CHAPTER VIII
Mediterranean Operations
PLANNING FOR THE INVASION OF NORTH AFRICA
After preliminary discussions held in the Arcadia Conferenceof December 1941 to January 1942, the Allied leaders decided to beginformulating definitive plans by late July for Operation TORCH, designed to gaincomplete control of northern Africa. These plans, which were completed in Augustand September 1942, provided that task forces of the United Kingdom and theUnited States should strike simultaneously at Algiers and Oran on theMediterranean coast and at Casablanca on the Atlantic coast of Morocco, incoordination with a planned offensive of the British Eighth Army from the ElAlamein line in the East.1
Western Task Force
Despite the fact that medical supplies were limited, supplyplanning was adequate. The medical troops were to land with unit equipment andcombat supplies, minus special items which would follow in later convoys. A30-day maintenance of supplies, including blood plasma, special drugs, andbiologicals, was to be unloaded on the beaches, and a 60-day maintenance was tobe unloaded at the main port of entry. A 45-day supply level was to bemaintained, and medical supply points were to be established on the beaches foreach combat group after the landing of assault troops. Also, a medical supplydepot was to be established at the main port of entry as soon as possible afterD+5 to provide support for the entire task force.
To minimize disturbing the wounded and to maintain an evendistribution of equipment, arrangements were to be made for the exchange oflitters, blankets, splints, and similar items at transfer points.
The Western Task Force of 34,000 American troops was to landalong the western coast of Morocco after sailing from the United States. In theassault on Safi, a company of the 9th Medical Battalion was to handle themedical supplies for Subtask Force Blackstone, a medical supply depot was to beestablished which would be responsible for obtaining supplies and hav-
1For a more definitive discussion of strategic planning for Operation TORCH, see Howe, George F.: Northwest Africa: Seizing the Initiative in the West. United States Army in World War II. The Mediterranean Theater of Operations. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1957, pp. 13-31.
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ing them available for use by the collecting station, andproperty exchange with the battalion medical section and the naval shore partywas to be controlled. The unit was also responsible for furnishing medicalsupplies for the battalion medical sections.
Medical support for Subtask Force Goalpost, which was to landin the Mehdia-Port Lyautey area, and for Subtask Force Brushwood, which was toland at F?dala and swing south to capture Casablanca, was to be furnished bydetachments from the medical battalions organic to the divisions involved,augmented by a detachment from the 56th Medical Battalion.2
Center Task Force
The Center Task Force of 40,800 American and British troopsof the II Corps was to land in the vicinity of Oran, Algeria. Its supplyplanning was conducted on a joint British-American level from 3 September to 20October 1942.
Because of a shortage of medical supplies in the UnitedStates and limited shipping space, needed material had not been arriving inEngland. The British, therefore, were to furnish medical material wheneverpossible. To further satisfy supply shortages, assemblies not needed elsewherewere applied to the task force requirements. Additional supplies were sent tothe United Kingdom from New York for initial depot stocks and to fill outhospital equipment assemblies turned over to the U.S. forces by the British.
Processing of requisitions for initial issue, and forreplacement of medical supplies for the task force while it was in the UnitedKingdom, was accomplished by the 1st Medical Supply Depot. This depot, whileoperating 5 separate depots, accomplished the overwhelming task of equippingcombat troops with 15 days of medical supplies, packing and shipping 27 medicalmaintenance units, reprocessing 3 surgical hospitals, 3 evacuation hospitals, 5station hospitals, and 2 general hospitals.3
Eastern Task Force
The Eastern Task Force of 23,000 British troops and 10,000Americans was to land in the vicinity of Algiers. For political reasons, theAmerican elements, two regimental combat teams, were to withdraw and let theBritish have full control after the initial assault. Responsibility forlogistical support
2(1) Headquarters, Task Force A, Washington, D.C., Annex No. 2 to Administrative Order No. 1, 10 Oct. 1942. (2) Annual Report, 9th Medical Battalion, 9th Infantry Division, 1942. (3) Journal, 56th Medical Battalion, 7 December 1941-1 May 1942 and 26 November 1942-17 January 1943. (4) Wiltse, Charles M.: The Medical Department: Medical Service in the Mediterranean and Minor Theaters. United States Army in World War II. The Technical Services. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1965.
3(1) Annual Report of the Surgeon, II Corps, 1942. (2) Letter, Col. F. C. Tyng, MC, Chief, Finance and Supply Service, OTSG, to Lt. Col. Earle G. G. Standlee, MC [Chief, Finance and Supply Division], Office of the Chief Surgeon, ETOUSA, 1 Aug. 1942. (3) Annual Report, 1st Medical Supply Depot, ETOUSA, 1942.
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fell primarily on the British First Army, which was to besupplied from the United Kingdom.4
ASSAULT ON NORTH AFRICA
Western Task Force
The leading elements of the Western Task Force landed atthree points-Safi, F?dala, and Port Lyautey-on the western coast of Moroccoduring the early morning hours of 8 November 1942.
To protect the 30-day stock of medical supplies, they wereevenly distributed in the convoy. The inadequate number of available vehicleswas accentuated by the commandeering of some of them for other combat duties.Only 8 cross-country, and 12 armored, ambulances were available for medicalsupport necessary between the beaches.5
The bulk of the supplies for Subtask Force Blackstone wasunloaded at the Safi docks where a large warehouse was converted into aregimental aid and collecting station. However, because of the great confusionwhich was caused by sniper fire, landing of equipment was hindered considerably.The novel idea of stenciling exchangeable equipment did not work out inpractice. Equipment which went back to the ships with casualties was seldomreturned. A serious shortage of blankets was averted, however, because the 56thMedical Battalion had carried an extra supply.
As there was no equipment available other than that broughtin by company B, cots and other needed equipment were borrowed from the Navy. Anoperating table was obtained, X-rays and sterilization were handled by theFrench hospital, and a much needed refrigerator was obtained from a localmerchant.
Approximately 40 surgical operations were performed at nightwith three flashlights providing the illumination.6
Despite delays caused by heavy enemy fire, supply dumps wereestablished on the main beaches near F?dala by the afternoon of D-day. Forwardmovement of these supplies was held to a minimum because of the serious lack oftransportation. Shortages of essential medical supplies and equipment resultedbecause ships were behind schedule in unloading.
Encountering perhaps the stiffest resistance, Subtask ForceGoalpost was forced to advance its H-hour, and only a few waves were landed bydaylight.
Contrary to the expected practice, morphine tablets wereissued and used. Syrettes, requisitioned by the medical depot of the commandbefore embar-
4(1) Davidson, William L.: Medical Supply in the Mediterranean Theater of Operations, U.S. Army. [Official record.] (2) Letter, Col. C. R. Landon, AGD, Headquarters, SOS, ETOUSA, to Commander in Chief, Allied Forces, and others, 18 Jan. 1943, subject: Supply of TORCH from U.K.
5Kenner, Albert W.: Medical Service in the North African Campaign. Bull. U.S. Army M. Dept. 76: 76-84, May 1944.
6(1) Clift, Glenn G.: Field Operations of the Medical Department in the Mediterranean Theater of Operations, United States Army. [Official record.] (2) See footnote 2(2), p. 204.
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MAP 4.-Medical supply depots in North Africa,1942-43.
kation, were mistakenly held for base hospitals which did notarrive until later convoys.7
Center Task Force
Favored by the element of surprise, the initial assault onthree beaches in the Oran area was successful. Arzew was secured at 0300 hoursand the 48th Surgical [later redesignated 128th Evacuation] Hospital came ashoreand began operating. Much of the necessary medical equipment was not availableuntil 1800 hours, but a makeshift hospital nevertheless was set up in a Frenchbarracks. Emergency supplies and supplies obtained from transports were useduntil the morning of D+2, when the equipment of the 38th Evacuation Hospitalarrived and was turned over to the 48th Surgical Hospital. Among these supplieswere 480 units of plasma and 100 morphine Syrettes.
7(1) Final Report of Western Task Force, Operation TORCH, 7-11 Nov. 1942, Annex No. 2, Headquarters, Subtask Force Brushwood, 3d Infantry Division (Reinf.), F?dala, Morocco, Casablanca Operation. (2) Letter, Brig. Gen. L. K. Truscott, Jr., to Commanding General, Western Task Force, 18 Dec. 1942, subject: Report of Operations [Goalpost], in Final Report of Western Task Force, Operation TORCH, 7-11 Nov. 1942, Annex 3. (3) Camardella, Ralph A.: Medical Aspects of Landing Operations, Subtask Force Goalpost, 8-11 Nov. 1942. [Official record.]
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By December 1942, the 38th Evacuation Hospital had the bulkof its equipment and was operating under tentage near Oran.
The 51st Medical Battalion, which arrived on the D+3 convoy,was responsible for setting up a medical supply depot after a detachment haddistributed medical supplies to the beachhead troops. Some difficulty occurredin coordinating activities between the port regulating officer and the medicalsupply officer of the task force. The first medical supplies received at theport rarely reached the dump, or arrived in bad condition. Boxes were notproperly tagged and packing lists were practically nonexistent.
After the fall of Oran on 10 November, the 1st AdvanceSection of the 2d Medical Supply Depot landed and relieved the 51st MedicalBattalion of the supply dump operation. Unfortunately, many desperately neededvehicles were lost at sea. On Christmas Day 1942, the balance of the 2d MedicalSupply Depot, commanded by Lt. Col. Elmer B. M. Casey, MC, arrived in Oran,where it joined its advance section in the operation of the depot (map 4).
Because of the critical shortage of drugs, surgicalinstruments, dental supplies and equipment, and some basic hospital and medicalfield items of equipment, subsequent issues were made on a priority basisaccording to the role
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that a given organization was playing in the operation. Astroops moved forward, it was necessary to build medical maintenance for theirsupport. This caused a tightening of issues to local troops and caused anavalanche of complaints. This situation, however, was remedied rapidly, and by21 November, practically all required items could be provided.
Perhaps the most serious problem of medical supply during theearly stages of the Center Task Force was the lack of proper communicationbetween principal medical supply personnel, probably because of the extremesecrecy of the operation.8
Eastern Task Force
The Eastern Task Force landed on the beaches near Algiers onschedule and was initially unopposed, but firm resistance was encountered as thetroops began to move inland.
Medical support rendered during the operation came fromcompany C and the 2d Platoon of company D, 109th Medical Battalion, and companyA and the 2d Platoon of company D, 9th Medical Battalion, organic respectivelyto the 34th and 9th Divisions; and from four teams of the 2d Auxiliary SurgicalGroup. The first detachment of company C, 109th Medical Battalion, landed at0730 hours on D-day (8 November), carrying its medical supplies and equipment onsix heavily laden litters. A clearing station with one ambulance, six litters,and other medical supplies was established. Because of the delay in unloadingthe medical supplies and equipment, U.S. medical units had to obtain emergencysupplies from the British, who hand-carried them from the beach. In severalcases, rough seas prevented the rapid unloading of material.
It was not until D+6 that, by using borrowed vehicles, allsupplies from the ship were unloaded and transported to a schoolhouse where thehospital was sited.
Lessons Learned From Operation TORCH
One of the paramount medical problems of the entire TORCHoperation was that personnel did not have in their possession sufficient medicalequipment to permit their proper functioning upon landing. To provide an initialsupply dump, it was suggested that each medical soldier be issued a haversack orcarrier containing vitally essential dressings, instruments, drugs, and blood.
It was also suggested that medical maintenance units bepacked in 100-pound waterproof boxes, designed for hand-carrying duringlandings.
In addition, it was proven that the 4- by 4-ft. ambulance wasinadequately
8(1) Annual Report, 128th Evacuation Hospital, 1943. (2) Annual Report, 38th Evacuation Hospital, 1942. (3) Annual Reports, 2d Medical Supply Depot, 1942 and 1943. (4) See footnotes 4(1), p. 205; and 6(1), p. 205.
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powered and had too high a silhouette. A half-track orsix-wheeled vehicle was suggested as a substitute.9
ESTABLISHMENT OF BASE SECTION MEDICAL SUPPLY
With the formation of Headquarters, Mediterranean Base Section,on 7 December, followed closely by the opening of Headquarters, Atlantic BaseSection, on 30 December 1942, there began what might be considered theoutstanding logistical agency in the war against the Axis. Activation andemployment of the base section in the wake of the conquering Army becamestanding operating procedure.
Atlantic Base Section
The Surgeon's Office, Atlantic Base Section,10with Col. (later Maj. Gen.) Guy B. Denit, MC, as Surgeon, was originallyestablished in September 1942 as the Surgeon's Office, Headquarters, SOS(Services of Supply), Task Force A, located at Fort George G. Meade, Md. Themedical supply section of this office was under the command of Maj. (later Lt.Col.) Theodore L. Finley, MC, the Medical Supply Officer, who coordinated thepreparation and shipment of 6 tons of medical supplies by 13 December.
