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AMEDD Corps History > U.S. Army Dental Corps > United States Army Dental Service in World War II

PROCUREMENT IN WORLD WAR I

At the time of the armistice, World War I, the strength of the Dental Corps totaled 6,284 officers. Not all of these had been called to active duty however, and the maximum number actually functioning with the Corps at any one time was 4,620.¹ As nearly as can be determined, a little over 1,500 additional dentists who did not serve in their professional capacity were in the land forces as enlisted men.² The Navy Dental Corps expanded from a total of 30 dental officers at the outbreak of hostilities to over 500 by the end of 1917,³ but the number of dentists serving as enlisted men in that organization is not known.

The Army, alone, enlisted or inducted 1,789 dental students, and the schools were so depleted that only 906 dentists graduated in 1920 as compared with 3,587 the year before.⁴

At the start of World War I, dentists were provided in an overall ratio of 1 officer for each 1,000 troops, but this figure proved so inadequate that on 30 September 1918 an increase to 2 dentists for each 1,000 men in the continental United States was authorized, and the allowance forhospitals was fixed at 3 officers for each 1,000 beds.⁵ The war ended, however, before these ratios could be placed in effect. In 1919 the War Department supported a bill to provide 1 dentist for each 500 men in the peacetime establishment, but in spite of the backing of The SurgeonGeneral and the Secretary of War this legislation failed to pass.⁶

The grades held by Army dentists at the end of the war were as follows:⁷

Colonel	9 (0.2 percent)
Lieutenant colonel	17 (0.4 percent)
Major	91 (2.0 percent)
Captain	292 (6.5 percent)
Lieutenant	4,101 (90.9 percent)

¹Annual Report . . . Surgeon General, 1919.Washington, Government Printing Office, 1919, vol. II.
²Ibid.
³Annual Report of The Surgeon General, U. S. Navy, 1918. Washington,Government Printing Office, 1918.
⁴Horner, Harlan H.: Dental education and dental personnel. J.Am. Dent. A. 33: 872, Jul 1946.
⁵See footnote 2, above.
⁶Colonel Logan`s Farewell Letter to the Dental Corps. J. A.Mil. Dent. Surg. U. S. 3: 78-80, Apr. 1919.
⁷See footnote 1, above.

THE DETERMINATION OF REQUIREMENTS FOR
DENTAL OFFICERS, WORLD WAR II

Experience Prior to World War II

In the decade preceding the Second World War, the average civilian dentistwas responsible for about 1,800 persons, including infants and the agedwho required little or no attention, though the ratio varied from approximately 1:500 in certain urban centers to less than 1:5,000 in some rural districts.⁸⁹ Dental care for the civilian population was notoriously deficient.It was freely admitted that not over 25 percent of the public receivedthe care needed to preserve dental health,^{10 11} and representativesof the dental profession estimated that it would require 1 dentist foreach 524 persons just to provide annual maintenance treatment, with noattempt to correct old, accumulated defects. It was further estimated thatthe fantastic figure of 1 dentist for each 295 persons would be neededto rehabilitate the entire population in one year. These figures had littlesignificance in determining dental officer requirements for a militarypopulation for the following reasons:

1. While the average civilian dentist actually saw only about 400 patientsa year, many of them received nothing but emergency treatment.^{12 13}However, all of the military dentist`s patients, regardless of the number,were in the age group needing constant and extensive care.

2. The stresses of military life required that the soldier have a higherlevel of dental health than his civilian contemporary.

3. The military dentist inevitably lost more time from professionalduties than the civilian dentist: he had to devote more time to trainingfor purely military functions, and his work was interrupted by maneuversand tactical exercises.

Prewar military experience failed equally to provide an answer to therequirement problem. In the years between 1920 and 1939 the inadequate 1:1,000 ratio of World War I was liberalized somewhat, but it never exceeded1.44 per 1,000 troops, as indicated in the following tabulation:¹⁴

⁸See footnote 4, p. 35.
⁹Bagdonas, Joseph E.: Economic considerations in reestablishinga dental practice. J. Am. Dent. A. 33: 4-20, Jan 1946.
¹⁰Morey, Lon W.: Dental personnel. J. Am. Dent., A. 32: 131-144 ,Feb 1945.
¹¹Dollar, Melvin L.: Dental needs and the costs of dental carein the United States. Ill. Dent. J. 14: 185-199, May 1945.
¹²See footnote 4, p. 35.
¹³See footnote 9, above.
¹⁴Memo, Col Albert G. Love for SG, 2 Oct 39, sub: Allowanceof medical and dental officers. [D]

*Date*	*Number of officers authorized*	*Authorized ratio per 1,000*
4 June 1920	298	1.00
30 June 1922	158	1.08
15 May 1936	183	1.26
29 January 1938	258	1.44
3 April 1939	*316	1.39

*This authorized strength was not reached prior to thewar, and there were only about 269 dentists in the Regular Army DentalCorps in April 1942.

Based on the estimation that a proportion of 1 dentist for each 524persons would be required just to provide maintenance care, it is not surprisingthat the cited peacetime authorizations proved inadequate. In 1928, whenthe ratio was approximately 1 dentist per 1,000 personnel, the Directorof the Dental Division, SGO, reported that:¹⁵

. . . a one to 1,000 proportion of dental officers tototal strength is quite insufficient. Dental diseases in our Army havebeen, and . . . are today out of control. There is a limit beyond whichit is impossible to go without more personnel. We are today approachingthat limit, and about 50 percent remain who are continually in need ofdental service.

In 1941, at a hearing before the Committee on Military Affairs, Brig.Gen. Leigh C. Fairbank¹⁶ testified that even under peacetimephysical standards a 1:750 ratio had also fallen short of minimum needs.

By the start of the Second World War, therefore, experience had shownthat any ratio of less than 1 dental officer for 750 men would be grosslyinadequate, but since more liberal ratios had not been tried in practiceexperience was of little value in predicting the need for dental officersfor the defense forces.

Estimates Based on Actual Requirements
for Dental Treatment

Had it been known exactly how much work the average wartime inducteewould require it would have been possible to calculate the number of dentalofficers needed at any stage of mobilization. Were it known, for instance,that each new man would require 7.2 hours of treatment for the correctionof old, accumulated defects, and 1.8 hours of treatment each year thereafterfor regular maintenance care, the needs of a static force of 1,500,000men, with a yearly turnover of 25 percent, could have been determined asfollows:

	Hours
1.8 hours of care for 1,500,000 men (annual maintenance)	2,700,000
7.2 hours of care for 375,000 recruits (rehabilitation)	2,700,000
TOTAL	5,400,000
Number of dentists needed	3,000 (1 per 500 men)

¹⁵Rhoades, R. H.: The Dental Service of theArmy of the United States. J. Am. Dent. A. 15: 257-264, Feb 1928.
¹⁶Testimony, General Fairbank, 18-20 Mar 41, in U. S. SenateHearings before Committee on Mil Affairs, S. 783, p. 161.

In this case, which might approximate actual conditions in a peacetimeforce if dependents received no care, a ratio of 1 dentist for each 500men would prove adequate.

However, if this hypothetical force were to be increased by nearly 4,000,000men in one year as occurred in the United States Army in 1942, the situationwould be far different. Total needs would then be as follows: Hours 1.8hours of care for

	Hours
1.8 hours of care for 3,500,000 men (average strength during year)	6,300,000
7.2 hours of care for 4,000,000 men (recruits)	28,800,000
TOTAL	35,100,000
Number of dentists needed	19,500 (1 per 180 men)

In this situation, which also might approximate actual conditions duringmobilization, the ratio which was adequate for the static force would provideonly about 36 percent of the dentists needed by the expanding Army. Later,however, after this augmented force reached stability, the need for dentistswould again be met by the 1:500 proportion, or by an even lower ratio.

Unfortunately, reliable information on which to base actual calculationsof requirements for dental personnel was entirely lacking at the startof World War II. The figures used in the preceding illustration are onlyconvenient approximations, useful for the development of a general principle.In chapter VI it is shown that almost no data on the dental condition ofmales of military age were available when plans for the mobilization ofthe emergency dental service were being laid.

Even if dental needs were known with considerable accuracy, it wouldgenerally be impossible to procure and equip dental officers in strictaccordance with calculated needs. In Chart 1 the actual number of dentistson duty each month of World War II is compared with the theoretical requirementfor the same period, based on the hypothetical figures used (1.8 hoursfor maintenance care, 7.2 hours for rehabilitation). The curve on thischart which shows theoretical needs is of course riot quantitatively accurate,but the wide fluctuations which are its conspicuous feature would be foundon any similar chart, regardless of the exact figures used, as long asthe time required for rehabilitation of new men greatly exceeds that requiredfor annual maintenance. By comparison the slowly rising curve of dentalpersonnel on duty reflects a number of delaying factors which are likelyto be operative in any emergency. The two years from 1940 through 1941represented a training period in which the immediate mobilization of alarge force was not anticipated. With the start of actual hostilities considerabletime was required to commission the necessary dentists, and through 1942it was impossible even to equip fully all the dentists actually in uniform.

CHART 1. COMPARISON OF THEORETICAL MONTHLYREQUIREMENTS FOR DENTAL OFFICERS DURING WORLD WAR II WITH THE NUMBER ACTUALLYON ACTIVE DUTY.

In contrast with the gradually rising curve of dental personnel on duty,the curve of theoretical requirements fluctuates rapidly and within widelimits. Nearly 30,000 dentists would have been needed late in 1942, when half a million men were inducted in 1 month, while only 10,000 would havebeen needed less than a year later, after the tempo of mobilization hadslowed. To have procured, trained, and equipped 30,000 dentists in 1942,for only a few months work, would have resulted in a gross waste of manpowerand industrial capacity. In most cases it will probably be found impracticalor impossible to call to duty, to meet peak requirements, a number of dentalofficers greatly exceeding the number which will be needed when relativestability has been reached, regardless of calculated needs for short periods.

Nevertheless, reference to calculated requirements, even when basedon very incomplete information, may point out possible improvements inthe mobilization program. In particular, it will generally emphasize thedesirability of building up the Dental Service as rapidly as possible afterplans for the augmentation of the Armed Forces are announced, regardlessof fixed ratios of dentists to total strength. In many respects the positionof the Dental Service is comparable to that of a training activity. Ifseveral hundred thousand men are to be "processed" each monththe necessary training centers

must be established in advance of the influx, not built up graduallyon the basis of some fixed ratio of training personnel to the number oftroops already in uniform. Similarly, the Dental Service should be in maximumpractical operation at the start of a period of expansion, readyto care, for inductees as they pass through the training camps; if, however,the rate of mobilization of dental facilities is gauged to maintain somefixed ratio of dental officers to total Army strength, the necessary menand equipment will be available only at the end of the influx, after mostinductees have already completed their training and have been assignedto tactical units. This situation will occur regardless of how liberalthe accepted ratio may be.

It has already been pointed out that it will generally be impracticableto mobilize the full facilities needed to meet temporary peak demands;it is also possible that personnel and supply difficulties will hinderor prevent the early establishment of dental clinics in the future as theyhave in the past. These facts should not obscure the validity of the generalprinciple that, when a major augmentation of the Armed Forces is imminent,the Dental Service should be built up to the total strength which willultimately be required, as rapidly as may be possible under the circumstancesexisting at the time. At the start of World War II, for instance, it waspatently impossible and undesirable to provide the 30,000 dental officerswho might have been used in 1942. Further, it would have been impossibleto equip such a number of dentists even if they could have been obtained.But 15,000 dentists were ultimately mobilized, and 10,000 were on dutyby the end of 1942, while the average strength of the Dental Corps forthat year of expansion was only about 6,000 officers, and only about 3,000were available at the start of the year. It must be admitted that no improvementin the rate of mobilization of dentists was possible under conditions existingin 1942, but it is equally true that the 1:500 ratio of dentists to totalstrength, which was maintained fairly well, fell far short of meeting dentaldemands during that year. Further, if it had been possible to place onduty in May or June of 1942 the 10,000 dental officers who were workingin Army clinics in December, the problems of the Dental Service would havebeen reduced materially.

Reference to calculated requirements for dental treatment will alsoreveal not only that the application of a fixed ratio of dentists to totalstrength tends to delay the mobilization of dental facilities, but thatit fails to consider the primary factor in determining how many dentistswill be required-the rate of flow of inductees. This weakness isof course based on the fact that treatment for old, accumulated dentaldefects has been, and may be expected to be, greatly in excess of requirementsfor yearly maintenance care. If only maintenance treatment were neededby inductees the amount of that treatment would be directly proportionalto the number of men in the service, and a fixed ratio

of dentists to total strength, based on past experience, would be satisfactory.But when several times as many hours are necessary for the dental rehabilitationof an inductee as will be required for annual maintenance each year thereafter,the first consideration is not likely to be "how many troops are inthe Army?" but "how many new men will be inducted during theyear?" Thus, in the discussed hypothetical illustration, the ratioof dentists which met all needs of a static force broke down completelywhen applied to an expanding organization. These weaknesses of the methodof fixing dental personnel on the basis of an established ratio in a timeof emergency do not mean that such a ratio may not represent the maximumnumber of dentists that may be available, or that it may not be valuableas an indication of how many dentists will be required after stabilityhas been reached. They do indicate, however, the need for a critical evaluationof any proposed ratio in the light of the actual probable demand for treatmentwhenever a major mobilization is planned.

It is possible, of course, that future developments in methods of wagingwar may alter the mission and function of the medical services even tothe point of placing first emphasis on the care of the civilian population.

Limitations on the Number of Dentists
Available From Civilian Practice

During World War I only about 6,700 dentists were taken from privatepractice and the effect on civilian dental care was scarcely noticed. Priorto World War II very little thought had been given to the possibility thatthe number of dentists who could be obtained for the Armed Form was, infact, strictly limited. Nor did it seem probable that there might not bea sufficient number of personnel left to care for the minimum needs ofthe civil population.

The first attempt to determine how many dentists could be spared forthe Armed Forces was made in April 1941, when the American Dental Association(ADA) estimated that 21,000 dentists would fall within the draft age andthat only 6,700 of these would be eligible for induction.¹⁷However, this figure was based on induction criteria rather than on anysurvey of civilian needs, and it was therefore subject to change as draftregulations were altered.

In June 1942, local complaints of shortages of dental personnel impelledthe Procurement and Assignment Service for Physicians, Dentists, and Veterinarians(PAS), of the War Manpower Commission (WMC), to sponsor a general surveyof dental manpower.¹⁸ This survey, which was carried out withthe assistance of the U. S. Public Health Service (USPHS), was completedin

¹⁷Report of the Chicago meeting of the Committeeon Dental Preparedness. J. Am. Dent. A. 28: 635, Apr 1941.
¹⁸Minutes of the Directing Board, PAS, 22 Jun 42. On file NatlArchives, PAS, WMC.

February 1943 and revealed the following situation (projected to theend of 1943):¹⁹

Dentists listed in the 1940 census	70,417
Graduates, 1940-1943	8,928
TOTAL	79,345
Losses of death and retirement, 1940-1942	3,830
Dentists estimated to be in nonprofessional work with various essential agencies	1,021
Anticipated losses, 1943	1,624
TOTAL	6,475
Remaining effectives, end of 1934	72,870

PAS decided that a minimum of 1 dentist for each 2,500 persons shouldbe reserved for civilian care, or a total of 50,250 dentists for a civilpopulation of 125,625,000. This left 22,620 dentists who could be utilizedby the Armed Forces, 11,617 of whom were already on active duty in theArmy, Navy, and Public Health Service.

The findings of PAS, that 1 dentist was required for each 2,500 civiliansand that 22,620 dentists could be made available to the military, wereof course open to question on theoretical grounds. In the absence of specificinformation on the dental condition of the American public any such estimateswere necessarily arbitrary and based on opinion rather than upon factualknowledge. It could be pointed out, for instance, that even in peacetimemany communities had never had more than 1 dentist for each 5,000 persons.Further, it was obvious that PAS` ratio could not be applied uniformlysince those regions which had never approached the 1:2,500 ratio beforethe war could hardly expect to receive additional dental personnel in atime of national emergency, to bring them up to the authorized proportion.If these areas merely retained their prewar ratios, and if all other districtswere reduced to the recommended quota, considerably more dentists wouldhave been released for military service.

It was more difficult to criticize PAS findings from the practical pointof view. No one could claim that a ratio of 1 dentist for 5,000 persons,or an average per capita expenditure for dentistry of 9 cents a year, wasadequate for the maintenance of dental health; the fact that such conditionsexisted in some unfortunate regions did not justify their extension tothe entire nation. And while neither PAS nor any other agency could statewith certainty that a given ratio of dentists was actually required forcivilians, the Armed Forces would have had equal difficulty in justifyingany demand for an increased allotment since the figure set by PAS gavethem nearly one-third of the nations` dentists for 12 million men, whileonly two-thirds were reserved for the remaining 125 million civilians.

¹⁹Minutes of Committee on Dentistry, PAS, 20Feb 43. On file Nail Archives, PAS, WMC.

Also, while many areas which had had less than 1 dentist for each 2,500persons prior to the war would certainly have to continue with less thanthe PAS "minimum" ratio, the number of additional dentists madeavailable to the military by this circumstance was very small due to peculiaritiesof distribution. Dentists who were "excess" by the PAS definitionwere concentrated mainly in the larger urban centers, and it was not feasibleto take from 50 to 80 percent of the men in practice in such cities asNew York or Los Angeles to bring those districts down to the recommendedquota. A city of one million persons, for instance, with a ratio of 1 dentistfor each 1,000 individuals would have 1,000 dentists; of these, 600 wouldhave to be taken into the Armed Forces to reduce the proportion to 1 dentistfor each 2,500 persons. But many of the dentists in such a city would betoo old for active duty, or physically disqualified for military life;others would be in essential occupations. The number which would be acceptedby the Armed Forces would in most cases be far below the 600 which wouldtheoretically be declared available. The only way in which the remaindercould be utilized would be to relocate them in less favored districts torelease younger men who would in turn be taken by the Army or Navy. Thealternative would be to leave a higher proportion of dentists in centerswhich had normally enjoyed a high ratio in peacetime, offsetting thoseregions which could not attain the 1: 2,500 ratio.

In view of these considerations, the findings and broad recommendationsof PAS in respect to minimum requirements for civilian dental care mustbe considered reasonable and justifiable, at least until such time as moredefinite information is available concerning dental needs. When it is notedthat the Army and Navy, together, mobilized about 22,318 dental officersin the war it is apparent that they were close to the bottom of the manpowerbarrel, and that no significant increase in the overall ratio of dentalofficers to total strength was possible. Any future mobilization plan mustcertainly recognize that the essential, minimum needs of the civilian populationmust be met, and that the supply of dental personnel is far from inexhaustible.

ACTUAL BASIS FOR DETERMINING DENTAL MANPOWER
REQUIREMENTS, WORLD WAR II

While formal requests for procurement objectives were generally brief,with no discussion of the method of calculation, the ultimate goal of theChief of the Dental Division, SGO, and The Surgeon General was an overallratio of 1 dentist for each 500 men. Since information on the dental conditionof inductees was too meager to permit an accurate determination of the,number of dental officers needed to provide a calculated amount of treatment,it seems probable that the 1:500 ratio was based on one or more of thefollowing considerations:

1. When the 1: 4000 ratio proved grossly inadequate in World War I,the 1:500 proportion was authorized in Zone of Interior installations (except

hospitals). Though this number of dental officers was not obtained beforethe end of hostilities, the ratio had been approved by the Secretary ofWar and the Chief of Staff, and it was probably given serious considerationby the officers responsible for organizing the Dental Service in WorldWar II.

2. Ratios of from 1:1,000 to 1:700 had proved inadequate in peacetimeand a further increase to 1:500 may have seemed to be the next logicalstep, especially when dental standards for induction were being drasticallylowered.

3. It is possible that a ratio of 1:500 was considered the maximum whichwould be approved by the General Staff, regardless of demonstrable needs.

While the ratio of 1 dental officer for each 500 troops would ultimatelyhave led to the mobilization of only a little more than the total numberof dentists which PAS had decided could be spared for the Armed Forces,there is no evidence that this factor was originally considered in arrivingat the figure for the Army Dental Corps. The 1:500 ratio appears to havebeen generally accepted during the early stages of the expansion of thedefense forces, when it was not expected that the Army would reach a strengthwhere its requirements for dentists would seriously threaten civilian practice.Virtual agreement between PAS and the Armed Forces in this case was apparentlya happy coincidence.

Col. Robert C. Craven, who was responsible for personnel matters inthe Dental Division, SGO, during the early part of the war, stated thatthe 1:500 ratio was first agreed upon informally between Brig. Gen. LeighC. Fairbank, Director of the Dental Division, SGO, and Brig. Gen. GeorgeF. Lull, Chief of Personnel Services, SGO. When Brig. Gen. Robert H. Millsbecame Director of the Dental Division, SGO, in March 1942 he attemptedto have that ratio officially recognized, but The Surgeon General feltthat no definite action should be taken until requirements were more clearlyestablished.²⁰ General Mills was assured, however, that he couldprocure all the dentists he might need for corps area service commands,regardless of any fixed ratio, and relying on that promise he relaxed hisefforts to obtain formal approval of the desired proportion.²¹No further effort was made to have the 1:500 ratio recognized until nearthe end of hostilities, when postwar policies were being considered. Duringthe early part of the war, procurement objectives seem to have been determinedby informal agreement between the principal personnel officers concerned,with the proportion of 1 officer for each 500 men serving as a convenient,though unofficial, yardstick.²²

In practice the 1:500 ratio was attained only for very short intervalsduring the war, and the average ratio over this period was 1 officer for557

²⁰Memo, Brig Gen R. H. Mills for SG, 8 Apr42, no sub. SG: 703.-1.
²¹Proceedings of The Surgeon General`s Conference with CorpsArea and Army Dental Surgeons, 8-9 July 42. HD: 337.
²²The highly informal manner in which dental procurement objectiveswere established during the war has been confirmed in personal correspondenceand conversations between the author and Col Robert C. Craven, Dental Div,SGO, and Maj Ernest J. Fedor, dental liaison officer with the PersonnelService during much of the war.

men.²³ Efforts to maintain the 1:500 ratio were finally abandonedin September 1943, when ASF placed a ceiling of 15,200 officers on theDental Corps.²⁴

As the war progressed an effort was made to refine estimated requirementsfor dental officers on a more definite basis than an overall ratio. Ina memorandum from the SGO to ASF, dated 5 June 1944, analyzing the dentalpersonnel situation, it was noted that anticipated needs had been calculatedas follows:²⁵

1. For tactical units in the Zone of Interior and overseas, accordingto authorized tables of organization.

2. For other Zone of Interior installations, on the basis of 1 dentistfor each 500 troops, except for replacement training centers and separationcenters, which were authorized 1 dentist for each 300 troops.

