severity of wounds in those areas protected bythe vest.
4. There was a decrease in the convalescence time of many of the wounded inaction.
5. There was a decrease in the workload of medical personnel.
6. There was an increase in the percentage of wounded in action who returnedto frontline duty.
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7. There was an increase in the confidence and fighting spiritof the majority of troops wearing body armor.
Many of the medical officers in Korea felt that the armoredvest was one of the most effective forms of preventive medicine introduced inthe Korean War. It may safely be concluded that use of body armor coupled withrapid helicopter evacuation of casualties to mobile army surgical hospitalsimproved medical and surgical care, and extensive use of whole blood wasresponsible for the saving of many lives in Korea.
The advantages gained through the wound ballistics studiesand body armor test teams during the Korean War can only be perpetuated by anactive and purposeful continuation of certain activities during peacetime andimmediate, full reactivation of all units in the event ofhostilities. A medical program for the study of wounds and wounding is presentedin appendix I, page 851.
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FIGURE 364.-Armoredsuit for use in demolition work, 3 August 1953. A. Front view, overlapping doronplates. B. Rear view, Marine Corps vest (left) and Army vest, T52-3.