Upon arriving in Casablanca on 24 December 1942, the medicalsupply officer of Western Task Force, Maj. (later Lt. Col.) Marcel H. Mial, SnC,discovered that some medical supplies were already stored in warehouses situatedin five widely separated locations. Need for additional storage space wasevident, and sufficient additional space was gradually acquired.
During the early days in North Africa, all medical supplyactivities were under the control of Western Task Force; however, in themeantime, an agreement was reached whereby the supply officer of Headquarters,SOS, working closely with the task force medical supply officer, wouldfamiliarize himself with the supply operation. As only one officer among thesupply personnel was experienced, this handicapped operations to some extent.
Despite numerous difficulties involved in obtaining,transporting, and properly storing medical supplies and maintaining a stablework force, subdepot issue points were established at Casablanca and Rabat byDecember 1942. Personnel of hospital ship platoons began the first physicalinventory of medical supplies at these points. Under the direction of ColonelFinley and Lt. Col. (later Col.) Karl H. Metz, DC, the assistant supply officer,necessary requisitioning was initiated. Colonel Metz undertook the establishmentof
9(1) Platt, Edward V.: Record of Events, Company C, 109th Medical Battalion, October 15, 1942 to November 9, 1942. [Official record.] There are similar reports by Capt. Thomas E. Corcoran, MC, commanding officer of company C, and by Capt. Francis Gallo, MC. (2) Weiss, William A.: Record of Events [2d Auxiliary Surgical Group, Headquarters, Special Troops (Prov.), EAF], October 19, 1942 to November 20, 1942, 9 Dec. 1942. [Official record.] (3) Memorandum, Col. John F. Corby, MC, Deputy Surgeon, AFHQ, to Chief of Staff, AFHQ, 30 Jan. 1943.
10This part of the chapter, unless otherwise stated, is based on the Annual Report of the Atlantic Base Section, 1943.
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necessary depot routine and organization of records. Duringthis time, one issue point and four warehouses were opened.
On 26 February 1943, Maj. Frederick Schneider, MAC, arrivedand was designated assistant supply officer. At this time, the 4th MedicalSupply Depot [later 4th Medical Depot Company],11commanded by Maj. (later Lt. Col.) Walter Smit, VC, arrived to assume theoperation of the Atlantic Base Section Medical Depot. Supply points wereimmediately opened at Rabat and Mekn?s, and a final reserve warehouse was setup at Safi.
Before the acquisition of several warehouses in Casablanca,it became necessary to store valuable supplies out of doors in a bivouac area.In Casablanca alone, there were 14 small warehouses; consolidation wasimpossible because of the nonavailability of larger buildings and thecompetition for space which came from hospitals and the other technicalservices.
Emphasis abruptly shifted to the assembling of medicalmaintenance units needed in other areas of North Africa in support of combattroops. An effort was made to balance requirements in the entire theater. InApril, a 25-bed station hospital was shipped to Marrakech (map 4), and twomedical maintenance units were sent to Rabat for storage to facilitate forwardmovement of balanced medical stocks. Much equipment was moved by train to theMediterranean and Eastern Base Sections at the request of the medical supplyofficer of the North African theater.
Despite many handicaps, more than 700 requisitions a monthwere filled by the Atlantic Base Section medical supply depot during the firstmonths of operation, including a pressing demand for smallpox vaccine.
By June 1943, the level of supply had reached 141 days, andthe problem of adequate warehouse space recurred. In July, the space problem waseased somewhat when 100 tons of medical supplies were turned over to the French,and additional warehouse space was obtained. The shipment of 400 tons ofadditional supplies to the Eastern Base Section to use in support of combattroops also helped considerably.
Mediterranean Base Section
Beginning with the cessation of hostilities in the Oran area on10 November 1942, space, which was acquired where it could be found, wassufficient only to satisfy immediate needs. The principal storage and issue siteconsisted of 22,000 square feet, located in the outskirts of Oran proper. Thebuildings where all medical supplies were first delivered were new, two-story,permanent type. Here, both issue and warehousing functions took place.Practically all stocks during this early period were medical maintenance unititems shipped with the initial convoys.
A former wine storage warehouse of some 22,000 square feetwas acquired subsequently in Oran proper, and all incoming supplies were firstprocessed through this point, broken down into general groups, and stored
11History, 4th Medical Depot Company (formerly 4th Medical Supply Depot), 1940-45.
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or redistributed to other locations. No absolute checking or"tally-in" was effected.
Another building, 2,250 square feet, was used exclusively forstoring three medical maintenance units which were regarded as the final reserveunits. Other lesser storage locations were acquired in the greater Oran area(fig. 45 A, B, and C) to accommodate the overflow of supplies received.12
The first depot of the Center Task Force, operated by the51st Medical Battalion, had a depot and issue section under one officer, and areceiving and warehouse section under a second officer; the third officer, alongwith the port medical supply officer, undertook the considerable task oflocating medical supplies and directing them to the receiving warehouse in Oran.During this period, identification and location of medical supplies at the portunloading points were made extremely difficult by the lack of personnel and byinaccurate ship manifests. Because information on berth locations of unloadingships was withheld as a security measure, a prolonged search for the suppliesforestalled preplanning for the movement of supplies to the warehouses.
Competition with the French Army for storage space was morekeenly felt in the Oran area than in the Casablanca area. The French Army hadpriority and, as a result, the U.S. Army medical supply requirements were placedlow on the list. For these reasons, numerous small medical warehouse locationswere scattered over a wide area.
Because of lack of proper warehousing and inequitabledistribution of supplies, complete records of depot stock could not bemaintained. All hands worked around the clock to accomplish an inventory, but itwas not until after 8 December 1942, when the Mediterranean Base Section assumedcontrol from Center Task Force, that physical inventory was ordered andaccomplished, and a semimonthly stock status reporting system was established.
The medical supply personnel of the Mediterranean BaseSection were inexperienced and were only hastily briefed on the supplysituation. Their immediate problem was the location and consolidation ofscattered medical supplies. Indigenous labor was employed to unload and load thescarce vehicles. Numerous incidents of loss of supplies resulted from exposure,pilferage, or accident in the port area, owing to lack of immediatetransportation.
In the beginning, medical supplies were receivedautomatically from the United States and the United Kingdom in the form ofmedical maintenance units (fig. 46), supplemented by items required for thegeographical location and the type of operation involved. Automatic shipmentsfrom the United States ceased soon after the invasion.
During the first few months of the North African campaign,the need for balancing medical stocks with adequate stock control measures, forrequirements determination by item, and for separate requisitioning on the Zoneof Interior was apparent. Automatic supply served its purpose well during theinitial stages, but even the first requisitions submitted by Mediterranean Base
12This section is based on the Annual Report, Mediterranean Base Section, 1943.
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FIGURE 45.-A. Exterior view of a medicalsupply warehouse in Oran. B. Oran depot optical shop.
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FIGURE 45.-Continued. C. Issue section of theOran Medical Depot.
Section on about D+30 had to be prepared on a man-days ofsupply basis by item, rather than by a calculation based on actual item demandexperience.13
In North Africa, where indigenous personnel provided most ofthe stevedore service (fig. 47), color markings appropriate to each technicalservice were placed on the corners of the boxes. This proved to be a great boonto the unloading and sorting process as natives, who were unable to comprehendthe instructions on shipping documents or stenciled on the sides of the boxes,sorted the supplies on the docks and beaches by color, thus enabling faster andless confusing removal of supplies to warehouses.14
By February 1943, the problem of medical warehouse space inOran became so severe that an unprecedented appeal was made to G-4 of thatheadquarters by the Surgeon. A tour of all depots impressed G-4 so much that acrash construction program was begun, and an excellent shed-type depot wasestablished on the outskirts of the city.15
13Medical Supply History, Mediterranean Base Section, 27 Sept. 1943. [Official record.]
14Letter, The Adjutant General, Headquarters, ETOUSA, to Commanding General, SOS, ETOUSA, and others, dated 9 Sept. 1942, subject: Information and Markings Required for Overseas Shipment.
15See footnote 13, above.
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TUNISIA CAMPAIGN
Supply Buildup
From the beginning of the Tunisia Campaign, launched whenthe Eastern Task Force turned east from Algiers on 11 November 1942, it wasobvious that supporting medical units had to be highlymobile. The fluid front, the lack of a secondary road network, and the poorcondition of the main road from Algiers were sizable obstacles. Inadequatesingle track, narrow gage railways were the main links from the MediterraneanBase Section to the Tunisian front.
As fighting developed into a seesaw battle in Tunisia,American medical units and their supplies were building up in the MediterraneanBase Section in preparation for their concentration in the T?bessa-Kasserinearea. They were to join in support of the II Corps, which was preparing to driveto the eastern coast of Tunisia to prevent the uniting of the Afrika Korps andthe
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German forces in Tunisia. The 1st Advanced Section of the 2dMedical Supply Depot was detached to furnish medical supply support for thisoperation.16
Resupply of the advancing units was effected automatically byshipment of 18 medical maintenance units from Oran and the United States. Thiswas later augmented by a balanced stock of supplies, shipped directly from theUnited States on requisition initiated by the Surgeon's Office, NATOUSA (NorthAfrican Theater of Operations, U.S. Army).
In coordination with the II Corps offensive of 26 January,medical units were concentrated in the Constantine-T?bessa area and, 10 milessouth of T?bessa, the 1st Advanced Section of the 2d Medical Supply Depot wentinto operation. As part of the buildup, a heavy forward movement of medicalsupplies and equipment took place from Oran by way of the single rail line
16See footnote 8(3), p. 208.
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through Algiers to Constantine and the narrow gage link fromthere to T?bessa. An initial stockage of four medical maintenance units,consisting of 70 tons of medical supplies, was set up and subsequent resupplyfor the corps was carried out with medical maintenance units and specialrequisitions. Because of the various problems of transportation andcommunication, timely coordination and shipment of required supplies andequipment were extremely difficult. Activation of the Eastern Base Section andestablishment of their medical depot at Constantine (map 4) greatly improvedthis situation.17
Eastern Base Section
On 22 February 1943, during the most critical point in theTunisian struggle, Headquarters, Eastern Base Section (map 4) was activated.Consistent with the pattern of base section employment, personnel were drawnfrom the previously established Atlantic and Mediterranean Base Sections. Thefirst medical depot in the new base section was established at Ain M'Lila andwent into operation with 40 tons of U.S. supplies and supplies from the Britishdepot near B?ne. By May, the original 40 tons had been increased to 383 tons.To accommodate this rapid supply buildup, medical sections were opened in twogeneral depots at B?ne and Philippeville. However, the main concentration ofsupplies remained at the Ain M'Lila depot, which, along with the two medicalsections, was operated by the 4th Medical Supply Depot. Relief from this heavyburden was forthcoming with the assignment of a section of the 2d Medical SupplyDepot to Ain M'Lila on 3 April 1943, and the arrival of the 7th Medical SupplyDepot at Mateur, where they established a medical section in General Depot No. 6on 26 May 1943.
The 7th Medical Supply Depot, commanded by Maj. (later Col.)Clark B. Williams, MC, had practically no warehouse space allotted to it and,therefore, obtained additional warehouse space by repairing several buildings.In spite of this, incoming supplies were received in quantities too great toplace under cover and, in August and September, about 1,000 tons of supplieswere in open storage. Fortunately, before the rainy season, a large warehouse inBizerte was assigned to the medical depot and the situation was relievedsomewhat. Proper warehousing was still difficult because of the scattering ofsupplies through some 26 warehouses of varied size. By 15 October, all medicalsupplies were consolidated into the 7th Medical Supply Depot [later 7th MedicalDepot Company] at Mateur.18
Because of certain surpluses reported by Maj. (later Lt.Col.) Henry T. Lapp, MC, the Mediterranean Base Section medical supply officer,a revision of the medical maintenance unit (fig. 48) was proposed. In aconference held in Oran, which included representatives from all echelons ofsupply, a combat medical maintenance unit-a modification of the current unit-wascreated.
17See footnote 12, p. 211.
18(1) General Order No. 5, NATOUSA, 13 Feb. 1943. (2) Annual Report, Eastern Base Section, 1943. (3) Annual Report, 7th Medical Supply Depot [later 7th Medical Depot Company], 1943.