3. For general hospitals, according to tables published in War DepartmentCircular No. 209, 26 May 1944.

4. Attrition was estimated at 50 officers monthly.

Tables of organization for tactical units mentioned in item 1 of thecited memorandum were planned to provide an average of 1 dentist for each1,200 men. Many adjustments were necessary before this general principlecould be applied to a host of smaller commands, and the results were sometimesunsatisfactory (see discussion in chapter VIII), but at least these tablesof organization provided a means for calculating requirements for projectedcombat forces on an exact, if arbitrary, basis.

The determination of requirements for dental officers in Zone of Interiorinstallations was more difficult. The following were some of the more importantproblems involved:

1. While procurement was based on the general ratios outlined in item2 of the cited memorandum, the number of dentists actually requisitionedby any installations was established by the corps area commander, withthe advice of his staff and local officials. As a result, dentist-troopratios might vary widely, even in commands of the same general type. Asearly as December 1940, The Surgeon General asked that mandatory tablesof organization be set up for the dental services of Zone of Interior campsand stations,²⁶ but this request was disapproved by The AdjutantGeneral as being contrary to the policy of

²³Calculated by the author from data in thefiles of the Dental Div, SGO.
²⁴The manner in which the ceiling for the Dental Corps was established,and the exact date, is not entirely clear. In a memorandum to the DeputySurgeon General, of 7 Sep 43, Lt Col D. G. Hall of the Personnel Service,SGO, stated that his office had "that day" been notified of arevised requirement based on changed plans in ASF. (Memo, Lt Col. DurwardG. Hall to Dep, SG, sub: Revised requirements for dental officers in theArmy. SG : 322.0531.) Other incidental references indicate that representativesof the Dental Division, the Military Personnel Division, SGO, and of G-1attended conferences on the matter before a decision was reached. It isalso probable that PAS had a hand in the matter, but the extent to whichits influence affected ASF is not known.
²⁵Memo, Brig Gen R. W. Bliss for CG, ASF, 5 Jun 44, sub: Requirementsfor Dental Corps officers. SG: 322.053-1.
²⁶Ltr, Col Larry B. McAfee to TAG, 10 Dec 40, sub: Personneltable, camp dental clinics. SG: 320.2-1.

decentralizing all possible authority to subordinate facilities.²⁷Recommended tables of organization for Zone of Interior installations werepublished from time to time, but they were merely "suggestions"which could be ignored by subordinate commands. In October 1943, the Directorof the Dental Division, SGO, noted that few service commands had requisitionedwhat was considered an adequate number of dentists, and one service commandhad only 73 percent of the recommended total 1.²⁸

The first "recommended" allotment of dental officers to Zoneof Interior installations, published in December 1940, provided for ISofficers and 26 enlisted men in each DC-1, and 11 officers and 17 enlistedmen for each DC-2. These clinics had 25 and 15 chairs, respectively, butit was anticipated that they would be partially manned by tactical unitsin the Zone of Interior.²⁹ In May 1944, War Department CircularNo. 209 recommended the following manning levels:³⁰

DC-1	25 officers	42 enlisted men
DC-2	15 officers	25 enlisted men
DC-3	8 officers	13 enlisted men
DC-4	3 officers	3 enlisted men
DC-5	1 officers	1 enlisted men

This directive also recommended that dental officers be assigned togeneral hospitals as follows:

1,000 beds	7 officers
1,500 beds	8 officers
1,750 beds	9 officers
2,000 beds	12 officers
2,500 beds	14 officers
3,000 beds	16 officers
3,500 beds	19 officers
4,000 beds	21 officers

However, this publication failed to answer many questions, since itbased its recommendations on clinic types rather than on the number oftroops served. Thus a DC-1 might be found in a camp with 7,000 men or ina camp with 12,000; obviously the dental needs of the two installationswould not be identical.

An ASF circular of 16 October 1945 recommended that dentists be providedZone of Interior camps on the basis of 2 officers and 3 enlisted men foreach 1,000 troops served, plus 1 officer and 1 1/2 enlisted men for each200 beds in the station hospital.³¹ It further suggested specificgrades and classifications for both officers and enlisted men, as shownin Tables 1 and 2. The influence of these recommendations on the determinationof Zone of Interior dental allotments cannot be determined.

²⁷(1) 1st Ind, TAG, to footnote 26,30 Dee 40.(2) See footnote 21, p. 44.
²⁸Memo, Dir, Dent Div for Chief, Prof Serv, SGO, 1 Oct 43, nosub. SG: 703-1.
²⁹See footnote 27, above.
³⁰WD Cir 209, 26 May 44.
³¹ASP Cir 389,16 Oct 45.

2. It was difficult to predict the extent to which the dentists of tacticalunits in training in the Zone of Interior could be utilized in camp clinics.For a discussion of this problem see chapter VII.

3. The rate of attrition in the Dental Corps was not constant and itcould not be predicted with accuracy. During the early part of the warit was less than had been expected, while later it was necessary to acceleratenormal attrition to permit the replacement of older men with ASTP graduates.

TABLE 1. DENTAL OFFICERS RECOMMENDED FOR ZONE OF INTERIOR DENTALCLINICS BY
ASF CIRCULAR No. 389, 16 OCTOBER 1945

Grade	Qualifications	DC-1	DC-2	DC-3	DC-4	DC-5
Lieutenant colonel	Dental staff officer	1	-----	-----	-----	-----
Lieutenant colonel	General	-----	1	-----	-----	-----
Major	General	-----	1	1	1	-----
Major	Oral Surgeon	1	-----	-----	-----	-----
Major	Exodontist	1	1	-----	-----	-----
Major	Prosthodontist	2	1	-----	-----	-----
Major	Periodontist	1	-----	-----	-----	-----
Captain or lieutenant	General	19	11	5	2	1
Captain or lieutenant	Exodontist	-----	-----	1	-----	-----
Captain or lieutenant	Prosthodontist	-----	-----	1	-----	-----
Total officers		25	15	8	3	1

TABLE 2. ENLISTED ASSISTANTS RECOMMENDED FOR ZONE OF INTERIORDENTAL CLINICS
BY ASF CIRCULAR No. 389, 16 OCTOBER 1945

Grade	Qualifications	DC-1	DC-2	DC-3	DC-4	DC-5
Technical sergeant	Administrative	1	-----	-----	-----	-----
Staff sergeant	Administrative	-----	1	-----	-----	-----
Sergeant	Administrative	-----	-----	1	-----	-----
Corporal	Clerk	1	1	-----	-----	-----
Technician, 3d gr	Laboratory technician	2	1	1	-----	-----
Technician, 4th gr	Laboratory technician	3	2	1	-----	-----
Technician, 4th gr	X-ray technician	1	-----	-----	-----	-----
Technician, 4th gr	Chair assistant	9	5	3	1	-----
Technician, 5th gr	Laboratory technician	5	3	1	-----	-----
Technician, 5th gr	X-ray technician	-----	1	1	-----	-----
Technician, 5th gr	Chair assistant	17	9	5	2	1
Private, first class	Supply clerk	1	1	-----	-----	-----
Private, first class	Basic	1	-----	-----	-----	-----
Private	Basic	1	1	-----	-----	-----
Total enlisted men		42	25	13	3	1

CHRONOLOGICAL PROGRESS OF THE MOBILIZATION
OF DENTAL OFFICERS

Table 3 shows the monthly procurement of dental officers for the period1 January 1939 to 28 February 1946.³²

Though tension in Europe mounted during the late 1930`s, staff officersresponsible for the Army Dental Service showed little concern over dentalpersonnel problems. It was expected that the fully mobilized ground andair forces would number only about 4,000,000 troops and that a ratio of1.4 dentists for each 1,000 total strength would be sufficient. This wouldprovide for a Dental Corps of 5,600 men.³³ No difficulty hadbeen experienced in obtaining almost this number of dentists during WorldWar I, even without the benefit of a strong Organized Reserve. Also, inspite of the termination of the dental ROTC in 1932 (see chapter IV), 258Regular Army dentists, 250 National Guard officers, and 5,197 Reserve officerswere enrolled in the Dental Corps in September 1938; thus it appeared thatif war came very few additional dentists would be required. It was alsothe opinion of The Surgeon General that dental officers could be procuredrapidly and put on active duty with very little training, and it was franklystated that no uneasiness need be felt even if the Dental Reserve fellto 50 percent of its authorized strength.³⁴ At this time itwas certainly not foreseen that the Army would reach a strength of over8 million men, that a drastic lowering of physical standards would be necessary,and that the 1.4 ratio, which had failed to measure up to the lesser needsduring and following World War I, would be completely inadequate for thisexpanded force.

TABLE 3. OFFICERS CALLED TO ACTIVE DUTY IN THE DENTAL CORPS,BY COMPONENT,
JANUARY 1939 THROUGH FEBRUARY 1946

Date	Component				Total
Date	Regular Army	Reserve	National Guard	Army of the United States	Total
1939
Total	19	25	----------	----------	44
January	----------	----------	----------	----------	----------
February	----------	1	----------	----------	1
March	----------	----------	----------	----------	----------
April	----------	----------	----------	----------	----------
May	----------	----------	----------	----------	----------
June	----------	----------	----------	----------	----------
July	13	2	----------	----------	15
August	----------	2	----------	----------	2

³²Monthly procurement of dental officers, 1Jan 39 through Feb 46. Info furnished by Strength Acctg Br, AGO, 3 Jul46.
³³Memo, Col James E. Baylis, Tng Div, SGO, for SG, 6 Sep 38.[D]
³⁴Ibid.

TABLE 3. OFFICERS CALLED TO ACTIVE DUTY IN THE DENTAL CORPS,BY COMPONENT,
JANUARY 1939 THROUGH FEBRUARY 1946--Continued

Date	Component				Total
Date	Regular Army	Reserve	National Guard	Army of the United States	Total
1939
September	----------	3	----------	----------	3
October	----------	1	----------	----------	1
November	6	9	----------	----------	15
December	----------	7	----------	----------	7
1940
Total	29	408	145	----------	582
January	----------	----------	1	----------	1
February	----------	3	1	----------	4
March	----------	30	----------	----------	30
April	----------	13	1	----------	14
May	----------	2	----------	----------	2
June	17	6	----------	----------	23
July	7	17	----------	----------	24
August	----------	21	----------	----------	21
September	----------	42	62	----------	104
October	----------	100	36	----------	136
November	----------	103	31	----------	134
December	5	71	13	----------	89
1941
Total	6	1,938	165	48	2,157
January	----------	125	57	----------	182
February	----------	159	71	----------	230
March	----------	202	31	----------	233
April	1	340	3	1	345
May	----------	218	1	----------	219
June	----------	140	1	----------	141
July	4	250	1	1	256
August	----------	150	----------	----------	150
September	----------	120	----------	1	121
October	----------	119	----------	12	131
November	----------	62	----------	23	85
December	1	53	----------	10	64

TABLE 3. OFFICERS CALLED TO ACTIVE DUTY IN THE DENTAL CORPS,BY COMPONENT,
JANUARY 1939 THROUGH FEBRUARY 1946--Continued

Date	Component				Total
Date	Regular Army	Reserve	National Guard	Army of the United States	Total
1942
Total	21	1,134	1	5,670	6,826
January	1	126	----------	179	306
February	2	77	----------	97	176
March	----------	85	----------	34	119
April	4	157	----------	149	310
May	1	149	----------	292	442
June	5	95	----------	457	557
July	4	259	----------	966	1,229
August	----------	100	1	1,038	1,139
September	3	56	----------	1,171	1,230
October	----------	13	----------	561	574
November	----------	15	----------	356	371
December	1	2	----------	370	373
1943
Total	----------	59	----------	4,941	5,000
January	----------	5	----------	162	167
February	----------	9	----------	192	201
March	----------	4	----------	277	281
April	----------	5	----------	374	379
May	----------	4	----------	910	914
June	----------	10	----------	556	566
July	----------	11	----------	679	690
August	----------	4	----------	540	544
September	----------	2	----------	347	349
October	----------	3	----------	266	269
November	----------	----------	----------	364	364
December	----------	2	----------	274	276
1944
Total	----------	40	----------	1,889	1,929
January	----------	4	----------	346	350
February	----------	14	----------	536	550
March	----------	5	----------	108	113
April	----------	8	----------	129	137
May	----------	1	----------	58	59
June	----------	----------	----------	19	19
July	----------	----------	----------	104	104
August	----------	----------	----------	5	5
September	----------	----------	----------	117	117

TABLE 3. OFFICERS CALLED TO ACTIVE DUTY IN THE DENTAL CORPS,BY COMPONENT,
JANUARY 1939 THROUGH FEBRUARY 1946--Continued

Date	Component				Total
Date	Regular Army	Reserve	National Guard	Army of the United States	Total
1944
October	----------	2	----------	233	235
November	----------	6	----------	186	192
December	----------	----------	----------	48	48
1945
Total	----------	2	----------	233	235
January	----------	1	----------	49	50
February	----------	----------	----------	45	45
March	----------	1	----------	47	48
April	----------	----------	----------	85	85
May	----------	----------	----------	1	1
June	----------	----------	----------	4	4
July	----------	----------	----------	----------	----------
August	----------	----------	----------	1	1
September	----------	----------	----------	----------	----------
October	----------	----------	----------	----------	----------
November	----------	----------	----------	----------	----------
December	----------	----------	----------	1	1
1946
Total	----------	----------	----------	2	2
January	----------	----------	----------	1	1
February	----------	----------	----------	1	1
1939-1946
Aggregate	75	3,606	311	12,783	16,775

In September 1938, when the Dental Reserve had reached a level slightlyover its authorized strength³⁵, The Surgeon General recommendedthat all further procurement for that organization be suspended. This recommendation,which reflected the then optimistic attitude of The Surgeon General, wasapproved by the General Staff and, with a few exceptions (successful candidatesfor the Regular Army, recent graduates desiring immediate active duty)no new commissions were offered until October 1940.³⁶ Between30 June 1938 and 30 June 1941 the Dental Corps Reserve suffered a net lossof 771 officers, in spite of the fact that 722 commissions were given youngdentists during fiscal

³⁵See footnote 33, p. 48.
³⁶Ltr, ACofS, G-1 to TAG, 29 Sep 38, sub: Suspension of appointmentsin the Dental Reserve Corps. [D]

year 1941.³⁷ On the latter date the Dental Reserve numbered4,428 officers.

Increases in the number of dentists on active duty were small priorto the inauguration of Selective Service in September 1940. The authorizedstrength of the Regular Army Dental Corps was raised to 316 officers inApril 1939³⁸, and about 50 Reserve officers were called to voluntaryduty in April and September 1939.³⁹ On 30 June 1940, 354 dentists,including 101 Reserve officers, were on duty.⁴⁰

By the end of July 1940,150 Reserve dentists had accepted voluntaryactive service, but this number was 391 less than the total then required,and it was anticipated that 1,259 dentists would be needed when expansionunder the Selective Service Act was started in October.⁴¹ On27 August 1940 the President was empowered to call to active duty, withor without consent, any member of the Reserve or National Guard.⁴²Any officer below the grade of captain, with dependents, could resign,however, and a considerable number of Medical Department officers madeuse of this privilege.⁴³ By 26 October 1940 The Surgeon Generalforesaw an early exhaustion of the Dental Reserve and he recommended thatthe suspension on new commissions, which had been in effect since September1938, be lifted without delay.⁴⁴ Three days later the ban waslifted to the extent of permitting the corps area commanders to fill existingvacancies.⁴⁵ Under current procurement objectives, however,there were very few dental vacancies at this time, and it was found impossiblein some cases even to offer commissions to those few dentists who had beeninducted as enlisted men.⁴⁶

By 30 April 1941, 35.5 percent of all Dental Reserve officers were onactive duty, though the proportion varied from 20 percent to 59 percentin different corps areas.⁴⁷

On 5 May 1941 previous restrictions against new commissions in the DentalReserve were further modified to permit the acceptance of any qualifieddentists who had been inducted as enlisted men, and the corps areas wereinstructed to

³⁷Annual Reports . . . Surgeon General, 1938-41.Washington, Government Printing Office, 1938-41.
³⁸Sec 8, 53 Stat 558.
³⁹See footnote 14, p. 36.
⁴⁰Annual Report . . . Surgeon General, 1940. Washington, GovernmentPrinting Office, 1940.
⁴¹Ltr, SG to TAG, 6 Aug 40, sub: Shortage of Medical Departmentpersonnel. SG: 320.2-1.
⁴²Annual Report . . . Surgeon General, 1941. Washington, GovernmentPrinting Office, 1941.
⁴³Ltr, TAG to all CA or Dept Comdrs, 1 Sep 40, sub: Resignationof officers of the Officers` Reserve Corps. SG: 210.83-ORC.
⁴⁴Ltr, Col Larry B. McAfee, to TAG, 26 Oct 40, sub: Appointmentin the Medical, Dental, and Veterinary Reserve Corps. AG: 210.1.
⁴⁵Ltr, Col Larry B. McAfee to all CA surgs, 29 Oct 40, sub:Extended active duty vacancy required for approval of applicant for commission.[D]
⁴⁶See footnote 16, p. 37.
⁴⁷Ltr, TAG to all CGs, CofS, GHQ, Chiefs of all Arms and Services,2 Jun 41, sub: Information as to the percentage of eligible reserve officerswho are on extended duty as of April 30, 1941. AG: 210.31-ORC.

encourage applications from persons in this category.⁴⁸ By30 June 1941, 2,111 dental officers, predominantly Reserve, were on activeduty.⁴⁹

In October 1941 The Surgeon General reported some concern over the numberof resignations and physical disqualifications in the Dental Reserve, andrequested authority to reopen procurement in that branch. However, he stillrecommended against any great increase in the Reserve, since to grant commissionsto men who could not be used by the Army would amount to. conferring exemptionfrom military service, which was properly the prerogative of the SelectiveService System.⁵⁰ Apparently it was still believed that theReserve, augmented with a few inductees and recent graduates, would besufficient to meet anticipated needs. This optimism was not shared by theFederal Security Administrator, Paul V. McNutt. On 30 October 1941, inhis recommendation to the President for the establishment of a Procurementand Assignment Service to insure the most economical use of limited medicalpersonnel, Mr. McNutt also included a tentative plan for a draft of civilianprofessional men, should such action prove necessary.⁵¹ Theattitude of The Surgeon General at this time is probably explained by thefact that 2,905 dental officers were on duty, or only 6 less than the authorizedprocurement objective, and Pearl Harbor was still in the future.⁵²

Three days after entrance of the United States into the war all releasesfrom active duty, except for physical disability or incompetence, weresuspended.⁵³ On 19 December the Medical Department was instructedto establish pools of medical personnel from which replacements could bemade without delay. No specific level was prescribed for the Dental Corps,but 1,500 officers were to be maintained in such pools by the Medical Departmentas a whole.⁵⁴

With the entry of the United States into actual hostilities the needfor a rapid expansion of the Medical Department was clear. On 1 January1942 The Surgeon General requested authority to call to duty 1,350 additionaldentists,⁵⁵ but The Adjutant General approved an increase of500 only.⁵⁶

In the latter part of January 1942, it was directed that only a limitednum-

⁴⁸Rad, TAG to CGs all CAs, 5 May 41. AG: 210.1-ORC.
⁴⁹Officers appointed in the Dental Corps from 1 January 1939through February 1946. Info furnished by Strength Accounting Branch, AGO,3 Jul 46. RD: 320.2.
⁵⁰Memo, Lt Col R. C. Craven for TAG, 8 Oct 41. AG : 080 (ADA).
⁵¹Ltr, Paul V. McNutt, Federal Security Administrator, to thePresident, 30 Oct 41.[D]
⁵²Lt Col Alfred Mordecai : A history of the Procurement andAssignment Service for physicians, dentists, veterinarians, sanitary engineers,and nurses, War Manpower Commission. HD: 314.7-2.
⁵³Ltr, TAG to Chief of the Army Air Forces; Commanding General,Air Force Combat Command; Chief of Staff, GHQ; and the Chiefs of all Armsand Services, 10 Dec 41, sub: Suspension of releases from active service.SG: 320.2-1.
⁵⁴Ltr, TAG to Chief of each arm or service, 19 Dec 41, sub:Officer filler and loss replacements for ground arms and services. SG:320.2-1.
⁵⁵Ltr, SG to TAG, 1 Jan 42, sub: Procurement objective, MedicalDepartment officers, Army of the United States. AG: 210.1.
⁵⁶1st ind, TAG to SG, 24 Jan 42, to ltr cited in footnote 55.

ber of Regular Army dental officers, varying from 2 in the Fifth CorpsArea to 13 in the Fourth, would be allotted to corps area activities.⁵⁷

On 12 April 1949, The Surgeon General was instructed by Services ofSupply (SOS) to establish Medical Officer Recruiting Boards to commissionofficers in the field. This action was intended mainly to speed the laggingprocurement of medical rather than dental officers, for dentists were notto be accepted unless they were under 37 years of age or had been classifiedI-A by their draft boards. By May 1942 it was evident that the Army wouldreach a strength much greater than had been anticipated in prewar plans.In that month the Military Personnel Division, SOS, estimated that 7,110dentists would be needed by 1 January 1943, as follows:⁵⁸

Services of Supply	2,699
Operations of AGF	2,472
Army Air Force	1,755
Pools	184

As of 31 March 1942 there were 3,373 dental officers on duty and itwas estimated that only 587 more could be obtained from the Reserve; itwould therefore be necessary to make 3,150 new appointments in the Armyof the United States (AUS) during the remainder of 1942.⁵⁹ On3 July 1942 The Surgeon General reported that the procurement objectiveof 500 officers, authorized on 24 January, had been filled and he requestedan additional objective of 4,000 dentists.⁶⁰ This time his requestwas approved in full within a few days.⁶¹

Some difficulty was expected in obtaining 4,000 more dentists for on9 July 1942 The Adjutant General directed the corps areas to add dentalofficers to all Medical Officer Recruiting Boards and. granted authority,for the first time, to consider applications for original appointmentsfrom the following:⁶²

1. Dentists between the ages of 37 and 45.
2. Dentists qualified only for limited service.
3. Dentists whose training and experience justified an original appointmentabove the grade of lieutenant.

