CHAPTER IV
Casualty Survey-New Georgia and Burma Campaigns
James E. T. Hopkins, M.D.
NEW GEORGIA CAMPAIGN
1ST BATTALION, 148TH INFANTRY, 37TH DIVISION
The material in this chapter is based on an attempt to surveyand analyze the circumstances related to the production of battle casualties inthree infantry battalions in combat, as follows:
The 1st Battalion, 148th Infantry, 37th Division, in the NewGeorgia campaign.
The 1st and 3d Battalions, 5307th Composite Unit(Provisional), in the Burma campaign.1
Materials and Methods
The same method of collecting data was followed in the NewGeorgia and Burma campaigns. Information on the circumstances in which thecasualties occurred was obtained by questioning the surviving casualties; theirfriends and the friends of those killed in action; platoon leaders; companycommanders; and medical officers. It should be emphasized that both thesurviving casualties and those questioned concerning them and concerning thecasualties killed in action were usually known to the writer of this chapter: inthis type of warfare, officers and men lived in closeassociation with each other. The opinions expressed are the writer's own, andmany of them are no more than presumptions, especially as they concern commentsthat are strictly military.
1The author of this chapter, Dr.James E. T. Hopkins, a captain in the U. S. Army Medical Corps during World War II, served for 18 days of combat on New Georgia Island in1943 as assistant battalion surgeon with the 1st Battalion, 148th Infantry, 37th Division. He also served as combat teamsurgeon and later as battalion surgeon for the 3d Battalion of the 5307th Composite Unit (Provisional) in Burma in 1944("Merrill's Marauders").
After only a few days of combat experience, Captain Hopkinswas deeply impressed by the many casualties among U.S. troops which apparentlyresulted from carelessness. He was also impressed by the fact that aconsiderable number of casualties killed in action died from head and chestwounds in which the missiles entered from the front or from the side of thebody. These observations led him to consider seriously the possibility of theuse of body armor for the protection of vital areas of the body (p. 275).
During his time in combat, therefore, Captain Hopkinscollected all possible data on combat casualties in order to demonstrate howcombat losses could be reduced. The results of his studies were compiled withthe help and encouragement of Col. (later Brig. Gen.) George R. Callender, MC,of the U.S. Army Medical Center and Chairman of the Missile Casualties (WoundBallistics) Committee; Brig. Gen. Albert G. Love, of the Historical Division,Office of the Surgeon General; and Col. Michael E. DeBakey, MC, of the SurgicalConsultants Division of the same office.-J. C. B.
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On the other hand, all of the opinions expressed are based ona genuine effort to secure the precise facts. The writer secured muchinformation on the battlefield, where he often acted as an aidman, and fromclose association with company commanders during actual fighting and with othersin a position to know the facts.
The following data were obtained whenever this was possible:
1. The name of the casualty, with his rank, serial number,and unit.
2. The type of action; the type of terrain with availablecover, and the duty of the casualty.
3. The weather conditions and the time of day.
4. The anatomic location of the wound and the degree ofseverity.
5. The type of causative agent and the approximate range.
6. The treatment received.
7. The classification of the casualty as to type and eventualdisposition.
8. The classification of the casualty as to the possible avoidability of his injury. That is, anattempt was made to determine whether the injury might have been avoided by amore appropriate order from his officer, or by a better planned action on hisown part, or for any other reason.
From the standpoint of type of casualty and eventualdisposition, the following classification was used:
1. KIA (killed in action).-Those found dead or who died upto 30 minutes after being found.
2. DOW (died of wounds).-Those wounded casualties whoreached a medical installation and survived more than 30 minutes and those who received treatment from a medical officerbefore death.
3. WIA (wounded in action).-Casualties wounded in action inNew Georgia and in Burma were classified into four categories:
a.-Those returned to duty from the battalion aid station.Because of the terrain in New Georgia and the tactical nature of fighting in the jungle, wounded men were often retained in, and sent back to duty from, thebattalion aid station, who, under more favorable circumstances, would have beenevacuated for treatment. This was also true in theBurma campaign.
b.-Those returned to duty from a medical facility, within1 month of wounding.2 In New Georgia, there were no field, portable,or evacuation hospitals and no surgical teams, and the chain of evacuation wasfrom the battalion aid station, usually through a collecting company, to astation hospital, in which urgent surgery was performed.
In Burma, during the first half of the campaign, casualtieswere evacuated by Piper Cub to the 20th General Hospital for initial woundsurgery, which they frequently did not receive for 24 hours. During the secondhalf of the campaign, the 42d Portable Hospital was flown in and operated inclose proximity to the battalion aid station. After emergency treatment, themajority of these men were evacuated to the 20th General Hospital. Smallernumbers were evacuated to the 14th Evacuation Hospital and the 111th StationHospital.
2For convenience of discussionhereafter termed "first echelon hospital."
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c.-Those returned to duty from a medical facility within 4months of wounding.3 On New Georgia, those men who did not requireurgent surgery or who, for various reasons, were not operated on in a firstechelon hospital, were evacuated by LST's to a station hospital inGuadalcanal, which they usually reached within 24 to 36 hours. Some casualtieswere also evacuated to the station hospital in New Caledonia. The nearestgeneral hospital was in the Fiji Islands.
d.-Those evacuated to the United States, after spendingmore than 4 months in hospital.
Geography and Climate
The New Georgia group of islands, which lie approximately 250miles northwest of Guadalcanal, are chiefly made up of coral except forKolombangara and Rendova, which are of volcanic origin. These islands, which arenot so rugged and mountainous as the islands of the Guadalcanal group, arecovered with thick jungle made up of large trees; tall, leafy jungle plants; andtangled vines and roots. Although the jungle growth is thick, it offers littleactual obstruction for even men or machines. In many instances, bulldozers wereable to weave around the larger trees and advance as much as a mile a daythrough the growth.
The casualties included in this study all took place on NewGeorgia Island between 18 July and 5 August 1943, inclusive. Even though thisis a coral island, many areas are extremely marshy, and in the section about theMunda airfield very little coral is visible. The majority of the foxholes weredug in the red clay which made up the topsoil covering the coral.
During the period of combat, the climate was very mild, withtemperatures ranging from 70? to 90? F. The humidity was very high, butrainfall was minimal.
Military Operation and Forces Involved
Military operation.-The NewGeorgia campaign, a combined military operation, had as its main objectiveseizure of the Munda airfield and driving the Japanese from New Georgia and thesurrounding islands. The operation was started on 30 June 1943 and completed by22 September 1943, with the occupation by U.S. troops of all important islandsin the New Georgia group.
Elements of the 172d and 169th Infantry Regiments of the 43dDivision landed on New Georgia Island at Zanana Beach between 2 and 6 July toproceed to a line of departure on the Barike River. After considerable fighting,with heavy casualties, these two regiments drove west on theMunda trail and established a new beachhead at Liana, at which the 103dInfantry of the 43d Division was landed.
On 11 July 1943, these three regimentsstarted an attack on the Japanese defensive position alongthe coastal strip. On 18 July, the 148th and 145th
3For convenience of discussionhereafter termed "second echelon hospital."
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Infantry Regiments of the 37th Division landed at the Zananaand Liana beachheads. These regiments, together with the 161st Infantry of the25th Division, started a coordinated attack on 25 July which ended in theseizure of the Munda airfield on 5 August 1943.
Forces involved.-It is difficultto make an accurate estimate of the number of men engaged in the campaign on NewGeorgia because of the many types of military units involved and the variouslocations of the islands on which the fighting took place. For the first 17 daysof the campaign, no more than 8,000 infantrymen fought on New Georgia. By 25July, this force had increased to 15,000 men. The total strength of all U.S.forces involved in the New Georgia campaign was approximately 35,000. Table 26lists the total U.S. casualties of the New Georgia campaign; 95 percent of theselosses occurred during the first 5 weeks.
Southwest sector.-Between 18 Julyand 5 August 1943, the period covered by this survey of casualties in the 1stBattalion, the 148th Infantry operated in the southwest sector of New GeorgiaIsland with this battalion, the 2d Battalion, and a regimental headquarters. The3d Battalion operated separately with a force of Marines on the north side ofthe island.
Category | Total casualties | 25th Division | 37th Division | 43d Division | Other | ||||
Officers | Enlisted men | Officers | Enlisted men | Officers | Enlisted men | Officers | Enlisted men | Enlisted men | |
Killed in action | 48 | 924 | 11 | 120 | 11 | 179 | 26 | 436 | 189 |
Wounded in action | 169 | 3,704 | 35 | 515 | 47 | 840 | 87 | 1,855 | 494 |
Died of wounds | 7 | 115 | 1 | 9 | --- | 36 | 6 | 70 | --- |
Missing in action | 2 | 21 | --- | 1 | --- | 5 | 2 | 15 | --- |
Accidental deaths | --- | 4 | --- | 2 | --- | 2 | --- | --- | --- |
| Total | 226 | 4,768 | 47 | 647 | 58 | 1,062 | 121 | 2,376 | 683 |
The 1st and 2d Battalions of this regiment arrived at ZananaBeach on 18 July. The 2d Battalion proceeded to relieve the 43d Divisioncommand post, which had been surrounded, and to open the supply route to the169th and 172d Infantry Regiments of the 43d Division. The 1st Battalion, whicharrived early in the morning, after a few minor contacts with the Japanese,succeeded in advancing within 1 mile of the Barike River along the Munda trail.
At 1100 hours on 19 July, when the battalion was advancingalong this trail, it came under automatic weapons fire at the Barike River;several men were killed and several wounded. The river was not crossed until 20July,
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when the battalion succeeded in advancing to a parachute dropwhere the 169th Infantry was relieved. A few casualties occurred during the dayfrom enemy automatic weapons fire and from friendly artillery fire.
At 0600 hours on 25 July, the battalion attacked from a lineof departure in front of O'Brien Hill on a 270? azimuth, which it was tofollow until the end of the campaign for the Munda airfield.
Time 37th Division had been assigned a sector north of thenorth flank of the 43d Division and had beers given the primary mission ofsecuring the high ground commanding the Munda airfield. From right to lefttoward the beach front, U.S. forces were disposed as follows:
1st and 2d Battalions, 148th Infantry Regiment.
The 161st Infantry Regiment.
2 battalions of the 145th Infantry Regiment.
The 176th Infantry Regiment.
The 103d Infantry Regiment.