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Items and quantities included were tailored to the Tunisiancombat requirements. Unessentials were eliminated or reduced while items ingreater demand were added or existing quantities increased. The result was acompact 30-day supply for 10,000 troops, with a weight of 12 to 14 tons comparedto the standard weight of 20 tons. This proved to be highly satisfactory, andinformation was cabled to the Surgeon General's Office for appropriate action.Subsequent modifications were made by NATOUSA as experience dictated. From thisexperience, the beach medical maintenance unit was designed for use in theSicilian operation.19
Drive Through Tunisia
Preparations began for an anticipated offensive after thewithdrawal of the German forces at Kasserine Pass on 22 February.
Medical units were hard-pressed during the subsequent action,which began on rugged terrain which somewhat handicapped movement of supplies.
19(1) See footnote 12, p. 211. (2) Report, Maj. Gen. A. W. Kenner, Chief Medical Officer, SHAEF, to Chief Surgeon, ETOUSA, and others, 13 Apr. 1944, subject: Report of Visit to AFHQ.
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FIGURE 49.-Col. Charles F. Shook, MC,Surgeon, Services of Supply, North African theater.
However, in one area a modified ammunition cart provedinvaluable in carrying medical supplies to battalion aid stations, which as aresult were able to function closer to the front than would have otherwise beenpossible.20
After redeployment of 100,000 men and equipment of the IICorps as the enemy withdrew toward Bizerte, various problems of medical supplycame to the attention of Maj. (later Lt. Col.) Ervin H. Markus, MC, MedicalSupply Officer of the Eastern Base Section. As of 1 May 1943, II Corps wassupplied with one combat medical maintenance unit every 5 days; this wasaugmented by TBA (table of basic allowance) shortage replacements that wererequisitioned every 2 weeks. Many items were critically short, the most seriousbeing dental items, because of shortages in the United States, limitation inmedical maintenance units, and severe combat losses experienced in the TunisiaCampaign.
It was apparent in such an operation that initial depotstocks should include provision for replacement of combat losses of all basicmedical equipment. Losses were also attributed to fair wear and tear, deliberatedestructions to prevent enemy seizure, losses at sea, and theft. Losses at seawere made up automatically by the U.S. port, but delays necessarily ensued, thusslowing down the reequipping of arriving units. Adding to all these problems wasthe
20Recollections of Lt. Col. Douglas Hesford, MSC, included in an early draft of this chapter.
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further task of supplying units arriving with shortages inbasic equipment. It was not until June 1943, after the Tunisia Campaign hadended, that units began receiving their full authorization of equipment. ByAugust 1943, more than 1,400 tons of medical supplies were on hand in theEastern Base Section, units were well equipped, and critical shortages werevirtually nonexistent. Consolidation of equipment was accomplished and, by theclose of 1943, all medical supplies were received, stored, and issued at onelocation, the Mateur depot operated by the 7th Medical Depot Company.21
FORMATION OF SERVICES OF SUPPLY
A high point in the logistical effort to support theMediterranean campaigns was the activation of SOS, NATOUSA, on 15 February 1943in Oran.22 Lack of coordination between thebase sections made this move necessary. The Medical Section of SOS, NATOUSA, wasorganized by Colonel Finley, medical supply officer of the Atlantic BaseSection, who was followed in May by Col. Benjamin Norris, MC. In August, Col.Charles F. Shook, MC (fig. 49), became SOS Surgeon. The new organization assumedthe function of centralized stock control and made all requisitions on the portof embarkation while maintaining necessary stock levels in the various supplydepots of the theater.
Centralized Operations
The strength of the Medical Section, SOS, soon began to makeitself felt in medical supply operations of the theater. By operating with basesection medical supply officers, theater medical supply activities took oncoordinated order and purpose. Conferences were held with hospital commanders,chiefs of professional services, and medical supply officers to reassure them inmatters of medical supply.
Perhaps the most significant contribution made to medicalsupply by the Services of Supply was the establishment of a theaterwide centralstock control system, which was inaugurated when SOS assumed responsibility forediting requisitions sent to the Zone of Interior.
Coincident with this was the development of item replacementrates for the theater, based on 90 days, in lieu of those developed by the WarDepartment. Control of incoming shipments and intertheater shipments was also asignificant feature. In the meantime, the theater had notified the SurgeonGeneral's Office of the imbalanced stock position resulting from medicalmaintenance units and requested a one-time shipment of a balanced depot stock.The shipment arrived in late 1943 and helped to balance theater stocks ofmedical supplies and to fill any quick requisition for these supplies in anypart of the theater.23
21See footnote 18(2), p. 216.
22General Order No. 6, NATOUSA, 14 Feb. 1943.
23Annual Report, Medical Section, SOS, NATOUSA, 1943.
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Medical Supply and Aid to the French
As soon as the North African landings had been completed andthe French surrender was made final, the Allies wasted no time in gainingcomplete French support. Under the direction of the Joint Rearmament Committee,the reequipment of the French was accomplished in three phases, the first havingas its goal the supply of forces for the defense of North and West Africa.
Supplies for the French began arriving in early April 1943,and the U.S. bases were then instructed to assist with the reception, storage,assembly, and issue of serviceable equipment (fig. 50). French technicalpersonnel, attached to those base section service units which handled equipmentfor delivery to French units undergoing resupply, were instructed in supplyprocedure by 2d Lt. (later Capt.) Douglas Hesford, MSC, of the MediterraneanBase Section, and 1st Lt. (later Maj.) Alexander F. Striker, SnC, of the SOSmedical section. Several warehouses were occupied by the French, but followedU.S. procedures. All tricolor marked supplies were turned over to them. By thetime responsibility for resupply of the French was turned over to the Fifth U.S.Army, supplies for 1 month for 100,000 men had been built up in the Oranwarehouse.24
24(1) See footnote 4(1), p. 205. (2) Notes on Conference Concerning Supply of French Expeditionary Corps, held at Headquarters, SOS, NATOUSA, 29 Sept. 1943.
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ISLAND CAMPAIGNS
Preliminary Planning
Contrasting sharply with the lack of detailed planning andpoor communications of the North African campaign, planning for the invasion ofSicily, begun as a result of the British and American conference held at theAnfa Hotel near Casablanca in January 1943, was thorough and centralized. Planswhich were approved on 13 May 1943 established the reconstituted 1st ArmoredCorps, designated "Force 343," as the American element of the invasionforce.
Under the direction of Col. L. Holmes Ginn, Jr., MC, who leftthe 1st Armored Division to become Surgeon, 15th Army Group, and Col. Richard T.Arnest, MC, II Corps Surgeon, results of Operation TORCH were closelyscrutinized, and issue and maintenance requirements were established. Maj.(later Lt. Col.) Howard C. Jones, SnC, of the SOS medical section, and MajorLapp, of the Mediterranean Base Section, were the officers principallyresponsible for medical supply planning and coordination with the preinvasiontraining which was taking place at Mostaganem, Algeria, in April 1943. Plans hadto provide for supply over the beaches for a period of 30 days because of thelack of a readily available port. The first supply convoy which was to originatein the United States was scheduled to arrive at D+14 after a port was secured.
In an AFHQ (Allied Forces Headquarters) communication of 28March 1943, items estimated to be essential were listed, and those not in stockor on order were to be requisitioned from the United States. All itemsrequisitioned by Force 343 that could be furnished from theater stocks wereextracted to base sections for packing and marking, while the remainder were tobe held in the Zone of Interior under receipt of disposition instructions.Limited shipping space made it necessary to mount the invasion in three separateconvoys, landing at 4-day intervals. If beach resupply should prove inadequate,arrangements were made for the partial use of the port of Syracuse (in theBritish area) after D+14.
After carefully studying the lessons learned from the NorthAfrican invasion, planners decided that medical units would land with unitequipment plus special supply items, such as blood plasma, extra morphineSyrettes, and dressings. A balanced stock of medical supplies for a 7-daymaintenance of the forces (fig. 51) was to be unloaded on the beaches on D-day.Medical supply dumps were to be established in widely dispersed, yet protected,points on the beaches immediately after the landing of assault groups.
Under the supervision of the beach surgeon, property exchangewas to be accomplished on the beaches before supplies were moved forward.
The first followup convoy was to carry a 7-day maintenance inaddition to its own 7-day maintenance. The second followup group was to carry a7-day maintenance for the assault group and a 7-day maintenance for the firstfollowup in addition to its own 7-day maintenance, except II Corps, which
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was to carry a 14-day maintenance. Each subsequent followup wasto bring in a 7-day maintenance plus 7 days for troops in, up to five followupconvoys previously landed.
Special items, such as sunburn cream and seasick capsules,were to be drawn and issued before embarkation. Thirty days' combatmaintenance of certain expendable supplies and pest control materials was to beprepared by SOS, NATOUSA, or the New York Port of Embarkation, and was to beavailable on call of the Commanding General, Force 343.
An additional 30 to 60 days' maintenance was to be laiddown by the Surgeon, SOS, NATOUSA, on call of the Commanding General, Force 343,to be built up in Sicily. A 10-day supply for troops of subtask forces served bybeaches was to be available by D+32, and a 20-day supply for all troops by D+90.
The Force 343 surgeon was to requisition special suppliesfrom the Eastern Base Section, whose surgeon was responsible for preparingsupplies for shipment and delivery to ports.
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Hospital ships and carriers were authorized to transportmedical supplies, and were used to replenish stocks and to handle propertyexchange of items of equipment returned to North Africa with patients evacuatedby air. As a secondary benefit, this procedure helped relieve the shortage ofshipping space.
Emergency requisitions were to be placed in the same manneras those for other supplies. Force 343, however, was to give resulting shipmentsa priority in their daily requests for air transportation. Moreover, the EasternBase Section surgeon was to maintain a small medical supply dump in the vicinityof Kairouan, Tunisia, to contain a balanced stock of those items typicallyrequired for emergency air shipments.25
Sicily Campaign
With plans completed, the pick-and-shovel work of medical supplysupport began, the main burden of packing and marking falling on the 2d MedicalSupply Depot at Oran (fig. 52), which ran an around-the-clock operation for 2months.
The advance detachment of the 4th Medical Supply Depot, whichhad been operating at Ain M'Lila, Algeria, was ordered to Ferryville, Tunisia,on 1 June 1943, where it operated around the clock, supplying task force unitsdestined to make the Sicilian invasion. On 7 July, the dump was closed, and theunit (3 officers and 42 enlisted men) moved to Sicily, attached to the 3dDivision, and landed at Licata on 12 July 1943.26
The 1st Advance Section of the 2d Medical Supply Depotremained near Algiers until 8 July, when it was attached to the 1st Division andsubsequently landed near Gela, Sicily, on 13 July.27
After a period of heavy bombardment, the amphibious assaulton Sicily began on 10 July. Despite the destruction of 20 percent of the landingcraft by heavy seas, all beaches on the southern shore were secure by the end ofthe first day.
The landing of medical personnel at Gela was unduly delayedbecause of heavy opposition and lack of unit equipment on the beach. A clearingstation of the 1st Medical Battalion was established, but was hampered by thelack of necessary equipment. A significant amount of medical equipment,including ambulances, was lost at sea as a result of rough landings and enemyaction. These setbacks handicapped hard-pressed medical units, but did notseriously hinder supply support in general.28
25(1) Report of Operations of the Seventh U.S. Army in the Sicilian Campaign, 10 July to 17 August 1943. Part I-Summary of Operations. [Official record.] (2) Headquarters, I Armored Corps (Reinf.), Annex No. 2 to Administrative Order No. 1, "Medical, Part 3, Supply," 14 June 1943.
26See footnotes 11, p. 210; and 18(2), p. 216.
27(1) See footnote 11, p. 210. (2) Irwin, Lawrence J.: Medical Supply Field Operations, 10 Aug. 1945. [Official record.]
28(1) See footnote 25(1), above. (2) Wiltse, Charles M.: The Medical Department: Medical Service in the Mediterranean and Minor Theaters. United States Army in World War II. The Technical Services. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1965. (3) Report, Col. Richard T. Arnest, MC, Surgeon, II Corps, to The Surgeon General (through channels), dated 30 Aug. 1943, subject: Report of Medical Activities; Sicilian Campaign.
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The end of the amphibious phase on 16 July was followed by therapid advance of the Seventh U.S. Army, which made it very difficult for medicalunits to keep pace. However, support never faded as the drive carried forwarduntil 22 July, when Palermo fell to the Americans. The Sicily Campaign came to aclose with the fall of Messina on 17 August 1943.
In spite of the careful planning and preparation, anticipatedshortages of certain items, such as tincture of opium, glycyrrhiza and opiumtablets, sulfaguanidine tablets, hydrogen peroxide, litters, blankets, mercury,some surgical and dental instruments, and canvas cots, did occur.
Approximately 110 tons of medical supplies were landed on 16beaches between D-day and D+2. These initial supply loads consisted of combatmedical maintenance units, heavily augmented by items which experience in NorthAfrica had shown to be required. Medical supplies and equipment were unloaded onthe beaches in haphazard fashion, and were later picked up by the beach grouppersonnel, who issued them as needed until medical supply depot personnel cameashore. In the Scoglitti area, medical supplies were so widely scattered on thebeaches that collecting them was a slow and difficult task.