Though dentists in these categories were to be accepted only by authorityof The Surgeon General, they had not previously been placed on active dutyunder any circumstances. At about the same time the, Dental Division, SGO,was directed to call to active service all physically qualified lieutenantcolonels and colonels of the Reserve, a step which had been postponed aslong as possible

⁵⁷Ltr, TAG to all CA comdrs, 27 Jan 42, sub:Allotment of Regular Army officers for duty with the Corps Area ServiceCommands. AG: 320.2.
⁵⁸Memo, Brig Gen James E. Wharton for Pers Off, SGO, 11 May42. SG:320.2-1.
⁵⁹Ibid.
⁶⁰Ltr, Lt Col Francis M. Fitts to CG, SOS, 3 Jul 42, sub: Procurementobjective, Dental Corps, Army of the United States. SG: 320.2-1.
⁶¹Ltr, TAG to SG, 8 Jul 42, sub: Procurement objective, Armyof the United States, for duty with Dental Corps (Surgeon General). SG320.2-1.
⁶²Ltr, TAG to CGs all CAs, 9 Jul 42, sub: Dental Corps membersfor certain Medical Department recruiting boards. AG: SPX 210.31.

due to the difficulty of assigning men in the higher grades to appropriatepositions.⁶³ Misgivings concerning dental procurement provedunfounded at this time. On 1 September 1942 dental representatives wereremoved from the Medical Officer Recruiting Boards and the latter wereinstructed not to accept any new dental applications.⁶⁴ A fewdays later the Dental Division, SGO, notified its liaison officer withthe ADA that the objective of 4,000 officers authorized in July 1942, hadnearly been filled and that commissions would thereafter be given onlyto men who had been declared Class I-A by their draft boards.⁶⁵From September through November 1942 further procurement of dental officerswas actually discouraged.

On 16 November 1942 The Surgeon General reported that there were 9,706dental officers on duty, a number slightly in excess of current requirements.However, with mobilization plans providing for many more men than had beenconsidered necessary at the beginning of the year, it was estimated that17,248 dentists would be needed by the end of 1943. The Surgeon Generaltherefore asked for a new procurement objective of 7,200 dental officersin addition to the 300 officers of the unexpended portion of the old objective.⁶⁶This request was approved on 27 November.⁶⁷ On 15 January 1943PAS, WMC, agreed to declare 400 civilian dentists available each monththrough the year, for a total of 4,800 dentists; the remaining 2,700 dentalofficers were to be obtained from the newly established Army SpecializedTraining Program (ASTP) (see chapter IV), from dentists inducted as enlistedmen by Selective Service, and from students holding inactive Medical AdministrativeCorps Reserve commissions.⁶⁸

During the first months of 1943, the program to meet the procurementobjective of 7,500 dental officers lagged somewhat, though difficultiesof dental procurement were overshadowed by the much more acute shortageof medical officers. In February the Dental Division asked that PAS speedits activities as only 269 dentists had been declared available since 1January. In April, the Medical Department was still short 1,042 dentistsand 6,677 physicians, but by May, when the situation in respect to medicalofficers was grave, some improvement was noted in the procurement of dentalofficers.⁶⁹ Though Selective Service placed dentists in the"scarce" category at about this time,⁷⁰ this actionwas intended only to prevent the waste of dental manpower in non-professionalactivities, and on 22 May representatives of the War Department

⁶³See footnote 21, p. 44.
⁶⁴Rad, TAG to CG, 1st SvC, 1 Sep 42. SG: 210.31-1.
⁶⁵Ltr, Col Robert C. Craven to Maj Kenneth R. Cofield, 4 Sep42. [D]
⁶⁶Ltr, SG to CG, SOS, 16 Nov 42, sub: 1943 procurement objective,Dental Corps, Army of the United States. SG: 320.2-1.
⁶⁷Ltr, TAG to SG, 27 Nov 42, sub: Increase in procurement objective,Army of the United States, for The Surgeon General (Dental Corps). SG:320.2-1.
⁶⁸See footnote 52, p. 53.
⁶⁹Ltr, SG to ACofS, G-1, 13 May 43, sub: Procurement of physiciansand dentists. AG: 210.1.
⁷⁰WD Memo W605-23-43, 15 May 43, sub: Scarce categories of specializedskills. AG: 210.1.

and PAS found that "the dental picture was not alarming."⁷¹By the end of June 1943, 12,046 dental officers were on duty, and halfof the year`s objective had been obtained.⁷²

On 7 September 1943, when about 13,500 dentists were in the service,ASF placed an arbitrary ceiling of 15,200 officers on the Dental Corps.It was then estimated that in addition to graduates of the ASTP and studentsholding Reserve Medical Administrative Corps commissions only 1,124 moredentists would be needed from civil life. Both PAS and the Officer ProcurementService (OPS) of the ASF were notified not to accept additional applicationsfrom dentists who were over 38 years of age or who were not physicallyfit for unlimited military service. This action is especially significantwhen it is noted that at this same time The Surgeon General was seriouslyconsidering a draft of 12,000 physicians.⁷³ By 9 December 1943,over 14,200 dental officers were in the military service and further procurementfrom civilian sources, other than from students in the ASTP or the MedicalAdministrative Corps Reserve, was stopped.⁷⁴

On 16, December 1943, The Surgeon General agreed, at the request ofthe Veterans Administration, to commission all dentists of that agencywho were under 63 years of age, and about 170 dental officers in this categorywere ultimately accepted. These men remained in their normal duties withthe Veterans Administration.⁷⁵

Peculiarly, serious difficulties in dental procurement did not ariseuntil the Dental Service approached its maximum strength in the springof 1944, and then the principal problem was not to obtain replacements,but to find vacancies for graduates of the ASTP and for such dentists asmight be inducted by Selective Service. At that time the Dental Corps numberednearly 15,000 officers, many of whom had already been on active duty for2 to 3 years. Very few of these men could be returned to civilian lifeunder existing directives, and natural attrition had proved to be muchless than expected. On the other hand, the ASTP had been established earlyin 1943 to provide about 825 dental officers every 9 months, and unlessvacancies could be found for them they would have to be released to privatepractice after the Government had given them draft exemption and paid fora considerable part of their professional training.

The Dental Division and the War Department did not agree on the bestsolution for this problem. The Dental Division was influenced mainly bythe fessional training.

⁷¹Minutes of Conf between the Directing Board,PAS, and representatives of the WD, 22 May 43. On file Natl Archives, PASfiles, WMC.
⁷²Annual Report ... Surgeon General for CG, ASF, (1943). HD:319.1-2.
⁷³Draft of proposed call on Selective Service for the conscriptionof 12,000 physicians, submitted toThe Surgeon General on 9 Oct 43 by LtCol Durward G. Hall. [D]
⁷⁴Ltr, Col Durward G. Hall to Exec Off, PAS, 10 Dec 43, sub:Cancellation of further procurement of dentists. [D]
⁷⁵Annual Rpt, Procmt Br, Mil Pers Div SGO, 1943. HD: 319.1-2.

1. During the early stages of mobilization some men had been commissionedwho were physically or mentally incapable of performing their duties efficiently.Their presence decreased the effectiveness of the entire Dental Service.

2. Long before the start of actual hostilities many Reserve officershad volunteered for active duty in the emergency. After 3 years of service,during which their colleagues at home had enjoyed exceptionally high incomes,these officers were anxious to return to their offices as soon as theycould be spared. It was believed that if ASTP graduates were released whilethe older men were held in the Army the resulting drop in morale wouldbe catastrophic.

The Dental Division therefore wished to replace older men with recentgraduates who had no family ties and who might be expected to be availableduring the demobilization period.

The War Department, on the other hand, apparently attached more importanceto the following considerations:

1. Any great turnover in dental personnel would mean wasted effort intraining replacements.

2. Officers with several years of service were considered the most valuableto the Army, and it was doubted if recent graduates of the curtailed dentalcourse would be equal in ability to men with 5 to 20 years of practicalexperience.

3. Line officers and enlisted men who had proved themselves in combatcould be replaced only at the cost of American lives; they had to be, retaineduntil the last battle was won. To release dental officers, who generallylived a less dangerous and rigorous life, while combat personnel had toremain in the fighting, might seriously impair the morale of the latter.

For these reasons the War Department at first preferred to keep theolder officers in service, even at the expense of discharging recent graduatesunder the Army training program. It later changed its attitude to conformmore nearly to that of the Dental Division, but this did not occur untilthe graduating class of June 1944 had been lost and the dental ASTP hadbeen terminated.⁷⁶

On 11 March 1944 The Surgeon General, at the request of the Dental Division,advised the Military Personnel Division, ASF, that the authorized ceilingfor dental officers had been reached; in addition, that approximately 1,294ASTP students would graduate during the remainder of the year. At the sametime he noted that many dental officers were in a "limited service"status and he recommended that the following be relieved from active dutyin numbers sufficient to make room for the younger men:⁷⁷

⁷⁶Data on reasons for War Department oppositionto the discharge of older dental officers in early 1944 have been difficultto obtain, and reliance has had to be placed on information given by officerson duty in the War Department at the time. Considerable material has beenobtained from Maj Ernest J. Fedor, who was dental liaison officer withthe Military Personnel Division, SGO, during much of the war. There issome reason to believe that the War Department saw the advantages of replacingthe older officers, but that it wished to avoid a categorical statementof policy which would receive wide publicity and which might lead to criticismby line personnel who could not be included.
⁷⁷Memo, Col Robert J. Carpenter, Exec Off SGO, for Dir Mil PersDiv, ASF, 11 Mar 44. SG: 322 . 0531.

1. Any dentist over 45 years of age who was classified"limited service."
2. Dentists over 38 years of age who were recommended for release by corpsarea commanders. This provision was expected to authorize the dischargeof men who were not sufficiently incompetent to be released under existingcriteria, but who were of doubtful value to the dental service.

This request was disapproved on the grounds that existing directiveswere adequate to assure the discharge of inefficient officers. The primarypurpose of this proposal, to create vacancies, was apparently given littleconsideration.⁷⁸ On 1 April 1944, however, Lt. Col. DurwardG. Hall, of the Military Personnel Division, SGO, reported to The SurgeonGeneral that he had received, informal, verbal authority to exceed theofficial ceiling for short periods of time to permit the commissioningof some, ASTP graduates, and that he had also been instructed to releaseenough dentists over 40 years of age to maintain the required level. G-1and ASF refused to confirm these agreements in writing, however, and ColonelHall was doubtful concerning the advisability of putting them in effect.⁷⁹

On 16 May 1944 the Director of the Dental Division was informed by theMilitary Personnel Division, SGO, that due to a lack of vacancies no graduatesof the class of June 1944 would be commissioned in the Army, though somenames would be referred to the Veterans Administration and the Navy.⁸⁰About 225 dental ASTP graduates were actually commissioned at this timeby the Navy.⁸¹ Shortly thereafter the dental ASTP was terminated,except for senior students who would finish their courses by 1945.⁸²While The Surgeon General advised against this step, even he apparentlyunderestimated the, difficulties which would be encountered in maintaininga Dental Service for a million or more men in the postwar period, afterwartime officers had been dis-charged and Selective Service had been terminated.On 5 June 1944 he stated that while it "might be desirable from somepoints of view to grant at least some appointments to ASTP graduates,"such action was "not justified in view of the present strength ofthe corps."⁸³

A partial change of attitude on the part of the War Department GeneralStaff was registered in July 1944 when the Commanding General, ASF, wasdirected to commission qualified ASTP students graduating after June 1944if they were not desired by the Navy.⁸⁴ Necessary vacancieswere to be created

⁷⁸Memo, Brig Gen R. B. Reynolds, Mil Pers Div,ASF, for SG, 25 Mar 44, sub: Relief from active duty of temporary officersof Dental Corps over 40 years of age on permanent limited duty status.HD: 314.
⁷⁹Memo, Lt Col Durward G. Hall for Dep SG, 1 Apr 44. [D]
⁸⁰Memo, Maj Ernest J. Fedor for Maj Gen R. H. Mills, 16 May44, sub: Disposition of dental ASTP graduates who will complete their coursein dentistry during the month of June 1944. [D]
⁸¹Ltr, Capt W. F. Peterson to SG, 10 Oct 44, sub: ASTP dentalstudents commissioned in the U. S. Naval Reserve. [D]
⁸²See discussion of the Dental ASTP in chapter IV.
⁸³Memo, Brig Gen R. W. Bliss for CG, ASF, 5 Jun 44, sub: Requirementsfor Dental Corps officers. SG: 322.053-1.
⁸⁴Memo, Maj Gen M. G. White for CG, ASF, 18 Jul 44, sub: ASTPdental program. Quoted in semiannual report, Pers Serv, SGO, 1 Jul-31 Dec44. HD: 319.1-2.

through the discharge of surplus, overage officers or by the reclassificationof the inefficient. The effectiveness of this step was largely nullified,however, by the fact that the dental ASTP would graduate its last studentin April 1945, in contrast to the medical ASTP which would continue toprovide replacements until January 1948. No authority was given at thistime to commission graduates holding Medical Administrative Corps Reservecommissions or dentists who might be inducted, though the latter couldbe discharged under existing regulations.⁸⁵On 28 August 1944The Surgeon General was further advised that some 300 senior students holdingMedical Administrative Corps Reserve commissions could be placed on activeduty on graduation.⁸⁶

Peak strength of the Dental Corps was reached in November 1944, when15,292 officers were on duty.⁸⁷At the end of 1944 there were15,110 dental officers in the service.⁸⁸ Only 1,418 dentistshad been commissioned during the year, as follows:⁸⁹

Graduates of the dental ASTP	997
Graduates with Reserve MAC commissions	94
Civilians (other than inductees)	324
Dentists inducted as enlisted men	3

From 1 August through 31 December, 503 officers had been discharged,mainly to create vacancies for younger men, and at the end of the year212 still awaited separation under previous commitments.⁹⁰

By 1945 the dental procurement picture was beginning to change. TheDental Corps remained at just a little under. authorized maximum strength,but the only prospective replacements were the 218 senior ASTP studentswho were to graduate in April and 180 students holding Reserve MedicalAdministrative Corps commissions, many of whom might be rejected for physicaldefects. Nine hundred former ASTP students would graduate after April,but they had been unconditionally released by the Army in June 1944 andthe Military Personnel Division of the SGO was very doubtful if G-1 couldbe "sold" on any new procurement program from civilian life.⁹¹

Early in February 1945 a, dental officer with the Military PersonnelDivision, SGO, noted the possibility of a later shortage of dentists, andthat office warned the Director of the Dental Division that future procurementwas pre-

⁸⁵AR 615-360, 25 May 44.
⁸⁶Ltr, Maj F. E. Golembieski to SG, 28 Aug 44, sub: Appointmentof inactive Medical Administrative Corps dental graduates. Quoted in semiannualreport, Pers Serv, SGO, 1 Jul-31 Dec 44, Incl 10. HD: 319.1-2.
⁸⁷Memo, Mr. Isaac Cogan for Chief, Dental Cons Div, SGO, 8 Oct46, sub: Basic data for Dental Corps. SG: 322.0531. The figure given includesofficers with the Veterans Administration, traveling, or sick. It doesnot include officers on terminal leave, officers enroute home for discharge,or officers sick in hospital, not expected to return to duty.
⁸⁸Data from Resources Anal Div, SGO. [D]
⁸⁹Annual Report, Pers Oprs Br, Pers Serv SGO, 1944. HD:319.1-2.
⁹⁰Memo, Maj Ernest J. Fedor for Chief, Procmt Br, Pers ServSGO, 17 Jan 45, sub: Dental Corps active duty strength. HD: 314.
⁹¹Ibid.

carious and that conservation of dental officers would be necessary.⁹²More revealing was a note attached to this correspondence, in which theDirector of the Military Personnel Division recommended to his own personnelthat "we slow down on the Release and Separation Board in the MilitaryPersonnel Division; take no more (dentists) in nor request any new procurementobjective; let attrition go below the ceiling and gamble on redeploymentand partial demobilization overtaking us." Apparently it was believedat this time that most procurement troubles would be over with the expectedend of hostilities, and if dental officers were required for the postwarperiod they could be obtained through Selective Service. The possibilitythat demobilization might actually result in a temporary increase in thedemand for dental treatment had been mentioned as early as June 1944, butit seems not to have been considered too seriously.⁹³

When the war ended in Europe the Dental Corps numbered 14,700 officers,providing an overall ratio of 1.8 dentists for each 1,000 troops, or 2.6per 1,000 in the United States and 1.3 per 1,000 overseas.⁹⁴

Soon after V-E Day The Adjutant General suggested a review of the procurementobjectives for dental officers to determine if they might not be reducedin view of changed conditions. In reply The Surgeon General noted thatprevious sources of replacements were rapidly drying up and he asked that:⁹⁵

1. Present authority to commission Medical AdministrativeReserve Corps graduates, applying only to those who had been enrolled inthe senior class as of 1 July 1944, be extended throughout 1945.
2. Authority be granted to commission any dentist inducted as an enlistedman, rather than discharge him under current instructions.

It was not expected that these measures would suffice to maintain theexisting strength of the Dental Corps, but it was believed that they wouldenable the Dental Service to meet the lessened demand for treatment whichmight accompany a decrease in the total strength of the Army. No actionwas taken on this request. By July 1945 The Surgeon General anticipateda shortage of 475 dental officers by the end of the year, and he recommendedthat the Dental Corps be maintained at 15,000 officers (exclusive of thosewith the Veterans Administration) until March 1946. He further advisedthat 805 new dental officers be obtained, as follows:⁹⁶

Students holding MAC commissions	70
Inducted dentists	35
Former ASTP students	700

⁹²Memo, Lt Col Durward G. Hall for Maj GenR. H. Mills, 8 Feb 45, sub: Dental Corps officers. SG: 322.0531.
⁹³See footnote 83, p. 58.
⁹⁴See footnote 87, p. 59.
⁹⁵Memo, SG for AG, Appointment and Induction Br, AppointmentSec, 4 Jun 45, sub: Procurement objective for appointment in the Army ofthe United States. AG: 210.1 (G-1).
⁹⁶Memo, Brig Gen R. W. Bliss for ACofS, G-1, 6 Jul 45, sub:Ceiling and procurement objective for Dental Corps officers. HD: 314.

On 18 July the General Staff approved these recommendations.⁹⁷It must, be noted, however, that the Army had no hold on former ASTP studentswho did not choose to volunteer, and instructions to the service commandsactually specified that no persuasion would be used in recruiting fromthat category. Nor were applications from civilian dentists, other thanformer ASTP students, to be accepted.⁹⁸ This limited, largelyvoluntary program produced very little result.

Soon after the collapse of Japan all procurement of officers was stoppedby a blanket order issued by The Adjutant General.⁹⁹ By thistime the Dental Corps was down to 13,600 men, and on 20 September the DeputySurgeon General requested that the commissioning of MAC students be resumedto permit the earlier discharge of older dentists. This time no mentionwas made of procuring former ASTP students then in civilian status.¹⁰⁰This request of the Deputy Surgeon General was approved about a month later,but it could have little effect in any event since there were only 173MAC students remaining in the schools, and rejections for physical disabilitywere high because a large proportion of the physically fit had given uptheir Reserve status to enter the ASTP.¹⁰¹ By the end of theyear the strength of the Dental Corps was down to 9,600 men.¹⁰²Serious personnel difficulties were still not anticipated in this periodas evidenced by General Mills` statement in October that, even though dentistswere being discharged in connection with the reduction of the Army, nomajor procurement program was being considered.¹⁰³

With the sudden end of the war, pressure for the release of veteranMedical Department officers mounted rapidly, to a point where a congressionalinvestigation was threatened. In particular, the Office of The SurgeonGeneral was flooded with letters protesting the fact that men with severalyears of service were being held in the Army while students who had beengiven deferment and whose education had been partially paid for by theGovernment were being released to private practice.¹⁰⁴ Nevertheless,it was found necessary to maintain considerable forces to meet unexpectedpostwar responsibilities.