This general alinement of regiments was to be maintaineduntil the fall of the Munda airfield on 5 August 1943.
By the afternoon of 27 July, the two battalions of the148th Infantry had advanced slightly beyond and to the right of O'Brien Hilland had begun to set up a supply dump in this area. There was considerablepatrol activity during this time. On the following day, after losing five men inan ambush, the 1st and 2d Battalions advanced 1,000 yards on the 270? azimuthto a point overlooking Biblo Hill. Very little opposition was offered by theenemy.
One company was left to protect the supply dump, but on 29July it was surrounded by a superior Japanese force and all communications weresevered. Following this action, the two battalions were forced to withdraw. The2d Battalion, minus Companies G and E, withdrew to the 37th Division area bytraveling single file through the jungle.
The 1st Battalion, together with Companies G and E of the 2dBattalion, fought the Japanese along the trail and about the supply dump untilthe morning of 1 August, when they routed the enemy forces and again establishedcontact with the 161st Infantry, which had been advancing westward on theirleft flank.
The action just described resulted in a large proportion ofthe casualties sustained by the 148th Infantry during this campaign. For 4 days,the 1st Battalion had no means of evacuating its wounded.
On 1 August, the regiment again began its advance to theright of the 161st Infantry. During the next 4 days, it continued in acoordinated attack with the other regiment until it finally reached the beachapproximately 1,000 yards north of the Munda airfield.
During this operation, the majority of U.S. casualtiesresulted from automatic weapons fire, though a considerable number were due tofriendly artillery and mortar fire. There was no enemy aerial activity duringthe later stages of this campaign.
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Casualties of 1st Battalion, 148th Infantry
U.S. troops in the southwest sector of New Georgia Island never exceeded 18,000 infantrymen. It was estimated that there were nevermore than 6,000 Japanese troops involved in the fighting in this sector, whichwas the heaviest in the campaign.
Table 27 lists the casualties incurred by the 1st Battalion,148th Infantry, during the 18 days of this survey. Approximately 2,000 enemydead were counted during the period between 3 July and 5 August. During the 18days the 1st Battalion was in combat, it was estimated that they killed between300 and 400 Japanese with small arms and mortar fire and that artillery firedirected by officers of the rifle companies accounted for an additional 100 to200 Japanese dead.
Category | Casualties | |
| Number | Percent | |
Killed in action | 35 | 19.3 |
Wounded in action: | ||
| Died of wounds | 11 | 6.1 |
| Survived wounds | 135 | 74.6 |
| Total | 146 | 80.7 |
| 181 | 100.0 |
Hospitalization and evacuation.-When the1st Battalion, 148th Infantry, 37th Division, arrived at Zanana Beach, NewGeorgia Island, on 18 July 1943, one collecting company (Company B, 118thMedical Battalion) was serving the elements of the 43d Division about the Mundaarea. For the first 5 days of the campaign, only this company served the 1stBattalion. On 22 July, the 112th Clearing Company moved to Liana Beach about 1mile behind the 1st Battalion sector, but its collecting companies did not reachthe battalion aid station until 3 August, the 17th day of combat. In themeantime, some medical care was provided by a collecting company from the 25thDivision.
While no attempt will be made to discuss routes of evacuationand types of medical care for units involved in the campaign other than the 1stBattalion, 148th Regiment, it might be added that according to a report from theOffice of the Surgeon, South Pacific Area, entitled "Medical Service, NewGeorgia Campaign," the medical and surgical care provided during thegreater part of the New Georgia campaign was deficient in many respects andmedical facilities
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from battalion aid levels through the hospital echelon werealso often inadequate.
Most of the 1st Battalion casualties were evacuated onregimental supply trucks or ambulance jeeps (fig. 144). During the first 5 daysof combat, they were taken from Zanana Beach to Guadalcanal by LST's, adistance of 200 miles which required from 20 to 24 hours' travel time. As arule, no treatment other than first aid was provided before the trip. En route,medical care for the 100 to 200 casualties usually carried on each ship wasprovided by one Navy medical officer.
FIGURE 144.-Medical aidmen carrying wounded man to ambulance jeep.
After the fifth day of combat, casualties were evacuatedthrough the 112th Clearing Company, and in many instances surgery was providedat this level (fig. 145). Because of the 24-hour evacuation policy, however,many casualties who had been treated inadequately took the long trip toGuadalcanal.
It was not until 28 July that the 17th Field Hospital was setup on Kokorana Island, 5 miles from the Liana beachhead. With the facilitiesthus provided, the wounded from the 1st Battalion had the benefit ofhospitalization about 3 miles distant by land routes and about 5 miles by waterevacuation (fig. 146).
During the 5-day period between 28 July and 1 August, allsupply lines were cut, as already mentioned, and casualties from the 1stBattalion and from Companies G and E of the 2d Battalion could not be evacuatedfrom the
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FIGURE 146.-Wounded soldiers lying in vessel, awaiting transportation to the 17th Field Hospital.
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battalion area; a large number of them therefore received nosurgical treatment for several days.
Details of the 181 casualties sustained on New GeorgiaIsland, as they were related to the various tactical situations, appear inappendix A (p. 769).
BURMA CAMPAIGN
1ST AND 3D BATTALIONS, 5307TH COMPOSITE UNIT (PROVISIONAL)
Geography and Climate
Northern Burma is separated from India and China by the highmountain ranges which make up the foothills of the Himalayas, some of whichreach an altitude of 20,000 feet. As in all of northern Burma, the jungle isvery heavy but is usually not impenetrable. The terrain is the main factorthat makes it difficult to pass through the jungle growth.
The unit reached Burma after a march up the Ledo Road (fig.147) and through the Pangsau Pass of the Kumon Range at 2,400 feet. They thenpassed into the Hukawng Valley, a very narrow valley bordered by very hilly,rugged, mountainous terrain. Much of the operation took place on the razorbackridges of the hills on the eastern border of the valley.
FIGURE 147.-View of the Ledo Road.
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Practically all of the unit's operations in this area, aswell as in the Mogaung and Myitkyina Valleys, were confined to the century-oldnative and game trails that are seen throughout all of northern Burma. TheHukawng Valley is extremely flat and is covered in some areas with dense junglegrowth and in others with elephant grass. The average altitude isapproximately 500 feet. Numerous Kachin villages, with a few nativeinhabitants, were repeatedly encountered throughout this area. The MogaungValley was approached through difficult terrain over the Ywangabum Mountains,along the course of the Tanai Hka River.
After its operations in this area, the unit retraced itsroute for perhaps 50 miles and passed over the 6,500-foot Jaupadu Bum Mountainsthat separate the Mogaung Valley from the Myitkyina Valley. This terrain wasperhaps the most rugged encountered during the North Burma campaign; in someplaces, 1-mile stretches of the overgrown trails had a rise of 3,000 feet.
During February and March 1944, the days were very hot, andthe temperature averaged about 80? F. The nights, however, were cool, andadditional clothing was required. There was a minimum amount of rainfallduring the entire campaign.
April was very warm during the day, and there waspractically no rainfall. May was hot and humid, with almost daily showers.This was the beginning of the monsoon season, which continued until the end ofOctober, but it did not materially affect operations as themajority of the troops had left the area by the end of June.
Organization of 5307th Composite Unit (Provisional)
In September 1943, 650 men and officers, all volunteers,congregated in New Caledonia to form a special infantry battalion. They had been selected fromthe 37th, 43d, 25th, and Americal Divisions. Later, 250additional men and officers arrived, from the 32d and 41st Divisions and fromthe 98th Pack Artillery, from Australia. Most of these men had been overseasfor more than a year and had seen action in the South Pacific or SouthwestPacific Areas.
These men made up the 3d Battalion of what was to become the 5307th Composite Unit (Provisional). They traveled to India on a transportwith a battalion from the United States, which was to become the 1st Battalionof this Unit, and a battalion from the Caribbean area which was to become the2d Battalion.
These three battalions, organized as an infantry regiment,trained in India from November 1943 to January 1944. During this time, therewere many transfers of men within the battalions, and about 150 replacementsarrived from casual units. The 31st Quartermaster Pack Troop was also absorbedby the regiment. On 1 January 1944, the three battalions were formallyactivated as the 5307th Composite Unit (Provisional).
After ship and train travel, the entire regimentarrived at Ledo, Assam,
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during the first week of February 1944. Its primary missionswas to spearhead the Chinese movement into North Burma.
After a march of 125 miles up the Ledo Road, the regimentleft the Chinese in the vicinity of Nyenbien, on the Chindwin, in the thirdweek of January and set out on a campaign which was to carry them on footbetween 700 and 1,000 miles over the mountainous and jungle terrain of northern Burma.They were to aid the Chinese in the occupation of the Hukawng,Mogaung, and Myitkyina Valleys. Their mission was climaxed by the capture of theMyitkyina airfield on 17 May 1944.
Early in June 1944, most of the 1st Battalion were evacuatedto various hospitals. The few who were not were reinforced with 300 to 400 menwho had been released from hospitals in late May and early June. Thereorganized battalion fought in the attack on Myitkyina during the latterpart of June, during July, and during the first 2 weeks of August. Thecasualties sustained after 8 June are not included in this survey.
Military Operation and Forces Involved
During the second week of February 1944, the three infantrybattalions which made up "Merrill's Marauders" entered northernBurma. After making a wide flanking movement to the left of the HukawngValley, they arrived in the vicinity of Walawbum during the first week of March. The numerous skirmishes and several engagements which took place resultedin complete success for the U.S. troops, and the operation enabled the Chineseto occupy the entire Hukawng Valley. Shortly after their arrival near Walawbumduring the first week of March, the regiment was relieved by Chinese troops.
During the next 3 weeks, the 1st Battalion, reinforced by aregiment of Chinese, marched across the Aipawn Bum Mountains to engage theJapanese at Shaduzup in the northern sector of the Mogaung Valley. Thisoperation, which was also very successful, enabled the Chinese divisions toenter the upper part of the Mogaung Valley, after passing down theJapanese-built road through the Jamba Bum Pass.
Meantime, the 2d and 3d Battalions of the regiments crossedthe Wangabum Mountains to the east, where they engaged the Japanese atInkangatawng, about 50 miles distant and 20 miles above Kamaing. The success ofthis operation enabled the Chinese troops to advance rapidly down theMogaung Road toward Kamaing, but because these troops failed to fulfill theirassigned mission, the 2d and 3d Battalions were forced to withdraw to themountains in the vicinity of Nhpum Ga, where one battalion was surrounded. The other, withthe aid of air-dropped pack artillery (fig. 148), engaged the Japanese for 9 days in a major battle to relievethe encircled troops.