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MAP 5.-Medical supply depots in Sicily, July-August 1943.
About 10 percent of the initial medical supply load in allareas was lost because of enemy action.
At Gela, the 1st Advance Section of the 2d Medical SupplyDepot established its first distribution point, which was stocked with suppliestaken over from the beach group or later taken from the beaches. To accomplishthis, the depot borrowed trucks from the 1st Medical Battalion while waiting fortheir own transportation to be unloaded.
The movement of the various supply depots (map 5), which wereoperated by sections of the 2d and 4th Medical Supply Depots, was indicative ofthe fast pace at which the combat situation developed. All medical suppliesunloaded in Sicily were received, segregated, inventoried, and moved toappropriate distribution points, which were each stocked with 15 to 20 tons ofbalanced medical supplies and located as near the combat elements as thetactical situation would permit.
During the course of the campaign, several Italian medicalsupply dumps and military hospitals were captured. Some material found in theseinstallations was adaptable for treatment of civilians and prisoners of war.
In spite of shortcomings and difficulties, medical supplysupport for the Sicily Campaign proved to be satisfactory because of carefulpreparation. Requisitioning of medical supplies and equipment estimated to beadequate for current maintenance plus a 30-day reserve was ultimately phased inon followup convoys from the United States. Acute shortages were satisfied by
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emergency requisitions on base depots in North Africa, withair delivery of urgent requirements. The first such emergency requisition wasfor litters to replace those lost due to the failure of property exchange withhospital ships and air transports involved in the evacuation of patients duringthe first week. Because this failure occurred along the entire chain ofevacuation, these items were constantly flowing to the rear and piling up.Canvas cots, also among the first emergency requirements, were needed to supportextensive bed expansion in hospitals.
In preparation for the Sicily Campaign, a 1- by 1- by 3-ft.box was designed to provide uniformity for ease of storing and as a containerone man could handle. A strip of wood was nailed across each end to afford ahandle. Although the objective was practical and realistic, boxes wereinadequately constructed because of the scarcity and poor quality of materialsavailable in North Africa. Therefore, much of the advantage to be gained wasoutweighed by the large number of broken boxes arriving at Sicilian supplypoints.
To counteract the flagrant rifling of supplies, it wasrecommended that cases containing whisky be marked with a code known only toshipping and receiving depot personnel.29
Lack of coordination between the elements making thebeachhead landing resulted in the breakdown of the property exchange system.Directives had been issued to leave all unused litters, blankets, and splints onthe beaches. The Seventh U.S. Army medical supply officer was unable to locatemany items which had been handled in this manner. Also, medical suppliesscheduled for loading on LST's (landing ships, tank) before their departurefrom North Africa were never loaded. Medical personnel who were assigned tothese ships were also missing. It was all typical of the innumerable,unexplainable aspects of war as no single cause could be identified at the time.30
The medical maintenance units were found to be generallyadequate, but, again, the quantity of cotton was excessive and out of proportionto the other items supplied. Conversely, camphorated tincture of opium, plasterof paris bandage, and crinoline were furnished in quantities far short ofrequirements. Also, some "seasonal" items furnished were "out ofseason" for the time of year the operation took place.
As with other TOE (table of organization and equipment)medical units, medical depots and their elements were constantly hampered by theshortage of organic transportation. Vehicles of the 1st Advance Section of the2d Medical Supply Depot were late in unloading. In any event, they wereinsufficient to transport all necessary unit equipment and personnel.Consequently, vehicles were borrowed from any available source.31
29(1) Letter, Capt. Charles D. McDonald, MSC, to MedicalSupply Officer, Seventh U.S. Army, 25 Sept. 1943, subject: Medical Supply DuringSicilian Campaign. (2) See footnotes 8(3), p. 208; and 25(1), p. 223.
30Letter, Col. L. Holmes Ginn, Jr., MC, Surgeon, 15th Army Group, to Brig. Gen. A. L. Hamblen, AFHQ, 20 July 1943,subject: Report of Visit to Sicily.
31See footnote 25(1), p. 223.
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Following the successful conclusion of the Sicily Campaign,the Island Base Section was activated at Palermo on 1 September 1943, therebyperpetuating the process of base section employment.
With the capture of Sicily, the Allies had achieved aspringboard to Italy and the Continent, and no time was lost in using Sicily forthis purpose. On 9 September 1943, initial landings took place at Salerno.
ASSAULT ON ITALY
Fifth U.S. Army Plans and Preparations
The Fifth U.S. Army, which was activated on 5 January 1943,at Oujda, French Morocco, began planning Operation AVALANCHE, the Salernoinvasion, in July 1943. A target date of 7 September 1943 was set. The medicalsupply planning team of SOS-Mediterranean Base Section, so effective in theSicily Campaign, joined with other Army personnel in planning the invasion ofItaly.
Medical units were selected, tonnages were computed andphased, and requisitions were prepared for convoys through D+24. A supply levelof 14 days was scheduled to be achieved by D+12. Supplies consisted of medicalmaintenance units, augmented by special items, such as plasma, litters,blankets, Atabrine, plaster of paris, and biologicals.
Experience developed in Sicily and the lessons learned in theTunisia Campaign were integrated into Fifth U.S. Army medical supply planning.All medical units were to carry ashore their full TBA material, with selectedunits designated to carry additional special supplies and equipment. A medicalsupply dump was to be established on the beach and absorbed by medical depotpersonnel scheduled for early landing. Initially, no forward delivery ofsupplies was planned because of the extremely limited number of supply personnelin the assault phase. The depot group was to establish forward supply points asnecessary and, later, to operate a depot to serve the entire force. Medicalunits landing with the assault force were to carry extra wheeled littercarriers, litters, blankets, Medical Department chests No. 2, splint sets, andother selected medical supplies and equipment. The splint sets, which were to betaken ashore in specially prepared waterproof containers by unit medicalpersonnel, consisted of dressings, gauze, bandages, cotton, crystallinesulfanilamide, morphine Syrettes, blood plasma, sulfadiazine ointment andtablets, halazone tablets, together with specially prepared sterile packets offine mesh gauze impregnated with boric acid or Vaseline ointment. Thewaterproofed packs containing these items weighed 70 pounds and could floatwhile supporting a man in water. In addition, unit personnel each carried 13units of plasma in the bottom extension of the individual medical kit. Contentsof the kit not expended during the assault phase were to be delivered to thebeach
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FIGURE 53.-Landing craft, infantry, unloading supplies,Italy, September 1943.
medical supply depot, a feature which was an application of arecommendation made following the initial landing experience in North Africa.32
Salerno Landings
The 4th Medical Supply Depot and the 12th Medical DepotCompany were selected for the Salerno operation, and a detachment of the 4thlanded with the assault force on D-day. Because of heavily mined beaches andintense enemy artillery fire, depot personnel could do little but dig in untilmidafternoon when beaches were cleared of mines up to ? mile inland. Portableairstrip landing mats of wire were laid on the sands so that supply vehiclescould operate freely. Because certain medical supplies brought in by invasionbarges were dumped into the water near the shore, depot personnel had difficultylocating them and fishing them out.
On D-day, more than 100 tons of medical supplies wereunloaded, secured, segregated by class, and stored at one location while anissue point was located at another spot (fig. 53). A total of 200 tons of unitequipment for the 16th and 95th Evacuation Hospitals was gathered and held bythe depot group
32(1) Annual Report, Surgeon, Fifth U.S. Army,1943. (2) WIltse, Charles M.: The Medical Department: Medical Service in the Mediterranean and Minor Theaters. United States Army in World War II. The Technical Services. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1965, pp. 251-252.
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pending arrival of unit personnel. This was a rare instancewhere equipment of major medical units preceded unit personnel in landing.
By D+4, all personnel of the 4th Medical Depot detachment hadarrived and supply tonnages had doubled. During the first month, the depotcommendably filled 1,102 requisitions while maintaining a detailed inventory ofsupplies.
As in most other beach operations up to this time, theunpredictable event was the chief cause of difficulty. In the Salerno landings,large quantities of gauze, cotton, adhesive tape, and medications were lost inthe water. Transports carrying medical supplies and equipment were sunk whilemany items such as fluoroscopic screens, X-ray equipment, darkroom tents, andColeman stoves were lost or damaged in transit.33
With the experience of Sicily behind it, the SOSorganization responded quickly to the urgent requirements of the new beachhead.The Salerno landings were accomplished with this more fully developed advantage.Requisitions for shortages were radioed from the beaches to SOS in North Africawhere resources of the theater could be employed in support.
It was not until 20 September 1943 that the beachhead wasfinally secured and the advance proceeded toward Naples and beyond the VolturnoRiver. On 4 October, the 12th Medical Depot Company, commanded by Maj. (laterLt. Col.) George P. Wilson, MSC, replaced the 4th Medical Supply Depotdetachment as the medical depot of the Fifth U.S. Army and took custody of the50 tons of medical supplies on hand. The detachment then rejoined its parentorganization, which, by this time, had established a base depot in Naples (fig.54) following its arrival from North Africa.
The 12th Medical Depot was based on the Naples depot forsupport; however, the latter did not open until 15 October and, because ofinadequate stock, full support of the 12th was not possible. Meanwhile, the 12thoperated a depot first at Avellino on 11 October and, on 25 October, at Caserta.These locations were advantageous because most medical units being supportedwere concentrated in that area, and the tactical situation warranted it. By 17December 1943 (map 6), the 12th was supporting a troop strength of 225,000 froma depot operated at Riardo and another containing some 120 tons of supplies andequipment set up in a monastery near Calvi Risorta.34
Peninsular Base Section
Meanwhile, the 4th Medical Supply Depot had established aforward dump at Secondigliano just north of Naples on 10 October (map 6). On 1November 1943, the base element of the 4th was assigned to the Peninsular BaseSection at Naples. With a wealth of experience to its credit, this unit quicklyadapted itself to the necessity of running a base depot. During this period andup to January 1944, it handled a large input of supplies from
33See footnotes 11, p. 210; and 32(1), p. 228.
34Annual Report, 12th Medical Depot Company, 1943.
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FIGURE 54.-Naples Fair Grounds served as a medical depotsite.
North Africa and the United States and sustained the 12thMedical Depot Company and surrounding medical units (fig. 55) despite heavy airattacks which failed to interrupt operations to a damaging extent.
The 4th Medical Depot Company for the first time was forcedto hire civilian laborers when a reorganization stripped it of 16 trainedenlisted men. Meanwhile, crowded conditions caused another dump, called Dump352, to be opened in the munitions factory tunnels located in the outskirts ofBagnoli. This new installation supported combat operations as well as severallarge medical treatment complexes.
At this point, it is to be noted that the theater was thenoperating two major medical depot systems: one represented by the 4th MedicalSupply Depot in the Peninsular Base Section in Italy and the other by the 2dMedical Supply Depot in Oran, which was carrying tremendous operating stocks andreserves for the entire theater.
Adriatic Depot
In addition to the supply depots of the Peninsular BaseSection, a depot was established by a detachment of the 4th Medical DepotCompany at Bari,
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Italy, in October 1943. This depot functioned as support forAir Force and supporting troops until 20 March 1944, when it was turned over tothe Medical Section, Army Air Forces Service Command. Supply responsibility wasthen handled by the Air Force in direct contact with the Zone of Interior.35
Anzio Operation
The 1st Advance Platoon of the 12th Medical Depot Company,after a secret move to Naples, was attached to VI Corps, then preparing for theAnzio operation. Again, this platoon was scheduled for D-day landings, but thistime it immediately followed shore engineer battalions to keep medical depotstocks and unit equipment separate from supplies and equipment of
35See footnote 11, p. 210. (2) Annual Report, Army Air ForceService Command, Mediterranean Theater of Operations, 1944.
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FIGURE 55.-Medical supply, 300th General Hospital, Naples,Italy.
other elements during the early hours on the beach. Again,shipping space was at a premium and, along with enemy action, the lack of it cutinto supply and equipment levels.
Refinements in packing and loading of supplies wereincorporated into the landing preparations while better features of the morerecent Salerno operation were also adopted. Increased supply levels, improvedrequisitioning procedures, special items, and property exchange were adequatelyprovided. Allied Forces Headquarters arranged for hospital ships to maintain areserve of litters, blankets, and splints, while naval landing craft carriedequipment to augment and further insure uninterrupted property exchange inpatient evacuation. As an added feature, combat commanders were directed toestablish guards over any enemy medical facilities or supplies encountered inthe advance to prevent looting and preserve their serviceability for use incaring for prisoners of war. This was no doubt prompted by problems encounteredin North Africa when it became the duty of some U.S. medical units to treatprisoner-of-war patients at a time when supplies, equipment, and medicalfacilities were at a premium.36
Arriving on the beach with the second assault wave on 22January 1944, the 1st Advance Platoon of the 12th Medical Depot Company,commanded by Capt. (later Maj.) Richard P. Gilbert., MSC, had a temporary beachdump
36Annual Report, Surgeon, Fifth [U.S.] Army, 1944.