Information on the total number of dentists to serve with the Army DentalCorps during the war is not completely reliable. The Strength Account-

⁹⁷Ltr, TAG to SG, 18 Jul 45, sub: Ceiling andprocurement objective for Dental Corps officers. AG: 210.1 (G-1).
⁹⁸Ltr, CG, ASF, to CG, 1st SvC, 25 Jul 45, sub: Procurementof dental officers. AG : 210.1.
⁹⁹Ltr, TAG to all agencies having procurement objectives, 2Sep 45, sub: Cancellation of procurement objectives. AG: 210.1.
¹⁰⁰Ltr, Maj Gen Geo. F. Lull to ACofS, G-1, 20 Sep 45, sub:Waiver of procurement objectives for appointment as second lieutenantsMAC-AUS (students, interns) as first lieutenants, Medical and Dental Corps,AUS. AG: 210.1.
¹⁰¹Ltr, TAG to SG, 13 Oct 45, sub: Appointments of second lieutenants,MAC-AUS, as first lieutenants, Medical and/or Dental Corps, AUS. AG: 210.1.
¹⁰²See footnote 88, p. 59.
¹⁰³Ltr, Maj Gen R. H. Mills to Capt D. E. Cooper, 26 Oct 45,no sub. SG:210.8.
¹⁰⁴Nearly the whole of SGO file 322.0531 for the year 1946 istaken up with complaints against the release of former Dental ASTP students.

ing Branch, AGO, reported that 16,775 dentists were called to activeduty from 1 January 1939 through 28 February 1946.¹⁰⁵ for atotal of about 17,100 men, including Regular Army and Reserve personnelalready serving at the start of the war. The Resources Analysis Division,SGO, however, estimated that about 18,000 dentists were on duty betweenOctober 1940 and the end of 1945.¹⁰⁶

SOURCES AND METHODS OF PROCUREMENT FOR DENTAL OFFICERS,
WORLD WAR II

General Considerations

On V-E Day the Army Dental Corps was made up of the following categories:¹⁰⁷¹⁰⁸

Component	Number of Officers	Percentage of total strength
Regular Army	266	1.7
National Guard	117	0.8
Organized Reserve	3,106	20.3
AUS (ASTP Graduates)	1,802	11.8
AUS (from civil life)	10,011	65.4

Regular Army

Since Regular Army dental officers were chosen in highly competitiveexaminations and received thorough training they were generally well qualifiedin the broad aspects of their profession. A few of the 250 Regular Armydental officers were unfitted for higher administrative duties by temperamentalor other defects, but the majority were well trained in that field (seechapter IV) and they filled key positions with credit to themselves andthe service. Prewar clinical training, however, had not encouraged thedevelopment of skilled specialists. In an era when a high proportion ofposts was small, the average Army dentist had to be able to handle a caseof periodontoclasia, treat a fractured mandible, construct a denture, orsupervise a station laboratory, and emphasis was placed on all-round abilityrather than on qualification in a single narrow field. Few dental officershad been able to limit their practices to one branch of dentistry. Withthe exception of certain outstanding individuals, therefore, the DentalService had to rely heavily on Reserve officers or former civilians toprovide the more complicated types of treatment.

The Regular Army Dental Corps was also unbalanced in respect to ageand experience. Of the 269 officers on duty in April 1942, nearly 100 hadbeen

¹⁰⁵See footnote 32, p. 48.
¹⁰⁶Memo, Mr. Isaac Cogan for Dir, Dental Div, 29 Aug 46, sub:Dental Corps officers, historical data. SG: 322.053-1.
¹⁰⁷Ibid.
¹⁰⁸The total given here, 15,302, is slightly higher than thenumber actually on duty on V-E Day as it includes a few officers who hadbeen released but whose discharge had not yet been reported. For otherdata on race, age, and clinical qualifications see chapter IV.

in the service for 24 years or longer; another 100 had approximately5 years or less of active duty, leaving only about 70 men with from 6 to23 years of service. One hundred and two dental officers were in the gradesof colonel or lieutenant colonel, 146 were in grades of captain or lieutenant,and only 21 officers were in the grade of major, where maximum physicalvigor was combined with at least 12 years of experience.¹⁰⁹This situation was unavoidable since it bad originated in the rapid expansionof the Dental Service during and immediately following the First WorldWar, and it would be corrected by natural attrition over a period of years.

At best, the Regular Army Dental Corps provided only about 11/2 percentof the 17,000 to 18,000 dentists who were on duty with the land forcesat some time during the war.

National Guard

The 250 dental officers in the National Guard at the start of the warprovided a nucleus of personnel who had had some service with their unitsin the field and who were available on very short notice. New commissionsin the National Guard brought the total taken on active duty from thatsource to 311 officers,¹¹⁰but like the Regular Army, the Guardwas too small to provide a significant part of the total treatment requiredin a major mobilization. In general, the training and efficiency of NationalGuard dentists was comparable to that of Reserve officers, with the differencethat they had generally had the benefit of slightly more practical experience.

The Organized Reserves

On 6 September 1938, 5,197 officers were enrolled in the Dental Reserve,a figure exceeding the authorized total by 97 officers. At that time itwas expected that 5,100 Reserve dentists, plus about 500 Regular Army andNational Guard officers, would be sufficient for the force of about 4 millionmen which might be mobilized in an emergency. So little concern was feltover dental procurement that the granting of new Reserve commissions wasimmediately stopped,¹¹¹ and it was not resumed for more thantwo years.¹¹² During this period the Dental Reserve lost 771officers, and 30 June 1941 it was down to a strength of 4,428 men, distributedin the following grades:¹¹³

Colonel	7
Lieutenant colonel	96
Major	354
Captain	909
Lieutenant	3,062

¹⁰⁹Army Directory for 20 April 1942.
¹¹⁰See footnote 49, p. 53.
¹¹¹See footnote 36, p. 51.
¹¹²See footnote 45, p. 52.
¹¹³See footnote 42, p. 52.

Prior to the start of hostilities in Europe a negligible number of DentalReserve officers had been on active duty with the Civilian ConservationCorps. A few more had been taken on duty in connection with increases inthe Air Force and for reinforcement of the defenses of Panama. Thus, on30 June 1940, 101 Reserve dentists were on voluntary active service.¹¹⁴

On 18 November 1940, maximum age limits for initial active duty withthe Reserve were established as follows:¹¹⁵

1. For troop duty, not more than five years above maximum prescribedfor initial appointment in the grade held.

2. For duty other than with troops:

Colonel	60 years
Lieutenant colonel	58 years
Major	54 years
Captain	50 years
Lieutenant	47 years

On 19 February 1941 it was directed that Reserve officers would be assignedon the same basis as Regular Army officers, with no restrictions on thepositions they might fill.¹¹⁶

At the end of June 1941, there were 2,090 Reserve and National Guarddental officers on active duty.¹¹⁷ By the end of the year thenumber had reached about 2,900.¹¹⁸On 7 November 1941 it wasdirected that, with a few exceptions, dentists taken on active duty directlyfrom civilian life would thereafter be commissioned in the Army of theUnited States, which was the temporary emergency force, rather than inthe permanent Reserve.¹¹⁹On 15 April 1942, when about 3,220Reserve and National Guard dental officers had been called,¹²⁰The Surgeon General reported that the Medical Department Reserve was nearlyexhausted, so far as physically fit officers in usable grades were concerned,and that emphasis would thereafter have to be directed toward the procurementof civilians with no previous military training.

From 1 January 1939 through February 1946 a total of 3,606 Dental Reserveofficers were called to active duty.¹²¹ However, it cannot bestated what proportion of the 4,428 dental reservists listed on 30 Julie1941 saw active

¹¹⁴Ibid.
¹¹⁵Ltr, TAG to CGs Hawaiian, Panama Canal, Philippine, and PuertoRican Depts; each Chief of Arm and Service; and each CA Comdr, 18 Nov 40,sub: Reserve officers, resident in overseas departments, for extended activeduty under Public Resolution 96, 76th Congress. AG: 210.31-1.
¹¹⁶Ltr, TAG to all Comdrs of CAs and Depts, each Chief of Armand Service, and CGs 1st, 2d, 3d, and 4th armies, 19 Feb 41, sub : Administrativestatus of Reserve officers on extended active duty. AG: 210.31 ORC.
¹¹⁷See footnote 42, p. 52.
¹¹⁸See footnote 55, p. 53.
¹¹⁹Ltr, TAG to CGs of all armies, CAs, and Depts, Chiefs ofArms and Services, and chiefs of other sections of the WD Overhead, 7 Nov41, sub: Policies relating to appointments in the Army of the United Statesunder the provisions of PL 252, 77th Congress. AG:210.1.
¹²⁰Ltr, Lt Col John A. Rogers, SGO (no addressee indicated),23 Apr 42, sub: Appointment in the Army of the United States (Medical Department).SG: 320.2-1.
¹²¹See footnote 49, p. 53.

duty, because additional commissions were granted between that dateand 7 November 1941 when new commissions in the Reserve were discontinued.It seems probable that the figure was close to 75 percent.

Before Selective Service and PAS could be established the Reserve suppliedtrained dental officers when they were immediately needed. In general,these officers performed their duties creditably. Their training had notalways been sufficient, however, to enable them to fill the more criticalpositions, and the classification of Reserve officers had not been accurateenough to permit assignment of specially qualified individuals to appropriatefunctions. Above all, the wartime experiences of many Reserve officersled them to doubt the advantages of belonging to that organization. Priorto the war the principal inducements for entering the Reserve, besidespatriotism, had been (1) assurance that the dentist would serve in thefield for which he was trained, and (2) the prospect that in time of emergencythe superior training of the Reserve officer would put him in a favorableposition for promotion and assignment. Events showed that there was littledanger that any dentist would have to serve in enlisted status, and theReserve dentist in the grade of captain or lieutenant seemed to have littlemore chance for promotion than the dentist called directly from civil life.As previous incentives for accepting Reserve commissions diminished inimportance it seemed probable that postwar procurement for that organizationwould have to be stimulated by financial remuneration in the form of payfor the time expended or as retirement privileges.

Interviews with senior dental officers have brought out the followingcomments concerning the effectiveness of the Dental Reserve Corps:¹²²¹²³

1. The patriotism, zeal, and professional qualifications of the averageReserve dentist were above criticism.

2. The Dental Reserve supplied essential officers during the most criticalperiod of the mobilization for war, before the Selective Service Systemwas in effective operation. Officers were obtained in a more orderly waythrough the Reserve than would have been possible through Selective Service,at least until the establishment of the PAS.

3. Reserve officers in the lower grades were able to assume their militaryduties immediately, with little or no additional training. Some, thoughnot all, of the senior officers successfully filled key positions whenthe Dental Service was filled out with former civilians with no previousexperience.

4. Some senior officers of the Reserve were found to lack the experienceand training required in important positions, and since routine chair workwas not appropriate for their high grades their proper assignment was extremelydifficult. This was not necessarily the fault of the officer himself sincehe had usually fulfilled the requirements for promotion to the field grades,but sporadic

¹²²Final Report of The Surgeon General, MedicalDepartment Personnel, included in ASF report on Logistics in World WarII, 1945. HD 319.1-2.
¹²³See footnote 21, p. 44.

correspondence courses and occasional 2-week periods of active dutywere simply not sufficient preparation for major administrative dutieswhich bore little resemblance to the officer`s peacetime activities. Insome aggravated cases senior officers of the Reserve had actually givenup the practice of their profession years before and were engaged in otheroccupations. When such men were called upon to instruct juniors or to operatelarger installations, the Dental Service inevitably suffered.

5. Prior to the war, classification of Reserve officers was defectiveand little accurate information was available concerning their true qualifications.As a result, most Reserve dentists were immediately assigned to tacticalcommands where it was believed they could be most useful, and many clinicalexperts were lost to professional centers where they were badly needed.The men themselves were discouraged when their special skills were notemployed.

6. In the year of the "phony" war, before Pearl Harbor hademphasized the national danger, Reserve officers were called from theirhomes and practices to staff the clinics of an Army assembled primarilyfor training purposes. Meanwhile, their competitors enjoyed the "boom."Under these conditions some Reserve officers felt that they had been calledupon to make uncalled-for sacrifices for their patriotism. If they hadbeen encouraged by the thought that they would get quicker promotion inthe coming expansion, their disappointment was even more acute, when someof these same competitors demanded, and received, higher grades as theprice of volunteering for active duty, while the Reserve officer remainedassigned to a tactical unit where promotion was stagnated. (This complaintwas more frequent in the Medical Corps than in the Dental Corps, wherefew initial appointments were given above the grade of captain.) Also,the very fact that a Reserve officer had some training in military mattersoften led to his assignment to a tactical organization, where opportunitiesfor the practice of his profession were poorest, while the man withoutmilitary experience was sent to a hospital where he maintained or improvedhis skill and where he lived under much m ore pleasant conditions. Finally,when it was announced in 1944 that ASTP graduates would be released toprivate practice, while Reserve officers with 3 years or more of servicewould be kept in the Army, criticism from Dental Reserve officers reacheda new peak, though the Office of The Surgeon General was in no way responsiblefor that decision. The experiences of some of these officers led them toadvise young graduates to stay out of the Reserve and take their chanceson induction 9 especially since there was little probability that theywould have to serve as enlisted men in any event.¹²⁴

World War II experience also indicated the need for more comprehensivetraining and more practical experience for Dental Reserve officers in thehigher grades.

¹²⁴Personal Ltr, Dr. Charles W. Freeman, Dean,Northwestern University Dental School, to Maj Maurice E. Washburn, 21 May46. SG: 322.0531.

ASTP, Medical Administrative Corps Reserve,
Enlisted Reserve

The procurement of some 1,900 dental officers through the ASTP, andof approximately 1,200 through the MAC and Enlisted Reserves, is discussedin Chapter IV. These men were generally recent graduates who entered theservice in the lowest grade, directly from school. They were already obligatedto render military service, and had not been engaged in essential civilianpractice, so their procurement offered no special problems.

Selective Service and Dental Procurement

It has been pointed out that until the spring of 1942 the, Dental Servicewas expanded mainly with officers from the Reserve and National Guard.The Surgeon General was able to pass on every application for these branches,to insure compliance with professional, moral, and ethical standards, andthe number taken from civil practice did not constitute a serious threatto civilian dental care. As these sources approached exhaustion, however,and as prospective requirements loomed larger, emphasis was switched tothe procurement of dentists engaged in private practice who lacked previousconnection with the Armed Forces. By V-E Day nearly two-thirds of the DentalCorps consisted of men taken directly from Civil life.¹²⁵ Asit became necessary to dip deeper into the reservoir of civilian practitionersThe Surgeon General had to rely on other agencies to assist in locatingeligible men, determining if they could be spared from their communities,and inducing them to accept active duty.

The first official, nonmilitary agency to enter the dental procurementfield was the Selective Service System. As the only authority which couldorder an individual into the Armed Forces, this organization had greatpotential importance for the Dental Service, but for some time after itwas established late in 1940 its activities proved more embarrassing thanhelpful, for the following reasons:

1. The Selective Service law provided for the deferment of persons essentialto the national health or welfare, but blanket deferment on an occupationalbasis was specifically prohibited. the responsibility for determining whichindividuals were actually indispensable rested mainly on the local draftboards. Neither the heads of the Selective Service System nor the membersof local boards were at first seriously concerned over the possibilitythat a shortage of dental personnel might develop, and the latter did nothesitate to induct dentists who were not at the moment urgently essentialin their communities. On the other hand, the ADA and The Surgeon Generalbelieved that the dental personnel situation was cause for alarm, and thatserious difficulties could be avoided only if every dentist were employedaccording to his skills.¹²⁶

¹²⁵See footnote 106, p. 62.
¹²⁶Memo, Brig Gen Albert G. Love for ACofS, G-1, 25 Mar 41.HD:314.

Since there were very few vacancies in the Dental Reserve, it appearedthat dentists inducted into the Army would have to serve as enlisted menin duties which could be performed equally well by less highly trainedpersonnel. The Surgeon General warned the War Department that it wouldbe the, target of widespread criticism from the profession and from civiliancommunities if the services of badly needed dentists were wasted in relativelyminor activities.

2. Selective Service boards were not technically qualified to pass onquestions of professional qualifications or ethics, nor were they greatlyconcerned with such matters. They therefore tended to induct dentists whocould not have been commissioned by the Army, even if vacancies had existed.In some instances, in fact, the boards apparently selected for inductionthose dentists who were considered least valuable to the, community, andsuch men were likely to be of doubtful value to the services as well.¹²⁷

The Surgeon General was powerless to prevent the induction of dentistsby Selective Service, but he attempted, unsuccessfully at first, to providefor the commissioning of qualified inductees in the Dental Corps. On thesame day that the Selective Service System was established The SurgeonGeneral reminded The Adjutant General that commissions in the Medical DepartmentReserve had been suspended since December 1939¹²⁸ and that professionalpersonnel who would later be in short supply would probably be inductedas enlisted men. He recommended that commissions be offered any inductedphysi-cian, dentist, or veterinarian, and those who faced imminent induction.¹²⁹A notation on this letter states that it was "returned informally,"apparently without action. Substantially the same request was repeatedon 26 October 1940,¹³⁰ and on 29 October the corps areas wereauthorized to resume commissioning Medical Department personnel to fillactual vacancies.¹³¹ Dental vacancies were practically nonexistentat this time, however, so this directive had little effect so far as theDental Corps was concerned. In November 1940 The Surgeon General askedthe corps areas to save the few available dental vacancies for men whomight be inducted,¹³² but even this slight gain was short-livedsince the granting of new commissions was again suspended on 8 December1940.¹³³ Procurement to fill vacancies in the Medical Departmentwas again resumed on 19 December¹³⁴ but The Surgeon Generalagain reported that there

¹²⁷Interv by the author with Maj Gen R. H.Mills (6 Oct 47) and Maj Ernest J. Fedor (24 Nov 47).
¹²⁸Commissions in the Dental Reserve had actually been suspendedsince September 1938.
¹²⁹Ltr, Col Larry B. McAfee to TAG, 16 Sep 40, sub: Appointmentin the Medical, Dental, and Veterinary Corps Reserve. [D]
¹³⁰See footnote 44, p. 52.
¹³¹See footnote 45, p. 52.
¹³²The original radiogram from The Surgeon General has not beenfound. It is mentioned in "Preparedness and War Activities of theAmerican Dental Association: A resume" J. Am. Dent. A. 33: 80, 1 Jan46.
¹³³Ltr, TAG to CA and Dept Comdrs, 8 Dec 40, sub: Suspensionof Appointments in the Officers` Reserve Corps. [D]
¹³⁴Ltr, TAG to each CA and Dept Comdr, and SG, 19 Dec 40, sub:Appointments in the Medical Department Reserve. [D]

were almost no vacancies in the Dental Corps.¹³⁵ A noticein the Journal of the American Dental Association for December 1940, thatany inducted dentist could apply for a commission, proved premature.¹³⁶On 22 January 1941 the Chief of the Dental Division again recommended thatphysicians, dentists, and veterinarians who received low call numbers,or who were inducted, should be offered commissions¹³⁷ but noaction was taken at this time.

Meanwhile, other interests had become involved in the matter. Two daysafter Selective Service was inaugurated Senator James E. Murray introduceda bill providing that any licensed physician or dentist who met establishedmental and physical standards should be commissioned in lieu of induction.¹³⁸This measure also provided for the deferment of medical and dental students,interns, and residents. At first it was reported that the Army was notopposed to this bill,¹³⁹ but on 16 December 1940, the War Departmentformally registered its disapproval, based on the following considerations:

1. It was felt that rigid regulations favorable to any one branch werenot justified. If all Medical Department personnel were given commissionson induction, engineers, lawyers, and other groups would feel entitledto the same treatment.

2. It was believed that deferment of persons actually essential to thepreservation of the nation`s health could be accomplished without legislationand that mandatory legislation would handicap the administration of SelectiveService.¹⁴⁰ No final action was taken on this measure beforethe end of the congressional session, and substantially the same bill wasreintroduced on 6 January 1941.¹⁴¹ Before hearings could beheld, however, an amended version was introduced which provided not onlyfor the commissioning of inducted dentists and the deferment of students,but for the deferment of teachers in medical and dental schools.¹⁴²Hearings were held on this bill from 18 to 20 March 1941¹⁴³and the Army again opposed passage, adding as another reason the fact thatit did not wish to be placed in the position of having to commission anyphysician or dentist who might be inducted, regardless of his professional,ethical, or

¹³⁵1st ind, SG, 20 Jan 41, to ltr from Lt ColT. W. Wren to CG, 8th CA, sub: Application for appointment in the DentalCorps Reserve. [D]
¹³⁶Fairbank, L. C. : Dentistry in mobilization. J. Am. Dent.A. 27: 1972, Dec 1940.
¹³⁷Memo, Brig Gen Leigh C. Fairbank for Brig Gen William E.Shedd, 22 Jan 41, sub: Reserve commissions for physicians, dentists, andveterinarians subject to induction Into the military service. HD: 314.
¹³⁸S. 4396, 76th Cong., introduced 18 Sep 40.
¹³⁹Committee on Legislation. J. Am. Dent. A. 28: 989-990, Jun1941.
¹⁴⁰Ltr, SecWar (Henry L. Stimson) to Hon Morris Sheppard, Chairman,Sen Committee on Mil Affairs, 16 Dec 40. Quoted in "Report of HearingsBefore the Committee on Military Affairs, United States Senate, 77th Congress,on S. 783, 18-20 Mar 41." Washington, Government Printing Office,1941, p. 144.
¹⁴¹197, 77th Cong., introduced 6 Jan 41.
¹⁴²S. 783, 77th Cong., introduced 6 Feb 41.
¹⁴³Report of Hearings before the Committee on Military Affairs,United States Senate, 77th Congress,on S.783,18-20 Mar 4l. Washington,Government Printing Office, 1941.

moral status.¹⁴⁴ Since both medical and dental officers testifiedagainst the measure it must be assumed that in spite of his repeated attemptsto get authority to commission inducted dentists The Surgeon General wasalso opposed to the Murray bill, probably because it left him Do chanceto reject the few men who were undesirable because they had graduated fromsubstandard schools or because they had engaged in unethical practice.The combined opposition of the War Department and of Selective Serviceblocked the passage of this legislation.