After the Japanese had been routed, in the third week ofApril, the three battalions of the unit assembled at the base of the JaupaduBum Mountains for the Myitkyina campaign. For this campaign, two forces wereorganized: (1) The 3d Battalion with the 88th Infantry Regiment (Chinese) and (2) the
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FIGURE 148-U.S. troops and Kachin natives watching a parachute supply drop.
1st Battalion with the 150th Infantry Regiment (Chinese). The 2d Battalion was held in regimental reserve.
While these troops were passing through the MyitkyinaValley, two major battles developed, both of which eventually ended in completesuccess for the U.S. forces. The Myitkyina airfield was captured by the 1stBattalion and the attached Chinese regiment on 17 May 1944. Shortly afterward,some 4,000 engineer and infantry troops were flown in.
For the greater part of the original 5307th Composite Unit(Provisional), the campaign in the Myitkyina area lasted another 3 weeks. Thetown itself did not fall for 2? months; then it was taken by Chinese forceswith the remnants of less than a battalion of the original unit.
Forces involved.-It is estimated(table 28) that a total of 8,700 U.S. troops were involved in the Myitkyinacampaign. Official, reliable figures are not available for the size of the enemyforces or casualties, nor are reliable figures available for Chinese casualties.
Casualties, 15 February-8 June 1944
Table 28, in addition to listing the numbers of U.S. troopsinvolved, and the estimated numbers of Japanese and Chinese troops involved, inthe North Burma campaign during the study period from 15 February to June 1944,also lists the casualties of the three forces. Certain of the 2d Battalionengagements are not included in this table; their casualties would total about40 KIA and about 200 WIA. Also excluded from the table are the several hundredcasualties, KIA and WIA, sustained by the two infantry and two
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Locality | Troops involved | Casualties sustained | ||||
United States | Chinese | Japanese | United States, killed in action | Japanese, killed in action | United States, wounded in action | |
Walawbum | 2,700 | --- | 1,000 | 5 | 850 | 28 |
Shaduzup | 800 | 3,000 | 1,000 | 8 | 600 | 23 |
Inkangahtaung | 1,200 | --- | 1,000 | 2 | 350 | 3 |
Nhpun Ga, Auche, Warong Poakum | 1,600 | --- | 1,000 | 22 | 600 | 67 |
Riptong | 700 | 3,000 | 200 | 1 | 185 | 4 |
Tingkrukawng | 700 | 2,900 | 400 | 6 | 350 | 15 |
Myitkyina: | ||||||
| 1st Battalion | 500 | --- | 50-200 | 3 | (1) | 9 |
| 3d Battalion | 500 | --- | 200-400 | 6 | 85 | 15 |
| Total | 8,700 | 8,900 | 4,850-5,200 | 53 | 3,020 | 164 |
1Undetermined.
engineer battalions flown into Myitkyina after the airfieldwas captured by U.S. troops.
While it was seldom possible to examine or count enemy dead,it is believed that about 3,000 Japanese were killed in North Burma. During thesame period, including the 40 casualties KIA from the 2d Battalion, almost 100U.S. troops were killed.
Evacuation and hospitalization.-The threebattalions of the 5307th Composite Unit (Provisional) operated along separatetrails for the greater part of the campaign in Burma. Evacuation of the woundedwas frequently not possible for periods of a week or more, but the majoritywere evacuated between a few hours to 10 days after wounding. During most of themajor engagements, landing strips were built on the rice paddies of the nativevillages, and the wounded were evacuated by aircraft. A few casualties were putin the care of Kachins (fig. 149), who evacuated them by litter or by elephanttransport.
After the capture of the Myitkyina airfield (fig. 150),casualties were evacuated by C-46's and C-47's to hospitals in the Ledoarea; namely, the 20th General Hospital, the 14th Evacuation Hospital, and the 111th Station Hospital. During the first 3 months of the campaign, thepatients were deposited in various collecting and clearing companies along theLedo Road, behind the advancing Chinese troops. In many instances, they did notreach the 20th General Hospital until several days after they had been wounded.
For the first 3 weeks of March, during the Shaduzupcampaign, the 1st Battalion had the services of a surgical team supplied by theSeagrave Unit.
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FIGURE 150.-Wounded soldiers awaiting evacuation, Myitkyina airfield.
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After they had been treated, these casualties were picked up by a platoonfrom a collecting company of the 13th Medical Battalion.
During the first 3 weeks of May, the 1st and 3d Battalions had the support ofthe 42d Surgical Portable Hospital and the Seagrave Portable Hospital. As aresult, the majority of their casualties received surgery within a few minutes(fig. 151) to a few hours after wounding.
FIGURE 151.-Operating room of surgical team in field hospital.
During the march up the Ledo Road, about 70 litter patients(fig. 152) were carried for as much as 10 miles to an airstrip 40 miles north ofMyitkyina.
Aside from the variable, and sometimes inadequate,facilities for their evacuation, the men of the 5307th Composite Unit(Provisional) received excellent surgical care.
Casualties sustained.-Table 29lists the casualties of the 1st and 3d Battalions, 5307th Composite Unit(Provisional), during the Burma campaign for the period 15 February to 8 June1944, inclusive. Detailed reports of these casualties in relation to thevarious tactical situations appear in appendix B for the 1st Battalion (cases 1-61,p. 783) and in appendix C for the 3d Battalion (cases 1-151, p. 789). Table 30is a compilation of tables 27 and 29, comparing the casualties of the surveyperiods in the New Georgia and Burma campaigns.
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FIGURE 152-Litter bearers carrying wounded Chinese soldier to an ambulance pickup point.
Category | 1st Battalion | 3d Battalion | Total casualties | |
Percent | ||||
Killed in action | 7 | 24 | 31 | 14.6 |
Wounded in action: | ||||
| Died of wounds | 8 | 17 | 25 | 11.8 |
| Survived wounds | 46 | 110 | 156 | 73.6 |
| Total | 54 | 127 | 181 | 85.4 |
Grand total | 61 | 151 | 212 | 100.0 |
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Category | 1st Battalion, New Georgia, 18 July-5 August 1943 | 1st and 3d Battalions, Burma, February-June 1944 | Total casualties | |
| Number | Percent | |||
Killed in action | 35 | 31 | 66 | 16.8 |
Wounded in action: | ||||
| Died of wounds | 11 | 25 | 36 | 9.2 |
| Survived wounds | 135 | 156 | 291 | 74.0 |
| Total | 146 | 181 | 327 | 83.2 |
Grand total | 181 | 212 | 393 | 100.0 |
ANALYSIS OF CASUALTIES
Basic Data
The units involved in the survey described in the precedingpages included:
The 1st Battalion, 148th Infantry, 37th Division, on NewGeorgia Island, 18 July-5 August 1943, inclusive.
The 1st and 3d Battalions, 5307th Composite Unit(Provisional), in Burma, 15 February-8 June 1944, inclusive.
In the preceding pages, in which each of these units wasconsidered separately, the background for the New Georgia and the Burmacampaigns was described, including the geography; the climate; the generalorder of battle, including the troops involved; and the evacuation andhospitalization setup. In the appendixes for each of these campaigns, there areprovided further details of the tactical situation as related to the number andlocation of the wounds sustained and the disposition of the WIA casualties. Themilitary situation has been clarified by the arrangement of all actions intotactical situations, and each individual injury (injuries) has been describedin such a way that it is possible to demonstrate what part each casualty playedin the particular tactical situation. Injuries that seemed preventable arefrankly indicated.
For ease of reference, the combined figures for the twocampaigns are brought together here. They consist of:
369 casualties, exclusive of 23 casualties carded for recordonly (CRO) and 1 KIA casualty not sustained in combat. These 24 casualties arenot considered further in most of the discussion.
101 fatal wounds, made up of 65 KIA casualties and 36 DOWcasualties.
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268 survivors, whose wounds were distributed as follows:
42 head
31 chest
14 abdomen
143 extremities, broken down into:
62 wounds of upper extremities
81 wounds of lower extremities
38 multiple wounds.
Table 31 lists the total casualties sustained during the survey period, withtheir general disposition among the various categories. The analysis reveals thefollowing facts:
1. The ratio of the total 393 casualties to the 102 total dead (KIA and DOW)was 3.9:1.
2. The ratio of the 291 survivors (WIA excluding DOW) to the 102 total dead(KIA and DOW) was 2.9:1.
Category | Casualties | |
| Number | Percent | |
Dead: | ||
| Killed in action | 66 | 16.8 |
| Wounded-treated-died-later | 36 | 9.2 |
| Total | 102 | 26.0 |
Living wounded: | ||
| Returned to duty from: | ||
Aid post | 74 | 18.8 |
Hospital, first echelon | 61 | 15.5 |
Hospital, rear echelon | 91 | 23.2 |
Evacuated to United States | 42 | 10.7 |
Minor wounds, no record | 23 | 5.8 |
| Total | 291 | 74.0 |
| 393 | 100.0 |
3. If the 23 casualties carded for record only are excluded from theanalysis, the ratio of total wounded to true KIA was 4.7:1. This is the morecommonly used ratio. In this survey, it is undoubtedly related to the closeproximity of the medical installations to the frontlines and to the fact that
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a considerable number of casualties listed as DOW might wellhave been tabulated as KIA under other circumstances.
4. Among the total 393 casualties, 249 (63.3 percent) werereturned to duty. If the 23 CRO casualties are excluded, 226 (57.5 percent) werereturned to duty.
Anatomic FrequencyTable 32 lists the anatomic distribution (regional frequency)of wounds in the 369 battle casualties and table 33 the distribution among the101 dead. The following comments seem warranted:
1. Wounds of the head and of the thorax accounted for thesame proportion of deaths among the KIA and the DOW. Among the 32 casualtieswith head injuries were 23 KIA's and 5 DOW's with brain injuries and 2 KIA'sand 2 DOW's with injuries to the face and neck.
2. The fact that more thoracic wounds were observed in thissurvey than in the Bougainville study (p. 318) is related to the greaterproportion of patrol and offensive action in this study. All casualties whodied from thoracic wounds had perforating injuries.