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in operation by 0700 hours on D+1. Gathering supplies was noproblem then because all that had arrived were several hundred blankets. On thefollowing day, the dump was moved to a more permanent site on a hill near theAnzio-Albano road.
Depot facilities consisted of a four-story building, 70- by40-ft., which accommodated the headquarters, issue room, shipping section, andliving quarters as well as two storage tents which were arranged so the largered crosses would be clearly visible to the enemy.
At first, supplies were distributed equally and stacked byclass; however, the constant threat of shelling and bombing made it necessary todistribute the most important items of supply in several areas to avoid completedestruction of any one particular item. This was a rather complicatedarrangement of stockpiles, but was worth the effort involved.
Despite the absence of unloading facilities on the beachheadduring the first 5 days, medical supply operations were sustained during thisperiod by the supplies carried in by combat and service units. These supplieswere transported on the vehicles organic to the various units or often carriedin mortar shell cases (fig. 56), and either dropped on the beach or carried tothe supply dump.
By D+6, the first shipment of medical maintenance unitspacked by the 4th Medical Depot Company in Bagnoli was completely unloaded.Because of difficulty in item identification, the British maintenance unitswhich were included were turned over to a British casualty clearing station.
Once again, despite precautionary efforts, property exchangein patient evacuation broke down on the beaches because LST's and other shipsdid not return with litter and blankets as expected. Unfortunately, largequantities of such items had been allowed to accumulate in Naples. This problemwas solved by requiring litter bearers unloading patients in Naples to return alitter and blanket to the LST for each patient removed.37
Because of heavy seas and shallow beaches which preventedproper landing or docking, emergency requisitions were dispatched to Napleswhere LST's were loaded, transported to Anzio, and landed directly on thebeaches. With improved weather conditions, ships in the harbor were soonunloaded and large surpluses began to accumulate in the depot. To handle thisunmanageable workload, 20 Italian civilians were hired. All supplies weretallied and stored by D+15. To offset the constant turnover of the indigenouswork force, a detachment of Italian soldiers was employed, but with no betterresults. Finally, the problem was solved by the assignment of 12 U.S. soldiersto the depot.
Harassed by air raids and shelling, the depot neverthelessprocessed requisitions in rapid time. Emergency requisitions for such items asdistilled
37(1) GIlbert, Richard P.: Combat Medical Supply Operations-theAnzio Beachhead. [Official record.] (2) Wiltse, Charles M.: TheMedical Department: Medical Service in the Mediterranean and Minor Theaters.United States Army in World War II. The Technical Services. Washington: U.S.Government Printing Office, 1965.
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FIGURE 56.-Mortar shell cases used atAnzio.
water, dextrose., and normal saline solutions, as well asessential items of equipment, were sent to the Peninsular Base Section to makeup for hoarding and heavy losses of hospital equipment on the beaches. Thesesupplies were rigidly controlled by the depot while items of equipment vitallyessential to hospital operation were maintained in depot stock. Hospitalequipment was not stocked according to usual procedure, but there was no otherway to make equipment immediately available. Rapid delivery of replacement itemsfrom Naples was successfully accomplished.
A steady flow of supplies into Anzio was maintained by use ofevery conceivable form of transportation ranging from Piper Cub to transports,destroyers, LCT's (landing craft, tank), and LST's. Consequently, by 24April 1944, a 93-day reserve of supplies was on hand. Again contrary toexpectation, the boxes for medical supplies failed to hold up. By this time, themore
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"popular" medical stock numbers stenciled on theboxes were well known to our troops, and whisky and narcotics again became aprime target of looters. Looting in Italy, in contrast to that in North Africa,was negligible. Difficulty was experienced in locating box numbers or the boxwhich carried the master packing lists of a shipment. The inadequacy of thetables of organization and equipment for a storage and issue platoon of amedical depot company was a problem.
Between 23 January and 7 June 1944, the 1st Advance Platoonof the 12th Medical Depot Company, while operating the supply point for theAnzio beachhead, handled 842 tons of supplies and equipment, of which 610 tonswere issued and 232 tons transferred. In keeping with the superior performanceof the medical service as a whole, this was a highly significant accomplishmentfor a small depot section operating under severest handicaps.
ROME-ARNO CAMPAIGN
Fifth U.S. Army Medical Service
U.S. medical units were regrouping near Carinola to supportthe Fifth U.S. Army in the spring offensive which was launched before midnighton 11 May 1944.
While the 1st Platoon of the 12th Medical Depot Company wassupporting the Anzio beachhead, its 2d Platoon moved from the base depot atCalvi Risorta on 20 April to the town of Nocelleto before the Fifth U.S. Armyattack. By this date, the unit was supporting a new Fifth U.S. Army area inwhich the troop strength had been increased to approximately 201,000. With theattack, the platoon again moved rapidly; first to Itri, then on to Rome by 9June and Piombino by 28 June, finally reaching the vicinity of Florence on 31 August 1944.
Meanwhile the 1st Platoon, after reverting to company controlwhen joined by the base section on 7 June, moved from Anzio to Civitavecchia on11 June and to Cecina on 9 July. While in the Civitavecchia and Cecina areas,the 1st Platoon experienced great difficulty in obtaining supplies from itsparent base section which had replaced it at Anzio. The small amount of suppliessent from Anzio, supplies flown in from Naples, and a limited amount of suppliesremaining at Civitavecchia comprised the total stock available for the Rome-Arnooffensive. Consequently, it would seem that were it not for excessesinadvertently built up during the early days at the Anzio beachhead, medicalunits could have experienced serious supply shortages during those crucial firstfew weeks of the campaign.38
During the Rome-Arno Campaign, the 12th Medical Depot Companywas reorganized, its three platoons being redesigned storage and issue platoons(fig. 57 A and B). Throughout the campaign, one platoon supported each of
38(1) Annual Report, 12th Medical Depot Company, 1944. (2)See footnote 37(1), p. 233.
(3) Mial, Marcel H.: Fifth Army Medical SupplyActivities, 1 August 1943-1 August 1944, dated 28 Aug. 1944. [Officialrecord.]
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237
MAP 7.-Medical supply depots in Italy, 6 January-17 September 1944.
the two U.S. corps engaged, while the base element maintained a positionaccessible to both (map 7). Problems of delivering supplies over rugged terrainwere solved by using every conceivable means of transportation, including packanimals and sleds.
During the period up to 11 September 1944, the 12th had operated entirelyunder canvas. As a result, supplies and equipment were subjected to the rigorsof wind, dust, rain, and general dampness, which made operations unsatisfactoryand costly.39
39Wiltse, Charles M.: The Medical Department: Medical Service in theMediterranean and Minor Theaters. United States Army in World War II. TheTechnical Services. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1965.
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On 17 August 1944, regular requisitioning in the PeninsularBase Section was established by the Fifth U.S. Army. The use of War Departmentreplacement factors, introduced as a means of determining medical supplyrequirements relative to troop strengths to be supported, had little effect onFifth U.S. Army's medical stock position during the Rome-Arno Campaign. Duringthe campaign, U.S. medical supply support was furnished to French, Brazilian,and various British units, and on occasion to Italian troops, as well as FifthU.S. Army Forces. Where Allied troops were concerned, delicate politicalquestions required equal delicacy in deciding when and what medical suppliescould be spared for Allied troops.
The sensitivity of this situation was recognized by Brig.Gen. Joseph I. Martin, Surgeon, Fifth U.S. Army, and he manifested this in hispolicies. Expendable supplies going to U.S. troops were drawn directly from thedepot; however, nonexpendables were processed through the Fifth U.S. Armymedical supply officer, Colonel Mial, for control purposes before depot action,as were all requisitions from Allied units. Approved requisitions for the Frenchwere forwarded to the depot, which in turn transferred the specified materialdirectly to the French medical supply depot which effected proper distribution.For the Brazilian units, Colonel Mial forwarded approved requisitions to the12th Medical Depot Company for issue directly to the Brazilian units concerned.
It was observed that there was widespread hoarding by allorganizations, which in some instances threatened their mobility. At this pointin the war, units had become familiar with the unreliability of the forwardmovement of supplies. Although not to be condoned, their hoarding was notentirely without explanation. To cope with these problems, the Army Surgeondirected that a vigorous supply discipline program be implemented in the FifthU.S. Army.
As a device to conserve medical equipment, a novel featurewas employed to provide Allied units with equipment in excess of authorizedallowances. In particular, when a request was found justified, the Army Surgeonauthorized the issue to a nearby U.S. unit, which in turn released it onhand-receipt to the Allied unit. Emergency issues were always made withoutquestion. Such occasions were frequent, particularly as a result of destructionof supplies and equipment by the elements.
The Army Surgeon also exercised scrutiny of depotinventories, while records on the location of all medical equipment used inFifth U.S. Army units were kept by his medical supply officer. Such extensivecontrol of material was, perhaps, the most detailed procedure used in a combatarea in the entire Mediterranean theater.40
Services of Supply Support
In February 1944, a realinement converted the year-old SOS,NATOUSA, into a true communications zone organization. Colonel Shook remained as
40(1) Administrative Directive No. 49, Headquarters,Fifth U.S. Army, 17 Aug. 1944, subject: Basis for Editing Class II Requisitions.(2) See footnote 36, p. 232.
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Communications Zone Surgeon, with an enlarged staff to carryout his expanded functions. Lt. Col. (later Col.) Joseph G. Cocke, MC, becameColonel Shook's deputy in April, and Lt. Col. (later Col.) Jenner G. Jones,MC, was placed in charge of the medical supply branch. Although thecommunications zone medical section took over many activities for which thetheater surgeon had previously been responsible, such as hospitalization andevacuation, working relations between the two groups continued to be harmonious.
Control of the base sections, also, passed to thecommunications zone early in 1944, together with base section supply problems.For example, most of the 2,000 tons of stock on hand in the Peninsular BaseSection consisted of medical maintenance unit components. Stocks of hospitalequipment, such as would be specially requisitioned through SOS, NATOUSA, werestrictly limited.
On 5 January, Services of Supply assumed responsibility forsupplying the various base sections in the theater and for keeping theaterstocks properly balanced. Due-in records were maintained by Peninsular BaseSection, utilizing SOS requisitions as sources of information. Theserequisitions were themselves based on the semimonthly inventory reports.
Extremes and urgency of support that SOS encountered wereexemplified by the German attack on ships anchored off Bari, in December 1943,causing the loss of one general hospital assembly, two station hospitalassemblies, and two field hospital assemblies. This would have been acatastrophe if SOS had not previously chosen to disregard instructions from theZone of Interior to dismantle two general hospital assemblies stored under tarpsat the Oran Medical Depot (fig. 58). Components of these assemblies comprisedthe bulk of immediate replacements.
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During the summer of 1944, the Peninsular Base Section founditself not only supporting the Rome-Arno offensive of the Fifth U.S. Army, butequipping and reequipping units of the VI Corps in addition to providingresupply requirements for the southern France beachhead forces. During July andAugust, the latter requirements amounted to 184 tons of medical supplies andequipment.
The peak of activity for SOS, NATOUSA, and other majorheadquarters was the summer of 1944. An infinite variety of relativelyunpublicized supply problems were arising and being solved. For example,shipment of dated items requiring refrigeration en route to, and while storedin, theater depots had been a problem from the beginning. Refrigerated space on ships was always overcrowded and inadequate. To solve both problems, SOSarranged with the New York Port of Embarkation to have appropriate shipmentspacked into Engineer Corps knocked-down, walk-in type refrigerators, which inturn were loaded aboard ship, intact. On arrival, the loaded refrigerators weredelivered intact to depots (fig. 59). Thus, adequate storage in transit pluscontinued storage on arrival at the depot were assured, while uniform expansionof the theater refrigerated storage capacity was achieved concurrently.41
Support through Leghorn-Tonnage of medical>supplies inthe Peninsular Base Section grew from 2,000 tons in January to 6,000 tons byAugust
41(1) Annual Report, Peninsular Base Section, 1944. (2) Fora more detailed description of the organization of the medical service inthe Mediterranean theater, see The Medical Department, United States Army.Organization and Administration in World War II. Washington: U.S. GovernmentPrinting Office, 1963.