Meanwhile, as The Surgeon General had foreseen, the War Department wasflooded with protests from congressmen, civilian communities, and the profession,at the wasteful use of physicians and dentists as enlisted soldiers. SinceThe Surgeon General was in agreement with these complaints, and had beenprevented from taking corrective action by higher authority, he washedhis hands of the whole matter and referred all protests to The AdjutantGeneral as "pertaining to your office." In January 1941 the Chairmanof the Military Preparedness Committee of the ADA discussed this questionwith Senator Claude Pepper, and the latter directed a letter of inquiryto the Secretary of War. When this communication was referred to The SurgeonGeneral, he submitted an analysis of probable needs showing that the Reservewould be depleted by June 1942, and again proposed that procurement forthe Dental Reserve be resumed.¹⁴⁵ However, when the ADA in February1941, recommended an increase in the Dental Reserve Corps from 5,100 officersto 8,000 officers, The Surgeon General opposed such action. It was statedlater that he felt that this number of men could not be used, and to enrollofficers in the Reserve, beyond the number which would be called to activeduty, was equivalent to granting occupational deferment, which was a prerogativeof Selective Service.^{146 147} It must be kept in mind that atthis time the country was still nearly a year away from active participationin the war.

As a result of the recommendations of The Surgeon General, the numerousprotests received, and the threat of legislative action if existing policieswere not changed, the War Department finally, on 5 May 1941, authorizedthe granting of a commission to any inducted dentist who was found to bequalified¹⁴⁸ Senator Murray stated that his bill had forcedconsideration of the problem, and this was implied, if not admitted, inGeneral Fairbank`s state-ment that the action of 5 May had "followedparticipation of Army representatives in hearings on the Murray bill."¹⁴⁹

¹⁴⁴Ibid.
¹⁴⁵2d ind, SG to TAG, 18 Feb 41, on ltr, SecWar to TAG, 27 Jan41. SG: 080 (ADA).
¹⁴⁶See footnote 50, p. 53.
¹⁴⁷Camalier, C. W. : Preparedness and war activities of theAmerican Dental Association : A resume. J. Am. Dent. A. 33:80, 1 Jan 46.
¹⁴⁸See footnote 48, p. 53.
¹⁴⁹Memo, Brig Gen Leigh C. Fairbank for SG, 25 Feb 42, sub:Procurement of dentists for military service. HD: 314.

The action of the Army in making it possible to offer commissions toinducted dentists solved only half of the problem, however. It still didnot prevent the more or less indiscriminate conscription of men who werenot immediately needed or wanted by the Armed Forces or who were in essentialcivilian positions. By the spring of 1941 Selective Service itself wasbeginning to show some alarm over the professional personnel situation,and on 22 April it cautioned the local boards that a shortage of dentistsmight impend.¹⁵⁰ This tentative warning was confirmed on 30April.¹⁵¹ Local boards were then reminded that (1) they stillhad full responsibility for determining if a dentist was indispensablein his own community, (2) the Army did not need dentists for the time being,and (3) if a board felt that a dentist should be inducted anyway he shouldbe notified that he might apply for a commission as soon as he enteredactive duty. This directive had the effect of discouraging the draft ofdentists, though it did not categorically prohibit such action.

In January 1942 Selective Service advised its boards that it was essentialthat all dentists be used where their services would do the most good,and it directed that the recently formed PAS, WMC, be consulted in determiningessentiality.¹⁵² This regulation was obviously not intendedto confer blanket exemption on dentists, however, since the boards werenotified at the same time that when dependency was the only cause for defermentit should be kept in mind that the salary of a commissioned officer wasnormally sufficient for the support of a family. In February 1942 the Directorof the Dental Division reported that dentists were still being inducted,and he recommended that Selective Service modify its regulations to preventthe conscription of Medical Department personnel except with the adviceand consent of the PAS.¹⁵³ No formal action was taken on thisrequest, but within 2 months the ADA reported that Selective Service boardswere generally deferring dentists, at least until the PAS could be placedin full operation.¹⁵⁴ In December 1942 Selective Service againadvised the local boards to give careful consideration to the occupationaldeferment of dentists,¹⁵⁵ and the conscription of professionalpersonnel was thereafter a very minor problem, though it did not ceaseentirely.

¹⁵⁰Memo, Dir, Selective Service System, forall State Directors, No. I-62, 22 Apr 41, sub: Occupational deferment ofstudents and other necessary men in certain specialized professional fields(III). On file Natl Hq Selective Service System.
¹⁵¹Telegram, Dir, Selective Service System, to all State Directors,30 Apr 41. On file Natl Hq Selective Service System.
¹⁵²Memo, Dir, Selective Service, for all State Directors (I-363),28 Jan 42, sub: Occupational deferments of medical doctors, dentists, anddoctors of veterinary medicine. In Memoranda to all State Directors1940-43. Washington, Government Printing Office, 1945.
¹⁵³ See footnote 149, p. 70.
¹⁵⁴The procurement and assignment service for physicians, dentists,and veterinarians. J. Am. Dent. A. 29: 653, Apr 1942.
¹⁵⁵Selective Service Occupational Bulletin No. 41, 14 Dec 42,sub: Doctors, dentists, veterinarians, and osteopaths. In OccupationalBulletins 1-44, and Activity and Occupation Bulletin 1-35. Washington,Government Printing Office, 1944.

As noted above, during the first years of the war Selective Servicewas most often blamed for inducting professional personnel who were notwanted by the Armed Forces. During this period the War Department, WMC,and the professions tended to deprecate the activities of Selective Servicein mobilizing physicians, dentists, and veterinarians as an indiscriminatethreat to essential civilian medical care and to the economic use of scarcepersonnel, and late in 1941 all of these agencies approved the formationof PAS, WMC (to be discussed later in this chapter), as an organizationwhich was expected to supplant Selective Service in this field. Thoughliaison between PAS and Selective Service was imperfect at first, the systemwas functioning by the end of 1942, at least to the extent that SelectiveService boards were inducting very few physicians or dentists who had notbeen cleared by PAS.

Unfortunately, a serious weakness was revealed in this program earlyin 1943 when voluntary procurement for the Medical Department began tolag. Fifty percent of all physicians and 17 percent of all dentists declared"available" by PAS refused to accept commissions, and the MedicalCorps, in particular, faced a critical and mounting shortage of personnel.¹⁵⁶¹⁵⁷ But when the War Department and PAS decided that the time hadcome for Selective Service to exercise its powers,¹⁵⁸ thosepowers were found to be inadequate, at least under existing policies. Amongthe reasons for, this situation, the following were most important:

1. While Selective Service had been criticized for inducting professionalpersonnel, it had done so only under the same policies that applied toany other category, according to a priority based mainly on age, physicalcondition, and absence of family responsibilities. It was a fundamentalprinciple of Selective Service that every man should be considered formilitary service on the basis of such impersonal factors, and boards werenow as reluctant to induct an individual merely because he happened tobe a physician or dentist as they had been to exempt him for the same reasonearlier in the war. But the supply of young professional men with few dependentswas small. Because of the long period of training required, medical personneltended to be older than their contemporaries in industry; because theyenjoyed a good income and constituted a stable element in the communitythey tended to acquire families soon after entering practice. It was nowfound that in spite of earlier complaints the majority of physicians, dentists,and veterinarians were immune to induction under current criteria.

PAS protested that from 70 to 80 percent of all recalcitrants were notsubject to induction because of age or dependency.¹⁵⁹ One statedirector reported

¹⁵⁶See footnote 52, p. 53.
¹⁵⁷Another author has declared that 26 percent of 7,259 dentistsdeclared available by PAS refused to accept commissions. See StateOfficers` Conference. J. Am. Dent. A. 31: 1574-1576, 15 Nov 44.
¹⁵⁸Rpt of Conference between Col Harley L. Swift, Off Dir MilPers, ASF, and representatives of PAS, 20 Mar 43. Off file Mil Pers Div,SGO, PAS file.
¹⁵⁹Minutes of Meeting, Directing Board, PAS, 31 Jul 43. Offfile Mil Pers Div, SGO, PAS file.

that out of 130 physicians declared eligible, only a handful had beeninduced to apply for commissions, and he complained that the remainderwere not at all impressed with the possibility that they might be inductedas enlisted men.¹⁶⁰ Even if he were drafted, the professionalman had little to fear since he would in all probability be offered a commissionwithout delay, and he often preferred to take the slight risk involvedwhen he refused to comply with PAS recommendations. When it was suggestedthat Selective Service take over PAS` functions even The Surgeon Generalwas doubtful that the situation would be improved by such action as longas such a large proportion of professional men were deferable for age ordependency.¹⁶¹

2. Selective Service regulations were generally drawn up on the assumptionthat an inductee would serve as an enlisted man, with an enlisted man`spay and allowances. In determining eligibility for induction these regulationsdid not recognize that the professional man would immediately be commissioned.and enjoy an income adequate to support a family in moderate circumstances.

3. During the first part of the war the Armed Forces, the WMC, and publicofficials had repeatedly warned the Selective Service System that it wastaking professional personnel from communities where they would later beneeded urgently, and that such personnel should not be inducted withoutstrong reason. Now it was becoming clear even to laymen that these, warningshad been well founded, and the growing shortage of physicians and dentistsin his own area made the member of a Selective Service Board extremelyreluctant to approve the induction of additional men in these categories,even at the request of PAS.¹⁶²

The only solution to this problem was for Selective Service to placea call on its local boards for the required number of physicians and dentistson an occupational basis. As noted above, however, this action would havebeen a radical departure from established policies, and as such it wasextremely distasteful to the Selective Service System. Prior to this timeno man had been inducted merely because he happened to be a cook or truckdriver who was critically needed by the Armed Forces, and any modificationof this principle was regarded with apprehension by that agency. But thesituation in respect to professional personnel was not entirely comparableto that of cooks and truck drivers; unlike the latter, physicians and dentistscould not be trained in a few weeks or months in an emergency, and theycould be obtained in large numbers only from civilian life. If the normaloperation of Selective Service failed to produce the number required, moredrastic steps were necessary. In October 1943 the War Department reluctantlymade a formal call on Selective Service for the conscription of 12,000physicians.

¹⁶⁰Ltr, Dr. Creighton Barker to Lt Col DurwardG. Hall, 27 Dec 43. [D]
¹⁶¹See footnote 69, p. 55.
¹⁶²Interv between the author and Maj Ernest J. Fedor, DentalLiaison Off, Mil Pers Div, SGO, 25 Nov 47.

The dental personnel situation, which had always been less criticalthan the medical, was much improved by the summer of 1943, and dentistswere not included in the proposed draft of physicians. In fact, other developmentseventually prevented even the proposed induction of physicians, but notuntil an important precedent had been established; it was finally recognizedby the Armed Forces, PAS, and Selective Service that the latter might haveto undertake the priority induction of specific groups whose special skillswere essential to the national defense if sufficient personnel could notbe procured voluntarily.¹⁶³

From the end of 1942 until May 1946 Selective Service played a smallpart in the procurement of dental officers and very few dentists were inductedas enlisted men. Sixty-one applications for commissions were received fromconscripted dentists during 1943, of whom 46 were accepted.¹⁶⁴Only seven officers were commissioned from the ranks from 1 January 1944through August 1945. Thirty-five applications were rejected in the sameperiod but this figure means little because men who were refused commissionscould, and did, make new applications at frequent intervals; it is probablethat most of the applications received in 1944 and 1945 came from men whohad been rejected for good reasons a year or more before.¹⁶⁵

With the end of hostilities the dental personnel picture began to deteriorateand Selective Service again became a factor in procurement. ASTP had graduatedits last dental student in the spring of 1945. The shortage of civiliandentists was acute, and even recent graduates could count on incomes ofas much as $10,000 yearly in private practice. Above all, effective pressureto volunteer for military service for patriotic reasons was almost eliminated.Yet the Army still had several million men scattered all over the worldwho had to be furnished dental care. Under these circumstances the militaryhad no alternative but to ask for a draft of dentists.¹⁶⁶ Thisdraft shattered all precedents for it was the first and only time duringand immediately following the war that Selective Service asked its boardsto induct men from a specific occupational group.¹⁶⁷ (Very fewdentists were actually drafted in 1946 since the Army took every precautionto insure that men threatened with induction would be offered commissionswith the least possible delay.)¹⁶⁸

Information on the number of dentists who actually served any considerabletime as enlisted men during the war is indefinite. Selective Service re-

¹⁶³This principle was later made the basisfor the draft of dentists in 1946.
¹⁶⁴History of the Army Dental Corps, Personnel, 1940-43, p.41. HD:314.7-2 (Dental).
¹⁶⁵Info compiled by the author from annual procurement summariesreceived from the Mil Pers Div, SGO.
¹⁶⁶Memo, Maj Gen Norman T. Kirk for ACofS, G-1, 17 May 46, sub:Procurement objective for Dental Corps officers. SG: 322.0531.
¹⁶⁷Info given the author by Dr. Matheus Smith, Natl Hq, SelectiveService System, 24 Nov 47.
¹⁶⁸Col (later Brig Gen) James M. Epperly, Dental Div, SGO, estimatedthat only about 4 dentists were inducted by their boards before they couldbe granted commissions. Personal interv with author, 10 Nov 47.

ports that 558 dentists were inducted and that 49 enlisted during thelife of that agency.¹⁶⁹ Army records, on the other hand, indicatethat only 263 inducted dentists and 14 who enlisted voluntarily were commissionedbetween 1 January 1941 and 30 June 1945.¹⁷⁰ A few additionalwere commissioned after 30 June 1945, but the total number of enlisteddentists commissioned by the Army probably did not exceed 300 officers.Since, the Navy did not accept any inducted dentists¹⁷¹ thesefigures, if correct, would indicate that some 300 dental graduates actuallycontinued to serve in enlisted status.

This conclusion is open to question, however, on the following grounds:

1. A few dentists who were inducted against the advice of the Army afterthe middle of 1944 were immediately discharged. In AGO records these menwould be shown to have been discharged as enlisted men, though their periodof service, was extremely short.

2. It is probable that a certain number of laboratory technicians, dentalassistants, or even dental students, were mistakenly listed as "dentists"in Selective Service forms. These men would of course not be eligible forcommissions in the Army.

Col. Louis H. Renfrow, of the Selective Service System, has said that"all but a very few" of the inducted dentists were commissioned.¹⁷²Similarly, Maj. Gen. Robert H. Mills stated that only a handful of inducteddentists were not commissioned.¹⁷³ On the other hand, Maj. ErnestFedor, formerly of the Military Personnel Division, SGO, reported thatthat office received some 100 to 125 applications for commissions whichwere rejected for various reasons, including the following:

1. A few unfortunates were unable to convince a board of line officersthat they possessed the superior intelligence, or met the generally higherstandards, demanded of an officer.

2. Some applicants were refugee dentists of doubtful background andability who had volunteered for military service as an aid to establishingcitizenship.

3. Some dentists held no state licenses, or had not practiced sincegraduation from dental college. Others had abandoned the practice of theirprofession for many years. The Army refused to commission such personnel.

4. Some dentists had been engaged in grossly unethical practice or hadbeen convicted of felonies.

5. A few dentists actually refused commissions because they were inlocations near home which they feared to lose, because they preferred theircurrent

¹⁶⁹Personal ltr, Col Louis H. Renfrow, SelectiveService Natl Hq, to the author, 10 Sep 47. HD: 31.4.
¹⁷⁰Info given the author by Mr. Kirkman J. Rhodes, StrengthAccounting Br, AGO, 8 Sep 47.
¹⁷¹Info given the author by Comdr J. V. Westerman, Bu Med andSurg, USN, 25 Nov 47.
¹⁷²Renfrow, L. H. : Dentistry in the Selective Service System.The Mil. Surgeon 101: 423, Nov 1947.
¹⁷³See footnote 127, p. 68.

duties, or because they felt their opportunities for an early dischargewere better as enlisted men than as officers. The Army could not use theabove categories in its clinics, and it is doubtful if any useful purposewould have been served by releasing most of them to return to civilianlife.

It seems probable that a little over 100 men technically classifiedas dentists served as enlisted men in the Army during the war. On the otherhand, there is every indication that most dentists whose qualificationswere not open to serious question were either offered commissions or discharged.This opinion has been confirmed by the Selective Service System,¹⁷⁴the Dental Division,¹⁷⁵ and organized dentistry.¹⁷⁶

The Procurement and Assignment Service,
War Manpower Commission

The background and activities of the Procurement and Assignment Serviceare covered in detail in Lt. Col. Alfred Mordecai`s "History of theProcurement and Assignment Service for Physicians, Dentists, Veterinarians,Sanitary Engineers, and Nurses, War Manpower Commission."¹⁷⁷

Briefly, PAS was formed in October 1941 as a Division of the Officeof Defense Health and Welfare Services. Its mission was to insure thatscarce medical personnel would be used to the best advantage of all concerned,so that the needs of the Armed Forces and of critical defense areas couldbe met with minimum hardship for the civilian population. In April 1942PAS was transferred to the War Manpower Commission and functioned underthat bureau for the remainder of the war. From the beginning, PAS was operatedin close cooperation with the Armed Forces, USPITS, the civilian professions,and the Selective Service System. At the time of its organization PAS consistedof the following:

1. A central policy board of 5 members (later increased to 8), includingDr. C. Willard Camalier as a representative of the dental profession.

2. Nine advisory subcommittees (later increased to 15) which were concernedwith the various medical branches. At first a single committee on dentistrywas included, but later a separate committee on dental education was added.

3. Nine corps area subcommittees, each consisting of 2 physicians, 1dentist, 1 medical educator, 1 dental educator, 1 veterinarian, and 1 hospitalrepresentative. These corps area, subcommittees were at first expectedto be the principal operating units, but they proved unwieldly and thestate subcommittees eventually assumed most administrative functions.

¹⁷⁴See footnote 172, p. 75.
¹⁷⁵See footnote 127, p. 68.
¹⁷⁶See footnote 147, p. 70.
¹⁷⁷See footnote 52, p. 53.

4. Thirty-nine state subcommittees (some covered more than one state;one state had two committees) consisting of a chairman and subordinatecommittees on medicine, dentistry, veterinary medicine, and, eventually,sanitary engineering and nursing. The chairman of the state dental committeewas nominated by the state dental society and he, in turn, nominated themembers of his committee.

5. County or district subcommittees for each profession, as required.Chairman of these committees were nominated by the district or county dentalsocieties, and in turn they nominated their own assistants. These committeeswere advisory only, and no one but the state chairman could declare a dentistavailable, but as a matter of custom the recommendations of the local chairmenwere accepted in the absence of compelling reasons to the contrary.

6. The Professional and Technical Employment and Training Division ofthe War Manpower Commission. Though a separate agency, this unit assistedPAS by maintaining rosters of medical personnel, with data on special qualifications,if any.

When PAS began to function, early in 1942, it met a definite need inthe procurement picture. As long as most physicians and dentists were obtainedfrom the Reserve, with very few commissions granted to men with no militaryexperience or training, The Surgeon General was able to contact prospectiveofficers, pass on their professional qualifications, and place them onactive duty. Even when larger numbers of dentists had to be procured hewas able to decentralize this function to corps area Medical Officer RecruitingBoards with fair success. But when it became necessary for the Army andNavy to take nearly 30 percent of all the dentists in the United Statesit was essential to insure not only that the Armed Forces got the officersthey required, but that the reasonable needs of the civilian population,especially in critical defense areas, were considered. Selective Servicewas familiar with local conditions but it lacked the technical informationfor such a project, and its efforts to procure medical personnel beforethe inauguration of PAS generally resulted only in increased confusion.Very early in the war the professional societies had attempted to listall professional personnel and record essential data on specialties, andat first they made some effort to induce younger men to volunteer for militaryservice, but many dentists failed to return questionnaires,¹⁷⁸and the men who were "selected" for Army duty by their colleagueswere resentful and inclined to question the justice of the method followed.No matter how impersonal the proceedings, when a society tried to decidewhich of its own members were most eligible, the resulting protests andcharges of favoritism generally made it glad to turn the whole problemover to an impartial, semiofficial agency with no axe to grind.

The PAS agreed to produce the required officers for the Army, adviseSelective Service concerning the availability of medical personnel, andassure

¹⁷⁸Committee on Dental Preparedness, Resumeof activities. J. Am. Dent. A. 27:1970, Dec 1940.

the dental profession and the nation that dental manpower would notbe wasted and that the needs of local communities would be considered.To carry out these aims it inaugurated two projects: (1) It made a strongeffort to list every dentist in the country with supplementary data onspecial abilities, educational background, age, dependents, et cetera.(2) It set up the mechanism for determining how many men could be sparedfrom any given area, selecting those who were most eligible and declaringthem available to the military.

The ADA had originally sent out a questionnaire to all dentists forwhom it could obtain addresses in October 1940¹⁷⁹ but listswere incomplete and the response was not too good; over a year later only75 percent of the questionnaires had been returned, and in some statesonly about half of the dentists replied.¹⁸⁰ The questionnairesreceived by the ADA were eventually turned over to PAS and they provideduseful information in the first stages of that agency`s operations, butPAS found it necessary to cooperate with the National Roster of Scientificand Specialized Personnel in sending out new questionnaires in February1942.¹⁸¹ Data so obtained were available to the Central Board,State Chairmen, or the military.

The question of the availability of dentists for military duty involvedseveral factors, including the following:

1. How many dentists were in practice in the United States?

2. How many dentists would be required to meet the minimum needs ofthe civilian population?

3. Which areas could best spare the dentists needed by the Armed Forces?An overall survey of medical personnel had been made very early in theoperation of PAS, but at first local chairmen were relied upon to determinethe availability of dentists.¹⁸²This policy did not prove satisfactory,however, for the following reasons:

1. Dental manpower was distributed very unevenly over the nation. Somecities had more than one dentist for every 1,000 persons, while some ruralareas had less than one dentist for 5,000 individuals. PAS representativesin the latter districts felt called upon to deliver at least a few dentists,though they could not, in fact, be spared. The representative in a bigcity might declare, a large number of men available and still obtain onlya small proportion of the dentists which could have been taken withoutendangering civilian practice.

2. The southern states, which generally had the lowest proportion ofdentists to total population, had already supplied the most dentists ona volun-teer basis during 1940 and 1941.