3. Although no KIA's are found among the abdominalinjuries listed as such, some casualties tabulated under multiple injuries hadabdominal wounds. Of the 25 casualties with abdominal wounds, 13 had viscerallesions, but only one was operated on. Three of the casualties listed in themultiple injuries group had laparotomies, but none survived. During the surveyperiod, most casualties with abdominal wounds were not killed instantly butdied of shock and hemorrhage before they could be operated on. Early, adequatesurgery would have decreased considerably the number of DOW's in the NewGeorgia-Burma campaigns.
TABLE 32.-Distribution ofwounds in 369 battle casualties, by anatomic location (regional frequency)1
Anatomic location | Total casualties | Dead | Living | |||
| Number | Percent | Number | Percent2 | Number | Percent2 | |
Head | 74 | 20.1 | 32 | 43.2 | 42 | 56.8 |
Thorax | 63 | 17.1 | 32 | 50.8 | 31 | 49.2 |
Abdomen | 25 | 6.8 | 11 | 44.0 | 14 | 56.0 |
Extremities: | ||||||
| Upper | 63 | 17.1 | 1 | 1.6 | 62 | 98.4 |
| Lower | 83 | 22.4 | 2 | 2.4 | 81 | 97.6 |
Multiple | 61 | 16.5 | 23 | 37.7 | 38 | 62.3 |
| Total | 369 | 100.0 | 101 | 27.4 | 268 | 72.6 |
1Twenty-three cases with veryminor wounds and one nonbattle casualty excluded from total number ofcasualties.
2Percent for dichotomy, deadversus living, by each anatomic location and for total dead versus living.
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TABLE 33.-Distribution ofwounds in 101 dead, by anatomic location
Anatomic location | Total casualties | Killed in action | Died of wounds | |||
| Number | Percent | Number | Percent1 | Number | Percent1 | |
Head | 32 | 31.7 | 25 | 78.1 | 7 | 21.9 |
Thorax | 32 | 31.7 | 25 | 78.1 | 7 | 21.9 |
Abdomen | 11 | 10.9 | --- | .0 | 11 | 100.0 |
Extremities: | ||||||
| Upper | 1 | 1.0 | --- | .0 | 1 | 100.0 |
| Lower | 2 | 2.0 | --- | .0 | 2 | 100.0 |
Multiple | 23 | 22.7 | 15 | 65.2 | 8 | 34.8 |
| Total | 101 | 100.0 | 65 | 64.4 | 36 | 35.6 |
1Percent for dichotomy, killed inaction versus died of wounds, by each anatomic location and for total killed inaction versus died of wounds.
Table 34 lists the regional frequency of wounds among the 268casualties who survived their wounds. It is apparent in this survey, as it hasbeen apparent in others, that wounds of the extremities predominate among theWIA and that this group sustained fewer wounds in the anatomic regions in whichvital organs are located.
Table 34 also indicates the results of surgical skill in themanagement of wounds of the extremities. The lack of definitive care in thesecampaigns is shown by the fact that few casualties with serious abdominalwounds lived to be evacuated to the United States. A high proportion of thosewho survived to be evacuated had only flesh wounds in this critical area.
TABLE 34.-Distribution of wounds in 268 living wounded, by anatomic location
Anatomic location | Total casualties | Returned to duty | Evacuated to United States | ||||
| Number | Percent | Number | Percent1 | Number | Percent1 | ||
Head | 42 | 15.7 | 30 | 71.4 | 12 | 28.6 | |
Thorax | 31 | 11.6 | 28 | 90.3 | 3 | 9.7 | |
Abdomen | 14 | 5.2 | 13 | 92.9 | 1 | 7.1 | |
Extremities: | |||||||
| Upper | 62 | 23.1 | 56 | 90.3 | 6 | 9.7 | |
| Lower | 81 | 30.2 | 69 | 85.2 | 12 | 14.8 | |
Multiple | 38 | 14.2 | 30 | 78.9 | 8 | 21.1 | |
| Total | 268 | 100.0 | 226 | 84.3 | 42 | 15.7 | |
1Percent for dichotomy, dutyversus evacuated to United States, by each anatomic location and for total dutyversus evacuated to United States.
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Distribution of Wounds in Relation to Projected Body Area
Missiles from a given weapon usually move in one directiontoward a casualty. If the projected area of the body is completely exposed, ittherefore offers a better measure for the study of probable hits than the areaof the total unprotected body surface. The mean projected body area is obtainedfrom projection in the standing, kneeling, and sitting positions.4
Table 35 presents a comparison of mean projected body areaswith body areas hit. The wound distribution for the thorax exceeds the meanprojected body area by 4.5 percent, while wounds of the head exceed it by 7.9percent.
Anatomic location | Mean projected body area | Wound distribution | Rifle | Machinegun | Mortar | Artillery | Grenade |
Percent | Percent | Percent | Percent | Percent | Percent | Percent | |
Head | 12.0 | 19.9 | 21.1 | 20.3 | 20.2 | 19.4 | 18.7 |
Thorax | 16.0 | 20.5 | 22.1 | 19.5 | 21.3 | 19.4 | 20.0 |
Abdomen | 11.0 | 9.6 | 7.4 | 12.8 | 12.8 | 5.6 | 9.3 |
Extremities: | |||||||
| Upper | 22.0 | 21.0 | 26.2 | 20.3 | 18.1 | 16.7 | 24.0 |
| Lower | 39.0 | 29.0 | 23.2 | 27.1 | 27.6 | 38.9 | 28.0 |
| Total | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 |
Distribution of Wounds in Relation to Disposition ofCasualties
Table 36 presents a breakdown of the anatomic distribution ofwounds in relation to the general disposition of wounded casualties whosurvived. Casualties with wounds of the extremities show a very low mortalityrate, a high percentage of returns to duty, and a relatively high incidence ofevacuation to the United States.
Table 37 presents the incidence of fractures of theextremities (62 upper, 81 lower) among surviving casualties. Of the 143 withwounds of the extremities, 31 (44.0 percent) had associated fractures. Therewere 15 fractures (24.2 percent) among the 62 wounds of the upper extremity and16 (19.8 percent) among the 81 wounds of the lower extremities. Among the 42casualties evacuated to the United States, 18 were returned because offractures.
4Burns, B. D., and Zuckerman, S.:The Wounding Power of Small Bomb and Shell Fragments. R. C. No. 350 of theResearch and Experiments Department of the Ministry of Home Security.
258
259
Disposition | Total living wounded | Fractures | Nonfractures | |||
| Number | Percent | Number | Percent1 | Number | Percent1 | |
| Upper extremity wound | ||||||
Returned to duty from: | ||||||
| Aid post | 15 | 24.2 | --- | 0.0 | 15 | 100.0 |
| First echelon | 19 | 30.6 | 3 | 15.8 | 16 | 84.2 |
| Rear echelon | 22 | 35.5 | 7 | 31.8 | 15 | 68.2 |
Evacuated to United States | 6 | 9.7 | 5 | 83.3 | 1 | 16.7 |
| Total | 62 | 100.0 | 15 | 24.2 | 47 | 75.8 |
| Lower extremity wound | ||||||
Returned to duty from: | ||||||
| Aid post | 17 | 21.0 | --- | 0.0 | 17 | 100.0 |
| First echelon | 15 | 18.5 | --- | .0 | 15 | 100.0 |
| Rear echelon | 37 | 45.7 | 9 | 24.3 | 28 | 75.7 |
Evacuated to United States | 12 | 14.8 | 7 | 58.3 | 5 | 41.7 |
| Total | 81 | 100.0 | 16 | 19.8 | 65 | 80.2 |
1Percent for dichotomy, fractures versus nonfractures, under eachdisposition category and for total fractures versus nonfractures by upper andlower extremity wounds.
CAUSATIVE AGENTS
The number of battle casualties produced by various weaponsdepends upon many factors, such as the type of warfare (defensive, offensive,patrol); the number of weapons; the ammunition available; the training ofpersonnel on both sides; tactics; terrain; and weather. This study presents thevarious types of casualties produced because the enemy used their weapons toadvantage at a particular time. It does not show the maximum effectiveness ofany weapon, information which could be obtained only from a controlledexperiment. The study does show, however, certain facts about the weaponsemployed and about the way they were employed which can reasonably be expectedto be approximated in future campaigns.
The effectiveness of a particular weapon can be determined bystudying the percentage of deaths among the total number of casualties causedby it. This percentage, which is termed the weapon's "relative lethaleffect," is shown in table 38.
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TABLE 38.-Distribution of 369 battle casualties, by relative lethal effect of causative agent
Causative agent | Total casualties | Dead | Living | |||
| Number | Percent | Number | Percent1 | Number | Percent1 | |
Machinegun | 119 | 32.3 | 53 | 44.5 | 66 | 55.5 |
Rifle | 94 | 25.5 | 24 | 25.5 | 70 | 74.5 |
Mortar | 62 | 16.8 | 10 | 16.1 | 52 | 83.9 |
Grenade | 52 | 14.1 | 6 | 11.5 | 46 | 88.5 |
Artillery | 33 | 8.9 | 6 | 18.2 | 27 | 81.8 |
Miscellaneous | 9 | 2.4 | 2 | 22.2 | 7 | 77.8 |
| Total | 369 | 100.0 | 101 | 27.4 | 268 | 72.6 |
1Percent for dichotomy, dead versus living, by eachcausative agent and for total dead versus living.
In the Bougainville survey (ch. V), mortars caused thegreatest number of casualties (38.7 percent) and had a relative lethal effect of11.8 percent. The rifle ranked second, with 24.8 percent casualties and 32.2percent relative lethal effect. In the New Georgia-Burma study, the machinegunleads with 32.3 percent casualties and a relative lethal effect of 44.5 percent.The higher effectiveness of this weapon would appear to be characteristic ofjungle warfare.
Relation to Anatomic Distribution of Wounds
Table 39 presents a breakdown of the relative lethal effectof weapons as related to anatomic distribution of the wounds which they caused.The following comments seem warranted:
1. A comparison of wounds of the head and of the thoraxindicates a considerable increase in the relative lethal effect in wounds of thethorax caused by both small arms and fragment-type wounds of the thorax. Thefigures might be interpreted as reflecting the protection provided by both theskull and the helmet.