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1944. With Leghorn captured, this base section acquired asupply base fully capable of filling all Fifth U.S. Army needs. Stocks wererapidly built up so that by the year's end, tonnages of medical materiel inLeghorn were equal to those carried in Naples (fig. 60). This was accomplishednot without considerable difficulty as the actual point of receipt of individualitems could not be predicted more than 10 days in advance of unloading. Problemsarising out of necessity for transshipment were substantial.
The 4th Medical Depot Company, base depot for the PeninsularBase Section, continued operation at Bagnoli. By April 1944,tonnage had increased to 4,000 tons and issues reached an aggregate of 1,000tons a month. During the Rome-Arno Campaign, the activity of the 4th increasedmarkedly to a peak in May, when 2,228 requisitions were filled.
Preparations to move North African bases-Characteristic ofoperations in the theater as the war moved closer to the enemy heartland,base section operations of earlier campaigns gradually consolidated and phasedout of operation. Consequently, excess stocks in North Africa were shipped tothe Peninsular Base Section. A large shipment from the Eastern Base Sectionarrived simultaneously with an 8,000-package shipment from the MediterraneanBase Section. This deluge was a backbreaking task to handle, but in 6 days,the 4th Medical Depot Company had it all recorded and warehoused.
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This and other depot workloads could not have beenaccomplished with the 136 men authorized under new TOE 8-667. Depot personnelwho were rendered excess under the earlier reorganization were retained ontemporary duty.42
Shifting of supply depots in rear areas-On departureof the base element of the 12th Medical Depot Company from Anzio, it wasreplaced by the 7th Medical Depot Company, which was at the time assigned toPeninsular Base Section. It operated the Anzio issue point from 11 to 21 June1944, when it was directed to operate the depot at Civitavecchia. Being relievedby a detachment of the 4th Medical Depot Company, the 7th returned toNaples and, by 1 July, had begun preparations for the forthcoming invasion ofsouthern France.
The supply of troops in the Rome area presented particularproblems to the Peninsular Base Section. After considerable delay, a plan wasevolved to institute service to these units directly from the Naples depot whilethe 4th Medical Depot Company detachment at Civitavecchia supplied only units inthat immediate vicinity. In addition, the 12th General Hospital in Rome wasstocked to distribute supplies to those units in the Rome area.
On 7 July 1944, a group from the Civitavecchia detachmentestablished a small issue point at Piombino. Coincident with this, all medicaldepots south of the Volturno River were consolidated by 17 July. Operations werethereby centered in Bagnoli while all medical depot operations between theVolturno and Civitavecchia had been eliminated. Meanwhile, the 4th Medical DepotCompany had been augmented by the 684th Quartermaster Base Depot Company, whichpreviously had been attached to the 7th Medical Depot Company (map 7) and wasfurther attached to the 4th on relief of the 7th from the Civitavecchiaassignment.43
SOUTHERN FRANCE CAMPAIGN
Following the capture of Rome on 5 June 1944 and theestablishment of Headquarters, SOS, NATOUSA, at Caserta, on 4 July, the CoastalBase Section, with the specific mission to support the invasion of France, wasorganized. When the invading VI Corps struck the coast of southern France on 15August 1944, it was accompanied by personnel of the section, now calledContinental Base Section, who opened its headquarters at Marseille. Tocompensate for the long supply line, CONAD (Continental Advance Section), whichwas established close to the Armies at Dijon, replaced the deactivatedContinental Base Section. Delta Base Section was activated simultaneously withheadquarters at Marseille. Together CONAD and Delta Base Section constitutedSOLOC (Southern Line of Communications), of which Colonel Shook was Surgeon.
42(1) See footnote 41(1), p. 240. (2) Annual Report, 232d Medical Service Battalion, 1944.
43(1) Annual Report, 7th Medical Depot Company, 1944. (2) See footnote 42(2), above. (3) Annual Report, 684th Quartermaster Base Depot Company, 1944.
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Base Section Medical Supply
During their brief tenure in Marseille, Continental BaseSection personnel located an excellent depot site near port and rail facilities,and unloaded and warehoused over 200 tons of medical supplies before the arrivalof the 231st Medical Composite Battalion (formerly 2d Medical Supply Depot) on10 September 1944. At the outset, the base surgeon, who had been supervisingbeach dump operations, was advised that several ships would unload 200 tons ofmedical supplies in the near future. Without depot personnel, warehousing, ortransportation, the assistant base section medical supply officer took immediateaction and, after scouring the city, found a suitable building which he claimedfor use as a medical depot. Despite some difficulty unloading the supplies androunding up needed personnel, all 200 tons of equipment were stored within 15hours. Under these circumstances, the first medical supplies for base sectionoperation were received, stored by catalog class, and readied for issue within72 hours of arrival.44
With the arrival of the veteran 231st Medical CompositeBattalion, commanded by Major Markus, base section depot operations began withvigor. Originally designated Medical Depot 356 (later European theater Depot M-452),it grew to be one of the largest and most ideally operated depots in thetheater, with over 255,000 square feet of closed shed and open warehouse space(fig. 61 A and B).
To alleviate the manpower shortage, elements of the 46th and81st Medical Base Depot Companies and the 320th Medical Service Detachment wereattached to the 231st at various times. A mobile optical unit of the 7th MedicalDepot Company was attached to the Marseille depot on 10 September to handleoptical repair for the base section.
Early Depot Operations
On 16 August 1944, an advance section of the 7th MedicalDepot Company, which had been attached to the Seventh U.S. Army for the SouthernFrance Campaign on 13 July, came ashore at Sainte-Maxime, and took over theoperation of the three medical supply dumps at Sainte-Maxime, Le Muy, and Saint-Rapha?l (fig. 62).
By 25 August, this section, after operating an issue point atLe Cannet, had moved to Saint-Maximin, where it was joined by the main body ofthe 7th Medical Depot Company (map 8).
Moving rapidly up the Rh?ne Valley in support of the SeventhU.S. Army offensive, units of the 7th Medical Depot Companybriefly operated supply points at Meyrargues, Aspremont (map 8), Voreppe,Selli?res, and Baume before the entire company reunited on 20 September atVesoul (map 9). Here the first permanent depot in southern France wasestablished in a
44See footnote 41(1), p. 240.
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large tobacco warehouse, which provided adequate space forstorage, issue offices, mess facilities, and billets.45
Through the efforts of the 46th Medical Depot Company andMaj. (later Lt. Col.) Oliver A. Parssinen, MAC, modern palletized storagemethods and maximum materials-handling equipment were introduced, thus enablingthe depot to better support the 6th Army Group.
By 31 October, 444,715 tons of general cargo and 147,231vehicles had been disembarked in southern France. Because of the improved port,rail, and road facilities, supplies were handled and moved rapidly. Eventuallythe medical depot developed and maintained a 15-day level of supplies for theCombat Zone and a 15-day level for CONAD.46
45(1) Report, 231st Medical Composite Battalion, dated 28Oct. 1944, subject: Medical Historical Data. (2) See footnote 43(1), p. 242.
46(1) Annual Report, 46th Medical Depot Company,1944. (2) Headquarters, Communications Zone, NATOUSA, Circular Number 113, 6Oct. 1944. (3) Wiltse, Charles M.: The Medical Department: Medical Service in the Mediterraneanand Minor Theaters. United States Army in World War II. The Technical Services. Washington: U.S.Government Printing Office, 1965. (4) See footnote 45(1), above.
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On 26 October, the 71st Medical Base Depot Company wasassigned to CONAD at Dijon, where it joined in operating the depot there withthe 70th which had arrived several days previously. That depot site, although ithad satisfactory billeting for personnel, lacked adequate covered warehousespace. Consequently, large amounts of stock were in open storage.47
Later Depot Operations
As of 1 November 1944, both CONAD and the Delta Base Sectionwere absorbed by SOLOC. The original staff of this group was drawn from theCommunications Zone, NATOUSA, organization, including its surgeon, ColonelShook. Indeed, the personnel shifts were so extensive that Communications Zone,MTOUSA (as it was formally known after 1 November 1944), went out of existence in less than a month. Its functions, including medical supply, were resumed bythe theater medical section. In southern France, meanwhile,
47Narrative Summary, 71st Medical Base Depot Company,November 1944.
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FIGURE 62.-Beach medical supply dump in southern France.
in a radical departure from earlier policy, a MedicalAdministrative Corps officer, Lt. Col. Allen Pappas, became medical supplyofficer of SOLOC.
At first, both the Delta Base Section and CONAD were suppliedby Communications Zone, NATOUSA, but all supplies for CONAD passed through theDelta Base Section. They were often transferred by DUKW's (amphibious trucks,2?-ton cargo) from ships directly to waiting freight cars, boundfor forward areas without ever entering the Delta Base Depot. Receipts at thedepot were very small for the first 2 months. In fact, adequate stocklevels could not be achieved in either base section because ship arrivals wereuncertain. Also, because the Marseille port was only partially restored,unloading was relatively slow, and transportation from port to depot was tightlyscheduled. In spite of this, the 231st Medical Composite Battalion managed tofill 60 percent of the requisitions received from the Seventh U.S. Army, theFrench Army, CONAD, and Delta Base units. No serious shortage developed withinDelta Base medical units, fortunately, because they had arrived in France with a90-day supply. Stocks up to the authorized levels were finally on hand in theDelta Base Depot by mid-November. During the preceding 3 months, the 231st hadreceived 3,329 tons and issued 1,894.
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MAP 8.-Seventh U.S. Army depots in southern France, 16-29 August 1944.
At this point in the war in southern France, stress onconservation was growing. Inducements were offered for return of salvageto depots, and emphasis was placed on repair. For some time, CONAD was withoutmedical repair facilities of its own and was forced to farm out work to othermilitary units in its area, but many items had to be returned to the 231stMedical Composite Battalion in Marseille.
Packaging of supplies received by the 231st was generallyexcellent, and breakage was minimal. In November, blankets were scarce and theshortage of certain immunizing biologicals was a cause for concern. By January1945, the general stock picture was very good, with steady improvement in itembalance and with no items in critically short supply.
Efforts made by the depot to institute modernwarehouse and stock-handling practices were completely successful by March 1945,resulting in a com-
248
MAP 9.-Seventh U.S. Army depots, 5-19 September 1944.
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mendation from G-4, Headquarters, Delta Base Section, aswell as Army Service Forces representatives from Washington. During April, asubstantial increase in tonnage received brought considerable pressure to bearupon the storage section of the depot. A special pallet-building crew wasemployed to avoid a growing backpile of stock. From this experience, a uniqueinclined plane, skate conveyor, receiving platform was devised which permittedsimultaneous receipt, sorting, palletizing, and delivery of boxes to baylocations for immediate forklift stacking. Thus, sporadic receipts of largequantities of operating supplies no longer disrupted normal operations.48
Compared to previous base section operations, Delta BaseSection operations were extremely smooth. This was due primarily to theconfidence and experience with which the headquarters, staff section, units, andindividuals performed their tasks.
In December 1944, the depot opened a large pharmacy toprepare bulk quantities of 31 standard stock preparations-such as tincture ofgreen soap, cough mixtures, and ointments-for issue to small unit dispensariesof the area, thereby relieving overburdened hospital pharmacies of thisconsiderable workload. During the first 6 months of operation, the depotpharmacy issued more than 13,000 units of these preparations.49
NORTH APENNINES OPERATION
By the middle of August 1944, when the swift thrust intosouthern France was being launched, the Allied armies in Italy were slowed to ahalt on the south bank of the Arno River and along the Met?uro River on theAdriatic. Both the Fifth U.S. Army and the British Eighth Army had outrun theirsupplies.
When it became apparent toward the middle of November 1944that a hoped-for breakthrough into the Po Valley would not materialize and thatFifth U.S. Army operations for some time would be limited to patrol actions, theArmy dug in for the winter.50 The next few months were used to regroup,reequip, and bring the Armies up to strength for the final drive.
The 12th Medical Depot Company at this time attempted toadapt local civilian help to its operations to offset the reduction in strengthfrom 166 to 136 in the reorganization under the new TOE. This provedunsatisfactory because, with each move, a new group of civilian workers had tobe hired and trained. In late 1944, some relief was provided by the attachmentof a company of Italian service troops which remained with the depot as itmoved.
Another remarkable feature of TOE 8-667 was the inclusionof dental teams, which were described by one depot commander as so much"dead wood" because of their chronic absence on detached service. Afurther analysis of TOE showed that, after discounting these-and allowing forpersonnel as
48See footnote 46(1), p. 244.
49See footnote 46(1), p. 244.
50See footnote 36, p. 232.
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signed to the two storage and issue platoons operating remotefrom depot headquarters, to the optical team, to maintenance duty, and toHeadquarters overhead-only 19 enlisted men remained at the base element toprocure, store, and issue supplies and equipment, which usually amounted to anissue workload of 5 tons daily.