3. No uniform yardstick had been established by which local chairmen

¹⁷⁹Committee on Dental Preparedness. J. Am.Dent. A. 27: 1658, Oct 1940.
¹⁸⁰Procurement and assignment agency for professional personnelin the Army. J. Am. Dent. A. 28: 2026-2030, Dec 1941.
¹⁸¹See footnote 52, p. 53.
¹⁸²See footnote 19, p. 42.

could determine how many dentists should be retained to meet the reasonableneeds of the civilian population.

In June 1942 the directing board of PAS decided to undertake a nationwidesurvey of dental resources as a basis for establishing state allocations.¹⁸³The Committee on Dentistry carried out this survey with the assistanceof USPHS and the results were, reported on 20 February 1943.¹⁸⁴The findings of this committee have already been discussed in this chapterunder "Limitations on the Number of Dentists Available from CivilianPractice."

When it had been determined how many dentists were in practice in anyarea, and how many were required for civilian care, state chairmen wereassigned quotas based on current military needs. When procurement reachedits fastest tempo in the first months of 1943 PAS was obligated to declare400 dentists available each month.¹⁸⁵

The first procedure adopted by PAS and The Surgeon General for the procurementof medical personnel involved the following steps:¹⁸⁶

1. The Surgeon General notified the central office, PAS, of his requirementsfor officers.

2. The central office, PAS, made up lists of names, from its files andforwarded them to the SGO liaison officer with the appropriate professionalorganization for ethical and educational clearance.

3. The SGO liaison officer sent the lists to the state PAS chairmenconcerned. The latter eliminated all men considered essential and returnedthe lists to the central office, PAS.

4. The central office, PAS, mailed individual application forms andauthorizations for a physical examination at an Army installation.

5. Physical examination reports were mailed, by the surgeons completingthem, directly to The Surgeon General. Completed applications were returnedby the individual to the central office, PAS, where they were checked foraccuracy by an SGO liaison officer, and if correct they were sent to TheSurgeon General.

6. If the applicant was acceptable to The Surgeon General all papersin the case were forwarded to The Adjutant General, who offered the mana commission. The Surgeon General notified any applicant whose requestfor a commission was rejected.

This system proved to be very cumbersome in operation and it was simplifiedconsiderably in the spring of 1942 when the Medical Officer RecruitingBoards were established by The Surgeon General. These boards were organizedin each state, with authority to contact prospects, pass on their professionalqualifications and ethical standing, and offer commissions in the gradesof

¹⁸³See footnote 18, p. 41.
¹⁸⁴See footnote 19, p. 42.
¹⁸⁵See footnote 52, p. 53.
¹⁸⁶Ibid.

lieutenant or captain on the spot. The boards often set up their officesin the same quarters occupied by the state PAS, and cooperation was closeand informal. PAS retained the sole right to declare any man available,however, and the boards were instructed to process no physician or dentistwho was not cleared by the state PAS chairman.^{187 188 189}

When the functions of the Medical Officer Recruiting Boards were takenover by OPS, ASF, at the end of 1942, The Surgeon General again had topass on the acceptability of applicants and the procurement process againbecame more complicated. The field offices of OPS then contacted prospectsin cooperation with local PAS representatives, completed applications,and forwarded them to The Surgeon General. If the prospective officer appearedto be acceptable his application was sent to the central office, PAS, whichforwarded it to the state chairman for clearance as to availability. Thelatter sent the application to the SGO liaison officer with the appropriateprofessional society for ethical and professional clearance, and it wasthen returned to The Surgeon General for final action. The clearance ofthe state PAS chairman was an essential part of the application.

When professional personnel who had been declared available by PAS refusedto apply for commissions the case was turned over to Selective Servicefor appropriate action.

Opinions concerning the effectiveness of PAS, in respect to the procurementof dentists, varied. Certainly some agency was needed to determine availabilityand advise Selective Service and The Surgeon General on matters affectingmedical manpower. This function PAS seems to have performed with reasonablesatisfaction. But its name suggested that PAS was expected to go furtherand actually present to the Armed Forces the names of qualified men whowould accept commissions if they were physically fit, and in this activityit was less successful. Half of the physicians declared available, anda smaller proportion of the dentists, refused to volunteer for militaryservice. In the critical days of early 1943 both the Army and Navy expressedconsiderable dissatisfaction concerning PAS` inability to provide replacements.The agency was accused of "pussyfooting" and it was stated thatPAS chairmen should "get tough," that younger men were neededas state chairmen, or even that Selective Service should take over PASfunctions. The shortage of dental officers was less acute than that ofmedical personnel, but a representative of the Dental Division also expressedsome concern over the lagging procurement of dentists during the first2 months of 1943. Much of this criticism seems to have stemmed from a misunderstandingof the limited powers of PAS and of its proper function. If the PAS hadhad effective backing from Selective Service any man declared availablewould have hurried to apply for a com-

¹⁸⁷Ltr, TAG to CG, 1st CA, 28 Apr 42, sub:Medical Officer Recruiting Boards. AG: 210.31.
¹⁸⁸Memo, SG for Medical Officer Recruiting Boards, 27 May 42,sub: Memorandum to Medical Officer Recruiting Boards. Natl Archives, PASfiles, WMC.
¹⁸⁹Ltr, SG to Medical Officer Recruiting Boards, 20 Jun 42:Instructions. [D]

mission to prevent his induction as an enlisted man, but it was apparentfrom the start that professional personnel were not much worried over thepossibility of being drafted.¹⁹⁰ The Assistant Executive Officerof Selective Service himself admitted that his organization had had greatdifficulty in supporting the OPS in its efforts to obtain medical officersand that local boards often refused to take the advice of PAS.¹⁹¹PAS was an advisory body only; it had no authority to apply official pressureto recalcitrants. It could supply technical knowledge which Selective Servicedid not possess, but Selective Service had to exercise any compulsion required.It would therefore appear that the first consideration, if an agency similarto PAS is to be established in the future, should be a definite arrangementfor effective cooperation between that body and Selective Service.¹⁹²

PAS was also criticized by a representative of the Dental Division forf ailing to pass on the ethical qualifications of dentists. It was statedthat local PAS personnel were afraid to commit themselves in doubtful cases,merely declaring the man available and leaving it up to The Surgeon Generalto refuse or accept him.¹⁹³ This, again, would appear to havebeen the proper function of The Surgeon General`s liaison officers withthe professional societies, rather than of PAS.

It was also inevitable with so much at stake, that personalities andprofessional jealousy should sometimes enter the picture. PAS necessarilyhad to give the directors of schools and hospitals a certain amount offreedom to determine which members of the staff were essential and whichcould be spared. One hospital director was categorically accused of usinghis influence in this respect to force younger physicians to play his politicalgames under threat of induction into the Army.¹⁹⁴ It was alsofelt that methods used by local personnel were not always wisely chosen.It was reported, for instance, that in some large cities, where individualscould not be known personally, the local chairmen contacted the supplyhouses to see who ran up the largest bills, and declared these men essentialon the grounds that they were obviously doing the most work!¹⁹⁵Such abuses were apparently infrequent, however, and there seems to beno reason to believe that PAS was not as impersonal in its actions as anyhuman agency could be. Certainly PAS personnel gave unselfishly of theirtime and energy in a thankless job.

¹⁹⁰See footnote 1601, p. 73.
¹⁹¹Ltr, Richard H. Eanes, Asst Exec Off, Selective Service System,to Maj Gen Geo F. Lull, 21 Mar 44, sub: State Director advice No 206. [D].
¹⁹²It must be admitted, however, that local PAS representativeswere sometimes suspected of declaring medical personnel available underpressure from higher authority, and then informing Selective Service Boardmembers that they did not actually believe these individuals could be spared.Information from Maj Ernest Fedor, given the author 25 Nov 47.
¹⁹³See footnote 21, p. 44.
¹⁹⁴The confidential letter carrying this accusation has beenseen by the author, but no useful pur-pose would be served by divulgingthe names of individuals and institutions concerned.
¹⁹⁵See footnote 162, p. 73.

At the end of the war the Director of the Dental Division stated thatPAS bad proved "workable."¹⁹⁶

After giving PAS credit for preventing the induction of dentists asenlisted men, to which it was not entitled, the American Dental Associationnoted that:¹⁹⁷

The Procurement and Assignment Service, through its Stateand local committees, brought the selection of dentists for service downto a level where local factors could play an important part. Admittedly,it did not work perfectly, and inequalities can be found without too muchresearch. But the fact remains that the Procurement and Assignment Servicedid a better job than any previous similar agency. Dentists should seeto it that, in any future crisis, it is given sufficient authority to makeits program more effective.

PAS took a very minor part in dental procurement for the Army after9 December 1943.

Medical Officer Recruiting Boards

As it became necessary to procure large numbers of medical personneldirectly from civil life in 1942 The Surgeon General was authorized toestablish decentralized boards which could locate prospective officers,pass on their professional and ethical standing, and offer them immediatecommissions in one of the two lower grades without reference to the SGO.The corps areas were instructed to form these boards in April 1942¹⁹⁸but they were of minor importance to dental procurement for severalmonths since there were very few vacancies in the Dental Corps at thattime. When The Surgeon General was authorized a new procurement objectiveof 4,000 dentists in July 1942, it was directed that a dental officer wouldbe added to each of the 30 boards which were then operating in 25 States.¹⁹⁹The Surgeon General`s objective was reached very rapidly, and dentistswere removed from the remaining boards on 1 September 1942.²⁰⁰At the same time the boards were instructed to process no more dental applicationsexcept for men classified I-A by Selective Service. Initial quotas forphysicians were also being met, and the first board had already been closedfor this reason on 26 June 1942. By 21 October 1942 most boards had suspendedoperations because there was no longer a need for their services. The OPS,ASF, came into operation in November 1942, and the Medical Officer RecruitingBoards did not have an opportunity to demonstrate their effectiveness inthe personnel crisis of 1943.

The Medical Officer Recruiting Boards were more important to the MedicalCorps than to the Dental Service and they are discussed at length in othersections of the Medical History. In general, Medical Department officers,

¹⁹⁶See footnote 122, p. 65.
¹⁹⁷The right to gripe: The fifth freedom. J. Am. Dent. A. 33:118-122, 1 Jan 46.
¹⁹⁸Ltr, TAG to CG, 1st CA, 28 Apr 42, sub Medical officer recruitingboards. AG: 210.31.
¹⁹⁹See footnote 62, p. 54.
²⁰⁰See footnote 64, p. 55.

working closely with PAS, were able to approach individuals and professionalsocieties more effectively than laymen, and the activities of the, MedicalOfficer Recruiting Boards were compared favorably with those of the nonprofessionalOfficer Procurement Service Boards which succeeded them. The fact thatnearly 4,000 dentists were commissioned in less than 2 months showed thatboards operating under The Surgeon General could play an important partin dental procurement if the need arose and they had the opportunity.

Officer Procurement Service, ASF

On 7 November 1942 the War Department directed that all direct com missionsfrom civil life would thenceforth be handled through an Officer ProcurementService operating under ASF.²⁰¹ For most branches of the Army,officer replacements were being obtained largely from officer candidateschools at the end of 1942, and very few men without previous militaryexperience were being considered. Instructions given OPS indicate thatno small part of its mission was to keep a tight rein on direct commissionsfrom civil life, to keep them to a minimum, and this negative attitudeseems to have colored its early operations. But the Medical Departmentwas faced with a different problem; it needed officers and it needed themin a hurry, and they could be obtained only from civil practice. The SurgeonGeneral made no secret of the fact that in his opinion OPS hindered ratherthan helped procurement, and that it was a poor substitute for his ownMedical Officer Recruiting Boards.

Soon after OPS started to function in February 1943, The Surgeon Generalexpressed great dissatisfaction with the results attained and recommendedthat if no improvement were noted by the end of March, the Medical OfficerRecruiting Boards be reestablished. On the same day the Dental Divisioncomplained of the slow procurement of dental officers since the first ofthe year, and the delay was blamed on OPS since PAS reported that the neededdentists were available. By May 1943 the dental personnel situation wasless disturbing, but the shortage of medical officers remained so acutethat the SGO began to consider a special conscription by Selective Service.²⁰²The procurement, of medical officers continued to lag until ASTP graduatesbecame available, but whether the difficulties encountered were due todeficiencies of OPS, or to the f act that civilian medical resources wereapproaching exhaustion, a matter of opinion. Since the procurement of dentalofficers under OPS offered no problems not common to all Medical Departmentprocurement, detailed discussion of that agency will be left for the generalmedical administrative history.

American Dental Association

The American Dental Association was of course deeply interested in theprocurement of dental officers. Soon after the start of hostilities inEurope

²⁰¹WD Cir 367, 7 Nov 42.
²⁰²See footnote 69, p. 55.

in the fall of 1939, the Director of the Dental Division asked the ADAto establish a committee to consult and cooperate with the military.²⁰³At the time no action was taken, but when the request was repeated in Decembera "Committee on National Defense" (later called the "Committeeon National Preparedness") was appointed without further delay.²⁰⁴Corresponding committees were formed in each state. It appears that TheSurgeon General initially expected the ADA to play a major role, in theprocurement of dental officers, and in July 1940, he specifically requestedthe Association to undertake the following program: ²⁰⁵

1. The Association to conduct a survey of the dental profession throughits state and local societies.

2. The local societies to canvass their members to determine which ofthese would be willing to serve, which could be spared for military service,and which should remain at home because of age, physical disability, oressentiality in civilian capacity.

3. The local societies to list those who were selected for possiblemilitary duty according to their professional qualifications, listing asoral surgeons, prosthetists, etc., only those of outstanding ability. Also,to select qualified men to serve on examination boards.

4. The state societies to maintain a roster of all available members.

5. The American Dental Association to maintain a numerical roster ofavailable men, by states.

6. The Medical Department of the Army to have one or more selected officerson duty with the American Dental Association when and if necessary.

7. The War Department, corps areas, or regional officers to call uponthe American Dental Association for dentists by Specialties, as and whenrequired.

8. The American Dental Association to call upon the states accordingto their quotas for the dentists required; the states, in turn, to callupon the local societies for their quotas.

The plan discussed above would have placed almost the entire burdenof procurement on the ADA; the Army was merely to request a certain numberof dentists with the desired qualifications and the ADA was to deliverthem. The Association would have assumed the duties liter assigned to PASin that it would have had to determine local needs, specify the dentistswhich could be spared, and maintain a roster according to individual qualifications.In addition it would have accepted much of the responsibility of SelectiveService in determining individual eligibility for military duty and, presumably,in exerting the pressure necessary to induce dentists to accept commissionsin the Army.

The ADA was apparently favorably inclined toward the plan because itwould give some assurance that dentists would not be taken indiscriminately,

²⁰³President`s Page. J. Am. Dent. A. 28: 982,Jun 1941.
²⁰⁴See footnote 154, p. 71.
²⁰⁵Ltr, Maj Gen James C. Magee to Dr. Arthur H. Merritt, PresADA, 6 Jul 40. SG: 080 (ADA) T.

without regard to the needs of their communities, and because it wouldgive the organization an opportunity to perform a valuable service.

A program for an immediate survey and classification of all civiliandental personnel was submitted to the Board of Trustees of the ADA in September²⁰⁶1940. It was approved without delay and $20,000 appropriated for the purpose,in addition to $5,000 for expenses of the Preparedness Committee. Questionnaireswere mailed in October of the same year.

Unfortunately, serious defects soon developed in the scheme to use theADA as the principal dental procurement agency. The Association lackedofficial status, and about 25 percent of the questionnaires sent to individualdentists were ignored. Also, the local ADA officers were too close to theirmembership to have the objective attitude and impersonal status requiredof any official who is to determine which men will be taken from the communityfor military service. There is no evidence that the endeavors of the ADAin this respect were anything but disinterested, but some dentists objectedstrongly to being picked for the Armed Forces by their competitors, andcharges that political influence was being exerted were inevitable underthe circumstances. Antagonism resulted among local members, and the wholetask soon proved very distasteful to those who had to carry it out. Further,when a dentist refused to accept a commission after being recommended bythe ADA the latter had no authority to enforce its decision.

The ADA was happy to relinquish its thankless task to PAS in 1942. Itplayed an important part in the inauguration of that organization, andit maintained close liaison with it throughout the war.²⁰⁷ Itturned over to PAS the data. it had obtained through its survey of civiliandentists, providing that body with much valuable information on which toproceed while plans were being made for PAS` own survey of June 1942. TheADA also cooperated closely with the Dental Advisory Committee of the SelectiveService System.²⁰⁸

The ADA rendered an important service to The Surgeon General by assumingresponsibility for determining the professional and ethical status of prospectivedental officers. In May 1942²⁰⁹a representative of the SGO wasplaced on duty with the national headquarters of the ADA and the Associationfurnished him the information on which to decide whether or not a man`sstanding in the profession made him acceptable for the Army Dental Corps.Membership in the ADA was not required, but dentists who did not meet recognizedethical standards, who were graduates of substandard schools (mainly foreign),who did not possess valid licenses to practice, or who had been convictedof serious offenses, were rejected for military service in the Dental Corps.

²⁰⁶See footnote 203, p. 84.
²⁰⁷Committee on Dental Preparedness: A procurement and assignmentagency. J. Am. Dent. A. 28:2057-2060, Dec 1941.
²⁰⁸See footnote 147, p. 70.
²⁰⁹WD SO 131, 19 May 42.

The part played by the ADA in the rehabilitation programs for SelectiveService registrants is discussed in chapter VI.

The ADA consistently objected to the induction of dentists and dentalstudents as enlisted men. It backed the Murray bills to commission inducteddentists and defer dental students and instructors, and it made vigorousefforts to have the Dental Reserve increased in 1940 and 1941 to permitthe commissioning of inducted dentists.²¹⁰ It also sponsoreda plan to provide care for the patients of dentists in the Armed Forcesand to keep the latters` practices intact until their return.²¹¹

ATTRITION IN THE ARMY DENTAL CORPS

In the period from 7 December 1941 through 31 December 1946, 2,107 dentalofficers were lost to the Army, as follows: ^{212 213}

Cause	Total	Cause	Total
Killed in action	20	Over 38, no suitable assignment	448
Died of wounds	5	Key man in industry or Government	3
Declared dead	0	Hardship	8
Missing in action (subsequently returned to duty)	1	Honorable discharge	4
Captured	38	Resignation	64
Deaths from accident, aircraft	8	Reclassification, honorable and other than honorable	28
Deaths from accident, not aircraft	15	Dishonorable discharge	6
Died of disease	56	Conditions other than honorable	29
Suicide	2	Other	12
Other nonbattle deaths	10	Unsatisfactory service	2
Retirement	15	Necessary to national health	1
Physically disqualified	1,328	-----	-----
Overage	4	-----	-----

(See chapter IX for losses due to demobilization.)

From 7 December 1941 to 30 June 1945, an average of about 50 dentalofficers were lost each month, for all causes. This was a rate of about5.2 percent a year of the average of 11,400 dental officers on duty duringthis period. This rate was far from uniform, however, and was artificiallystimulated in 1944 to permit replacement of some veterans by younger ASTPgraduates.

In general, combat losses, or discharges for disabilities resultingfrom wounds, were almost negligible so far as the overall manpower problemwas concerned. Only 20 dentists were returned to the Zone of Interior forserious injuries during the period 7 December 1941 through 31 December1946, and not all of these officers were lost to the Service. Thus, lossesfrom battle action

²¹⁰See footnote 147, p. 70.
²¹¹Ibid.
²¹²Casualty data are for the period 7 December 1941 through31 December 1946. Army Battle Casualties and Nonbattle Deaths in WorldWar II, Final Report, 7 Dec 41-31 Dec 46. Strength and Acctg Br, AGO.
²¹³Statistics for the remaining causes are for the period 7December 1941 through 30 June 1945. Compiled from data on file in the PersonnelStat Unit, Administrative Services Div, AGO.

(killed, died of wounds, captured, or missing) amounted to 1.5 percentof the mean, Dental Corps strength overseas during the 4 war years, orabout 0.38 percent per year. (See also chapter IV, p. 117, for casualtydata, 7 Dec 41-31 Dec 46.)

Administrative discharges accounted for 624 separations, or 30 percentof the total. Of these, 448 were men over 38 years of age who were releasedto create vacancies for younger ASTP graduates, and to the extent thatthese separations were optional they need not be considered in the personnelproblem.

By far the largest proportion of all losses, 63 percent, were due tophysical disqualification. The 1,328 dentists discharged for this reasonin the period reported amounted to 12 percent of the average of 11,400officers on duty, or about 3.5 percent each year. It has already been pointedout that few physical discharges resulted from battle injuries; most representednormal attrition under the stresses of wartime conditions. These losseswere understandably higher than in peacetime when retirements for physicaldisability had amounted to about one-half of 1 percent a year.

About 45 dentists, or 0.4 percent of the average strength for the period,were released under conditions "other than honorable." This wasonly 0.25 percent of about 18,000 dentists on duty at some time duringthe emergency.

During the first 2 years of the war the Dental Corps was primarily concernedwith obtaining enough officers to staff its expanding installations andsome dentists were accepted who, for physical or other reasons, had a lessthan average work capacity. By 1943, however, the Army was approachingrelative stability and it was possible to place greater emphasis on physicalfitness and efficiency. Also, the ASTP was expected to supply a large numberof graduates who had been given deferment from military service and hadreceived at least a part of their training at Government expense. It washighly desirable that these men be taken into the Dental Corps rather thanreleased to return to civilian practice. Finally, a certain amount of "turnover"in the Dental Service was, necessary to provide a balanced force from thestandpoint of age and total service. Efforts to improve the efficiencyof the Dental Corps and to create vacancies for young replacements tooktwo main directions: (1) to relieve from active duty those officers whosephysical condition limited their assignment or prevented them from workingnormal hours, and (2) to eliminate those few officers whose efficiencywas below accepted standards.