2. Fragmentation-type weapons carried a very high relativelethal effect in abdominal wounds, obviously because of the ease with which theabdomen is penetrated and the subsequent high mortality rate. The machinegunalso carried a very high lethal effect in abdominal wounds, but there were nodeaths in this group as a result of rifle wounds.
3. The relative lethal effect for all weapons was very lowfor wounds of the extremities.
4. Of the 61 casualties with multiple wounds, 32 (52.5 percent) were wounded by fragmentation weapons. Amongthe 26 surviving casualties who were wounded by shell fragments, 59 percentreturned to duty from the first echelon and 31.7 percent from the secondechelon.
Since relatively few deaths result from wounds of theextremities, the effectiveness of weapons in relation to them must be judged bythe disposition
261-262
of the casualty. Since fractures were one of the chiefreasons for evacuation to the United States, the relative effectiveness ofweapons on the extremities can also be judged by the number of fractures theycause. Table 40 contains these data. As might be expected, small arms weregenerally more effective than fragments in producing fractures.
TABLE 39.-Relative lethaleffect of weapons, by anatomic location of wounds and for multiplewounds
Causative agent | Total casualties | Dead | Living | |||
| Number | Percent | Number | Percent1 | Number | Percent1 | |
| Head wounds | ||||||
Machinegun | 25 | 33.8 | 16 | 64.0 | 9 | 36.0 |
Rifle | 20 | 27.0 | 9 | 45.0 | 11 | 55.0 |
Mortar | 11 | 14.9 | 2 | 18.2 | 9 | 81.8 |
Grenade | 10 | 13.5 | 1 | 10.0 | 9 | 90.0 |
Artillery | 6 | 8.1 | 3 | 50.0 | 3 | 50.0 |
Miscellaneous | 2 | 2.7 | 1 | 50.0 | 1 | 50.0 |
| Total | 74 | 100.0 | 32 | 43.2 | 42 | 56.8 |
| Thoracic wounds | ||||||
Machinegun | 18 | 28.6 | 13 | 72.2 | 5 | 27.8 |
Rifle | 21 | 33.3 | 13 | 61.9 | 8 | 38.1 |
Mortar | 10 | 15.9 | 3 | 30.0 | 7 | 70.0 |
Grenade | 8 | 12.7 | 2 | 25.0 | 6 | 75.0 |
Artillery | 6 | 9.5 | 1 | 16.7 | 5 | 83.3 |
| Total | 63 | 100.0 | 32 | 50.8 | 31 | 49.2 |
| Abdominal wounds | ||||||
Machinegun | 11 | 44.0 | 8 | 72.7 | 3 | 27.3 |
Rifle | 6 | 24.0 | --- | .0 | 6 | 100.0 |
Mortar | 5 | 20.0 | 1 | 20.0 | 4 | 80.0 |
Grenade | 2 | 8.0 | 1 | 50.0 | 1 | 50.0 |
Artillery | 1 | 4.0 | 1 | 100.0 | --- | .0 |
| Total | 25 | 100.0 | 11 | 44.0 | 14 | 56.0 |
| Upper extremity wounds | ||||||
Machinegun | 18 | 28.6 | --- | 0.0 | 18 | 100.0 |
Rifle | 23 | 36.5 | --- | .0 | 23 | 100.0 |
Mortar | 7 | 11.1 | --- | .0 | 7 | 100.0 |
Grenade | 10 | 15.9 | 1 | 10.0 | 9 | 90.0 |
Artillery | 5 | 7.9 | --- | .0 | 5 | 100.0 |
| Total | 63 | 100.0 | 1 | 1.6 | 62 | 98.4 |
| Lower extremity wounds | ||||||
Machinegun | 24 | 28.9 | 2 | 8.3 | 22 | 91.7 |
Rifle | 21 | 25.3 | --- | .0 | 21 | 100.0 |
Mortar | 13 | 15.7 | --- | .0 | 13 | 100.0 |
Grenade | 11 | 13.3 | --- | .0 | 11 | 100.0 |
Artillery | 10 | 12.0 | --- | .0 | 10 | 100.0 |
Miscellaneous | 4 | 4.8 | --- | .0 | 4 | 100.0 |
| Total | 83 | 100.0 | 2 | 2.4 | 81 | 97.6 |
| Multiple wounds | ||||||
Machinegun | 23 | 37.7 | 14 | 60.9 | 9 | 39.1 |
Rifle | 3 | 4.9 | 2 | 66.7 | 1 | 33.3 |
Mortar | 16 | 26.2 | 4 | 25.0 | 12 | 75.0 |
Grenade | 11 | 18.1 | 1 | 9.1 | 10 | 90.9 |
Artillery | 5 | 8.2 | 1 | 20.0 | 4 | 80.0 |
Miscellaneous | 3 | 4.9 | 1 | 33.3 | 2 | 66.7 |
| Total | 61 | 100.0 | 23 | 37.7 | 38 | 62.3 |
1Percent for dichotomy, dead versus living, by eachcausative agent and for total dead versus living by anatomic location of woundsand for multiple wounds.
As table 41 shows, small arms were responsible for 77 (76.3 percent) of the101 casualties KIA and DOW. The proportion for the same group in theBougainville campaign was 58.2 percent.
Neither the New Georgia-Burma nor the Bougainville records contain anyinformation concerning the effect of U.S. weapons on enemy dead. It is
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Causative agent | Total wounds | Fractures | Nonfractures | |||
| Number | Percent | Number | Percent1 | Number | Percent1 | |
| Upper extremity | ||||||
Machinegun | 18 | 29.0 | 5 | 27.8 | 13 | 72.2 |
Rifle | 23 | 37.1 | 7 | 30.4 | 16 | 69.6 |
Mortar | 7 | 11.3 | 1 | 14.3 | 6 | 85.7 |
Grenade | 9 | 14.5 | 2 | 22.2 | 7 | 77.8 |
Artillery | 5 | 8.1 | --- | .0 | 5 | 100.0 |
| Total | 62 | 100.0 | 15 | 24.2 | 47 | 75.8 |
| Lower extremity | ||||||
Machinegun | 22 | 27.2 | 8 | 36.4 | 14 | 63.6 |
Rifle | 21 | 26.0 | 3 | 14.3 | 18 | 85.7 |
Mortar | 13 | 16.0 | 2 | 15.4 | 11 | 84.6 |
Grenade | 11 | 13.6 | --- | .0 | 11 | 100.0 |
Artillery | 10 | 12.3 | 2 | 20.0 | 8 | 80.0 |
Miscellaneous | 4 | 4.9 | 1 | 25.0 | 3 | 75.0 |
| Total | 81 | 100.0 | 16 | 19.8 | 65 | 80.2 |
1Percent for dichotomy, fracture versus nonfracture,by each causative agent and for total fracture versus nonfracture, by upper andlower extremity wounds.
TABLE 41.-Distribution of 101 fatalcasualties, by relative effect of causative agent
Causative agent | Total dead | Killed in action | Died of wounds | |||
| Number | Percent | Number | Percent1 | Number | Percent1 | |
Machinegun | 53 | 52.5 | 37 | 69.8 | 16 | 30.2 |
Rifle | 24 | 23.8 | 16 | 66.7 | 8 | 33.3 |
Mortar | 10 | 9.9 | 6 | 60.0 | 4 | 40.0 |
Grenade | 6 | 5.9 | 3 | 50.0 | 3 | 50.0 |
Artillery | 6 | 5.9 | 2 | 33.3 | 4 | 66.7 |
Miscellaneous | 2 | 2.0 | 1 | 50.0 | 1 | 50.0 |
| Total | 101 | 100.0 | 65 | 64.4 | 36 | 35.6 |
1Percent for dichotomy, killed inaction versus died of wounds, by causative agent and for total killed in actionversus died of wounds.
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characteristic of U.S. troops to use all firepower available,which means that there was a high incidence of wounds per enemy casualty. Thisconsideration, together with other factors, made it impossible to gatherreliable information on this phase of the survey.
Relative Lethal Effect of U.S. Weapons on U.S. Casualties
Table 42 lists 66 U.S. casualties caused by U.S. weaponsfired by U.S. soldiers, chiefly because of mistaken identity; leaving foxholesat night; and accidental discharges and shorts from artillery and mortar fire.
Table 43 presents the disposition of these casualties.
Relative Lethal Effect of Weapons on Disposition ofCasualties
A weapon can be evaluated by the disposition of thecasualties it causes in addition to the number of wounds it produces in eachbody area. The criterion of disposition furnishes an excellent means ofpredicting what percentage of casualties injured by various weapons will bekilled instantly or die later, what percentage of returns to duty will occurwithin certain time periods, and what proportion of casualties wounded invarious body areas will survive.
Table 44 lists the disposition of casualties in relation tothe various types of weapons which caused their wounds. Those who returned toduty usually returned within 30 days or less from first echelon hospitals andwithin 120 days or less from second echelon hospitals.
As this table shows, a very high proportion (60.5 percent) ofall machinegun casualties were considered as "lost to the service."This group includes the total KIA (53) plus the number evacuated to the UnitedStates (19). A considerable number of those evacuated could, of course, continuein service after a period of hospitalization.
TABLE 42.- Relative lethaleffect of U.S. weapons on 66 U.S. casualties
Weapons | Total casualties | Dead | Living wounded | |||
| Number | Percent | Number | Percent1 | Number | Percent1 | |
Machinegun | 3 | 4.5 | 1 | 33.3 | 2 | 66.7 |
Rifle | 19 | 28.8 | 8 | 42.1 | 11 | 57.9 |
Mortar | 15 | 22.7 | 4 | 26.7 | 11 | 73.3 |
Grenade | 8 | 12.1 | 2 | 25.0 | 6 | 75.0 |
Artillery | 17 | 25.8 | 1 | 5.9 | 16 | 94.1 |
Miscellaneous | 4 | 6.1 | --- | .0 | 4 | 100.0 |
| Total | 66 | 100.0 | 16 | 24.2 | 50 | 75.8 |
1Percent for dichotomy, dead versusliving, by each weapon and for total dead versus living.