On this aspect of depot operations, the commanding officer ofthe 12th Medical Depot Company, Major Wilson, commented as follows:51
It is understood that the present table was inaugurated inorder to conserve manpower. It does just that, but to the detriment ofefficiency in an organization in which efficiency should be foremost.
It is neither practical nor possible to train civiliansspeaking only a foreign language to fill requisitions nor to properly warehousesupplies within such a short period of time as must be done in order for them tobe of value to a field medical depot. An organization of this type may mean amatter of life and death to a soldier in the front lines. Also, it is suggestedby War Department assignment that a Medical Depot Company be employed for each75,000 troops. In reality this depot is servicing three times that number.
Changes in Theater Supply Organization
During the lull in fighting in the winter of 1944-45,theater medical supply responsibilities were being assumed by the Mediterraneantheater surgeon's office. On 20 November 1944, a reorganization occurred inwhich the Communications Zone of the Mediterranean theater was dissolved and itsresponsibility in southern France was passed to SOLOC, which in turn became asubordinate command of the European theater. In this move, Colonel Shook,appointed SOLOC Surgeon, took most of his staff with him, thus causing a severepersonnel problem in the Mediterranean theater. This deficiency at one pointplaced in jeopardy the timely submission of the theater medical supplyrequisition to the United States and of the supply consumption report until somerelief was forthcoming.
Studies were undertaken to fix order times and shipping timesfor a more accurate theater requisitioning objective. Material status reportitems were found to have an order and shipping time of 45 days while other itemstook about 150 days. Further studies involving costs of transportation, storage,and issue of medical supplies were also undertaken.52
The role of the Peninsular Base Section as the intermediaryin the chain of supply between the Fifth U.S. Army and the Mediterranean theaterwas being circumvented during this winter period. On several occasions, theFifth U.S. Army went directly to the Mediterranean theater for supplies; in oneinstance, this resulted in a duplication when the 12th Medical Depot Companyrequisitioned on the depot at Leghorn at the same time the latter was acting ona cable request from the theater to satisfy the same requirement.
During the winter, the back-order system was improved withinFifth U.S. Army medical depot operations and with the Peninsular Base Section
51See footnotes 4(1), p. 205; and 38(1), p. 235.
52(1) Annual Report, Surgeon, MTOUSA, 1944. (2) See footnote 41(2), p. 240.
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depot. Previously, back-orders were held until many became invalid beforethey could be filled, and the volume became so great that all were ultimatelycanceled. After 60 days elapsed, back-orders were canceled to prevent suchaccumulations and, at the same time, to realize a more efficient reorderprocess.53
Changes in North African Operations
The Mediterranean Base Section transferred its headquarters from Oran toCasablanca in November 1944. In addition to its normal mission, the 56th StationHospital became a depot in the Atlantic Base Section on movement of the 60thMedical Base Depot Company to the Peninsular Base Section from Oran. The 56thStation Hospital received 100 tons of supplies from Oran, plus subsequentshipments diverted from their original Mediterranean Base Section destination.
Previously, as operations contracted in North Africa, about 1,000 tons ofmedical stock were transferred to the Mediterranean Base Section, from whichpoint they were redistributed to southern France, Italy, the Zone of Interior,and to Allied and cobelligerent forces. Eventually, however, the center ofgravity for supply in North Africa moved westward from Oran to Casablanca, owingto the concentration of U.S. forces, mostly Air Corps, in that area. Thus, by 10December 1944, medical supply operations in the Eastern, Mediterranean, andAtlantic Base Sections, once a substantial part of a vast and unprecedentedlogistical machine, were relegated to the 57th Station Hospital in the EasternBase Section area, to the 54th Station Hospital in the Mediterranean BaseSection area, and to the 56th Station Hospital in the Atlantic Base Section areaas an additional responsibility.54
Other Theater Changes
Peninsular Base Section headquarters moved from Naples to Leghorn on 25November 1944, where it joined its advance headquarters section. With this move,the base section medical supply officer and his staff were permanently locatedin Leghorn while medical supply activities in Naples became the part-timeresponsibility of one officer. Stocks in Leghorn and Naples were fairly equallydivided for a time, but the rapid increase at Leghorn was eventually matched bya similar decrease in Naples. A large portion of stocks on hand in Naples,however, was theater excess concentrated there as a result of shipments from theMediterranean and Island Base Sections. The task of balancing stocks betweenNaples and Leghorn presented some extremely knotty problems. Meanwhile, emphasiswas placed on the buildup of balanced stocks at Leghorn and avoiding theaccumulation of any excess there.
53See footnote 4(1), p. 205.
54(1) Annual Report, 56th Station Hospital, 1944. (2) Annual Report,60th Medical Base Depot Company, 1944. (3) Annual Report, 54th StationHospital, 1944. (4) Annual Report, 57th Station Hospital, 1944.
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Inspection of hospital supply activities in January 1945 bythe medical supply officer of the Peninsular Base Section revealed that, after 2years of virtually unrestricted activity, many glaring deficiencies existed instock accounting, storage, requisitioning, and housekeeping. Accordingly, aseries of medical supply conferences were held which served to revise thestandards and to improve operations.55
The two Northern Base Section depots operated on Corsicasince February 1944, by an advance section of the 7th Medical Depot Company,were consolidated in October 1944 into one depot operated by a detachment of the684th Quartermaster Base Depot Company. By the end of March 1945, and beforedeactivation of Headquarters, Northern Base Section, on 25 May, medical suppliesthere had been reduced to only 75 tons; by 6 April 1945, the depot had closedand personnel departed for Italy. Units remaining in Corsica were supplied bythe 40th Station Hospital, which carried a 120-day supply for 1,000 beds.56
In January 1945, a medical supply conference was held atFifth U.S. Army headquarters. This conference improved inventory reporting, andclarified requirements determination and maintenance of stock levels, inaddition to establishing policy for continuous review of stocks fordetermination and disposition of excesses.57
The increase in tonnage at the Leghorn depot, which hadaccelerated during November and December, abruptly halted in January 1945,prompted by an anticipated German offensive which had the port of Leghorn as itsobjective. Previously scheduled shipments were diverted to Naples and, inanticipation of attack, redistribution of large quantities of stock to the 12thMedical Depot Company at Florence was planned. The Fifth U.S. Army supply levelwas increased from 10 to 20 days, with tonnages jumping from 150 to 205 tons.However, plans and preparations were never brought into action because theGerman offensive did not materialize. Normal operations were resumed at Leghorn,and during February and March 1945, tonnage rose to almost 4,500 tons.58
Meanwhile, the 4th Medical Depot Company was redesignated andreorganized as the 232d Medical Composite Battalion. The 72d Base Depot Companyassisted it in the storage and issue of supplies in the Naples area, while the73d Medical Base Depot Company operated the Leghorn depot from October throughDecember 1944.
The 232d was again reorganized into a medical servicebattalion of the same number, which improved its authorized strength andmaintenance ele-
55Hansen, William L.: [Peninsular] Base Section MedicalSupply Activities, 10 Aug. 1945. [Official record.]
56Annual Report, Northern Base Section. 1944 and 1945.
57Report of Supply Conference at Headquarters, Fifth U.S. Army, 2-3 January 1945, dated 4 Jan. 1945.
58See footnote 55, above.
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ment. The 60th and 80th Medical Base Depot Companies, and the684th Quartermaster Base Depot Company, all attached or assigned to thebattalion, successively operated the depot at Leghorn which served seven stationhospitals, five general hospitals, the 12th Medical Depot Company, various portbattalions, Quartermaster detachments, Air Force units, and a variety of otherelements in the area.
The Leghorn depot became the main medical supply point forthe theater during February 1945, and maintained theater reserves for theNorthern and Mediterranean Base Sections, and the Adriatic Depot. The fifthechelon maintenance shop, spare parts, stock of teeth, and optical repair shophad been previously transferred from Naples to Leghorn during January.59
PO VALLEY CAMPAIGN
Preparations for the final drive into the Po Valley werethorough and extensive. The Fifth U.S. Army was brought to full strength--almost270,000 on 1 April 1945, as compared to the 170,000, 6 months earlier. However,resources available to the Fifth U.S. Army Surgeon were increased by only one400-bed evacuation hospital over the inadequate number of facilities for thelesser strength supported in the North Apennines Campaign. Additional medicalbattalions, ambulance companies, or supply units were not added. Hospital bedcapacity was less than enough to keep pace with the increase in troop strength.Close general hospital support of the Army medical facilities was necessary toabsorb the overflow.60
Moving from their respective locations in Filigare and Luccaas the campaign advanced, the two forward storage and issue platoons of the 12thMedical Depot Company established depots at Porretta and Bologna. Each leftbehind a small detachment in its former location to operate dumps whichsupported units remaining in the vicinity.
By 30 April 1945, the 2d Storage and Issue Platoon hadprogressed to Verona by way of Mirandola, and shortly thereafter, the depotheadquarters, maintenance section, and 1st Storage Issue Platoon moved fromFlorence to Modena, while the 3d Storage and Issue Platoon remained at Bologna(map 10). The headquarters section had barely completed setting up whenhostilities in Italy ceased on 2 May 1945.61
During the final offensive, heavy casualties as well asnonavailability of trucks and ambulances and subsequent delays caused a greatdeal of confusion. The confusion was in no way lessened by the fact that medicalunits, following on the heels of the retreating enemy, often found themselvesoperating behind the German lines.
59See footnote 42(2), p. 242.
60Annual Report, Surgeon, Fifth U.S. Army, 1945.
61Monograph, Lt. Col. George P. Wilson, MSC, dated 13Aug. 1945, subject: Fifth Army Medical Depot Activities.
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MAP 10.-Medical supply depots in northern Italy, 15October1944-1 May 1945.
SOME SUPPLY ACTIVITIES IN REVIEW
Depot Operations
During the Italian campaign, the 12th Medical Depot Companyperformed herculean tasks of operation and movement (fig. 63). It received atotal of 2,524 tons of supplies and issued 2,402 tons. Nonrepairable and surplusequipment and supplies were moved to the rear. New organizations entering combatfor the first time drew heavily on expendable supplies until they
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learned through experience that it was neither wise norexpedient to be burdened with excessive quantities.62
Changes in depot locations were necessarily governed by changes in the tactical situation. The pattern of depot movement normally put an advance detail at the new location to make preparations for receiving the balance of the depot. When time was not of the essence, the issue room and stock ac-
62See footnote 61, p. 253.
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counting section were the last to move. Usually convoys oforiginal-package stock were moved first. This gave the issue section time inwhich to pack loose stock. To facilitate these moves, men of the issue sectionpremarked cases for the various classes with the medical catalog class number toidentify the contents, thus permitting requisitions to be filled immediatelyupon arrival.
In effecting a move, experience proved that one convoy a daywas the most practical as it permitted unloading at the new location before thenext convoy arrived, and permitted men at the old location to strike tentagewhile preparing the next convoy. Fortunately, all moves were possible indaylight which helped to avoid undue confusion.63
Medical Maintenance
During the first 30 days of operations in North Africa, theneed for a medical maintenance program was quite evident (fig. 64). Almost allfield
63See footnote 61, p. 253.
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X-ray equipment, which was irreplaceable, arrived with brokenleaded glass screens. Even such minor items as wicks in the kerosenerefrigerators burned out, and glass tubing on steam sterilizers and plasticknobs on the sterilizers arrived broken. With no maintenance program, even thesimplest parts were not available for replacement. It is true that manyreplacement parts were in the medical supply catalog, but there was only a tokennumber, and they were primarily of a type such as otoscope and ophthalmoscopelight bulbs normally consumed in the use of the basic item.
The ingenuity of members of various medical units wasrelied upon to reconcile numerous maintenance problems. Many "RubeGoldberg" devices and modifications worked extremely well and were sopractical that eventually a theater program was established wherein all suchcreations and modifications were reduced to drawings, gathered together,published, and distributed within the theater for the benefit of all units (fig.65 A and B).
The parts problem gathered such momentum that, within 60 daysfrom D-day, a recommendation was forwarded from the Medical Section,Mediterranean Base Section, that, as an interim measure, manufacturers berequired to pack with each item they supplied, a 6-month supply of thosecomponent parts which they considered necessary for frequent replacement. Thiswas never fully implemented, except for the Coleman stove. Parts provisioning ofthis type later became a feature in the Medical Department's maintenanceprogram.