Release of Limited Service Officers. As early as July 1943 theWar Department had directed that line. officers qualified only for limitedservice might be released, but physicians, dentists, and chaplains hadbeen specifically excepted.²¹⁴ A similar order of 1 November1943 applied to dentists,²¹⁵ but

²¹⁴Radiogram, Maj Gen M. G. White, ACofS G-1,10 Jul 43, quoted verbatim in History of the Army Dental Corps, 21 Feb-1Apr 44, Bi-weekly Dental Service Reports. HD: 024.
²¹⁵Ltr, TAG to CGs AAF, AGF, ASF, 1 Nov 43, sub: Instructionsrelative to retention of officers on active duty for limited service. AG210.85.

was again modified in January 1944 to exclude physicians, dentists,and chaplains.²¹⁶ In February 1944 the Director of the DentalDivision recommended that dental officers once more be included in thecategory which could be separated when found eligible only for limitedservice, but at the time no action was taken. In March 1944, with the urgentneed for creating vacancies for prospective ASTP graduates (see discussionthis chapter, pp. 56-59), this recommendation was resubmitted, and on 18April 1944 The Adjutant General published a directive providing that, dentalofficers were to be released if: (1) they had been commissioned for generalservice and were later found to be qualified only for limited service,or (2) if they had originally been accepted for limited service but hadsuffered deterioration of their physical condition while in military service.

Some difficulty was encountered in persuading all concerned to giveeffective support to the policy of April 1944. In August 1944 ASF complainedthat even retiring boards were returning limited service dentists to activeduty with the recommendation that they be used in administrative functionswhen they could not work at the chair.²¹⁷ ASF pointed out thelack of administrative positions in the Dental Service and advised thatsince plenty of physically qualified young dentists were available fromASTP the retention of limited service officers was not desired. About 2months later, however, the policy of ASF was modified by the War Departmentto permit major commands to retain limited service dental officers if itcould be certified that their services were required and could be usedefficiently.²¹⁸

Except for a few senior students the dental ASTP had been terminatedby the end of 1944 and replacements were more difficult to find. The SurgeonGeneral therefore abandoned the attempt to have all limited service dentistsreleased²¹⁹ and on 23 December 1944²²⁰ the ASF directivewhich made the separation of such officers mandatory was rescinded. Itcannot be determined how many dental officers were released under thisprogram since they were included in the larger category separated for physicaldisabilities. Also, many officers classified for limited service only wereseparated under other provisions, especially those pertaining to the dischargeof personnel for whom no suitable assignment could be found. At any ratethe number of limited service dental officers released as such was unimportantin the overall personnel picture.

Release of Officers for Whom no Suitable Assignment Existed.The first general attempt to separate the less efficient officers, otherthan those in the limited service category, was made in December 1943 whenThe Adjutant

²¹⁶Ltr, TAG to CGs, AAF, AGF, ASF, 13 Jan 44,sub: Instructions relative to retention of officers on active duty forlimited service. AG: 210.85.
²¹⁷ASF Cir 272, 24 Aug 44; ASF Cir 274, 25 Aug 44.
²¹⁸WD Cir 403, 14 Oct 44.
²¹⁹Memo, Maj Ernest J. Fedor for Dir Mil Pers Div, 28 Nov 44,sub: Relief from active duty of Dental Corps officers. HD: 314.
²²⁰ASF Cir 420, 23 Dec 44.

General authorized major commands to release officers over 45 yearsof age "for whom no suitable assignment could be found."²²¹In January 1944 the age limit for such separations was reduced to 38 years.²²²It was pointed out that a number of officers in all branches had renderedvaluable service during mobilization, but that due to physical defectsor other circumstances over which they had no control they could not beplaced in appropriate positions now that the Army was entering a new phaseof the war. Such of these men as were surplus in their commands, who didnot come under other regulations permitting their discharge, and whoseservice had justified separation under honorable conditions, were to bereleased without prejudice.

The separation of dental officers under this directive proceeded veryslowly and eventually more specific action was initiated. In May 1944 theWar Department noted that recommendations for the release of dentists hadbeen based primarily on personal desires rather than the good of the service,and ordered a general survey of all dental officers with a view towardselecting for discharge those who were least effective.²²³ TheSurgeon General ordered replacement pools, where dental officers awaitedassignment, to refer to a general hospital for disposition any dentistunable to do a full day`s work. Other officers in these pools, who wereover 38 years of age and could not be assigned to appropriate positions,were to be interviewed to determine if they would accept voluntary separation.By the end of 1944, 121 dentists were released on the basis of such individualrecommendations, but that number was fax short of the figure required topermit the commissioning of available ASTP graduates.²²⁴

In order to reduce the dental replacement pools which then numbered811 officers, and to permit the commissioning of an anticipated 900 ASTPgraduates, ASF directed The Surgeon General, on 10 August 1944, to recommendspecific quotas to be separated by the various major commands.²²⁵Order of priority for discharge, without regard to age, was to be:

1. Officers who were not physically capable of doing afull day`s duty operating at a dental chair.
2. Officers marked "limited service" who required special considerationas to climate, diet, type of work, or who were qualified for assignmentwithin the United States only.
3. Officers in the lower efficiency rating brackets.
4. Officers in a limited service status, other than those in "2"above.
5. Officers in other categories whose relief from active duty could beaccomplished under current War Department directives.

²²¹Ltr, TAG to Divs of WDGS, 8 Dec 43, sub:Relief from active duty of officers for whom no suitable assignment exists.SG: 210.8.
²²²Ltr, TAG to Divs of WDGS, 12 Jan 44, sub: Relief from activeduty of officers for whom no suitable assignment exists. SG : 210.8.
²²³WD Memo W605-44, 25 May 44.
²²⁴Semiannual Rpt Procmt Br Mil Pers Div SGO, 1 Jul to 31 Dec44, pars. 1 o, p. q. HD.
²²⁵Memo, Brig Gen Russel B. Reynolds, Dir Mil Pers Div ASF,for SG, 10 Aug 44, sub: Relief from active duty of Dental Corps officers.Filed as incl 11 to rpt cited in footnote 224.

The authority to release officers in the categories listed, regardlessof age, was an exception to War Department policy and at the time, wasapplied only to the Dental Corps.

In order to protect officers eligible for separation under this policybut who had rendered faithful and valuable service, the aforementioneddirective was, at the suggestion of the Assistant Chief of Staff G-1, latermodified to eliminate any reference to inefficiency. As finally publishedit provided for the release of:²²⁶

1. Officers who were not physically capable of doing afull day`s duty operating at a dental chair.
2. Officers marked "Limited Service" who required special considerationas to climate, diet, type of work, or who were qualified for assignmentwithin the United States only.
3. Officers whose relief from active duty could be accomplished under currentWar Department policies.
4. Officers selected by The Surgeon General who could be released withleast detriment to the service. This category was to be used after exhaustingcategories "1" through "3" above...

In compliance with the 29 August 1944 directive, The Surgeon Generalrecommended on 2 September 1944 that 1,209 dental officers be separatedin the United States as follows:²²⁷

Service Commands (10 to 15 percent in each area)	516
Surgeon General (to be released from pools)	376
Army Air Forces	200
Army Ground Forces	75
Office, Chief of Transportation	35
Military District of Washington	7

A second list covering officers overseas was submitted on 28 September.²²⁸it recommended the release of 5 percent of the dentists in each theater,for a total of 2l2 officers. The Adjutant General approved in toto theoverseas request but in the United States a preliminary quota of only 250dentists was authorized for separation.²²⁹ This was subsequentlyincreased to 290²³⁰ and it was expected that new allotmentswould be announced between January and May 1945. By the end of 1944, 239dental officers had been released under this program in the Zone of Interior²³¹and the overseas quota of 212 officers was being processed,

²²⁶Memo, Brig Gen Russel B. Reynolds for SG,29 Aug 44, sub: Relief from active duty of Dental Corps officers. Filedas incl 11 to rpt cited in footnote 224.
²²⁷Memo, Col J. R. Hudnall for CG ASF, 2 Sep 44, sub: Relieffrom active duty of Dental Corps officers. Filed as incl 11 to rpt citedin footnote 224.
²²⁸Incl 12 to footnote 224, Memo, Maj Gen R. H. Mills for CGASF, 28 Sep 44, sub: Relief from active duty of Dental Corps officers.HD.
²²⁹See footnote 224, p. 89.
²³⁰1st ind, TAG to CofT, 4 Nov 44, on Ltr, Lt Col A. Kojassar,OCT, to TAG, 12 Oct 44, sub: Relief from active duty of Dental Corps officers.SG 210.8.
²³¹See footnote 224, p. 89.

but by that time the personnel situation had changed considerably andno further "mass" quotas were announced. On 29 December 1944a new War Department circular summarized and liberalized earlier provisionsfor the relief of officers for whom no assignment could be found, who wereessential to national health and interest in a civilian capacity, or whosuffered unusual hardships because of their military service, and futurereleases for causes other than physical disability were generally carriedout under that circular.²³² No further pressure was appliedto speed the separation of older or less efficient men. (See pp. 87-88).

Release of Dentists Needed in their Local Communities. For sometime before the end of 1944 the Procurement and Assignment Service hadtried to have released from active duty Army physicians who were urgentlyneeded in their communities. Results bad been insignificant, however, bothbecause The Surgeon General could spare very few officers and because PASat first showed little critical judgment in drawing up its recommendations.²³³As a result of a conference early in January 1945, PAS notified its statechairmen for physicians that the Army would consider separating a few medicalofficers though no men would be released who were under 39 years of age,who were qualified for general service, or who were practicing a specialtyin the Medical Department. Great care was recommended in selecting onlythe most worthy cases.²³⁴ Dental officers were not mentionedin the instructions to PAS state chairmen, but before the end of demobilizationsome 18 officers were actually separated as essential to national healthor interest.²³⁵

Release of Dental Officers for Hardship. Release of dental officersfor hardship, also authorized by War Department Circular 485, 29 December1944, took place slowly prior to the end of the war. By the end of June1945 only eight dentists had been separated for this cause. In August 1945,however, the War Department directed that increased consideration be giventhis f actor as a cause for release from active duty before eligibilitywas established under normal separation criteria.²³⁶

Slowed "Turnover" Immediately Prior to V-E Day. Atthe end of 1944, the dental ASTP was approaching its termination and itappeared that in the future very few replacements would be available fromthis source. On 17 January 1945, a representative of the Military PersonnelDivision, SGO, warned that unless conservation of dental officers was practicedthe procurement of dentists from civil life would have to be resumed bythe end of June.²³⁷ Alerted

²³²WD Cir 485, 29 Dec 44.
²³³A note accompanying a report of a conference between Armyand PAS representatives in January 1945 states that "They (PAS) threweverything at us before; lists were meaningless." On file with Ltr,PAS to state chairmen for physicians, 27 Jan 45, sub: Release of physiciansfrom the Army Medical Corps to return to practice . SG: 210.8.
²³⁴Basic communication referred to in footnote 233.
²³⁵Data given to the author by the Strength Accounting Br AGO,13 Feb 48.
²³⁶By the end of August 1947 a total of 45 dental officers hadbeen discharged for hardships. See also footnote 235, above.
²³⁷See footnote 90, p. 59.

by this warning, it was announced on 8 February 1945 that dental officerpersonnel then on duty would be considered as being within a critical andscarce category.²³⁸ Further, that separations for causes otherthan those authorized by the provisions of War Department Circular 485(see p. 91) would be limited insofar as practicable.²³⁹ Whilethe application of this rigid conservation policy enabled the Dental Corpsto maintain its strength at the level required, it also slowed down the"turnover" of its officer personnel. This created a personnelsituation which was far from favorable, and which at the end of the war(see chapter IX, Demobilization), was subject to a great deal of criticism.

STANDARDS FOR COMMISSION IN THE ARMY DENTAL CORPS

Physical Standards

With minor exceptions (e. g., dental standards for Medical Departmentofficers and chaplains early in the war) physical standards for commissioningin the Dental Corps were the same as for all other branches.²⁴⁰Approximately one-third of all applicants were rejected for physical defects.²⁴¹

The Dental Division was very reluctant to commission dentists who couldnot work a full day, who could not serve in unfavorable climates, or whowere otherwise unavailable for general assignment. The first deviationfrom this policy came in July 1942 when Medical Officer Recruiting Boardswere directed to accept dentists in the limited service category, apparentlyanticipating that sufficient officers could not otherwise be obtained.²⁴²By September 1942, procurement objectives were being filled without difficultyand The Surgeon General directed that only men threatened by inductionwould be commissioned, automatically eliminating limited service applicants.²⁴³With the granting of a new procurement objective for 7,200 dental officersin November 1942, restrictions on the commissioning of dentists were temporarilylifted and those in limited service categories again accepted, though TheSurgeon General passed on all applications and it is probable that thenumber approved was kept as, low as possible. On 8 September 1943 the PASwas asked not to declare available any dentists who were classified for"limited service" only. No additional dentists were acceptedin that category during the remainder of the war, and with the first of1944, efforts were concentrated on eliminating such officers already inthe Dental Corps (see discussion this chapter, pp. 87-88).

²³⁸See footnote 92, p. 60.
²³⁹Ibid.
²⁴⁰See AR 40-105 for physical standards for military serviceat different periods of the war. Also, MR 1-9, 31 Aug 40. HD.
²⁴¹Ltr, Col Robert C. Craven to Dr. John W. Leggett, 1 Sep 42.[D]
²⁴²See footnote 62, p. 54.
²⁴³See footnote 65, p. 55.

Age restrictions for dental officers varied considerably from time totime. In November 1940 it was directed that Reserve dentists would be calledto active duty only when they were under the following maximum ages:²⁴⁴

First lieutenant	47 years
Captain	50 years
Major	54 years
Lieutenant colonel	58 years
Colonel	60 years

In August 1941 these. provisions were modified to require that dentistson duty with troops be not over 56 year old, or 58 years if they were onArmy staffs. Age-in-grade requirements were simultaneously removed.²⁴⁵

But while trained Reserve officers were generally accepted for activeduty as long as they were not over the prescribed maximum age, the principalneed was for young, vigorous men who could be assigned to combat unitsor to over-seas areas with unfavorable climates. Most of this group weretaken directly from civil life, without previous experience, and commissionedin the lowest grade. For these reasons the Dental Division desired to limit,as far as possible, procurement outside the reserve to men under 37 yearsof age who were eligible for general military duty and for whom the gradeof lieutenant or captain would be appropriate. But the Dental Corps alsowanted to be able to offer a commission to any dentist who might be threatenedwith early induction, so the maximum age limit went to 39 years duringthe periods when the Selective Service age limit was set at that figure.For brief periods when procurement threatened to lag, the upper age limitwas raised to 44 or even 45 years.

When The Surgeon General established his Medical Officer RecruitingBoards in April 1942 he was instructed to accept older physicians to theextent necessary to permit him to obtain men with the necessary professionalqualifications, but applicants for the Dental Corps were still to be acceptedonly if they were under 37 years of age.²⁴⁶ The following monththis directive was modified to allow the commissioning of dentists over37 who were classified I-A by their Selective Service Boards²⁴⁷and in June 1942 The Surgeon General informed The Adjutant General thata few men between the ages of 37 and 50 would be commissioned, but onlywith the express approval of The Surgeon General in each case.²⁴⁸It was implied that such exceptions to general policy would be made onlyto permit the commissioning of outstanding individuals, and the recordssupport that inference. As a matter of fact, routine instruct-

²⁴⁴See footnote 116, p. 64.
²⁴⁵Ltr, TAG to CGs of all Armies, Army Corps, Divs, CAs, Depts,Def and Base Comds, COs of Exempted Stas, Chiefs of Arms and Servs, Chiefof Armored Force, Chief AAF, CG, AF Combat Comd, and Chief of Staff, GHQ,23 Aug 41, sub : Extension of tours of active duty, reserve officers. SG210.31-1.
²⁴⁶See footnote 198, p. 82.
²⁴⁷Ltr, Lt Col J. R. Hudnall to Lt Col A. R. Nichols, 16 May42, sub: Medical officer recruiting board, letters of appointment and relatedforms. [D]
²⁴⁸Ltr, Lt Col Francis M. Fitts to Off Procmt Div, AGO, 24 Jun42, sub: Officer procurement for the Army of the United States. SG:320.2-1.

tions to the Medical Officer Recruiting Boards a week later again directedthat dental officers were to be appointed only if they were under 37 yearsof age.²⁴⁹ With the authorization of a new procurement objectiveof 4,000 dentists on 8 July 1942, the boards were temporarily instructedto accept applications from dentists up to 45 years of age, though applicationsfrom men over 37 still had to be approved by The Surgeon General.²⁵⁰

In January 1943 The Surgeon General directed that only dentists under38 years of age would be considered, but on 19 May the Secretary of Warwas notified that dentists would be accepted up to age 42, or age 44 ifclassified I-A. In June 1943 the service commands were authorized to acceptdentists between the ages of 38 and 44 if they had been declared availableby the PAS, had refused commissions, and had been recommended for inductionby Selective Service, but it is believed that this procedure was followedin very few cases.²⁵¹ In September 1943 the PAS was requestednot to declare available any dentists who had reached the age of 38. Bythe end of 1943 The Adjutant General had authorized the release of dentistsover 45 years of age for whom no suitable assignment could be found²⁵²and this age limit was subsequently lowered to 38.²⁵³ In March1944 the Dental Division recommended that all dentists over 40 years ofage be released, but this request was denied by ASF.^{254 255}

On V-E Day the age distribution of the Dental Corps was as follows:

Age	Number of officers	Percentage of all officers
Under 30	3,902	25.5
30-34	4,086	26.7
35-39	4,958	32.4
40-44	1,423	9.3
45-49	581	3.8
50 or over	352	2.3

Professional and Ethical Standards

Educational requirements for dental officers were relatively simple;the. applicant had to be a graduate of a standard school acceptable toThe Surgeon General. All American schools were approved, including thoselimited to Negro students. The question of foreign schools was troublesometo the Medical

²⁴⁹Telegram, TAG to Medical Officers` RecruitingBoard, 9th CA, 2 Jul 42. AG: 210.31.
²⁵⁰See footnote 62, p. 54.
²⁵¹Ltr, TAG to CG, 5th SvC, 8 Jun 43, sub: Induction of physiciansand dentists 38 years of age and over. SG: PAS files, Mil Pers Div.
²⁵²Ltr, TAG to Divs of WD Gen Staff, CGs AGF, AAF, ASF, DefComds, Overseas Theaters and Depts, 8 Dec 43, sub: Relief from active dutyof officers for whom no suitable assignment exists. SG: 210.8.
²⁵³Ltr, TAG to Divs of WD Gen Staff, CGs AGF, AAF, ASF, DefComds, Overseas Theaters and Depts, 12 Jan 44, sub: Relief from activeduty of officers for whom no suitable assignment exists. AG: 210.85.
²⁵⁴Memo, Exec Off, SGO, to Dir Mil Pers Div, ASF, 11 Mar 44.HD: 314.
²⁵⁵The original of the communication rejecting The Surgeon General`srequest of 11 March 1944 has not been found. This letter, dated 25 March1944, is quoted verbatim, however, in a report of the Dental Division forthe period 21 Feb-1 Apr 44, on file in Bi-weekly Reports file. HD: 024.
²⁵⁶See footnote 106, p. 62.

Corps, but the number of graduates of foreign schools applying for dentalcommissions was negligible.

During the first year of the war an applicant for the Dental Corps wasrequired to have a valid license to practice in a state or territory, butin January 1943 this requisite was dropped, as far as recent graduateswere concerned, to make it possible to accept the latter immediately, withoutwaiting for them to take a board.

The enforcement of ethical standards involved some knotty problems.It was of course directed that only dentists in good standing in the professionwould be commissioned, but the definition of ethical practice, and itsapplication in specific cases, was not always easy. In the absence, ofevidence to the contrary, membership in the ADA was a prima, facie indicationof acceptability, but approximately one-third of the dentists in the UnitedStates were not members of the ADA and these men had to be considered ontheir own merits. In some cases it was charged that actual membership hadbeen required locally. In New York City, for instance, the Allied DentalCouncil complained that its members had been asked if they belonged tothe 2d District Dental Society (ADA) when they applied for commissionsat the city recruiting board²⁵⁷ It was not specifically statedthat they would otherwise be rejected, but rightly or wrongly that inferencewas drawn. The Surgeon General immediately replied that membership in anysociety was not a requisite for a commission in the Army.²⁵⁸But the ADA was allowed to set the ethical standard for acceptance, bythe Dental Corps, and to pass on the standing of individuals through theSGO liaison office at ADA national headquarters, resulting in occasionalprotests from groups having less rigid requirements. In May 1943, for instance,a number of members of a New York society met with representatives of theDental Division to protest refusal of the 2d District Dental Society tocertify them to the Army, mainly on the grounds that they were "advertisers."They were informed that "dentists in New York City . . . must conformto the code of ethics laid down by the 2d District Dental Society."²⁵⁹A few days later the protesting dentists were called to a joint meetingwith representatives of the 2d District Society and they were informedthat if they met the requirements of that organization (i. e., removedthe offending signs) they would be certified. Many dentists followed thisadvice and were accepted.

The practice of allowing the ADA to pass on the ethical status of non-membersmay be questioned, but it is difficult to see how the problem could havebeen solved in any other way. The ordinary citizen is assumed to be honestif he is not convicted of a crime, and the merchant who gains an advantagein

²⁵⁷Ltr, Dr. M. J. Futterman, Chairman, NationalVictory Committee, Allied Dental Council, New York, to SG, 24 Jun 42. [D]
²⁵⁸Ltr, Maj Gen R. H. Mills to Dr. M. J. Futterman, 30 Jun 42.[D]
²⁵⁹Statement, Col Robert C. Craven to Co-chairman of Mil AffairsCommittee, 2d District Dental Society, 17 May 43. [D]

a business deal is considered to be a smart operator, but the ethicsof the commercial world are not applicable to dental practice; if the merchantdelivers goods other than those specified the fact is readily apparentand redress can easily be made, but the quality of the dentist`s work canbe determined only after many years have elapsed, and after irreparabledamage may have been done. The dentist is therefore in a unique positionof trust in that he must consider not only his own interests but thoseof his patients as well. To protect its patients, and its own good name,the dental profession has found it necessary to set for itself standardswhich are materially higher than those prescribed by law, which are generallydrawn up to meet commercial requirements. This has been accomplished throughthe only organization representing any large proportion of American dentists,the ADA.