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TABLE 43.-Disposition of 66 U.S. casualties produced by U.S. weapons, by category
Category | Casualties | |
| Number | Percent | |
Dead: | ||
| Killed in action | 11 | 16.7 |
| DOW (died of wounds) | 5 | 7.6 |
| Total | 16 | 24.3 |
Wounded, living: | ||
| Returned to duty from: | ||
Aid station | 15 | 22.7 |
First echelon | 8 | 12.1 |
Rear echelon | 19 | 28.8 |
| Evacuated to United States | 8 | 12.1 |
| Total | 50 | 75.7 |
Grand total | 66 | 100.0 |
The rifle was second to the machinegun in the production of casualties, butonly 31.9 percent of the casualties it caused (24 KIA plus 6 evacuated to theUnited States) were lost to the service. Fragmentation-type weapons closelyapproximated the rifle in effectiveness.
The grenade continued to have the lowest relative lethal effect and thehighest return to duty rate in the casualties it caused.
To demonstrate further the relative effectiveness of various weapons, tables45 and 46 were prepared from the figures listed in table 44. These tables show:
1. Very few casualties with small arms wounds returned to duty from the firstechelon (7.6 percent machinegun and 14.9 percent rifle).
2. The majority of small arms casualties were either KIA or were evacuated tothe rear echelon or to the United States (84.0 percent machinegun and 67 percentrifle).
3. The rest of casualties wounded by small arms were returned to duty fromthe battalion aid station.
4. Approximately 21 percent of the casualties with wounds caused by mortarsand 24 percent of those with wounds caused by artillery fire returned to dutyfrom first echelon hospitals.
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TABLE 44.-Relative effect of weapons ondisposition of casualties
Causative agent | Total casualties | Total dead | Casualties returned to duty | Casualties evacuated to United States | ||||||||||
Total | From aid station | From first echelon | From rear echelon | |||||||||||
Number | Percent | Number | Percent1 | Number | Percent1 | Number | Percent | Number | Percent | Number | Percent | Number | Percent | |
Machinegun | 119 | 33.1 | 53 | 44.5 | 47 | 39.5 | 10 | 21.3 | 9 | 19.1 | 28 | 59.6 | 19 | 16.0 |
Rifle | 94 | 26.1 | 24 | 25.5 | 64 | 68.1 | 17 | 26.6 | 14 | 21.9 | 33 | 51.5 | 6 | 6.4 |
Mortar | 62 | 17.2 | 10 | 16.1 | 44 | 71.0 | 21 | 47.7 | 13 | 29.6 | 10 | 22.7 | 8 | 12.9 |
Grenade | 52 | 14.4 | 6 | 11.5 | 42 | 80.8 | 16 | 38.1 | 16 | 38.1 | 10 | 23.8 | 4 | 7.7 |
Artillery | 33 | 9.2 | 6 | 18.2 | 23 | 69.7 | 8 | 34.8 | 8 | 34.8 | 7 | 30.4 | 4 | 12.1 |
| Total | 360 | 100.0 | 99 | 27.5 | 220 | 61.1 | 72 | 32.7 | 60 | 27.3 | 88 | 40.0 | 41 | 11.4 |
1Percent for trichotomy, dead versusduty versus evacuated to United States, by each causative agent and for totaldead versus duty versus evacuated to United States.
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TABLE 45.-Relative effect ofweapons: Casualties returned to duty from first echelon
Weapon | Total casualties | Casualties lost to combat | |
| Number | Percent of total | ||
|
| |||
Machinegun | 119 | 100 | 84.0 |
Rifle | 94 | 63 | 67.0 |
Mortar | 62 | 28 | 45.2 |
Grenade | 52 | 20 | 38.5 |
Artillery | 33 | 17 | 51.5 |
1This includes men who were lost to immediate combat. It also includes men who could perhaps have offered resistance to the enemy for hours or days in spite of their wounds.
Casualties "Lost to Combat"
A final method of determining the effectiveness ofweapons is presented in table 47, the basis of which is the casualties lost tocombat because they were killed in action or because they were so incapacitatedthat they would be unable to fight under any circumstances.
The Bougainville report utilized a number of traumatic conditions by which toevaluate the seriousness of wounds. The same criteria were used in the analysisof the New Georgia-Burma casualties to determine those who were classified as"Lost to Combat":
1. Wounds of the head and central nervous system that producedunconsciousness and paralysis.
2. Wounds of intrathoracic structures that produced hemorrhage and shock.
3. Wounds of intraperitoneal structures that produced hemorrhage and shock.
4. Wounds of the extremities that produced fractures of the long bones,severance of major vessels, or major traumatic amputations.
5. Extensive soft-tissue wounds that produced shock.
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TABLE 47.-Relative effect of weapons: Casualties lost immediately to combat1
Weapon | Total casualties | Casualties lost to combat | |
| Number | Percent of total | ||
| Number | |||
Machinegun | 119 | 66 | 55.5 |
Rifle | 94 | 36 | 38.3 |
Mortar | 62 | 15 | 24.2 |
Grenade | 52 | 9 | 17.3 |
Artillery | 33 | 12 | 36.4 |
1This includes men who could nothave fought during any period before evacuation or death, their injuries puttingthem immediately out of action.
CIRCUMSTANCES OF WOUNDING
In addition to determining the relative effectiveness ofvarious weapons, the survey unit was interested in evaluating the circumstancesin which casualties were produced. Information collected concerning the positionof the casualty when he was hit, the available protection, the type of action,and the distance from the wounding agent was classified under the followingheadings:
1. The cover group:
a. Best protection (in a pillbox, usually constructed of heavy logs).
b. Moderate protection (in a foxhole or trench with no overhead cover).
c. Least protection (a tree, shallow hole, or log; or in the open with no protection at all).
2. The position of the casualty:
a. Standing (includes walking and running).
b. Sitting (includes crouching or kneeling).
c. Prone.
3. The type of action:
a. Patrol (small groups moving through jungle often determine the presence of the enemy by running into fire).
b. Defensive (troops usually dug in with fixed positions).
c. Offensive (applied to attack which develops after the enemy has been located by patrol activity).
Influence of Cover
Table 48 presents the influence of cover on the production ofcasualties by the various wounding agents.
In the Bougainville report, 20.1 percent of 1,557 casualtieswere wounded in well-covered pillboxes or well-dug holes (p. 418). This reportshows that the pillbox offers relatively greater protection against aimed fire.
269
In the New Georgia-Burma survey, pillboxes were not usedbecause of the offensive-type action and the extremely fluid frontlines. Onlyone man was hit in a pillbox, which was of Japanese construction. The bulletpassed between the logs and killed him, which could not have occurred if thepillbox had been properly constructed.
Of the 369 casualties, 17.5 percent were wounded in foxholes,many of which were of poor construction. A well-constructed foxhole offersexcellent protection from flat trajectory weapons but not as good protectionfrom shell fragments, particularly when there are a number of tree bursts.
TABLE 48.-Distribution of 349 casualties, by position and protection and by causative agent
Position and protection | Causative agent | Total casualties | |||||
| Rifle | Machinegun | Grenade | Mortar | Artillery | Number | Percent | |
Standing: | |||||||
| No cover | 43 | 76 | 22 | 17 | 3 | 161 | 46.1 |
| Partial cover | 1 | 1 | --- | --- | --- | 2 | .6 |
| Total | 44 | 77 | 22 | 17 | 3 | 163 | 46.7 |
Sitting: | |||||||
| No cover | 20 | 3 | 1 | 15 | 1 | 40 | 11.5 |
| Partial cover | 4 | 1 | --- | --- | --- | 5 | 1.4 |
| Total | 24 | 4 | 1 | 15 | 1 | 45 | 12.9 |
Prone: | |||||||
| No cover | 15 | 29 | 12 | 3 | 8 | 67 | 19.2 |
| Partial cover | 2 | 1 | 3 | 6 | --- | 12 | 3.4 |
| Total | 17 | 30 | 15 | 9 | 8 | 79 | 22.6 |
Pillbox | --- | 1 | --- | --- | --- | 1 | .3 |
Trench hole | 13 | 3 | 10 | 15 | 20 | 61 | 17.5 |
| Total | 13 | 4 | 10 | 15 | 20 | 62 | 17.8 |
| 98 | 115 | 48 | 56 | 32 | 349 | 100.0 |
Influence of Position
The influence of position can be used to determine whetherthe number of hits depends solely upon the body surface exposed or is greaterfor aimed fire (table 49). For both aimed and unaimed fire, twice as manycasualties occurred among standing as among prone soldiers. When the factor ofcover
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is removed (table 50), the relative proportions remain about the same, whichis what might be expected if all missiles were unaimed and were traveling atrandom. In this jungle study, apparently a considerable proportion of allcasualties resulted from random unaimed hits.
Rifles and machineguns are considered aimed weapons. Weapons which produceshell fragments, such as mortars, artillery, and grenades, are unaimed weapons.Bullets in jungle warfare came largely from weapons aimed only in theapproximate direction and elevation.
The Japanese utilized their aimed weapons (rifle and machinegun) mostefficiently when U.S. troops were on patrol or on offensive action (table 51).Their unaimed weapons (mortar, grenade, artillery) were used to best advantagewhen they were on the offensive or U.S. troops were on the defensive.
Position | Aimed fire1 | Random fire2 | Casualties | |||
| Number | Percent | Number | Percent | Number | Percent | |
Standing | 121 | 61.7 | 42 | 46.1 | 163 | 56.8 |
Sitting | 28 | 14.3 | 17 | 18.7 | 45 | 15.7 |
Prone | 47 | 24.0 | 32 | 35.2 | 79 | 27.5 |
| Total | 196 | 100.0 | 91 | 100.0 | 287 | 100.0 |
1Rifle and machinegun.
2Mortar, artillery, and grenade.
TABLE 50.- Distribution of 270 casualties, by aimed and random fire and by position (no cover)
Position | Aimed fire1 | Random fire2 | Casualties | |||
| Number | Percent | Number | Percent | Number | Percent | |
Standing | 119 | 64.0 | 44 | 52.4 | 163 | 60.4 |
Sitting | 23 | 12.4 | 17 | 20.2 | 40 | 14.8 |
Prone | 44 | 23.6 | 23 | 27.4 | 67 | 24.8 |
| Total | 186 | 100.0 | 84 | 100.0 | 270 | 100.0 |
1Rifle and machinegun.
2Mortar, artillery, and grenade.