The first requisition prepared in the Mediterranean BaseSection included many nonstandard items, over half of which were uncatalogedrepair parts. In the absence of necessary catalogs and technical skills,identification of the wide variety of parts for the numerous manufacturers andtypes of equipment in use was, in most instances, nothing more than guesswork.Considerable effort was later expended over a 6-month period by the MedicalSection, Headquarters, SOS, to establish a firmer basis of requirements, but thesize and complexity of the task severely limited any broad approach to thesubject. Meanwhile, item-for-item exchange and cannibalization caused largequantities of unserviceable items to accumulate in depots, and the irreducibleminimum resulting from cannibalization was frequently reached. It was in thisclimate that a semblance of medical maintenance activity developed in medicaldepots from a part-time operation of expediency into activities in base depotswhich could be called shops.
With the capitulation of Italian and German forces in NorthAfrica, maintenance shop activity was accelerated. Many skilled and eagerelectricians, metal workers, and craftsmen were found among the prisoners. Whenthe invasion of southern France was launched, this type of augmented maintenanceshop activity in base depots was at the peak of its development. The medicaldepot at Marseille, operated by the 231st Medical Composite Battalion, boasted avery active and capable shop supervised by a maintenance trained officer. This,however, was the exception rather than the rule.
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259
In spite of these developments, maintenance of medicalequipment in general and of spare parts in particular remained a painful problemthroughout the theater's active period.64
Local Procurement
Early in the Tunisia Campaign, it was directed that theprocurement of supplies, services, and facilities interfere as little aspossible with the local economic situation.
Practically all drugs and chemicals which had been importedinto North Africa before the war began had been consumed at the time of theAllied invasion. However, small amounts of alcohol and mercury were found andsubsequently procured for use of U.S. forces.
An important service was performed by a small metal-platingshop which had sufficient stocks of basic materials to produce a plated finishsuperior to the poorly plated knives, forks, and spoons of U.S. issue. A programwas instituted wherein all medical units in the Oran area turned inunserviceable utensils for an item-for-item exchange at the depot. This waslater expanded to some surgical instruments when total production was increasedto about 300 pieces per week. What promised to become a thorny problem waspartially solved by this unexpectedly available local service.
In all of the Mediterranean campaigns, the possibilities oflocal procurement were examined and exploited whenever possible. In Sicily, allthat could be located were 7? pairs of spectacle lenses and some lenssurface-grinding equipment. This, of course, had no practical application to theU.S. optical activities. However, 20,000 liters of 95 percent proof ethylalcohol at 10 cents a liter was found as well as usable quantities ofhydrochloric, sulfuric, and picric acids. Also in Sicily, local laboratoryservices were contracted for during February 1944, with an expenditure totaling$2,796.35.
A firm in Rome was located, capable of producing asatisfactory artificial eye for $2.50, which was one-third the prevailing pricefor this item in the United States. Artificial eyes were thus procured at a rateof 24 per week. A source of medicinal oxygen was also located in Italy, and some350,000 gallons were procured.65
64(1) Semiannual Report, 231st Medical CompositeBattalion, 1 January-30 June 1945. (2) See footnote 52(1), p. 250.
65(1) Administrative Memorandum No. 7, Allied ForceHeadquarters, 15 Oct. 1942. (2) See footnote 52(1), p. 250. (3) Letter,Commanding Officer, 6th General Hospital, to Surgeon, Peninsular Base Section, 1 Aug. 1944, subject: Eye Prostheses. (4) Letter, 1st Lt. PeterF. Heinrich, SnC, 7th Medical Supply Depot, to Surgeon, SOS, NATOUSA, 24 Oct.1943, subject: Report of Findings Relative to Purchase of Optical Supplies inPalermo, Sicily. (5) Letter, Commanding Officer, Island Base Section and 10thPort, to Commanding General, SOS, NATOUSA, 5 Mar. 1944, subject: Monthly Reportof Local Purchases for February 1944. (6) Letter, Commanding Officer, IslandBase Section, to Commanding General, SOS, NATOUSA, 27 Oct. 1943, subject:Local Purchases.
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SUPPORT OF CIVILIAN POPULATIONS
Role of Allied Military Government
The management and support by Allied Forces of civilians inoccupied areas of the Mediterranean theater was initially the task of AMGOT(Allied Military Government of Occupied Territory). Initial medical supplyplanning took place in preparation for the Sicily Campaign when the Britishplanning unit provided for a director of public health, responsible for makingavailable drugs, dressings, pharmacies, and hospitals.66
Before this, the use of U.S. medical supplies to treatcivilians was accomplished for either political or other purposes which had animmediate effect on the capability of the United States to prosecute the war. InOran, for example, French civilian health authorities established clinics forthe treatment of venereal diseases. These clinics were furnished U.S. medicalsupply support.
Supply requirements for AMGOT necessarily took lower prioritythan those for purely military purposes. Beginning with the Sicilian campaign,however, AMGOT supplies were allotted space which was included in the task forcequotas. Because the Combined Chiefs of Staff had not yet approved the items tobe made available to AMGOT, U.S. medical supplies for civilian purposes inSicily were limited to what could be spared by combat and occupation forces.
In planning for Sicily, AMGOT, in the British plan, wasresponsible for estimating and providing medical stores for the civilianpopulation. Arrangements were to be made to issue these supplies through publichealth centers, hospitals, drugstores, or direct issue as necessary. Units weremade up of biological units, basic medical units, and Engineer and QuartermasterCorps sanitary supplies designed for specific purposes.
The Italian medical depot captured in Caltanissetta, Sicily,used as a U.S. Army medical depot and later turned over to AMGOT, was thefirst supplying depot to AMGOT regions I (Sicily) and II (toe-and-heelprovinces of Italy). Later, AFHQ arranged to stockpile Civil AffairsDivision units in regions I and II with a buildup covering 9 months beginningSeptember 1943. Over 1,100 Civil Affairs Division units of various types werethe estimated requirements to service the population of 8,862,000 in regions Iand II for 90 days (fig. 66).
Responsibility for the distribution and storage of civilianmedical supplies was originally based on a coordinated effort between theMedical Section, NATOUSA, and the Military Government Section, AFHQ. Thisresponsibility later was given entirely to the Medical Section, NATOUSA, to
66For a detailed study of civil affairs and publichealth in Italy, see Medical Department, U.S. Army. Preventive Medicine in WorldWar II. Volume VIII. Civil Affairs and Military Government. PublicHealth Activities. [In preparation.]
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improve control. Within the medical section, thisresponsibility fell to the medical supply officer.67
Medical Supply Branch, AMGOT
In November 1943, a medical supply branch was formallyincorporated into the newly reorganized Public Health Subcommission of theAllied Control Commission, AMGOT, which ultimately relieved the 15th Army Groupof its civilian medical supply functions. Col. Martin E. Griffin, MC, Chief,Medical Supply Depots, Allied Control Commission, was appointed its chiefmedical supply officer on 1 January 1944.68
Region III military government headquarters set up a centralmedical supply depot in a Red Cross warehouse in Naples in November 1943, and inJanuary 1944, the Allied Control Commission took it over. Supplies from theUnited Kingdom, United States, or North Africa were stored and distributed toall regions of Italy. The NATOUSA policy for distributing supplies providedthat, except for an initial 30-day period, medical supplies should not be issuedautomatically on a Civil Affairs Division unit basis to civilians in a conqueredarea. Supplies for the initial 30-day period consisted of a balanced stock oflifesaving supplies, warehoused in strategic supply areas, and issued onrequisition to meet actual relief needs. These supplies could be replaced fromtheater stocks as required. After the initial period, medical supplies furnishedto civilians in an occupied country were either medical supplies forrestoration of health, or lifesaving supplies. Supplies were thus requisitionedby regional public health officers on the medical depot by line item rather thanby Civil Affairs Division units.
Augmented by additional personnel, the central medical supplydepot operated, under detailed accounting procedures, a price list, togetherwith procurement, storage, and issue instructions. Supplies were received fromNorth Africa, the United States, and the United Kingdom, and distributed to thewarehouses established in each region under the supervision of the regionalpublic health officer. All supplies ceased to be the property of the AlliedControl Commission when they were sold and shipped to the Italian agency, MediciProvenciali, established to distribute medical supplies to the population ofeach province.69
In addition to computing requirements, requisitioning, andaccounting for supplies, together with their sale, distribution, andcontrol, regional public health officers in Italy also assisted reputablemanufacturers in resuming production of essential drugs and biologicals. Freeissues from Italian warehouses were permitted only in emergencies. Fair pricesto hospitals and
67See footnote 4(1), p. 240.
68See footnote 4(1), p. 240.
69(1) See footnote 4(1), p. 240. (2) Memorandum, Surgeon. NATOUSA, to Military Government Section, AFHQ, 17 Dec. 1943, subject:Requirements of Medical Supplies for AMG.
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clinics, doctors and midwives, pharmacies and other retailchannels were established, controlled, and issued in that priority.70
Growth of Medical Supply Support
By March 1944, the Naples depot possessed completefacilities. Regions I to VI, inclusive, had supply depots in operation and asubdepot was established in Bari concurrent with the move of region IIheadquarters to that city. Except for a few items which had been covered byspecial requisitions, there were adequate stocks of medical supplies in occupiedItaly for civilian medical care.
From March to July 1944, the medical supply branch of thecontrol commission operated depots at Reggio, Bari, and Rome for variableperiods. Personnel was shifted from depot to depot, as the occasion demanded, toset up distribution in new areas. With the advent of cobelligerent statusaccorded the Italian Government, distribution of medical supplies in region IIwas turned over to Italian civilian organizations, such as wholesale drughouses. This arrangement proved highly satisfactory and helped to overcome theexisting problem of shortages of military personnel.
The general policy in administering civilian medical supplysupport in occupied areas of the Mediterranean theater, as developed fromexperience by the Medical Supply Branch, provided that items and quantities mustbe the minimums essential for the area concerned, and luxury items were notto be supplied. Medical supplies and equipment in an area at the time ofoccupation were to be preserved with the cooperation of combat commanders. Drugsfor the prevention and cure of venereal diseases and preventive biologicals forother communicable diseases were to be emphasized, and public health officerswould be familiarized with the types of medical items available for the care ofcivilian populations. The supply organization, as well as procedures for supply,procurement, accounting, and control, was to be established as early as possiblewith maximum use of existing normal distribution channels within the civiliancommunity. Finally, it was emphasized that issues would be on an itembasis rather than a Civil Affairs Division unit basis.71
Use of Local Resources
Civilian supplies requisitioned for the period July toDecember 1944 did not arrive in the theater as scheduled, chiefly because oftransportation problems. Insufficient transportation also aggravated the supplyof northern regions from the Naples depot. However, during this period, as moreand more local supplies were uncovered, it appeared that the theaterstockpile would suffice for a much longer period than originally anticipated.
70See footnote 4(1), p. 240.
71See footnote 4(1), p. 240.
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In 1944, the G-5 section was established in AFHQ tocarry out the Supreme Allied Commander's responsibilities in civil affairs.Ultimately, the section assumed control of civilian supplies in the theater, andthe central Civilian Medical Depot, Mediterranean theater, was established inlieu of the Central Medical Depot, and dealt directly with AFHQ.
During 25-28 September 1944, approximately 600 tons ofsupplies were unloaded at Naples, and many shortages of long standing werethereby relieved. On 1 November 1944, responsibility for distributing medicalsupplies in northern Italy, except Army areas under AMGOT control, passed to theItalian Government.
Beginning with the end of hostilities in Italy on 2 May 1945,AFHQ directed that military responsibility for civilian medical supplies inItaly was to be terminated as rapidly as possible. Effective 15 August 1945, theItalian Government accepted all shipments of medical supplies at boatside andassumed responsibility for their distribution throughout Italy.72
REDEPLOYMENT
In the late spring of 1944, plans were being developed bySOS, NATOUSA, for the redeployment of U.S. troops and supplies when hostilitiesceased. As a corollary, the Atlantic and Eastern Base Sections closed inNovember 1944, and the Mediterranean Base Section, once the supply giant of thetheater, was reduced to a small role in North Africa. All medical materielcoming into the theater was received at either Leghorn or Naples, with thePeninsular Base Section having the responsibility for intrabase distribution.Eventually, the bulk of the theater reserves was also transferred to the latterbase section, which assumed all medical supply functions of the Mediterraneantheater on 1 October 1945. A month later, the Medical Section of theMediterranean theater was also discontinued, leaving the Peninsular Base Sectionresponsible for medical support of all U.S. forces remaining in the theater.73
72(1) See footnote 4(1), p. 240. (2) Letter, Surgeon,NATOUSA, to Col. George M. Powell, MC, SGO, 30 Dec. 1944. (3) Letter, Col. M. E.Griffin, MC, to Lt. Col. Ryle A. Radke, MC, Surgeon's Office, NATOUSA,14 Oct. 1944.
73Final Report, Medical Supply Officer, Office of theSurgeon, MTOUSA, 30 Sept. 1945.