Not all of the criteria established by the ADA have been accepted bynonmembers of that body. Advertising, for instance, tends to substitutethe press agent`s skill for a laboriously acquired professional reputation,but in itself it may not indicate gross moral deficiency. It was thereforeheld in some quarters that the fact that a dentist had advertised for patientswas not an adequate reason for barring him from the Army Dental Corps.As a matter of past experience, however, advertising had so often beenassociated with other, more objectionable practices that it was certainlya danger signal to be given considerable weight in determining whetheror not a dentist was of the type wanted for Army installations. In generalthe ADA standards had been found satisfactory in operation, and their acceptanceby the Dental Corps would appear to have been justified. Moreover, TheSurgeon General had neither the information nor the organization with whichto undertake the evaluation of thousands of dentists, and the ADA was theonly body which had both. It has been suggested that the PAS should haveassumed respon-sibility for determining ethical and professional standing,but if it had been given that task it would almost certainly have had togo to the ADA for the information on which to act.

COMMISSIONS ABOVE THE GRADE OF FIRST LIEUTENANT

During the war the Dental Division generally disapproved of grantinginitial commissions above the lowest grade, and even when an allotmentof higher grades was authorized it was seldom filled. This policy was voluntarilyadopted without pressure from higher authority in either the SGO or theWar Department. The first major procurement objective of the war, grantedin January 1942, provided for the procurement of 5 majors, 20 captains,and 475 lieutenants, but it was filled almost entirely in the grade oflieutenant.²⁶⁰ When the Medical Officer Recruiting Boards wereestablished in April 1942 The Surgeon General was permitted to offer sufficientcommissions above the

²⁶⁰See footnote 56, p. 53.

lowest grade to attract qualified applicants, but a few weeks laterthe boards were specifically directed that dentists would be commissionedin the grade of first lieutenant only, except in special cases, and withthe approval of The Surgeon General.²⁶¹ In June 1942 The SurgeonGeneral notified The Adjutant General that a few dentists above the ageof 37 would be given commissions as captains or majors with the approvalof the Chief of the Dental Division, but implied that such cases wouldbe very rare.²⁶² In September 1942 an officer of the DentalDivision stated that captaincies would be given only to men over 40, withspecial qualifications. A few appointments above the lowest grade weremade in 1943, but by 1 January 1944 only 2 dentists had been commissionedas majors and 163 as captains.²⁶³ At least one of the abovemajors was commissioned for the Veterans Administration, and most subsequentcommissions above the grade of captain were for that organization.

The policy of the Dental Division in respect to granting higher originalcommissions was criticized by PAS, which felt that its task would havebeen easier if it could have offered captaincies or majorities to hesitantapplicants. Some dental societies also felt that qualified specialistsor older men with families should be given grades above that of first lieutenant.The position of the Dental Division was that for each dentist appointedas a captain or major some officer who had volunteered a year or more beforewould be deprived of promotion. It was felt that men already in the servicegenerally had as much to offer as the dentists who were holding out foradvanced grades, and there could be no question but that the former werebetter qualified from the military point of view. Only in exceptional casesdid clinical proficiency justify giving a dentist without military backgrounda commission in a higher grade than had been offered the man who volunteeredimmediately after Pearl Harbor. The situation was also complicated by theabsence of definite standards for determining clinical qualifications;as long as there were no recognized boards to say whether or not a dentistshould be classed as a specialist, claims to special ability were madevery freely, and to have granted dentists advanced grades on the basisof their own statements would in many cases have resulted in an injusticeto the Government and to the officers already commissioned. There can beno doubt, however, that qualified oral surgeons or prosthetic specialistswere not attracted by the grades they were offered in the Dental Service,and this fact was noted in personnel summaries submitted at the end ofthe war.²⁶⁴ If the policy of assigning dental officers to unitsin the grade of either captain or lieutenant is followed in the futureit will be possible, to offer captaincies to the more experienced dentistswithout jeopardizing the

²⁶¹Ltr, SG, no distribution indicated, butapparently directed to Medical Officer Recruiting Boards, 23 Apr 42, sub:Appointment in the Army of the United States (Medical Department). SG:320.2-1.
²⁶²See footnote 247, p. 93.
²⁶³Brown, P. W. : Procurement of dental officers from civillife, p. 32. HD: 314.7-2 (Dentistry--Army Dental Corps).
²⁶⁴See footnote 122, p. 65.

rights of earlier volunteers. The establishment of recognized specialtyboards will also make it possible to commission qualified dentists as captainsor majors on an equitable basis, with a minimum of protest from nonboardmembers. But only a limited number of vacancies exist in the higher grades,and if they are used carelessly, to lure reluctant dentists when procurementbecomes more difficult, the earlier volunteers will suffer, and moralemay be expected to drop.

THE DEFERMENT OF INSTRUCTORS IN DENTAL SCHOOLS

(See Chapter on "Personnel and Training.")

THE NONPROFESSIONAL USE OF DENTAL OFFICERS

The number of dentists in the United States has never exceeded the bareminimum required to meet the most urgent requirements. When the Armed Forcestook nearly a third of all civilian dentists the remainder were able tocare for the nonmilitary population only with the greatest difficulty.No more men could be spared without endangering the health of war workers,school children, and the general public. It was therefore imperative thatthe available supply of dental officers be used with the utmost economy.

Under some circumstances a military dentist had to be prepared to assumenonprofessional duties. A dental officer with a small task force attackinga Pacific island, for instance, could not hope to accomplish much dentalwork during the assault phase, and he could generally render the most valuableservice by acting as assistant to a medical officer. Also, during the firstpart of the war, medical organizations, and even tactical units, were sometimesso short of trained personnel that any officers with military experiencehad to fill key positions until replacements could be trained. In thesesituations dental officers were used as executives or even as detachmentcommanders. Regulations provided that dentists could not command any unit,but these directives were often ignored.²⁶⁵ When the DentalDivision recommended in 1942 that an order be published prohibiting theuse of dentists for other than their proper clinical or administrativeduties, the Military Personnel Division of the SGO flatly refused approvalon the grounds that dental officers were at that time indispensable inmany auxiliary positions.²⁶⁶

There was less justification for the tendency to use dental officersin minor duties which could have been performed by administrative personnelwith a few months of training. In the case of tactical commands this abuseoften resulted from the circumstances surrounding the formation of newunits in the Zone of Interior. As new organizations were assembled therewas usually an interim period during which most dental care was furnishedby the permanent station

²⁶⁵See footnote 21, p. 44.
²⁶⁶Ibid.

dental clinic. At this time assigned dental officers often lacked theirequipment, and the full complement of enlisted personnel had not yet arrived.A field hospital, for instance, had little clinical work to perform untilit went overseas, yet it had a full quota of administrative positions tobe filled by inexperienced officers. Under these conditions it was almostroutine practice to assign the three dental officers to nonprofessionaltasks since they had free time and the other officers were busy copingwith unfamiliar jobs.

But when such a unit arrived overseas the situation changed completely.The dentists were immediately overwhelmed with demands for treatment, butthe assignment to outside duties often continued. The dental surgeon ofthe Middle East theater found that two dentists in one hospital were togetheracting as mess officer, supply officer, transportation officer, financeofficer, censor officer, and sanitary officer.²⁶⁷ The dentalsurgeon of the China-Burma-India theater reported that "We reallyhave plenty of dental officers en route to and in the theater if they couldbe properly placed and put on their proper duty, but we still have plentywith supply units, messing with minor staff jobs, censoring mail, runningmesses, etc."²⁶⁸

The improper utilization of dental officers during the first years ofWorld War II also derived in part from the prewar doctrine that the dentist`snormal duty in combat was to assist the surgeon. This conception had inturn resulted from the admitted circumstance that under the World War Iorganization the Dental Service could not function too effectively in aforward area and some other duty had to be found for the dental officerof a unit in action. The period of actual combat in World War I was tooshort to reveal the danger of this policy, but as the Second World Warprogressed it was found that evacuations for dental emergencies soon reachedimportant proportions when routine treatment was neglected over any considerableperiod of time; the dental officer could render the most important serviceto his command by giving all his time to his proper professional duties.The dental surgeon of the European theater reported that "the dentalofficers were used purely as auxiliary medical officers in most instances. . . until the medical officers realized that men were getting into thechain of evacuation for dental reasons only, showing that the best utilizationof dental officers was not being made."²⁶⁹ A conferenceof senior dental surgeons, called by The Surgeon General in February 1945,recommended that:²⁷⁰

The utilization of dental officers as auxiliary medicalofficers, as a routine procedure, is condemned.... the dental needs ofa division require the full and most efficient utilization of its dentalpersonnel in dental activities at all times.

²⁶⁷Jeffcott, G. F.: Dental problems in theMiddle East Theater of Operations. Mil. Surgeon 96: 54-58, Jan 1945.
²⁶⁸Personal ltr, Col Dell S. Gray to Col Rex McK. McDowell,1 Jul 44. [D]
²⁶⁹Ltr, Col. Thomas L. Smith, Dental Surg, ETO, to SG, 6 Feb45, sub: History of the Dental Division, Headquarters, ETOUSA, from 1 Septhrough 31 Dec 44. HD: 730 (Dentistry) ETO.
²⁷⁰Memo, Maj Gen R. H. Mills to Brig Gen F. A. Blesse, 8 Feb45. [D]

100

It was ultimately clear that if dental officers could not render regulardental care under the existing organization, that organization would haveto be changed. (See discussion of the division Dental Service in chapterVIII.)

Until the middle of 1942, dental officers` services were also misusedto some extent in permanent installations of the Zone of Interior. (Seechapter I, page 14.) This practice was prohibited in the Zone of Interiorby a War Department directive of 31 July 1942 which provided that in thefuture dentists would be used only in the operation or supervision of theDental Service, and that dentists currently performing other functionswould be replaced as soon as substitutes could be trained.²⁷¹The Air Force issued a similar directive on 7 September 1942.²⁷²

World War II experience supported the following conclusions in respectto the proper use of dental officers:

1. The number of dentists available in an emergency will normally bestrictly limited. It will be sufficient only if they are used with thegreatest economy.

2. If the dentists assigned to combat units are used for other thanprofessional duties, except for very short periods of time, evacuationsfor dental emergencies may be expected to result in an excessive loss ofmanpower when it is most urgently needed.

3. It is essential that the Dental Service be organized to permit dentalofficers to function with a minimum of interruption due to tactical operations.If dental officers cannot treat the soldiers of their commands during combatthey should be removed and used for the care of units in reserve.

4. Some line officers who do not appreciate the need for regular denialcare in their commands will probably continue to use dentists in nonessentialactivities until prevented by a specific official directive or by a reorganizationof dental facilities.

Early steps to prevent the misuse of dentists were reasonably effectivein the Zone of Interior, but they had no direct application outside theUnited States. Changes in the organization of dental facilities in tacticalunits and the development of the mobile operating and prosthetic unitsimproved the situation overseas to some extent, but the nonprofessionaluse of dentists was not altogether eliminated before the end of hostilities.Finally, in October 1945, the War Department directed all commands, Zoneof Interior and overseas, that no medical, dental, or Army Nurse Corpsofficers would be used in positions which could be filled by officers ofother corps of the Medical Department.²⁷³

²⁷¹Ltr, TAG to CGs all Svcs, 31 Jul 42, sub:Utilization of dental officers for professional duties. AG: 210.312 (DentalCorps).
²⁷²AAF Reg 25-4, 7 Sep 42, sub: Utilization of dental officerswith the AAF. On file in the Office of the Air Surgeon, USAF.
²⁷³WD Cir 307, 6 Oct 45.

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THE RELOCATION OF CIVILIAN DENTISTS

The program to relocate civilian dentists who were excess to the needsof their communities, so that they could provide dental treatment in areaswhere they were more critically required, was of course not a responsibilityof the Armed Forces. It did affect the overall utilization of dental manpower,however, and the Army was even more directly concerned when it had to furnishdental care at such locations as the Oak Ridge atomic bomb plant. Actually,the relocation program seems to have received very little attention duringthe war, either because it was considered unnecessary or because it wasconsidered impractical by those who would have had to enforce it.

Early in 1944 Congress appropriated $200,000 to be used to encouragedentists and physicians to move to districts where health care was precarious.Volunteers were to be paid $250 a month for 3 months to enable them toget a start in the new location, and all moving expenses were to be paid.Local communities were to carry one-quarter of the total expense in eachcase.²⁷⁴ The small amount of money appropriated indicates thatthe effort was experimental, and practical results of the voluntary relocationprogram were actually negligible. Only 7 applications were received, and3 dentists were moved; 1 other moved with Federal assistance but with noexpenditure of funds. The project was abandoned in June 1944.²⁷⁵

In theory PAS could have brought about the relocation of dentists bydeclaring them nonessential in their own areas, making them subject toconscription if they did not move to critical districts. But such actiondepended upon effective support from Selective Service, and it has alreadybeen seen that such support was lacking. Moreover, PAS itself showed littleinterest in the matter. Dr. C. Willard Camalier, who was Chairman of theWar Service Committee of the ADA, and also a, member of the Directing Board,PAS, had reported that:²⁷⁶

... while we have no figures on the matter, I am inclinedto feel that very little, if any, of this (relocation) was done. As a-memberof the Procurement and Assignment Directing Board, I was quite well awareof the fact that the Armed Services were taking so many dentists from civilpractice that those left were kept so busy that it would not have beenprofitable for them to locate in other sections of the United States. Theywould have all they could possibly look after in their own areas. In severalinstances, such as Michigan, near the war plants, and a few points downSouth, officers of the U. S. Public Health Service were detailed to carefor the needs of the population. Dentists under the auspices of the Armywere utilized at Oak Ridge, Tennessee.

Whether or not the relocation program was necessary, or whether it wouldhave produced more tangible results if a more sustained effort had beenmade

²⁷⁴Congress provides fund for relocation ofcivilian dentists. J. Am. Dent. A. 31 : 166, Jan 1944.
²⁷⁵Relocation program for dentists halted June 30. J. Am. Dent.A. 31 1021, Jul 1944.
²⁷⁶Personal ltr, Dr. C. Willard Camalier to the author, 16 Oct47. [D]

102

by all concerned, is not a matter for consideration here. It seems clear,though, that dentists who are very busy in their home communities willnot voluntarily move to other locations; if such redistribution becomesunavoidable in a future emergency some compulsion or extra remunerationmust be provided.

UTILIZATION OF FEMALE DENTISTS

Three bills to authorize the commissioning of female dentists were introducedin Congress between June 1943 and March 1945.^{277 278 279} TheDental Division and the Army opposed enactment of all of these bills onthe grounds that there was no shortage of male dentists in the Armed Forcesand that to commission females would raise special problems of housingand assignment.²⁸⁰ After 1944 it was also noted that the Armywas already being criticized because it could not accept all ASTP graduates.Another consideration, which was implied but not stated in these protests,was that the factor which limited the number of dentists available to theArmed Forces was not a numerical shortage of male dentists but the necessityfor leaving sufficient personnel to meet the minimum needs of the civilianpopulation. It would have served no useful purpose to commission womenand then leave a corresponding number of able-bodied males to care fortheir patients. Probably as a result of Army disapproval, none of the billsto commission female dentists was passed by Congress.

POSTWAR PROCUREMENT FOR THE DENTAL CORPS

On 10 August 1945 the War Department announced that it was consideringa plan for increasing the Regular Army Dental Corps by offering commissionsto dental officers who had demonstrated their capabilities during the emergencyperiod.²⁸¹ The necessary legislation was passed by Congresson 28 December 1945,²⁸² and the procedure to be followed waspublished by the War Department on the following day.²⁸³ Theintegration program was designed to bring the total number of officersin the Regular Army to 50,000, an increase of a little under 34,000 officers.The Dental Corps was authorized an additional 476 officers, to bring itstotal strength to 743 dentists.²⁸⁴

²⁷⁷H. R. 2892, 78th Cong., introduced by RepresentativeJohn J. Sparkman, on 7 Jun 43.
²⁷⁸H. R. 1704, 79th Cong., introduced by Representative JohnJ. Sparkman, on 23 Jan 45.
²⁷⁹S. 731, 79th Cong., introduced by Senator Claude Pepper,on 13 Mar 45.
²⁸⁰For criticism of the bills to commission female dentistssee: (1) Ltr, SecWar to Hon Andrew J. May, 22 Jul 43. (2) Ltr, SecWar toHon Elbert D. Thomas, 8 May 45. (3) Memo, Maj Gen R. H. Mills for Mil PersDiv SGO, 27 Mar 45. All in HD: 314.
²⁸¹WD Cir 243, 10 Aug 45.
²⁸²Public Law 281, 79th Cong., 28 Dec 45.
²⁸³WD Cir 392, 29 Dec 45.
²⁸⁴Data given the author by Col James M. Epperly of the DentalDiv SGO, on 15 Jan 48.

103

SUMMARY, DENTAL OFFICER PROCUREMENT PROGRAM

The dental officer procurement program of World War II was successfulin that more than 15,000 qualified dentists were obtained for the Armyunder very difficult conditions. The principal defects revealed were:²⁸⁵

1. During the early part of the war applicants were accepted withoutregard to their true availability, endangering civilian dental practicein some areas.

2. The policy of commissioning almost all applicants in the, lowestgrade protected earlier volunteers but it lost the services of some expertclinicians, who might profitably have been accepted as captains or majorsin spite of their lack of military experience. Deviation from World WarII policy, in a limited number of selected cases, will probably prove advisablein any future mobilization.

3. The classification of officers according to special skills was notaccurate enough, especially during the first years of the war, to permitthe most efficient assignment and utilization of personnel. Clinical specialistswere sometimes assigned to small tactical units rather than to hospitalsor other large installations where their services could best be used.

4. Experience at the end of hostilities, when dental officers had tobe held in the service after other officers were released, and when conscriptionwas necessary to procure even a part of the replacements needed, clearlydemonstrated the need for a slow but constant turnover of dental personnelduring a long war. Older men with families and with established practiceswill be willing to serve in the Army during the early stages of an emergency,but they will bring strong and effective pressure to bear if, after theyhave served for 2 or 3 years, they see recent graduates of the dental schoolsreturning to civilian life to take over their practices. The situationof a dental officer in this respect is different from that of a line officer.No able-bodied young man who is eligible for service in the infantry, forinstance, will be allowed to evade military duty after he graduates fromhigh school or college; he will be taken into the Army without delay, andhis status will generally be inferior to that of the man who came on dutyat an earlier date. But the shortage of dentists in the United States issuch that recent dental graduates will not ordinarily be taken into theArmed Forces for nondental duty. If they cannot be used as dental officersbecause of a lack of vacancies they will be allowed to set up offices incivilian communities to provide badly needed dental care. It is easy tounderstand the older dentists` position that the younger men should begiven their share of military service, releasing officers who have alreadyhad several years of active duty. When Dr. X, who had served 3 years inthe Army, with 2 years overseas, received a letter from his wife sayingthat young Dr. Y, who had graduated the year before, had now taken overmost of Dr. X`s practice

²⁸⁵See footnote 122, p. 65.

104

his morale took a severe dip. When Dr. X was later held in the Armyafter other officers with similar service were being released, his generaldistaste for all things military was converted to an active resentmentwhich would color his future actions as a member of the dental professionand as a citizen.

If the Army Dental Corps consists almost entirely of officers with severalyears of service when hostilities end, these men will have to be releasedwithout delay; at about the same time compulsory procurement may be terminated,resulting in a critical personnel crisis. By the very nature of their business,dentists cannot afford to give up the practices which they have taken yearsto build to accept temporary, voluntary, military service in the postwarperiod. If the older men are gradually replaced by recent graduates duringthe war a more balanced Dental Corps will result, demobilization at theend of hostilities will be more orderly, and personnel difficulties willbe minimized during the difficult period of transition from war to peace.

5. The procurement program was characterized by frequent changes ofpolicy which confused and irritated cooperating agencies and the dentiststhemselves. The ADA complained of this situation as follows: ²⁸⁶

When war came, the Army opened and closed commissionsin the Dental Corps with such eccentric rapidity that dentists and stateProcurement and Assignment chairmen were in a perpetual quandary. On oneday a large procurement objective would be set and on another the DentalCorps would be closed and dentists in the process of getting commissions,having closed their offices would be sent back to civilian life. The ArmySpecialized Training Program war, initiated with the proper flourish ofmilitary trumpets as the answer to the problem of providing the Army witha continuing supply of dental personnel. This program was barely in fullmotion when one entire class of dental graduates was sent into civilianlife because "procurement objectives" allegedly had been reached.. . . Under this mistaken knowledge of its own needs the Army eventuallyshut down the entire dental ASTP and permitted many potential dental officersto return to civil life instead of completing their training as replacementsfor veteran officers. So certain was the Army that the matter of dentalpersonnel was well in hand that, at about this time, the Dental Corps wasagain closed.

This criticism was of course extreme, and not fully justified. So faras is known, dentists in the process of being commissioned were alwaysaccepted for service if they met physical requirements. The frequent changesin policy complained of generally paralleled War Department changes inestimates of the forces needed to meet new developments, and the extentto which the flow of dentists into the Armed Forces could have been smoothedout is a matter of opinion. Procurement objectives were admittedly changedon short notice, however, and a more consistent program would certainlybe desirable, to the extent it could be achieved under emergency conditions.

²⁸⁶Dental officers pay again. J. Am. Dent.A. 33: 755-757, 1 Jun 46.