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TABLE 51.-Distribution of 362casualties, by type of action and causative agent
Causative agent | Total casualties | Patrol | Defensive | Offensive | ||||
Number | Percent | Number | Percent1 | Number | Percent1 | Number | Percent1 | |
Aimed weapon: | ||||||||
| Rifle | 96 | 43.8 | 15 | 15.6 | 46 | 47.9 | 35 | 36.5 |
| Machinegun | 123 | 56.2 | 47 | 38.2 | 23 | 18.7 | 53 | 43.1 |
| Total | 219 | 100.0 | 62 | 28.3 | 69 | 31.5 | 88 | 40.2 |
(86.1) | (45.1) | (64.2) | ||||||
Unaimed weapon: | ||||||||
| Mortar | 62 | 43.4 | 1 | 1.6 | 40 | 64.5 | 21 | 33.9 |
| Grenade | 50 | 35.0 | 9 | 18.0 | 13 | 26.0 | 28 | 56.0 |
| Artillery | 31 | 21.6 | --- | .0 | 31 | 100.0 | --- | .0 |
| Total | 143 | 100.0 | 10 | 7.0 | 84 | 58.7 | 49 | 34.3 |
(13.9) | (54.9) | (35.8) | ||||||
| 362 | 100.0 | 72 | 19.9 | 153 | 42.3 | 137 | 37.8 |
1Percent for trichotomy, patrol versus defensiveversus offensive, by type weapon, and for total patrol versus defensive versusoffensive.
NOTE.-Figures in parenthesesexpress percent of total type of weapon for total type of activity.
Influence of Range of Small Arms Missiles
Any information that can be collected concerning the range ofsmall arms or the distance from a shellburst at the time of wounding is ofextreme importance in assessing the wounding potential of a weapon, as well asin designing and constructing personnel armor. If the weight of the bullet orfragment is known, plus its approximate velocity (by interpolation from range ordistance values), the kinetic energy of the missile at the time of impact can bedetermined. All of these data are of interest and of fundamental importance inthe basic studies on wound ballistics. (See chapters II and III.)
Table 52 presents the data on 208 casualties (93 from riflefire and 115 from machinegun fire) in which the approximate range was known. Asthe table shows, the greater number of injuries occurred at distances under 75yards. The observation is typical of jungle warfare, in which small arms areseldom actually aimed at distances greater than 50 yards.
Table 53 presents the data on 85 casualties (56 from mortarand 29 from artillery fire) in which the range was known. The majority of theinjuries occurred at distances under 10 yards from the burst. The enemy handgrenade was seldom effective as a wounding agent at distances greater than 3yards (table 54).
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Approximate range (yards) of small arms missile | Dead | Living wounded | Total casualties | |
Returned to duty | Evacuated to United States | |||
Number | Number | Number | Number | |
Rifle: | ||||
| 0 to 25 | 8 | 13 | 2 | 23 |
| 25 to 50 | 5 | 4 | 1 | 10 |
| 50 to 75 | 2 | 26 | 2 | 30 |
| Over 75 | 7 | 22 | 1 | 30 |
| Total | 22 | 65 | 6 | 93 |
Machinegun: | ||||
| 0 to 25 | 7 | 2 | 3 | 12 |
| 25 to 50 | 8 | 5 | 3 | 16 |
| 50 to 75 | 23 | 18 | 6 | 47 |
| Over 75 | 15 | 22 | 3 | 40 |
| Total | 53 | 47 | 15 | 115 |
| 75 | 112 | 21 | 208 |
Distance (yards) from point of burst of causative agent | Dead | Living wounded | Total casualties | |
Returned to duty | Evacuated to United States | |||
Number | Number | Number | Number | |
Mortar shells: | ||||
| 0 to 10 | 8 | 35 | 6 | 49 |
| 10 to 20 | 1 | 5 | 1 | 7 |
| 20 to 50 | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Over 50 | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Total | 9 | 40 | 7 | 56 |
Artillery shells: | ||||
| 0 to 10 | 6 | 7 | --- | 13 |
| 10 to 20 | --- | 4 | --- | 4 |
| 20 to 50 | --- | 1 | 3 | 4 |
| Over 50 | --- | 8 | --- | 8 |
| Total | 6 | 20 | 3 | 29 |
| 15 | 60 | 10 | 85 |
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TABLE 54.-Distribution of 47casualties wounded by hand grenade, by distance from detonation of causative agent
Distance from detonation of causative agent (yards) | Dead | Number of casualties | Total | |
Returned to duty | Evacuated to United States | |||
0 to 3 | 6 | 28 | 4 | 38 |
3 to 5 | --- | 9 | --- | 9 |
Over 5 | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Total | 6 | 37 | 4 | 47 |
In summary, the following distances were typical for theoffensive type action which characterized the New Georgia-Burma fighting:
Records show that 90 percent of the dead killed by bulletswere hit at ranges under 100 yards. Furthermore, many of these bullets had lowvelocities because they had passed through brush or trees. Mortars and artilleryseldom killed at distances greater than 10 yards from the burst, and close to100 percent of casualties from these weapons occurred at less than 50 yards. Norecords are available that show men killed at distances greater than 5 yardsfrom a grenade burst.
Over 75 percent of casualties killed by fragments from mortarand artillery shells were less than 10 yards from the source of the fragments.
Over 80 percent of casualties killed by fragments from handgrenades were less than 3 yards from the detonation.
DISPOSITION OF CASUALTIES
A review of the disposition of battle casualties furnishesmuch valuable information. In the type of warfare discussed in this chapter,between 16 and 25 percent of all men hit were killed. Approximately the sameproportions were returned to duty immediately, and 40 percent were returned toduty within 4 months. The remaining 10 to 15 percent were evacuated to theUnited States.
Disposition According to Anatomic Distribution of Wounds
The anatomic distribution of wounds played the most importantrole in the disposition of casualties:
1. Casualties who received wounds of the head, chest, orabdomen had a 50-percent chance of being killed in action. Of those who survived penetrating wounds of the head,chest, or abdominal cavity, only a very few could be returned to duty. Most ofthe men with wounds in these three areas who
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could be returned to duty had only flesh wounds. In theseareas, a little protection might have made the difference between death ordisability and a minor wound.
2. More than three-quarters of all casualties with wounds ofthe extremities returned to duty without leaving the theater of action.Fatalities due to these wounds were so few as to be insignificant. When theyoccurred, most of them could be attributed to carelessness.
Disposition According to Causative Agent
Disposition of casualties according to the agents whichcaused their wounds was one way of establishing the effectiveness of weaponsused by Japanese infantry. In descending order of effectiveness, these weaponswere machinegun, rifle, artillery, mortar, and grenade.
Machineguns of a caliber equivalent to that of rifles causedgreater losses than rifles principally because they caused multiple woundsinvolving multiple regions. Sixty percent of all casualties struck by machinegunbullets were lost to service, a proportion which conclusively demonstrates thedeadly effectiveness of this and other automatic weapons.
Shell fragments did not approach the effectiveness of bulletsunless they hit men who were upright and unprotected or the shell had a treeburst.
Artillery and mortars, as employed in the Pacific areas withlittle use of time fuzes, were much more effective than grenades, which, asalready noted, seldom killed at distances greater than a few feet. Artillery andmortars accounted for about 30 percent of men lost to service (casualties killedor evacuated to the United States) in each of their respective categories.
When casualties killed in action, those evacuated to the rearechelons, and those evacuated to the United States are totaled, a comparison ofthe wounds produced by each weapon provides figures which further substantiatethe results just cited. The machinegun leads with 84 percent and the grenadecomes last with 38.5 percent. The ratio remains the same when the dead are addedto the group of men who could not continue to fight for even a short time in anemergency. On the other hand, casualties who returned to duty from the firstechelon did so with increasing frequency according to whether they were woundedby grenades, mortars, artillery, rifles, or machineguns.
About 75 percent of the 101 dead in the New Georgia-Burmasurvey died because of wounds from small arms. Two-thirds of these fatalitieswere caused by machineguns, generally the .25 caliber weapon that the Japaneseused as the equivalent of the U.S. Browning automatic rifle. A large butundetermined number of Japanese casualties were caused by U.S. automaticweapons: In a single brief engagement involving only one combat team, two U.S.heavy machineguns fired 10,000 rounds, and more than 400 Japanese were killed.
In the type of warfare in which troops tended to seek coverin natural vegetation and did not always build strong fortifications, theBrowning auto-
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matic rifle proved a very valuable weapon. The Japanese lightmachinegun also proved extremely effective against U.S. troops. With both ofthese weapons, it was possible to throw a large volume of fire rapidly into agroup of men before any of them could assume prone positions. In junglewarfare, in which brief glimpses of the enemy were the rule, these automaticguns were decisive; a burst often caught men on their feet, with vital areas oftheir bodies exposed.
In this type of jungle warfare, tremendous U.S. artilleryconcentrations in all probability caused the largest percentage of Japanesecasualties. On the other hand, the value of the automatic weapon, often firinginitial bursts in the general direction of groups of enemy above ground, shouldnot be underestimated.
The great value of time fuzes for artillery was welldemonstrated by the large numbers of casualties U.S. troops sustained from thevery light and inaccurate Japanese artillery fire when they were subjected to itwhile near trees and large bushes. The time fuze, when properly used, wouldcertainly have been as effective as these so-called tree bursts.
INFLUENCE OF PROTECTIVE ARMOR
In the Bougainville study, head wounds exceeded theproportion predicted for the mean projected body area by twice the expectedpercentage. Wounds of the abdomen and lower extremities did not quite reach thetheoretical number of hits for the mean projected body areas of these regions.
In the New Georgia-Burma report, as already noted, theexpected proportion of wounds of the head is exceeded by 7.9 percent and ofwounds of the thorax by 4.5 percent. Wounds of the lower extremities andabdomen, as in the Bougainville report, are below the expected proportions.
A great increase over the theoretical proportion of headinjuries can be expected in defensive warfare. In fact, no matter what the typeof warfare, wounds of the head can be expected to exceed the theoretical.Apparently this is also true of thoracic wounds. Adequate studies are notavailable for wounds of the back, front, and right and left sides of the body,but personal experience leads to the tentative conclusion that at leasttwo-thirds of all hits in both dead and living will occur on the anterior bodysurface.
Table 55 presents the distribution and entrance sites of thelethal wounds in 173 casualties (78 in the New Georgia-Burma campaigns, 95 inthe Bougainville campaign) who were killed in action with wounds of the head,chest, and abdomen. There is a decided concentration of wounds in the frontalregion of the head and on the left side of the chest as compared to the rightside.
The data secured when the total dead of all jungle campaignswere combined are shown in table 56.
Approximately 40 percent of U.S. dead had head wounds as thecause of death. The larger proportion of these casualties, however, showed nopenetra-
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tion of the helmet, thus indicating that ballisticprotection was of some value. On the other hand, the coverage provided by thestandard M1 helmet seemed inadequate to protect against the sort of missileswhich entered the brain. Further investigation will be necessary to prove thispoint, but this study indicates that the greater percentage of head wounds, aswell as the many deaths due to such wounds, could be prevented by a morescientifically designed helmet. Such a helmet should (1) be made of better armormaterial and (2) should also protect the brain from every approach, including alarge part of the face. The unprotected upper portion of the face was the pointof entrance for most missiles which penetrated the brain and produced lethalwounds. Casualties with superficial but severe injuries of the face and neck hadan excellent chance for survival.
Anatomic location | Region wounded | Total number of casualties | |
| Anterior | Posterior | ||
Head | 49 | 11 | 60 |
Thorax | 53 | 26 | 79 |
Abdomen | 24 | 10 | 34 |
| Total | 126 | 47 | 173 |
Anatomic location | Total casualties | |
| Number | Percent | |
Head | 176 | 35.5 |
Thorax | 119 | 24.0 |
Abdomen | 59 | 11.9 |
Extremities | 18 | 3.6 |
Multiple | 124 | 25.0 |
| Total | 496 | 100.0 |
As already mentioned, only an insignificant and largelyunnecessary proportion of deaths were due to wounds of the extremities.
Practical experience with war dead, as well as knowledge ofanatomy and of the possibilities of good surgery, leads to the conclusion that agreat saving in life could be effected by the proper use of one square foot ofarmor on the anterior surface of the chest. The base figure of 60 (3? lb.)ounces per
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square foot for armor capable of resisting 20 mm. fragments at close rangeprovides a strong argument for such protection. The weight of this piece ofequipment would not equal the 7-pound weight of the old-type gas mask. Theequipment would certainly not be as cumbersome.
The possibility of designing the infantry rifle belt to increase its abilityto resist low-velocity missiles should also be considered.5
U.S. CASUALTIES CAUSED BY U.S.MISSILES
Of the 369 casualties in New Georgia and Burma, 66 (17.9 percent) were causedby U.S. fire, as were 219 (12.2 percent) of the 1,788 Bougainville casualties.All types of weapons were represented, with rifle and artillery leading in bothreports. It is doubtful that higher command is aware that U.S. soldiers killedand wounded such a large proportion of their fellow soldiers as these figuressuggest. Accurate figures exist only for isolated reports, such as the reportsfor the Bougainville and the New Georgia-Burma campaigns.
There were a variety of reasons for this tragic situation: Individualcarelessness, usually on the part of the men hit; poor training in the use ofweapons; poor unit discipline; lack of dissemination of information; poorleadership; and faulty judgment.
Limited experience suggests that artillery casualties were for the most partdue to poor fire direction byinexperienced observers and also suggests that many casualties could probablyhave been prevented if adequate containers had been provided for grenades and ifthe length of safety time had been stamped on each grenade.
The majority of rifle and machinegun casualties occurred at night and werecaused by mistaken identity. In most instances the casualty showed poor judgment-hestood up in his foxhole; moved about the perimeter; entered a perimeter withoutproper caution; or performed other foolish acts.
Nearly all rifle and machinegun casualties in the group hit by U.S. fireoccurred when U.S. units were in defensive positions, in which there was littleneed for hasty decisions. The men should have had more confidence in camouflageand in their ability with specific weapons. Good communications and a generalknowledge of the tactical situation would also have appreciably reduced thenumber of such casualties.
Most self-inflicted wounds were caused by carelessness and were notintentional.
Methods of Prevention
A consideration of the circumstances in which each injury caused by U.S. fireoccurred would include: (1) The position of the casualty;(2) the type of action; (3) the natural protection; (4) the terrain,time, and weather; (5) the
5These suggestions were made by Dr. Hopkins in1944, immediately after he had completed his surveys. His remarks demonstratethe widespread interest in body armor on the part of many of the medicalofficers engaged in the initial treatment of battle casualties.-J. C. B.
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type of weapon; (6) the range of the bullet or shellburst;(7) the planning of the operation; and (8) leadership. Some of these factorsrequire discussion.
Position.-Too many commanding officers and their menapparently did not realize the protective value of the crawling position.Frequently, soldiers would hit the ground when firing commenced but rise to asemierect position in order to advance toward a known enemy position at shortrange. If a squad could knock out a pillbox in an hour of crawling, withoutcasualties, there was no point to trying to do it in 30 minutes by advancing ina crouch and sustaining casualties. The odds were too great to justify the timesaved.
The great value of the prone position should also beemphasized. Records available indicate that in jungle warfare very few men werehit when they stuck close to the ground. Of 646 casualties (460 in Bougainvilleand 186 in New Georgia and Burma) hit by bullets and without protection of anysort, only 146 were injured while prone. Of 788 casualties (704 in Bougainvilleand 84 in New Georgia and Burma) hit by shell fragments, only 233 were injuredwhile prone.
Protection.-The value ofprotection is clear in figures from both the Bougainville and the NewGeorgia-Burma campaigns. In the Bougainville campaign, which was chieflydefensive, only 484 of the 1,906 men hit had protection of any sort. On NewGeorgia, 30 Japanese were killed at night inside the perimeter of the 1stBattalion, 148th Infantry. The U.S. troops were in shallow holes and did nothave a single casualty. In the Burma campaign, a combat team of 450 men werewell dug in on a river bend but had only open foxholes. During an enemy attacklasting 1 hour and 15 minutes, 400 Japanese were killed while trying to crossthe river. Not a single U.S. soldier was killed, in spite of a tremendousconcentration of Japanese machinegun and rifle fire. Three minor injuries werecaused by mortar fragments. This illustration is only one of many possibleexamples of the value of even shallow foxholes.
Type of combat.-In the type ofwarfare encompassed by this survey, about 50 percent of the casualties occurredin defensive action. The Japanese, in spite of the great odds, usually attackedin the early morning or late afternoon. Well-indoctrinated troops, who wereaware of this fact, could be prepared for the attacks by digging adequatefoxholes, preparing fire lanes, and generally showing alertness.
A fair average for U.S. casualties caused by offensive actionagainst the Japanese seems to be about 35 percent, while patrol activityaccounts for 15 percent. In the patrol group, 75 percent of the casualties wereprobably caused by aimed weapons. In defensive and offensive warfare, aimedweapons accounted, respectively, for 30 and 60 percent of casualties.
The Japanese made use of defensive warfare and excelled inthe use of terrain and camouflage for defensive purposes. In New Georgia, 16 ofthe 1st Battalion's initial casualties (5 dead and 11 wounded) were caused byfire from 2 enemy heavy machineguns covering a small bridge. These guns wereplaced in an area of thick jungle and steep hills which made flanking movementsalmost
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impossible. The entire battalion was held up for 36 hoursand did not locate the positions of the guns until the area had been pulverizedby artillery and mortar fire.
In Burma, the enemy invariably set up trail blocks at thecrests of steep hills, locations which usually provided perfect fire lanes andin which flanking was difficult. Nor did they neglect to have similar positionsprepared in advance of a withdrawal.
Without pack artillery, dive bombers, expert use of mortars,and strafing (all in small quantities), it is doubtful that the 3d Battalion ofMerrill's Marauders would ever have relieved the 2d Battalion after anoffensive against one battalion of Japanese over a 5-mile jungle trail. TheJapanese had favorable terrain, but the tree burst of U.S. artillery andmortars, plus close fighting with grenades, finally defeated them. The greateffect of mortar and artillery tree bursts can hardly be overemphasized.
Leadership.-In accounting for U.S.combat casualties, the role of leadership is clearly evident. A careful reviewof the causes of casualties in New Georgia among men of the 1st Battalion, 148thInfantry, shows that a very large number of them could be explained by poorleadership, chiefly at the battalion and regimental level.
The Intelligence and Reconnaissance Platoon of the 3dBattalion of Merrill's Marauders in Burma accounted for approximately 400Japanese casualties in 26 engagements with the loss of only 3 U.S. soldiers KIA.The platoon leader (1st Lt. Logan E. Weston, Inf.), who devised the tacticalformation used by the platoon, was the man chiefly responsible for the smallnumber of casualties. Incidentally, the health of this platoon was alwaysrelatively good, and it had an insignificant number of accidents during thecampaign. The platoon realized the value of their particular standardoperational procedures for patrol and for defensive and offensive activities.Their excellent record is largely attributable to the excellent leadershipexercised by their platoon commander.
Other factors.-Poor distributionof plans and combat information was often responsible for injuries. Infantrymenparticipating in patrols and in offensive action in such circumstances did notunderstand the general purpose of the engagement.
Face and hand camouflage was seldom used by troops fightingjungle warfare, yet the split second of hesitation occasioned by camouflagemight frequently be prolonged, with disastrous results for the enemy. Thiswould be especially true on patrol activity but would also play an importantpart in any type of action in which aimed weapons might cause casualties.
Greater stress should have been laid on the necessity forfoxholes, and their preparation and occupation should have been more strictlyenforced by the unit command. More attention should have been given to thephysical and mental condition, as well as to the personal needs, of the troops.Elective actions should not have been undertaken without adequate food andrest.
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Needless casualties caused by neglect of the simpleprinciples of self-preservation, firepower, sound tactics, and the physicalwell-being of the troops should not have been tolerated.
CONCLUSIONS
In the past, the attention of both Medical Corps and combatofficers has been focused on the care of the wounded after they were injured.The purpose of this survey was to call attention to means of reducing the numberof wounded and particularly the number of casualties killed in action. In otherwords, the point has now been reached when more consideration should be given tothe individual U.S. soldier who, even with superior equipment and supplies, willbe killed or wounded in combat.
Body armor has been used in warfare in the past and itsweight willingly tolerated by soldiers once its effectiveness was demonstrated.The stakes for the individual and for the Army are so high that the most carefulinvestigation of existing armor and experimentation with improved types of armorand helmets are fully justified.
In addition, all tactical lessons of combat should beexploited fully. The Army cannot afford to neglect any suggestion which promisesto save the lives of U.S. citizens who are temporarily subject to its orders. Itis believed that the survey reported in this chapter points to the possibilityof saving many lives and avoiding many wounds.
